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Resilient Strategies of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) From the

Context of Nigerian National Security Aminu Hayatu Sanusi Doctor of
Philosophy Universiti Utara Malaysia 2018

Research · July 2018

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RESILIENT STRATEGIES OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF
NIGERIA (IMN) FROM THE CONTEXT OF NIGERIAN
NATIONAL SECURITY

AMINU HAYATU SANUSI

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA
2018
RESILIENT STRATEGIES OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF
NIGERIA (IMN) FROM THE CONTEXT OF NIGERIAN
NATIONAL SECURITY

AMINU HAYATU SANUSI (901294)

A Thesis submitted to the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government, in

fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy
Universiti Utara Malaysia
 PERMISSION TO USE

In presenting this thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree

from Universiti Utara Malaysia, I agree that the Universiti Library may make it freely
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for the copying of this thesis
in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purpose may be granted by my
supervisor(s) or, in their absence, by the Dean of Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of
Government. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis or
parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It
is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to Universiti Utara
Malaysia for any scholarly use which may be made of any material from my thesis.

Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of materials in this thesis, in
whole or in part, should be addressed to:

Dean (Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government)

UUM College of Law, Government and International Studies

Universiti Utara Malaysia

06010 UUM Sintok

Kedah Darul Aman

i
 ABSTRACT

In the contemporary global system, concerns over approaches and processes of radical
socio- political movements and groups, as well as their implications to national
security and stability, have long been a priority agenda for the national security in
many states. This study focuses on the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), to identify
and assess IMN’s resilient strategies and the impact of such on Nigerian national
security. The study is situated within a framework of a triangular conflation of Political
Process Theory (PPT), Strategic Action Fields Theory (SAFs) and Securitization
Theory (ST). The study adopted qualitative method to collect and analyze both primary
and secondary data. The primary data were generated from purposive interview
alongside focus group discussion, whereas, the secondary data were derived from
document and literature review. Using Braun & Clerk’s describe-compare-relate
deductive model of data analysis, the study found that the IMN makes use of academic
Forum, martyrs foundation, Hurrahs-paramilitary guards, ISMA Medical Care
Initiative, Resource Forum, Communications Forum and Sisters Forum, as political
opportunity strategies. In a similar vein, the IMN uses fodiyyah philosophy, narratives,
unity week, public procession and Mut’ah marriage as framing process strategies. The
third category of strategy used by the IMN is based on mobilizing structures; these are
Iran/Hezbollah influence, intergroup victimhood solidarity, international
organizations, ancillary organs and paradigm shift from Islamism to Realpolitik. These
strategies for the IMN translate into more resource mobilization vis-à-vis patronage,
domestic and external support and solidarity, wider popularity and greater influence.
Therefore, as against the popular conviction that the IMN stockpiles arms to achieve a
regime change, the group grows more resilient by utilizing these strategies as sources
of soft power against the Nigerian state. The implication of these strategies of the IMN
on the national security of the Nigerian state are both in terms of vandalizing public
properties and tampering with the right of others during processions as well as
connection with foreign actors to interfere in the internal affairs of the Nigerian state
leaving the narrow and broad security interest of the Nigerian state and sovereignty
with much to be desired. In order to effectively deter or contain any of such perceived
group threats to her national security, the Nigerian state instead of the application of
force must implore soft approach by putting in place different mechanisms to improve
the socio-economic and cultural conditions (in terms of want and fear) of majority of
her vulnerable population that is mostly exploited by the IMN or other non-state actors
against state interest.

Keywords: Counterterrorism, Islamic Movement, Fodiyyah, National Security,

Nigeria

ii
 ABSTRAK

Di dalam sistem global kontemporari, kebimbangan mengenai pendekatan dan proses

pergerakan kumpulan radikal sosio-politik serta implikasinya terhadap keselamatan
dan kestabilan negara telah lama menjadi agenda utama kepada keselamatan nasional
di banyak negara. Kajian ini memberi tumpuan kepada Pergerakan Islam di Nigeria
(IMN), mengenal pasti dan menilai strategi kuat IMN dan kesannya terhadap
keselamatan nasional Nigeria. Kajian ini menggunakan kerangka triangulasi di antara
Teori Proses Politik (PPT), Teori Tindakan Strategik (SAFs) dan Teori Pensekuritian
(ST). Kajian ini menggunakan kaedah kualitatif untuk mengumpul dan menganalisis
kedua-dua data primer dan sekunder. Data primer diperoleh daripada temubual
bertujuan bersama kumpulan fokus dan data sekunder diperoleh daripada dokumen
dan kajian literatur. Dengan menggunakan model deduktif Menjelas-Membanding-
Mengkait Braun & Clerk untuk analisis data, kajian ini mendapati bahawa IMN
menggunakan forum akademik, Yayasan Martir, Hurras-pengawal keselamatan separa
tentera, ISMA inisiatif rawatan perubatan islam, forum sumber, forum komunikasi dan
forum wanita sebagai strategi peluang berpolitik. Dalam hal yang sama, IMN
menggunakan falsafah Fodiyyah, kaedah naratif, program minggu perpaduan,
perarakan awam dan perkahwinan mut'ah sebagai proses merangka strategi. Kategori
strategi ketiga yang digunakan oleh IMN adalah berdasarkan struktur mobilisasi; iaitu
menggunakan pengaruh Iran/ Hizbullah, perpaduan antara kesukarelawanan,
organisasi antarabangsa, pertubuhan sokongan dan anjakan paradigma dari islamisme
kepada politik sebenar. Strategi-strategi ini memberi peluang kepada IMN untuk lebih
banyak menggerakkan sumber pembiayaan, sokongan perpaduan domestik dan
antarabangsa, meluaskan populariti dan pengaruh yang lebih besar. Oleh itu, di sebalik
tanggapan yang lazim terhadap IMN bahawa ia menyimpan stok-stok senjata untuk
kepentingan politiknya; IMN dapat mengubah tanggapan ini dan seterusnya
berkembang teguh dengan menggunakan strategi-strategi yang telah disebutkan
sebagai sumber strategi kuasa lembut terhadap negara Nigeria. Implikasi amalan
strategi ini oleh IMN terhadap keselamatan nasional Nigeria kedua-duanya dari segi
kehilangan nyawa dan harta benda serta pencerobohan dan campur tangan dalam hal
ehwal dalaman Nigeria dari pihak luar yang mengakibatkan kepentingan keselamatan
dan kedaulatan negara perlu dilindungi. Untuk menangani kesan negatif strategi IMN
terhadap keselamatan nasional, Nigeria perlu meningkatkan taraf sosioekonomi
majoriti penduduknya yang terdedah kepada ancaman yang kebanyakannya
dieksploitasi oleh IMN.

Kata Kunci: Keganasan Balas, Pergerakan Islam Fodiyyah, Keselamatan Negara,

Nigeria

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I remain profusely grateful first to almighty Allah, who in his infinite mercy grants me
the ability to compile this dissertation.
Secondly, to my indefatigable supervisors Assoc. Dr. Prof. Muhammad Fuad Othman
and Dr. Muhammad Dino Khairri B. Sharifuddin both who debated ideas with me and
were yet patient and accommodative of my shortcomings throughout.
I also wish to thank the staff of Graduate School of Government for their support and
encouragement during the course of the study.
In addition, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my parents Hajia Fatima
Yahaya and Engineer Hayatu Sanusi and my lovely wife Raliya Aminu Hayatu and
our son Hayat Hayat (Little Engineer), as well as my sisters, brothers and friends, all
of who could not wait to see the successful completion of this daunting task and who
all missed me while I was away.

iv
 DEDICATION

For the sake of

Almighty Allah

To

Prophet Muhammad (saw).

To

Innan Amadu, Fatima Yahaya, Hayatu Sanusi, Ummita, and Little Engr.

And to the blessed memories of

Waziri Lawal, Waziri Sanusi, Alkalin Lardi, Hajiya ‘Yar Inna and Yahaya Sanusi.

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PERMISSION TO USE ............................................................................................. 1

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ ii

ABSTRAK ................................................................................................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................................................................... iv

DEDICATION ............................................................................................................ v

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... vi

LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................... x

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. xi

LIST OF APPENDICES ......................................................................................... xii

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1

1.0 Introductory Background ......................................................................................... 1

1.2 Historical Background of the Study ........................................................................ 4
1.2.1 Highlight on Global Islamist Movements .................................................... 5
1.2.2 Historical Evolution of the IMN ................................................................ 10
1.2.2.1 The Period of Muslim Students Society (MSS) .................................. 14
1.2.2.2 Iran and the period of Islam only: The Dynamics of a Relationship .. 15
1.2.2.3 The Emergence of Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN).................... 16
1.2.2.4 Biography of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky: Leader of the IMN .......... 17
1.2.2.5 IMN’s Imagined Organizational Structure.......................................... 20
1.2.3.1 Colonial Period-Independence (1900-1960) ....................................... 25
1.2.3.2 Military Junta ...................................................................................... 28
1.2.3.3 Civil Rule ............................................................................................ 30
1.3 Problem Statement ................................................................................................. 33
1.4 Research Objectives .............................................................................................. 36
1.5 Research Questions................................................................................................ 36
1.6 Significance of the Research ................................................................................. 36
1.7 Scope of the Research............................................................................................ 40
1.7.1 Strategy scope ............................................................................................ 40

vi
 1.7.2 Unit of Analysis ......................................................................................... 41
1.8 Definition of Key Concepts ................................................................................... 41
1.8.1 Resilience ................................................................................................... 41
1.8.2 Strategy ...................................................................................................... 42
1.8.3 National Security ....................................................................................... 46
1.9 Research Method ................................................................................................... 47
1.9.1 Qualitative Method .................................................................................... 47
1.9.1.1 Phenomenological Approach .............................................................. 48
1.9.1.2 Sampling Method ................................................................................ 49
1.9.1.2.1 Purposive Sampling Method ........................................................ 49
1.9.1.3 Source of Data ..................................................................................... 49
1.9.1.3.1 In-depth Interview ........................................................................ 51
1.9.1.3.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) ................................................... 55
1.9.1.3.3 Document Review ........................................................................ 57
1.9.1.4 Data Collection Procedure and Instruments ........................................ 59
1.9.1.5 Population of the Study ....................................................................... 62
1.9.1.6 Data Analysis methods, tools and techniques ..................................... 62
1.9.1.6.1 Content/Document Analysis ......................................................... 64
1.9.1.6.2 Thematic Method ......................................................................... 65
1.9.1.6.3 Thematic Process .......................................................................... 65
1.10 Organization of Chapters ..................................................................................... 67

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 68

2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 68

2.2 Strategy: Perspectives and Paradigms ................................................................... 69
2.2.1 International Strategy ................................................................................. 70
2.2.2 Business Organizations Strategy (BOS) .................................................... 77
2.2.3 Strategy as Practice (S-as-p) ...................................................................... 79
2.2.4 Social Movement Strategy (SMS) ............................................................. 84
2.3 Islamism, Politics and Secularism ......................................................................... 95
2.3.1 Colonial-Secularity and the Muslim World ............................................. 100
2.3.2 Modernity and Islamic Response............................................................. 108

vii
 2.3.3 Islamist Movements in Perspective ......................................................... 126
2.3.3.1 Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood (MB) ................................................... 135
2.3.3.2 Turkey: Gülen Movement (Hizmet Service)..................................... 137
2.4 Security Discourse ............................................................................................... 144
2.4.1 Classical/Realist [State-centric] Framework ........................................... 145
2.4.2 Neorealist Security ................................................................................... 146
2.4.2.1 Copenhagen-Securitization Perspective ............................................ 151
2.4.2.2 The Human/New Security Approach ................................................ 152
2.5 IMN and the Nigerian State ................................................................................. 157
2.5.1 Research Gap ........................................................................................... 163
2.6 Theoretical Framework........................................................................................ 164
2.6.1 Political Process Theory (PPT) ................................................................ 164
2.6.2 Strategic Action Fields Theory (SAFs) ................................................... 167
2.6.3 Securitization Theory (ST) ...................................................................... 169

CHAPTER THREE STRATEGY HANDLES AND TOOLS ........................... 174

3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 174

3.2 Rational Actor Model (RAM) ............................................................................. 174
3.3 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) ............................................................................ 178
3.4 Game Theory ....................................................................................................... 179
3.5 Chess Strategy ..................................................................................................... 181
3.6 Confusing the Enemy .......................................................................................... 181
3.7 SWOT Analysis ................................................................................................... 182
3.8 Fundamental Elements of Strategic Thought Process ......................................... 183

CHAPTER FOUR DATA INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS ................. 185

4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 185

4.2 Respondents’ bio data .......................................................................................... 187
4.3 Political Opportunities ......................................................................................... 189
4.3.1 IMN Specialized Organs .......................................................................... 189
4.3.1.1 Academic Forum ............................................................................... 191
4.3.1.2 Shuhada (Martyrs) Foundation ......................................................... 195
4.3.1.3 Hurras (Para-military Guards)........................................................... 198

viii
 4.3.1.4 ISMA Medical Care Initiative ........................................................... 202
4.3.1.5 Resource Forum ................................................................................ 203
4.3.1.6 Communications Forum .................................................................... 207
4.3.1.7 Sisters Forum .................................................................................... 210
4.4 Summary of findings ........................................................................................... 213

CHAPTER FIVE FRAMING PROCESS STRATEGIES ................................. 215

5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 215

5.2 Fodiyyah Philosophy (Fodiodism) ...................................................................... 215
5.3 Narrative as Politics of signification ................................................................... 227
5.4 Usbu’ul Wahda (Unity Week) ............................................................................. 235
5.5 Public processions ............................................................................................... 237
5.6 Mut’ah (Temporary Marriage) ............................................................................ 243
5.7 Summary of findings ........................................................................................... 246

CHAPTER SIX MOBILIZING STRUCTURES ................................................ 248

6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 248

6.2 Iran/Hezbollah Influence ..................................................................................... 249
6.3 Inter-Group (Victimhood) Solidarity................................................................... 259
6.4 International Groups and Organizations .............................................................. 263
6.5 Corporate Registration: Ancillary organs as IMN ............................................... 267
6.6 Paradigm Shift: From Islamism to Realpolitik .................................................... 271
6.7 Summary of findings ........................................................................................... 277

CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ................ 280

7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 280

7.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 280
7.4 Recommendations ............................................................................................... 283
7.4.1 Future Research ....................................................................................... 283
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 285

ix
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Showing Relationship between research questions, data collection

procedure and instruments. ..................................................................... 61
Table 2.1 Showing Summary of Strategy Approaches ........................................... 94
Table 2.2 Showing Mere Classification of Islamic Periods Based on
Ideology/Mission and Strategy ............................................................. 107
Table 2.3 General Ideological Quantinum of Islamist Movements across the
Globe ..................................................................................................... 133
Table 2.4 Showing Basic Approaches to the Concept of Security ........................ 156
Table 4.1 Showing General Profile of Interview Informants ................................ 188
Table 4.2 Showing IMN’s Specialised Organs ..................................................... 191
Table 5.1 Showing Approximate number of IMN Fodiyyah Schools .................. 217
Table 6.1 Showing the Periodic Distribution of IMN’s Positions on Issues of
National Allegiance and Patriotism in Nigeria between the Span of
Late 1970s/Early 1980s-Date. ............................................................... 274
Table 6.2 Showing Grand Summary of Research Findings .................................. 279

x
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Showing IMN’s Imagined Organizational Structure based on Field

Work Data ............................................................................................... 24
Figure 1.2 Showing Basic Elements of the Concept of Strategy .............................. 46
Figure 1.3 Showing Triangular Source of Data. ....................................................... 51
Figure 2.1 Showing Basic Elements of International Strategy ................................. 75
Figure 2.2 Showing Basic Elements Business Organization Strategy ..................... 78
Figure 2.3 Showing Basic Elements of Strategy as Practice .................................... 84
Figure 2.4 Showing Basic Elements of Social Movement Strategy ......................... 92
Figure 2.5 Showing triangular conflation of Political Process, Strategic Action
Fields and Securitization Theories. ....................................................... 164
Figure 4.1 Political opportunity strategies implications on National security ....... 214
Figure 5.1 Framing process strategies implications on National security .............. 247
Figure 6.1 Mobilizing structures strategies implications on National security ...... 278

xi
 LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A : Interview Questions ........................................................................ 307

Appendix B : Transcription Coding Conventions Used ....................................... 308
Appendix C : Sample of Interview Transcription ................................................. 309
Appendix D : Data Collection Letter .................................................................... 310
Appendix E : Field Work Pictures ........................................................................ 311
Appendix F : Sample of Reviewed Documents on IMN ...................................... 313
Appendix G : Sample of IMN Pictures ................................................................. 324
Appendix H : IMN Website .................................................................................. 335
Appendix I : Nigerian Security vs IMN ............................................................. 336
Appendix J : IMN defies ICJ in reply .................................................................. 337
Appendix K : Iran Intelligence .............................................................................. 338
Appendix L : El-Zakzaky’s Funtua Declaration message of Non-allegiance
to the Nigerian state and constitution ............................................. 339

xii
 CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introductory Background

…Conflict frequently motivates interactions between those who have

power and those who do not and that this conflict is at the heart of
strategy. King & Walker (2014).

The problematique of this study which is to analyse the resilient strategies of the

Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and its implications on the Nigeria national

security, is partly provoked by the recurrent clash and national security questions

arising from the activities and constant tension between the IMN and the Nigerian

state. The endurance of the clash between the two has overtime worsened as result of

security questions, thereby generating serious controversy within and outside the

confines of the Nigerian state.

Despite the fact that the IMN is an Islamically inclined movement, this study is by no

means about IMN’s religious ideology, or its Shi’a sectarian creed, or even religious

activities, rather, it’s about IMN as a resistant movement whose choices of action in

the Nigerian political space makes it gain greater resilience and whose growing

resilience is perceived as an emerging threat against the Nigerian national security. So

while IMN is perceived as a political competitor and struggler, the three most

important concepts in the study are Resilience, Strategy and National security. Where

Islamic issues of the movement is presented in the study (like literature review and

historical background), it is for the purpose of the group’s history, clarification,

reference or making a point.

1
A growing concern therefore to understand the problem is evident in the various

endeavours of scholars, intellectuals, analysts and policy makers alike from different

perspectives. Solomon, & Steele, (2017), in his work Micro-moves in international

relations theory for example, observes that:

...as evidenced by growing trends in studies of practices, emotions

and the everyday, there is continuing broad dissatisfaction with
grand or structural theory’s value without ‘going down’ to ‘lower
levels’ of analysis where structures are enacted and contested…

It is in this line of concern that this study is premised on studying and analysing

activities (taken in this as strategies) of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and

the implications of these strategies to Nigerian national security.

The IMN is an Islamic Movement whose major motive was to instate Islamic political

system by challenging Nigeria’s currently practiced western style democracy. Even

under various military governments, the movement demonstrated (and still does) vocal

opposition to the secularity of the Nigerian State as a main preoccupation. Its stated

mission is to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria (see Appendix M), which has kept it

in intermittent skirmishes with government security forces. On the occasion of its

silver jubilee, on April 10, 2005, the movement declared that its main aim is “the

establishment of an Islamic system and state, no more no less. Umar (2001).

In its quest towards the supposed achievement of its aim, the group’s activities and

proclamations have been perceived as posing direct threat and, therefore, bred constant

clash with the Nigerian state’s security apparatuses.

The IMN through its activities has, on different occasions, triggered and provoked

reactions from security apparatus of the Nigerian state, resulting in an enduring clash

between the two which hardly takes place without the loss of lives and properties. The

2
periodic clash between the IMN and the Nigerian state, until the most recent one,

shoots the problem to its very climax, leaving the Nigerian state with much to be

desired, in terms of national security. The most recent clash, for example, between the

IMN and the Nigerian state or its Army apparatus in Zaria, on the 12th of December,

2015 and an earlier one, the 25th of July, 2014, is a full pledge problem which calls for

investigation because of its multidimensional effects on the security of the Nigerian

regime in particular and the state in general.

The tragic nature of the latest clash which dominated the political, security, and even

international discourse and which saw the immediate setting up of Judicial

Commission of Inquiry (JCI) by the Kaduna State government, to investigate the

unfortunate incidence and its ramifications, as well as the amendment of the law on

religious activities, is a clear indication of the heightened nature of the security threat

perception by the Nigerian state against the IMN.

The IMN overtime has become a sort of leading agent of radical opposition and

contentious politics in Nigeria. This is because apart from the enduring tension

between it and Nigerian state on the one hand, there also exist rivalry and occasional

clash between the IMN and the Sunni Islamic sect members, and on the other,

community members in certain stranglehold areas of the IMN in Northern Nigeria.

While for some, the origin of all this is domestic politics, for others it is largely

traceable to external factors.

Many commendable works such as Gent, (2003) Ostien, (2012), Doukhan, (2016)

Zenn, (2013), Karmon, (2007), etc, have attempted to explain some of the issues

concerning IMN in Nigeria, but it would either be historical evolution, (see Hassan

2015), the group’s religious activities, (see Isa, 2014), external connections, and

3
growth and development, (see Ostien, 2012; Doukhan, (2016) and Zenn, (2013), etc,

thus, leaving out the dimension of the factors of the group’s resilience (despite various

suppressive attempts by the Nigerian state, to contain the group’s anti-state activities.

In support of the fact of the growing relevance of strategy to contemporary groups and

social movements, Salwen, (1998) aptly puts that:

…analysis of Islamist movements’ behaviour also generally

emphasizes the role of authoritarian states in constraining them,
failing to take into account the organizations’ own agency and the
ways in which organizational structure and nature influence the
choice of strategies for achieving objectives.

To fill in the gaps of existing works, this study uniquely treats the IMN as a political

group whose activities as characterized by strategy for resilience in a contentious and

competitive Nigerian political environment affect national security.

1.2 Historical Background of the Study

This section provides the historical background of the subjects of the study

phenomenon. It covers the evolutionary process of the IMN and a historical summary

of the Nigerian state and its periodic security issues. It also briefly highlights the

evolution of Islamist Movements right from the time of the prophet, the splits and

eventual emergence of Islamist Movements of the modern era. The section covers

highlight on global Islamist Movements, historical evolution of the IMN, biography of

Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky-leader of the IMN, and historical contexts of security

challenges in Nigeria. The whole essence is to see the nature and manner as well as

the evolutionary dynamics and relationships of Islamist Movements in line with the

interest, objective and context of this research.

4
1.2.1 Highlight on Global Islamist Movements

The whole essence under this sub-heading is to see the impact of the evolutionary

dynamics and relationships of Islam in the light and context of this research. Islamic

movement was first initiated by the prophet of Islam Mohammed (SAW) aided by his

successors in 662AD. This was in the early Seventh century when the prophet doubled

as both religious and political leader (Rubin, 2010). This period was however viewed

as the Golden Age of Islam in terms of both piety and remarkable military and political

successes. In a similar vein Islam continued to expand with the activities of the

immediate successive Caliphs (Abu-Bakr, Umar, Usman and Aliyu and Mu’awuyah

and their subsequent successors) all of whom in different capacities have tried to

expand the horizons of Islam beyond its original geographical enclaves.

This continued through the conquering of other societies and dynamic and kingdoms

as well. But as different and factions as well as splits continue to manifest themselves

due to differences in understandings, interpretations, perspective, narrative etc., intra-

Islamic factions, wars and counters wars kept deepening overtime. In the general sense

however, Islam enjoyed the remarkable success of consolidating its base and support

in the cities of Mecca and Medina and even beyond. The defeat for example of the

Muslim army of both the Persian and Byzantine empires as well as the eventual spread

of the religion around 637 C.E through the extensive creation of new empires cutting

across Modern day Afghanistan in the east, into the hinterlands Egypt and North

Africa, and up to Andulus (modern day Spain) West wards, has been a remarkable

success period for Islamic mission across the globe.

However, Islamic movement in the modern sense was conceived as reactionary force

against colonialism and eventually as status-and challengers who seek to replace

5
secularism with Islam systems. The history of contemporary Islamism and movements

started in the Arab World, particularly with the ideas, writings and actions of Islamic

scholars like Hassan-al-Banna (1906-1949) who founded the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood in 1928. That is to say that though Islam has existed for almost 1,400

years, but the radical Islamist political philosophy is a modern creation Rubin (2010).

The reactions of these Islamic scholars were in order to tackle and reject European

domination through colonialist imperial occupation Islamist personalities states to

activate their positions. In search for permanent solutions therefore Islamic scholars

like Muhammed Abdu (1849-1905) in Egypt, Rashid Rida (1865-1935) have had

consistently called to the return of the Islamic early period. This was period that saw

the emergence of Salafism through rapid growth of madrasas in place like Egypt,

Tunisia, morocco etc. Wickham (2013).

As these Islamic activities continued to spread, and with the founding of Muslim

Brotherhood, the cardinal principle of Hassan-al-Banna who was himself influenced

by Rashid Rida was the rejection of secularism and western foreign economic and

military domination and its eventual replacement with dynamic political system i.e.

“din wa dawla (religion and state) Jordan (Islamic action)” front.

Starting from the declining period of the last Islamic Khilafah the Ottoman Empire at

about 100 years ago, the time it was called the sick man of the world, the Ottoman

Empire finally fell at the time of World War I and eventually gave way to what is now

called the Middle East Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.

Again after another 100 years, these are areas that were created by French and English

empirical periods including even Lebanon and Palestine, remained secularist states

6
with dominants interests of Arab nationalism against the Ottoman Empire which was

based on an Arab nation.

Then came after about 50 years the rise of different interest, nationalist cold war

rightist and leftist tends etc. these tendencies have had ended the pseudo-liberal

regimes in the region especially Iraq, Syria to be replaced by military coup de etre

regimes. This development paved the way for a renewed enmity and rivalry between

the evolutionary military regime and the proliferating Pan-Arabists reactionaries. So

the frame of most of these Pan Arabism reactionaries later paved the way for the third

era which is the era of Islamist movement who now claim to be the custodians of the

solutions of the Arab world. Danielson, (2007)

Therefore, immediately after WWII, these countries are caught up in cold war alliances

and pro-nationalist groups and agitations. But after the cold war the leftists’ weakness

or disappearance gave way to the Islamist movement that were literate suppressed by

the dominant pan Arab movement. This was the period of the emergence of Al-Qaeda

Mujahedeen in Afghanistan; it was then a positive thing even supported and influenced

by the US. Al-Qaida and other Islamist movement continued to spread and mushroom

throughout the Middle East Taliban in Pakistan. And then around the late 1970s and

early 1980s we say the birth of the Sharia Iranian Islamic revolution through

militarizing and radicalizing it’s with the purpose of spreading Iranian influence in the

region and beyond.

The distinct nature of the era of Islamist movements in the Arab world saw the

existence of many and variety of national and international players i.e. other nation

states international organization, civil societies, sectarian groups and alliances etc.

7
Balfour and Pioppi, (2008) in “Idealist Mass Movements: External Actors and Political

Change in the Arab World”, have possibly developed their own argument on the native

and dynamics and evolving strategies and political programmes of islamist movements

in the Arab world based on two broad authentically positions”.

The first is the integration Islamist movements and the Arab world into the global

liberal reform processes. These reform processes can be seen in terms of

democratization endeavours (if there is genuinely anything like that) as well as the

charging ideologies of Islamist movements towards moderation and political inclusion

rather than strict Islamism as their traditional past would suggest.

By contrast, the second position is the reconcilability of political Islam with liberal

democracy that some of these islamist movements still hold. This position is

perpetuating the struggle between these anti-democratic fundamentalist islamist

movements and their authoritarian regimes of the region-the totality of what ends up

posing serious security threats to the local populace in the region or respective

sovereign entities of the Arabs World.

As Brown et al, (2006) believe, the most islamist movements have at one time or the

other in their respective histories, accepted to concede to a basic democratic rules and

even wisely participate in full democratic processes of their countries. But due to the

autocratic or actual failure to live up to their expectations these movements on parties

end up of the states reverting to earlier positions by withdrawing from the political

participation (case of MB in Egypt). As valid as Balfour and Pioppi’s argument may

be, it can be said to have underestimated other forces and interests intervene in the

societies of the Arab world which have the capacity to affect the dynamics of these

islamist movement and political parties.

8
There are some example sectarian ideological play-cards that have evolved overtime

to influence the nature and strategies or general politics of these islamist movements

in the Arab world. Over generalized the experiences of the Arab world as if the Arab

world is a homogenous entity that is devoid of geographical and language or historical

specifies. What about Egypt in Africa and Iraq in the middle east? What about Saudi

Arabia’s constitutional monarchical state and Non-Arab speaking Iranian Shia state

and so on?

To further understand Balfour and Pioppi, anyway, they have similarly emphasized on

the understandability of the socio-economic interests of the constituencies of these

mass Islamist movements vis-à-vis their ideational representations. So all or most

Islamic movement leader are made characteristics for both the good and bad

movements, right from the time of the prophet and beyond. Therefore, the nature and

goals as well as approaches or strategies of these Islamist movements always depend

on their environmental circumstances.

The classical Islamist movements for example have sharp contrast with contemporary

ones. This in the sense that the letter, such influences as foreign and modern-state

relations do not exist in the past.

In a nutshell, it is, therefore, easy to see that the historical evolution viz-a-vis the

politics and strategies of Islamist movements always depend on the historical, socio-

economic, cultural, geographical and political circumstances, conditions and forces

and interests surrounding them.

Those Islamist Movements which existed during the reign of colonialism for example,

have their distinct outlook from those in the post-colonial or specifically globalization

9
age; similarly, those that existed during the uni-polar or bi-polar have contrasts with

those in the liberal or neoliberal period; so also those in the Eastern Europe, Middle

East, North and West Africa etc.

The beginning of 20th century has witnessed the mushrooming of Islamist Movements

as reactions to colonialism and widespread and resilience as reaction to different forms

of crises associated with new developments in the 21 st century.

Specifically, political Islam was or less at the background until around the mid-1980s

when the Berlin Walls gave way for Islam to begin to emerge as a new anti-western

challenge agent through the springing up and growth of many anti-communist/anti-

west Islamist groups and social forces and movements in different places like

Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, North and West Africa etc. Turam (2007).

1.2.2 Historical Evolution of the IMN

The foundation of Islamic Movement in Nigeria was laid initially as a result of the

contact with Arabians through the Trans Saharan trade across the West African Sub-

region. After several years, this was to be succeeded by another milestone Islamic

Resurgent reform (Jihad) activity by Sheikh Usman Bin Fodio which conquered most

part of Northern Nigeria.

However, in the modern day Nigeria, Islamism in the modern sense of it is traceable

to the activities of the influential scholar Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi through

whom the Sunni ideology mainly made its way into Nigeria McCormack in Rubin

(2010). It was in fact due to Gumi’s influence that the first Pan-Nigerian Islamic

Organization-the Jama’atu Nasrul Islam (JNI) was established. The JNI eventually

became the coordination umbrella of all formal Islamic association beginning with

10
Sheikh Gumi’s Izalatul Bid’ah waIqamatussunnah (Izalah) in 1978. The Izalah whose

approach was quiet strategic had taken advantage of its Anti-Sufi variant of Islamism

to gain massive followership through the effective use of both print and broadcast

media, sermons, public lectures, Madrasas including women etc.

The competition between the new Izalah association and the old Sufi brotherhood was

said to have provoked the emergence and competition for hegemony and dominance

between different Islamic groups in Nigeria. To further buttress this argument was

Abubakar Gumi’s famous quotation in 1987 despite the fact that Prayer is the foremost

important act of worship in Islam that, “Politics was more important than prayer” this

clearly shows a zeal for political dominance in the midst of intra-religious competition.

Eventually, around the mid-1970s, the Izalah organization’s activities and external

contacts especially with Sudan and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East came to influence

the activities of the young university students to form the Muslim Students Society of

Nigeria (MSSN). For the fact that IMN is an off-shoot of the MSSN, the emergence of

the group in Nigeria in the early 1980s has quiet been very much complex, complicated

and competitive in the realm of public and intellectual discourse.

The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) is one of the Islamic groups in Nigeria that

suffers from contentious narratives. Being also that the IMN is the dramatis personae

in this study, this chapter is dedicated to the anatomy of the IMN in terms of the

group’s history, evolution, ideology, identity, activities, structure, relations and

general dynamics.

The history and development of IMN in Nigerian can only be better expressed when

looked at from the angle of conditions and generational category of antecedents; this

is because the history of the movement since its inception kept on metamorphosing to

11
date. In fact, many are of the belief that since its emergence, the membership and

activities of the IMN-Shi’a faction group in Nigeria has rapidly increased and

continuously metamorphose and further manifest itself in various forms, character, and

attributes up to its current state as Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN).

There are different narratives regarding the origin of IMN in Nigeria, one side of the

argument has it that the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the post Islamic revolution

period had embarked on efforts to reach out to other societies especially in Asia and

Africa for the purpose of exporting the Islamic revolution beyond the middle east.

The other side of the narrative was that IRI was making such move in Asia and Africa

in order to politically counter the domineering force of the rival Sunni sect lead by

Saudi Arabia as a continuous manifestation of the cold war competition and struggle

between them. In fact Ostien (2012) has indicated that after the Iranian revolution of

1979, many young Muslims during their university days got inclined to the Shia

ideology especially with the flooding of abundant literature into Africa and other third

world countries, to the extent that the then vibrant members of the Muslim Student

Society and the later leader of the IMN (Ibrahim Yaqub El-Zakzaky) were sponsored

by the Iranian government to visit the country (Iran) and for the first time ever had the

opportunity for a physical contact with the Shia Mullahs and Ayatollah Khomeini

himself.

Still though, Ben Amara and Dr. Mustapha Gwadabe will argue that the Shi’a or IMN

in Nigeria may have drawn its inspiration from Iranian Revolution of 1979, but also

the movement emerged even stronger due to the facts of socio-economic hardships and

political instability of the post independent Nigeria; the movement gained its

momentum by organizing the depressed masses along the line of Sharia alternative of

12
the failed Nigerian system. However nowadays the movement seems to be fully

involved in Shiite doctrine (Amara, 2013).

Yet some sources attribute the origin of Shi’a-IMN in Nigeria to a period when Ibrahim

Zakzaky the leader of the group had his first contact with Iran during when he was the

National Vice President (International) of the MSSN, others like Dr. Bashir Aliyu,

Mallam Hayatu Kaura, Dr. Muhammad Babangida, Dr. El-Haroon Muhammad and a

host of others together with whom the movement was pioneered believed that Ibrahim

El-Zakzaky was not the first in Nigeria to be in contact with Iranian Shi’a clergy, rather

he was the first to politicise it. They further contended that El-Zakzaky’s first visit to

Iran could not have been responsible for his exportation of the Shi’a ideology to

Nigeria as some people want to believe, but his subsequent interactions and

correspondence with the Iranian Shi’a clergy like Ayatollah Khamna’ee and other

Iranian cultural attachés in Nigeria, in fact these suspicious moves had led many of his

(Elzakzaky) contemporaries to constantly ask and question him about his suspicious

interaction with Shiites but he would insist he was not aligned to such sectarian creed.

Though the evolution process of the IMN was more of a mosaic one with serious

intermeshing relationships between the different periods that characterizes it, it is

nevertheless imperative to try as much as possible to categorise the periods for the

purpose better understanding of the dynamics of the group historical events and

processes. The historical evolution of the IMN in Nigeria is in this study deliberately

categorized according to periods; this is because each category has its distinct character

from the other and must therefore be studied and presented as such.

13
1.2.2.1 The Period of Muslim Students Society (MSS)

In the beginning as mentioned earlier, the issue about agitations and call for an Islamic

Revolution in Nigeria drew its inspiration from other Islamic scholars’ writings like

Abul Ala Al-Maududi, Sayyid Hawa, Sayyid Kutub, Muhammad Kutub, Hasanul-

Banna), movements and activities like Mujahidun in Afghanistan, Ikhwan Al-

Muslimun a.k.a Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) that was then going on around the

world in places like Syria, Sudan Afghanistan, Egypt, etc. according to Zenn, (2013)

The changing national and global contexts of evolution and

proliferation of Islamist movements in Nigeria and many other
global societies since the 1970’s has led the transformation of a
fraction of MSS into an ideologically mass religious movement. The
most important MSS figure in the emergence of IMN is sheikh
Ibrahim Elzakzaky.

This gingering period was eventually consolidated with the spontaneous occurrence of

the Iranian Islamic Revolution which further emboldened not only Muslim groups and

movement around the globe but also the downtrodden and the oppressed especially

given Imam Khomeini’s insistence that the revolution was neither sectarian nor class

oriented but a purely ecumenicist Islamic Revolution whose intention was of uniting

and freeing global Muslims from the chains of inferiority and imperialistic domination

rather than the realpolitik mission of achieving proselytization through a process of

Taqiyyah (dissimulation),which permits the trivialization or even outright denial of

affiliation to Shi’a where it serves a follower’s or general sect interest-an agenda which

became obvious in the later activities of the regime. In fact, Bar, S. (2009) is of the

opinion that:

The Iranian Revolution did not portray itself to the Muslim world as
a “Shiite” revolution, but as an Islamic Revolution for Muslims
throughout the world…

14
 …the general Islamic frame of reference of the regime entails a
belief in the universalism of the Islamic mission of the Revolution.
Hence, the ideology of the regime motivated the various arms of the
state to forge alliances against the “world arrogance” (i.e. the United
States) not only with groups and states whose ideologies were
closely compatible with that of Iran, but also with any element,
which saw the US as a nemesis.

The above description aptly captures the most important reason why MB in Nigeria

gladly embraced Iranian Revolution without any seeming reservation.

1.2.2.2 Iran and the period of Islam only: The Dynamics of a Relationship

The evolution of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria cannot be meaningful without going

back to the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

In the beginning of the revolutionary movement Zakzaky and most of his

contemporaries were committed, struggled and operated on the common belief and

conviction for the attainment and practice of Shari’a on the singular platform of what

Elzakzaky himself constantly referred Muslim Brothers in Nigeria, even though the

general ideology of the Muslim brothers has been that of Islam, but there was quantum

of paradigms regarding their understanding of what an Islamic struggle in a secular

system should look like.

The first are those who believe that Muslim brothers must decisively pursue their

interest independent of participating in the affairs of the Nigerian state (that is to say

it stands outside and independent of the Nigerian state). The second were those who

believe that Muslim brothers should join the system with the aim of bringing about

gradual revolution in favor of Sharia.

The third were yet others who had the belief in maintaining Islamic Traditional Sufism.

These are adherents of Abdulkadir Assufy’s school of though. This period reigned

15
until when Elzakzaky returned from an open declaration (famously known as Funtua

declaration) was made at a gathering of the Muslim Brothers in Funtua, that, Islam

only. The implication of “Islam only” Funtua declaration at that time was that El-

Zakzaky (of course alongside some others) does not recognize any authority apart from

that of Allah and Shari’a is the only recognized source of constitution. Many of the

Muslim Brothers in struggle had complied with Elzakzaky’s proposal while some out

rightly didn’t, this particular period was immediately followed by a series of actions

and utterances leading to the suspicion of Elzakzaky by many of the Muslim brothers,

of, following the footsteps of the Iranian Shi’a sectarian ideology rather than the

mainstream Islam that was devoid of any sectarian inclination which they had all

earlier believed in.

