Educational Philosophy and Theory

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Friendship, Intimacy and Humor

Mordechai Gordon

To cite this article: Mordechai Gordon (2014) Friendship, Intimacy and Humor, Educational
Philosophy and Theory, 46:2, 162-174, DOI: 10.1080/00131857.2012.721732

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Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2014
Vol. 46, No. 2, 162–174, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2012.721732

Friendship, Intimacy and Humor

MORDECHAI GORDON
School of Education, Quinnipiac University

Abstract

A review of the literature in philosophy in the past 20 years indicates that relatively little has
been written on the connection between friendship, intimacy and humor. This article is
intended to begin to address the neglect of this topic among philosophers by focusing on some
interesting aspects of the relationship between friendship, intimacy and humor. The author
begins his analysis by examining the different types of friendships while highlighting the char-
acteristics of the particular kind of friendship that involves intimacy. The second part of this
article discusses the concept of intimacy, which has not received much attention among phi-
losophers. Next, the author takes a close look at the issue of humor while distinguishing it
from both joking and laughter. He then moves to the heart of this article, which focuses on
the question of: how can humor enhance intimacy in friendship? In the final part of this arti-
cle, the author briefly outlines some educational implications that can be gleaned from the
analysis of the relationship between friendship, intimacy and humor.

Keywords: humor, laughter, friendship, intimacy, philosophy

Introduction
A review of the literature in philosophy and education indicates that relatively little
has been written on the connection between friendship, intimacy and humor. To be
sure, the issue of friendship has been dealt with extensively by philosophers dating all
the way back to Plato’s dialogue the Lysis and Aristotle who addressed this topic
extensively in the Nicomachean ethics. The subject of intimacy has not received as
much attention among philosophers in comparison to friendship, perhaps because this
term has usually been associated with sexual encounters and relationships. Finally,
humor has received more consideration in recent years from philosophers such as
John Morreall, Thomas Nagel and Simon Critchley (Nagel, 1971; Morreall, 1983,
2009; Critchley, 2002). Yet the connections between these three important human
phenomena have seldom been seriously explored.
One noticeable exception to this trend is Ted Cohen’s book Jokes: Philosophical
thoughts on joking matters (Cohen, 1999), which argues effectively that many jokes tap
into the beliefs, knowledge and feelings that the teller shares with the listener and

Ó 2012 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia

 Friendship, Intimacy and Humor 163

thereby create a sense of intimacy between the two. Still, Cohen’s analysis is different
than this project since Cohen deals only with jokes and not with humor in general
and because he focuses only on intimacy and does not address friendship. Even the
concept of intimacy, which constitutes the core of his argument about the import of
joking for human existence, is discussed rather briefly and never adequately defined in
his book (more on Cohen’s thesis later). Given the relative inattention among philoso-
phers to this topic and given that experience suggests that humor can play a signifi-
cant role in friendships and other intimate relationships, there is a pressing need to
investigate some of the potential connections between friendship, intimacy and
humor.
This article is designed to address the neglect of this topic among philosophers by
focusing on some interesting aspects of the relationship between friendship, intimacy
and humor. I begin my analysis by examining the different types of friendships while
highlighting the characteristics of the particular kind of friendship that involves inti-
macy. The second part of this article discusses the concept of intimacy, which has not
received much attention among philosophers. Next, I take a close look at the issue of
humor while distinguishing it from both joking and laughter. I then move to the heart
of this article, which focuses on the question: how can humor enhance intimacy in
friendships? In the final part of this article, I briefly outline some educational implica-
tions that can be gleaned from the analysis of the relationship between friendship,
intimacy and humor.

