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Security and International
Relations in Central Africa
A Practitioner’s Perspective
a r m e l di rou
Security and International Relations in Central Africa
Armel Dirou
Security
and International
Relations in Central
Africa
A Practitioner’s Perspective
Armel Dirou
London, UK
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
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Disclaimer
The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the French Ministry for the Armed
Forces.
For safety reasons French military rules require that, in an account,
only Generals and Battle Group commanding officers be mentioned by
surname. All others are mentioned by their rank and first name.
To the legionnaires and mountain troopers whom I had the honour of
commanding and who deserve the highest praise for their amazing cultural
sensitivity, proactivity, reactivity, self-control, tenacity and resolve. All were
superb fighting soldiers and also peacemakers. They belonged to the 2nd
Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, the 1st Foreign Legion Engineer
Regiment, the 7th Mountain Infantry Battalion, the 93rd Mountain
Artillery Regiment and to my own regiment, the 4th Mountain Cavalry
Regiment.
Foreword
I first met Colonel Armel Dirou when I was the UK Field Army
Commander and he was serving as the Military Assistant to General
Arnaud Sainte-Claire Deville, then Commandant des Forces Terrestres.
General Arnaud and I were good friends and we took a Command-led
approach to improving the cooperation and integration between French
and UK Forces. We made good progress and Armel Dirou did much of
the groundwork to bring our ideas to fruition. I admired Armel then
for his wisdom, pragmatism, zest for life and firm belief in the Entente
Cordiale. And I admire him now, both for his continuing work in London
to bring France and the UK closer together militarily and for the creative
employment of intellectual and emotional energy he has demonstrated
in writing this book. I am therefore honoured to provide an introduc-
tion to Security and International Relations in Central Africa covering
the valiant exploits of the Battlegroup de Boissieu in the Central African
Republic in 2014.
This is a book for those who care deeply about the profession of
arms and want to understand the complexities of conflict in the fledging
democracies of the world. Our interventions have not delivered quick
victories given the intractable nature of the problems faced. Nor will they,
but this should not stop us from trying to be far smarter in developing
new approaches to achieve satisfactory outcomes at acceptable cost. If
we are to improve, then we need to learn. It would be too easy to brush
over the myriad challenges facing a commander and his battlegroup in the
ix
x FOREWORD
Central African Republic (CAR). Armel does not. He writes (“warts and
all”) with honesty, insight and pride in those he commanded and their
achievements. As a result, we learn more, to the advantage of women and
men who face similar deployments, and the education of those who order
and direct such operations.
Anyone who has fought in Afghanistan, Iraq or Mali will recognise
the challenges facing the Legionnaires and Mountain Troopers of Battle-
group de Boissieu as they worked to bring stability and security to vast
areas of ungoverned and under-governed space in the Central African
Republic (CAR). These are the so-called Forever Wars, operating (and
often fighting) in support of weak, sovereign governments to establish
peace, the rule of law and democracy. To work at the end of extended
(and sometimes overextended) supply-lines with difficult communications
and incomplete intelligence is never straightforward; nor is maintaining
continuity of purpose with the troops that served before or come after
you, or securing the support and trust of the people: “speaking not
only to their minds, but also their hearts”. These challenges are then
compounded by time, space and distance, when the components of the
force are dispersed to provide presence across a large geographic area.
Under these conditions, it takes a significant effort to concentrate force.
And all while the warlords, armed groups, criminal gangs and corrupt offi-
cials who profit from chaos and disorder and fear stability work to counter
progress by employing all the tools, both conventional and asymmetric,
available to them. And yet, the Battlegroup de Boissieuwas ultimately
successful, creating the security conditions before and after the Battle of
Batangafo to allow the deployment of the United Nations (UN).
Progress was hard won. It took the combined efforts of extremely well
trained, experienced commanders who were prepared to make difficult
decisions on limited information, and resolute, tough, highly profes-
sional, well-equipped soldiers—in this case Legionnaires and Mountain
Troopers, supported by bold Airforce and Army pilots whose support
is not just desirable, but often essential. You see here the value of the
French combat culture. Not just iron hearts, but the power of funda-
mental good, the worth of responsibility and the strength of example.