1.2.2.3 The Emergence of Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN)

So immediately, thereafter, with the eventual obvious success of the Islamic

Revolution in Iran, the Iranian Shi’a Clergy became boldened to spread the tentacles

of the Shi’a ideology beyond the confines of Iran. This was a time when the Islamic

Revolutionary Movement in Nigeria had passively seen the IRI as a model of Islamic

Revolution. During this time, religious clergies from Iran especially, visited Nigeria

regularly to the extent that the IRI had stationed in the Nigerian territory that it

regarded as “cultural attachés”. These attachés served as the agents of Iranian Ministry

of Culture and Islamic Propagation (MCIP) in collaboration with other ecumenical

Islamic organizations such as Majma‘-e jahani baraye taqrib-e bein-e mazaheb-e

eslami (Society for Reconciliation between the Schools Majma‘-e jahani-ye ahl-e beit

(in Arabic – Al- majma’ al- ‘alami lilahl albeit; and the Sazeman-e Tablighat-e Islami)

(Islamic Propagation Organization).The ministry operates in various countries through

16
Iranian “Cultural Centers” within the Iranian embassies. These are particularly active

in the periphery of the Muslim world – South East Asia, the CIS countries and Africa.

Bar S, (2009).

Similarly, the main targets of these aforementioned organizations are the Non-Arab

Muslims. The relationship between these attaches, Shi’a missionary organizations and

the then so called Muslim Brothers in Nigeria continued without much suspicion

(except by few), of exporting Shi’a ideology until the time when El-Zakzaky’s tilt

towards Shi’ism was noted by his close allies and associates. These cultural attaches

had never then claimed the Shi’a identity. Even Zakzaky himself who was on various

occasions suspected of hiding his inclination and allegiance to Iranian Shi’a Clergy

whenever he was confronted, he kept assuring his friends in the struggle that all was

only America’s conspiracy described as among the factors that helped the spread of

Shi’a ideology in Nigeria. “Influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran, the movement

now accepts being Shi‘i after years of denial when the climate of opinion about Shi‘ism

in Nigeria was not particularly open …regarding the perceived silence or apparent

complacency with the secular Nigerian state, the adherents explained that this is a

process of the Shi‘a doctrine of Taqiyyah (concealment of belief) until strength to fight

is gathered” (Hassan 2015).

1.2.2.4 Biography of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky: Leader of the IMN

Sheikh Ibrahim Elzakzaky was born in the ancient city of Zaria, Kaduna state of

Nigeria precisely on the 5th of May, 1953. He started his (informal) education at about

the age sixteen with one Mallam Mani (late) alongside his brothers at Sarkin Ladanai.

Mallam Ali’s house. Apart from different other voluntary teachers that El-Zakzaky

learnt from. He shuttled between one Islamic teacher and the other until in 1969 when

17
he formally joined School for Arabic Studies (SAS), Kano where he obtained his

Grade II Teachers Certificate. It was as a student of the SAS that El-Zakzaky first met

Sheikh Nasiru Kabara with whom he eventually studied privately. Immediately after

the SAS he joined the famous Ahmadu Bello University to study BSc Economics from

the year 1976 until 1979 (the very year of Iranian Islamic Revolution) when he was

expelled alongside others.

Having found himself back at Zaria- a place well known for Islamic scholarship and

later Western Education, (also called The Centre of Learning) the passionate Islamists

continued his to exploit the abundant Islamic knowledge from different Ulama on

different subjects ranging from Arabiyya (Arabic Language), Tafsir (Qur’anic

Translation/Transliteration), Faqih (Islamic Jurisprudence), Nahawu (Arabic

Grammar), Adab (Islamic Sociology), Luggah (Arabic Literature) etc.

It is generally believed that El-Zakzaky’s passion for Islam coupled with MSS’ nature

of Islamic activism paved the way for him to discover the then reigning Islamic

Revolutionary ideas and literature of Islamic scholars like Abul-Ala Maududi, Sayyid

Kutub, Hasan-Al-Banna, Sayyid Hawa etc which was what shaped the psyche of

Muslim, Students in Nigerian university campuses and Muslim brothers outside the

University. It was also believed that Elzakzaky like other Muslim Students toyed the

line of Sunni ideology (including the time when he was MSS’ vice president

(International Affairs) when he first visited Iran as a visiting student representative of

the MSS in the Iranian Islamic Republic’s First Anniversary) until around 1994 when

he was clearly noticed as leaning towards Shi’a ideology by his then friends and

associates in the struggle. “After traveling to Iran in 1980, al-Zakzaky adopted the

symbolism and rhetoric of Shi’a Iranian Leader Ayatollah Khomeini on top of the

18
ideology of the late Sunni Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood founder, Hasan al-Banna,

and Muslim Brotherhood thought leader, Sayyid Qutb (Zenn, 2013).

El-Zakzaky is a term driven from the name of Zaria (also called Zazzau), so the “El”

is an Arabic prefix which means “belonging to or of”, when the “El” is prefixed to the

word “Zakzaky” it then means “of Zazzau”. So, the name Ibrahim El-Zakzaky means

Ibrahim of Zazzau. This style of naming is borrowed from the Arabian culture which

usually identify a person with his home town or sometimes tribe or clan; for example,

El-Bagdady (of Bagdad), El-Rumi (of Rome), El-Farabi (of Farab) etc.

El-Zakzaky’s rather radical position of lack of recognition for constituted authorities,

accusations of civil disobedience and his persistent insistence that "there is no

government except that of Allah" has portrayed him as a sort of Regime Change

fanatic. In fact, it is this challenging tendency that led him to be arrested and detained

on various occasions. His total prison experience is nine years in nine different prisons

across the country - the most famous being Enugu (1981-1984), the Interrogation

Centre of National Security Organization (NSO), Lagos (1984-1985), Kiri-Kiri

Maximum Security (1985), Port Harcourt (1987-1989 and 1996-1997) and Kaduna

(1987 and 1997-1998). El-Zakzaky’s first attempt to organise the public based on the

need to have Islamic front in Nigeria was together with other like minds in 1977 at

Funtua, Katsina state during the Islamic Vacation Course (IVC) of the MSS. His belief

and declaration of Islamic revolution and withdrawal of allegiance to the Nigerian state

would later be followed with his arrest and kept in the custody of the Nigeria Police

Force in Zaria in 1979 when he was still a student at the ABU Zaria. This arrest did

not last long as he was released after three days. He continued with his activities as it

would gradually grow more radicalised. In 1981, he was again arrested, taken to court

19
and eventually sentenced to four-year imprisonment between 1981-1984. That same

year he was rearrested but this time was detained in the prison for only a year and was

later released in 1985. In 1987, El-Zakzaky was again arrested and imprisoned for

another two years to be released in 1989. He was again rearrested ion 1992 and

detained for two weeks by the Nigerian SSS, but was released after two weeks.

El-Zakzaky is married to his university days Islamic struggle partner, and had six

children three of whom were killed during a deadly encounter between the IMN group

and the NA in Zaria in 2013.

1.2.2.5 IMN’s Imagined Organizational Structure

Being that the IMN is not a formal organization with written down constitution and

modus operandi, there isn’t any written document or constitution that is guiding its

operation more so that it’s not directly registered with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs

Commission (CAC).

However, this study for the first time puts forward a somewhat imagined

organizational structure of the IMN based field work data. The organizational structure

is never a claim of the exact structure of the group, but a representation of the supposed

structure which will serve as a starting point for improvement by subsequent studies

on the group. The structure of the group is a caricature of Hasanul-Banna’s Egyptian

Islamic group-the Muslim Brotherhood and a loose replica of the Iranian Islamic

Republic’s religious clergy hierarchical order. The supposed reason for such a hybrid

outlook is not without the fact that the IMN (as discussed above) is an evolutionary

product of mainly these two politico-religious discourses. So while the concept of

Imam is used to refer to a supreme leader based on the theory of Velayet-e-Faqih in

20
the politico-religious spectrum of the Shi’a creed, the Sunni use the term Khalifah; to

further prove that the IMN structure is a hybrid, the terms of Daurah and Halqah were

major practices of the Hasanul-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.

The group like many other Islamist Movements, runs a centralised kind of hierarchy

where Imam as in the Iranian Shi’a clergy system, is the supreme leader of the group.

He has absolute power which is not subjected to any form of checks or balances. Being

that since the full pledge operation of the group as IMN after the breakaway of the last

Sunni faction, the organization and determination of modus operandi and approach of

the group has been the prerogative of its first and ever self-appointed Leader-Ibrahim

El-Zakzaky, the determination of ideological direction, activities and decisions and

final directives of the group remained with its founder Elzakzaky. This however does

not mean that communication and power relations in the organization is strictly top-

down, rather it is both ways depending on the sensitivity of the matter.

Directly below the leader, is his deputy who also was there by virtue of the fact that he

was among the few charismatic members of the MSS that endured together with El-

Zakzaky up to the IMN. The function of the deputy Imam is not designated as such,

but by tradition, he assists the supreme leader and is still the intermediary between the

leader and the Majlis Shura in which he is a member. The deputy leader may be a

passive one in terms of actual functions of a deputy, but he is an active one because he

sits at the helm of day to day activities of the group on behalf of the leader. In the circle

of leadership of the IMN, Majlis Shura (Consultative or Advisory Council) is the next

in terms of ranking after the deputy. The Majlis Shura which originated during the

reign of the four Caliphs of Islam as successors of prophet Muhammad (saw), has

become for contemporary Islamist Movements a mechanism for authority legitimation

21
and pledge of allegiance. Hottman, (2011). For the fact that Majlis Shura are chosen

out of consideration for their knowledge depth and wisdom, their traditional function

among other roles, is to serve as consultants and advisers to the leader.

However, slightly on the contrary, the role of Majlis Shura of the IMN is normally the

day to day administration and supervision of the field activities of the IMN as well as

the linkage between the mass of the movement and its leadership. In fact, many

members of the Majlis Shura of the IMN are not deeply knowledgeable as one would

expect.

Directly below the Majlis Shura is the Specialized Organs of the IMN. The specialised

organs are the heart of the IMN because they perform all the functions for which the

group is committed. There are about Eight standing (specialised) ancillary organs of

the IMN. Their major function is to provide services to IMN members in all aspects of

human life. The evolution of these specialised organs have great deal of relationship

with the IMN’s vocal and active opposition and lamentation against the failure of the

Nigerian state to carry out its social contract responsibilities. For these and many other

similar reasons, the specialised organs of the IMN were specially designed to replace

or at least to supplement the functions of the Nigerian state.

The ISMA Medical Care Initiative, for example, provides health care services to IMN

members; the Hurras function as security operatives of the IMN; the Business Forum

is charged with responsibility of ensuring economic well-being of the IMN members

as well as business and entrepreneurial innovations; Information and Publications

does the job of information generation and dissemination. Others are Martyrs

Foundation whose responsibility is to manage the affairs of those who lost their lives

in the cause of the group’s struggle and to handle the affairs of their families which

22
they left behind, there is also the Sisters Forum, this organ is headed by the wife of the

IMN leader. The function of this organ is to coordinate the affairs of women members

of the IMN in such a way that those with potentialities of interest to the IMN are

identified and assigned responsibilities of different dimensions.

As mentioned earlier, the IMN is structured in such a way that it has coordinating

centres in all the thirty-six states of the Nigerian federation. These state centres are

called Daura. The major function of each Daura is to coordinate and direct the affairs

of the IMN on behalf of the leadership of the group. The Dauras (plural of Daurah)

are linked to the specialized organs of the IMN for harmonized operation and directly

answerable to the Majlis Shura and the IMN leader in that order.

The last layer in the IMN organizational hierarchy is the Local Government centres

known as Halqah. Each of the 774 local governments of Nigeria is coordinated by a

Halqah in the same manner that the Daurahs are in the states. All Halqahs (plural of

Halqah) are answerable and report to their state Daurah.

23
 H

IMN LEADER (IMAM)

DEPUTY
LEADER

MAJLIS SHURA R

SPECIALISED ORGANS

A
Daura Daura Daura Daura Daura

Halq Halq Halq Halq Halq Halq

ah ah ah ah ah ah S

Figure 1.1 Showing IMN’s Imagined Organizational Structure based on Field Work
Data

1.2.3 Historical contexts of security challenges in Nigeria

As clarified in the conceptual operationalization of this study, because of the fact that

the conditions and factors that influence regime change during each of these categories

in Nigeria are unique and actually differ between categories, this subsection of the

study categorizes Regimes in Nigeria not on the basis tenure, period, term or

dispensation, but on the basis of their typology. Colonialism, Military, and civil rule

are therefore considered as separate categories each from the other. The discussion that

follows therefore, is a depiction of the different Regime phases though with specific

24
emphasis to the major challenges that some of the regimes had faced as well as the

different approaches used by the regimes to respond to the challenges, this is given the

fact that each category’s constituent elements have more similarities in philosophy,

character and modus operandi than differences.

1.2.3.1 Colonial Period-Independence (1900-1960)

Regime Change in today’s Nigeria cannot be effectively discussed without throwing

some light on the nature of regimes and the major change(s) that took place in Pre-

colonial Nigeria.

The first major societal revolution that happened to an area that is later to be called

Nigeria was the Islamic Jihad of Usman bn Fodio. This jihad happened around and

had stretched beyond Nigeria to encapsulate some West African city states like Ghana,

Mali, Songhai, Oyo, Borno, Benin and Hausa states. Danfodio-the leader of the jihad

did not though claim to have founded Islamic religion in these societies but has

succeeded in reviving the rather abandoned injunctions, practices and general

regulations of the Islamic religion through societal reformation and re-orientation by

using the Jama’a approach to establish what he regarded as Caliphates. He led a jihad

that succeeded in shaping the socio-political, intellectual and diplomatic structures of

the larger segment of the contemporary West Africa

This for many mainstream scholars on this subject was the most vital and effective

effort that succeeded in replacing the different administrative centres of the old city

states systems which were in existence hitherto the advent of the jihad with a purely

Islamic Political system based on Quaran and the practices and sayings of prophet

Muhammad (saw) known Islamically, as Sunnah. Leading to the proper establishment

25
of Daular Usmaniyyah with its headquarter in Sokoto state in the present day Nigeria.

The Sokoto Caliphate replaced injustice with justice, egalitarianism in economic

activities, equality, equity, equilibrium in and checks and balances in its socio-political

sector etc. security was provided for of live and properties of the people and the

Caliphate itself. The Daular Usmaniyyah reigned formally fell as a result of the British

Armies’ use of superior military technology, maxim gun or the threat of the use of it.

Soft means of security was replaced with hard means. Suppression, oppression, forced

labour, unlawful resources exploitation and expatriation, imposed alien administrative

system, non-negotiated and unbalanced trade ensued. Life and property of the people

became completely insecure and endangered etc.

There is absolutely no need here to go into the deep argument on the philosophy and

rationale behind colonial rule in Africa and Nigeria in particular. However, it can be

generally stated for the purpose of clarification that the advent of colonialism in Africa

got its roots from the Berlin conference of 1884 when European countries sat,

scrambled and shared the African continent among them. Britain happens to acquire

the place that is to be later called Nigeria. Leaving the detailed description of events

to history, the most important thing to note here is that apart from the informal contact

during the pre-Berlin conference (1650-1884) and the post-scramble period that

reigned between 1885 and 1900, the British had ruled Nigeria specifically, between

1900 and 1960 when the country’s independence was won.

Between the periods stated above the British had succeeded in constituting the country

first into Southern and Northern protectorates for the purpose of easy administration.

By 1914, the two protectorates became amalgamated under a single administrative unit

26
called Nigeria headed by a Governor General who himself was answerable to the

Queen of England.

Between the said period, the British had occupied themselves with exploiting and

expatriating to Britain the abundant natural resources that Nigeria had, forced labour

on Nigerians with meagre wages which was itself derived from tax payment that was

imposed on Nigerians, strict and harsh working conditions on farmlands and factories

leading to the malnutrition, diseases and death of many natives, substitution of the

means of livelihood from farming of food crops to that of cash crops for colonial

benefit, general brutality which manifest itself by making the British expatriates to be

superior over the natives on aspects like settlement areas and accommodation, vehicle

ownership, position in workplaces etc, curtailed human rights arising from lack of or

repressed freedom of speech and association, cultural dilution and retardation etc.

The totality of these unfavourable policies of the British regime in Nigeria provided

the basis for grievances and eventual organization and formation of different

associations and groups by the then various nationalist individuals, groups and

movements such as Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Anthony Enahoro, NEPA,

NEPU, Zikkism etc and later ones like Ahmadu Bello, Obafemi Awolowo, Northern

Peoples’ Congress (NPC), Action Group (AG) etc, which kept on metamorphosing

and maturing into more serious and complex agitating avenues for freedom and

independence. Despite the continued suppression of the agitation for independence,

coupled with the wave of nationalist movements and agitation that was blowing all

over African countries, the British were left with no option by around 1950’s than to

resolve that power was going to be handed over to the natives of Nigeria. And by 1960

power was handed over to the elected political class of Nigeria as the first republic.

27
This change of regime can be said to have been influenced by local conditions aided

by similar sister liberation movements and struggles that were simultaneously going

on around Africa at that moment.

The organization, agitation and the general wider resistance movements against

colonial domination for liberation was believed by many scholars to be the basis of

challenge against the colonial empire which eventually became increasingly

threatened until it relinquished power to the natives on 1st October 1960. This was

therefore considered to be the first form of resistance against the incumbents of the

colonial Nigerian state.

1.2.3.2 Military Junta

Military rule in Nigeria started from January 16, 1966 when the Nigerian pioneer

political leaders were killed in a coup de etat and a military class was in place headed

by Lt Gen Aguiyi Ironsi, but the life of the dispensation was made short by a counter

coup on July 29, 1966. Another Military class led by General Yakubu Gowon whose

ruler ship lasted from August 1, 1966 until July 29, 1975 when he was overthrown by

the next Military government that was in place under the leadership of Major General

Murtala Ramat Mohammed/Obasanjo. It was during the Yakubu Gowon regime that

Nigeria witnessed the first and ever civil war that almost tore the country apart. The

civil war which was caused by the South Eastern Nigeria’s (Biafran state) secessionist

move had engulfed thousands of lives, properties worth millions of Naira, and was the

second major factor for the mutual suspicion, hatred and unhealthy completion and

increasing insecurity between the Igbos and the Hausas on the one hand, and the

Northerners and the South Southerners on the other. The successor to the Gowon

government-the Mohammed/Obasanjo military government was the first Military

28
government (as against the previous ones), to sincerely and successfully organise

transition and handed over power to a democratically elected government in October

1, 1979. After an interval of six years there was another Military government led by

Major General Muhammadu Buhari in power. Buhari’s government lasted only

between 1983 and 1985. By August 7, 1985 the Military government of General

Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida had taken over from Buhari’s government in a coup de

etat. Babangida who was considered as the second longest serving military ruler after

General Yakubu Gowon. Babangida whose military dispensation was characterized by

dubious transition promises served for eight years between 1975 and 1993 without

really achieving a successful transition was at long last pressured into resignation and

forceful hand over to a civilian interim government headed by Earnest Shonekan,

whose regime himself lasted for only eight months. The Babangida’s military regime

due to its overstay and corruption as well as unending promises and Machiavellian

style of leadership was responsible for the emergence of many tribal, ethnic, regional

religious and pro-democracy groups throughout Nigeria. As a result of this unique

plurality, therefore, influence and external connections of these groups increased

rapidly to the extent that completion between and among the groups and against the

Nigerian state became intense, intrusion into affairs of the Nigerian state by external

actors became on the rise, inter regional and ethnic rivalry and completion especially

between the South Western Yoruba dominated region and the Northern Hausa

dominated region became severely intense, etc. This was the time when Nigeria saw

the mushrooming of groups like the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), the

Afenifere, the June 12 agitations and many other ethnic and regional groups.

The Military government which came afterwards was that of General Sani Abacha

who ruled from November 17, 1993 and eventually died on June 8, 1998. The Abacha

29
regime had recorded many successes especially in terms developmental projects and

income per capita. The regime also was noted for relative security of lives and

properties. But one of the main argument against the regime was its ability to achieve

state security through the suppression of human rights and freedom. This was because

the security of individuals who became figures in group and human right mobilisations

was at that time under serious risk and threat of elimination.

The examples of Ken Saro Wiwa and Nine others of the Niger Delta agitation for

environmental protection is still fresh in the minds of many Nigerians.

In fact, according to many scholars, the Killing of Saro was among the major factors

that enflamed the restlessness arising from the activities of the Niger Delta agitators in

the South Southern Nigeria till date.

The last of them all the Military rulers till date, is General Abdulsalami Abubakar who

ruled from June 9, 1998 and thereby arranged a transition and handed over power to a

democratically elected government in May 29, 1999. The regime had a brief stay so

did not have any complications.

1.2.3.3 Civil Rule

Civil rule in Nigeria did not just begin by the relinquishing of power by the colonialists;

rather, the process began long before independence with the formation of political

parties and other transition arrangements.

Even though this is a subject for another day, but it is important to understand despite

the fact that there were other smaller political parties, but the colonialist policy of

dividing Nigeria into basically three regions and later four, had contributed to the

30
formation of political parties on the basis of regional inclinations and tribal dominance

such that by the time that elections were concluded in 1959, the three major tribes have

won seats in their respective localities with little semblance for a federal outlook.

So, by the time the British handed over power in October 1, 1960, a civilian

government headed by Abubakar Tarawa Balewa as the Prime minister and Dr.

Nnamdi Azikiwe as the president without power, the republic was only able to survive

for only Six years from 1960 to 1966. The next was the second republic under the

leadership of Alhaji Shehu Shagari which reigned between October 1, 1979 and

December 31, 1983. The third and fourth republic was celebrated as the return of

democracy in Nigeria on May 29, 1999, when Olusegun Obasanjo served for two terms

and handed over power to another elected civilian Alhaji Umaru Musa Yaradua on

May 29, 2007.

The major security challenge during the regime of Yar’adua was the activities of the

numerous Niger Delta agitators. These groups had seriously threatened National

security to the extent that the Yar’adua regime through the vandalization of Oil

pipelines, hijacking of oil exploration sites, taking into hostage foreign oil expatriates,

establishing of illegal refineries, thefts and killings. These and many other reasons was

why the Yar’adua regime had to initiate different negotiation processes with them

including the famous national amnesty programme and the creation of Niger Delta

ministry all in an attempt to restore peace and security in the country.

Yaradua ruled in the fifth republic but later died on May 5, 2010 leading to the taking

over of his deputy Good luck Ebele Jonathan who served until he was defeated in his

second term bid and handed over to a new civilian administration of Muhammadu

Buhari on May 29, 2015. During the Jonathan administration, the activities of the

31
Niger Delta militants had actually piped down. Many scholars argued that being that

Jonathan was from the Niger Delta, he was able to silence the militants through

political inclusion, offering of illegal and illegitimate huge contracts to the Niger Delta

Chiefs and Militant commanders, was what has successfully minimised the militant

activities. Others still argue that the Jonathan administration’s major security challenge

was boomeranging effects of the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents. The Boko

Haram which took control of large part of the far North East, had taking their activities

of suicide bombings, killings, and abductions up to the capital city of Nigeria-Abuja.

Due to the activities of the BH, billions of Nigeria’s Naira was claimed to have been

spent but with no results to show. Jonathan’s successor Muhammadu Buhari is serving

as the civilian president of Nigeria up to date. His administration is also characterised

by many security challenges arising from the activities of the same BH, Niger Delta

Militants, renewed agitations of the Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPoB), and the

challenges of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) on whom this study is about.

Nigeria’s experience of a prolonged military interregnum the common characteristics

of the military junta were the major and primary reasons that had hindered the

existence of a vibrant civil society that would have checked the excesses of the Military

rule and would have served as a harbinger for socio-economic and political

developments in the Nigerian polity. And these were the reasons that led to

concentration and exacerbation of tension, confusions, grievances as well as crises of

rising expectation which only got the opportunity to explode leading to the overheating

of the political system in the tail end of the Military rule in Nigeria while civil rule in

Nigeria has experienced consistent interregnums of military rule. But like the military,

the kind suppression that the civil class has experienced has been attributed by many

scholars to the kind of political parties and civil governments that emerge in Nigeria’s

32
political system; a kind of political parties which major concern were not sound

manifestos and policies but just kangaroo arrangements that would be used to defeat

and ouster military rule. So by the time that democracy became consistent, civilian

governments had little to offer to the people.

1.3 Problem Statement

The problematique of this study is to identify, examine and analyse the resilience

strategies of the IMN and the implications of such strategies on Nigerian national

security. This is done by way of interpreting the activities of the IMN as strategies for

resilience in its competition, basically against the Nigerian state and by extension,

other rival groups like the Sunni Islamic sect in the Nigerian political arena.

The problem of the study becomes appealing considering the constant recurrence of

periodic confrontation between the IMN and the Nigerian state culminating in the

widespread conviction and Nigerian state’s scepticism of IMN’s arms stockpiling and

potentiality for terrorism and existential threat to the Nigerian national security.

Similarly, on various occasions, the Nigerian state has painted the IMN as a potential

threat to the Nigerian national security. This is evidenced looking at the regular arrest

and detention of the group’s leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky; Enugu prison (1981-1984),

the Interrogation Centre of National Security Organization (NSO), Lagos (1984-1985),

Kiri-Kiri Maximum Security (1985), Port Harcourt (1987-1989 and 1996-1997) and

Kaduna (1987 and 1997-1998).

The securitization moves in terms of cordon search operations, arrest of members,

confiscation and destruction of property (2015) by the Nigerian security agents, on all

sites and properties of the IMN as response to the challenge of the IMN, implicates the

33
group as a potential existential threat against the Nigerian state as perceived by the

Nigerian government.

In addition to all this, Kaduna state of Nigeria has had to set up a Judicial Commission

of Inquiry (JCI) to investigate the clash between the Nigerian Army and the IMN in

2015 in Zaria. Based on the JCI’s recommendation a report by the Kaduna state

government was released which indicts the IMN and its excesses leading to the

pronouncement of ban on the group in Kaduna state.

The release of government report (see JCI 2015) and subsequent white papers and

position statements indicate to the fact that the Nigerian state feels threatened by the

IMN.

However, In spite of Nigerian state’s application of different approaches and measures

to eliminate, control or supress the threatening tendencies of IMN, the group has over

the years shown evidence of resilience. Although it is not clear what strategies the

group utilizes and why, but it is obvious that the group’s membership strength,

resources, activities, connections and support is boomeranging.

The need therefore to identify, and assess and analyse the strategies used by IMN as it

affects the Nigerian national security, are the objectives that shoot the problem of this

study to its very peak.

In spite of the fact that the IMN’s origin, proclamations and general outlook is

religious, the group’s declaration in several instances in the past, of its motive to

transform the Nigerian political system from secular to Islamic, as well as the

increasing politicization of its activities and controversy with the Nigerian state (Zenn,

2013; Alao, 2009), makes it a subject of public interest, political concern and scholarly

34
discourse through which the real nature of the activities of the movement can be

analysed and interpreted. Therefore, the attempt by this study to interpret the activities

of the IMN (beyond mere Islamism), to mean strategies for resilience, exposes for

better understanding, the strategic nature and rationale of the group, especially as it

implicates the Nigerian national security.

In any case, there are a number of existing literature, (all of which are articles rather

than books or thesis) for example Kew, (2007), Alao, (2009), Isa, (2010), Hall, &

Cossey, (2011), Last, (2012), Schoonover, (2013) Ajasa, & Solomon, (2014) etc,

which have made considerable efforts to discuss the IMN, but these are mostly from

religio-theological, and or exclusively external links without any one of them

addressing the IMN as a strategic and rational political actor whose strategies matter

to the Nigerian state and its national security.

Having said that, it is clear that this study is not in any way making claim of pioneer

research on IMN, rather, it uniquely fills the gaps the aforementioned works have left

a gap worthy of filling in terms of the need to identify what strategies the IMN group

employs in its constant struggle against the Nigerian state, the rationale why these

strategies are resorted to by the IMN, and the implication of how such strategies affect

the Nigerian national security.

To fill in the methodological gap in the study area as well as to achieve the study

objectives, the research is situated within a framework of a combination of Political

Process Theory (PPT), Strategic Action Fields (SAFs) and Securitization Theory (ST).

Also being that the study is on a given phenomenon, a qualitative approach is utilised

to conduct a phenomenological survey of the research problem using a triangulation

35
of specialised interview, Focus Group Discussion and Literature Review as data

sources.

The findings of this research will, therefore, no doubt contribute to the existing body

of knowledge on national and international security and stability as well as dynamics

of resistant groups and movements and their strategic choices in relation to their home

land and international security.

1.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of this research are to:

1. Identify the strategies of the IMN.

2. Assess the goals of IMN’s strategies.

3. Analyse the implications of IMN’s strategies to Nigerian national security.

1.5 Research Questions

1. What are the strategies used by IMN in the course of its struggle in Nigeria?

2. Why does the IMN strategize in Nigeria?

3. How do the strategies of the IMN affect the Nigerian national security?

1.6 Significance of the Research

This study is significant in a number of ways.

From the onset, it must be admitted that previous works have addressed in their own

different ways (as later discussed in the literature review), the concept and phenomena

of strategy and security as well as different other dimensions and contexts related to

36
both, but these studies have left empirical, contextual and theoretical gaps for this

study to fill in.

First, the strategy works which cover such dimensions as International Strategy,

Business Organization Strategy, and Strategy as practice and Groups and Social

Movements Strategy have left out the dimensions of strategy in Domestic contentious

politics involving political groups and movements. Therefore, as they have been able

to show the nature and impact of strategy on international politics and actors,

organizational performance, as well as customers and clients, there exist a gap (which

this study intends to fill) on the nature and impact of a domestic political group’s

practical strategy on national security with all its attendant contemporary dimensions

and ramifications. This therefore, leaves for this study, an empirical gap.

Secondly, although similar groups as IMN elsewhere (see Gülen Movement in the

literature review), have been studied in relation to their nation’s and international

security, no study has ever focussed and interpreted Islamic Movement of Nigeria’s

activities as strategy for resilience as well as the impact of such strategy activities on

Nigerian national security, this also leaves a contextual gap for this study.

Thirdly and finally, the individual and separate usage of each of PPT, SAFs and ST in

other works leave for this study a theoretical gap that can be filled by uniquely forging

three to form a framework of a triangular conflating the three into a single framework

that can be used to study and understand IMN’s strategies, meaning and their national

security implications. This also fills a significant theoretical void in the field of

strategy, security and contentious politics.

37
In a nutshell, it can be understood from the above that this study fills in an empirical

gap firstly by interpreting the activities and practices of the Islamic Movement in

Nigeria as resilient strategies by contextualizing such strategies within the purview of

Nigerian national security, and secondly, it fills a contextual gap by drawing from

similar studies elsewhere to focus on IMN in Nigeria, and thirdly by forging a

theoretical framework from an three hitherto separate theories to fill a theoretical gap.

Filling in such gaps to identify, and assess the rationale of IMN strategies, as well as

to examine the impact of such on Nigeria’s national security, the study’s objectives are

thereby met.

It is a fact that since the appearance of the group in public as IMN proper, in the mid-

1990s, there have been about seven different clashes between it and the machineries

of the Nigerian state which culminated into numerous loss of lives and properties, with

the group being the most affected. The two most recent clashes between the group and

the Nigerian Army for example have resulted in the loss of 349 lives, injuring of 66

Persons as well as destruction of property estimated to worth of about N153,

330,707.93. (JCI, 2016)

Similarly, the eventual setting up of Judicial Commission of Inquiry (JCI) to

investigate the matter as well as the independent investigations conducted by such

organizations as Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) and Amnesty

International (AI) into the conflict between the Shi’a-IMN and the Army apparatus of

the Nigerian state is a clear evidence that the activities of the group is increasingly

attracting national and international attention, beyond normal politics, see (Shadjareh,

M. & Choudhury, A. 2014, and Amnesty International 2016), therefore, any study on

38
IMN that would analyse the group’s resilience strategies as it affects national security

is significant on the following grounds:

The study fills in the existing practical gap by analysing how security of the Nigerian

state is threatened through the changing nature and strategy of IMN, especially more

so that strategy deals more with means to an end and not the end itself (Mbachu &

Yesufu 2007). This, therefore, provides a deeper understanding of the dynamic of IMN

strategy and the reactionary securitizing context of Nigerian national security.

The study examines the strategies of the IMN and its implication to national security

makes it additionally unique and crucial to security concerns of the Nigerian state at a

time when it is facing different kinds of security threats from IMN and other similar

challenging groups like the Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) agitation, Boko

Haram and Niger Delta Avengers, to mention a few.

As a work about strategy and security, the study as a piece of theoretical contribution,

adds to the scarce body of literature concerning strategy of resistant of Islamist

Movements in relation to national security of their countries or regions, provides a

baseline from which further questions on Islamist Movements’ strategies can be

generated and answered in order to advance our understanding of the relationship

between resilience, strategy and national security. The study can therefore, be utilised

by students of strategic studies and scholars of contentious politics as a theoretical

guide which can help in understanding the dynamics of religious movements’

resilience strategies in relation to national security. Also, with the aid of findings helps

in clearly exposing the relationship between strategies of resistant Islamic Movements

and national security.

39
As a study on Strategy, security and contentious politics, this research is worth doing-

taking into cognisance the growing activities of Islamist Movements and collective

action vis-à-vis increasing elective affinities between group strategies and national

international security.

1.7 Scope of the Research

Generally, the research covers the span of period between late 1970s - date (period of

Muslim Students Society (MSS), Islam Only (IO) and currently Islamic Movement of

Nigeria (IMN). It also covers international and domestic environments as the areas of

the study problem.

Also, since the aim of this research work is to examine IMN’s strategies in relation to

Nigerian national security, then it is taken that both the IMN and the Nigerian state are

the research phenomena.

1.7.1 Strategy scope

Even though it is difficult to say exactly where the practice of strategy starts or ends,

or what is and is not included in the idea and practice of strategizing, but, taking into

cognizance the operational conceptualization of strategy (in the definition of concepts

section in this study), as well as Pettigrew’s (1990) definition, the scope of strategy as

idea and practice can be adopted to entail any activity and or resources that might

contribute to the orientation of a group towards the achievement of its aims or

objectives over space and time. By implication, this strategic scope definition draws

the boundary of space for IMN’s strategies to mean all its internal and external group

activities and, the boundary of time to mean the very period, or what Henry & Seidl

(2003) would term Strategic Episodes, (reflexions and practices in the form of strategy

40
reviews and retreats), within which the process of the strategizing takes place. This

demarcation of the IMN strategic practice is necessary because everything cannot be

strategy as Wildavsky (1973) contends that, if strategy is everything, then maybe it’s

nothing.

1.7.2 Unit of Analysis

Since the ultimate aim of the research is to draw conclusions about IMN which happen

to be the object of the research, then according to Patton (2002; Yin 2003) IMN is in

this case the study’s unit of analysis. This is because it is the IMN (comprising of its

leadership, followership, resources, tools and activities) which performs the

strategizing practices whether micro or macro. (Samra-Fredricks 2003); micro in terms

of individual strategic activity, small trips of conversations, meetings, gatherings,

individual leader’s activities etc, and then macro in terms of strategic ideas, decisions

or practices all within the broader strategic framework(s) etc. (Eisenhardt 1989a).

1.8 Definition of Key Concepts

In any study of this nature, conceptual clarification is important. This is because

meaning of concepts is not static; it changes with the dynamics of time, relevance and

context. Drawing from the trend and context of the theoretical framework, therefore,

it is imperative to attempt to clarify the crucial concepts of Resilience, Strategy and

National Security as the main referent objects in this study.

1.8.1 Resilience

Resilience as a process which varies across circumstances and time is the ability or

capacity of an individual or group to adapt to changes or overcome adversity. Hegney

41
et al (2008) opines that it is “the ability to bounce back from negative experiences”

Being a concept first developed as ecology concept by Holling (1973) to mean “the

persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these

systems to absorb change of state variable, driving variables, and parameters, and still

persist”. (ibid, p.17). This idea of resilience has been further expatiated by Lebel

(2001) to mean the maintenance and re-organization of a particular system

configuration as response to disturbance-driven change inherent in the larger system.

Looking at all these conceptions, it could be understood that resilience of any kind or

sort should have at least all the following three characteristics as Folke et. al. (2002)

would have it: (i) the ability of an individual or a system to absorb shock and remain

within a given state; (ii) the degree of self-re-organization of a system after the

occurrence of a given disturbance-driven shock and; (iii) the ability and degree to

which the system can learn from experience by changing and adapting to the new

condition and domain.

Given the above, resilience in the context of this research is operationalized as the

rational ability of the IMN to consolidate itself through the use of the Strategic

elements of Actor, Resources, Network and Opportunities, to effectively Maintain,

Adjust, Adapt, Shift, Re-think and Re-adjust in reaction to disturbance, shock and

threat within the competitive Nigerian Political Realm.

1.8.2 Strategy

Strategy, a concept which originates in the 6th century C.E from Greek as strategos,

(stratus: army, ago: lead) meaning a high-level plan by art of troop leader, commander,

42
or generalship to achieve one or more goals under conditions of uncertainty. (Momah,

1993), is an essentially contested concept which has wider dimensions.

Strategy as a concept has over the years, since its early prominence in the 18th century,

undergone transformations in terms of misconceptions, misuse, misrepresentations,

and misapplications. This is, anyway, due to the evolving nature of the concept and

the increasing competition between different disciplines to appropriate it. The other

problem associated with the concept is its over generalized usage as if it is synonymous

with planning or vision of what is wanted to be done in a desired direction.

In the classical sense, Clausewitz in (Betts, 2002), for example see strategy: as the use

of an engagement for the purpose of the war.

From business organization perspective, Mintzberg & Waters, (1985) yet view

strategy can be intended or can emerge as a pattern of activity as the organization

adapts to its environment or competes.

Some other scholars, on the other hand, see strategy more broadly as generally

involving the setting of goals, determining actions to achieve the goals, and mobilizing

resources to execute the actions. Kaplan, & Morton, (1996).

Van de Ven, (1992), similarly opines that a strategy is anything that describes how the

ends (goals) will be achieved by the means (resources).

Johnson (2007), defined strategy as a practice of what people do and how this is

influenced by and influences their organizational, institutional, and environmental

contexts. It can be seen that in this definition there exist centrality of human action vis-

à-vis organizational goal.

43
While definitions by the aforementioned scholars see strategy from their own stand

points, they appear a bit simplistic, thereby undermining the complex, comprehensive

and flexible nature of the concept, especially in terms of its realistic disposition of

employing any means possible to achieve a targeted outcome, competitive struggle

against all odds and the nature of the actor.

In order to maintain the trend and conceptual and theoretical order in this study,

therefore, the operationalization of the concept of strategy negates the classical

definitions given by early realist scholars like Sun Tzu, Carl Von Clausewitz, Liddell

Hart, Helmuth Von Moltke, etc which only bothers about strategy for the attainment

of success during or against war time for principalities, municipalities and later nation-

states in the international system.

This is the more reason why scholars of Strategic thought argued that while planning

or vision tries to answer the question of what to do, strategy tries to answer the question

of how to do.