Friendship
Like many of the Socratic dialogues, Plato’s discussion of friendship in the Lysis
seems to go around in circles endlessly while never reaching any firm conclusions.
More importantly, the account provided in this dialogue is rather narrow, in my view,
in large part because Plato does not get much beyond an instrumental conception of
friendship. Still, Socrates presents one of the main insights of this dialogue when he
argues correctly that friendship implies a mutual relationship between two people in
which each person exhibits affection for the other as opposed to a situation in which
only one individual has feelings for the other.
Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the one
beloved, whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the
friend; or is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they both love
one another? (Jowett, 1956, pp. 15–16)
In her article ‘Friendship and reasons of intimacy’, Diane Jeske develops this
essential feature of friendship much further:
First, of course, friends must have certain mutual attitudes toward one
another, including fondness, affection, and a desire for the other’s compan-
ionship. Friends must be disposed to benefit one another by, for example,
providing emotional support or aid in the pursuit of (at least some) ambi-
tions. Second friends must have a certain history with one another involving
various forms of concerned interaction. People cannot simply decide to
164 Mordechai Gordon

become friends with one another on the spur of the moment. And thirdly,
friendships are necessarily relationships of intimacy: friends must be open
and responsive to one another in ways that lead to mutual understanding.
(Jeske, 2001, pp. 334–335)
In this view, friendships should not be conflated with mere acquaintances, colleagues
or with people such as those Facebook contacts who we know but with whom we do
not have close relationships. Indeed, friendships are those special relationships based
on intimacy, mutual affection and some significant time spent together. Jeske (2001,
p. 335) argues correctly that friendships can be called into question when one of the
two persons is not responsive to the other’s problems and misfortunes or ‘simply takes
no interest in the other’s attitudes, emotions and self-understanding’.
Related to this notion of friendship is Aristotle’s concept of virtue friendship. In the
Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle famously distinguished between three types of friend-
ship——based on utility, pleasure and virtue (McKeon, 1947).1 The first kind of friend-
ship refers to relations between two people who like each other primarily for the utility
that they provide each other (such as two tennis or golf partners). Pleasure friendships
are those connections that people pursue because they find someone pleasant to talk to
or amusing and fun to be around. In either case, what is desired in this type of friend-
ship is not the other person him or herself, but rather his or her usefulness or pleasant-
ness. As such, Aristotle believed that utility and pleasure friendships are incidental and
easily dissolved when one party ceases to be useful or pleasant to the other.
In contrast to both utility and pleasure companionships, virtue friendships are those
that involve two people who value each other for their own sake rather than for some
ulterior of self-seeking motive. As Aristotle described it:
Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly
friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally;
therefore their friendships last as long as they are good——and goodness is
an enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and to his friend,
for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other.
So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualifica-
tion and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them
are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. (McKeon,
1947)2
According to Aristotle’s view, virtue friendships are both permanent and non-
instrumental in the sense that they are valuable for their own sake. Moreover, he
believed that virtue friendships incorporate both the utility and pleasure aspects of
friendship. Since true friends always have the well-being (virtue) of the other in mind,
they are certainly helpful to and enjoy being with each other. In other words, two
people who have a virtuous or true friendship are necessarily both useful and pleasant
to each other. Regardless of whether Aristotle’s analysis of the three types of friend-
ships is accurate, for our purposes it is important to highlight that his notion of virtue
friendship includes some of the same basic characteristics as those identified by Jeske
above, namely, permanence, trust and mutual support.
 Friendship, Intimacy and Humor 165

