Final Petitioner

TEAM CODE: J43
IN THE HONORABLE HIGH COURT OF SEVEN KINGDOMS
IN WRIT PETITION NO: ________ OF 2024

IN
TYRION
THE WRIT BAELISH
PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE…. PETITIONER OF
CONSTITUTION
SEVEN KINGDOMS
VERSUS
UNION OF SEVEN KINGDOMS …RESPONDENT
INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………..4
TABLE OF CASES……………………………...…………………………….5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………….……8-9
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………….10
ISSUES FRAMED……………………………………………………………11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………...……12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………….
……..13-24
1. Whether the painter is liable u/s 295A of SKPC and whether the ban u/s 95
CRPC valid?
2. Whether banning the sale of the painting violates any fundamental rights
protected under Part III of the Seven Kingdoms constitution?
PRAYER………………………………………………………………………25
ABBREVIATIONS
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 2

S.NO ABBREVIATION FULL FORMS
1. A. P ANDRA PRADESH
2. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
3. ALD ANDHRA LEGAL DECISIONS
4. ART ARTICLE
5. CL CLAUSE
6. CRPC CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
7. IBID JUST ABOVE
8. SECTION SECTION
9. SC SUPREME COURT
10. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
11. SCR SUPREME COURT CASES
12. SDM SUB DIVISIONAL MAGIRSTRATE
13. SKPC SEVEN KINGDOMS PENAL CODE
14. U/S UNDER SECTION
15. UP UTTAR PRADESH

16. VS/v VERSUS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
1. STATUTES REFERRED
S.NO STATUTES REFERRED CITED PAGE NO.
1. THE CONSTITUTION OF SEVEN PASSIM

KINGDOMS, 1950
2. SEVEN KINGDOMS PENAL CODE,1860 PASSIM
3. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,1973 PASSIM
2. TABLE OF CASES
S.NO NAME OF THE CASES AND ITS REVELANT CITATION PAGE

NO
1. Lakshmi Ganesh Films and Ors. vs Government of A.P. And Ors; 17

2006(4) ALD374
2. Madhu Limaye v SDM, Monghyr, AIR 1971 SC 2486 22
3. Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar, 2017 SCC 15

450
4. Naravan Dass Indurakhya vs State Of Madhya Pradesh 1973 20

SCR (1) 392
5.
Piara Singh Bhaniara vs State of Punjab and Another; 1977 AIR
20
2274
6. R M Lohia v State of Bihar, (1966) 1 SCR 709 22
7. Ramji Lal Modi v The State Of U.P, 1957 SCC 334 15
8. Sanjay Leela Bhansali & Ors vs State & Ors; (2018) 1 SCC 77 18
9. State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005)8 23

SCC 534
10. State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Lalai Singh Yadav, (1976) 4 SCC 213 14

3. TREATIES, BOOKS, REPORTS AND DIGESTS
S.NO NAME OF THE BOOKS WITH THE AUTHOUR OR PUBLISHER
1. DURGA DAS BASSU, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, 8TH EDITION
2. M P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7TH EDITION, 2014,

LEXIS NEXIS
1. IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
1. “Petitioner” for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for ‘Tyrion
Baelish’.
2. “Respondent” for the purpose of this Memorandum shall stand for ‘Union of
Seven kingdoms’.
2. DYNAMIC LINKS

(OFFICIAL WEBSITES APPROVED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF

INDIA)
1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.scconline.com
3. www.judis.nic (Official website of the Supreme Court of Seven Kingdoms:
Unreported Judgements)
4. www.westlawindia.com

STATEMENT OF JRISDICTION
The Petitioners have approached the Hon’ble High court of Seven Kingdoms under Article
226 of the Constitution of Seven Kingdoms by filing a writ of Mandamus, challenging the
validity of the ban ordered by the State Government. The petitioner humbly submits to the
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.
“226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.

(1)Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders
or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warrantor and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part III and for any other purpose.
[(1-A) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."; was inserted after
15th Amendment].
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3)Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or
in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause
(1), without—
(a)furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea
for such interim order; and
(b)giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court
for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose

favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose
of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from
the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where
the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day
afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the
interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said
next day, stand vacated.
(4)The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the
power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.”