For the purpose of studying strategies, of the IMN group, against Nigerian national

security, a situation where countries strategize in order to securitize from external

aggression, this study adopts the political or non-market strategy (Bonardi et al., 2005;

Bonardi and Keim, 2005)- a kind of strategy that actors seek in order to get resources,

maintain their positions, accrue power and influence, and, in certain instances, disrupt

and challenge the positions of other actors.

This view shows that a good strategy must reflect a preference for a future condition

or state and must determine how best to get there.

To achieve such end, Yarger (2013) aptly puts:

44
 …strategy confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors; and it
addresses resource and organizational issues; even then some factors
simply will remain beyond control or may be unforeseen. Rational
choice, chance and probability, irrational actors, allies, and
competitors are all part of the strategic paradigm. Strategy is
inherently comprehensive; its foremost purpose is to favourably
influence the complex and volatile strategic environment by
providing direction for the judicious application of power toward
achievement of policy-driven objectives.

From the definition above, it can be clearly and simply discerned that, the ability of

any endeavour to ensure, in a conscious, coherent and optimal manner, the use of all

resources at the strategic disposal and to reflect choices in preferences (strategic

thinking), to pursue, protect and advance an interest is what makes it distinct from non-

strategic pursuits.

The operational definition relevant to this study therefore, comes from combination of

Van de Ven, (1992), Bonardi et al., (2005); Bonardi and Keim, (2005), Johnson (2007)

Yarger (2013), whose definitions provide the basic elements of strategy as Goals-

Actor-Resources-Outcomes; Goals in terms of essence of the strategy, Actor in terms

of individuals or group/organization strategist, Resources in terms of ideas, tools,

finance, environment, Outcome in terms of achievement or failure.

45
 CONCEPT OF STRATEGY

GOAL ACTOR RESOURCES OUTCOME

Achievement
Individual,
Essence/ Rational Choice; Ideas, Tools, or Failure in
Group/Organ relation to
View of ization Finance, Environment
Goal
Strategy strategist

Figure 1.2 Showing Basic Elements of the Concept of Strategy

1.8.3 National Security

The concept of Security is not an independent concept. It is always related to individual

or societal value systems, (Brauch 2003). Every actor talking about security assigns

different meanings to the term. This makes it possible in this research to attempt to

conceptualize the concept within the context of nation state so that all security

discussions will depend on the nation-state context.

Being that the concept of National Security is an essentially contested concept, this

study has drawn and adopted from the overwhelming and consensus literature

reviewed in this study that National Security entails three basic components; the issues

of security concerning internal (domestic) security, regime security, and external

security.

46
1.9 Research Method

In this sub-section, the methodology which is used in the study is discussed in line

with the requirements of scientific research. Basically, therefore, the research adopts

the qualitative method of data collection and analysis. The reason for this is that being

a phenomenological study premised mainly on human behaviour and rationality, the

strategies of the IMN in relation to the issues of national security can best be studied

using the qualitative approach. Items of the qualitative method used in this study

include Phenomenological Approach, Purposive Sampling Method, Data sources,

Data Analysis methods, tools and techniques, Content Analysis, Secondary Analysis,

Thematic Analysis, and Thematic Process.

1.9.1 Qualitative Method

This research being qualitative is based according to Gollan, & Silverberg, (2001):

Qualitative Methods are concerned with collecting and analysing information in as

many forms, chiefly non-numeric, as possible, smaller numbers of instances or

examples which are seen as being interesting or illuminating and aims to achieve depth

rather than breadth. Qualitative methods are therefore, suitable to uncover and

understand what lies behind any phenomenon about which little is known, they are

used to gain novel and fresh slants on things about which quite a bit is already known.

Similarly, Qualitative methods can give the intricate details of phenomena that are

difficult to convey with quantitative methods.

Eisenhardt (1989b) presupposes that when little is relatively known about an area,

qualitative research is often recommended. As stated in the introductory part, there

47
exist appreciable amount of literature (not abundant though) on the Shi’a ideology of

IMN and some few papers on the group’s relationship with other groups and its

inclination with Iranian IRI, but as important as it is, no endeavour is yet being made

to capture the empirical features concerning both the group’s strategic dynamics and

the relationship of that to national security despite the dynamism and complexity

involving the activities of the IMN. For Patton, (2002) in Johnson (2007), the need to

go closer to phenomena with such characteristics requires doing observation in order

to capture the in-vivo experiences through the conduct of In-depth Interviews and

Focus Group so as to understand what people really mean by what they do and how

that is interpreted beyond the actors’ point of view.

Another advantage of the qualitative approach is the anticipation of unexpected

discoveries from the multivocal character of the qualitative data; they may speak on

different issues and may even talk on different meanings when different

epistemological questions/sub-questions are applied (Alvesson & Sveningson 2003).

The entire field work as recommended by (ibid), has been conducted using additional

conceptual handles in addition to the stated research questions in order bound the study

focus and to also aid the better structuring of the data collection and analysis.

1.9.1.1 Phenomenological Approach

A phenomenological approach is adopted using a combination of interview, focus

group discussion and secondary literature to collect data. Phenomenological research,

therefore, being is an expression of the lived experiences of people by way of

operationalizing it as a phenomenon of investigation through the use of descriptive

means. (van Manen, 1990). Gollan & Silverberg, (2001) Furthermore, Garver, &

Mentzer, (1999) “…estimates of the incidence, size, and characteristics of protest

48
demonstrations and governmental sanctions are less reliable. A preferable solution

would be to use reliable validity constructs, (emphasis mine), to construct measures of

underlying latent variables.”

In an attempt, therefore, to identify, examine and analyse the resilience strategies of

the IMN and the implications of such strategies to Nigerian national security, this study

finds Phenomenal Qualitative method suitable, using a triangulation between a

combination of primary and secondary types of data sources from In-depth Interviews,

FGD and literature review until theoretical saturation is reached.

1.9.1.2 Sampling Method

1.9.1.2.1 Purposive Sampling Method

In order to have a fair representation and response from the population of the study,

this research implores purposive sampling technique. This is because of its ability to

critically think and define the parameters of the population that is intended to be

studied at an early stage. Miles & Huberman, (1994).

The advantage of the purposive sampling method is that it has the tendency for

snowballing.

1.9.1.3 Source of Data

As mentioned earlier, this study employed Multiple Operationism-a combination of

data collection approaches of In-depth interview, FGD and Document Review. This is

in order to avoid overdependence on a single fallible method and sharing the same

weaknesses.

49
The essence of adopting these three approaches in this study to ensure data validity

through data collection approach flexibility in such a way that each of the three

approaches serves as a check to the other. This is because the study by its very nature

is one that is characterized by competition, hegemonic struggle, contention, rivalry,

conflict of interest-hence conflicting narratives and data.

Since no data collection approach is without bias tendency, then the need to

supplement the Interview and FGD becomes pretty desirable. The issue however, is

not the choice of interview and FGD in themselves, but the principal objection is using

anyone of them alone in a study like this one that is characterized by conflicting

positions and narratives. To buttress this view, Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, &

Sechrest, (1966), argues that Interviews and questionnaires must be supplemented by

methods testing the same social science variables but having different methodological

weaknesses.

Although Adler, & Adler, (1987), advise graduate students to sample between Twelve

(12) and Sixty (60), with Thirty (30) being the mean for a structured interview, the

case of this research is slightly different, the problem is one which requires width and

depth multimethod data collection. As a result, therefore, a total number of Thirty-

Eight (38) respondents have been interviewed. Seventeen for (17) In-depth Interview

and Twenty-one (21) for FGD. The number is arrived at on the basis of conceptual

data saturation. This is because as Fusch, & Ness, L. R. (2015) and Mason, M. (2010)

suggest, the data saturation was reached when it was believed that enough information

to replicate the study was available hence no information was new. This is also for the

fact that failure to reach data saturation seriously affects data quality.

50
 In-depth Interview

FGD Document Review

Figure 1.3 Showing Triangular Source of Data.

Regarding respondents, it is, important to mention that since this study is by its very

nature sensitive and security inclined as well as the unearthing of certain covert

activities and operations, the study is reluctant in revealing the identity of other

respondents, security personnel and organizations, intelligence sources, secret

documents, and other confidential sources. This is in recognition of request by the

respondents to have their identity concealed for security and other confidential reasons.

In any case, the essence of the multimethod data collection approach is on the one hand

to maximise objectivity, relative truth and relevant data and, on the other minimize

response tendency for error, bias, and subjectivity, all of which weaken the necessary

validity and reliability requirements of a scientific research.

1.9.1.3.1 In-depth Interview

For the purpose of interview, a multiple selection of a total of Fifteen (15)

knowledgeable, expert and experienced respondents spread across the six geopolitical

zones of Nigeria were selected and interviewed based on their discipline, philosophy,

substantive topic expertise and geographical locality, as well as the practicalities of

space and data about the research phenomenon. Data was collected using semi-

structured Face to Face and or Telephonic interview of guided questions by way of

51
selecting two (1) representative of State Security Service (SSS), One (1) from

Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA), One (1) from the Nigerian Police (NPF), One (1)

from Nigerian Civil Security and Defence Corps (NSCDC), Two (2) from Nigerian

Army, Two (2) Security Experts, Two (2) IMN key members, Two (2) Shi’a Clerics

and two (2) Sunni (Former Elzakzaky’s Islam Only allies), and One (1) Iranian official.

The advantage of multiple interviews as opined by (Johnson 2007), is the opportunity

of verifying different sources each against the other and classifying responses into

carefully constructed categories.

The SSS and NIA labelled A2 and A2, respectively, are chosen because of a

combination of their theoretical and practical knowledge and experience on secret and

confidential issues and dealings in and about Nigeria. They have the advantage of

being in possession of information regarding both the internal and external workings

and relations of and about the IMN. There cannot be any more appropriate persons

with official status and reliable information to consult on secret information of the

nation than the SSS and the NIA.

B1 and B2 represents the Nigerian Army (N/A). The N/A is a necessary respondent in

this study because all the clashes between the IMN and the Nigerian state was done

with the N/A. Therefore, as an agency whose responsibility is to protect the Nigerian

state from external aggression and internal subversion, it has useful information

regarding both issues of national security and about its encounter with the IMN.

Similarly, the Nigerian Police Force labelled here as C1 and C2 respectively, are the

custodians of civil security matters, peace-keeping operations, civil dispute settlements

as well as criminal matters. In many cases the NPF and the NSCDC are the first to

come across or be contacted on issues or disputes between IMN members and others.

52
The inclusion of D1 and D2 (Civil Security Experts) among respondents is to serve as

bridge between practical and theoretical issues of the study. This is necessary because

such important concepts and variables of the study as Resilience, Strategies, and

National Security cannot be safely analysed without the input of scholarly

interpretations and insights. Similarly, the identification, conceptualization, definition

and dimensions of practical activities in relation to threat and security requires the aid

of security experts.

E1 and E2 which represent Sunni Islamist who were formerly pioneers of what is now

IMN, serve as checks and balance to the information and data obtainable from their

hitherto contemporaries that now make up the IMN. This category of respondents is

most useful in getting data especially the dynamics, of the IMN from its inception to

date as well as historical data. On the other hand, other Shi’a factions which are

represented by F1 and F2, are important informers because they represent Shi’a

organizations (Darul Thaqalain and Mu’assasatu Rasul A’azam) independent of the

IMN. This is in recognition of the fact that organizations share Shi’ite religious

ideology with IMN but differ politically.

G1and G2 represent the IMN which is one of the study population. Iranian official

labelled as H is also chosen to balance inputs obtainable from other sources about the

strange relationship between the IMN and the Iranian state.

In sum, he choice of the interview respondents is based on two broad classifications;

Strategy practitioners and Experts and Security Officials and Experts. Strategy

practitioners on the one hand as Johnson (2007) argues, are not only research subjects,

but strategy experts in themselves by virtue of them possessing rich store of tacit in-

depth knowledge arising from their participation in strategy practices day by day. This

53
also tallies with Situated Learning perspective which argues that knowledge of a

practice can only be properly acquired by participating in it. In this case, a combination

of leaders and members of the IMN considered as practitioners while academic experts

on strategy are considered as non-practitioner experts with vast theoretical knowledge

on strategy and security.

The interview sources have their strengths and limitations which is relatively made to

be addressed by the strengths of the document review approach. For example, only

those persons who are accessible and willing to cooperate offered themselves for the

interview and FGD and; even for those who have accepted to offer themselves for the

interview, they may have responded in part by their individual dimensions that are

possibly irrelevant to the target of the research questions or even at par with the

research objectives. As Montibeller, & von Winterfeldt, (2018), argued that:

Behavioural decision research has demonstrated that value and uncertainty judgments

of data collectors and experts are subject to numerous biases. Individual biases during

In-depth Interviews can be either cognitive, such as overconfidence, or motivational,

such as wishful thinking.

In fact, in the cause of conducting this study’s interview, certain respondents were

noticed to proceed differently from an earlier response they gave either perhaps

because they come to perceive the sensitivity of the subject under discussion, or

because they have an interest to protect. In this case, document review is a reliable

supplementary source of data minimize such anticipated gaps as reactive

measurement, sampling error, human instrument error and respondent’s error inherent

in the interview method as Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, (1966), suggested

in their pioneer study on document review.

54
1.9.1.3.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

FGD as a way of collecting qualitative data essentially involves engaging multiple

individuals simultaneously in an informal group discussion focussed around a

particular topic or set of issues. Edmunds, (2000). As an organised discussion with a

selected group of individuals to gain information about their views, experiences and

several perspectives on a given topic, FGD helps in providing the research with the

strategic opportunity to subject the questions of this research endeavour to much freer,

flexible and broader discussions. (Rabiee, 2004). The essence of FGD in this study is

to augment the interview data with insights from non-IMN, non-Nigerian state sources

by triggering discussions that will expose participants’ thoughts, perceptions,

opinions, and as much as possible use the avenue to understand salient dimensions of

complex social stimuli as a precursor to further tests (Lunt, 1996). As such, the process

of three (3) groups are chosen through a random selection of six to ten (6-10) persons,

for each of the three (3) geopolitical zones of Northern Nigeria, i.e., North Central,

North West and North East. The choice of the number of heads per group is informed

by Patton (2002) where he would suggest that “…groups are typically 6 to 10 people

with similar backgrounds who participate in the interview for one to two hours” Patton

(2002).

In the coding, I1, I2 and I3 represent Focus Group Discussion in the three Geopolitical

Zones of Northern Nigeria. I1 is composed of Eight (8) members, I2, six (6) members,

while I3 had Seven members. This gives a total number of Twenty One (21)

respondents for the FGD. Through the FGD data was obtained freely as experience of

neutral population which have experienced the activities of IMN overtime. The FGD

is equally desirable because it serves as interview and document review data cross-

55
check and being responses from a mixture in each of the three FGD, of the IMN,

neutral citizens, and the Nigerian state officials.

Similarly, the purpose of the FGD is not to capture data from only the IMN member’s

domain or stranglehold geopolitical zones, but to be able to strike a sort of balance in

terms of other respondents’ categories mentioned above. The advantage of this FGD

method is that it is faster and more economical because multiple participants are

engaged within a short time and with minimal resources and maximum flexibility.

On the other hand, are security experts and knowledgeable scholars who have

researched, taught and written a lot in the area of Security and Strategic Studies in

Nigeria, while security officials have first-hand knowledge and experience about

national security threats and issues as well as Nigerian states’ securitization moves

regarding all security challenges.

The rationale for choice of the geographical area of the FGD groups is that though the

aforementioned North West, Central, and East are the stranglehold of the IMN with

North West as the site of its birth, headquarters, leader’s indigenous home as well as

the site of its headquarter (Husainiyyah Baqiyyatullah), major activities and the usual

battleground between the group and the Army apparatus of the Nigerian state. The

IMN has its minor membership across the rest of these geopolitical zones i.e. South-

West, South-East and South-South, therefore interviews of some security experts were

drawn from these zones to balance the geographical coverage of data collection.

However, FGD has its own disadvantages. When discussing in groups, researchers and

experts might be affected by group-level biases. These biases have serious implications

for research conclusions and constitute challenges to research decision analysts, who

56
need judgments as inputs to a decision or risk analysis processes, because they can

degrade the quality of the analysis. (Montibeller, & von Winterfeldt, 2018).

All these anticipated limitations are expected to be minimized with the employment of

up to three approaches to data collection in this study.

1.9.1.3.3 Document Review

Document review is a way which data is collected by way of reviewing existing

literature. Miles, & Huberman, (1994). Document review permits for

Phenomenological reflection to elicit essential and incidental themes. Bowen, (2009).

Instead of data collection as in the case of interview and FGD, the approach of

document review to data grab is data selection. The essence of utilization of document

review in this research despite the use of interview and FGD is to augment and

overcome their lapses and shortcomings.

Apart from its efficiency because of less time consumption, document review approach

does not require the cooperation of the interview or FGD respondent. It’s as well an

approach which is not contaminable by the respondent as in the case of interview and

FGD. Other advantages of it are document stability, exactness and broad coverage.

Even though, in some researches like those of specialized form, especially hermeneutic

inquiry or phenomenological reflection, document review may be used as stand-alone,

it is in most cases used as complement to other sources of data. (Merriam, 1988).

The documents reviewed in the course data collection of this study include but not

limited to hard copy electronic extant literature and documents such as published

materials on both IMN and the Nigerian state, the IMN document and website

publications and images, program logs, newsletters, etc, reports of Judicial

57
Commission of Inquiry (JCI), Amnesty International (AI) and Islamic Human Rights

Commission (IHRC), on the IMN-N/A clash, Kaduna state government’s white paper

on the JCI report, Nigerian Department of Security Service (DSS), Police Force (NPF)

and the N/A confidential records on the IMN etc (see Appendix J ).

The process that was followed during the document review was in line with Atkinson,

& Coffey’s, (2004) supposition:

1. Assessing existing documents to ascertain the types and availability of

documents that are relevant to the research needs.

2. Securing permission of access to the document been identified; pertaining to

this research, all the documents reviewed were done with the permission of their

custodians. However, because most of the documents are security or confidential

documents, like the ones in possession of DSS, NPF and N/A, only notes from

skimming was allowed about those documents provided.

3. Ensuring confidentiality where necessary; condition of anonymity of specific

source and confidentiality of sensitive content was given by the DSS and NPF before

allowed access to certain documents.

4. Compilation of the documents relevant to researcher’s evaluation,

5. Understanding condition under which and rationale of the production of the

documents under review in order to determine the quality and relativity of data being

collected; some of the documents reviewed like the JCI report is considered by this

research as one with partial credibility because of IMN group’s total boycott and

refusal to at least make proxy submission to the JCI sitting.

58
6. Determining the accuracy of the documents (see appendix K for IMN’s reply

to the JCI invitation for participation)

7. Summarizing the information from documents reviewed using especially,

document review form.

1.9.1.4 Data Collection Procedure and Instruments

Data collection procedure is crucial to the quality and reliability of the data collected.

The procedure of data collection is determined by the nature of the research and the

methodology adopted. In the case of this research, which adopts a qualitative method

of data collection through interview, FGD and document review, the procedure and

instruments of data collection was basically guided by the research questions and by

implication objective s. Sekaran & Bougie (2016). The procedure followed in this

research is that although all questions were asked all across, each question determines

what, who, how and when to be asked. Since the essence of purposive interview is to

share the experience of experts or participants of a particular research phenomenon,

then questions were asked by laying emphasis based on closeness of the participant to

the fact. Similarly, certain same questions were asked using various approaches in

order to confirm the genuiness of response or verify the true intent of it.

The timing and the approach during data collection was done with clinical care and

precaution so as to avoid collection of data possibly influenced by negative of mood

or environment. For example, as request from the researcher’s end an FGD was once

requested to be postponed due the sudden death of the younger brother to one of the

key participants, who has been Nigerian Army’s custody until his death. This kind of

59
condition of obvious anger against the Nigerian Army can influence the mood of the

respondent in a negative way against the data to be collected from him.

Data was collected by way of asking research questions. But since the choice of

research respondents was based on purposive sampling, all three questions of the

research were asked across all respondents, but question emphasis was made to

participants with professional knowledge or peculiar experience until saturation is

reached. This approach has provided the study with opportunities of being redirected

to unknown sources as well as accidental access to relevant data to the research

questions. All this is in line with the provisions of snowball purposive sampling

technique of qualitative data collection. Creswell, & Poth, (2017).

Since the essence of document review in the study is to augment Interview and FGD,

logic of skimming-reading-interpretation was maintained throughout the review of

data documents. The skimming served as superficial examination after which the

reading served as thorough examination. Corbin, & Strauss, (2008).

60
Table 1.1
Showing Relationship between research questions, data collection procedure and instruments.
Research Questions Data Collection Procedure Data Collection Tools
1. What are the 1. Direct questions mixed with flexible ones were asked during 1. For the purpose of interview and FGD, Audio
strategies used by interview in order to identify the specific strategies either known recorder, pen, pencil and paper were used in and at
IMN in the course of or observed, used by the IMN which makes it resilient in its different occasions during the interview and FGD.
its struggle in struggle in the Nigerian body polity.
Nigeria?
E-mail and phone contacts of some of the participants were
obtained for the purpose of clarifications and follow-up
questions.
2. Why does the IMN 2. In the case of FGD, each of the three main questions were 2. For the purpose of Document Review, pencil,
strategize in Nigeria? first thrown to the floor at reasonable intervals for discussion. pen and paper was used to take down notes. In rare
Other questions relating to the main questions were also asked instances, photocopying machine was used to
and discussed. duplicate some written materials.
3. How do the 3. For document review, the process of data extraction from
strategies of the IMN relevant documents was characterized by skimming, reading and
affect the Nigerian interpretation.
national security?
Source: Author’s Compilation.

61
1.9.1.5 Population of the Study

A research population according to Creswell, & Poth, (2017) is a section of the

population which constitute the subject of a research endeavour. The research

population of this study consist IMN members, Nigerian citizens and security

custodians of the Nigerian state, therefore, Patton (2002) Given (2008), and Dodgson,

(2017) would suggest that it will be time consuming, too expensive and unfeasible to

contact all the population of the study, a purposely selected samples from the subjects

of this study have been made. As stated earlier, consideration based on practical actor,

specialization, experience, knowledge and closeness to phenomenon of research is

what guided the population sampling procedure of this research.

1.9.1.6 Data Analysis methods, tools and techniques

This study in the process of its data analysis uses a combination of methods, tools and

techniques. The essence of the combination is to equip the analysis process with the

most relevant and useful approaches in order to get the best out of the research data.

Using describe-compare-relate model, a combination of content, secondary, and

SWOT analysis as tools and techniques to provide the data analysis process with the

necessary rigour it requires to check the excesses of the data collected from different

and variant sources by way of describing, comparing and relating them.

In the same vein, data analysis is designed using effective thinking approaches so as

achieve a sound, fair, rightly thought data analysis. In this light the analysis thinking

approaches propounded by Freeman, (2017) are adopted as relevant tools for this

study. According to Freeman since data which does not come with built in directions,

then there is the need for strategic thinking in terms of a dynamic decision-making

62
process in-the-midst of the particularities of a data set, situation, aims and desires,

rather than a predetermined procedure to follow. According to Maxwell, (2013),

…as a researcher, you will need to continually assess how your design is actually

working during the research and how it influences and is influenced by the context in

which you’re operating, and to make adjustments and changes so that your study can

accomplish what you want.

To achieve a positively dynamic analysis therefore, three out of the five thinking

approaches propounded by Freeman are adopted by this study.

1. Categorical Thinking

2. Narrative Thinking

3. Dialectical Thinking

Using, Categorical Thinking it enables the research to classify and order theme

categories for analysis in order to know what they are and about, based on the collected

data and in relation to the overall objective of the research and its questions. All the

analysis themes in this study are arrived at based on this approach by way of

identifying objects, actions and units as well as identifying categories from

relationships and comparison between data units.

As for narrative thinking, the construction of meanings and effectives from pieces of

narratives about the research elements in relation to their action in time, space and

framework of the research is essential in the analysis thinking process.

dialectical thinking as a third approach in the analysis thinking method, plays the role

of uncovering from the research data inherent contradictions which when analysed

63
would show transformations arising from such continuous process of analysis

thinking. Generally, therefore, the essence the selection of the three methods is to serve

the combined functions of theme identification, data employment as well as

transformation in the course of data analysis.

1.9.1.6.1 Content/Document Analysis

Content analysis as a research technique is an objective, systematic and quantitative

description of the manifest content of communication, Berslson (1954). The contents

of IMN Website, Nigerian Army Website, Al-Mizan Newspaper, position papers,

some selected Newspapers (Daily trust, leadership, & the Sun newspapers) and Video

clips is analysed using the procedures for collecting and organizing non-structured

information into a standardized format, which facilitates making inferences about the

characteristics and meanings of written or recorded material. The Bureau of Justice

Assistance (2006). The questions also of source reliability (i.e. newspaper-derived

content analysis of events) according to Snyder (1978), Jackman & Boyd (1979) is

crucial in content analysis.

Similarly, Relevant Secondary data such as books, Articles, Government documents,

Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry (JCI) into the Zaria clashes, etc. would

be analysed where necessary in the process of data analysis.

Taking into consideration that this study is trying to derive meaning from emphasis,

silence, foreground and background information, a referential type of content analysis

is adopted in order to effectively trace the trend overtime and space, of the IMN’s

strategies in relation to Nigerian national security.

64
This technique is especially useful to the study considering the need for thorough and

rigorous examination and analysis of the complexity of language in the production of

meaning (Franzosi, 2004). The advantage of the content analysis technique (as against

interview method for example), provides the study with a reasonably untailored data

about for example Head line typologies, Bones of contention, Proclamations, Ideas

and Positions overtime, etc.

1.9.1.6.2 Thematic Method

This study intends to utilise the thematic method of data analysis. This basically entails

the three-main process of data reduction, data display and data drawing and

conclusion. Apart from the other two sources, data from the above mentioned

triangular sources, the interview data is categorised into key and Non-key informants.

The key informants (security experts and IMN key members in the case of this study)

are the interviewees which are expected to provide the major target data while the non-

key informants are the Content and secondary Analysis which are critical in providing

insights and support to the key information, as well as serve as collaborator sources or

contradictory evidence as the case may be.

1.9.1.6.3 Thematic Process

Data in this study collected using three triangular methods of Interview, focus group

discussion and secondary literature is analysed using the thematic technique of

[Describe-Compare-Relate] model developed by Braun & Clerk, 2006). This

technique which is about either inductive bottom-up approach or deductive top-down

approach is suitable and reliable for analysing qualitative data.

In any case, in order to avoid possible restraints usually imposed by structured

methodology in the deductive bottom-up approach and as well the necessity to

65
establish obvious and clear connections between objectives of the research and the

summary of findings derivable from the raw data collected, the inductive bottom-up

approach which uses the most frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in the

raw data to emerge at the themes of the analysis is used.

In order to meet both requirements of validity and reliability, the themes in the thematic

technique of analysis which identifies, analyse and report responses are based on the

most frequent themes drawn from a pattern of responses of the collected data. (Braun

& Clerk, 2006).

In fact, according to Yin (1994), the advantage of this technique is that it provides a

platform where flexible descriptions and comparisons are made between the set and

range of data being analysed, and as well as how the dependent and independent

variables of the study relate to each other. Additionally, this method helps in both

complementing and particularly answering the research questions as well as gives the

opportunity to see if there is some reasonable consistency between the research

questions and the data.

This methodological procedure is particularly relevant and useful to this study because

it avails it with the very flexible avenue to:

1. Describe what the strategies of the IMN are and

2. Compare the variety of responses between interview, focus group discussion

and secondary data in order to determine why they engage in such strategies.

3. Show how the study’s independent variable of strategies relates to its

dependent variable of Nigerian national security. This way, the study is practically

66
logical, systematic and focussed because a synergy has been established between the

problem, objective and questions of the study, and, the entire data presentation,

analysis and eventual conclusion that arises from all that.

1.10 Organization of Chapters

This study is divided into Seven Chapters. Chapter one comprises of General

Introduction, Background of the study, Research problem statement, Objectives,

Questions, Significance, Scope, Concepts definition, Research Method, and Chapters

Organization. Chapter two is made up of the Literature review and Theoretical

Framework. The third Chapter consist of Strategy Toolbox of Conceptual Handles.,

The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Chapters presents Data, Analysis and findings, while the

Seventh chapter presents summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

67
 CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter adopts a narrative approach (Baumeister, & Leary, 1997), to review and

evaluate relevant and available books and journal publications and thesis pertaining to

the problem as well as variables and main concepts of the study. The essence is to see

the extant literature and how far scholars have explored the concepts, theories, and

variables of the study in their discursive engagements. The themes of the review are

Strategy, which entails the sub-themes of international strategy; business organization

strategy; strategy-as-practice and; social movement strategy.

The next theme which is Islamism, politics and secularism has been reviewed with

sub-themes colonial secularity and the Muslim world, modernity and Islamic response

as well as Islamism movements in perspective. The essence is to review and evaluate

Islamic world of scholarship so as to aid understanding of the connections between

religious ideologies, their manifestations and impacts on such and similar groups as

the IMN.

The last aspect of review under the Islamic theme is Islamist Movements and

movements strategies in the politico-security contexts of their spheres of operation and

the concept of Security.

Though the study is not about the Islamic ideology or practice of the IMN, the

inclusion of Islamic literature is to serve as guide towards understanding of certain

68
religious dynamics that have their dimensions either the history of the IMN group and

or its strategy activities. Therefore, the selection of Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Gulen

Movements is in order to grasp their nature of resilience, strategies as well as some

security issues in relation to their areas of operation locally or globally; this is because

all kinds of groups or movements exist within a context and not out of a vacuum.

The fourth aspect of this section deals with the theme of national security. The various

schools and dimensions of national security have been reviewed and evaluated based

on its relevance to the research problem. The sub-themes covered under the security

headings are traditional security; neorealist school; Copenhagen school and

securitization school.

The final aspect of this section deals with the practical literature about IMN as

variously discussed by scholars. This is however, dramatically different from the

aforementioned theoretical discussion on security.

The relevance of these is to provide a holistic picture of the security framework for

better understanding when it comes to its application or discussion in relation to the

problem and or concepts of the study.

2.2 Strategy: Perspectives and Paradigms

This sub-section presents a review of related strategy literature. The sub-themes of

strategy have been categorized into three; International Strategy which presents

literature on strategy in the international system based on politics, power and security;

Business Organization Strategy based on Managerial Strategy formulation and;

Strategy as Practice (S-as-p) based on Actor’s field practice as real strategy practice

rather than mere strategy formulation.

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The centrality of Strategy to this research calls for a comprehensive review of its

literature so as to have clear understanding of the concepts and debates and discourse

surrounding it. Similarly, the review holds the promise of exposing the conceptual,

theoretical and practical gaps that this study fills.

2.2.1 International Strategy

Initially, the concept of strategy was only relevant in the military science and practice

for the purposes of war. Intellectually speaking the works of Tzu The Art of War, Tzu

(2005), Carl Von Clausewitz’s War, politics, and power: Selections from on war, and

I believe and profess, Von Clausewitz & Collins (1962), Liddel Hart’s The Ghost of

Napoleon and Strategy: the indirect approach, Hart (1967); Hart, (1914), Machiavelli’s

The prince, Machiavelli, & Viroli (2008) and a host of other classics were among the

most influential foundational texts that had set the pace for what later came to be

understood as Power politics, Realism, and Realpolitik that characterize the Strategic

international relationships which obtained in the pre-cold war period. During this very

period which was characterized by wars and conquests, military capacity, territorial

security and expansion through the act of strategy was the most important concerns of

leaders. Advisers of leaders and scholars were more preoccupied with advice and

theorization about the strategies of territorial preservation, expansion and security.

Thus, international security was exclusively military strategy against attack and

defence especially during wars and conquests. But due to the fact that all classical

military were defence mercenaries of empires and later nation states, the science and

practice of international strategy rapidly expanded to encapsulate forging of federal

systems for collective security of hitherto small nation-states and their regime and

national security. All such philosophical and theoretical postulations in the realm of

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international relations as Classical, Neo-classical, Idealist, Realist, Neo-realist and

International regimes are in one way or the other products of International Strategy.

Since the Ancient renaissance and medieval periods through to the enlightenment age,

it was the military strategy that characterized the relationships between municipalities,

principalities, empires, and civilizations thereby leading to various wars and conquests

such as Greco-Persian wars, Punic wars, Peloponnesian war, battle of Himera, battle

of Beneventom in the Ancient period; the Crusades, Wars of the Roses, Italians’ wars,

first Barons wars in the medieval period. Although World Wars I and II have been

fought in the enlightenment age, but this period has a distinct characteristic in terms of

its hybridity of both hard strategy and soft strategy. Hard in terms of military might

and soft in terms of socio-economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and ideological

dominance and influence.

As mentioned above, the concern of classical strategy was purely Power. In the Art of

War written in 5th Century BC, Sun Tzu has fantastically theorized for the military

generals, and war commanders’ various strategies on how to attack and defend; how

to deceive and confuse the enemy; how to utilize minimal resources during war for

maximum gain and how not to etc. In a similar manner Carl von Clausewitz in his

famous work-On War, has passionately operationalized war expectations and

disappointments in war and the very dimensions there from.

From the point of view of power retention, consolidation and expansion, Niccolo

Machiavelli in his The Prince, The Discourse of Livy and Seven Books on the Art of

War, has expressed the different ways, methods, tactics and strategies that rulers can

lead their subjects as well as keeping their principalities and municipalities intact and

free from external aggression and or internal subversion. Especially in The Prince,

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Machiavelli employed a historical approach to advise the Prince on the best possible

way to rule and to preserve his power and territory.

These concerns, approaches and modes of thought-which by their very nature had

politics, security and strategy at their core, were what prevailed and dominated the

political discourse and debate in the classical era, hence the activities that characterize

the span of the classical era was looking at strategy from the lenses of might is right

with minute regard for diplomacy.

Many scholars of international studies and politics have the consensus that both world

wars have been characterized by the common features of dominance, and balance and

of power shift in the balance, quest for spread and ideological completion (especially

between US-led capitalism and USSR-led socialism in the case of WW II), cooperation

and alliance all of which were the concerns of the then international system’s notion

of strategy. this tendency for domination became even further exacerbated with the

outbreak of WW II. Nation states as main actors in the of the international system

By the end of World War, I, the prevailing strategic system of the international system

swiftly moved in from an extreme decentralized jungle system to one in search of

global interdependence, peace, order and security. This situation was what gradually

led to the establishment and eventual proliferation of different kinds of international

organizations starting with the forging of The League of Nations this for many scholars

of international politics was mainly responsible for the strategic paradigm shift in the

international system from classical realism based on the idea of power and brute force,

wars and conquest, to neoclassical realism based on Realpolitik i.e. the ability of actors

in the international system to pursue power and influence others using certain strategic

calculus whether idealistic or realistic, diplomatic or otherwise. In fact, this notion of

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international ideological dominance had quickly manifested itself leading to the cold

war between the USA and the USSR.

So since the post-World War II period through Cold War and Post-Cold War period

and, with capitalism’s defeat of communism, the idea of international strategy kept

metamorphosing away from military power to ideological, civilizational interests

through different media and methods such as international treaties, laws and

conventions, as products of Neoliberal globalization. Showry, (1989). For (McKeown,

2017).

Such international organizations as World Trade Organization, regional economic

communities, International Non-Governmental Organizations and their domestic

appendages and proxies became the frontline vanguards of capitalism, imperialism,

globalization, free trade and multinationalism worldwide as a mark of new dominant

and exploitative tools of centre-periphery relationship. (Amin, (2017).

To juxtapose this view even further is to cite many examples of how international

relations between and among countries in the international system has taken a new

dimension by prioritizing economic issues of foreign Direct Investment,

multinationalism and international trade and finance. Jedwab, (2014), Ding, (2014),

and Michalski, & Pan, (2017). Such diplomatic strategy in this direction as in the case

of China in relation to the rest of the world especially developing and underdeveloped

societies of the globe is often referred to as Check-Book Diplomacy.

The seminal work of Thomas Friedman The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-

first century Friedman, (2005), is indeed a good and relevant material on how

multinational organizations serve as strategic agents and tools of imperialism and

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globalization for the maximization of capital and spread of capitalism as well as the

imperial motive of cultural domination and exploitation.

For a number of scholars, as Marx, (1993), Marx, & Engels, (2009), Marx, (2012) and

Lenin, (1999), would earlier argue, that with the abolishment of colonialism,

multinational companies are the new tools of the new tools of imperial domination

Lee, (1971), Warren, (1973), through the unegotiated exploitation of resources,

Callinicos, (2007), domination and expansion of capitalism Caltung, (1976 in the

global vulnerable societies especially of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

The Cold War had been a struggle between two economic systems-capitalism and

communism-and with the fall of the wall, there was only one system left and everyone

had to orient himself or herself to it one way or another. Henceforth, more and more

economies would be governed from the ground up, by the interests, demands, and

aspirations of the people, rather than from the top down, by the interests of some

narrow ruling clique. (Friedman, 2005)

Assis, & Franco, (2017), opines that the US-led capitalist world has not only succeeded

in spreading the tentacles of capitalism, Fuchs, (2017), using different International

Organizations, but it also employs and uses the tactics alongside other capitalist

international actors, of creating, masterminding and monitoring civil society

organizations as such as Global Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International etc to

supplement the activities of capitalism all over the globe. (Cole, 2017). The activities

and worldwide spread of multinational companies and the international laws, treaties

and conventions have been widely alluded to by many writers as evidence of

contemporary global strategy also referred to as Grand Strategy.

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It can be understood here that the proliferation of these international organization as

capitalistic tools is a deliberate renewed or contemporary strategy of power acquisition

and dominance in the international system. It’s a Realpolitik based on expansionist

motive irrespective of the different sectors of life. All these arguments of civilizational

or ideological competition, struggle and strategy in the international system have been

dealt with by various scholars of international politics.

International Strategy (IS)

GOALS ACTOR MODALITY & PROCESS TOOLS OUTCOME

Security/ Military; War; Competition; Hard/Soft Influence;

Influence Nation Realpolitik Power; Security
states/IOs

Figure 2.1 Showing Basic Elements of International Strategy

A number of International relation and politics theorists would theorize that the

strategic activities that characterize the post-cold war period today is the constant and

enduring struggle and conflict emanating from what may be called civilizational clash.

Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilization and the Re-making of the New World

Order, (Samuel, 1993), has aptly captured this perspective. Huntington is of the view

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that in the pre-cold war period the international system was divided along two major

ideological powers-this is in fact why Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the

Last Man, (Fukuyama, 1992), primarily argued that among all these ideological

civilizations, liberal democracy which is a product of capitalism has proved to be the

most resilient and is therefore the last man.

So, Huntington further argued that the most important distinctions are no longer

ideological, economic or political factors, rather, cultural-that conflict in the

international system will thenceforth be characterized by the dictates of the eight

cultural civilizations he has outlined in the civilization thesis.