In his essay ‘Friendship’, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1876) advances our understand-
ing of this concept by arguing that friendship does not entail a perfect harmony or
uniformity of opinion between two persons. Instead, as Jason Scorza (2004, p. 95)
points out, Emerson ‘views friendship as a turbulent union, characterized almost as
much by incivility as by civility, and almost as much by separateness as by unity or
harmony’. In Emerson’s view, true friends are not people who resemble one another
and do not always agree with each other on the important matters of life. Instead,
they challenge each other’s perspectives and values and introduce one another to new
experiences that can help one transcend one’s dogmas and habitual ways of being in
the world.
For Emerson, friendship includes two essential components, truth and tenderness,
which are equally important to his understanding of this concept. As Emerson so elo-
quently states,
A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere. Before him I may think
aloud. I am arrived at last in the presence of a man so real and equal, that I
may drop even those most undermost garments of dissimulation, courtesy
and second thought, which men never put off, and may deal with him with
the simplicity and wholeness with which one chemical atom meets another.
Sincerity is the luxury allowed like diadems and authority, only to the high-
est rank, that being permitted to speak the truth, as having none above it to
court or conform unto. (1876, pp. 193–194)
Emerson explained that in most of our daily interactions with others, pretense and
artificiality rather than directness and honesty are the norm. He wrote that ‘we parry
and fend the approach of our fellow-man by compliments, by gossip, by amusements,
by affairs’ (Emerson, 1876, p. 194). On this view, we tend to hide our true intents
and feelings in most of our everyday communications with others. In contrast, true
friendship is unique in that it allows us to let our guards down and be ourselves in
the face of the other. This is because friends do not require us to conform to prede-
termined patterns of behavior or adhere to conventional standards of discourse.
Tenderness, the second basic component of friendship, has to do with love and
Emerson notes that in most cases people are connected to each other by other
motives such as lust, fear, admiration or financial necessity as opposed to tenderness
(Emerson, 1876, p. 195). Scorza (2004, p. 99) writes that ‘tenderness, when properly
understood as a manner of speaking, demands recognition and respect for the dignity
and autonomy of others’. Yet, Scorza thinks that, for Emerson, tenderness also sug-
gests an attitude of firmness since friends should not relate to each other as if they
were overly delicate or fragile. As someone who put such a big premium on the
principle of self-reliance, Emerson believed that one may be tender towards others
(i.e. love them) without treating them as if they were incapable of making their own
choices.
The above discussion suggests that a wide range of diverse thinkers believe that true
friendships are those special relationships based on mutual affection, a significant time
spent together and intimacy. Learning from Emerson, we may also conclude that a
friendship does not necessarily involve two people who are similar in their personal
166 Mordechai Gordon

views, tastes or lifestyles. Instead, as he argued, friends must be able to be open and
honest with each other and not pretend to be someone that they are not. Friends
must also be able to balance an attitude of tenderness and firmness towards each
other. That is, they need to love one another while not sacrificing their own auton-
omy, dignity and sense of self in the process.

Intimacy
Following Robert Gerstein (1978, p. 79), I wish to argue that an intimate relationship
is one that we value for its own sake rather than one in which two people use each
other or is relatively insignificant for them. Intimacy, in this view, should not be con-
fused with sexual encounters, though it is obvious that many intimate relationships
include the physical aspect. Put differently, the existence of sexual relations between
two people is not a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for intimacy. Gerstein
emphasizes that intimate relationships are characterized by both intensity and signifi-
cance for the individuals involved in them:
An experience of intimacy is first of all an experience of a relationship in
which we are deeply engrossed. It is an experience so intense that it wholly
shapes our consciousness and action. We do not understand ourselves to be
choosing to do this or that, or to be looking here or there as we choose.
Rather, whatever we do, whatever we see, is a product of the experience we
are taking part. (Gerstein, 1978, pp. 76–77)
In Gerstein’s view, intimacy distinguishes those relationships that are very meaningful
and close from ones that are shallow and relatively unimportant.
This understanding of intimacy is much stronger than the one espoused by Cohen
in his analysis of jokes mentioned previously. For Cohen, intimacy ‘is the shared sense
of those in a community. The members know that they are in this community, and
they know that they are joined there by one another’ (Cohen, 1999, p. 28). He
explains that such a community is made up of two basic constituents: a common set
of beliefs, dispositions, prejudices and outlooks; and a shared feeling about something.
However, I agree with Noel Carroll (2000), who argues persuasively that such a con-
ception of intimacy is rather thin.3 For we could easily imagine members of a sport’s
team or book club sharing some beliefs or feelings (about wanting to win or liking
particular types of stories) yet not being fond of or particularly close to each other. In
Aristotelian terms, the problem is that Cohen’s notion of intimacy implies a utilitarian
rather than a virtuous notion of friendship.
The kind of intimacy that exists in close friendships and relationships in general
goes well beyond the sharing of convictions and sentiments that Cohen points to.
Indeed, as Bennett Helm asserts, intimacy implies that we are receptive to having our
friends direct and interpret us and thereby change our interests:
To be directed by your friend is to allow her interests, values, etc. to shape
your own; thus, your friend may suggest that you go to the opera together,
and you may agree to go, even though you have no antecedent interest in
opera. Through this interest, enthusiasm and suggestion …, you may be
 Friendship, Intimacy and Humor 167