Success demanded absolute commitment to the Mission and persever-
ance to overcome difficulties. And we learn (again) that while everything
in war is theoretically simple, even the simplest thing was difficult in the
CAR.
FOREWORD xi
We are also reminded that the ability to continue learning marks leaders
apart, with the best having a unquenchable thirst for knowledge. Towards
the end of the book, Armel dissects “prudence and determination”, a
term that came to define his time in CAR. His analysis is well-judged
with the ideas offering more than enough material for a second book,
but for now I commend “Security and International Relations in Central
Africa” to you.
xiii
xiv PREFACE
1 Général de Boissieu (c.r.), Pour combattre avec de Gaulle, Plon, Paris, 1981, back page.
Translation in English is mine, and unless otherwise stated, all the following translations
from French are on my own.
Acknowledgements
Beyond the acknowledgements that I have for all the soldiers who served
in our Battlegroup, Security and International Relations in Central
Africa would have been harder to achieve without the help of many
people. I am therefore indebted to those whose support and contribu-
tion were invaluable in writing this book, and I would like to express to
them my deepest gratitude. I have to mention the incredible dedication of
Jon Cresswell who spent many hours polishing my English to transform
my account into something publishable. In addition to his daily work as a
colonel in the British Army, Jon happily undertook this additional burden
because he recognised that our story should be told.
I must also thank Professor David Ellery who nominated me to be
a member of University College at Durham University. The starting
point for this book is a series of lectures that I started to give at the
Durham Global Security Institute. I would also like to extend my thanks
to Professor Rob Johnson, with whom long discussions have allowed me
to develop my thinking on command and decision-making processes in
combat.
My thanks would not be complete if I did not include all those
who patiently reread my drafts and enlightened me with their questions,
remarks and demands for clarification. I am thinking in particular of Sir
Tom Phillips KCMG, former diplomat and former commandant of the
Royal College of Defence Studies; the Right Honourable Tom Tugendhat
MBE VR, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee; Jean-Pierre
xv
xvi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Lee, a partner with global law firm Mayer Brown LLP; Dr. Michael
Shurkin, Senior Political Scientist at RAND; Dr. Guillaume Lasconjarias;
the Reverend John Ellis QHC, Chaplain in Chief of the Royal Air Force;
Professor Beatrice Heuser, Chair of International Relations at Glasgow
University, and Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE, former Chief of the Secret
Intelligence Service, whose support was much valued and appreciated.
Acknowledgement is due to the Durham University online publications
as well in which some passages first appeared.
Finally, I would like to conclude with a personal note. I owe a
great debt to several officers from whom I received so much. Some
were my instructors at the Military Academy of Saint Cyr, others were
commanding officers or chiefs of operations of my regiment. Their
highest level of demand has always guided me in the accomplishment
of my missions and tasks. And finally, I would like to single out my Force
Commander during the time discussed in the following pages, General
Eric Bellot des Minières, who honoured me by giving me his full trust
and a huge room for initiative in the field.
As the book goes to press, I am saddened to learn of the death in action
of Sergeant Maxime Blasco in Mali. A magnificent soldier, he experienced
combat for the first time during the combat of M’Bali and then during
the battle of Batangafo; he was recognised for his heroic actions there,
even though he was at that time a Private soldier. This book is, therefore,
a small part of his own great story. I cherish his memory and pay my
heartfelt tribute to his wife and their son.