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Background
1. The Seven Kingdoms is a democratic nation with a pluralistic society, where
adherents of all faiths are free to practice their religion. The two primary religions are
the indigenous “Old Gods” and the introduced “Faith of the Seven.”
2. King’s Landing, the birthplace of Tyrion Baelish(petitioner), is a culturally significant

city known for its association with the “Faith of the Seven.” Notably, it is the resting
place of Aegon and Halaena, a revered saintly couple credited with bringing the
“Faith of the Seven” to the Seven Kingdoms.
II. The Painting and Public Reaction

3. Petitioner, a renowned painter, created a new artwork titled “The Divine Love.” This
painting depicted the union of Aegon and Halaena.
4. The depiction of Aegon with boyish charm and bluish skin caused outrage among
followers of both religions.
5. Public outcry arose, with protestors demanding Petitioner’s beheading and accusing
him of threatening the peace of the Seven Kingdoms.
III. Government Action

6. Responding to the public outcry, the Government swiftly imposed a ban on the sale
and exhibition of Petitioner’s painting, “The Divine Love.”
IV. Legal Action

7. In response to the Government’s ban, Petitioner filed a lawsuit challenging its
legality.
V. Point of Contention
8. The central issue in this case is whether the Government’s ban on Plaintiff’s artwork
constitutes an infringement on his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the
Seven Kingdoms’ constitution.

ISSUES FRAMED
THE PETITIONER SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION IN

THE PRESENT CASE.
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE PAINTER IS LIABLE U/S 295 A OF SKPC AND WHETHER THE
BAN U/S 95 CRPC VALID?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER BANNING THE SALE OF THE PAINTING VIOLATES ANY

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER PART III OF THE SEVEN
KINGDOMS CONSTITUTION?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1:
WHETHER THE PAINTER IS LIABLE U/S 295 A OF SKPC AND WHETHER THE
BAN U/S 95 CRPC VALID?
The Petitioner has not insulted the religious feelings of followers of ‘Faith of the Seven’. The
painting doesn't have malicious intent and the ban on the sale violates the freedom of speech
and artistic expression. Furthermore, the procedure for imposing the ban lacked transparency.
ISSUE 2:
WHETHER BANNING THE SALE OF THE PAINTING VIOLATES ANY

The painting's ban violates the Artist's right to free speech protected by the Constitution.
However, this right is not absolute and can be limited to maintain public order. The restriction
needs to be justified and proportionate, respecting the diversity of beliefs in a society.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE PAINTER IS LIABLE U/S 295 A OF SKPC AND WHETHER

THE BAN U/S 95 CRPC VALID?
May it please the Honorable Court,
The counsel respectfully submits that the painting created by "Tyrion Baelish" does not
possess the intent to cause harm or offense to the religious sentiments of any individual or
community. Hence, the painter cannot be held liable under Section 295A of the SKPC.
Furthermore, the imposition of a ban on the sale of the painting is ultra vires, as it lacks
sufficient grounds for such prohibition and contravenes the fundamental principles of natural
justice. Firstly, the essence of Section 295A of the SKPC hinges on the intention to outrage
religious feelings. However, upon a thorough examination of the painting in question, it
becomes evident that there is no deliberate attempt to incite religious animosity or
disparagement. The absence of malicious intent precludes any basis for legal liability under
the aforementioned provision. Secondly, the imposition of a ban on the sale of the painting
lacks procedural fairness and transparency. The principle of natural justice mandates that
individuals affected by governmental actions are entitled to know the grounds on which such
actions are based. In this instance, the ban was instituted without providing clear and specific
reasons, depriving the painter of the opportunity to challenge the decision, and undermining
the fundamental principles of due process.
“Section 295A - Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of
any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. —
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any
class of 7 [citizens of India], 8 [by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs
of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to 9 [three years], or with fine, or with both.]”