moved directly by him to acquire an interest in opera only because he’s

your friend. To be interpreted by your friend is to allow your understanding
of yourself, in particular of your strengths and weaknesses, to be shaped by
your friend’s interpretation of you. (Helm, 2009, p. 10)
Thus, your friend may admire your personal integrity and sense of justice and you
may arrive at a deeper or different understanding of yourself as a result of this inter-
pretation. In short, the existence of intimacy in a relationship indicates that the two
parties allow their identities to be shaped, at least in part, by the other.

Humor
In order to avoid confusions and conceptual errors, I would like to briefly distinguish
humor from both laughter and jokes. Following Morreall’s analysis, I am using the
term laughter to denote ‘a combination of bodily events, including the spasmodic
expulsion of air from the lungs, accompanying sounds, characteristic facial distortions,
and in heavy laughter the shaking of the whole body’ (Morreall, 1987, p. 4). That is,
laughter refers to the physical activity that is caused by and expresses the feelings of a
pleasant psychological shift. Laughter can be produced by a wide range of activities
from tickling to hearing a joke and from regaining safety after being in danger to
watching other people experience misfortune.
Humor refers to ‘that quality of action, speech or writing, which excites amuse-
ment’ (OED) and often results in laughter. Our sense of humor is that capacity that
enables us to identify ironical, cynical, sarcastic, witty, ludicrous and generally funny
expressions, comments or actions. Humor is used here in the broad sense of the term
to signify a variety of activities from self-depreciating and wry remarks to absurd and
hilarious deeds. It can manifest in many different ways including jokes, puns, funny
facial expressions, imitating others, spontaneous comments that amuse people and so
forth. Laughter and amusement are some of the most frequent responses to humor.
However, there are many cases in which people laugh that are not really humorous
(e.g. tickling, running into an old friend on the street, feeling embarrassed).
Jokes represent a particular type of humor, one that is produced in advance (usually
not by the teller), repeatable and created for a wide audience. As Morreall (2009, p.
84) points out, unlike spontaneous humor, jokes are prepared and later performed
from memory or a written text, consist of fictional narratives as opposed to actual
occurrences, and are generally stories that one person creates and another tells. As
such, he believes that jokes are a much lower form of humor than spontaneous
comedic remarks. Regardless of how we rate jokes, for our purposes it is worth
mentioning that humor is a much broader term than jokes since the former refers to a
wide range of comedic activities and can manifest in many other ways besides telling
jokes.
It is also important to emphasize that humor is fundamentally a social experience.4
For one, we laugh much more when we are surrounded by other people than when
we are alone. Indeed, laughter is contagious and it has even been proven to work as a
form of therapy for people who are depressed or just feel sad. Jokes are meant to be
shared with others and comedians know that when the audience is not being amused,
168 Mordechai Gordon

the humor is probably not very funny. Above all, humor can greatly reduce the ten-
sion among people and enable individuals who are different from each other to
get along and even live together in harmony.
In his famous essay entitled In praise of folly, Desiderius Erasmus eloquently cap-
tures the social value of humor and silliness. Written in 1509, this essay is a long
speech made by the goddess Folly on her own behalf in which she argues that it is
foolishness rather than reason that makes possible everything we value most in life:
In sum, no society, no union in life, could be either pleasant or lasting with-
out me [Folly]. A people does not for long tolerate its prince, or a master
tolerate his servant, a handmaiden her mistress, a teacher his student, a
friend his friend, a wife her husband, a landlord his tenant, a partner his
partner, or a boarder his fellow boarder, except as they mutually or by turns
are mistaken, on occasion flatter, on occasion wisely wink, and otherwise
soothe themselves with the sweetness of folly. (Erasmus, 1509/1941, p. 28)
Erasmus’s point is that in order to have harmonious relationships with our col-
leagues, family members or friends we need to be able to overlook some of their
blemishes and laugh when they make mistakes. It is folly and our sense of humor, no
less than reason, which enable us to live together with others, form close relationships
with them and tolerate their shortcomings. And as I will argue in the next section,
when used appropriately and prudently humor can even enhance intimacy in friend-
ships and other close relationships.