So, for Huntington concludes by finally predicting an enduring clash between the

prevailing western cultural hegemony (of military superiority and western political

culture and values), and resistant cultures of the rest of the world (Islam, Asia, China

and the Americas). In line with these seminal works other scholarly insights and

perspectives, we can to some extent agree with Huntington and yet Mahmud

Mamdani’s Good Muslim Bad Muslim Birt, (2006), and Edward Said’s Orientalism,

(Said, 1979), that, the struggle between, Western culture and its inherent capitalistic

ideology and Islam with each trying to secure, expand, dominate, survive and prevail,

of the contemporary pattern of international strategy.

It should therefore, be understood here that all of these literature, coupled with our

lived experiences and contemporary realities, prove that, the phenomenon and concept

of international strategy has in the process of its evolution ever since, passed and

suffered changes and transformations (from military dominance to ideological

dominance to cultural hegemony), due to the dynamic realities and developments in

the international system. Whether unipolar, bi-polar, multipolar, socialism, capitalism,

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realism, idealism, Islam, Christianity or Jewism-the quest to dominate, win, capture,

ally, cooperate, block, unite or secure, it’s simply about international strategy.

2.2.2 Business Organizations Strategy (BOS)

From the review of international strategy above, it would be noted that strategy was

exclusive seen in terms of power relations and ideological and cultural struggle, quest

for dominance and hegemony but not in terms of formal organizational phenomenon.

Even though business organization strategy holds the promise of a long run

complementarity to the ideological motive of capitalistic hegemony, but it is centrally

concerned with … In the case of the former such famous works as Henry Mintzberg

and Andrew Pettigrew are classic examples of managerial level strategies for business

organizations…. Rather than results from one-off decisions, strategies are outcomes

of quiet complex processes. This is a clear difference therefore between strategic

management and strategizing. The former is a suggestion of organizational

management rationale flowing from top to low level hierarchy while the latter is about

collective of day to day activities of group or organizational members towards the

realization of organizational goals i.e., strategy formulation in the form of complex

organization and processes by organizational management.

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 Business Organization Strategy

(BOS)

GOALS ACTOR MODALITY & PROCESS TOOLS OUTCOME

Profit Management Rational choice; strategic Capital; Patronage

thought; Competitive Thought; /Non-
Advantage Patronage

Figure 2.2 Showing Basic Elements Business Organization Strategy

In line with trending development on the domain and practice and implementation of

strategy in business organizations (Kärnä, 2016) sampled Fourteen organizations to

contributes to the strategic discourse in business by slightly moving away from

manager cantered strategy to micro-level strategic activities of mid-level practitioners.

For Kärnä, effective communication, organizing, coordinating and facilitating

strategies of organization performed by the supportive functions of mid-level

practitioners is what brings about organizational trust and positive culture rather than

the classical top-bottom managerial strategy approach that tends to be too absorptive

and exploitative for a successful business objective. Though here, it can be understood

that mid-level practitioners hold more promise for the potentialities of facilitating

strategy process through knowledge creation, common understanding increment and

means for strategy implementation, but the crucial managerial role cannot be either

underestimated. What it could be a better position is to understand the necessity of a

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what may be regarded as fair strategy-a situation where consulting is mutual between

the top-level and mid-level practitioners. The top level managers who are expected to

acquire greater knowledge and skills are in a better position to anticipate long term

strategies while the mid-level does the application. It should be a simple case of

thought and action.

2.2.3 Strategy as Practice (S-as-p)

The foundational works of Whittington 1996, Johnson, Melin and Whittington 2003,

Jarzabkowski, (2004), Jarzabkowski, (2005), Whittington, (2006), Johnson, (2007),

Jarzabkowski, Balogun and Seidl 2007) Jarzabkowski, & Whittington, (2008),

Jarzabkowski, & Paul Spee, (2009), Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, (2010),

Vaara, & Whittington, (2012), on Strategy as Practice (S-as-p), has remarkably pushed

the frontiers of strategic theory and practice of Strategy beyond the mere role of

organizational management. Whereas strategy has traditionally been seen as

something an organization has-for example, a diversification strategy or an

internationalization strategy- for strategy as practice researchers, strategy is something

that people do. Strategy is a kind of work, not just a property of organizations. This

reconception of strategy immediately opens up aspects of strategy that the academic

discipline- both content and process wings- has so far been reluctant to address.

(Jarzabkowski, P., & Whittington, R. 2008).

As a young research field concentrating on how the strategists actually do strategy

Strategy-as-Practice (S-as-p) is defies the traditional views of strategy thereby

centrally concentrating to understand strength of micro activities of strategy. Its

uniqueness of separating performers from non-performers is what makes it strategy as

practice. Valmra, et al (2006). The major interest of strategy researchers in a general

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sense entails consciousness of participation, however, any domain of activity of theses

researchers nevertheless requires deeper understanding of the broad frameworks of

such movements. (Johnson, 2007).

The nature therefore of this study makes it possible to be biased towards strategy as

action rather than strategic management. In this regard, the works of different scholars

has set a rolling ball for the emergence of an evolving paradigm in the theory and

practice of strategy. this evolving paradigm which is referred to as Strategy as practice

(S-as-p). S-as-p seeks to transcend the traditional boundaries of strategy whereby

explanation of strategic action and change is understood in terms of top managers’ role

vis-à-vis business firm performance. S-as-p’s four basic units of concern are Actors

(who does it?); Modality and Process (how they do it); Tools (what they use) and;

Outcome (what they get)

Basically therefore, a good strategy framework should at least be characterized by

Goals, Problems/Challenges, Options/Rational Choice and Cost/ Benefits.

Although the use of strategy is most frequent in connection with warfare, the concept

permeates politics and other fields, where the logic remains the same. Strategy focuses

on questions of how, when, and where and determines how the subsequent answers

are interdependently formulated. Strictly speaking, it is understood as direct or indirect

competition with others. (Miller, & King, 2005)

There are a number of literature and dimensions on Strategy. When talking about

strategy therefore, clear distinction must be made as to what type of strategy? Strategy

literature like any other concept has its historical origin, meaning, development,

dynamics, dimensions and perspectives. Basically therefore, strategic discourse can be

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categorized into three broad dimensions; International Strategy, Business-organization

strategy and Strategy as practice (S-as -p), (Johnson, 2007). Particularly, while

international strategy concerns itself with power, security and quest for dominance in

the international system, business strategy has as its central concern any idea that will

complement business organizational motive, while the latter (Strategy as practice), is

largely concerned with actor’s real field practice, processes as well as the strategic

outcome of that.

Despite the fact that activities of the subject of this research-IMN being not a profit

oriented organization, are more closely concerned with S-as-p, this does not however

mean that there are no areas of relativity or convergence that makes the other two types

relevant to the whole research in one way or the other. International strategy for

example is useful in understanding the evolutionary nature, dynamics and dimensions

of strategy. Business Strategy on the other hand is useful in the sense that it explores

an entirely different dimension of strategy away from the international concept. Most

importantly both are crucial to the conceptual and theoretical frameworks and

variables of the study

This is a clear difference therefore between strategic management and strategizing.

The former is a suggestion of organizational management rationale flowing from top

to low level hierarchy while the latter is about collective of day to day activities of

group or organizational members towards the realization of organizational goals i.e.,

strategy making in the form of complex organization and processes by organizational

members.

This shows that strategy is an encapsulation of all the above which have great deal of

relationships all through strategy process. First it is the goals of an organization or

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group that determine the nature of the strategy to be embarked upon. This is done in

consideration and recognition of the problems and challenges in relation to both

internal and external conditions. It is this determination that will then require a rational

and well calculated thought based on the options available, this will then be followed

by either cost or benefit arising from choice is finally reflected in the outcome.

Jarzabkowski, P. (2004); Jarzabkowski, P. (2005), among the early works on S-as-p,

contend to see Strategy as that which managers have as against that which managers

do. For them, Strategy is not supposed to be like a skill which managers own or have

monopoly of, rather, it is supposed to entail activities which integrate the role of who

take the action to the field (practitioners). This is very much a call for a micro approach

the doing of strategy. The ability to put organizational practitioners of strategy in

perspective makes it possible that all aspect of strategy practice is integrated and

therefore more insights gained.

Similarly, in one of the most important theoretical and practical literatures S-as-p,

Johnson, G. (2007) argued that instead of focusing on the thoughts and actions of

managers, s’-as-p is more concerned with the actions/practices and effects of

strategists. As a research based approach Johnson (2007) leads other authors to provide

theoretical and practical insights and methodologies for strategy thinkers and

practitioners alike.

In another path breaking perspective, Whittington, R. (2006) Rather than merely

seeing strategy as something people merely do, Whittington suggests that the strategy

practice can only be complete, comprehensive and effective when the three important

concepts of strategy praxis, strategy practices and strategy practitioners are integrated

into the two organizational levels of intra-organizational and extra-organizational

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activities and relations. This way only can it be possible to, through the practice of

strategy create strategy, transfer strategy and make strategy practitioners.

Jarzabkowski, P., & Whittington, R. (2008) Apart from their individual chapters in

different journals since 2000, the works of (Mintzberg 1973; Mintsberg and Waters

1985; Pettigrew 1973) has paved way for the generations and launching of new ideas

on the theory and practice of strategy. Strategy as practice (s-as-p), rather than the

macro aspects of organizational strategy as Mintzberg and others would theorize,

focuses on the macro level aspects and activities, processes and practices of

organizational strategy and strategizing. The various work on s-as-p serves as a

connecting bridge between the older managerial view and the latter practice oriented

perspective. The effects made so far has helped provide an alternative to the

mainstream strategy research and practice via its attempt to move away from mere

focus on effects of strategy in performance alone to a more comprehensive and deep-

rooted explanation. The planning process and implementation of strategy thought and

practice. The s-as-p agenda has helped the evolutionary process of the field of strategy

with new perspectives and fresher insights.

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 Strategy as Practice (S-as-P)

GOAL ACTOR MODALITY & TOOLS OUTCOME

PROCESS

Profit Managemen Rational choice; Capital; Patronage

t; Mid & Competitive Actor;
Low-Level Advantage; Field Network
Practitioners Practice

Figure 2.3 Showing Basic Elements of Strategy as Practice

As Eisenhardt (1989a) and Yin (2003) believes, the causes and practice of strategic

actions are multiple and can therefore not all be captured in a micro or macro-level

research alone, it needs the complementarity of what they call analytical

generalizability. Though it does not hold the place of grand theoretical framework, but

it serves the purpose of concepts and frameworks sensitizer by grounding the research

in the practical activity and reason of human actors. (Giddens, 1984; Reckwiz, 2002)

2.2.4 Social Movement Strategy (SMS)

There are quite numerous theories and perspectives that propose to analyze the

dynamics, intricacies, characteristics, and the nature of groups and movements and

their political tendencies (either of cooperation or of conflict) that characterize them.

This is because generally, it is believed that groups do not fall from the sky, there’s

normally a condition that leads to their formation. And just as the conditions, the nature

of groups and perhaps the politics that characterize them has great deal of relationship

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with both internal and external factors. In fact, the conceptualization of groups and

their theories are determined by the very conditions, circumstance and perspective

from which they are analyzed and perceived. Moreover, it is believed that the condition

that warrant groups to be formed, differ. Some groups get to be formed on the grounds

of their economic conditions, some social, others political etc. From the functionalist

perspective for example, Emile Durkheim (1893), had expressed that the starting point

for the formation of social groups can be traced to the division of labor in the society;

that is to say that technical positions in the divisions of labor can be transformed into

socially meaningful groups with their own distinctive cultures.

Durkheim argues that rather than abandoning the site of production and emphasizing

on “postmodern” sources like race, gender, lifestyles etc as sources of identity and

divisions of classes, one should understand that the labour market is well organized

and explanatorily powerful at the micro-level of occupations. These primary

associations born out of division of labour are what Weber termed as “Gemeinschaft

occupations”.

Here, both Ferdinand Tonnies (1887), and Getzner (1985) corroborate with Durkheim

on the idea of “Gesellschaft” and “Gemeinschaft”. In Gesellschaft, society describes

associations in which the larger associations never take precedence over the

individual’s self-interest.

And these associations or groups lack the same level of shared social mores, which

means rather than family or community ties as in Gemeinschaft, secondary

relationships are involved. Therefore, Tonnies believes that as an association in which

individuals are mainly oriented to the will of the larger group, Gemeinschaft’s

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activities are regulated by common mores or beliefs about the appropriate behavior

and responsibilities of members of the group or association.

Similarly, Getzner, (1985), in his book “Social Organization: A Study of the Larger

Mind”, the concept of “primary” and “secondary” groups were first introduced. The

former to mean those kinds of groups that are marked by the concern for one another,

shared activities and culture and long periods of time spent together. They are

psychologically comforting and influential in developing personal identity, e.g.:

families and close friends etc. Secondary groups according to Getzner, was the general

later development in life which is much less likely to be influential on one’s identity

than primary groups. This include groups in which one exchange explicit commodities,

such as Labour for wages, services for payments, and such they also include classes,

teams and groups of co-workers. The key word in secondary groups is largeness,

impersonality, and goal orientation, even though they are mostly on short term basis.

In his book, Preface to the Division of Labour in Society (1893), and also somewhere

in Suicide (1897), and elsewhere (see especially Pifer, 1994), Durkheim believed that

harmony rather than conflict, defined societal organization. It is on this basis that

Durkheim posited that solidarity was the normal condition that binds society together

through what he regarded as mechanical and organic solidarities. The former refers to

integration based on shared beliefs and sentiments while the latter refers to integration

those results from specialization and interdependence.

So group solidarity changes as society becomes more complex anomie and when

individuals lose their solidarity as when values become generalized as a result of

normative values becoming generalized rather than personally embraced.

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But Terry and hoppfer (1986), in their social identity theory did not, however, relent

in trying to politicize the boundaries of groups by showing that in-group feelings are

the conceptual distinctions that separate people into groups and thereby generate

feelings of a similarity and group membership, while, out-group are those feelings

which an individual develops as a result of not identifying with a group. According to

Durkheim, these symbolic boundaries make individuals to become more likely to

engage in individual mobility strategies by engaging in further activities to consolidate

their group structure and activities by, for example, choosing their leaders, making of

decisions, goals setting, controlling members’ behavior etc.

“The curiosity by people or groups to evaluate themselves by comparing their

achievements or performances are referred to as reference grouping” (Kolsty, 1945).

Tom and Bubby, (2012:56-7) borrowed from Dunbar (2010), to suggest how a stable

group relationship can be achieved. Dunbar proposes that from 100 to a minimum of

230 persons in a group with a commonly used value of 150. For him with this size, an

individual knows who each person is, and how each person relates to every other

person in the group. From this proposition, however, it could be understood that the

size of a group has an implication on the effectiveness and efficiency of it.

Stanley Milgram (1967), in his Social Network Theory, (SNT) showed that the

interrelationships at various levels of organizations play a critical role in determining

the way organizations are run, problems solved and, the degree to which individuals

or groups succeed in achieving their goals.

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Milgram in this theory further argues that, when acting in social groups, we defend

ourselves in terms of our group membership and seek to have our group valued

positively relative to other groups.

However, in our unequal world many people find themselves in groupings that are

devalued compared to others, and that this depends upon two issues:

Permeability: if we believe that we can still progress in society despites our group

membership i.e. group found are permeable) we will try to distance ourselves from the

group and be seen as individuals. If there is no chance of advancement because group

founders are impermeable then we will begin to identify with the group and act

collectively with fellow members to improve or situation. Security: what we do as

group members depends upon security. If we believe the present situation is either

legitimate or inevitable, we will adapt to it. We may seek to improve the valuation of

our own group (e.g. stressing new positive characteristics) but we won’t question the

system itself. However, if we see the situation as illegitimate and we can envisage

other ways or organizing society (cognitive alternatives) then we will act collectively

to challenge the status quo and bring about social change. Dunber (1987), in Persons

(1939); Persons Parsons, & Smelser, (1965) on Resources Mobilization Theory,

(RMT), argue that interests can be accepted as expressed interests, but recognize that

there are organization and mobilization problems in intra and inter – class alliances...

these tend to produce factionalism or consensus movements (or both), sometimes even

culturally embedded interest groups or lobbies movements. At the extreme, these

movements may in fact be organized from above by political parties. Parties or unions,

or other state or international organizations, or influential individuals as the case may

be.

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On this basis, therefore, we can ignore material interest and then accept expressed

interest to show that organization, mobilization, threat, power etc., can sometimes

determine or predict collective action not material (economic) conditions as Marx

would argue.

It is important, however, to say that groups as social classes are just like an amoeba

which changes its shape in response to the different circumstances in which it finds

itself. This differentiation in the theorization of groups as social classes does not at all

require for the declaration of a victor or vanquish theory or model, but renders all as

relative depending of the suitability in application. For us to understand the dynamics

of these groups, we have to make an attempt to understand the nature of them.

On the nature of Groups, in his social identity approach, a renowned social

psychologist Muzafer Sherif (1984), formulated a technical definition of a social group

“It is a social unit consisting of a number of individuals interacting with each other

with respect to:

Common motives of goals; an accepted division of labour; Established status

relationships; Accepted norms and values with references to matters relevant to the

group, and; The development of accepted sanctions, such as raise and punishment

when norms were respected or violated. The key word in social identity approach in

“awareness of a common category membership” and that a social group can be

“usefully conceptualized as a member of individuals who have internalized the same

social category membership as a component of their self-concept stated otherwise. A

social group, therefore, is a situation where one or more human interact with one

another, share similar characteristics, and collectively have a sense of unity.

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Firstly, a social group exhibits some degree of social extension and is more than a

sample collection of aggregates of individuals. Secondly, Social cohesion can be

seamed through shared interest, value, representations, ethnic or social background,

and kinship ties, among other factor. Thirdly, the social identity approach posits that:

the necessary and sufficient conditions for the formation of social groups in the

awareness of a common category membership, fourthly, the social cohesion approach:

more than a sample or aggregate of individuals, such as people waiting at a bus stop

or people waiting in a line. Examples of groups include families, companies, circle of

friends, clubs, local chapters of fraternities and local religious congregations.

On the other hand, Social movement as a social science concept has undergone

different transformation overtime. But the most important and comprehensive attempts

to operationalize the concept based on contemporary development was put forward by

Tarrow 1998; MC Adam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, in their “contentions politics”. They

referred to social movement as all kinds of collective political struggles involving

governments and not formally constituted political actors using conventional means

(such as devolutions, ethnic and religious conflicts).

In similar direction and vein Koopmans and Rucht 1996, Eziekiel, 2002; Pfahl-

Traighber, 2003; Virchows 2004; Adams and Roschigno, 2005; Sagerman, 2007 and;

Della Porta, 2013 believed that extremist and violent groups and movements such as

Jihadists and supremacists all are equally on the basis of social movements. This also

sample with the under tending of Wictorowicz, 2004,2006. The simple yard sticks

about all these in the episodes of interaction between multiple parties/actors and the

processes of construction in contentious politics. But in a broader sense these

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arguments juxtapose the basic necessary existence of certain elements before a

concentrations politics is qualified as a social movement.

The first is the target societies. Theological societies are, though, not to be confused

with surrounding environment or society, rather, it represents the target achievement

desired by the social movement or contending parties. But the target societies are

basically of two types, the positive and the negative. The being of a target society as

positive or negative depends on the mission of the group. Normally the contending

party’s ideology or realm is seen by its contending actor as negative while the area or

issue of contest to which each of the contending party seek to take advantage of

constitutes the positive target society. Here the ideology inconsistency of contending

polities can affect the slightly target society from a positive to a negative one. For

example, when a radical Islamist group changes its perdition from strict Islamism to

moderate one its target society is in most cases affected. The second element that

combines to quality parties in confectioneries politics as SMs is internal stratification.

Williams, (1995) believes that group have the tendency to generate internal

stratification as a result of differences and variations in a group interims of level, peer,

strata etc. all of which are needed to be effectively harmonized, carry out responsibility

and function which are expected to be translated into tactics and strategies for the

attainment of group goal and organizational objectives.

Socially, frustrated follower’s ideological activists, philosophers, knowledge

custodian’s bourgeoisies, elite’s vibrant youth, criminal persons etc. are good

examples of resources for internal stratification. Additionally, individuals seeking

loyalty and social bonds might be attracted through social activities like (see pg. 5)

processions rallies, parties, congregation etc. (Koehler, 2014).

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 Social Movement Strategy
(SMS)

GOAL ACTOR MODALITY & TOOLS OUTCOME

PROCESS

Resilience;
Relevance; Leaders; Rationality; Struggle; Masses; Power
Power Masses Competitive Network
Capture Advantage;
Contention; Field
Practice

Figure 2.4 Showing Basic Elements of Social Movement Strategy

Thirdly, the ability movements to create economic networks in such a way that they

can independently finance their activities and operations is what details

“Infrastructure”. The establishment of infrastructure by SMs is critical to their

continued existence and survival. Infrastructure is not restricted to economic activities,

rather it cuts across other spheres such as cooperate designs in terms of uniforms,

Lagos web design, badges fliers, posters, flags colours, symbols etc. that can show a

sort of commonality and conspiracy of the group. It also entails meanings and identity.

The infrastructure, therefore, plays the function of showcasing the movement in real

life, creating a kind of visibility, impact and a movement specific way of life (a sort of

the movement’s hardware) (1 bid).

The fourth is “Ideology”. In this case against extant ideologies that characterizes

normative or classical social movement ideology in the contemporary sense entails

moralizing and beliefs formation through forms of political and communication

framings (Benford and Snow 2000), that is to say by being active participants in

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processes that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction (1 bid),

movement factors tends to be mobilized towards set of beliefs and meanings that

legitimize the activities of SM.

In sum, it can be understood that, rather than being a stagnant concept, strategy has

evolved from right from its origin in the ancient period until the contemporary age of

globalization. In the process of its evolution, the concept and practice of strategy

attained its dynamic status due to the essential contestations that characterize its

conception and application between different philosophies, schools of thought,

approaches, perspectives and paradigms. As showcased in the summary in the table

below, the differences in the primary factors of subject matter, environment, actor and

tools are what differentiates the meaning of Strategy between its four basic approaches

i.e. International strategy, Business organization strategy, Strategy as practice and

Social Movement Strategy.

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Table 2.1
Showing Summary of Strategy Approaches
International Strategy Business Organization Strategy as Practice (S-as- Groups and Social
Strategy p) Movements Strategy

Elementary Subject 1. Military Strategy Strategy Formulation Strategy 1. Power seizure

Matter
2. International Action 2. Political Influence
power and
(Strategizing) 3. Contentious Politics
security

Environment International System Organizations Organizations Political System

Actor 1. Territorial Units Organizational 1. Organizational Social Movements
Management Management
2. Nation states
2. Field Actors/
3. International
Practitioners
Organizations
and Regimes

Tools 1. Hard Power 1. Strategic Thought 1. Strategic Action 1. Action Plans

2. Soft Power 2. Resources 2. Resources 2. Environment
3. Resources 3. Resources
4. Network
5. Mobilization
Source: Authors Device from Extant Literature and Field Survey Data

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2.3 Islamism, Politics and Secularism

Secularism which refers to separation of religion from politics started from the West.

The concept was nourished and shaped during the period of renaissance. This doctrine

donates the reason why religion and politics were separated in modern politics. Moten

(1996) explained secularism as formal philosophical system, which was proposed in

1846 in England by Jacob Holyoak. Its most shared postulates are three: worldly

orientation, liberalism and western science. The first postulate declared humanity as

ultimate reality and assumes that the ultimate aim of human beings should be sought

with reference to the present life and social wellbeing without relationship with

religion and to the life here after (Moten,1996). Liberalism, according to him, was

founded upon humanism, a belief in the integrity and sanctity of the free individual

who has human right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The last postulate, which

western science adopts, is a belief in natural causation and consequent emphasis on the

generalisability and applicability of the methodological pattern of Newton’s physics

for discovery of truth. This means its emphasis in that direction was the applicability

of the reason, observation and experiment to the neglect of revelation, tradition or

authority (Moten, 1996). As Benderrvand (2007) observed, secularism was first

espoused in Christianity during the era of the middle ages, when people revolted

against the churches hegemony. The situation resulted in set of events like

breakthrough in scientific fields and new industrial development.

Secularism was a response to the religious infighting that posed a serious threat to the

emerging modern Europe; it was a revolution to keep the state distant from the church,

Safi, (2001). This is as a result of the attitudes of the ruling class of the church to

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scientific experience of the mankind, which ultimately led to the revolt against their

hegemony and subsequently culminating in scientific revolution.

Prior to the revolution, it was the church which shaped all aspects of social lives of

people. According to this view, it was the domination of man by the religion which

retarded the development of science, technology and inventions. Therefore, if really

the society needed to develop it had to disentangle politics or state from the fetters of

religion, as it happened in the history of Europe; it was this idea that was brought to

the east in the name of opening a new vista for development and progress.

There are different reasons put forward by the exponents of secularism. For example,

a Behdardvand (2007) mention in his analysis of the subject matter that the proponents

of secularism hold that religion of God is fixed while social conditions are changing.

These two can never be in the same domain, rather to be maintained in distinct entity.

This illustrates that political, economic and social relationship undergo constant

changes and progress, while religion has to do with particular or specific time or age

and its provisions have to be confined only to that period; it cannot organize life

thereby. This also connotes that because of the stability and limitation of religion it

cannot accommodate the contemporary realities; in other words, it has problem of

accommodation.

Another reason adopted by the secular rationality is that, human intellect has the ability

to form its own knowledge independent of revelation (Vaezi, 2004). This explicitly

indicated that without the aid of God, human intellect by constructing various set of

knowledge, life can be organized, improved and developed. Furthermore, the

advocates of secularism did not only insist on keeping religion distinct from politics

but also from all aspect of human life, such as culture, law, ethics, philosophy and

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economy. Surprisingly, with the development in Europe as a result of scientific

revolution and the backwardness of east couple with western influence of some elites,

the idea of secularism was brought to the Muslim nations, which culminated in

termination of Caliphate system of governance. The objective here is to resolve the

crises of the Muslim Ummah by sweeping aside the influence of Islam in the sphere

of life as it happened in the West, this according to them will bring about development.

Looking at affairs, the influence of religion upon politics is not a new phenomenon in

public lives of the people or something that could be only confined to Islam.

Christianity has dominated man before the period of renaissance, even though, Islam

has different history with that of Christianity; therefore, the idea of secularism is new

and foreign to Islam. In Islam, religion has the same domain with politics, and this

union is because Islam is comprehensive to include both spirituality and materiality.

The activities of the Prophet Muhammad following his Hijrah to Madina had brought

about a lot of changes to the Arabian Peninsula. This could not only be interpreted as

changes in spiritual life of the Arabs, as El-awa (1980) observed, even in Mecca they

did not have any form of political system until the inception of Islam and the Institution

of Madina. With this development, the primary sources of Islamic political thought

and its theory made it manifestation. Bringing together a number of hostile tribes into

one political community and even drawing a charter (Dustur al-Madany) that

incorporates articles concerning the relationship, responsibilities and obligations of

every tribe towards one another was strongly a political endeavour.

It was also a step in instituting and shaping the structure of social order of the Muslim

Ummah. Moreover, in relation to this the Prophet has established a diplomatic

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relationship, organized an army, entered into treaties with various tribes, passed

judgments in different cases, these are all political not spiritual matters.

Furthermore, the classical authorities (Quran, Sunnah, the rightly guided caliphate of

four immediate successors of the Prophet) and the Scholars like Ibn Khaldun, al-

Mawardi, al-Ghazali, and even the contemporary scholars like al-Qaradawi, al-Banna

and Mawdudi respectively, one can discern from their work and activities the

relationship or influence of religion to politics. Musa Abdul (1980) has noted that Ibn

Khaldun distinguished three kind of state according to their government and purpose.

He mentioned the first kind of state as ‘’Siyasa diniya’’ a government which is based

on divinely revealed law, the sharia which represent ideal Islamic theocracy Abdul,

(1980).

This shows that religion has a role in running the state. Another instance was the saying

of al-Ghazali which could also serve as evidence that ‘’religion and temporal power

are twins’’ Moten, (1996). All these indicate temporal and spiritual unification of

religion, most especially in Islam.

Islam recognizes no distinction between spiritual and temporal realm and between

religion and political activities. Both the two are unitary and complementary sides of

Islam. It is obvious that the Islamic legal system requires state apparatus for its

implementation. Imam Khomeini seem to adopt similar opinion in his treatise Islamic

government when he emphasizes that the nature of Islam and its law requires, Islamic

government for its implementation Khomeini, (1970). Here, Khomeini established a

relationship between Islam and politics by presenting it as religion which needs the aid

of government for the execution of some of its laws, like the execution of hudud and

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other capital punishments. It is the responsibility of government by Jurist, and, thus,

determines that Islam has political dimension.

In principle, the above analysis showed clearly that there is politics in religion and

vice-versa. This perception predisposes most of contemporary Islamic political

movements to aspire for the establishment of Islamic state, perhaps for the maximum

realization of the objectives of religion. Islamic state by definition is an ideal society

in which the system of rules has to do with the protection of Islam and promotion of

the interest of the ruled for the maximum realization of objectives of the Sharia.

To understand the nature of the sharia is very essential, as it was framed as a legal

system by Allah to suit the changing circumstances, and this proves why sometime it

was flexible. Of course, there are certain provisions in Islamic sharia which are fixed

in nature, but it does not mean that they cannot be changed by circumstance.

However, establishing Islamic society cannot be confined to a particular age or time

and Islam cannot be devoid of politics. The comprehensiveness of Islam was

demonstrated from the nature of Islamic mission which require its adherent to establish

it in social and political realm.

Misconceptions surrounding the establishment of Islam as a system of governance in

modern world, the influence or domination of imperialists on Muslim countries and

the internal crises of Muslim Ummah, as a result of their inability to understand

properly the true teaching of Islam, paved the way for secularism to triumph in Muslim

countries. It was because of the emergence of modernity that Muslims must submit

their politics, economy, culture and their social life to the human reason and intellect.

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The contact of Muslims with colonialism and imperialism made their system

vulnerable and susceptible to secularism.

2.3.1 Colonial-Secularity and the Muslim World

Colonialism which refers to the practice of domination or policy of acquiring full or

partial political control over the territory and people of another country, occupying it

with settler and exploiting it economically. It refers here to Western European

countries mainly colonizing Muslims world. The main countries which were active in

this form of colonization were France and the United Kingdom, which during the 18th

century almost had the complete power in the world trade. Before the expansion of

colonial empires in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Muslims world was characterized

by the predominant political role of Islam, particularly Ottoman Empire, which in the

words of Dale (2002) “created the largest and arguably most militarily powerful

empire in the world at that period” (Dale, 2002). Rodney (1972) was of the view that,

Islam was one of the greatest revealed religion which played a significant role in the

period of the feudal development of the Magreb, as it extended its control across

Africa, Asia and Europe in the 7th century of the Christian era. To him empire building

under the banner of Islam could be described as a classical example of the role of

religion in that respect (Rodney, 1972).

In fact, as late as the seventeenth century, Islamic polity was in force in the Indian sub-

continent under the Monghuls, the influence of Islamic system remained pervasive in

the world until very recently when the long period of European dominance reached its

peak in the early 18th century, with a massive encroachment over Muslim territories,

which in 1912, hardly any Islamic State seemed destined to survive as an independent

nation. Turkey and Persia appeared doomed to being partitioned or becoming spheres

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of influence; from Morocco to Java, from Bukhara to Decca, the vast majority of

Muslims lived under British, Dutch, French, Italian and Russian domination (Kohn,

1975 in Bin Mat, 2005).

The above explanation portrayed explicitly the position of Othman Empire in the zones

of influence and colonization by the European nations. Muslims independence steadily

crumbled as region after region fell under European control from West Africa to the

Eastern fringes of South-east Asia, from the Steppes of Central Asia to the tip of the

Indian Peninsula. European powers proceeded to capture territories ruled by Muslims.

Ansari (2002) noted that during the First World War, majority of the Muslims world

had been put under varying types and degrees of European colonial control (Ansari,

2002).

Prior to that, Muslims rulers had faced internal conundrum made all the more difficult

to deal with, by the accelerating challenges from the West, elements that further

deteriorated the situation. Consequently, advancement in Europe first brought the

Christian world to compete with the Muslim world and propelled it further ahead,

ending any hope of equality between the Muslims and the non-Muslims world.

Economically and politically, the Muslim world is vulnerable and this was exacerbated

by the incorporation and subjugation of Muslims into the empires acquired by

European powers during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The encounter of the Muslim world with the European world had significantly

produced negative impact, most fundamentally as Ansari (2002) stressed, “The impact

of expanding modernizing state was profound, whether the state was a European

colonial one or a Muslim one responding to the more technologically advanced West”

Ansari, (2002). It produced new demand and opportunities for many Muslims who

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were caught up in its drive to implement a new system of government and production.

These changes and progress made Muslims to be able to keep in touch with each

other’s as communication and transportation system improved vis-à-vis literacy. Thus,

modernity as it is well known was introduced to the Muslim world in the context of

being dominated by European colonial powers Abu Azyad, (2004).

This also introduced a variety of challenges to the Muslim states politically,

economically and intellectually, for example, most of the foreign trade, particularly of

the Middle East was now with Europe, therefore, Western thought began to acquire

prominence and Muslim’s culture seemed to change.

With regards to above, Bin Mat was of the view that after the dominance of the

religious underpinning in the Islamic societies, substantial changes in the political

languages employed and in its contents have taken place since the encounter of the

Middle East with Europe, beginning with the Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1798.

Though, as he opined, the occupation lasted only three years, it exposed the people of

Egypt to the ideas of enlightenment and paved the way for the introduction of Western

thought into Egypt in particular, and it spread to other parts of the Ottoman Empire in

the nineteenth century (Bin Mat, 2005).

According to Safi (1995) in his analysis of developmental trends in contemporary

Muslim experience,

the state of decline of the Ottoman empire felt by Sultan Salim, especially with regard

to its army in spite of military threat from the rising European powers, most notably

the Russian Empire, propelled him to embark on projects of military modernization,

which made it possible for Mohammed Ali, the governor of Egypt to follow his

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footsteps, and a little later, students from Egypt were sent in small groups to receive

education and training in Europe. (Safi, 1995).

This unprecedented move to send Muslim students to study in the West encouraged

Ottoman Salim II to follow suit, which as Safi opined, undoubtedly marked the

beginning of profound cultural changes in Middle Eastern society. After coming back,

having been exposed to superior education, the European educated students were

deeply impressed by the advanced political and social institutions of Europe, thus, they

started pointing out the flaws of the Ottoman Empire (Safi, 1995). From the assertion

made by Safi, we can also deduce that western influence has produced secular elites

within Muslim countries as a result of their close interaction with Europe. These paved

the way for both European cultural assimilation and institutional reforms in Egypt and

Turkey the seat of Calipal administration.

Enayat (1982) and Bin Mat (2005) concurred that the introduction of western reforms

into Othman Turkey from the time of Salim III (1789 – 1807 C.E.) followed

consecutive losses of territory to Christians of the orthodox church in the battlefield,

and the declaration of their Sultan as Caliph must be considered a major political event

in the history of Turkey. These, among others, are the political antecedents

surrounding the termination of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, under the leadership of

Mustfa Kemal (Ataturk) the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

According to Scruton (2002), Westernizing, involving both a deliberate move away

from Islamic ideas of legitimacy and ruthless secularization of society, with “Ulama”

losing whatever power they had once possessed in educational, legal and

administrative process. It is the beginning of modern Turkey which most scholars

unanimously agreed and it was made possible because of Turkey’s association with

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foreign invaders. This development had a greater impact on religio-political thought

of the Muslim Ummah especially with respect to Islamic State.

The character of Ottoman government system was guided by Caliphate political

theory, the Sultan, a temporal leader assuming the title of Caliph was responsible to

both people and God; he has a legislative right to make royal law (Qanun), but is

guided by Sharia. Ulama have a specific function of ensuring the existence of harmony

between Qanun and Sharia. There was also the position of Qadis who are responsible

for administration of sharia in the institution. With the introduction of legal and

administrative reform (Tanzimat) in this empire, it marked the beginning of change

from an Islamic to Western society, because the outstanding characteristic of this

reform is presentation of two different legal systems, instead of sharia which is the

only prevailing one.

Again, some scholars are of the view that, economic factors are also responsible for

the decline of Muslim empires, particularly Ottoman Empire; the increasing

dependence of the treasury of Ottoman state on loan floated in Western Europe, and

its conversion into a backward supplier of raw materials to the Western capitalists are

the cause of its ineffectiveness Egil & Rhodes, (1975; in Bin Mat, (2005).

This clearly indicates the economic weakness of the Ottoman Empire and led to the

successful penetration of the Western world into the Islamic world especially in the

field of trades, politics and military. Similarly, Bernard Lewis observed that; the

success of Western ideas in the Muslim world in the 19th century is often ascribed to

the advance of the material might of the Western world to the establishment of the

European economy, polity and certainly, to military supremacy in the Islamic world.

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Although, these are not sufficient explanations of the problem; the initial attraction of

these ideas is to be found in their secularism (Bin Mat, 2005).

Therefore, with regard to the above, the major problems of Muslim nations could

found their explanation in secular thought, the very antithesis of the Islamic system. It

is as El-Miskin (1993) described “the occidental archetype that was transplanted in

most of the former colonies of the Muslim world” (al-Miskin, 1993). It is a theory of

separation of religion from politics which had its very basis during the era of the middle

Ages, when people revolted against the church’s hegemony, which according to

Benderrvand (2007) culminated in a set of events such as breakthrough in new

scientific field, many innovations, new industrial interventions … Benderrvand,

(2007).

Secular thought that emerged out of genuine misconception of the life of Jesus was

transplanted to Islamic countries through modernists and European armies. The

Western educated elites without taking into consideration the comprehensiveness of

Islam and without taking into account where the idea emerged; they questioned the

religion and attributed lack of material advancement to it. For example, Malik (n.d)

noted;

that when the glamour of the high standard of living in the imperial countries came to

the notice of the western educated class of these colonies, they attributed it to their

system of thought and institution, without pondering over the real infrastructure on

which this society was constructed; they (educated class) became enamored with their

philosophy of life and political thinking. (Malik:n.d)

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These contributed in producing secular political institutions within the Islamic world

and it has been the greatest damage done to Islamic politics. Furthermore, with the

collapse of Ottoman Empire, the core of Islamic community, Muslims asserted the

feeling of nationalism which as Moten (1996) opined, had eventually led to the

structure of the modern nation state, each replete with national frontiers, national flags,

anthems and its own interest in preference and at the cost of all others Moten, (1996).

The feeling of nationalism has weakened the unity of Islam. Islam opposes Western

style of nationalism (qawmiyah) and viewing it from the al-Faruqi perspective is an

instrument used by the opponents of Islam to divide the Ummah against one another

and a threat to the divine transcendence through its violation of the most basic

institutions and values of humanity on the earth, Shafiq, (1994).

It has already been indicated that Muslim states are weak because of their internal

problems, coupled with imperialist pressure which led to the destruction of longest and

strongest empire in the early 19th century, but one can go further to discern from that,

the spinoff of that contact, that is, the stagnation and oscillation in Islamic political

thought which hinders the establishment of genuine political system; and ultimately

brought the end of the Sunni caliphate political system. This has, ultimately, calls for

the emergence of struggles for Islamic reform and revivalism as responses to the

sinister bedevilling Muslim nations.