A violation of Section 295A entails intentionally causing injury or offense to the religious
sentiments or beliefs of any community through speech, text, symbols, or visual depictions,
constituting an offense punishable under the Seven Kingdoms Penal Code. Though religion
should be separated from politics, it is a utopian concept at its best. There is no government
that has existed which has been able to separate religion from politics. The parameters of free
speech and its restrictions regarding offences pertaining to religion are defined In Section
295A.It lays up penalties for wilful and intentional conduct meant to offend someone's
religious sensibilities by disparaging their religion or religious beliefs. It asks for either type
of incarceration for a duration that may last up to [three years], along with a fine or both. It
has been used to address a variety of concerns, including punishing political humour, and
requesting book bans or book withdrawals, as well as political criticism on social media.
NO HARM TO PUBLIC ORDER OR PEACE
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Lalai Singh Yadav1 The
State, in India, is secular and does not take sides with one religion or other prevalent in our
pluralistic society. It has no direct concern with the faiths of the people but is deeply
obligated not merely to preserve and protect society against breaches of the peace and
violations of public order but also to create conditions where the sentiments and feelings of
people of diverse or opposing beliefs and bigotries are not so molested by ribald writings or
offensive publications as to provoke or outrage groups into possible violent action.
Essentially, good government necessitates peace and security and whoever violates by bombs
or books societal tranquillity will become target of legal interdict by the State.
It is evident from the above order of the apex court that the legislative intent behind Section
295A of the SKPC is to safeguard public interest and safety, aiming to prevent potential
violent outbreaks resulting from offensive publications. In the case at hand, concerning the
painting "The Divine Love," alleged to be derogatory to religious sentiments, it has indeed
sparked indignation among followers of both communities. However, it is noteworthy that the
protests have not escalated to a level that threatens the peace and safety of the entire nation or
a significant portion of the population. While there have been demands from certain groups
for extreme measures such as the beheading of the painter, such isolated incidents do not
constitute a defeat of public order in the broader context. Therefore, it can be concluded that
public order remains intact in the present case.
1
(1976) 4 SCC 213

In the same case2 J V. R. Krishnaiyer observed “India is a land of cultural contrarieties, co-
existence of many religions and anti-religions, rationalism and bigotry, primitive cults, and
materialist doctrines. The compulsions of history and geography and the assault of modern
science on the retreating forces of medieval ways a mosaic like tapestry of lovely and
unlovely strands have made large and liberal tolerance of mutual criticism, even though
expressed in intemperate diction, a necessity of life. Governments, we are confident, will not
act in hubris, but will weigh these hard facts of our society while putting into operation the
harsh directives for forfeiture. From Galileo and Darwin, Thoreau and Ruskin to Karl Marx,
H.G. Wells, Barnard Shaw and Bertrand Russel, many great thinkers have been objected to
for their thoughts and statements-avoiding for a moment great Indians from Manu to Nehru.
Even today, here and there, diehards may be found in our country who are offended by their
writings, but no Government will be antediluvian enough to invoke the power to seize their
great writings because a few fanatics hold obdurate views on them.”
ABSENCE OF MALICE
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla
Shyamsundar3 has held that “every act of insult to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly
or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class
will not fall in the domain of section 295A IPC”.
In the case Ramji Lal Modi v The State Of U.P4 In the first place el. (2) of Art. 19 protects a
law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and
expression "in the interests of" public order, which is much wider than "for maintenance of"
public order. If, therefore, certain activities have a tendency to cause public disorder, a law
penalising such activities as an offence cannot but be held to be a law imposing reasonable
restriction "in the interests of public order" although in some cases those activities may not
actually lead to a breach of public order. In the next place. S 295A does not penalise any and
every act of insult to or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of
citizens but it penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the
religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate
and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insults to religion
2
State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Lalai Singh Yadav (1976) 4 SCC 213
3
2017 SCC 450
4
1957 SCC 334

offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage

the religious feelings of that class do not come within the section. It only Punishes the
aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. The calculated tendency of this
aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order and the section, which
penalises such activities, is well within the protection of cl. (2) of Art. 19 as being a law
imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a).
In adjudicating cases under Section 295A of the Seven Kingdoms Penal Code, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving that the accused harboured malicious and deliberate
intentions to outrage religious sentiments, targeting a collective group rather than an
individual. Crucially, the offense is not predicated on the mere content of discourse, whether
oral or written, but rather on the perceived manner in which it was conveyed. The
determination of culpability hinges primarily on discerning the accused's intent, a task often
fraught with complexity.
Intention assumes paramount significance in determining liability under this provision, as