Humor, Intimacy and Friendship

The fact that humor can enhance the quality of our relationships with significant oth-
ers suggests that it may have a role to play in building intimacy among friends and
companions. Cohen, whose analysis focuses strictly on jokes, addresses this issue in
part by focusing on the question: why do we want our significant others to appreciate
the same jokes that we like? For Cohen, the reason is not because of altruism but
rather due to
a wish, a need, a longing to share these things, to feel them together. And it
is not quite enough to explain this to say that we are, after all, communal
creatures, although I suppose we are. The other component in the explana-
tion is the fact that I need reassurance that this something inside me, the
something that is tickled by a joke, is indeed something that constitutes an
element of my humanity. I discover something of what it is to be a human
being by finding this thing in me, and then having it echoed in you, another
human being. (Cohen, 1999, p. 31)
According to this view, jokes create intimacy between two people by highlighting
the beliefs and feelings they share in common as well as by providing proof that what
one person finds funny is a genuine human absurdity that the other recognizes too.
Being amused by the same incongruity or silliness in a joke and sharing some feelings
about this joke is enough for Cohen to assume that intimacy is being forged between
 Friendship, Intimacy and Humor 169

two people. However, in his review of Cohen’s book, Carroll points out that when a
professional comedian makes an audience laugh this does not necessarily mean that
he shares some basic feelings and beliefs with the viewers (who may themselves pos-
sess a diverse range of sentiments). Moreover, Carroll reminds us that some people
use jokes, and humor in general, to evade rather than promote intimacy. He also
notes that many conversations, including gossip and shop talk, create a kind of inti-
macy based on shared beliefs and feelings. In short, Carroll (2000, p. 450) rightly
asserts that Cohen is too hasty to discover intimacy when two or more people are sim-
ply laughing at the same joke together.
What we need, then, is a more comprehensive and persuasive account of how
humor in general (not just in jokes) can enhance intimacy in friendships and other
close relationships. In what follows, I provide such an explanation while drawing on
some examples from literature and film, which I believe illustrate the power of humor
to foster intimacy among friends. To begin with, it seems quite obvious that humor
and laughter can increase the pleasure of friendships. In Carroll’s words, ‘laughter
among friends is a pleasure, and one of the pleasures of friendship is the opportunity
to share laughter’ (2002, p. 205). Humor enables us to get beyond the tense moments
that we experience in our friendships and other close relationships and move to a
more comfortable place. Since laughter and humor can increase the pleasure among
friends, it seems reasonable to conclude that they can also lead two people to become
more intimate in the sense of feeling that their relationship is getting closer and
becoming more meaningful.
In contrast, when a friendship between two persons deteriorates, the earlier pleasure
they enjoyed of sharing a joke or just laughing together often begins to dissipate as
well. In such cases, one person’s sense of humor no longer amuses the other and may
even annoy or offend him or her. Summing up this point, Morreall writes that
When two people are quarreling, one of the first things they stop doing
together is laughing; they refuse to laugh at each other’s attempts at humor,
and refuse to laugh together at something incongruous happening to them.
As soon as they begin to laugh once more, we know that the end of the
quarrel is at hand. (Morreall, 1983, p. 115)
Yasmina Reza’s play Art provides an illuminating example of this particular con-
nection between humor and friendship (Reza, 1996). This play is about a man named
Serge who buys a white painting that he loves for 200,000 francs and the reactions of
his friends Marc and Yvan to the painting. Marc, in particular, has a very harsh
response to the purchase, which he regards as ‘shit’, and claims that Serge’s affection
towards the painting threatens to wreck their friendship. Yvan tries in vain to mediate
between his two friends while often experiencing the brunt of their antagonism redi-
rected at him. Interestingly, after the initial confrontation between Serge and Marc
about the painting each one of them complains to Yvan that the other has lost his
sense of humor. First, Marc remarks to Yvan about Serge that ‘He’s always been a
freak, but a freak with a sense of humor. You see, basically, what really upsets me is
that you can’t have a laugh with him any more’. A couple of days later Serge confides
170 Mordechai Gordon