Contents
Epilogue 95
Afterthoughts 99
Conclusion 125
Annexes 129
Sources 133
Index 137
xvii
About the Author
xix
Abbreviations
xxi
xxii ABBREVIATIONS
Situated between Cameroon to the west, Chad to the north, Sudan to the
east, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville to the
south, the Central African Republic is landlocked in the heart of Central
Africa. The country is divided into two main areas, “the North and the
Sudano-Sahelian region on the one hand, and the central and southern
regions on the other”.1 Due to its geographical location, “the Ubangi-
Chari area appears very different from the rest of the continent because of
this geographical isolation. It is clearly socially and culturally behind other
African countries where famous kingdoms and empires flourish: Téké in
Congo, Bamoun in Cameroon, Menelik in Ethiopia, Toro in Uganda,
Matabele in Zimbabwe, Zulu in South Africa, Songhai, Mandingo and
Mali in West Africa! Perhaps to the credit of the Ubangi-Chari, one might
note that almost all of these countries have an opening to the sea, which
has certainly [supported] trade and facilitated progress”.2
The whole of Central Africa, including today’s Central African
Republic, has long been considered by Europeans as a land untouched
Map of Africa
CHAPTER 2
Mission Preparation
The clouds were grey and low, visibility was poor and down to about
four hundred metres. The rain had been falling for some hours now and
had penetrated through our Goretex and combat kit as the wind blew
across the Champagne countryside. The mud stuck to everything and
slowed down all movement. I went from point to point to meet the exer-
cising troops as they perfected their drills. Snipers observed what they
could in the face of the weather from their concealed positions, wearing
now soaking ghillie suits. I stopped and crawled in beside them to look
through the sights to see the target area; there was not much to see.
Continuing my inspection I joined the anti-tank platoon equipped with
a missile that I knew well. The soldiers were in a waterlogged ditch. I
jumped in and asked the detachment commander how he had briefed
his team before looking through the optics myself to see if I could pick
out the targets. The weather was pretty awful and made the surveillance
and observation difficult… Next I went to the mortars. Here the section
commander gave me an update on his equipment and explained his role
in providing short-range fire support with the 81 mm mortar. He talked
me through his drills which I asked him to repeat as I had very little expe-
rience of deploying mortars and I could tell from his expression that my
apparent lack of understanding came as a surprise. Keen to both convince
and reassure me, he added that he was qualified and experienced on his
equipment. I reassured him of my confidence in him and his team, and
indeed the effectiveness of their supporting fire was vital if the battle-
group as a whole was to perform at its best. It was particularly important
to establish a bond with these infantrymen because they belonged to the
7th Mountain Infantry Battalion and their company had been attached
to my Regiment for our forthcoming overseas tour in Africa. I needed to
invest in the time to integrate them into the Battlegroup and understand
the capabilities they brought with them.
In March 2014 my Battlegroup was preparing to deploy to N’Djamena
in Chad on Operation Sparrowhawk. The Battlegroup would comprise
an infantry company, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, an engi-
neer troop, a Joint Terminal Attack Controller team known as JTACs,
and a Logistic Support squadron. After this period of internal training,
the unit would be exercised and evaluated by the Army’s main tactical
combat centre at Mailly-le-Camp. There, for the first few days, we fitted
simulation kit and blue force tracker systems to our vehicles, weapon
systems and personal equipment so that every element of the Battlegroup
was represented and could be tracked and assessed by Exercise Control.
The operational evaluation would begin on Sunday afternoon and the
Battlegroup would have four days and nights in which to reach the high
standard I wanted them to achieve. Through their ingenuity, skills and
determination together with well applied and rigorous drills, the infantry
company was graded 4/5 and the armoured squadron 5/5. Given that
no armoured squadron had achieved this over the last two years and none
were to do so for the following two years, this was a significant result
which demonstrated the superb standard set by the Squadron Leader,
Captain Vincent, who was determined to make his squadron the reference
for others to match. He had been seriously wounded in Afghanistan a few
years earlier and had not since returned to lead a combat unit. Under his
command, the squadron was the very best that it could be. His leader-
ship was a mixture of high standard, compassion and personal example.