established through judicial precedent. However, discerning intent poses considerable
challenges, typically necessitating reliance on the explicit words employed by the accused.
Unless the uttered words unequivocally intend to foment animosity or antipathy towards
adherents of a particular religion, establishing culpability under Section 295A becomes
exceedingly arduous. In essence, while the statute seeks to safeguard religious sensibilities,
its application hinges upon a nuanced assessment of intent, which remains contingent upon
the overt expressions or actions of the accused. Consequently, without clear and unmistakable
evidence indicating a deliberate endeavour to stoke religious animosity, the threshold for
invoking punitive measures under Section 295A remains substantially high.
Based on the precedents and jurisprudence underlying criminal law, it is evident that Section
295A requires a clear demonstration of aggravated malice on the part of the offender. In the
present case concerning the painting "The Divine Love," the depiction of Aegon with boyish
charm and bluish skin, albeit contrary to religious doctrine prohibiting the portrayal of gods
in human-like forms, cannot reasonably be construed as intentionally intended to insult
religious sentiments. The term "insult," as per the dictionary definition, denotes an affront to
one's self-respect potentially warranting damages. However, in this instance, no deliberate

harm to self-respect is inflicted upon Aegon, but rather an imaginative portrayal aimed at
fostering harmony between communities. Associating one religion with another in a manner
devoid of religious connotations promotes a reasonable approach conducive to harmony
rather than discord. Therefore, the painting cannot be deemed to have malicious intent or to
constitute an insult to religious sentiments within the purview of Section 295A.
The objectors to the exhibition of the film are not a captive audience. Casual passers-by on
the public street, those using public transport or by compulsive exposure to billboards are not
involuntarily and forcibly exposed to the contents of this film. The film is a work of fiction
and is exhibited for commercial purposes. Those who go to the theatre are required to buy a
ticket to see the film. Thus they watch it at their volition and by conscious choice. Those who
are offended by the content or its theme are free to avoid watching the film. The objectors are
thus not captive audience of the film. Dissenters of speech and expression have no censorial
right in respect of the intellectual, moral, religious, dogmatic or other choices of all mankind.
The Constitution of India does not confer or tolerate such individualized, hyper-sensitive
private censorial intrusion into and regulation of the guaranteed freedom of others.5
The reference to the judgment concerning the movie adaptation of "The Da Vinci Code"
underscores the principle that individuals have the freedom to choose whether to engage with
artistic works that may challenge their beliefs. In that case, despite criticism from the
Christian community regarding the film's portrayal of Jesus, the court affirmed the right of
individuals to decide whether to watch the movie. Similarly, in the present case involving the
painting "The Divine Love," the artwork is available for sale, and individuals have the
voluntary choice to purchase it or not. Unlike billboards or posters that are publicly exposed
to all, the painting's availability for sale allows individuals to make informed decisions about
their engagement with the artwork. Therefore, the freedom of choice afforded to individuals
in deciding whether to engage with artistic works remains paramount, aligning with the
principles upheld in the aforementioned judgment.
POETIC LICENCE
As far as the words "poetic licence", are concerned, it can never remotely mean a licence as
used or understood in the language of law. There is no authority who gives a licence to a
poet. These are words from the realm of literature. The poet assumes his own freedom which
is allowed to him by the fundamental concept of poetry. He is free to depart from reality; fly
5
Lakshmi Ganesh Films and Ors. vs Government of A.P. And Ors; 2006(4)ALD374