to Yvan that Marc ‘started in with his sardonic laugh … Not a trace of charm … Not
a trace of humor’ (Reza, 1996, pp. 10, 14–15).
At the end of the play, following a near break-up of his 15-year friendship with
Marc, Serge is able to take part in the amusement when both Yvan and Marc refer to
the painting as ‘a piece of white shit’ and burst out in uncontrollable laughter. Indeed,
Serge even encourages Marc to draw on the painting with a felt-tip pen (which he
does) before the three friends go out to enjoy a meal together. Reza’s play shows that
as soon as friends who are quarreling are able to move beyond their rigid perspectives
and take themselves less seriously, their friendship can resume its former course and
even become stronger. It illustrates the point made by Bergson (1913) that laughter is
a social gesture that is used to make fun of people who are behaving in inflexible and
ridiculous ways. Based on the experience of the characters in Art, we can see that
humor and the ability to laugh at ourselves can help us to cope with those tensions
and conflicts that inevitably arise in our friendships.5 By providing pleasure to our
relationships, humor and laughter can also enhance our connection and intimacy with
our significant others.
Aside from increasing the pleasure in friendships, humor and laughter can also
enhance intimacy by exposing our identities and making us vulnerable in the face of
others. As Carroll puts it,
Laughter reveals something about who we are——our beliefs, attitudes, and
emotions——and, for that reason, we are often only willing to be so open
about our sensibilities around friends. We don’t joke with the Pope, though
we may tell jokes about the Pope to friends——to friends rather than to
strangers, since we usually have no idea about their attitudes about religion.
(Carroll, 2002, p. 205)
Carroll’s point is that since laughter exposes our personal whims and quirks, we tend to
laugh in the company of our friends rather than strangers. Yet precisely because humor
and laughter often leave us more exposed and vulnerable, they can lead us to become
more intimate with our friends. That is, intimacy with our significant others can be
forged when we use humor to take risks and disclose our deepest feelings and beliefs.6
One scene that illustrates how friends use humor to expose their beliefs and feelings
in order to become more intimate is in Woody Allen’s famous film Annie Hall. In this
scene, Allen and Annie (Diane Keaton), who have recently started dating, are in a
bookstore when Allen approaches her with a couple of books in his hand on ‘Death
and Dying’ and says that he wants to buy her these books. As Allen explains:
I am obsessed with death I think. It’s a big subject with me; I have a very
pessimistic view of life. You should know this about me if we’re going to go
out. You know, I feel that life is divided into the horrible and the miserable,
those are the two categories. The horrible would be like terminal cases,
blind people, or crippled. I don’t know how they get through life, it’s amaz-
ing to me. And the miserable is everyone else. So when you go through life
you should be thankful that you’re miserable, because you’re very lucky to
be miserable!
 Friendship, Intimacy and Humor 171