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Table 2.2
Showing Mere Classification of Islamic Periods Based on Ideology/Mission and Strategy
Period Ideology/Mission Prophet’s Era Caliphate Moderation Revolution Postmodern Era
Era
Revolution Moderation/Revolution
Revolution

Strategy Preaching, Diplomacy, Islamic religious Approval & Gradual expansion of political
examplinary life Wars & leadership’s application of space through Infiltration,
of the prophet and Conquest accommodation & and radical violence, proxyships, bandwagoning,
other pious acceptance of power insurgency and local & international alliances,
Caliphs & divisions with existing terrorism through propaganda, etc.
Muslims, governments and as outright challenge of
diplomacy, wars long as Islam is not the status-quo and
& conquest prosecuted self-sought for
political power.
Source: Author’s compilation from Rubin (2003), (2010), Armajani (2012) and Okumu & Ikelegbe, (2010).

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2.3.2 Modernity and Islamic Response

Given the prevailing condition of Western influence in Islamic societies and their

ascendancy which coincided with the decline of Muslim empires, the application of

Islam in relation to the state is deeply confronted by the emerging technical, economic,

political and military superiority of Western society. Muslims have been forced to

review their position politically, to address the challenges of modernity and its

consequences.

Thus, Muslims encounter with the West had a profound influence that even led them

to compare their stagnant condition with that of the more dynamic West. Questions

arose about the rationale behind Western superiority and ascendancy vis-à-vis the

decline of the East. Consequently, they were made to register their dissatisfaction with

the condition of their society and tremendously responded. These responses could be

largely considered negative or positive depending on the way and manner in which

they perceived the challenges.

In relation to this, Abdul Rashid Moten, observed that this state of affairs has after

shocking the confidence of Muslims in their own civilization, gave rise to three major

intellectual trends in their analysis of historical reverses and prescriptions for remedial

action. Yvonne Haddad calls them acculturationists, normativists and neo-

normativists, while Khurshid Ahmad levelled them as Modernist, traditionalists and

tajdid. Moten (1996).

The acculturationists or modernists advocated for the adoption of western scientific

knowledge and technical know-how, they denounced blindly following of tradition,

and gave priority to reason in Islamic thought. Moten, (1996). Most of the intellectuals

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that belong to this perspective accepted the richness of Islam if it was re-interpreted,

but they lack sufficient Islamic knowledge to use in building new doctrines. Their

argument was that Muslims should be involved in selected western borrowing hence

the scope of Islam is very limited. Islamic modernism was in the words of Esposito,

“the response both to the continued internal weakness and to the external political,

religious and cultural threat of colonialism” Esposito, (1988). Their central argument

is that Islam is compatible with modernity and it can fully address the problems of the

contemporary world. They criticized the traditional scholars for their failure to re-

interpret Islam to meet the changing circumstances of Muslims life. Thus, their

ultimate aim is to release Muslim societies from the fetters of ossification, reinterpret

Islam, make a reform and use some aspects of Western thought to build modern Arab

and Islamic states.

The first person who came forward among these intellectuals was the Jamal-ud-din al-

Afghani (1838 – 1897). He stood out prominently, calling for a reform of Islamic

society; responded to the situation of Muslim Ummah defensively, relating the

backwardness and decline of Muslims not to Islam, but to the traditional scholars for

their misunderstanding of Islam. For, if they really understood it properly and

explained it correctly, as was the case during the time of the Prophet (SAW), Muslim

empires would not be easily dominated by European powers.

“He roamed the Muslim world, calling for internal reform in order to defend and

eventually drive out the West” Esposito, (1988:130). Evidently, the attempt by

Afghani was to bridge the gap between secular modernists and traditionalists, but

because of his constant reference to west and criticism against traditional Ulama, he

turned semi secular. He strongly believed that Muslims can restore back their previous

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glory not by rejecting the source of advancement of the West, but rather by reclaiming

reason and science which has been the integral part of the message of Islam. Al-

afghani’s solution was not the wholesale adoption of Western institutions and values,

but rather the purification of Islam from degenerated practice. He called upon Muslims

to rise against tyrannical rulers, unite under the banner of pan Islamism, and

essentially, to form a nationalist movement against the menacing threat of the West

and foreign occupation Shahin, (1993).

The objective of al-Afghani was not only to refine Islam to respond to the challenges

of the situation but also to unite Muslims into a single caliphate. Haddad (1994)

pointed out that “Afghani was an activist who instilled in his students the urgency of

resisting European intervention in the life of their country and the importance of seeing

Islamic peoples as one unified community”. The Afghani reform mission had a

profound influence on Muslim political thought because it appears as if he changed

the course and trend of their thinking. Similarly, his disciple Muh’d Abduh being

aware of the state of decadence in Muslim societies and the threat of Western

hegemony, he concentrated his activity and teaching in the arena of thought Abu Azyd,

(2004). He placed a priority on thought because he understood that there are a lot of

misconceptions with regards to understanding of the Holy Quran.

Abduh was convinced that the transformation of Muslim societies depended on a

reinterpretation of Islam and its implementation through national and social reforms

Esposito, (1988). He re-examined and explained the basic source of knowledge,

“Qur’an and Sunnah”. This gave him an opportunity to affirm the superiority of

Muslim faith. He said the superiority of the West is because it took the best of Islam

and appropriated it to itself. Abduh was first Egyptian to point out the backwardness

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of the Egyptian society and the fact that it had lost its capacity to renew itself. The

social and political problems of Egypt, he said, are due to its own heritage which has

made it incapable of responding to the challenges of the age Haddad, (1994).

Abduh accused Egypt of turning its back to the real teaching of the Qur’an and their

enormous temptation of trying to emulate the West. The Qur’an is the law as well as

the guardian for mankind. “Following these laws is the only means of the revival of

the nation. He said the establishment of a righteous and just society must be in

accordance with the teaching of the Qur’an” Haddad, (1994).

The basic foundation of his reform is reinterpreting the Qur’an and Sunnah to suit

current situation. He criticized the slavish imitation of past or west and closing the

door of ijtihad. He called on Muslims to be able to understand the reality of modern

time, according to him, ‘’ Ulama are to act as a dam against the incursion of foreigners”

Haddad, (1994). Recognizing the seriousness of Western challenges, he never believed

in Muslims being subservient to Europeans and noted that they are not fit to govern

Islamic societies since they are infidels. “Abduh’s Quranic interpretation and his use

of public interest as an Islamic justification for legal reform were adopted by reformers

in Egypt as well as other Muslim countries to introduce changes in family law”

Espositor, (1988). But his effort to carry Islam forward to the challenges of modern

time met with criticism of shaping the idea of secularism from different writers,

example Safi (1995) observed that this is due mainly to the fact that the works of

Abduh helped in revealing the flaws of the traditionalist model without offering an

alternative. His students and followers, including Sa’ad Zagluy and Mustafa Kamal,

substituted the Western model for the traditional. Haddad (1994) shares the same view

with the critics of Abduh that his effort led to division among his disciples; some saw

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his vision as the salvation of Egyptian society. Others advocated a separation between

religion and state. This could be true looking at the state of affairs after the death of

Abduh (1905).

His students’ responses often can be categorized into two and their thoughts could be

found in secular rationality. The first of these are the supporters of pure secularism.

They advocated the separation of religion and politics, and the establishment of

modern nation-states modelled on the west. Islam should be restricted to personal life,

and public life should be modelled in modern way, that is European ideas and

technology in government. According to Vaezi (2004), this secular thinking perceived

social relationships as part of “human” affairs and not “divine” affairs. They are extra

religious as opposed to intra religious. Law, economy and other political decisions as

well as the formation of our social orders and system of rights and duties are all

considered as the relationship between man and man, and not man and God (Vaezi,

2004)

Therefore, religion in this case must delegate everything to human reasoning and

science, this mode of thinking perceived Islam as tradition which is outdated, obsolete

and fixed. As presented by Safi (1995) an example of this kind of response could be

found in the work of Tahah Husayn (1938) Mustaqbal althaqafah fi misr, where

Husayn demonstrates the Western nature of Misra and emphasizes the importance of

historical continuality. Husayn wrote, “I do not want us to contemplate the future of

culture in Egypt except by reflecting on its distant past, and near present, because we

do not want and cannot afford to severe linkage between our past and present” cited in

Safi, (1995).

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According to Safi, Husayn argued that Pharaonic Egypt was in harmonious

relationship with the “Western” nation of Greece, while it was engaged in a bloody

conflict with the “Eastern” nation of Persia. Husayn returned from the distant past to

the present to find that the old close ties between the Egyptian and European society

have been renewed in the last few decades Safi, (1995). The advocates of this

perspective reject the compatibility of Islam with modernity and give religion a very

limited scope.

The second category of Abduh students, though they do not consider themselves

secularists, but their attitudes towards Islamic system reveal that. Their central

argument is that though, Islam encompasses values and ideas, and it is not composed

of both politics and spirituality, thus, Muslims are free to support any system or

regime. The first person to initiate the discussion of this matter was Sheik Ali Abdal

Razaq in a book entitled al-Islam wa’ Usul al-Hukm, published in 1925 El-Awa,

(1980) just one year after the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey. The book was

written in response to the Caliphate and state in modern time. His central argument

was that the caliphate system of governance had no basis either in the Qur’an, or the

tradition or the consensus.

To prove his argument, he comprehensively dealt with major pieces of evidence which

are normally drawn from these three sources in establishing the obligatory nature of

the caliphate Enayat, (1982). To him, the reality of the crises within the Muslim

Ummah has to do with their system of caliphate, therefore, he explicitly criticizes it,

and assume that “the government of Islamic states can be “of any kind”; it can be

autocracy or bureaucracy, monarchy or republic, a dictatorship or constitutional or

consultative government. El-awa, (1980). Sheik Ali was trying to expose to the people

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of Egypt and the Islamic Ummah that Quran does not specifically mention any form

of government or system to be established, therefore, because of the crises in caliphate

system hitherto, they better modernize it. Ali went again and said the government of

Islamic state can be ‘’democratic, socialist or Bolshevik, that the Prophet was nothing

but Rasul messenger for a religious call. Purely for the sake of religion, unblemished

by any tendency to rule or call for the formation of state El-Awa, (1980:66-67). This

was implicitly a secular thinking, demonstrating the prophet as only a Messenger for

spiritual matters, while he under took a lot of political and economic issues like;

defence, collection of zakat (obligatory alms) and most importantly he forms the state

at Madina.

The fundamental difference between these two classes of secularists is that while the

former argues that politics and religion must remain disentangled from each other, the

later contends that Islam does not in any way require or compel its followers to

establish it in the political sphere. Their attempt is to demonstrate Islam as a purely

spiritual doctrine, as opposed to both political and spiritual.

The emergence of modernity made them see the urgency to adopt it and the internal

and external problems experienced by Islamic countries during and after colonialism,

provided them a clue that Islam cannot organize or conduct human affairs in the

contemporary world. The shortcoming of this response lies with its genuine failure to

understand properly the basic tenets and the historical basis of Islam. No intellectual

that is conversant with Islam will insist on segregating Islam and politics, because

profuse historical evidence confirms the role of the Prophet as both a spiritual and

political head, even Western thinkers like Anthony Black agreed with that:

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His purpose was to construct out of tribal confederacies a new people driven by his

own sense of moral mission. Judaism had preached an all embracing (ethnic) law while

Christianity had preached spiritual (universal) brotherhood. But neither seriously

addressed the problem of military power and political authority; both had accepted life

under alien, pagan rule. Muhammad preached spiritual brotherhood plus an all

embracing law, and universal political control to be achieved Black, (2001).

Looking at the above analysis, one will agree with the political mission of the Prophet,

especially after his migration to Medina, where as we mention earlier that he organized

a lot of political and social matters which law is always there to safe guard. Despite

the perception and argument of the secularist, secularism has failed to provide the

Islamic world with the solution to its problems, following the Westernization of

Turkey, rather the situation deteriorated. Moten (1996) noted that:

Turkey was proclaimed a secular Republic; European clothes and alphabets were made

compulsory, and shrines and religious brotherhood were closed. Resistance to these

policies was met with repression, and even death. Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia

followed a gentler programme. He maintained Islam as state religion but prohibited

women from wearing the hijab (veil) and, in 1961, called upon the Tunisians not to

fast in the month of Ramadan, in order to fight underdevelopment. In both cases,

however, the seeds of secularism fell on barren ground as evidenced, in retrospect, by

the active and organized Islamic movements of the last twenty years Moten, (1996).

Surprisingly, with all the secularization reforms measures in Turkey, it cannot secure

a full membership of the European Union since its application on 14th April, 1987. In

its effort to European accession, concerning terms spelled out by the Copenhagen

Political Criteria, the country is still demanded to “focus on major elements, such as

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drafting a new constitution, before it can fully comply with the criteria” Today Zaman,

(2011). This means that Turkey despite its secularization since 1924 does not have a

democratic constitution. This clearly demonstrates the failure of secularism in Turkey

as opposed to the Caliphate system.

Another modernist who took the responsibility of responding to the situation of

Muslims in the Indian sub-continent with regards to the emergence of modernity was

Syed Ahmad Khan. He was of the opinion that Muslims should relinquish the policy

of opposition to the England, accepts the prevalent political situation and should

participate in the political process under the British rule to safeguard their political

interests” Malik: n.d. Looking at the situation of India, especially after Shah

AbdulAzeez, he was of the view that political resistance that appeals to Pan-Islam was

impractical.

With reinterpretation of Islam for fresh issues and accepting political reality of India,

the survival of India will be maintained. “Though he maintained that the Qur’an was

the final authority, in practice his rationalist approach meant that where a seeming

conflict existed between text and reason, reason prevailed’’ Espositor, (1988). This

actually was heresy, an opinion which does not coincide with established norms as

human reasoning has limitation, and matters that lie outside the reach of reasoning can

only be obtain through text. This denotes the supremacy of text over reason. Ahmad

khan was making attempt at that time to maintain Islam in the arena of politics.

However, his deep affinity to the West differentiated him with other scholars and

deviated from the established norm.

Muhammad Iqbal being educated both in the West and East gave him a unique effort

and serious attempt at grappling with the problems of modern Western influence; “for

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Iqbal, Islamic law was central to the unity and life of the Muslim community: When a

community forsakes its law, its parts are severed, like scattered dust. The being of the

Muslim rests alone on law, which is in truth the inner core of the apostle’s faith

Espositor, (1988). He perceived the law of God to be governing the whole universe,

based on his vision of Islam in which unity of God (Tauheed), oneness of God applies

not only to His nature but also to his relationship with the world.

Concerning the Muslim world with regards to its decay and decline and the challenges

posed to it by the emergence of modernity, Iqbal viewed the inner nature of Islam as

comprehensive, dynamic and creative. Therefore, he developed a synthesis between

East and West. While Iqbal admired the accomplishments of the West – its dynamic

spirit, intellectual tradition and technology – he was equally critical of its excesses,

such as European imperialism and colonialism, the economic exploitation of

capitalism, the atheism of Marxism and the moral bankruptcy of secularism Esposito,

(1988). He predicted the threat of establishing a Hindu-secular state especially to

minority Muslims. Therefore, he advanced the aim of having a world Muslim state.

He proposed the establishment of an Independent Muslims State in India where

Muslims might be able to lead their individual and corporate lives according to the

dictates of Islam Malik: (n.d: 9). Given the above objective, he emphasizes to his co-

workers, the leader of the Muslim League Party and the founder of Pakistan, the urgent

need for the Muslims State in India, which resulted in Pakistan in 1947. He rejected

an idea that nationalism developed the universal brotherhood.

The influence and the limitation of his ideas are evident in failing to provide a

systematic and comprehensive way for legal reforms. These are some of the views of

acculturationists as responses to the modern world, of course, it planted the seeds of

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revivalism but it eventually became the ground for secularism among certain Muslim

intellectuals. However, al-Afghani, Abduh, Ahmad Khan, and Iqbal were able to

prescribe a remedy and attracted circles of followers, their reforms measures proved

less successful in implementation.

The Normativists (Ulama) are those who hold past to Islamic traditions and heritages.

They attributed Muslim failure to their deviation from traditions. They saw Muslim

association with the West as dangerous to Islam for it is threat to Muslim faith and

culture. In their view, the sole cause of cultural and political decline of Muslims

societies was the constant but corrupting accretions of alien institutions and ideas into

Islam and its system. Therefore, they, solidly, believe that in order to restore Islam to

its pristine purity, it is essential to exterminate these alien elements from Islamic

system. Ahmed, (2006).

Similarly, developing new ideas and answers in the Holy Qur’an is of no use. Islam is

closed and everything already articulated in the past. They only saw remedy to the

situation of the Muslim Ummah not in adaptation of changes but rather returned to the

straight path of Islam century old. They polarized the world into two, Dar al-Islam

(where people lived under Islamic rule and territory), and Dar al-harb (where people

no longer live under Islamic rule). In such situation, it is necessary to live in Dar-al-

Islam otherwise; you must either engage in arm struggle (Jihad) or emigrate to Dar-al-

Islam. For example, “In India, the Shah Abdul Aziz, issued a fatwa declaring India a

non-Islamic territory, a land of warfare in which to fight or to flee where there is

Islamic appropriate responses, while some attempted to emigrate, more joined the

jihad movement” Esposito, (1988). This dogma was presented by this kind of Ulama

and leaders and they refused to adjust their very idea of medievalism. “Majority of

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religious leaders advocated a policy of cultural isolation and non-cooperation. They

equated any form of political accommodation of Western culture with betrayal and

surrender Esposito, (1988). Therefore, the remedy or response to the predicament of

Muslims, brought by Modernity is for Muslims to delink from colonialists and adopt

their Islamic heritage and culture.

Given the whole challenges faced by Muslim states, acculturationists tried to chart the

future direction of Islam through its reinterpretation of text in the light of modern

realities; while imitating the West not in its totality, traditionalists maintained the

Islamic heritage with no possibility of adopting changes.

Islamic acculturationists planted the seed for the acceptance of changes, struggling

with the continuity of Islamic heritage with modification, albeit with limitation to

Islamic family laws and the establishment of Islamic organizations. In retrospect, it

can now be said beyond doubt that their legacy has been a major factor in

contemporary Islamic resurgence (Neo-normativists) which aimed at the

establishment of an Islamic state as an alternative to the caliphate system. Thus, this

development has greater impact in shaping and moulding the ideas and thought of

al-Qaradawi, contrary to Sanusi (2001) who classified and categorized him as liberal

scholar.

The Neo-normativists are current trends in contemporary Islamic revivalism and

activism. They perceived the richness of Islamic thought and comprehensiveness to

offer answers to modern realities. They emphasize the totality of Islam as the divinely

mandated alternative to the materialism and secularism of west’’ Moten (1996). What

this category of scholars sought was a comprehensive and universal reform along

Islamic line and in all aspect of life, including politics and economy which were now

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under the influence of secularism as a result of modernity. They based their argument

on the tradition which states that “wisdom is like the believer’s lost camel; it is his to

mount regardless of where he may find it”.

One of the Intellectuals that dominate neo-normativist perspective, although not

initially, was Mohammad Rashid Rida. He defended his society and actively became

an opponent of Western encroachment. His major concern was the state of decay,

weakness and backwardness of the Muslim world in relation to the West. Like his

earlier mentors (Afghani and Abduh), he believed that Islam will not progress with

narrow conservatism of traditionalists or blind imitation of Westerners. Western

progress is irresistible compared with the East and the disparity is wide; the East

suffered tyranny and stagnation. He explicitly expresses his views in one of his articles:

Europe attacked us with the strength of its nation, science, industries, organization,

wealth, shrewdness and wisdom … So long as we remain in this state of ignorance,

disorder, fragmentation and paralysis, we will never be able to stand before Europe …

We have to sacrifice money and unite to develop the nation, and then force our rulers

to reform our conditions. For this is the age of nations, not individuals; discipline and

solidarity, not despotism. (al-Manar, 8 in Shahin, 1993).

Ridah has the same opinion with his mentors al-Afgani and Abduh initially, and even

his ideas were seen as a continuation of Abduh’s thought. But thirty years after the

death of Abduh, Rida shifted towards more conservative in ideology, trying to

reinvigorate and demonstrate the compatibility of modernity with Islamic system.

Similarly, like Abduh and Afghani, he blamed the decline of Muslim societies on the

Ulama which were opposed to political participation. He shares Salafi’s view, but with

the idea of Pan Arabism, and he opposed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, because

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he correctly foresaw that it would mean the end of the Caliphate, and he opposed the

British Sponsored Pan Arabian Movement of Feisal, especially when it was defeated

in Damascus” Al-Ahram, (1999).

According to Shahin (1993) realizing the drastic consequence of secular nationalism

on Muslim solidarity, particularly in its crucial confrontation with Western

imperialism, Rida opposed the advocates of Nationalism and supported Pan-

Ottomanism and Pan Islamism. This is because Rida strongly and ardently sought the

survival of the Islamic world order. To him, this will lead to Muslims unity. He also

advocated for Muslims democracy, Constitution and Parliament, even though, they

were seen as manifestation of the West, but they are of progress. He also believed that

implementation of Islamic law and sharia requires an Islamic government in any

country, since law was the product of consultation between the rulers (Caliphs) and

the Ulama, who are the guardian and interpreters of law Esposito, (1988). This gave

rise to his idea of Islamic state and its emergence in religio-political thinking.

Through Rida’s views, the current thought had been shaped and nourished. As a result

of decadence in the Muslim’s world and the challenges posed by modernity, broad-

based reform could be said to have been instituted by this scholar. It attempted to

restore Muslim glory by sweeping aside the major sources of their betrayal. In 1898

Rida founded his al-Manar as weekly and later as monthly journal to introduce

Abduh’s interpretation of holy Quran in which some of his political views were

expressed and the Rida independent political thought, particularly with question

regarding modern issues Shahin, (1993). The Rida reform project could be considered

as the root of the current neo-revivalists’ movement in the Muslim’s world. His tireless

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effort and especially using his Al-Manar which serves as the major source of reference

for his political and intellectual views shaped the contemporary Islamic politics.

Mawlana Mawdudi, Hassan al-Banna, Hassan Turabi among others are contemporary

scholars with neo-normativist perception. They saw the establishment of an Islamic

system not as an alternative but Islamic imperative, again ‘’ coping with modernity did

not require a new foreign-inspired alternative when the community (Ummah) had tried

in true faith and way of life Esposito (1988). Islam encompasses way of life and it does

not oppose science and technology, rather it upholds and makes an appropriate use of

it.

Realizing the modern secular tendency in most Islamic land and the existence of Islam

as total life made them to adopt a religio-political approach in their Islamic movements

in the Muslim nations. Organizations like Jama’at-i-Islami and Muslim brothers are

the example of neo-normativists. They perceived the content and scope of Islam as

rich and wider, it is all-inclusive and timeless system. Sayyid Abu’l A la Mawdudi is

founder of the Jama at islami which served as the basis for the development of

contemporary Islamic thought. He saw revolution as the only means of rescuing the

Islamic society and reconstruction of their system of thought. He defines revolution as

an alteration in the structure, supporting myth, political institutions and elite personnel

in conformity with fundamental principles of Islam. Moten, (1996). From the above

conception, one can deduce that the existing structure of the Muslims society was

required to be altered, their system of belief and institutions need to re-orient and

reform, and all these should be done in accordance with the teaching of Islam. What

Mawdudi saw was the reality of the situation of Muslim nations such as the emergence

of new political order which was contrary to Islam, the decay in their system of thought

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and the formation of secular elite as a result of the western influence. And to restore

back their previous glory all these should be obliterated and exchange with total system

of Islam.

In order to carry the mission of revolution forward, Mawdudi established Jama’a ti

Islami. It embodies Mawdudi’s Islamic vision and it was not a political party Esposito,

(1988) & Moten, (1996). Its members were derived from different universities and

discipline and they were trained in faith and commitment toward creating Islamic state

as response to the emergence of modernity and solution to the crises of the Ummah.

Mawdudi and his Jama’ati Islami conducted their Islamic activities in peaceful manner

within the boundary of existing constitution in Pakistan and other countries, although,

they were captured and imprisoned by the authorities as a result of their sedition.

However, Moten (1996) observed that, Mawdudi was able to influence General Zia-

ul-Haq the president of Pakistan by implementing many Islamic principles. This

actually shows the impact of his movement in Pakistan as a political struggle.

Similarly, Hassan al-Banna who also shared the same belief with Mawdudi, perceived

the failure of Muslim nations to stem from their inability to follow properly the true

teaching of Islam and its comprehensiveness. Furthermore, as a result of combination

of various factors, he saw the contemporary Muslim nations in dilemma and at critical

cross road. These factors include; the threat posed by western imperialists, the

tendency of modernists to secularize the whole society, the internal weakness of the

Muslim Ummah and last but not the least the inability of Muslim to restore back their

political institutions.

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Al-Banna was critical about the situation of Muslim nations most especially the Egypt

society. Thus, he established an Islamic organization which was known as Muslim

brotherhood (ikhwanulal-muslimun). The objective of this organization was to carry

reform mission.

Al-Banna imparted his activism and taught them how to demonstrate Islam is

comprehensive in most of their activities commins, (1994). Al-Banna considered that

the Islamic mission could only be achieve through organized Muslim group, even

though it was insufficient to realize the aims, the Muslims needs to be re-united.

The approach adopted by al-Banna in his renewal of Islam as a political system, are

traditional desires to restore an early Islamic ideal and reconstruction with emphasis

and the reliance on Islamic source. Al-Banna holds that European civilization is

nothing more than atheism, immorality class selfishness and usury.

The Muslim’s political subordination rendered it to European cultural influence.

Europe have imported to Egypt immodest dress for women, dance halls, founded

school which inculcate west and furthermore, depicted Islam as defective Commins,

(1994). These are some of the problems al-Banna saw as threat to the Egyptian society

and thus call for Islamic solution which should be comprehensive and touch all aspects

of life politically, economically, socially and culturally. He also attributed the failure

of Muslims of Egypt to the scholars of Azhar for their irrelevant interpretations of

Islam as purely ritual worship. With regards to this al-Banna focused on systematic

presentation of Islam to the people in particular and the Ummah in general. Although,

his movement was not a political party, but its vision and belief that Islamic state is to

exist in society governed by Islamic sharia drew it into the political arena. Its

condemnation of the government of Egypt led to violence, arm conflict and the

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assassination of its leader in 1949. Furthermore, the movement was banned and its

members were imprisoned. By and large, they were able to remain working and active

within the system after and before they were re-banned in 2013 during the coup and

overthrownment of Mursi government.

From the foregoing analysis, we can conclude by saying that the Muslim brotherhood

and Jama’ati Islami under the leadership of al-Banna and Maududi demonstrated the

neo-normativist approach to the socio political condition of Muslim of twentieth

century. Furthermore, they saw their option as more appropriate and as the foundation

of Islamic state.

In a nutshell, the responses of acculturationists was to establish Islamic heritage

through re-interpretation of Islam in the light of modern realities, though, they

implicitly shaped the idea of current thought, but they planted the seeds of secularism.

Normativists maintained the Islamic heritage with resistance to change and perceived

the entire acculturationists approach as foreign and new to Islam. And finally, neo-

normativists shouldered the responsibility of interpreting Islam as organic entity which

encompasses both politics and religion. Their legacy was the present Islamic activism

in most of Muslim countries to regain their political powers. The impact and influence

of al-Banna thought could be seen in al-Qaradawi as one of the members of Muslim

brother-hood in Egypt. Muslim brothers were able to win the election and assume as

the successful party to rule the country in 2012, before they were overthrown and

banned. The neo-normativists insist in universality of Islam and its comprehensiveness

to be compatible with the present age and viewed Islamic state and its characteristic in

many ways.

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2.3.3 Islamist Movements in Perspective

Islamist movements and parties have demonstrated the ability to develop effective

political strategies, elaborate platforms for action with popular appeal and set up

efficient organizational structures designed both for political and social work, thereby

mobilizing large constituencies. (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000)

The essence of this sub-section is to review two examples from literature that border

around the nature and strategies of Islamist Movements similar to the evolution of

IMN. Generally, Islamist movements neither emerged out of a vacuum nor are they

stagnant. They rather emerged and evolve and continue to do so as reactions to socio-

cultural and political influences of colonialism that apparently intercepted the

historical growth and development of a long, deep and complex historical, political,

philosophical and cultural tradition. Balfour, & Pioppi, (2008)

For these and many other reasons, scholars are beginning to theorize that against their

traditional roles of religious education, Islamist movements are fast wearing new looks

of political participation. This development is associated with different reasons

depending on conditions and circumstances. Considering the dependent and

independent variables security and strategy of this research, the interest of this review

is not to trace the histories or general dynamics of these Islamist Movements rather, to

relatively use few selected examples to represent showcase the strategies and the

security questions associated with the activities of these movements.

Numerous literature has shown that the nature of Islamist Movements in relation to

state politics for example, can be basically categorized into two: those that have

adjusted and moved away from traditional anti-secular politics through a possible

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integration into processes of liberal reform and; those that maintain the traditional

belief that Islamic system is non-negotiable and therefore see all authoritarian regimes

as defenders of liberal democratic system against anti-democratic fundamentalism.

Aclimandos et al (2010). In both cases the Islamist groups and movements are seen to

be gaining edge over the state in most cases.

This brings us to the arguments as to the factors that influence the disposition and

ideologies of Islamist Movements. As a basic starting point, the “inclusion-

moderation; exclusion-radicalization hypothesis in relation to political Islam argues on

the idea that political groups and individuals may become more moderate as a result

of their inclusion in pluralist political processes and exclusion-radicalization

hypothesis which states that, the more authoritarian and repressive a government, the

more radical and unwilling to play by the rules of the game.

Mohammad Ayoob’s analysis of Islamism in his work “political Islam: Image and

Reality'”. Ayoob proves that although the concept of Islam has a universal meaning,

but its context and applicability largely depend on the native of the political

environment in which it is practical. In which sense Ayoob argue that the political

imagination therefore, of Islamist movement is similarly determined by the political

discus and activities of these movements, in their various peculiar environments. That

is to say the activities and strategies as well as relationship are determined by the nature

of their political environment and local challenges. Whether an Islamist movement is

peaceful, violent or radical is also largely determined by the native of these local and

into natural challenges and connections as well as force and interest.

For the first time, therefore, the idea of political Islam becomes very much prominent

among Muslim people through their interaction and expenses shaking the dominance

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and ascendancy of western power and colonialism which for over two hundred years

has undermined the possibility of Islamic polities in these various states. So the

Islamists preoccupation with the notion of Islamic state was cut only in an attempt to

Islamize by hacking the then existing western established polities in Muslim majority

societies.

It was, in fact, through arguments, writing and idea Muslim scholarship that many

Islamist movements began to emerge with the objectives of influencing the political

systems in favour of Islamic state.

A very important exposition in relation to the idea of “Political Islam” is visible in

Ayoob’s analysis where he identified in his attempt to expatiate on the relationships

that existed between post-colonial dictatorial regimes of the Arab world and the

Islamist movement. Ayoob identified three (3) levels of relationships that gave most

of these Islamist movements the free ride and advantages to grow even stronger and

gain made prominence and brilliance in the course of their struggle with these regimes;

these in turn were the things that opened the gates for Islamist instruction into the post-

colonial political process as golden opportunities. All these, however, were

possibilities that caused the increment and attraction to political Islam had copied with

governing elite’s failure to deliver on their promises of economic progress political

participation and inclusion and ovation of domination tendencies of western societies.

The first advantage that the Islamist took was “co-optation” the attempt for example

to co-opt these islamist elements only provided the islamist with greater opportunities

and access to political platform and media.

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Secondly, the attempt to “compete” with the islamist as equally being committed to

Islam has instead of giving them greater priority ended up surrendering the rhetoric

grounds to the Islamist to continue to criticize the rules for being failures through

cushion, arrests and detentions.

Thirdly, the attempt to suppress the Islamist provided them with more moral higher

ground and followers confidence and with more support for their cause rather than

those of the dictators.

The theoretical foundations for global civilizational politics has long been set by the

Huntingtonian thesis The Clash of Civilizations. Though, it may not have specifically

dealt directly with the activities of Islamist groups or movements in their own right,

but may have treated them as the supposed actors of Islam at least politically. To this

end, many scholars of international politics have come to be conscious of the evolving

role and cruciality of Islamist movements as they continue to assume new and dynamic

roles in global cultural and ideological politics.

In “Revolutionaries and Reformers; Contemporary Islamist Movement in the Middle

East” Barry Rubin show the difficulty that Islamist movements of the liberal

democratic era face in their bid to capture power. These difficult choices left them with

options ranging between armed conflicts, parliamentary inclusions, party and electoral

“total Islamic” parties to some form of adjusted Islamism thereby reinterpreting Islam

in more liberal way.

But generally speaking, however, Buzan (2010) has captured accurately in what he

referred to as the tactics and strategies of Islamist movements have resorted to at

various instances depending on condition and circumstances such strategies and tactics

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as armed struggle, terrorism and sometimes grassroots organizations and even

elections, sometimes providing social services at least to their own supporters is also

considered. In greater instances anti-west ideologies and determination to bring down

pro-west, dictatorial or even secular governments have usual strategies of these

islamist movements. These Islamist movements are believed by many scholars to be

swinging in between the contentious political pendulum of their own societies thereby

adjusting to what is most advantageous in a particular situation at a particular time.

In Africa however, Abdelkerim Ousman (2016) reflects Veronique Dimier in his

description of the nature of Islamic Movements in Africa where he categorized the

radical and militant nature, appearance and usage of political influence of these

movements based on the type of colonial rule experience of the countries where they

existed.

In this sense, we can understand that those movements that exist in French colonies of

West and Central Africa like Niger, Senegal, Chad and Mali have the tendencies to

reflect the unified, centralized and bureaucratic nature of the French direct rule system.

This is because the French perception of Islam as a direct enemy and threat have had

informed the colony's strategy of restricting the construction of mosques and schools

as well as further fragmentation of the Marabouts religious movements into much

localized fiefdoms.

Coupled with later policy developments that used and subverted Islamic activism as

against vibrant Islamic movements in these countries, what exist are different mere

brands of Sufi orders and power relationships that succeeded in making Islamic

Movements less challenging and more supportive of the secular establishment.

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In the British colonies however, in countries like Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa etc., the

vibrancy of Islamic Movements has a great deal of relationship with the British indirect

rule system. This is to say unlike in the French colony where the traditional system

was replaced, the traditional and customary laws were allowed to supplement the new

British system. This has no doubt contributed in the freedom, radical and militarized

nature of the Islamic Movements.

Among the major factors that contributed to the resurgence of Islamic Movements

were: Western Colonization of the Islamic worlds: the ill-equipment and sudden

impact of the globalization processes on these Muslim countries of Africa had created

dehumanizing conditions of perpetual disparities and in-equalities as well as abject

poverty, deteriorated health condition, destruction of public services, history, cultures

and traditions all arising from the policies and activities of international financial

institutions and trade.

Oil Boom of the rich countries: coupled with the emergence of Wahabist in Saudi

Arabia which coupled with the creation of Muslim League in 1962. These two main

developments in the determination to counter the influence and spread of communism

and secular nationalism, has facilitated the missionary creation and expansion of

Islamic Movements around the globe through such endeavors as community program,

financing, education and socialization of Islamic groups and movements.

US and her allies' role in support of Israel against Palestine in the Palestine-Israel

conflict: Gulf Wars and the Middle East in general has generally aggravated and

further provoked the springing up of many Muslim groups and agitations against Israel

and its allies.

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The Western and US Media: The propaganda, language, terms coinage of the Western

and US media which generally projects Islam as hostile, backward, terrorist, threat to

freedom, progress and development, fanatic, wild, un-peaceful, threat to security etc

has played a significant role in the resurgence of Islamist Movements around the

world.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet supported

by US has led to the collapse of the Afghan state which created a vacuum to be filled

by bringing to the fore the Jihad fighters and the Taliban.

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Table 2.3
General Ideological Quantinum of Islamist Movements across the Globe
S/No Issue Scriptural Fundamentalists Scriptural Fundamentalists Conservative Traditionalists
1 Democrac Islam is a form of Democracy. The West has Islam is a form of democracy. There is some room for democratic
y no right to define what democracy should The West has no right to define instruments in the interpretation of
look like, and the Islamic form is superior what democracy should look Islamic practice, in community life
because it rests on the only correct and like, and because it rests on the and in certain sectors of public life.
Perfect religion. only correct and Perfect
religion.
2 Human Humans need guidance and control, but these Humans need guidance and Islam, properly lived, provides the
rights, must be reasonable and fair, as set down in control, but these must be optimum setting for humans.
individual sunnah and the Quran. reasonable and fair, as set Equality and freedom are wrong
liberties down in sunnah and the Quran. concepts; Islam instead gives
everyone their due in accord with
their station and nature.
3 Status of Tolerated, as long as they do not engage in Tolerated, as long as they do Tolerated and should be treated
minorities missionary activities. not engage in missionary decently and allowed to practice
activities. their religions and cultures, unless
they are contrary to Islamic
morality and law.
4 Islamic Islam is possible on the basis of individual Islam is possible on the basis of An Islamic state is best, because
state states, although a supranational ummah individual states, although a people can then most fully exercise
remains the ideal. supranational ummah remains their religion. Next best is to live
the ideal. immersed in an Islamic
community, doing as told by your
elders, family, and the
community’s religious leaders.

Table 2.3 (Continued)

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S/No Issue Scriptural Fundamentalists
5 Jihad The definition of jihad varies from person to
person. For women, childbirth is a form of
jihad. Jihad includes the struggle for personal
spiritual betterment. For some groups under
some circumstances, it includes armed
struggle, including terrorism
6 Sources The Quran, sunnah, Islamic philosophy,
science, scholarly interpretation, and
charismatic leaders.
Source: Curled from Balfour and Pioppi, (2008)
Scriptural Fundamentalists
The definition of jihad varies
from person to person. For
women, childbirth is a form of
jihad. Jihad includes the
struggle for personal spiritual
betterment. For some groups
under some circumstances, it
includes armed struggle,
including terrorism.
The Quran, sunnah, Islamic
philosophy, science, scholarly
interpretation, and charismatic
leaders.
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Conservative Traditionalists
Jihad is primarily the struggle for
personal moral betterment, but it
encompasses war on behalf of
Islam when necessary and
appropriate.
The Quran, sunnah, local custom
and tradition, and the opinions of
local mullahs
However, as Schwedler, (2013) would agree, due to the enormous problems and

challenges being faced by the Islamic world especially in the post-colonial and

imperial periods of the world, the Islamic world has been marked by resorting to

different solutions such as nationalism, Pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, Islamic

revolution etc. in the course of these struggles, four essential category of Islamist have

been identified. This does not however take for granted other minor categories and

sub-categories as explained in table above. These are summarily represented in this

study by two examples: the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Turkish Gulen

Movement.

2.3.3.1 Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

The Muslim Brotherhood since its inception in 1928 was by Hasan al-Banna in 1928.

It proposed to put Egypt under an Islamic regime based on Muslim law. The movement

was in the beginning generally understood to be a conservative Islamic movement

which fought against regimes that were or had secularist tendencies or at worse

understood to be allied with the then Soviet Union. Eventually, however, the

movement became characterized by an enduring dilemma and debate about whether

or not to participate in politics. The debate is rooted in the conviction of the movement

founder Hasan Al-Banna who argued that politicizing the movement or even making

it a political party has the tendency to drag what he regarded as the Islamic Polity into

unhealthy divisiveness that would end up defeating the aim of Islamism.