away from grammar; walk in glory by not following systematic metres; coin words at his
own will; use archaic words to convey thoughts or attribute meanings; hide ideas beyond
myths which can be absolutely unrealistic; totally pave a path where neither rhyme nor
rhythm prevail; can put serious ideas in satires, aphorisms, notorious repartees; take aid of
analogies, metaphors, similes in his own style, compare like "life with sandwiches that is
consumed everyday" or "life is like peeling of an onion", or "society is like a stew"; define
ideas that can balloon into the sky never to come down; cause violence to logic at his own
fancy; escape to the sphere of figurative truism; get engrossed in the "universal eye for
resemblance", and one can do nothing except writing a critical appreciation in his own
manner and according to his understanding. When a poet says, "I saw eternity yesterday
night", no reader would understand the term "eternity" in its prosaic sense. The Hamletian
question has many a layer; each is free to confer a meaning; be it traditional or modern or
individualistic. No one can stop a dramatist or a poet or a writer to write freely expressing his
thoughts, and similarly none can stop the critics to give their comments whatever its worth.
One may concentrate on Classical facets, and one may think at a metaphysical level or
concentrate on Romanticism as is understood in the poems of Keats, Byron or Shelley or one
may dwell on Nature and write poems like William Wordsworth whose poems, say some, are
didactic. One may also venture to compose like Alexander Pope or Dryden or get into
individual modernism like Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot or Pablo Neruda. That is fundamentally
what is meant by poetic licence." We may categorically state that the artistic licence should
be put on a high pedestal but the same has to be judged objectively on case to case basis.6
The above landmark judgment on the famous Padmavati movie stands as a testament to the
liberty granted to artists to exercise their creative freedom, including the use of poetic license
to depart from reality. Despite controversy surrounding the portrayal of the queen, the ruling
emphasized the importance of artistic expression and rejected claims of intentional religious
disharmony. Similarly, in the present case, while the painting may challenge the ideology of
specific communities, it does not necessarily imply malicious intent or an intention to sow
religious discord. Artists should be afforded the freedom to explore diverse perspectives and
interpretations without fear of reprisal, ensuring the continued vibrancy and diversity of
artistic expression in society.
6
Sanjay Leela Bhansali & Ors vs State & Ors ; (2018) 1 SCC 770

PROCEDURAL NON-COMPLIANCE
“Section 95. Power to declare certain publications forfeited and to issue search-warrants
for the same.
(1) Where
-(a)any newspaper, or book, or
(b)any document, wherever printed,
appears to the State Government to contain any matter the publication of which is punishable
under section 124-A or section 153-A or section 153-B or section 292 or section 293 or
section 295-A of the SKPC (45 of 1860), the State Government may, by notification, stating
the grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of the issue of the newspaper containing such
matter, and every copy of such book or other document to be forfeited to Government, and
thereupon any police officer may seize the same wherever found in Seven Kingdoms and any
Magistrate may by warrant authorise any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector
to enter upon and search for the same in any premises where any copy of such issue or any
such book or other document may be or may be reasonably suspected to be.
(2) In this section and in section 96,
-(a)"newspaper" and "book" have the same meaning as in the Press and Registration
of Books Act, 1867 (25 of 1867);
(b)"document" includes any painting, drawing or photograph, or other visible

representation.
(3) No order passed, or action taken under this section shall be called in question in any
Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of section 96.”
The clear language of the relevant section mandates that the government provide reasons for
any ban or forfeiture of publications under its purview. However, in the present case
concerning the painting "The Divine Love," the government notification fails to articulate
any such reasons for the ban. This omission constitutes a blatant violation of the principles of
natural justice, which are enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution of Seven kingdoms.
Natural justice demands fairness and transparency, none of which have been afforded in this

instance. Therefore, the government's failure to provide reasons for the ban on the painting
constitutes a procedural non-compliance resulting the ban to be ultra vires.
It is useful to consider here what is meant by grounds of opinion. The formation of an opinion
by Government is undoubtedly the ground for the action taken by them, but the grounds for
the opinion are obviously different. The opinion, after it has been formed, furnishes a ground
to Government for taking action contemplated, but the grounds on which the opinion itself is
formed are and must be other grounds' Those grounds must necessarily be the import or the
effect or the tendency of matters contained in the offending publication, either as a whole or
in portions of it, as illustrated by passages which Government may choose.7
As far as the second ground of non-observance of the mandatory requirement of stating the
grounds for formulating the opinion of the State in the order is concerned, there seems to be
substance in the plea. The authority, while passing the impugned Notification, has simply
referred to the provisions of Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. Even no reference is made to the
objectionable material which constitutes offences under Sections 501, 153-A and 295-A of
the Seven Kingdoms Penal Code, 1860. The requirement of the said Section is explicit. The
Government has to state the grounds of its opinion meaning thereby the basis for formulating
the opinion. Mere quoting the Section does not mean that the grounds are stated. The order
must disclose the application of mind on the facts and material constituting the offences
envisaged under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. and the opinion of the competent authority that this
material comes within the mischief of the Section. The impugned Notification is shorn of any
such ground based upon objectionable material or even the opinion based upon such material.
The mandatory requirement of Section 95 Cr.P.C. has not been complied with. Freedom of
speech and expression which includes the writing and publishing of any book or document is
a Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. Clause
(2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of Seven Kingdoms empowers the State to impose
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred under Clause (1) (a) of Article
19 in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of Seven Kingdoms, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency, or morality or in relation to
Contempt of Court, defamation or incitement of an offence by making a law. The State has
enacted Section 95 in exercise of the power under Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution
of India. Once a law is enacted and Fundamental Rights are sought to be curtailed by virtue
7
Naravan Dass Indurakhya vs State Of Madhya Pradesh; 1973 SCR (1) 392