As Allen finishes pontificating his rather gloomy take on life, you see Annie laughing
gently with delight and showing no sign of alarm or disgust. This scene, as well as
many others throughout the film, shows that humor can be used to share some per-
sonal information about ourselves and, in so doing, create more intimacy with our
partners or friends. In sharing some private details about ourselves, including ones
that are not particularly flattering, we allow ourselves to be vulnerable in the face of
our significant others and thus open ourselves to cultivating intimacy.
Another way in which humor can enhance intimacy in friendships is by prompting
people to view things from a different perspective and see something in a new light.
Our sense of humor and the capacity to laugh at ourselves involves a willingness to
consider ourselves silly or foolish; it implies an openness to evaluate some of our
habitual ways of thinking or acting in light of the perspectives of our significant others
whose viewpoints and preferences may be very different from our own. Recall that
Emerson argued that friends do not always agree with each other and that ideally they
should challenge each other’s point of view. The point is that by espousing the per-
spectives of our friends and close relations we demonstrate that we care about their
feelings and beliefs and are open to becoming more intimate with them.
A book that illustrates the power of humor to promote intimacy among friends by
getting people to view issues from multiple perspectives is Joseph Heller’s classic novel
Catch-22. Specifically, the friendship between Yossarian and Doc Daneeka exemplifies
how humor enables these two military personnel to maintain a close relation. As a
combat pilot, Yossarian keeps asking his friend Doc Daneeka to ground him from fly-
ing more missions for medical reasons. However, each time Doc Daneeka refuses to
help Yossarian while shifting the focus of the conversation to his own problems:
‘You think you’ve got troubles?’ Doc Daneeka rebuked him grievingly.
‘What about me? I lived on peanuts for eight years while I learned to be a
doctor. After the peanuts, I lived on chicken feed in my own office until I
could build up a practice decent enough to even pay expenses. Then, just
as the shop was finally starting to show a profit, they drafted me. I don’t
know what you’re complaining about’. (Heller, 1994, p. 23)
Doc Daneeka’s outrageously absurd sense of humor enables Yossarian to shift his
focus from his own misery to the suffering of his friend as well as other men in the
squadron. In other words, Doc Daneeka’s self-pitying rambles are designed to get
Yossarian to take himself less seriously, put things in perspective and focus on the
bright side of life. Doc Daneeka’s humor also helps to keep the relationship of these
two men on the light side during these trying times of war. It creates an intimate
bond between the two men who clearly recognize that they share a loathing for this
war and all of the absurdities that it has brought about.
To summarize, my analysis suggests that humor can enhance intimacy in friendship
in at least three ways: by increasing the pleasure among friends, by exposing our iden-
tities and making us vulnerable in the face of others, and by helping people to view
things from a different perspective and see something in a new light. Needless to say,
my contention is not that these are the only ways in which humor and laughter can
increase the intimacy among friends. Moreover, I am not claiming that the existence
172 Mordechai Gordon

of humor is a necessary condition for the development of close relations among

people. Rather, the point is simply that humor and laughter can help to facilitate the
development of intimacy in friendships and other close relationships.

Humor, Intimacy and Education

What are some of the implications for education that can be gleaned from my analysis
of the connections between friendship, intimacy and humor? Before discussing some
implications, it is worth pointing out that I am using education in the broad sense as
opposed to the more narrow sense of schooling. That is, education is used here to
refer to any interaction among human beings in which intellectual learning, emotional
development, or moral and spiritual edification takes place. According to this view,
friends can enlighten each other about many things such as new knowledge that they
were not aware of, implicit feelings that may not be adequately understood, and val-
ues that they are committed to. Thus, our friends often help us to arrive at new
insights about ourselves, the world around us and the various connections between
the two. Some of these insights may be painful or difficult to accept and, as I will
argue, here is where humor can play a significant role.
Consider, for instance, the relationship between Serge and Marc in the play Art
described above. Marc’s callous reaction to Serge’s purchase of the white painting not
only leads the two men to re-evaluate the quality of their friendship but also gets
Serge to examine his own commitments to modern art. However, as long as each of
the two friends takes himself so seriously and sticks to his defensive stance no move-
ment can be made towards analyzing themselves critically or repairing their damaged
friendship. Indeed, in the course of their many heated arguments both Marc and
Serge belittle and mock each other and assert that they now realize that they have
very little in common. Here is a brief exchange between Marc and Serge that illus-
trates the scorn that each one has for the other:
Serge: What do you give a fuck about?
Marc: I give a fuck about you buying that painting. I give a fuck about you
spending two hundred grand on that piece of shit.
Serge: I’m going to tell you what I give a fuck about——since everyone is
coming clean——I give a fuck about your sniggering and insinuations, your
suggestion that I also think this picture is a grotesque joke. You’ve denied
that I could feel a genuine attachment to it. You’ve tried to set up some
kind of loathsome complicity between us. And that’s what made me feel,
Marc, to repeat your expression, that we have less and less in common
recently, your perpetual display of suspicion. (Reza, 1996, pp. 44–45)
At this pinnacle point of the play, it is clear that Serge and Marc are so hurt and
angry with each other that they are only interested in scoring points rather than listen-
ing to the other and trying to understand where he is coming from. As such, neither
man is really open to learning anything new about oneself, the other or their friend-
ship. Likewise, at this point neither one is able to be enlightened by the other in any
 Friendship, Intimacy and Humor 173