Salwen S F (1998) argue that Historically, the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (MB)

eschewed involvement in political activities and vehemently opposed the formation of

political parties but the MB since around the late 1960s when its then leader Hassan

al-Hudaybi expressed in his release about political moderation tagged Preachers Not

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Judges in defiance of its initial philosophy had to adopt the strategy and alternate

between inclusive change and Rejectionism for political advantage.

The Muslim brotherhood of Egypt has, over the years, suffered clamp down and

suppression of various existing grassroots Salafi activist group and networks in 1990s.

this is because Salafism exist in particular as a significant tend among the poorer and

Marginalized strata of the society and can pose a challenge to the moderation and

institutionalization of islamist groups by divinity support for formal politics Stein, &

Volpi1, (2014). It could be understood here that this MBs interest use of these

grassroots Salafi activists and organizations has helped the MB to enjoy the support

and approval of the poor and the lower strata populace known as Muhammishin as

broader public in their process of moderation from strict Islamism to moderate

adjustment based on formation into a political party and even participating in the

electoral processes established by Egyptian secular political system.

Nevertheless, the ability of these Islamist movements to abandon or postpone their

revolutionary islamist mission of overthrowing corrupt regime and construction of

Islamic ones has favoured the middle class constituencies but, however, also been a

source of dissatisfaction and loss of confidence in them by many of their downtrodden

followers who understand the movement only as a mission for the establishment of

sharia system and nothing less.

In 2005 for example, the MB despite series of state repressions, arrests and bans had

remained resolute to participate in the elections, and in 2010 it also participated but

later withdrew on principle against massive electoral fraud. The Muslim Brotherhood

which was, therefore, founded on the philosophy of non-partisan politics is seen to

have gradually and strategically moved to forming one and eventually participating in

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elections in 1984. This is not outside the reality of the necessity for it to comply with

the requirements of the Egyptian political and electoral system.

But the most important observable strategy of the MB is its alternation between

inclusive change or, (what some scholars would call political moderation) and

rejectionist. This flexible tendency has emboldened the MB to remain resilient and

adaptive to all kinds of changes in the Egyptian political environment.

Similarly, as a pretty good strategy by the MB, such connections with broader publics

have provided them not only with approval for ideological moderation, but with all the

necessary support to participate and win elections with little hitches.

In whatever spirit, anyway, the MB is believed to have generally re-strategized from

being strictly a radical movement which seeks to totally uproot and replace the

Egyptian secular political system with an Islamic one, to a moderate one which now

seek to change the system through participation in plural electoral processes Schwedler

(2013).

2.3.3.2 Turkey: Gülen Movement (Hizmet Service)

The Gülen movement is a very important mass Islamist movement which has gained

prominence not only in its homeland turkey but also abroad.

One of the most important features of the movement is its claim of reclaiming oriental

Islam through the realization and enforcement of modernity and developing but yet

devoid of party-political activism. This point represents the Gülen movement in sharp

contrast with other islamist movement that stated as Islamic in order for them to fit

into the liberal democratic demands of their own states. Such movements as Egyptian

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Muslim brotherhood, the PJK etc. are good examples. The Gülen movement is

particularly interesting to this study because of its uniqueness in terms of ideology,

approach, strategies and most importantly the security perception on the movement by

the Turkish Authorities Barton, (2005).

Barton believed that the gulen movement is among the reasons why it is perceived as

threat to Turkish authorities. Obviously, it is the leader Fethullah Gülen’s charismatic

personally which attracts followers from all Turkish Nooks and Cranny. His being

Imam and strong command of Quran and Sunnah are both apart from his solid

scholarly base all of which are being dearly championed by both lay-people and middle

class Turks.

Similarly, the socio-conservative nature of the Gülen movement made the Turkish

state and other critics to be sceptic of the movement. This is because it is believed to

be promoting religious fanatism against the state interest of expected loyalty on the

part follower of the movement.

In deeper terms, it can be said that the scepticism of the Turkish state against the Gulen

movement has a dimension of a situation where the state adopted “civil religion” of

“Lausannian” Islam is a parallel of the Gülen movement of “Anatonian” Islam variant.

As much as the state retains the “Lausannian” version of Islam, as official religion, it

is the Anatonian Islam and the political Islam of “Milli Gurus” that were highly

followed in turkey more than the official one.

Thirdly, being an islamist movement the Turkish state see the Gülen movement as

being tilted and more sympathetic to islamist parties in opposition than the state itself.

All this is in spite of Fethullah Gülen’s consistent retraction that his movement is

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purely a spiritual one and which is against the instrumentalist use of religion in politics.

But the Turkish state would still regard the movement as threat to national society of

the Turkish state.

The Gülen movement is viewed by many analyst as a movement which has developed

various strategies in order to achieve quiet revolution in Turkey. But whether the

revolution is to put in place as Islamic system as it only uses Islamism as a vehicle in

the debate that keeps raging among scholars.

Rubin, B. (2003) for example has extensively discussed and analysed the nature,

strength and strategies of the Gülen movement in his book “Revolutionaries and

Reformers: Contemporary Islamist movements in the Middle East” Rubin identified

that the Gülen movement is one which has won a large receptive audience and

followership because of its ability to diffuse traditional Islamic values with modern

life and science. It is a movement which has a strange stranglehold in the Turkish

society and it diaspora due to its dialogue among other Islamic variants and its

magnanimity and tolerance towards even non-Muslims as Christian and Jews; the

Gülen movement among its strategies, is the adaption of the Ottoman empire approach

to extend tolerance towards secularists and non-believers in Turkey i.e. multiculturalist

approach.

In the same vein as a process of view and ideological promotion and spread, the

movement has been able to set up some wide range organizations such as the

journalists and writers foundation, the Turkish teachers foundation which has a

monthly journal called “sizinti” and two academic journals Yenist “(New Hope) and

the “fountain”. Together these activities are carried out with supplementary activities

as conferences, national and international symposia, panel discussions, talks etc.

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These activities have given the movement the convenience of Infiltration into

government positions and society; disarming regimes through peaceful and

harmonious compressions and actions rather than violence and confrontations;

establishment of educational system; entrenchment of modernity into Islamic

ideology; refusal to form a power seeking political party; reclamation of Ottoman

empire philosophy to gain more legitimacy and influence among populace; Hizmet:

working hard to achieve economic modernization and development.

Rubin also indicated that the Gülen movement uses the print and broadcast media to

propagate its activities thereby attracting larger followership of the Turkish citizens

and abroad. This is done through radio and T.V programs as well as its daily newspaper

called “Zaman”. The spreading coverage of these media cuts across all the nooks and

cranny, for the Turkish society and beyond including campaigns that involve

prominent intellectuals from Turkish universities (Rubin 2003).

Also aside of about 100 schools that the Gülen movement runs in turkey, it established

about 200 schools also in the Turkish diaspora. These schools help the movement in

some three basic ways. One as a source of fund raising for the movement, as

recruitment avenues for the Gülen ideology and long term mission.

In addition to schools, loyal followers from the Turkish speaking republics of the

Russian where he commands a lots of respect and followership do finance non-interest

bearing bank backed by sixteen partners and 125 million capitals all of which have

great deal of long run benefits for the Gülen movement.

One of the major difference between Gülen movement and other movements Rubin

states, is its constant sensitivity to avoiding any tendency that would put it against the

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status quo. This is done through self-imposed restrictions, avoidance of controversy or

even joining public debates that would pose challenges to the state. This for many

analysts is a peculiar strategy to the movement (as against its many sisters elsewhere)

to completely disarm the government, divert its attention away from Gülen movement

which the movement keeps growing, expanding and spreading its tentacles in turkey

and Turkish diaspora, in view of quiet revolution.

The movement has severally been suspected and accused of being a security threat to

the governments and regimes in Turkey. Scholars like Yilmaz, (2005) are of the belief

that Fethullah Gülen’s usual use of vague language and rhetoric as well as adages send

signals to the authorities that he is using vague language that frees him from clear-cut

accusation, but which enables him to mobilize the civil society and even government

officials against the state.

Also, as being variously accused, the Gülen movement in skilful underground and

whispering campaigns has, by way of that silently and systematically service, ran

schools for the promotion of pro- Gülen young stars. In fact, with the coming of then

military coup in 1997 on board, the Gülen movement has been accused of silent

revolution through the production of audio and video cassettes and speeches which

were televised on major TV stations in turkey. These and similar accusation are what

made the turkey government to declare the trial of Fethullah Gülen in absentia. Some

of these accusations were that:

…Gülen is trying to overthrow Turkey’s secular system and “create a theocratic state

based on Islamic dictatorship”; that Gulen’s chain of schools is being used to

“brainwash” Turkish youth into supporting the establishment of an Islamic state; that

Gulen’s plan is to use the country’s youth as tools toward this objective; that Gülen is

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behind the infiltration of fundamentalist radicals into the ranks of the state and

municipal public service; that Gülen makes a deliberate effort to “end Turkey’s

position in the world as a secular, democratic and social state governing by rule of

law”; that Gülen supports the idea of an elected presidency to ease the path towards

transformation of the country into a theocratic dictatorship; that, in and out of the

country, Gülen’s aim is to create leadership for the projected future dictatorship. This

has included a concerted effort to appear in foreign circles as a spokesman for the

Islamic element in Turkey; that Gülen has encouraged not only wealthy individuals,

but also major multi-partner enterprises to join his movement; and that Gülen’s

contacts with politicians have served him in obtaining state financing for many of these

projects. Barton, G. (2005).

In spite of all these pro-state activities, the Gülen movement has occasionally been

suspected and even accused by the Turkish authorities of plotting to take over power.

It has in many cases been accused of threatening regime and national security and,

therefore, suffered different kinds of suppression and sanctions.

During president Suleiman Demirel for example, the movements leader Fethullah

Gülen has been variously accused of making vague statement that were capable of

igniting violence or revolt against the state or even visiting public servants and the

military in favour of the movements mission of taking over power from the state.

Even the tension that at one time arose between Uzbekistan and turkey, were linked

with the circulated video and audio tapes that were alleged to have incited the tension.

This was explicitly expressed in Uzbekistan community schools run in turkey and the

refusal of the yok higher education council of turkey to continue to recognize the

universities opened overseas by the Gülen movement foundations and corporations. In

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most other cases, the Gülen movement has topped the agenda of the Turkey national

security meetings. To cap it all, lately, on the latest abortive military coup de etre in

turkey against the regime of Tayyib el-Dewan, the accusing finger was pointed at the

Gulen which led the expulsion and declaration of the movement as persona-non-grata

to the state of Turkey and its diaspora as well as the declaration of Fethullah Gülen

leader of the movement wanted.

Another movement the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) which also originally

started as a radical Islamist movement has successfully moved away from the strict

sense for Sharia to the idea of constitutional monarchy. But because these Islamists

movement were not ripe and capable of achieving their aims single handily, they had

to go hand-in-hand with other nationalist forces in what Ayoob described as “Islamo-

nationalist movement”.

Based on the table above, it could be understood that Islamic ideology and strategy are

based on periodic peculiarities, but though not limited to differences in time, and

environment. However, it is obvious from the trend the increasing politicization of

Islamist ideology and mission to the extent that in the postmodern era, while Islamism

is reduced to a mere banner, the real intent of Islamist movements is more of realpolitik

than real Islamism.

In the end, it is noteworthy that in spite of all the efforts by Islamic scholars, their

ideas, groups and movements in view of Islamic succession, there are only three

instances where Islamism became instituted. The overthrow of the Shah regime by the

Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, the overthrow of the USSR regime by the Afghan

Mujahedeen and the case of Sudan, no Islamic struggle has successfully seized power

in spite of the numerous ideology, strategy and tactics of the movements. This is

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evidently clear in the gradual movement of contemporary Islamic movements from

strict Islamism based on the quest for the establishment of Islamic states to moderation

based on mere political inclusion. Therefore, as Rubin would believe, these three

examples were what rekindled the hopes of contemporary Islamist movements leading

to their proliferation and resurgence based on different strands of ideology and tactics

and strategy especially their reformation strategy as against revolution.

2.4 Security Discourse

It is important to understand from the onset that security is one of the most

controversial, dynamic, flexible, vast, and contested concepts in the field of social

science and humanities. As a result, the concept has suffered conflicting interpretations

due to the differing angles and contexts from which it is viewed.

From Hobbes to Weber down the lane to contemporary thinkers, the concept of

national security is a broad concept which means different things in different

circumstances. While some see it even as ambiguous with hardly any specific origin,

the concept is as old as social contract and eventually nations, and nation-states

themselves. This is because the concept is a product of the desire of and by nation-

states to be secure and free from both internal subversion and external aggression in

terms of the core values of national security and territorial integrity (Alagappa, 1987).

Nevertheless, this study giving its nature has got the privilege to review security

literature based on its three broad categories of approaches; the classical or traditional-

state centric Approach, securitization Approach (Copenhagen school), and the human

security school.

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2.4.1 Classical/Realist [State-centric] Framework

Apart from these mainstream classical/traditional state-centric arguments there are of

course off-shoot perspectives which have succeeded in transcending the international

system argument to incorporate other security dimensions within the states themselves.

Except for theoretical peculiarities, these rather more inclusive perspectives have great

deal of semblances with the securitization perspectives that immediately followed

them. Buzan for example, would strongly argue that reasons and limits for the demand

of national security lie with the individual members of the state. This is, however, a

view from the angle of individual-state relationship. The point here is that, if a state is

minimal, then the individual tends to be more secure, but if the state is maximal, then

the individual turns increasingly insecure. This situation is what Buzan describe the

state as a source of threat itself.

The security or threat of the individual or group in any case emanates from the state

either directly or indirectly in the form of domestic law making and enforcement,

struggles over control of the state machinery, political action by the state against

groups and individuals, or state’s external security policies.

This threat for Buzan comes in one of two forms: either as political order or political

disorder. The interesting argument here is that the maximalist state out of its strict

regulations and excessive regulation end up infringing on the individual security of its

subjects-a phenomenon described by Buzan as political order threat. So also, the

reluctance of a state to impose strict laws and rules of operation, gives individuals in

the state the leverage to infringe on the right of others, break the law, cause public

nuisance and also inflict harm on to them. This situation is described by Buzan again

as political disorder threat.

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This framework to security is the oldest and is referred to as state-centric because of

its over concentration on the security of nation-states in the international system.

2.4.2 Neorealist Security

As one of the major scholars of security, Alagappa, (1998) provides yet another

operation of the security concept in the post-cold war era. His passionate

categorization offers a quantinum of perspectives over what the concept of security

entails, what the processes and levels of security and analysis are as well as who the

actors and referent of security are. Alagappa draws from both realism and classical

liberalism as well as Marxism to elaborate whether the referent of security is the state

or the people.

Even more captivating is his critical analysis or the scope of security. There Alagappa

draws the chronological boundaries that differentiate the internal and international

security. This clarifies the understanding and classification of security according to

narrow and broad. He pointed that the main thrust of interstate security id broad and

therefore state-centric, while that of internal security borders around. This

classification helps simplifies the understanding of security in terms of both

dimensions of internal and international politics. The last theoretical dimension of

security which we have less concern for now is the cooperation or conflict perspectives

and approaches.

From a more specific neorealist reference point, the analysis of security thinking and

practices of sixteen Asian state by Alagappa, (1998) brings out on the basis of

individual security independence, the existential threats and subjects of threats and

security of each of these Asian countries. Although the focus is on Asian countries,

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but Alagappa’s ground work provides to the scholarship community of security studies

fresh and comparative yardsticks and insights. Interestingly the work’s ability to

investigate the security thinking, behavior and practice of Asian elites makes it unique

in the sense that evolving security practices of major Asian powers is predicted in

Alagappa’s skillful operationalization of the concept of security as a subject of

unifying practice.

From a broader angle, Muthiah Alagappa’s work on The National Security of

Developing States: Lessons from Thailand (1987) has done a great job in tracing the

nitty-gritty of the national security concept, and is equally a good starting point for the

understanding of the dynamics of national security especially of developing nations.

For Alagappa, the concept national security can only be justifiably operationalized if

it answers the questions of: what is the object or goal of national security; what are the

sources and nature of threats to national security and; how is national security to be

enhanced and preserved. This national security framework has captured the opinions

and themes of major studies on the subject matter of national security.

Basically, Alagappa is concerned with the security of developing nations because he

believes that those are the most vulnerable both internally and externally. That is to

say unlike developing states whose constitution and state institutions and internal

system have matured and stabilized, developing whom have unique experience of

colonialism and imperialism are products of arbitrary constitutions and hence

considerable disharmony between groups and individuals within the state.

For Alagappa, the consequence of the group disharmony has succeeded in subjecting

the state to both internal and external challenges and this is the reason why the

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discussion of the security of developing states must take into cognizance that domestic

environment below the state level in terms of national and regime insecurity. For him

factors such as social, economic, political, and external take the front stage.

In terms of ideology of the state, Alagappa is of the notion that poor state broad based

ideological consensus affects the physical base legitimacy and organizing ideology

which in turn result in frequent contestation of incumbent regimes thereby breeding

internal insecurity.

Moreover, this problem of state’s poor broad based ideology does not only stop at the

level of eroding regime’s legitimacy through frequent contestations, but is also

succeeded by internal political struggles usually arising out of the activities of

challenger groups. This seriously undermines the regime and reduces its chances of

survival. Similarly, it leads to the attraction of external intervention which

automatically turns into external threat for the state itself, the regime or the domestic

compositions within the state. (Alagappa, 1987) What is rather fascinating in Alagappa

and indeed Ayoob, (1983), is their seeming understanding of the fact that the concern

of security in developed nations isn’t the same as developing-while the former is more

concerned with international threats; the latter is more concerned with internal threats.

This would be the more reason why its security analysis must be based on its primary

problem or concern.

…despite the rhetoric of many Third World leaders, the sense of

insecurity from which these states-and, more particularly, their
regimes-suffer, emanates to a substantial extent from within their
boundaries rather than from outside. Ayoob, (1983)

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Hermann, & Hermann, (1989), on the other hand, see national security as one which

addresses the broad aspects of domestic environment, international environment,

preferred value outcome, nature of threats and strategies to avert the threats.

We can go on and on about the definition of national security. However, it’s mostly

defined within a context or based on peculiar security issues of particular era or time.

So, for the purpose of this study, Muthiah Alagappa’s approach to national security is

adopted and operationalised to suit the context. Alagappa sees national security in

terms of three basic components: Internal security, regime security and external

security.

By internal security, nation states are more concerned with their ability to be free from

human and organizational threats. These threats can be in form of civil wars, violence,

crises, public and interpersonal conflicts, civil disturbances and disobedience,

insurgencies, etc. in order to minimize, contain, control, and avert such threats is the

reason why nation-states resort to the use of security agents and forces whose main

function is to maintain law and order which ultimately results in insurance of the core

values of national independence, territorial integrity, as well as the minimal core values

of physical survival of the population, and political independence of states. Stephen

Krasner (1983) added the factor of economic wellbeing, while Brown (1983) alone

added the factor of ability to maintain relations with the rest of the world on reasonable

terms. Attached to this category of security is the regime security. It is a term which

explains the security implication of the activities of domestic or international actors in

relation to a governing authority of a given political set up.

Beasley clarifies regime security by opining that …the domestic regime of the state,

but not the state itself, may be under threat of internal destabilization, exacerbated by

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the action or inaction of external influences. Beasley, (2009), These nation-states

security concern is expressed by both the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 which upholds

the supremacy and equality of states in the international system through the twin

principles of territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority

structures and the United Nation’s resolution on the Principle of Non-Interference, i.e.

UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965 Declaration.

External security as an aspect of internal security is concerned with the sovereignty

and, indivisibility and independence of nation-states as members of the international

system. Different kind of external actions in the international system such as

interferences, interventions, transnationalism, war, trade, coalitions, organizations, etc

could be potential threats to a nation-state’s national security.

Despite the variety of views on what national security actually is, there is a kind of

consensus among scholars of on the general nature of national security. So, from their

arguments there are three basic categories of national security that can be discerned:

Internal security; Regime security and; External security. All the three are considered

as elements of national security.

From the critical security angle, Foucault would argue further that by exercising and

expanding its power through increased surveillance to the extent that the privacy of its

citizens is being increasingly exposed and their right to free will, infringed upon.

Foucault’s argument further criticizes the modern state by arguing that the purpose of

governance is primarily that of promoting the security and welfare of its citizens

through increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc, not exposing the privacy and

security as well as infringing on their rights, freedom and privileges as is obvious in

the governance philosophy of the modern state.

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 …to achieve this purpose a distinctive means is required. At the level
of population, it is not possible to coerce every individual and
regulate their actions in minute detail. Rather, government operates
by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs.
It sets conditions, “artificially so arranging things so that people,
following only their own self-interest, will do as they ought as for
that that is the highest level of self-security. [Emphasis, mine]
Foucault, (1977)

But far from being so, the modern citizens’ awareness of being observed stifle

individuality by creating conformity. This way people end up acting, thinking and

being the same for fear of being fished out or punished-a situation Foucault called

Dynamic Normalization. These processes of the modern state for Foucault end up

inflicting huge negative security implications on the citizens by eradicating the free-

will, independence and yet privacy of the people and replacing that with a society of

unsecure and vulnerable Robots. This Foucault, argued, is undemocratic and is a

defiance of social contract.

2.4.2.1 Copenhagen-Securitization Perspective

Wæver (2004) identifies ‘securitization alongside “sectors” and “regional security

complexes “as the three central concepts for the Copenhagen School. Browning &

McDonald (2013)

The major assumption of the theory is that our basis for determining whether there is

a security threat to nation states is conditioned by certain determinants…these are

existential threat, securitizing actor, securitizing move and referent objects. An

existential threat is a security problem which is being perceived by the state or citizens

as security threat… The understanding that there is a security threat is followed by the

reaction of the Securitizing Actor which in most cases is the state. The state uses

certain form of narrative to expose to the audience and try to convince them on the

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intensity of the threat and the need to accept that a securitizing move is necessary. This

process is then concluded with what is regarded as claim acceptance by the referent

objects (who are in this case citizens of a state) and finally claim valuation by the

securitizing actor.

The “...impact of intra-state conflicts is in terms of degeneration of the environment,

sweeping demographic changes and the rapidly burgeoning cyber-warfare arena have

replaced inter-state wars as the main threats to a nation’s security in the 21st century”.

Srikanth, (2014)

Berti, (2015), on the other hand, is of the view that though these challenging non-state

actors may be perceived as causing insecurity, that is as far as their antagonism with

either the domestic regime or their retaliation or resistance to outside intervening

governments like US against Hamas. But, more so they provide alternative security

and relative governance to the populace in place of the proper government. Malka,

(2011), is of a similar view when he asserts that “they can be contained, their

capabilities can be degraded, but by their nature they continue to evolve”.

2.4.2.2 The Human/New Security Approach

Considering the fact that, all the hitherto realist and neorealist approaches to security

i.e. state-centred and securitization perspectives basically see the state as the referent

object of security; the new human security school as originally advanced by the UNDP

is a critique of these two major preceding perspectives. This is because it presupposes

the shifting of the focus of security from states to human beings.

Earlier scholarly views and concerns on securitization of weak states have contributed

to the debate and eventual emergence of the human security school.

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These views argue that a dysfunctional state is itself a chief source of insecurity to

itself and its citizens. Through political persecution, oppression, torture, social

exclusion or imprisonment, humans’ security becomes threatened. That is to say unlike

in the past when states were threatened by more powerful states, the post-cold war era

is characterized by threat to human security emanating from weak, failed or fragile

states based on their reduced capacity to deal with conflicts, terrorism, insurgencies

and other forms of threats like environmental, economic, political, health, corruption,

poverty, weak institutions etc, that arise from within them.

Conteh-Morgan, (2006), in his work Globalization, state failure, and collective

violence: The case of Sierra Leone, has been able to criticize globalization due to its

ability to weaken the strength of already weak states by creating unnecessary

upheavals in the socio-economic structures of these countries, as well as succeeding

in shattering the security of these states through the activities of existential security

driven individuals and groups. Davis, (2009) and Srikanth, (2014), corroborated on the

concern about the global systemic shift from traditional insecurity experienced by

nation-states as a consequence of either world wars and eventual bi-polity

competitions or unipolarity. He sees like his predecessor Conteh-Morgan, the

proliferation of non-state actors as a confounding problem for the security of nation-

states.

These rather renewed identities for both weak states and their subjects have made their

security worsened through their increased integration into an unbalanced international

system and intensified fragmentations within their domestic configurations. This view

seems to have built on the old centre/periphery argument which many scholars view

as defied the intricacies of the contemporary global system.

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Capitalizing, therefore, on the narrowness of the traditional security school as well as

the poor analytical utility of the approach the securitization perspective, the Human

Security Approach also referred to as new security is meant to address the

shortcomings of both Classical and Securitization approaches to security.

As Onoja, (2014) would similarly argue, prior to the UNDP’s 2014 paradigm shift, the

security of nation states has largely been interpreted from the angle of state structures,

but UNDP’s focus on the security of persons as being necessary for the security of

structures has succeeded in changing the equation of national security and is, therefore,

being regarded as forming the basis for contemporary conception of nation security.

As a product of the neoliberal school of thought, and a post-realist critical view, the

human security approach is by and large a democratic critical response to the

unjustifiable over-prioritization of the state security over and above the two

fundamental threats to humanity, i.e., freedom from want and freedom from fear.

Proponents of this approach through a multidisciplinary understanding of security

(human rights, development, freedom etc), argue on the need to make the individual a

proper referent of security rather than the state as in the traditional notion.

The 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) was believed to be the earliest and milestone publication to this

respect.

This move from traditional international security to human “new” security is

characterized by the widening and deepening of security... we see from the early 1990s

a growing focus on non-traditional threats, or new security threats including crime,

migration, small arms and insurgencies etc Beswick & Jackson (2011:8).

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Critics of the human security, however, argue by asking that can human beings ever

be effectively secured and to what extent? What about other features of conflicts that

do not have the fear or want dimensions?

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Table 2.4
Showing Basic Approaches to the Concept of Security
Security Referent Threatening Sources of Tools of Type of
S/No. Origin Concerns
Concept Object Agents Threat Security power
1. (a) Traditional Classical Defend & Nation Nation states External Formal security Hard
(international school protect the state states (states in (military, police
Security) from external the intelligence etc)
aggression & internationa
conquest l system)
(b) Securitizatio Copenhage Protecting Nation state Non-state actors’ External & State securitizing Hard
n school n school citizens through existential threats domestic move through
securitizing (individuals, state security
move against groups, agents &
existential insurgencies etc) institutions
threats that
undermine
national
security
2 Non- UNDP Provision of Individual Crimes, External & Non-military Soft
traditional individual’s (human migration, domestic (political,
security security security) insurgencies, economic,
through environmental societal,
guarantee of disasters, small environmental,
freedom from arms, drugs & criminal, etc)
fear & want arms trafficking,
diseases etc
Source: Author’s own device

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In sum, looking generally at the literature about national security, it could be discerned

that the dominant and central roles of the state, individuals, groups, globalization and

its discontents, as well as non-state actors, cannot be overemphasized. This leads us to

further understand that the security or threat against nation-states is a conglomeration

of internal and external factors each with its own dynamics and consequences.

2.5 IMN and the Nigerian State

Over years, it has been an established fact that the activities of dissent and resistance

movements including the IMN has overtime been responsible for huge toll on the

stability and human security in Nigeria especially in terms of disruption of livelihoods,

decline of economic viability and violation of human rights (Okumu & Ikelegbe,

2010). The resultant effect of such has been the gradual loss of state monopoly over

the use of violence and an eventual weakening of the capacity of the state to res

republica and conducive environment for the satisfaction of needs and provision of

welfare to the citizens.

The growing rate of clash and activities of the IMN in Nigeria has triggered different

kinds of reactions and responses, both among the governmental circle, public realm

and yet the academia, though with mixed feelings, perceptions, interpretations and

reactions. Since the early 1980s in the post Iranian revolution period, attention of

scholars began to be attracted given the disposition of the IMN and its obvious

inclination to the Iranian regime. It is out of such curiosity that scholars began to make

efforts to interrogate the group and its activities from their different analogies and

somewhat biases.

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Suleiman, (1998) for example in his classic work “Shiaism and the Islamic Movement

in Nigeria 1979-1991” sets out from the historical angle, where the work made a

thorough attempt to trace the genetical emergence of the Shi’a IMN group to its Iranian

role model of Islamic revolution and the group leader’s subsequent capitalization on

the socio-economic convulsion and political instability of the Nigerian state to refute

its legitimacy and laws, thereby, mobilizing large followership for the movement-

hammering though on the group’s claim of Shiaism as nothing but freedom and better

life for the oppressed and the downtrodden. The study has in its own right succeeded

in casting the IMN group in the light of its ideological inclination as well as part of its

evolutionary process and nature of activities, but, however, leaves much to be desired

in terms of the group’s external connections (apart from mere mention of its

connections with the Iranian Revolution), its extent and perhaps most importantly its

implication to the Nigerian society. Everything said aside, still, the work leaves a

reasonable gap in terms of developments about the IMN group that took place from

1998 when the work was published and lately.

Hunwick, (1996), showed that it is the early post 1979 Revolution that attracted a close

relationship between Iranian Shi’a clergy and the Nigerian Shi’a group as well as the

former’s mission of neutralizing the already existing influence of the Saudi Wahabist

in the Nigerian Sunni organizations.

Lubeck, Lipschutz, & Weeks, (2003), look at the Sharia claim in the Muslim

dominated Northern part of Nigeria as a manifestation of generated and accumulated

post-colonial Socio-economic and political problems of the Nigerian state. He goes

ahead to show the influence of Globalization coupled with states’ declining capacity

paved the way for the formation of different kinds of identities and self-determination

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movements in different nation states and their eventual connections with transnational

and regional global actors. “Under the condition of rapid global restructuring and the

social disruptions that invariably result, Islamic-inspired movements mobilize

transnational, national, and regional networks to support Muslim claims for autonomy,

state power, and new international borders” Lubeck, Lipschutz, & Weeks, (2003) This

author, therefore, gives the impression that all the self-determination movements in

Northern Nigeria have some sort of larger global outlook and connections. Though he

didn’t categorically mention the Shi’a or IMN, but his sweeping statement

automatically implicates the group.

Alao, (2009), does not seem to delve in the issues of the IMN, by pointing to the fact

that drawing from the Iranian model of Islamic Revolution, it is striving to establish

an Islamic State in Nigeria, he seems to cast the IMN as a group which suffers extra-

judicial killings in the hands of the Nigerian government in its struggle to establish an

Islamic political system without any deeper interrogation of the forces and interests in

the struggle between the duo.

Alkali, Monguno, & Mustafa, (2012), overviews the historical evolution of Shi’ism in

Nigeria and its eventual split with the other two Shi’a groups with which the IMN was

hitherto was one thing. He goes further to show that the split between IMN and the

other two Shi’a groups was due to IMN’s eventual revolutionary activist character

which they consider as too political like its role model the Iranian Revolution and a

defiance of the core Shi’a creed.

Austin (2012), hints on the core ideology of the Shi’a Islam-IMN group (as he referred

to them at different instances) and its nationwide spread with a small highlight on the

sect’s suspicious link with Iranian Shi’a showing however that the Islamic group had

159
no doubt drawn its inspiration from Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and has

capitalised on Ayatollah Khomeini’s approach to politics, but the extent of the

relationship between the two actors is still not clear.

Isa & Adam (2013), though from a narrower angle of Kano case study, have

constrained themselves to Shi’a sect and its factions. Nevertheless, they have by the

way been able to showcase that the IMN does not recognise the authority of the

Nigerian state due to their promising periodic violations of the laws of the land. They

have also projected the origin of the Shi’a as a genesis of its leader’s visit to Iran when

he was an active member of the MSS.

Hamming, (2014), taking advantage of the functional and legitimizing importance of

Islam stresses the sectarian aspect of the competitive nature between Saudi Arabia and

Iran for what he described as soft power supremacy dilemma in the gulf region and

beyond. Simply it means both countries are using such strategy of influence in order

to counter each other’s quest for grater and broader influence.

Yusuf, (2015), In his Analysis of the Political Thoughts of Dr. Yusuf Al-Qardawy on

the Islamic State in contemporary period, though his main focus is not on IMN as an

organization, but the author has treated the idea of the IMN i.e. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky as

synonymous with the ideology of the group being its founder and driver. Yusuf has

argued that El-Zakzaky believes in the idea of Vilayet e-Faqih where gradual

transformation through ideological infiltration leads to regime change (Revolution)

through what he (El-Zakzaky called Principle and Policy). For him the need to

establish an Islamic state is a principle and is therefore permanent. But the method

which will be applied to achieve that is what he regarded as policy which according to

him changes depending on the condition and circumstance on ground.

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Hassan, (2015), traces the origin of the IMN ideology to Iranian Islamic Revolution.

It did not discuss the IMN in detail but it, most importantly also, projects the activities

of the IMN as aiming regime change as an end goal.

Adam (2015), views the IMN-Shi’a group from the angle of their most symbolic

activities i.e. public processions as an effort to acquire public space in the Nigerian

polity that is dominated by religious and sectarian competition and rivalry.

Doukhan (2016), believed in the argument that the root of the Nigerian Shi’a is

traceable to the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Also, considered as a movement that is

anti-establishment movement calling for the strict adoption and adherence to Islamic

Sharia system against a disappointing Nigerian political system which is

masterminded by the Iranian Shi’a in order to increase its sphere of influence against

its Saudi-Sunni counterpart whose presence in Nigeria is already manifest among the

majority of the countries Muslim population. He did not stop at that because he went

ahead to how Iranian Regime in its bid to expand its influence uses the Lebanese to

influence and embolden the Nigeria Shi’a in favour of its strategic interest of

countering its Saudi-Sunni regional rival.

Isa (2016), simply mentioned the challenge that the Shi’a has come to pose to one of

the reigning Islamic group-the Sunni. Perhaps having done that in one, his other co-

authored paper Isa &Yakubu (2013)” The Shi’a and its factions in Nigeria: The case

study of Kano 1980-2011” the author takes another angle here and does not, therefore,

seem to delve into the deeper aspect of the politics between the two groups especially

in terms of contestation for public space in Nigeria

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To cap everything up, the review on IMN literature shows the rising magnitude of

scholarly concern about the group and its activities in the Nigerian body polity. Almost

all the literatures have succeeded in showcasing the IMN as a group which emerged

as a full pledge Shi’a group which drew its inspiration from the Iranian Islamic

Revolution of 1979 and continued to be mentored by the Iranian Regime. A few other

literatures have been able to briefly discuss the evolutionary process of the group and

its factions. But most importantly, almost all the literatures have been able to cast the

IMN in the light that its aim is regime change in favour of Islamic political system.

However, it can be seen from all the reviewed literature on IMN that have been found

by this study so far, (except for the case of Hamming, (2014), who has delved into the

dynamics of the group’s relationship with the Iranian Regime though from a

comparative approach and on the basis of religious ideology of Sunni and Shi’a), there

is not a single one among them that has used a theory to explain the nature and its

political activities, especially in relation to the question of security. It can also be seen

that all the literatures were more tilted towards the Shiite inclined religious ideology

of the IMN rather than broader security concerns arising from the activities of the

group.

Also, it can be noted that despite acknowledging the linkage between the Iranian

Regime and the IMN, these studies have only stopped at that without any further effort

to concretely prove how influence between the two takes place and of course the

implication of such influence on the security of the Nigerian Regime which the IMN

constantly challenges. This, anyway, forms the point of departure and gap of this

research.

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2.5.1 Research Gap

From all the literature reviewed above, it can be clearly seen that there is no doubt

quite abundant literature on strategy, Islamic ideas and Islamist movements and

national security.

The literature on strategy and national security has been able to extensively address

general theoretical and conceptual issues but has left gap for its application on the

activities of IMN. The literature on Islamic ideas and movements have succeeded in

capturing issues on a general level but not specifically on IMN.

Similarly, evidence from all these specific literature shows that the IMN has only been

studied from either religio-sectarian perspective, international influence vi-a-vis

completion for public space in Nigeria, or as a mere religious group which seeks to

establish Islamic government in Nigeria, but there isn’t any study which looks at the

problem of Nigerian national security from the angle of the implication of IMN

activities which are interpreted as the group’s strategies for resilience. This research

fills such gap.

Similarly, Theoretically speaking, the study is unique in that it uses combination of

PPT as mainframe with SAFs and ST as supporting theories in a study that focusses

on group strategy with national security dimension; Empirically, it is the first time that

IMN is studied as a strategy group whose activities assessed and gauged from Nigerian

national security context; the usage of a combination of In-depth interview with FGD

and Document review on IMN fills a methodological void.

From all this, it is notable that the study makes a significant contribution to knowledge

by filling in the stated gaps.

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2.6 Theoretical Framework

The study is situated within a triangular conflation of Political Process Theory (PPT),

Strategic Action Fields (SAFs) and Securitization Theory (ST). such combination

provides a holistic framework that explains the relationship between resistant

movements’ strategies for resilience, contentious politics and national security. In a

study of this nature-whose three major variables of strategy, movement and national

security are deeply interconnected and interdependent hence intertwined, it is

necessary to forge a holistic framework model that is capable of explaining the

dynamics and dimensions in the interaction between strategy, politics and security.

Although this theoretical combination is not making a total claim of absoluteness, it

however holds promise for relative relevance in explaining the conceptual and

practical relationships and intricacy betwixt resistance, resilience and contentious

politics from the points of view of strategy and national security.

PPT

SAFs ST

Figure 2.5 Showing triangular conflation of Political Process, Strategic Action Fields
and Securitization Theories.

2.6.1 Political Process Theory (PPT)

As a reliable tool for understanding the political environment, field processes and

intrigues between incumbents and their challengers, PPT provides the basis for

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understanding the nature and character of a competitive political environment and

contentious politics context where actors in contention or competition with each other

behave and strategize based on their knowledge about the field, other actors as well as

strengths, weaknesses and opportunities, threats that characterize the competition.

As discussed earlier in the literature review section the Political Process Theory (PPT)

is proposed to address the political lop-sidedness of its preceding Social Movement

Theories. The PPT is unique in its comprehensive approach to explain groups and

movements strategic actions in the context of complete political system.

Forged between the late 1970s and early 1980s by leading social movement

researchers of the United States and Western Europe, the PPT as an off-shoot of the

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), seeks to build on the shortcomings of the RMT.

The RMT is criticized for being too internal by over relying on the question of resource

mobilization as well as its inability to pay much attention to the centrality of the

rational mind which is crucial to the direction of the mobilized resource in view for

success desirability of the movement.

The PPT sees the activities of social movements as political in the light of the

inevitable role and importance of Political Opportunity Structures (POS), Mobilizing

Structures (MS), and Framing Processes (FP). Honda, (1997).