His mountain cavalry troopers held him in high regard and would follow
him anywhere, making the squadron a model of professional soldiers
empowered by mutual trust. While not the most talkative officer under
my command, he was a marvellous tactician and his self-discipline was
outstanding. I made no secret of my incredible good fortune to have such
professional officers, notably the squadron commanders, warrant officers
and NCOs under my command. Those who deployed overseas with other
battlegroups also performed superbly and delivered remarkable results.
2 MISSION PREPARATION 9
infantry heavy option which would naturally come under the command of
Captain François-Xavier. However, until I had confirmation from Bangui
I preferred not to say anything to my subordinate commanders to avoid
disappointment.
Ten days before departure, Colonel Yann confirmed that I would
deploy with my CP, logistic squadron and a mixed squadron group of
two armoured troops and two infantry platoons. Based on my assess-
ment and our previous discussion, I told him that I would deploy with
Captain Vincent and that Captain Frnaçois-Xavier would command the
other company group in Chad. He understood my logic and agreed.
Naturally, Captain François-Xavier was disappointed and he requested an
interview with me to express his disagreement with my decision. I under-
stood his point of view and was perfectly happy to discuss the issue.
Captain François-Xavier left Varces, near Grenoble, and drove through
the mountains to see me. I explained my decision and he presented his
view. I accepted that he was naturally disappointed, but his duty was now
to deploy as ordered and he returned to Varces. Now that the situation
was cleared up we could finalise the administrative details.
The deployment was on track and everyone knew what was required.
Nonetheless, ten days were long enough to bring some unexpected
surprises. On the eve of the deployment, I received a call from Colonel
Yann. He was very embarrassed and said that I had to change over the two
subunit commanders following direction from the Brigade Commander
in Mali. He added that this was non-negotiable. In response I questioned
whether it was appropriate to make such a change one day before the
start of the operation because it was not just the change of one name
but a subunit command team, and their respective freight was already in
transit. Colonel Yann terminated the conversation abruptly: whatever his
opinion he felt he had to support the decision of the Brigade Commander.
Nevertheless, I considered that this decision should have sat with me and
my assessment of my tactical mission, as the Battlegroup commander. It
was hard to resist the temptation of disobeying, but after calming down I
called Vincent to my office and told him that I was now required to send
him to Chad and would deploy to CAR with Captain François-Xavier. I
gave him some of the background for this last-minute change and, for the
first time in my career, I indicated that I did not agree with the order I
had received. In spite of his immense disappointment, he acknowledged
the order and went to brief his team and re-organise his troops as best as
he could at this late stage. The next day, he oversaw the departure of the
2 MISSION PREPARATION 13
members of the two troops of his squadron that had been preparing to
deploy to CAR with great dignity and discipline. I had no doubt that he
would go on to complete an excellent tour of duty in Chad. For me,
the key was the success of the operation and it was not the time for
recrimination so I engaged with Captain François-Xavier as if nothing
had happened.
The landing at Bangui was an eye-opener; as we approached there
were large numbers of people on the airstrip, with armed troops posi-
tioned along the runway to allow the aircraft to reach its unloading
point. Daylight was fading and it was dark by the time we actually left
the aircraft. The atmosphere was heavy, humid with a pungent smell of
wood burning fires filling the air. We boarded trucks to reach the French
camp where we were issued our helmets, body armour and the insignia
of Task Force Sangaris. Once the administrative formalities were over we
settled in for our first night in Central Africa. Over the next two days,
we collected our freight, ammunition and prepared our weapons. I took
advantage of this time in the capital to visit the various staff branch heads
in the headquarters including the chief of staff who was a good friend
from St Cyr. He was able to give me a full update on the Task Force’s
current and future operations. He also informed me of the key elements
for the theatre together with the political and tactical situation in the
country and I was able to merge this with my pre-deployment reading-in
about the region. The situation for each of the three Battlegroups was
very different. The unit based in Bangui controlled the capital and also
held a few locations outside of the city. Its main focus was the protec-
tion of centres of government and the headquarters. The unit located in
Bambari was in a particularly uncomfortable situation where its ability
to operate was extremely complicated. The commander’s freedom of
action was completely restricted. The north western unit, based in Bouar,
benefitted from an environment more conducive to taking the initiative
and manoeuvring. This tactical freedom offered much greater latitude
to conduct operations. Following various briefings from the Intelligence,
Logistics and Civil Affairs desks, I went to see Future Plans, known as G5
to find out how the next steps were expected to unfold. It was important
for me to understand how the Task Force envisaged the transition from
Stabilisation to Normalisation. I was also keen to ascertain the likelihood
of my unit being able to return to Chad to re-group at the end of the
mission. The staff were sceptical at best, even pessimistic. Finally, I went
to meet the Task Force commander, Brigadier General Soriano. We had
14 A. DIROU
known each other previously in the Plans Branch of the General Staff in
Paris. He welcomed me warmly and provided a very positive view of the
achievements made by my predecessor, whom I would meet up with a
few hours later.