way. Taking themselves so seriously and sticking to their defenses precludes Serge
and Marc from engaging in a genuine dialogue, one that could possibly lead them to
some new insights or to alter their rigid and hurtful stances.
Only at the very end of the play, when the two men stop attacking each other and
let go of some of their defenses, do they become open to learning something signifi-
cant about their relationship. Summarizing the transformation that Serge and Marc
went through, Yvan remarks sentimentally:
After Serge, in the act of pure madness, had demonstrated to Marc that he
cared more about him than he did about his painting, we went and had din-
ner, chez Emile. Over dinner, Serge and Marc took the decision to try to
rebuild a relationship destroyed by word and deed. At a certain moment,
one of them used the expression ‘trial period’ and I burst into tears. (Reza,
1996, p. 62)
Yvan’s testimony suggests that Serge came to appreciate that his relationship with
Marc was more important to him than his painting (which is why he allowed Marc to
draw on his white painting). Serge’s ‘crazy’ gesture enabled Marc to recognize that
the former had never lost his sense of humor and that he really cared about Marc’s
opinions. Ultimately, both realized that they could still be close friends as long as they
do not expect the other to have the same opinions and feelings all of the time. This
realization——that friendship does not depend on unwavering consent and that it can
thrive even when there is dissent——is rather common for intimate friends who have
become entangled in a serious argument that seems to call their friendship into
question.
The example of Serge and Marc in Yasmina Reza’s play Art demonstrates that
humor and laughter can play a major role in repairing friendships that have been jeop-
ardized or damaged. Humor can help to mend relationships because it enables us to
step back and keep in perspective our friends’ annoying words and deeds so that we
can focus our energies on the more important matters in life. Equally important is
that humor can serve as a tool that assists us in educating people, including our
friends and significant others, especially when the message that needs to be delivered
is somber or painful. Humor is a very effective way to convey the truth because it per-
mits frankness to be less threatening than a more confrontational style of discourse.
As Sammy Basu (1999, p. 391) argues, ‘comedy can make palatable what is otherwise
hard to swallow’. Learning from the case of Serge and Marc, we can see that humor
can get two friends who are fighting to stop attacking one another and simply listen
to each other so that a genuine dialogue can be launched. That is, humor can make it
easier for friends who are going through a conflict to cease blaming and begin to
really listen to each other.
In conclusion, I am not claiming that humor and laughter are always enlightening
or beneficial; obviously, they can also have negative outcomes for our relationships
with friends and significant others. For example, jokes, sarcastic remarks or ethnic
humor can be misinterpreted by our friends, leading them to feel offended or mistrust
us, and possibly even damage our relationships with them. As such, humor is really
no different than many other human responses (like sharing with our friends how we
174 Mordechai Gordon

feel about something that they did), which can have both positive and negative
impacts. In addition, humor, as has been stated before, can be used to evade rather
than promote intimacy with our friends and significant others. Still, acknowledging
these caveats, my argument in this article has been two-fold: first, that when used cor-
rectly humor and laughter can help to facilitate the development of intimacy in friend-
ships; and second, that humor can assist us in educating (in the sense of instructing
or enlightening) our significant others.

Notes
1. See Nicomachean ethics, Books VII and IX (McKeon, 1947).
2. Nicomachean ethics, Book VII, 8, chap. 3 (McKeon, 1947, p. 475).
3. See Carroll’s fine analysis of Cohen’s book entitled ‘Intimate laughter’ (Carroll, 2000).
4. Morreall develops this point further in his book Comic relief (2009, p. 59).
5. For a discussion of some of the benefits laughing at ourselves, see Gordon (2010).
6. I am certainly aware of the fact that some people use laughter and humor to evade rather
that create intimacy. My contention is not that humor and laughter necessarily enhance inti-
macy but rather that they can often facilitate this process.

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