of such law adherence to the procedure and manner or method for imposing restrictions on
Fundamental Rights is imperative. Thus, stating of grounds and formulation of opinion on
such grounds in the order under Section 95 Cr.P.C. is must and inescapable.8
The above precedents make it clear for the word used in the section “may” should be read as
“Shall” which makes it mandatory for the government to state grounds for taking action
against any publication made u/s 95 Cr.P.C.
2. WHETHER BANNING THE SALE OF THE PAINTING VIOLATES ANY

8
Piara Singh Bhaniara vs State Of Punjab And Another; 1977 AIR 2274

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution states-
“(1) All citizens shall have the right—
(a) to freedom of speech and expression.
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or
prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an
offence.”
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Seven Kingdoms guarantees the fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression, encompassing acts, processes, or instances of
representation through various mediums. Painting, as a form of expression, serves as a
conduit for artists such as "Tyrion Baelish" to convey their thoughts and emotions. In this
case, the painting "The Divine Love" is an expression of the painter's feelings and artistic
vision. By banning the painting, the government has violated the fundamental right of the
painter to share his creative expression not only with the people of Seven Kingdoms but also
with his followers worldwide. Such an action constitutes a flagrant infringement upon the
constitutional protections afforded under Article 19(1)(a), which safeguard the cherished
principles of free speech and expression. Therefore, the government's ban on the painting
constitutes a grave violation of the painter's fundamental rights and warrants judicial scrutiny
and redress.
+REASONABLE RESTRICTION
The right mentioned above is not an absolute right and Article 19 cl. 2 mentions the
restrictions on freedom of speech and expression given in cl. 1(a), ‘Reasonable restrictions’ as
outlined in Article 19(2) of the Constitution allows for restrictions in the interests of the
security and sovereignty of India, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order,
decency, or morality in the relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an
offence.

The term 'public order covers a small riot, an affray, breaches of peace, or acts disturbing
public tranquillity. But public order' and 'public tranquillity' may not always be synonymous.
For ex- ample, a man playing loud music in his home at night may disturb public tranquillity,
but not public order. Therefore, such acts as disturb only the serenity of others may not fall
within the term "public order.9
In the Ramji Lal Modi case10, the court had held that the Constitution in Article 19(2) permits
the state to restrict freedom of speech and expression ‘in interests of public order’. The court
stated that the term ‘In interests of’ gave it a very wide ambit and state can make any law for
it. The court also stated that the law is for an aggravated form of speech intended to disturb
public order. However, the court discarded the idea of proximity between the speech and the
violence that the state fears .
In a case11 Subba Rao J, speaking for the Court, pointed out that the expression "in the
interests of public order" though wider than the phrase "for the maintenance of public order"
still could not mean that the existence of any remote or fanciful connection between the
impugned act and public order would be sufficient to sustain the validity of the law. The
connection between the act prohibited or penalised and public order should be intimate. In
other words, there should be a reasonable and rational relation between it and the object
sought to be achieved, viz, public order. The nexus should thus be proximate-not far-fetched,
problematical, or too remote in the chain of its relationship with public order.
In a recent Constitution Bench Judgment (7 Judges) - State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti

Kureshi Kassab Jamat12 , Chief Justice Lahoti speaking for the majority, considered whether
a regulation or restriction on the right guaranteed under Article 19(1) includes total
prohibition of the right and the tests to identify whether the total prohibition would constitute
a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(2 to 6). Lahoti, J., summarized the
ratio culled out from several earlier precedents and stated that restriction includes prohibition;
the standard for judging the reasonability of restriction or a restriction amounting to
prohibition remains the same, except that a total prohibition must also satisfy the test that a
lesser alternative would be inadequate; and the question whether a restriction in effect
amounts to a total prohibition is a question of fact which shall have to be determined with
9
Madhu Limaye v SDM, Monghyr; AIR 1971 SC 2486
10
Ibid.
11
R M Lohia v State of Bihar; (1966) 1 SCR 709
12
(2005)8 SCC 534