It was time to leave Bangui and proceed to Bouar and our convoy
departed early the following morning. The distance was around 460 km.
The road was in a poor state with potholes everywhere and those travel-
ling in the rear of the trucks were thrown all over the place. Four hours
later we arrived at Bossembélé where I deployed two platoons. The village
was a vital access point to the northern part of our future area of responsi-
bility and control of this crossroads guaranteed our freedom of manoeuvre
between the capital and to the north and west. After a short stop, we
continued our journey through the villages of Yaloké and Bossentélé.
The long hours of sitting on the steel benches wearing our body armour
numbed our bodies; however, the worst part of the journey was to come
after the village of Baoro. Here the metalled road ended and huge ruts
punished the vehicles and their passengers. Fortunately, the weather was
good so at least the track was dry and navigable. The rain would have
made it a very different story. This last section of the route took us four
hours and finally we arrived at our destination, the town of Bouar.
We received a warm welcome from the in-place Battlegroup which was
code-named Dragoon, and I met the commanding officer who was a
very good friend. We had known each other during our days together
in a military school prior to going to St Cyr. Colonel Damien Wallaert
had done an outstanding job leading his battalion and his men had seen
action in which they had acquitted themselves well. On 5 May 2014,
three weeks prior to our arrival, two infantry platoons had been carrying
out a reconnaissance mission in the north of the country when it came
up against a mobile column of some forty fighters as they approached
the village of Boguila. The French troops attempted to intercept them
and they opened fire and deployed in an attempt to overrun the French
company in the village. The fighting was hard with, on one side, a force
armed with Kalashnikovs, RPG 7 rocket launchers and 14.5 mm heavy
machine guns and, on the French side, heavy infantry weapons, Eryx
anti-tanks missiles and 81 mm mortars. In the end, the French called
for Close Air Support and a Mirage 2000 out of N’Djamena dropped a
GBU-12 bomb. The fighting stopped at nightfall and did not resume the
following day. No detailed battle damage assessment was possible, but it
was clear that the adversary had sustained losses. We knew before arriving
2 MISSION PREPARATION 15
Chad
150km MARKOUNDA
13H00 BATANGAFO
PAOUA 190 km
12H00
100 km
10H00
BOCARANGA
190 km
Cameroon 11H00
BOSSANGOA
550 km
100 km BOUCA
BOZOUM 08H00
CARNOT
88 km
AMADA GAZA 03H30
BANGUI
BERBERATI
450 km
A Holistic Approach
phase was now nearly complete. I quickly met with many people, officials,
NGOs, mayors, catholic priests, the imam of Bouar and representatives of
the Muslim community, and visited many places in order to get a clear
idea of the region. I remembered a very insightful book which I had
read many years ago and I wanted to mirror its spirit in my mission to
deliver a safe and secure environment. Letters from Tonkin and Mada-
gascar was written by Marshal Lyautey and published in 1920 and offered
the direction that I wanted to follow. I had a particular link to Lyautey,
not only because he commanded the 1st squadron of my Regiment from
1887–1893 but also because my great-grandparents knew him when they
were in Morocco at the beginning of the protectorate in 1913. I grew
up with the memory of Lyautey and a love of the country where my
parents were also born. Even before joining my Regiment, I already had
an affinity with Lyautey. When I was young, I knew his story in detail
and his achievements overseas offered excellent food for thought. The
Marshal was therefore a source of inspiration.