The PPT is partly concerned with the cruciality of the context of external environment

as part of the raison de etre and factors for the emergence, activities and development

of SMs. This is important in the sense that the PPT has been able to overcome the

question of whether SMs are internally or externally driven, rather it understands and

values the cruciality of the historically formed structural contexts rather than merely

165
looking at the capacity or otherwise of the SMs to, as they wish, mobilize resources

and choose strategies.

This rather peculiar rational ability of the PPT to relate collective action of the SMs

with the factors of historical formation, nature, activities and strategies in the context

of Political Opportunity Structures (POS), Mobilizing Structures (MS), and Framing

Processes (FP) elevates the understanding about SMs from their classical irrational

breakdown outlook based on free choice of strategy, to a rationality-bound collective

action based on the nature of political environment and institutions. This unique nature

of the PPT is what makes POS the most central among the other two analytical tools

of the PPT-i.e. the MS and the FP earlier mentioned.

The POS was first developed and used respectively by the major thinkers of SM-

Eisinger (1973) and was developed by Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow

(1983). The greatest achievement of the POS tool, is its ability to provide the linkage

that is needed to be understood and analysed between the collectivized action of SMs

and the formal institutional structures of a polity vis-à-vis the strategic choices of the

SMs.

These political structures according to Kitschelt (1986), if they are open or closed

political input, (administrative structures), can determine the challenger’s accessibility

to the political decision making, if they are strong or weak political output

(governmental control over economy), can determine the implementation capacity of

the state as well as the strategic capability of the challenger, and if they have greater

or smaller (judicial independence) can determine chances of openness between the

regime and its challenger. Though the PPT may not be completely adequate to explain

collective actions of the IMs alone, due to its criticism of taking for granted what might

166
be an intervening variable to cause change in the course of changing decisions and

actions between the state and its challenger, but the PPT is a reasonable theory to

employ in studies of social movements, collective action, resistance groups and other

civil society movements.

Considering that in this study the IMN is taken to be both a rational actor and a

strategist, securitizing actor, whose such actions are hereby interpreted from the lenses

of Nigerian national security, the PPT provides the adequate and comprehensive

theoretical framework within which the study can suitably be situated, interpreted and

understood, but would also fill a significant theoretical void in contemporary emerging

trends on the intricate relationship between Islamic Movements, the political

environment their rationale and strategies. In short what makes PPT unique is its ability

to show the connection between the attributes of movements and the broader economic

and political contexts within which they operate.

2.6.2 Strategic Action Fields Theory (SAFs)

All collective actors (for example, organizations, extended families, clans, supply

chains, social movements, and governmental systems) are themselves made up of

SAFs. When they interact in a larger political, social, or economic field, that field also

becomes an SAF.

Each of these SAFs constitutes a meso-level social order and can be fruitfully analysed

from the perspective SAF. Fligstein, & McAdam (2011)

Flowing from the sociological traditions of Tonnies (1887), Durkheim (1893); (1897),

Persons (1939); Parsons, & Smelser, (1965), Kolsty, (1945), Milgram (1967), Getzner,

(1985), Dunber (1987), down to Tarrow 1998; MC Adam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, (as

167
discussed in more detail in the literature review), the purpose of our SAFs is to

understand better, the meanings derived from strategic actions between the incumbent

and his challenger, where such orders as field purpose, actors position, rule of the game

and actors’ the understanding of the action of other actors come from, and how they

are continuously contested and move back and forth on the continuum against their

opponents in the field.

There are certain elements that combine to make up the assumptions of the SAF: The

construction of fields for action is determined by the collective interests of actors on

new issues and concerns; The SAFs do not have fixed boundaries; their ability to shift,

therefore, depends on their situational definition of staking issues. There are basically

four aspects that give a given collectivity as SAF meaning; first is the diffuse

understanding of what is going on in the field which makes actors share a common

understanding of what is going on in the field though not necessarily implying that

such spoils are viewed as legitimate by them; Second is the actor’s knowledge about

field actors with incumbent-challenger relationship, in terms of power relationships

i.e. the knowledge about who their friends, their enemies, and their competitors are

because they know who occupies those roles in the field. Fligstein, & McAdam (2011);

An actor with shared understanding about the “rules” in the field is the third aspect.

That is to say the common view about understanding what legitimate, strategies and

tactics are possible, and interpretable for each of the roles in the field.

It reflects the cultural understanding of what moves make sense as interaction in the

field plays out. (ibid). The last is the interpretive frame. This entails actors’

encapsulated-shared view from their standpoint about. These way actors tend to make

their moves based on their point of reference. This means that the incumbent actor sees

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things from his position of dominance while the challenger perceives it from the

oppositional perspective as being dominated and all of this is expected to serve as

source of mobilization for field action.

The SAFs being fundamentally concerned with dynamic efforts of collective actors to

vie for strategic advantage in and through interaction with the broader environment in

which it their strategic action is embedded Fligstein & McAdam (2011), and ST’s

analytical power to explain the intricate relationship and politics between a securitizing

actor, existential threat, valued referent/audience, movement from normal politics to

security politics and an eventual securitizing move arising there from, this study which

is mainly about analyzing the strategies of the IMN in relation to Nigerian national

security, has carved out a theoretical framework by drawing from the relevant elements

of these three theories depicting a triangular relationship since any one of them lacks

independent sufficiency, adequacy and legitimacy to explain the entire variables of the

research problem.

2.6.3 Securitization Theory (ST)

Securitization Theory, on the other hand, is found suitable in explaining the security

intricacies between the strategies of groups and national security. It lets us know what

strategy or action of groups and movements can be interpreted as existential threat.

Thus, a combination of the two theories provides the study with effective and holistic

theoretical underpinning (informative guide and structure of thinking and analysis) for

the study.

Securitization is a successful act through which an inter-subjective understanding is

constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to

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a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to

deal with the threat. Buzan and Wæver (2003).

Given the intricate relationship between existential threats and its implication on the

Nigerian national security, this study requires a framework that can relatively explain

such causal relationship from a certain security angle thereby offering a tool for

practical security analysis.

As against the state-centric traditional realist school, which assumes that only powerful

states in the international system are capable of threatening other states, the

Neoclassical Realist framework which transcends the traditional boundaries is found

to be more relevant to the context of this study.

The trend of argument of the Securitization and non-securitization theory was started

by the seminal work of Ole Wæver titled Securitization and desecuritization.

(Wæver,1995).

The development of the securitization theory is precipitated by the shortcomings of the

classical/traditional school whose focus is being considered as very narrow due to its

subjective view on the role of states only. Since the end of the 1980s, however, the

field has expanded to encapsulate varied notion of what security is, terms of the

designation of threats with various authorities trying to define the underlying themes

of security. (Ole Wæver1995).

From then onwards, the school developed Securitization theory as a method of

studying the politics and political issues of security, considers certain non-state threats

like climate change, pests, political communities, religious groups and movements,

etc, are labelled as national security threats. In fact, it is called Copenhagen school

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because the spirit of the Copenhagen school [is] to invite and open up the discussion

of security rather than to entrench into a fortified position” Eriksson (1999). Even

though the securitization theory has been variously criticised in that the actions and

activities of the perceived threats are usually reactions to the provocative actions of

the state arising from its [over]securitization responses, laws and policies, this study

exploits these weaknesses by tending to suppose that the dismantlement of security

issues suggested that by keeping issues off security agendas, both desecuritization and

resilience processes occur after-or in response to-securitization processes Bourbeau,

& Vuori, (2015).

In summary, the three major elements (units and components) of the securitization

theory are: the concept of security in relation to threats which transcends the classical

boundaries of international security concerning only nation-states and their usual

political-military competition, to encompass spatial characteristics such as global,

regional and global, sectorial entities such as military, environmental, cultural,

political economic, etc, as well as the inevitable roles of non-state actor identities like,

migration, nations, tribes, classes, groups, movements etc., or non-tangible issues like

international rules and order, aggressive states, activities of international organizations

cultural imperialism, transnationalism etc.

The nature of valued referent objects which happen to be the subjects or recipients of

the existential threats (for e.g. citizens, legislators, or the state apparatus itself) posed

by the threatening actor(s) at any level either tangibly or intangibly. A successful

securitization requires the widespread acceptance among these valued referent objects

as to justify their legitimate claim for survival and eventual emergency approach by

leading securitization actor.

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The role of the leading securitizing actor mostly the state or its security apparatus by

considering that the existential threat has transformed from a mere political problem

to a subjective security threat thereby, placing the new issue on the security agenda for

a securitizing action. In this way, the normal rules and procedures governing politics

and decision making give way to extreme responses in recognition of the special or

emergency measures beyond normal rules that would otherwise bind. (Buzan,

Wæver& Wilde, 1998)

In a nutshell, looking at the ability of the PPT in terms of its analytical capacity to

explain the strategic dynamics of the SMs and their rationale, and nature in relation to

political opportunities, frames and mobilization in the political environment, and ST’s

analytical power to explain the intricate relationship and politics between a securitizing

actor, existential threat, valued referent/audience, movement from normal politics to

security politics and an eventual securitizing move arising there from, this study which

is mainly about analyzing the strategies of the IMN in relation to Nigerian national

security, has carved out a theoretical framework by drawing from the relevant elements

of these two theories, depicting a triangular relationship, given that each of the PPT

and ST has no independent sufficiency, adequacy to explain the entire variables of the

research problem, the PPT explains issues relating to the independent variable

(strategies of the IMN).

Despite its limitations however, the PPT is a tool in this research that helps answer the

first question and objective of this study which asked about the nature of IMN

strategies.

While PPT falls short of the capacity to explain deeply the meaning and dimensions

or shortcomings of strategic choices, the SAFs is a reliable theory that can dissect

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strategic field actions and so has the capacity to be used to interpret what strategies

mean as the second question and objective of this study demands.

The essence of securitization theory is to utilize its lenses and yardsticks to assess the

practices and actions and inactions of the Nigerian security operatives with respect to

the activities of IMN in Nigeria. The Securitization theory therefore complements both

PPT and SAFs in explaining the national security dimension as required by the third

question and objective of the study.

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 CHAPTER THREE
STRATEGY HANDLES AND TOOLS

3.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the framework of strategy as well as games that are strategy

related such as Chess, Rational Actor Theory (RAT), Strategic Action Fields (SAFs)

and SWOT analysis. These as issues and aspects relating to strategy help the study

with additional strategy concepts and tools which aid the analysis within the theoretical

framework of the study. These concepts and tools are chosen because they are both

related to the theoretical framework and the concept of strategy itself.

The essence is to furnish the study with a sort of strategy related mid-range, concepts

and models in such a way that constant conceptual and theoretical links and

explanations are established between the macro, micro and meso level strategies on

the one hand and the analysis of practical strategic activities of the IMN on the other,

in its course of doing strategy. All the elements in this chapter are in one way or the

other relevant to the research and can help in understanding especially certain aspects

of the research data analysis.

3.2 Rational Actor Model (RAM)

The RAT interprets the internal behavioural actions of the IMN which leads to its

choices, actions or inactions, and decisions in relation as strategic actions of the group

in relation to the larger political environment of Nigeria within which it exist. The idea

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of rational action has generally been taken to imply a conscious social actor engaging

in deliberate calculative strategies (Scott, 2000).

The basic assumption of the RAM otherwise called Rational Actor Theory (RAT), are

those decisions of the Rational Actor are connected to his goals, i.e. the goals of the

actor justifies any action he employs to achieve them, what Machiavelli would

describe as the end justifying the means. That is to say, in a better sense that, an actor

behaves rationally in his ability to aim outcomes through the design of his choices.

Outcomes in this model vary depending on factors such as nature of priority, options,

cost and benefits or consequences, choice, and then lastly outcome. The variety of

options are normally arranged in a preference scale order whereby the ability of the

actor to choose from the highest-ranking option is what is most necessary and is

therefore regarded as optimal choice. In quantitative terms, however, the ability of the

actor to arrive at an outcome at the expense of other options is what is considered as

utility or pay off.

As a branch of behavioural science, the RCT, is an off-shoot of game theory which

itself is a product of neo-classical economic theory. Though initially rooted in the

methodological individualistic sense, The RCT has developed to eventually

encapsulate all other forms of social and political actions, is a rationally motivated

instrumental action rather than non-rational. The models of the neo-classical research

program, which all centre on constrained decision-making with, given preferences,

have a common core, i.e., the concept of rationality. Bekemans, (1980)

Defined by Levin, & Milgrom, (2004), as rational choice is defined to mean the process

of determining what options are available and then choosing the most preferred one

according to some consistent criterion the theory is basically about the actors, their

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environment and the outcomes and therefore denies the existence of any kinds of

action other than the purely rational and calculative. Scott, (2000)

Proponents of the RCT like George Homans (1961) who initiated the basic framework

of the theory, followed by other important works in the 1960s and 1970s, like that of

Blau (1964), Coleman (1973), and Cook (1977) have been able to build and develop

the theory using their derived mathematical model.

Beyond the boundaries of traditional economics, the RCT continued to expand and be

applied to areas of Sociology and Political Science; voting choices, crime issue,

marriage, class and social relations, political movements etc.

Whereas the original concern of the RCTs is human behaviour in relation to ends and

scarce means, rational choice theorists have argued that the same general principles

can be used to understand interactions in which such resources as time; information,

approval, and prestige are involved. Scott, (2000) This is evident looking at the

growing politicization of the theory in its application to interpret different kinds of

political actions and activities, especially social interactions in the form of exchange

relationships motivated primarily by both reward and punishments or what Hans

Morgenthau would describe as Animus Dominandi.

It should be, however, understood that in spite of the need for a rational actor to always

behave as if he is maximizing expected utility, actor’s ability to optimize choice does

not infer that his decision is devoid of mistake or unintended consequences or

deliberate risks. Mistakes for example can occur due to factors such as

misunderstanding of situation, lack of or inadequate time and resources, all of which

can provide the basis to further understanding of what has caused the actor’s mistake.

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Similarly, an actor’s decision can be Risked when he may have deliberately (mostly

out of necessity), taken a decision that may result in painful actions. These kinds of

actions are not mistakes but risks. In RAT, it is still rational to take risks in as long as

it is targeted towards the goal of the actor.

…in another instance, unintended consequences beyond actor’s wish

can occur either due to uncertainties or due to certain intervening
variables that are not part of the actor’s initial calculation. The actor
here does not have control over such outcomes. These uncertainties
may be either Environmental or Strategic. Environmental
Uncertainties in this case (which carry along with it all the
intervening variables), entail among others, actor’s poor information
on the environment in which they operate, other actors that they
relate with or likely consequences of their action, while Strategic
uncertainties worsens the actor’s situation because of his opponent’s
ability to obfuscate actor’s opportunity to predict. This strategic
uncertainty arises from the rational behaviour of the various actors
and can seriously confuse matters. Petracca, (1991).

Nevertheless, critiques of the RCT have a growing concern over the possibility of

collective behaviour in a situation where individuals are only concerned about their

individual altruistic aggrandizements and ends. That is to say would individuals ever

act in such a way to benefit others rather than themselves? This very scepticism is

founded in Talcott Persons expression where he the Hobbesian problem of order: if

actions are self-interested, how is social life possible? (ibid).

In response to this valid argument, RCTs argued that collectivises like groups,

organizations, movements, political parties, trade unions etc can be reducible to

statements about the actions of individuals. Whenever it is possible to demonstrate the

existence of a decision-making apparatus through which individual intentions are

aggregated and an agreed policy formulated, it is legitimate to speak of collective

actors Hindess (1988). In fact, Ogu, (2013) further argues “that it begins with a few

simple assumptions about the individual and the relationship among individuals, and

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then builds models of social action and interaction that describe and explain the

complexities of larger groups, systems, and whole societies.”

But the RAT alone is not sufficient to be used to interpret the dynamics and intricacies

associated with studies that involve not only rationality, but also strategy and issues of

national security. This structural lacuna is what necessitates the employment of

another theoretical approach for effective analytical coverage of the rational and

strategic actions of the IMN. So, social movement and organizational scholars have

succeeded in pushing this synthetic project of social movement theorizing much

further by advocating the theoretical explanation and understanding of the role of

strategy in the action field relative to the broader competitive political environment.

3.3 Actor-Network Theory (ANT)

Over time the study and practice of strategy has to be influenced by Actor-Network

Theory (ANT). Although its origin is sociology of science ANT has gradually become

an important tool in the explanation of the relationship between strategic human and

non-human actors. As against the obsessive myopia of the conventional approaches

such as institutional and ethnographic approaches. ANT’s key methodological

principle is follow the actor (Latour, 1987; Law & Callon 1988). This key principle of

ANT presupposes that a combination of two insights. The first is that the possibility

of the continued existence of people, groups, institutions or strategies lies in people’s

capability of doing the work that makes them hence action of the actor. Secondly, the

availability of tools and materials to practitioners is what shapes the progress of action

of the actor. Clark & Fujimoto, (1992) overemphasize the importance of the cruciality

of the progress of science and technology in the kind of tools and materials that will

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complement human actor. The ANT simply shows that strategy can be a heterogeneous

network which seeks to combine the roles of both human and non-human actors.

According to Neoinstitutional theorists like Callon & Law (2002), at the Centre of

strategy as practice are people, working with others and reliant on tools of all kinds,

the success of whose activities depends both on mastery of the minutiae deep within

their organization or group and connection to the wider world outside.

In trying to showcase the relationship between strategy and the larger social system

and structures in which it is embedded and to project it as a pragmatic social practice

Schatzki, (2001) synthesizes three core themes; one, practice perspectives is about

minute and routine not just the extraordinary and large practices; two, human actors’

ability to tap from language, skills, shared understanding and technologies of the wider

society and; three, actors’ introduction of skills and resources to the ordinary activities

of their daily lives.

3.4 Game Theory

A field that influence most decision about social interaction. Put forward by John

Forbes Nash. It entails any interaction between multiple people in which each person’s

pay-off is affected by the decisions made by others. In other words, it could be applied

to any situations where people get together in business. Though game theory is wide

ranging used all the time by Economists, Political Scientists, Technologists, Military

Tacticians, and Psychologists just name a field. It has two main branches: cooperative

and non-cooperative or competitive game theory. Our concern here is the non-

cooperative/competitive game which covers social interactions where there will

always be some winners and some losers will require some set of strategies for

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competing players in order for them to minimize costs and maximize pay-offs. As a

result, each players is aware of his opponent’s aspiration to achieve the best possible

situation. So strategies in games are a set of rules we define them for a whole sum of

result for each player. Being the relevant one here, the dominant strategy equilibrium

game theory as a study of human behaviour in strategy setting. So to have a game you

need at least:

i. Two players (agents/people)

ii. Pay-off (potential outcomes)

iii. Rules (for the game)

Even with rules clearly defined, it is not obvious that players behave in expected ways.

This is why there are a number of solution concepts for games:

i. Dominant strategy equilibrium

ii. Nash-equilibrium

iii. Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium

iv. Bayesian equilibrium

v. Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Dominant strategy equilibrium is the most basic solution strategy. in the game any

player can have any number of possible strategy strictly dominant and the strategy and

therefore the player is always better off with that strategy no matter what other players

do. So when one strategy dominates what a player plays, then it is called dominant

strategy. Strategy that is best regardless of what the other player does. It is also called

dominant strategy equilibrium when both players have a particular strategy as their

dominant strategy.

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3.5 Chess Strategy

Basic Strategic Principles of Chess Opening, Attacking, Defending, Capturing &

Pursuing: Centre control-a situation where the middle ground of the battlefield is

dominated by the Pawn players in order to have control of the four central (super)

squares of d4, d5 and e4, e5 and as well monitor movements surrounding the centre

for the purpose shielding and easy attacks. Here the knight could have control of the

central squares; Peace development-a situation whereby the pieces are ensured to work

and being brought forth towards the Centre. The Knights are first brought out to f3 and

c3 squares while the Bishops also follow them. This shows that the centre is ensured

to be dominated with the presence of first the pawns followed by the knights and then

the bishops; Kings safety-a situation where the king is ensured being protected through

the act of castling-that is to say moving the king two squares to its right or left side and

then jumping the rook one square to towards the King’s former middle position. This

keeps the King in a safe and well protected position against any possible close or proxy

attack.

3.6 Confusing the Enemy

The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot

fathom our real intent. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. (1910)

The legendary boxing trainer and manager Cus D"Amato much later came up with a

boxing strategy called “Confusing the Enemy” Confusing the enemy is an important

strategy that gives the opponent a wrong impression of a direction his opponent or

contender is going. This will make the contender get distracted towards the wrong

direction while he is being deceived and taken by surprise over and over until he loses

the completion. In war, Sun Tzu suggested that the secret of winning a battle is our

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ability to confuse the enemy by diverting his attention to a false intention and as he

pays attention there, we then strike and take him unaware.

In boxing the same idea is utilized to give an opponent the impression that he is going

to be hit at a particular point and with a particular hand, while he struggles to protect

himself from the false attempt, then a real attempt is made to punch him at a time he

has concentrated his power and defense mechanisms elsewhere. The strategy of

confusing the enemy apart from during battles, wars or boxing, has come to be

prominently utilized in different aspects of life; other forms of games, politics and even

interpersonal interactions. The most important precondition for the application of the

strategy of confusing the enemy is competitive situations. Nation states and groups

within the individuals are preoccupied on a daily basis with one form of enemy

confusion strategy or the other in the pursuit of their own interests. It should be

understood here that elements of competition and interest are necessary conditions for

the application of the strategy of confusing the enemy. The strategy is relevant in this

study in understanding some of the actions and activities of the IMN in relation to her

competitors in the Nigerian political landscape.

3.7 SWOT Analysis

SWOT as an acronym which summarizes the concepts of Strengths, Weaknesses,

Opportunities and Threats, is a tool of analysis which is most widely used but not

limited to formal organizations. Because of its efficiency and reliability in terms of

comprehensiveness and dynamism, SWOT analysis has grown into a universal tool of

analysis mostly used by policy makers, political analysts, strategists etc to understand

the effectiveness and shortcomings of plans, decisions or actions. The first two factors

(Strengths and Weaknesses) are related to internal organizational factors and are

182
therefore, likely controllable by the organization, while opportunities and threats are,

external and, therefore, by their very nature uncontrollable because of their coverage

of a wider context or environment in which the whole entity operates (Oreski, 2012).

The general advantage of using the SWOT analysis is that it understands strengths as

factors that have prompted outstanding performance, weaknesses as group factors that

will increase costs or reduce quality, opportunities as significant new initiatives

available to group and threats as factors that could negatively affect group

performance. Harrison, (2010) Specifically, therefore, the relevance of SWOT analysis

in this study is the adoption and utilization of its logic in the process of analyzing the

performance of the strategies of the IMN (which is taken in this study to be a rational

actor (strategist), its internal and external strengths and weaknesses, as well as the

group’s opportunities and threats in relation to Nigerian national security i.e.

securitization politics.

3.8 Fundamental Elements of Strategic Thought Process

Akpuru Aja (1999:1-2) Policy and Strategic Studies: Unchartered Waters of War and

Peace in International Relations, Abakaliki, Willy Rose and Appleseed Publishing

Company. In Mbachu & Yesufu (2011:3-4) has outlined seven (7) fundamental

elements of Strategy as follows: Political formation: This as the first and foremost

element requires that there be an organised political entity with some sort of guiding

rules and regulations so as to enable the strategist achieve his desired end. Clear

definition of vision: this require a strategist to make clear the objectives or goals that

he sets out to achieve. Broad plan of action: this element of strategy is expected to link

up the triangular sub-elements of policy, theoretical guide and desired end of a

strategy. Information control: The timely and accurate control of information in the

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course of strategizing equips the strategist with the necessary data and ability to take

crucial decisions in competitive situations. The additional advantage of information

control is the opportunity for the much needed precision and directed action to avoid

resources waste and duplication of efforts. Timing: This also is another crucial element

of strategy. The attainment of desired goals and objectives in a strategy requires time

frame (precision) as well as its effective utilization. Cost Effectiveness: Since strategies

are expected to be achieved with minimum costs, then a cost-effective strategy is one

that has been achieved with the minimal cost in terms of material and human resources,

finance, time, etc. Implementation and monitoring: all the aforementioned elements

would have been useless without the ability of a strategist to implement and further

monitor these strategizing processes.

In terms of the strategic thought process, Akpuru Aja identifies strategic thought

processes as involving four (4) main stages:

1. Identifying the issue.

2. Deciding the guiding policy.

3. Deciding the strategy (ies) to towards the policy objective.

4. Putting strategy (ies) into action.

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 CHAPTER FOUR
DATA INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

Islamist movements, parties and groups parties have demonstrated

the ability to develop effective political strategies, elaborate
platforms for action with popular appeal and set up efficient
organizational structures, designed both for political and social
work, thereby mobilizing large constituencies (Aclimandos, et al.,
2010).

The analysis chapter is divided into three chapters based on the three main elements

of Political Process Theory (PPT), as the study’s Grand theory. This is because each

of the identified strategies of the IMN is best suited for analysis (with aid of the other

two theories of the study), under one of the PPT elementary categories; either Political

Opportunity, Framing Process or Mobilizing Structures.

Without pre-empting the succeeding chapters, it is essential to clarify that those

activities of the IMN which capitalise on the opportunities or weakness of the political

environment in which the operate, are placed under Political Opportunity in chapter

Four; those activity strategies of the IMN which happen to be the creation and initiative

of the IMN in order to gain advantage, are grouped under Framing Process in chapter

Five, while; IMN strategies that border around outsourcing and collaboration to score

certain goal, are situated under Mobilizing Structure in the Sixth Chapter.

This style of presentation is chosen in order to give the analysis some semblance of

focus and organization as well as the ability to maintain disciplinary spine within the

framework of strategy and security.

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In accordance with problematique, objectives and questions of the study as stated in

chapter one, this and next two chapters are presentation, analysis and findings of the

summarized, compressed and coded, i.e., identification, and interpretative examination

of the strategies of the IMN and the implications of such to Nigerian national security.

For the purpose of reiteration as stated in the methodology section, the analysis process

is based on Braun & Clerk’s describe-compare-relate model of data analysis as

assisted by Freeman’s three approaches to interpretive research process, i.e.,

Categorical Thinking, Narrative Thinking and Dialectical Thinking. In order therefore

to maintain coherence in the analysis, strategy related interpretations are carried out

on the basis of the Four elements of strategy stated in chapter one, i.e., Goal, Actor,

Resources and outcome. And for security, all security dimensions.

Similarly, the logic of system in the sense that all the relevant components of the study

which have been converged and integrated into the analysis. This is because as Harris,

& Jimenez, (2001), argued, data analysis in qualitative research should be about

convergence of relevant study parts in the analysis process. Therefore, the analysis is

situated and deduced from the study’s theoretical framework of Political Process,

Strategic Action Fields and Securitization theories (PPT, SAFs AND ST).

Nevertheless, other strategy related concepts and frameworks as presented in chapter

three of this work (Strategy Conceptual Handles Toolbox) are utilized where

applicable. Also, relevant literature documents been reviewed were utilised where

applicable to answer the research questions in with a view to meeting the research

objectives.

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4.2 Respondents’ bio data

The major essence is to achieve the research objectives by answering all the research

questions. Reference to the statement in the methods of data analysis sub-section in

chapter one, it would be recalled that the methods used to collect data in this study are

triangular; Interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and Literature Review.

Since it’s a phenomenological research, the choice and selection and coverage of the

category of interview informants, their areas of discipline as well as their sectors of

inclination is carefully done, to as much as possible, gain insightful responses and as

well strike a balance and minimize human tendency of bias and subjectivity. As

mentioned in the methodology section the personal names of the respondents are

represented by alphabets (F-I), except for those who declared that they have no

problem disclosing their names.

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Table 4.1
Showing General Profile of Interview Informants
No. of INTERVIEW
S/No. CODE SECTOR
Persons RESPONDENTS

1. 1 State Security Service (SSS) A1 Department of State

Security (DSS)
1 National Intelligence Agency A2
(NIA)
2. 2 Nigerian Army B1 Defence
B2
3. 1 Nigerian Police Force (NPF) C1 Home land Security
(Internal Affairs)
1 Nigerian Security & Civil C2
Defence Corps
4. 1 Civilian Security Expert D1 Academia
1 Civilian Security Expert D2 Private Service
5. 2 Sunni (Former Elzakzaky’s MB E1 Private Service
ally)
E2 Public Service
6. 1 Shi’a Cleric Barr. Bello Darul-Saqalain
Jahun

Hamza
Lawal
1 Shi’a Cleric Mu’assatul Rasul
A’azam
7. 2 IMN Officials G1 IMN/Public
Service
Isa Lawan
Ikara Public/Private
2 IMN Member Service

8. 1 Iranian Official H Iranian Embassy in

Nigeria
9. 3 Focus Group Discussion I1 North Central
I2 North West
I3 North East

Source: Author’s device

As stated earlier, the analysis is mainly guided by the PPT framework (mainframe)

and assisted by the provisions of the SAFs, while the lenses of the ST guides with the

insight of what constitutes security threat and national security interest.

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The three elements of the PPT frame are Political Opportunities (POs), Framing

Process (FP) and Mobilizing Structures (MS). The activity strategies of the IMN which

are analysed under the POs heading are the IMN specialised organs namely, Academic

Forum, Martyrs Foundation, Hurras (Para-military Guards), ISMA Medical Care

Initiative, Resource, Communication, and Sisters Fora.

As for FP, such IMN activities as Fodiyyah Schools, Narratives as Political

Signification and Usbu’ul Wahda (Unity Week) fall under this strategy category.

The MS element is characterized by the IMN strategies of Iran/Hezbollah Influence,

Intergroup Victimhood Solidarity, Corporate Registration: Ancillary organs and

Paradigm Shift: From Islamism to Realpolitik.

4.3 Political Opportunities

This sub-section presents and analysis activities of the IMN as Political Opportunity

(PO) strategies. As explained in chapter one, the PO result from any event or broad

social process that serves to undermine the calculations, expectations and assumptions

on which the political establishment is structured. Here the IMN takes advantage of

the weaknesses, failures and shortcomings of the Nigerian state in its social contract

with its citizens, by providing alternatives to the people, thereby attracting more

sympathy and followership.

4.3.1 IMN Specialized Organs

The IMN specialized organs are establishments that are duly registered with the

Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). Each of the organs is charged with a

special responsibility and are overall overseen and accountable to the leader of the

189
IMN Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. The IMN has successfully designed its organs in

such a way that each organ fills in certain gaps that exist in one sector or the other, of

the Nigerian state. This, therefore, makes it realistic for aggrieved citizens to see

opportunity in any of the organs.

The ISMA Medical Care Initiative, for example, is an alternative to the Nigerian

Ministry of Health; the Hurras against the Nigerian defence and security; the Business

Forum against Commerce and Economy; Information and Publications against

Ministry of Information etc. The activities of these specialized organs are, therefore,

identified and analysed and taken as resilience strategies of the IMN with emphasis on

their implications to the Nigerian national security. These strategies are: The Academic

Forum, Martyrs Foundation, the Hurras, ISMA Medical Care Initiative, Resource

Forum, Communications and Sisters Forum.

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Table 4.2
Showing IMN’s Specialised Organs
S/No Lajna/Committee Forum Foundation Schools

1. Dab’i (Publication) Resource Shuhada Fudiyyah

---------------------------- ------------------------

• I.M • Nursery,
Publications Primary and
• I.M Secondary
Productions • Tahfeez
• Science
Academy
2. Lajnar Fudiyyah Academic ISMA
Medical
Care
3. Usbu’ul Wahda Sisters
4. Nisf Sha’aban Youth
--------------------

• Fadl
Abbas
5. Ashura and Arba’een Huffaz

6. Tarbiyyah da Medical/Internet
Ilmantarwa
7. Quds Writers
8. Authentication and Builders
Documentation
9. Ahl Dusur
10. Hurras

Source: Author’s compilation from interview and literature data

4.3.1.1 Academic Forum

The Academic Forum is an IMN organ charged with the responsibility of organizing

and handling intellectual and doctrinal matters of the IMN both within and outside the

organization. The forum is membered by committed, dedicated scholars and educated

persons across all levels of education expect primary school. According to G1 and Isa

Lawal Ikara, part of the activities of this organ is but not limited to organizing

workshops, lectures, Islamic Vacation Courses, conferences and Seminars. (see

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Appendix H1,2&3) It also serves as the IMN's informal liaising agent for securing

admissions for IMN members in educational institutions, both within and outside

Nigeria. Though, this was denied by G1, Isa Lawal Ikara, all the other interview

sources and the JCI report have however, corroborates with I1, I2 and I3 to confirm

that the Academic Forum performs the above duties. According to an informant:

The overtime flow of significant number of Nigerian students into

various Iranian religious educational centres and schools, with long
term scholarships as variously reported by such publications as
Mahjubah, Echo of Islam and lately Al-Mizan newspaper, Al-
wilayah T.V among others was partly responsible for IMNs
radicalized nature as well as disrespect for Nigerian states law and
constitution as well as their revolutionary actions which has to a
large extent compromised Nigerian national security. (Interview
with D2)

Through the Academic Forum, the IMN takes advantage to educate the populace about

its activities and to clarify certain issues of contention, especially given the fact that

the IMN is a common rival to the Sunni sect, Shi’a factions of Daar Saqalain and

Mu’assasatu Rasul A’azam (Rasul A’azam Foundation) and indeed the Nigerian state.

Similarly, using the same avenue, the IMN in addition to scholarship opportunities,

usually sell its ideas, by way of questioning the integrity and legitimacy of the Nigerian

state as well as challenge other groups as being inactive, selfish or parochial on issues

affecting Nigerian citizens. Here, the argument, as put forward by G1, Isa Lawal Ikara

and H, is that if the IMN is not praised for undertaking responsibilities of the Nigerian

state of educating its citizens then it cannot be castigated. It can be said here that both

sides of the arguments for and against the Academic Forum activities of the IMN may

be said to be legitimate. But looking at it more critically, it would be realised that

whatever is the goal the IMN in engaging in such activities, the fact that it gives the

IMN the advantage to attract more followership and resources in favour of the

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movement, cannot be shied away from. This in turn is a soft strategy which makes the

IMN stronger, more organised, better educated and, therefore, hence more resilient.

Drawing some postulations from the Rational Actor Model (see strategy conceptual

handles in chapter three), the IMN proves to be a rational strategist because it

employed a means through which many citizens become attracted. To capitalize on the

weakness of the Nigerian state is not enough, but the decision on what choice to settle

for in order to gain advantage in its competition in the Nigerian state. This is aptly put

by Levin, & Milgrom, (2004),

that rational choice is about determining what options are available

and then choosing the most preferred one according to some
consistent criterion the theory is basically about the actors, their
environment and the outcomes and therefore denies the existence of
any kinds of action other than the purely rational and calculative.

This interpretation is shared by all interviewees except G1, Isa Lawal Ikara and H.

This ability of the IMN to capitalize on the weakness of the political system to educate

its members is not unique anyway to the IMN. It would be recalled from the reviewed

literature in chapter one of this study that the Gulen Movement and Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood have used similar strategies to educate their members through formal

schooling systems and irregular educative programmes independent of their state

governments. And that this strategy has fetched them massive followership, loyalty

and strength.

For A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, E1 and E2, although solidarity and prebendalism is a common

practice in Nigeria and it should, therefore, not be surprising that the IMN does all

such to its members (see Appendix). But A2 is sceptical of the fact that the movement

has deliberate intention of using such activities as silent avenues for political inclusion

which at the end might give the IMN political advantage to assert itself against the

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popular and minority and state interest in Nigeria. The activities of the Academic

Forum for A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, and C2 does pause a direct threat as some of the group’s

other activities, but that indirectly more and more people are brain washed against the

unity and patriotic interest of the Nigerian state. For them such kinds of activities have

long term effects against national security.

However, it should be noted that many security agents tend to ignore the advantages

that the Academic Forum gives to redundant and illiterate citizens whose

enlightenment keeps them away from crimes and other social vices. All said, the

Academic Forum contributes to more security to the Nigerian state than threat because

it educates citizens who have been abandoned by the Nigerian state. The UNDP

security concept would support this argument. However, as response to a follow up

question, C1, C2, D1 and D2 have been specifically concerned to show that the concept

of “Academic” may sound legitimate and normal, but IMN’s involvement in its

members’ education matters is unquestionably for the purpose indoctrinating them to

become radicalized against the Nigerian state.

Additionally, the securitization theory does not see the Academic Forum among those

activities that it regards as Existential Threat except as integral part of the IMN whole.

This is because for any threat to be qualified as existential, it has to be seen to perverse

the confines of normal politics. The IMN as a strategy actor, therefore, capitalizing on

the weakness of the Nigerian state to strategy use the Academic Forum as strategy

resource, which give it the opportunity to gain more resources it stronger, more

resilient, more popular, and gain more political inclusiveness and advantage as strategy

outcome, against the Nigerian state and yet other rival groups.

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To answer the first question of the research, the Academic Forum is a resilience

strategy used by the IMN; to answer the second question is to say that the Academic

Forum strategy makes the IMN to emerge more resilient by to gaining more resources,

political advantage and influence and; to answer question three, the IMN using the

Academic Forum strategy, does not pose direct threat to the Nigerian national security.

4.3.1.2 Shuhada (Martyrs) Foundation

According to E1, the IMN has a history of encouraging Shahada (Martyrdom). In fact,

it has been estimated that about 200 people so far have lost their lives so far in the

course of the group’s encounter with either the Nigerian state or conflict with other

sects or groups (see Appendix H21).

Similarly, the Shi’a creed as an ideology of the IMN itself has Shahada as a very

important concept. There is a saying of the Shi’a that Kullu Yaumin Ashura wa kullu

Ardin Karbala meaning Every Day is Ashura and every Land is Karbala (see

Appendix H21). This saying assumes that the de facto authorities should be confronted

at all times and anywhere to either achieve triumph or else martyrdom. Though

Martyrdom in Islam is not limited to the Shi’a ideology as E1, Barr. Lawal Jahun and

Hamza Lawal, but the condition under which it is encouraged in the Shi’a ideology is

unique to it. It has got its origin in Islam as a form of sacrifice of life in the same way

as Imam Husain has sacrificed his life during the Karbala clash between factions of

Islam during the reign of Mu’awuyah Bin Umar. This for the Shiites means that

adherents must be ready to die any day anywhere in the cause for preserving the creed.

The observation put forward by for example D1 and D2 in relation to this Martyrdom

is that the IMN is deliberately using its uneducated, vulnerable and villagers who were

always first killed during any encounter. This view is similar with inputs by I1 that the

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children of leaders of the movement were never made vulnerable or put in front lines

during the group’s activities despite the preaching that they are Martyrs when they die.

However, this was ridiculed at the time when Three of El-Zakzaky’s sons were killed

in the front lines of the group’s clash with the Nigerian Army in 2013 in Zaria, Kaduna

state of Nigeria.

Saddled with the responsibility of catering for the bereaved families of IMN members

who happen to lose their lives in the service of IMN, the Martyrs Foundation collects

and redistributes charity to the family of the deceased as well as organizes functions

and commemoration events in honour of the deceased. According to G1, Isa Lawal

Ikara, I1, I2 and I3, funds under this organ are generated through personal and group

donations, pledges, contributions and grants. What it means as far as the Martyrs

Foundation is concerned is that it is a strategy to assure existing or living IMN

members that to die for the group is not a problem. It is a common knowledge that

people especially heads of families has a permanent concern for the fate of their

families after their demise. Through the Martyrs Foundation, the IMN assures all

members of the continued care of their families in case they die.