regard to the facts end circumstances of each case, the ambit of the right and the effect of the
restriction upon the exercise of that right.
Within every great religion there are variations even of dogma. Dwaita, Adwaita and Visista-
Adwaita, Shaivism, Vaishnavism and a whole lot of heterogeneities in Hinduism; Shias and
Sunnis, Admedias and other nuances of Islmaic dogma; Roman Catholics, Protestants,
Lutherans, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Coptic Church and several other denominational
diversities in Christian thought attest the essential diversity of all human thought and belief.
There are inevitably, heterodoxies within orthodoxies. The unity of mankind is an assumption
of tolerance, a symbiosis of diversity. Freedom of speech and expression contributes to the
richness and the equilibrium of human existence.13
13
Ibid.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities citied it is
most humbly and respectfully requested that the Hon’ble High Court to adjudge and declare,
1. To remove the ban on the sale of the painting "The Divine Love" by issuing a writ of
mandamus, directing the government to revoke the notification imposing such ban.
This action is imperative to uphold the fundamental right to freedom of expression
enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
2. To award compensation to the Painter for the losses incurred as a result of the ban on
the sale of the painting. The ban has unjustly deprived the Painter of his livelihood
and infringed upon his constitutional rights, warranting appropriate restitution for the
damages suffered.
And pass any other order, decree or judgement that this Hon’ble Court deems fit in light of
justice, equity and good conscience.
For this act of Kindness, the Petitioner shall duty bound forever pray.
Place: Union of Seven Kingdoms Respectfully submitted,
Dated: 28th April 2024. Counsel for Petitioner

Final Petitioner

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TEAM CODE: J43

IN THE HONORABLE HIGH COURT OF SEVEN KINGDOMS

IN WRIT PETITION NO: ________ OF 2024

UNION OF SEVEN KINGDOMS …RESPONDENT

INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 2

S.NO ABBREVIATION FULL FORMS

2. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER

3. ALD ANDHRA LEGAL DECISIONS

6. CRPC CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

7. IBID JUST ABOVE

10. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

11. SCR SUPREME COURT CASES

12. SDM SUB DIVISIONAL MAGIRSTRATE

13. SKPC SEVEN KINGDOMS PENAL CODE

14. U/S UNDER SECTION

15. UP UTTAR PRADESH

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 3

16. VS/v VERSUS

S.NO STATUTES REFERRED CITED PAGE NO.

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF SEVEN PASSIM

2. SEVEN KINGDOMS PENAL CODE,1860 PASSIM

3. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,1973 PASSIM

S.NO NAME OF THE CASES AND ITS REVELANT CITATION PAGE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 4

1. Lakshmi Ganesh Films and Ors. vs Government of A.P. And Ors; 17

2. Madhu Limaye v SDM, Monghyr, AIR 1971 SC 2486 22

3. Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar, 2017 SCC 15

4. Naravan Dass Indurakhya vs State Of Madhya Pradesh 1973 20

6. R M Lohia v State of Bihar, (1966) 1 SCR 709 22

7. Ramji Lal Modi v The State Of U.P, 1957 SCC 334 15

9. State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005)8 23

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 5

3. TREATIES, BOOKS, REPORTS AND DIGESTS

S.NO NAME OF THE BOOKS WITH THE AUTHOUR OR PUBLISHER

1. DURGA DAS BASSU, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, 8TH EDITION

2. M P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7TH EDITION, 2014,

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 6

(OFFICIAL WEBSITES APPROVED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 7

“226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 8

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 9

2. King’s Landing, the birthplace of Tyrion Baelish(petitioner), is a culturally significant

II. The Painting and Public Reaction

III. Government Action

IV. Legal Action

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 10

THE PETITIONER SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION IN

WHETHER BANNING THE SALE OF THE PAINTING VIOLATES ANY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 11

WHETHER BANNING THE SALE OF THE PAINTING VIOLATES ANY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 12

1. WHETHER THE PAINTER IS LIABLE U/S 295 A OF SKPC AND WHETHER

May it please the Honorable Court,

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 13

NO HARM TO PUBLIC ORDER OR PEACE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 14

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 15

offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage

Intention assumes paramount significance in determining liability under this provision, as

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 16