Apart from defining the spirit in which I wished to operate, I had
to plan all the activities I wished to conduct. To this end, I used a US
approach I had observed in Afghanistan with the Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Teams. These teams organised their work around an acronym which
listed all the domains they had to address to cover all aspects of national
reconstruction. The acronym SWEAT MS CREG provided the handrail
to achieve the outcomes I wanted to achieve. Therefore, I reflected on
these eleven different domains: Sewage / Water / Electricity / Academic
/ Trash / Medical / Security / Communication / Religion / Economy
/ Government. The point was to define the “Ends” of the mission, the
“Ways” I wished to employ and the “Means” to deliver my effects. With
regard to the “Ends”, I considered two different stages, both short and
long term, because the realistic art of the possible had to guide our actions
first and foremost and make sense for soldiers if they were to embrace
the concept and make progress. Consequently, I defined the centre of
gravity: it was clearly the populace because it constituted the main param-
eter of the equation. We had to convince people, through our example
and effectiveness, that they could rely on us. Only this would allow us
to build something stronger in the longer term. My end state that was a
long-term objective and went well beyond the period of our operational
tour in Central Africa.
3 A HOLISTIC APPROACH 21
The purpose of this plan was to bring security to the region and conse-
quently stability that would allow the return of the Muslim population.
Prosperity would improve living conditions and encourage development
even though it is a long way to the top if you want to make peace.The
campaign plan took a holistic view and proposed a global approach to
tackle all the points we had to deal with. Instead of establishing a compli-
cated plan with too many lines of operation, noting that eleven areas to
be addressed seemed too much and risked losing my audience, I reduced
the plan to five lines of operation. Each line of operation began with a
letter of the city’s name, BOUAR:
Line 2:
Line 3:
Line 4:
Line 5:
1– Doing well 11 12 13 14 15 16
A. DIROU
and
communicaƟng
2 - ocal
L 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
organisaƟon
31 32 33 34 35 36 37
3 – nity and
U populaƟon
social bond
4 – ublic
P 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
authority
5 – ecovery
R 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
of economy
the request, and second by promoting the project and focusing minis-
terial attention on provincial issues. The best illustration of this success
was the inter-Ministerial agreement we managed to coordinate between
the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Defence and Territorial Communities
for regional application. Benefitting from the presence of a military police
non-commissioned officer, I drew on his police and law enforcement skills
to organise training for the region’s security forces, even though his chief
in Bangui did not approve as this role was not a formal part of his mission.
Between the spirit and the letter, I opted for spirit because “the only good
strategy is total ”.1
Progressively, the police were beginning to regain some confidence
and, feeling supported, returned to work. However, policing can only
be effective if the proper functioning of the judicial system supports
it. As with the prefect, I found common grounds with the prosecutor,
Tiburce Bilongo. Caring, demanding and insightful, he used his unfailing
energy to get the justice system up and running again, but one of his
first matters of business was that he needed space to detain people who
had been arrested. After some explaining and convincing all the project
stakeholders, we managed to get an official document signed, validated by
the four supervising ministers, making available to the courts the prison
cells of the Central African army barracks located in Bouar. This success
made it possible to demonstrate to the population that state authority was
returning. Police and justice were seen once again to be functioning. Each
small step contributed to the restoration of the perception of security and
impunity was no longer assumed. The effects on the ground were soon
apparent as villagers now felt able to take positive action against run-of-
the-mill criminals whom they could then deliver to the security forces, as
was the case in the village of Galo Bouya on 1 July 2014 when fourteen
Anti-Balakas were arrested. The confidence of the police and civil servants
increased as they felt supported and encouraged in their difficult duty.
In other areas, the prefect’s action was also significant and his constant
commitment made it possible to make progress across many issues. We
met regularly to exchange ideas and address the seemingly endless list
of problems we had to solve. Every Thursday, we met up at the end
of the afternoon for an update on our ongoing projects, to prepare the
1 Michael Shurkin, Grand Strategy is total: French Gen. André Beaufre on war in
the nuclear age, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/grand-strategy-is-total-french-gen-
andre-beaufre-on-war-in-the-nuclear-age/.
3 A HOLISTIC APPROACH 27
next phase and look at long-term requirements. Sharing the same vision,
our cooperation was excellent because the implementation of a holistic
plan, covering all sectors of the administration, was an exciting challenge.
Sharing our analysis on how to carry out the initiatives and notably in
the coordination of all the actors, Mr Ouagonda brought together NGO
representatives at regular intervals. The first meeting surprised the human-
itarian workers when the prefect requested not only an account of their
on-going activities but also of their long-term projects. Their surprise
was quite marked when they saw me at this first meeting and the reluc-
tance of some of them to see a soldier at this meeting was unsurprising.
After briefing them on the global approach he wanted to adopt and
listening to the NGOs explain their activities in his region, the prefect
set out his objectives. Furthermore, he remarked that he did not need
as many humanitarian organisations caring for women and children but
needed greater diversity to implement his plan, especially in agricultural
and energy development, water supply and road network improvement.
Some humanitarians workers were upset to be questioned in this way,
but the prefect was right. The NGO representatives seemed surprised to
be viewed through a long-term lens as usually their activities target the
urgent and immediate. The prefect explained his goal and how he wanted
to achieve it. For this, he needed to coordinate all the actors. The plan
provided the foundation for regional reconstruction and his energy was
the cement of this ambitious project.
This was made possible thanks to the concurrent tactical activi-
ties undertaken by the Battlegroup. Patrolling, observing specific areas,
intervening and rescuing civilian people, the legionnaires and mountain
soldiers of my Battlegroup became quickly recognised for their effec-
tiveness and the consideration they gave to the local population. The
Battlegroup’s laydown covered a huge area and the mobility of the light
units allowed a wide presence across the region. Even when a presence was
not possible, companies were able to move rapidly to intervene, including
by helicopter if necessary. The main mission was to maintain freedom of
movement on the main supply route linking Bangui to the Cameroo-
nian border. The road between the border town of Beloko and Bangui
was crucial, if not vital, for the stability of the Central African capital. All
means and goods to supply Bangui came through this route, for which
we were responsible for maintaining free movement. Each blockade or
interruption of the movement of goods destabilised the urban population.
28 A. DIROU
Failure at M’Bali
There was one obvious advantage with the unit’s deployment, which was
that we had numerous contacts with the civilian local authorities and with
MISCA units, which belonged to the African Union. Our main partner
was a highly competent Cameroon battalion, and together we cooperated
both in terms of information sharing and coordination on the ground.
After each subunit had taken into account its immediate area of respon-
sibility, we decided to conduct our first operation in depth to carry out a
reconnaissance mission towards the village of Bodjomo on 18 June 2014.
The presence of an armed group had been identified and, according to
the local population, this group was responsible for dozens of deaths
over the past few weeks. It was particularly mobile, attacking, killing and
looting the populace. I sent two platoons under Captain François-Xavier
to carry out this first reconnaissance because this village lay to the north
of his camp at Bossangoa. To command this first modest operation, I sent
Lieutenant Colonel Pierre with a small command team to cover the air-
ground integration while the Battlegroup’s main command post remained
in Bouar. Thus, the detachment consisted of an armoured troop, an
infantry platoon, a Gazelle helicopter patrol, and a JTAC team. Given the
size of the deployed force, I considered this operation was not my level
of responsibility. Therefore, my operations chief left Bouar to proceed to
Bossangoa. Our first mission in depth could now begin. On 18 June as
the detachment reached the village the gang was surprised by our arrival