All interviewees except G1, Isa Lawal Ikara, H and F2, agree that this strategy explains

the IMN as utilizing the both to attract new members and as well maintain the existing

ones due to its reliability and concern for its members. Opposite to this position is that

until now, the Nigerian Pension Scheme is still rickety and full of corruption. Many

families of deceased ones find it very difficult if not impossible to access the pensions

and gratuities of their lost ones. It is conceivable, therefore, to see that more people are

naturally attracted by the provisions for deceased ones in the IMN. During FGD with

some non-IMN members from the North East, five out of the seven persons in the

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group confessed that they would rather join a movement that can take care of their

families in their absence than remain under a corrupt and careless Nigerian state. Two

lessons can be drawn from this. One, many citizens of the Nigerian state do not have

confidence in it; secondly the IMN’s strategy of Political Opportunity has potential

resources among the Nigerian populace to easily draw from. In strategic terms, this

forms part of the goal of IMN in the Shuhada Foundation.

When you see young people struggling to die or even craving and
praying to their God for them to die, you know that they have been
well brainwashed. (interview with D1)

…Well! If you ask me one hundred more times, I will tell you that
Martyrdom in the IMN is nothing but religious manipulation for
political end. (interview with E1)

People do join the IMN because they know it is a sincere movement

to the paradise. That is why you see that the movement is expanding
everyday like a hurricane against the failed, so called Nigerian state,
that we have. (interview with Isa Lawal Ikara)

Against these backdrops as well as other documents precisely reports of the SSS, NPF

and N/A, the Shuhada Foundation can be interpreted to mean that it is an avenue where

the resistance capacity of the IMN group can be shown through those who offered

themselves to die for the group. This very tendency would naturally deter such

competitors like the Nigerian state from attacking the IMN and it also sends message

of ultimate resistance.

In terms of the security threat of the Martyrs Foundation, it has been overwhelmingly

believed by respondents of this study except G1 and Isa Lawal Ikara (which case is

natural), that the Foundation no doubt provide security to the families of deceased

ones, but looking at the broader picture, it implicates national security in the sense that

it is a permanent way of encouraging confrontation with state security agents or other

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rivals in among the civil society. This is evident looking at how many members of the

IMN (especially the youth) always pray for Martyrdom.

You hear them being mostly Hausa language speakers saying Allah Ka azurta mu da

Shahada meaning “we pray unto You O Allah to bless us with Martyrdom.” This is

quite dangerous to the security of the citizens of any nation state especially in a country

like Nigeria where the IMN attracts en mass using different tactical means. (interview

with C2)

As answer to question one of the research, the IMN ‘s Martyrs Foundation is concept

which the IMN utilize as a strategy in its political struggle against in the Nigerian state.

In response to question two, the IMN Martyrs Foundation serves as the outcome, a

reliable strategy for the IMN to remain resilient using those being killed as resources

of the strategy. to answer the third question of the research is to say that whereas from

the angle of Human Security perspective, it provides security for the families of the

deceased but it equally a threat to the lives of individual IMN members, it on the other

hand serve as threat to the lives of IMN members and as well the general security

interest of provision of security of lives and properties of Nigerian citizens-IMN

members inclusive.

4.3.1.3 Hurras (Para-military Guards)

According to the JTI (2016) Hurras is a term that was initially developed by Ayatollah

Khomeini to refer to the militia he set up as Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps

(IRGCs) or Guardians of the Revolution. The Hurras is one of the most important

organs of the IMN and they perform vast array of functions depending on the situation.

G1, Isa Lawal Ikara, H, and I3, as well as the JCI report, corroborate on the fact that

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the first and most important and in fact the genesis of its creation is to protect the IMN

leader and his family and by extension IMN members during gatherings and

processions of the group. All the Interview sources except D1, D2 and H, have

corroborated that the Hurras is a strategy tool and resource of the IMN in its

competitive situation in the Nigerian political landscape.

We can in fact relate the Hurras with Chess opening rules (see Strategy Conceptual

Handles Tool Box in chapter three of this study) where The IMN make use of a similar

strategy in the chess game where the volunteers (mostly village youths) are motivated

to serve the functions of PAWNS who always serve as the king’s shield & attackers.

The clash between the Nigerian Army and IMN members on Quds
day processions in Zaria in July, 2013 has resulted in the death of
over thirty (30) IMN members including the three (3) sons of the
group leader of the IMN. (Interview with G1)

They get shot at, injured because of their vulnerability. Many times the Hurras were

the victims in clashes between the Nigerian Army and the IMN. JCI’s report of July,

2016 on the inquiry into the clash between the 12th and 13th December 2015, about

349 members of Hurras and non-Hurras were killed in the course of defending the

leader of the IMN Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky in his house.

Similarly, A1, A2, B1, C1, D1, D2, E1, I1, and I3 all have opined that the strength of

the IMN is the Hurras.

The single pillar which boosts the image and protects the IMN both
internally and externally is the Hurras. it is the Hurras that gives the
IMN the physical capacity to fight its enemies and competitor
including the Army of the Nigerian state. (Interview with E1)

Documents, videos and newspaper columnists (see appendix F & H12), have

showcased the Hurras as deliberately being used by the IMN to fight the group’s

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battle. All these can be interpreted as strategy for IMN’s resilience in the course of its

struggle in the Nigerian body polity.

The Hurras receive paramilitary training home and abroad in Iran, Hezbollah

(Lebanon) etc, for the purpose of defending the leader. They use light weapons such

as knives, arrows, catapults, axe, machete etc. They also possess guns as defensive

weapons against clashes and attacks and as offensive weapons against the Nigerian

Army, Police, neighbourhoods of their leader and fight with other groups. Many

people believe that the Hurras possess dangerous weapons, but until now nobody is

able to prove that. (The issue of Arms stockpiling has been addressed under the sub-

theme of Iran and Hezbollah).

There has been over the years, rapid growth of IMN’s local and domestic activities

like the training of Hurras that are directly connected with foreign powers and organs

such as Hezbollah and Iran. (Interview with A2)

Except for the IMN interviewees (G1 and Isa Lawal Ikara), there is a consensus among

other interviewees reviewed documents obtained from DSS, NPF and N/A, that the

Hurras are a threat to the Nigerian national security because in the cause of defending

their leader, they end up inflicting serious harm to other people, either around the

community where they operate or elsewhere. There were recorded cases where the

Hurras use weapons to threaten people that do not share their ideological opinion.

Apart from societal threat, as mentioned in the analysis of the Martyrs Foundation, the

Hurras are fond of confronting security agents, breaking of laws and regulations and

general indiscipline etc.

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 Acts of aggression, unlawful intimidation against individuals or
communities leading to suspected murder or deliberate or accidental
loss of lives was variously reported about IMN members. (Interview
with B1)

For example, the Hurras who by virtue of their acquisition of light weapons have been

sighted many times to roaming and speeding during curfews, similarly, when there

were set rules that only one person is allowed per motorcycle they are usually seen

riding 3-in-one and speeding on the streets.

The Hurras many a times have terrorized law-abiding people who

insist on exercising their rights when they differ in action or opinion.
(Interview with B2)

Though many people argued that it is the fault of security agents who undertake

selective imposition of law, many others are of the belief that the security agents

themselves are afraid of the Hurras because they carry weapons and conduct mob

actions whenever any one of them is confronted. There are evidence of video clips

showing the IMN leaders inspecting the Hurras during paramilitary combat training

and ceremonies alluding to that (see Appendix H 27).

In a nutshell, to answer question one of the research is to say that the Hurras are

utilised by the IMN as strategy resource for the attainment of its resilience strategy

goal in Nigeria. As answer to question two, the Hurras strengthens the IMN because

it pools the physical power elements as strategy outcome that IMN needs in order to

match the physical power of its competing opponents especially the Nigerian state. To

answer question three, the Hurras are generally a source of security threats to lives and

property in the Nigerian state, though with little exceptions because it might mean for

the IMN nurturing a reserve army in view of ripe time just like the IRGCs which were

vanguards of the IIR process and later became formalized as official security apparatus

of the Islamic state, despite the existence of the state defence apparatus under the

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dethroned Shah-the SAVI. The Hurras is the most outstanding and glaring threat

against the Nigerian national security because it is a replica of the Nigerian security

agencies.

4.3.1.4 ISMA Medical Care Initiative

The ISMA Medical Care Initiative which comprise of health

professionals across different health cadre (Medical Doctors,
Health Technicians, Nurses, pharmacists etc) are saddled with the
responsibility for providing healthcare services, assistance and
advice as the case may be. (Interview with G1)

The organ has been very reliable over the years especially in providing first aid

services to IMN victims in their different clashes with the Nigerian Army. It also

extends magnanimity to even non IMN members through such services as blood

donations, contribution for the settlement of medical bills and drugs etc. Even other

groups within the state do not have as effective, responsive and organized medical care

system like that of the IMN through ISMA (see Appendix H14, 15 & 16).

Through the ISMA platform, many Nigerian citizens have joined the IMN group

leading to the increment of its membership of the group. Though there is no official

periodic statistics on the number of people that join the IMN due to the activities of

ISMA, but the booming of the forum’s membership and activities has been observed

overtime to be shooting speedily. That is to say the IMN draws its strategy resources

partly from the membership and services of the IMN to meet its goal of resilience in

the Nigerian political arena.

From the lenses of Political Opportunity strategy, what this means is that the IMN uses

this medium as to gain and attract public sympathy and patronage. But it should be

noted here that the IMN derives the opportunity from Nigerian state’s lackadaisical

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attitude towards health care provision and delivery to its citizens. There are many

Nigerians who do not have access to basic medical facilities and services even in urban

not even rural areas. IMN’s ability to come up with ISMA Medical Care Initiative

gives the group the opportunity to mobilize more followers. The ISMA Medical Care

Initiative, as confirmed by Barr. Bello Jahun, Hamza Lawal, G1, and Isa Lawal Ikara

is an activity of the of the IMN that has limited negative effect on Nigeria’s national

security, except that it helps in providing and improving social security. The organ is

doing a lot in terms of assuring members of the movement and non-members alike on

their improved health and assurances. This also corroborates with the provision of the

Human Security approach which sees the ability to secure and improve the health of

individuals as an essential element of national security.

4.3.1.5 Resource Forum

The Resource Forum (RF) basically serves the function of Socio-economic

Empowerment and Interventions Empowerment of the poor and the less privileged

skills acquisition, economic empowerment schemes,). According to many sources, the

IMN on different occasions have gone to hospitals and other health centres to donate

blood. This kind of generosity has on several occasions given the IMN the opportunity

to win the sympathy of youths and other less privilege of the Nigerian society.

The IMN has benefited and still benefits immensely as a resort from the
disenchantment of certain Nigerian citizens, arising from the Nigerian
state’s inability to address their needs and problems. (Interview with
D1)

According to all the participants, The IMN group has special economic empowerment

and skills acquisition programmes such as Fertilizer support to local farmers in

villages, buying houses for the blind & cripple offering of Gratitude to traditional

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rulers, sponsoring the education and welfare of orphans and other less privileged

persons around communities, Investment due to Fai’ah (1/4 of initial capital offered

as contribution), offering of gratitude to traditional rulers, Ram support for naming

ceremonies and parents that name their children Husain etc.

IMN developed among other effective cooperative and solidarity

cultural device through, provision of livelihood means to potential
members through offer of credit facilities such as motorcycles loan,
business credits, etc. which many new members saw as solution to
their problems. This resolve has attracted many people to join the
IMN in search for solution to their endless problems. (Interview with
E2)

Apart from such domestic micro-economic schemes, the IMN as corroborated by A1,

A2. B1, B2, C1 and C2, engages in collaboration, workshops and training with

different domestic and international business consultancies in order to educate its

members on modern business skills and approaches as well as micro-economic

businesses. Between 15th and 25th February 2014 for example, G1 and Isa Lawal Ikara

said that twenty representatives of the IMN resource forum attended a workshop that

was organized by Islamic Economic Collaboration Front in Ghana and later Turkey.

(see Appendix H18, 19,& 20).

In the workshop we received training on how we can easily establish

medium and small scale micro-finance. The training has highlighted
with a promise of establishing collaboration, global models of
Islamic micro-finance, examples models from village banks, Qard
Alhassan, Grameen Bank, RoSCA and other credit unions and
microfinance cooperatives. (Interview with G1), corroborated by Isa
Lawal Ikara.

Isa Lawal Ikara further notes that arrangements have gone far regarding establishment

of contributory pension scheme which will be based on IMN’s organizational

hierarchy of (Halqah tier of Local Governments, Daurah tiers of the states, and the

Majlis Shura of the headquarter).

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 The essence of the pension, is to ensure IMN members’ financial
security way into their lives because the government of Nigeria since
its inception in 1960 has proved to be worthless and anti-the people
it’s meant to serve! (Interview with Isa Lawal Ikara).

Capitalizing on state weaknesses, and as the theoretical concept of Opportunity

Mobilization would have it, all these are strategies used by the IMN through its

resource Forum as avenues to attract people to the movement thereby capitalizing on

the stricken nature of the Nigerian economy (Political Opportunity). That is to say the

IMN capitalizes on the social institutional (in terms of lack of political legitimacy and

effectiveness) and economic weaknesses (in terms of poor GDP, Poverty, inflation,

hunger and scarcity) of the Nigerian state. The offering of gratitude to traditional rulers

for example, helps the IMN to gather different security and non-security information

on individuals, groups, families, government etc, concerning their communities, to

serve as source of recruitment into the movement.

To answer the research’s second questions which seeks to understand why the IMN

strategizes, is to say that the Resource Forum as a strategy has proved to be quite

effective because it has been a source of recruitment and resource mobilization in

terms of information and secret generation, support, backing, sympathy and

compliance of immediate communities. All this makes the IMN more resilient in its

struggle with the Nigerian state and yet against other competing forces in the Nigerian

body polity.

The security implication of the socio-economic empowerment can be viewed from two

angles. The first is that it helps in cushioning the would be effects of the economic

hardships which reduces the tendencies for all sorts of crime (kidnappings, theft, armed

robbery, rape, conflicts as a result of tensions arising from poverty stickiness etc,

inherent in the Nigerian state). This very point tallies with UNDPs human security

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requirement (see security literature review), because such intervention programmes

and empowerment schemes of the IMN is a sure way of freeing the IMN members

from want and by implication, fear.

Discussion with Isa Lawal Ikara on IMN pension scheme idea tallies with Stiglitz, &

Holzmann, (2001) discussion in their book New ideas about old age security: Toward

sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century, where they opined that there is

growing resort at the global stage to the old pension system, embraced by world policy

leaders and private organizations and community groups based on the idea of multi-

pillar equity Investment to manage public and society funds. This shows also that

IMN’s pension idea in this sense is still in line with the UNDP concept of human

security. This dimension of security, even though some of the respondents argue

against, does totally affect the Nigerian citizens’ lives and properties or the general

security of the Nigerian state, negatively.

However, from the second angle, A1, A2, C1, C2, and D1 corroborate with Keck, &

Sikkink, (1999) that the indirect assistance that comes from other external sources

including the major one (Iran) and yet other transnational advocacy networks,

culminates in undermining the sovereignty, integrity, unity and general security of the

Nigerian state. The information provided by traditional rulers and other individuals for

example equips the IMN with certain security secrets that the traditional rulers are

supposed to share exclusively share with government and its security officials; this

way the IMN uses such information to expose to its members’ government security

secrets and plans. The Business Forum is one of the most vibrant resilience strategy of

the IMN with minimal short term security threat to Nigeria, but long term implication

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for regime security and sovereignty. To buttress this point, a security respondent puts

that:

Security issues are not taken for granted, despite the fact that you do
not see implication, it does not mean that it does not exist. In most
cases these kinds of activities have long term effects on the security
of nations. We have recently seen how the Gulen movement in Turkey
has almost toppled the status-quo regime. So, whether short term or
long term, security threat is security threat. (Interview with A1)

Situating this issue within the postulations of Securitization theory, and to answer

question three of the research, which asks that how do the IMN strategies affect

Nigerian national security? The IMN through the activities of its Resource Forum both

beneficial and harmful to the Nigerian national security. Beneficial in the sense that it

helps cushion the effect and repercussion the enduring economic hardship created by

poor leadership in the Nigerian state. Harmful in the sense that the meddling of external

influences in the IMN into the affairs of the Nigerian state, in the name of economic

relations and interventions, undermine the sovereignty, regime and general national

security interest of Nigeria.

4.3.1.6 Communications Forum

As a social and media networks organ, the Communication Forum is also another

organ of the IMN that is in fact very strong, active and instrumental to the group's

mission and vision. The communication Forum is subordinated by many other sub-

fora of strong media outfits and contacts. The Al-Mizan Newspaper, The Struggle, The

Pointer, Gwagwarmaya, IMN website, Islamic Movement II, Islamic Movement

(Arabic II), Harkar Musulunci, Al-Mizan (Hausa), Pointer Express, Office of Sayyid

Khameini, Ahlul-Bayt Digital Library, Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Mission, Ahlul-Bayt

Agency News, social media fora in both English and Hausa languages (see Appendix

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I). According to E1, E2, Barr. Bello Jahun, Hamza Lawal and I2, through the

communications Forum the IMN equally exploits what this study would call “existing

mobilizing structures” such as the social and network media of TV, Internet, Satellites,

Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Blogs, etc, to mobilize both human and

capital resources, spread more of propaganda, rumour mongering etc than intense

Islamic teachings and preaching which it constantly claimed to be doing, using its own

website, social media, audio & video clips, newspapers, whistle blowing about for

example actions of detention of the IMN leader, Army actions of killings, mass graves,

court cases, etc. Networks include Alwilayah TV, Alminhaj TV, According to

Doukhan, (2016).

Zakzaky has made good use of the media in reaching out to his
followers. Film documentaries of religious leaders are translated into
the local Hausa language, with hundreds of DVDs sold to locals
every month, and two news Magazines-Pointers Express, published
in English, and Mizan, published in Hausa-have existed for years.

Media and Communications is one of the most effective weapons of the IMN, through

such media platforms the IMN spreads its propaganda for the purpose of shaping

public opinion in its favour and also politics of signification and framing that are later

discussed hereunder. Especially against the Nigerian state, the communication

platform of the IMN. In a cross section of a random sample of the Al-Mizan

Newspaper between the year 2000 and 2015, there is nothing less than fifteen (15)

headlines in each which is talking about either effort to suppress the IMN struggle,

government conspiracy, information which is ridiculing the government or other rival

groups like the IMN, or stories and reports or examples from Iran or other oppressed

people in places like Palestine and Saudi Arabia. Usually the headlines for example

reads in Al-Mizan Hausa Sojojin Gwamnati sun sha Kashi a Biniwai meaning

“Government Soldiers have been shamelessly defeated in Benue”, Mu da karfin Allah

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mu ka dogara ba da bakin Bindiga ba –Inji El-Zakzaky meaning “what we depend in

is Allah not the power of Gun”, anyi ma ‘yan uwa kisan kiyashi a Zaria meaning “our

brothers have been massacred in Zaria” (See Appendix H9&10). Looking these

examples one can easily see the reason why the newspaper and its sister media are

utilized as good strategies for the IMN to remain resolute and resilient in its struggle

in Nigeria. But in these aforementioned TV stations, their daily business is not the

same as those of the social media and newspapers, theirs is more balanced because

their daily programmes are combinations of different (though strictly Shi’a)

programmes. Here Shi’a programmes must be differentiated from IMN programmes.

So elements of propaganda against what concerns the Nigerian state or the affairs of

IMN are usually found mainly in programmes that concerns the IMN especially during

trial periods of the movement for example when their leader is detained or members

killed or injured during clashes with the Nigerian state. So mainly speaking, informal

outfits like the Twitter, Facebook and others mentioned above, the IMN uses its

communications outfits to mobilize new members, retain old ones, sell its ideology as

well as brainwash, bewitch, and control the thinking of their members. It has been

estimated that over ¼ of the IMN members use Twitter, over 3/10 use Facebook, and

well over 4/10 use Watsapp. This according to Barr. Bello Jahun and Hamza Lawal, is

not in fact the only benefit that the IMN derives from the communications forum; that

it also uses same media to mobilise the sentiments of domestic and international

organizations and actors against any unwanted situation it finds itself. This

communication forum of the IMN is actually an effective strategy through which the

IMN emerges stronger and firmer.

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Using the conception of Human security approach, these aforementioned strategies

have no negative implications for the Nigerian national security, but looking at

classical securitization approaches and as A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, D1, and Isa Lawal

Ikara, the activities of the Communications Forum have negative implications for the

Nigerian national security. This is because these activities create and instil hatred in

the minds of the IMN members against the Nigerian state and therefore the slightest

opportunity they would get; they will go against the general interest of the Nigerian

state. This latest argument can be seen to hold more weight than the assertion that

everything is all about movement affairs. Because in the long run or even short run,

the messages transmitted can manifest themselves in any form of threat by the group

against the state. There were in the past for example instances where members of the

movement during clash with apparatus of the Nigerian state were overheard repeating

messages passed on to them through these media as reasons why they see the Nigerian

state as evil and even illegitimate.

4.3.1.7 Sisters Forum

The sisters Forum is led by the wife of the leader (equivalent to what Nigerians would

call First Lady), the Sisters Forum, basically which membership is strictly women,

organizes what the IMN regarded as Mu'atamar lectures like the annual Yaum Zahra

(Zahra day). The level structure of the IMN is maintained in organizing such

Mu'atamar and other support services by the organ. The Sisters Forum has its major

source of funding as contributions from member sisters and donations from other

sources within and outside the IMN organization.

Some interview sources like D1, Isa Lawal Ikara and Barr. Bello Jahun have said that

as unlike its major rival-the Sunni sect in Nigeria and also against the usual practice in

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Islam, the IMN in all its public activities involve or allow for women participation (see

Appendix H22 & 23). The IMN women participate fully in rallies and demonstrations

that the group undertakes anytime, and anywhere in Nigeria. Women participation in

struggle and appeal against discrimination and a symbol of gender equality. This has

been utilized by the group as a means to sort of show up of Strength and diversity to,

serve as deterrence against governmental undermining of the group as well as other

competing groups and also to achieve greater political relevance and wider competing

space; Indirect appeal for the support of global civil society groups to the Nigerian

state, but a counter response to the group’s major rival the-Sunni which is known for

keeping women off the public arena.

The sisters’ forum is one of the major pillars of the IMN because it
serves as a centre of gravity for all the women members of the IMN
and a very strong source of recruitment for new women members.
(Interview with D1)

Through sisters’ forum, the IMN has succeeded in attracting

financial contributions, donations, as well as assistance to
vulnerable women. Just as the men, you can easily see how the
number of women members is booming day by day. They are easily
identifiable because of their permanent black colour uniform.
(Interview with E2)

The essence of this strategy is to take advantage of the women gender to gain more

population and followership for the purpose of more strength to survive the

competition and to gain more relevance in the Nigerian political space.

As for Sisters Forum, However, the major concern on this issue of women public

participation as far as national security is concerned, is the way and manner that the

women are made so vulnerable as a result of which they have been severally shot to

death or wonder during the group's clashes with either government or other people.

Through all these activities carried out by these specialized organs of the IMN as

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shown above, the IMN grows to become more attractive every day to different

categories of hopeless people who live in a country where educational opportunities

are rare, life is expensive, corruption and poverty are on the high side and where

government is always found wanting in terms of accountability, welfare services and

infrastructure provisioning. These extended social charitable activities of IMN form a

basis and golden chance for opportunity mobilization through what Balfour & Pioppi

(2013) would bottom-up political recruitment and activism. Through these means new

members are recruited, old ones are retained, and therefore the IMN gets a comparative

advantage over the Nigerian state and its other rival groups hence becomes more

resilient.

To answer question one of the research, Sisters Forum is a strategy used by the IMN

so as to mobilise more resources, acquire greater power and influence, as well as

advantage in the course of the movement’s challenge and competition in the Nigerian

political system. Answer to question two, these strategies which capitalize on the

weaknesses of the Nigerian state have so far proved effective for the IMN because

over the years the IMN has been making positive impacts in terms of membership

strengths, resources, public sympathy, positive public perception, external support,

wider coverage, and greater power and influence. This also proves that the

effectiveness of these strategies makes the IMN to become resilient against the

Nigerian state and its security interest. Although the magnitude, intensity and

dimension of the security threat of each element of the PO differ. To answer the third

question of the research is to say that it is indirectly a threat to the Nigerian national

security in the long term because it contributes to the broader activities of the IMN.

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4.4 Summary of findings

In relation to question one of the research, the IMN makes use of Academic Forum,

Martyrs Foundation, Hurras, ISMA Medical Care Initiative, Resource Forum,

Communications Forum and Sisters Forum, as Political Opportunity Strategies.

Pertaining to question two of the research, all of these strategies have proved quiet

effective for the IMN in terms of the way the IMN succeeded in drawing from political

opportunity advantages in terms of weakness of the Nigerian state to use these

strategy-activities to attract greater domestic follower/membership, resources, support

and patronage.

To meet the third question of the study, is to say that, all the PO strategies have in

various degrees great negative implications for the Nigerian national security.

Specifically, Academic and Resource For indirect threat, Martyrs Foundation and

Sisters Forum short term threat, Hurras and Communications Forum short and long

term threat, while Isma Medical care initiative posed Indirect threat.

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 Political opportunity
strategies

Academic Forum
Resource Forum Indirect Long-Term threat

Martyrs foundation
Short-Term threat
Sisters Forum

National Security
Hurras
Short & Long-term threat
Communications Forum

ISMA Medical Care Indirect threat

Initiative

Figure 4.1 Political opportunity strategies implications on National security

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 CHAPTER FIVE
FRAMING PROCESS STRATEGIES

5.1 Introduction

This strategy entails any initiative that the challenger picks in order to create

opportunity and comparative advantage against his opponent. The IMN using this

strategy has devised many means which it uses to manoeuvre both the Nigerian state

and other rival groups. Framing processes uses knowledge of the political environment

as well as of the opponent to know where, how and when to do what.

5.2 Fodiyyah Philosophy (Fodiodism)

The IMN in all its claims and actions traces its political genealogy to the Jihad of

Sheikh Usman Danfodio. It is pertinent to note that the IMN generally is understood

to have adopted the philosophy and approach of sheikh Usman bin Fodio's revivalist

jihad in most of its activities and motive. This is what in this research is termed as

Fodiodism.

According to the JCI report (2015) MSS as the core group from which the IMN

emerged has right from the beginning has expressed its desire and commitment to the

replication of the jihad of Sheikh Usman bin Fodio. Later, after the eventual split of

the MSS brotherhood struggle into different factions, splinter groups and fall outs, the

IMN as a faction is the group which continued to claim such connections with the

Danfodio jihad to the extent of naming places and establishing schools as Fodiyyah

i.e. (of Danfodio) It is for this reason that the group is fond of establishing schools,

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naming of places & businesses after Danfodio throughout Nigeria, as well as

organizing what it referred to as Dan-Fodio week. So far there are about twenty-seven

(27) numbers of Fodiyyah schools owned by the IMN throughout Nigeria (see

Appendix H4&5).

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Table 5.1
Showing Approximate number of IMN Fodiyyah Schools
Approx. No. of Fudiyyah
S/N L.G.A Location of Schools
Membership Schools
1) Bauchi State
1 Alkali 417 3 Alkali, Gwaram, Duguri.
2 Kerfi 128 1 Kerfi.
3 Darazo 219 3 Darazo, Kwankeyal and Gabari
4 Shira 180 3 Faggo, Zigau and Disina
5 Jama’are 53 1 Jama’are
6 Itas/Gadan 10 NIL
7 Giade 400 2 Faguyi and Zabi
8 Gamawa 22 NIL
9 Toro 501 2 Rinji and Gumau
10 Dass 607 3 Yalwa, Gutal and Dass
11 Tafawa Balewa 160 1 Buminu
12 Ningi 188 1 Ningi
13 Ganjuwa 108 1 Kafin Madaki
14 Missau 470 2 Misau and Hardawa
Unguwar Shagari, Lushi, Sumayyah at Jaja, As-Labul Kisa’iy at Gwallaga
15 Bauchi 2000 5
and Radhwiyyah at Ibo Quarters.
16 Katagum 370 1 Azare
17 Dambam 31 1 Dambam
18 Zaki 26 1 Zaki
19 Warji 200 NIL
Total 6,068 32

217
Table 5.1 (Continued)

S/N L.G.A Approx. Membership No. of Fudiyyah Schools Location of Schools

2) Katsina State
1 Katsina 2,250 2
2 Jibiya 513 1
3 Kaita 311
4 Batsari 250
5 Batagarawa 175
6 Rimi 350 1 Rimi
7 Charanchi 265 Charanchi
8 Kankiya 270
9 Dutsimma 500
10 Safana 317
11 Kurfi 200 i)
12 Kankara 180
13 Kafur 571
14 Matazu 125
15 Musawa 60
16 Dan Musa 50
17 Funtuwa 1,250 2 Funtuwa
18 Bakori 823
19 Sabuwa 700
20 Dandume 800 1 Dandume

218
Table 5.1 (Continued)
S/N L.G.A Approx. Membership No. of Fudiyyah Schools Location of Schools
21 Faskari 500
22 Malamfashi 1000 1 Malumfashi
23 Danja 750
24 Mashi 412
25 Daura 150
26 Sandamu 70
27 Ingawa 75
28 Bindawa 75
29 Mani 70
30 Mai Aduwa NIL
31 Kusada 20
32 Zango NIL
33 Baure NIL
34 Dutsi NIL
Total 13,277 9

219
Table 5.1 (Continued)

S/N L.G.A Approx. Membership No. of Fudiyyah Schools Location of Schools

3) Kebbi State
1 Birnin Kebbi 150 1 Birnin Kebbi
2 Bunza 40 1 Bunza
3 Jega 70 1 Jega
4 Koko 100 1 Koko
5 Alearu 20
6 Kangiwa 10
7 Argungu 10
8 Kamba 20
9 Aljannare 5
10 Bagudo 100 1 Bagudo
11 Zuru 200 1 Zuru one 1 Mosque
12 Gwandu 150 1 Gwansu and 1 Mosque
13 Yawuri 200 1 Yawuri and 1 Mosque
14 Ngashi 200 1 Ngashi and 1 Mosque
15 Maiyamma 60 1 Maiyamma and 1 Mosque
Total 1335 10 4 Mosques

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Table 5.1 (Continued)

S/N L.G.A Approx. Membership No. of Fudiyyah Schools Location of Schools

4) Zamfara State
1 Gusau 200 2 Gusau
2 Talata Mafara 1,000 4 Talata Mafara
3 Bakura 200
4 Maradun 350
5 Tsafe 1,000
6 Shinkafi 200 2 Shinkafi 1 mosque, 1 playing field
7 Birnin Magaji NIL
8 Zurmi 10
9 Bungudu 10
10 Gummi 20
11 Anka 20
12 Bukkuyum 50
13 Maru 30
Total 3,115

5) Gombe State:
1 Gombe 5
2 Dukku 3
3 FunaKaye 2
4 Deba 2
Total 1,000 12 Estimated at 1000 mostly in the villages.

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Table 5.1 (Continued)
Approx. No. of Fudiyyah
S/N L.G.A Location of Schools
Membership Schools
6) Adamawa State
1 Yola 1
2 Mubi 2
3 Gombi 1
4 Numan 1
Total 500 5 Estimated at 500 mostly in the villages

7) Yobe State
1 Nguru 900 2 Nguru
2 Gaidam 250 1 Gaidam
Potiskum/Nanger
3 400 10 Potiskum/Nangere/Fika one Secondary School
e/Fika
4 Gulani 300 2 Gulani
5 Damaturu 50 1 Damatutu
Total 1,900 15 One Secondary School named “Al-Mustapha”

8) Borno State
Maiduguri/Konduga/Jere: And 1 women school, both at
Maiduguri/ 500 1
Bulumkutu
Konduga/Jere

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Table 5.1 (Continued)
S/ Approx. No. of Fudiyyah
L.G.A Location of Schools
N Membership Schools
9) Kaduna State
Zaria, Soba,
Kubau, Kauru,
1 Giwa, 3,000 MANY
Pambegiwa and
Mafarfi
Kaduna-Jaji
2 and Birnin 3,000 MANY
Gwari
Total 6,000

10) Kogi State

Okene, Dekina,
Ajaokuta, Iddah Estimated to be about 200
and Lokoja

11) Plateau State

Jos City 300 2

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Table 5.1 (Continued)
No. of
Approx. Fudiyya
S/N L.G.A Location of Schools
Membership h
Schools
12) FCT Abuja: concentrated at Area I Jumu’ah Mosque their number is estimated at about 150.

13) Niger State

Suleja, Madalla, Dakwa
1 1000
and Zuba
2 Kontogora 500

14) Kano State

Ungogo/ Fagge/ Dawakin Identified and a big plot of Land intended for building of school and
1 3,000 4
Tofa mosque.
2 Nassarawa 450 12 With 14 Ta’alim (Study circle) centres, 1 Juma’ah mosque
3 Kura/Garun Malam 500 1
4 Madobi 500 3
Sheka, Gaida, Unguwar Geza and Danbare; 1 bread baking house, many
5 Kumbotso 700 4
Yogourt making shops
6 Tarauni 1,000 3 Unguwa Uku, Daurawa and Farm centre.
Total 6,150 27
Source: Author’s compilation

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Being the fact that, the Sheikh Danfodio’s revivalist Jihad has been very famous and

well celebrated, accepted and appreciated indiscriminately between and among all

muslins and sects, not only in Nigeria but even in West Africa, the IMN uses such as

a strategy to legitimize their political activities to become popular and relevant

amongst the Muslim populace. This, the IMN does by showing that the path which it

(the IMN) is toeing is exactly that of reclaiming Islamic political system in Nigeria or

at least in Northern as a short and long term long agenda respectively, in order to

achieve more popularity and public acceptability, sympathy and patronage. In the

assertion of E1 and E2, Danfodio’s jihad to us is simply a template. Though this

opinion may not represent the reality, but it serves to show the claimed connection

between what all muslins would not dismiss (Danfodio’s jihad) and the ideology of

the IMN.

Through the Fodiyyah schools, the IMN stands a better chance of attracting more

patronage and legitimacy among Muslims, restricting their members from attending

other schools and especially given the development of the group’s competition with

its Sunni rival, the Fodiyyah schools serves as check-mate to the similar Islamiyah

school system operated by the Sunnis. Apart from being an evidence of clear definition

of vision as Akpuru Aja (1999) suggested in his seven (7) outlined fundamental

elements of Strategy, this check-mate as a Chess game strategy assures the IMN is sure

immunity from all forms of external aggression, penetration, threat of infiltration

dominance. It is equally sure of ideological protection, development and spread among

the populace and even most importantly a source of recruitment. Similarly, it shows

that the IMN uses Strategic Action Field (SAF) through its show of diffuse

understanding of what is going on in the field or what SWOT analysis would address

as being conscious of its strengths and opportunities as against its weaknesses and the

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threats its facing from its competitor(s). in the Game theory language, this action of

the IMN can be interpreted as Dominant strategy game because it seeks to dominate

its opponents in the field through its ability to increasingly spread its influence beyond

its original sphere.

The Jama’atu Tajdid Islamy (JTI) in its submission to the JCI in 2015 opined that:

…The Fodiyyah primary school system through which they train

their children and other peoples’ children to imbibe the Shi’ite creed
and practice at a very young age. The overwhelming majority of the
youths that were at the forefront of all their activities and clashes
were products of these Fodiyyah schools.

In the same vein, Amnesty International (AI) corroborates with JTI wherein they

reported that dozens of schools known as Fodiyyah were established by the IMN,

schools which many see as vehicles for recruitment of members among

underprivileged youth. International (2016). Similarly, the naming of places and

businesses after Danfodio gives the impression that the IMN not only share the same

ideology with Danfodio, but also the same mission of Danfodio’s jihad-a bias which

is believed to be held by all Muslims.

Many interviewees are of the opinion that such Danfodio week and other activities and

initiatives related to it has a sort of long term implication for the Nigerian national

security in two ways. One, looking at the philosophy of education and Shi’a sectarian

ideology that is taught in those schools, draws inspiration and pays most of its

allegiance to the radicalistic philosophy and beliefs of Iranian Islamic revolution and

political thoughts of the Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini rather than

to the principles of the Nigerian state.

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Therefore, to specifically answer questions one, two and three of the research,

Fodiyyah schools has been identified as a strategy aspect of the framing process grand

strategy. It is an effective Framing Process strategy for the IMN which by way of

boosting followership strength, wider coverage and resources all of which enriches

and makes it resilient in the Nigerian state. However, in terms of Nigerian national

security, it poses a long-term danger to the unity, peace, security, and general

continuity and survival of the Nigerian state because it entails nurturing, incubating

and prolytizing young people, who will be leaders and followers of tomorrow towards

anti-Nigerian state ideology, as securitization theory would have it.

5.3 Narrative as Politics of signification

…from this perspective, social movements are not viewed merely as

carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of
structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies.
Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively
engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for
constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers (Snow &
Benford 1988). They are deeply embroiled, along with the media,
local governments, and the state, in what has been referred to as “the
politics of signification (Hall 1982).

This analogy above and the cutting edge politics of memory debate over who and how

we remember, coincides very much with Ted Sarbin’s narratology principle where he

expressed that “human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices

according to narrative structures” Sarbin (1986 a & b). Thus we see here the capacity

of creating a political psychology which automatically connects the mind with the

society. So in whatever form it is being undertaken; whether narrative, storytelling,

framing or politics of signification, the main essence is to produce a narrative that will

directly or indirectly inform and control the action of target audience in a desired

direction.

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This is though aside of the facts that many may seem to think that narrative is confined

to oral story telling thereby exonerating other aspects of it such as literary materials,

audio-visual materials, pi Maguire, (2017) corroborates with Waldner, (2017),

Maguire, (2017), Seidel, (2017) to presuppose that political organizations, groups and

other kinds of organizations and indeed states themselves make use of such tools as

parody, humor, fantasy, literature, visual art exhibitions, (Hirsch, 1997), drama etc to

create especially controversial victimhood narratives that end up shaping the

subjectivity of their audience for the purpose of political propaganda. Such avenues as

gratiffi in the process of contentious politics and are normally utilized by micro-level

political activism that is often used by marginalized persons who lack access to

institutionalized forms of political participation hence a form of resistance (Miklavcic,

2008; Waldner & Dobratz, 2013).

Since also framing entails the capacity of the strategist to mobilize and make other

actors to resonate with him in the service of his actions either based on rationality or

emotion, the IMN leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky alongside other key leaders in the

movement in their public and private lectures, teachings and lessons to the members

tell narratives in the form of storytelling by normally casting the Nigerian state as a

stooge of these Wahhabi-Saudi, America and by extension Israel. That they are

therefore nothing more than enemies of progress, enemies of Islam, traitors, Zionists,

conspirators; that the Nigerian government is the official of the Boko Haram because

it created it; claims for exposing government plans for massacre, using machineries

within the Shi’a to attack the Nigerian Army (NA) during IMN-NA clash so as to

blackmail the Shiites; the Nigerian state has nothing but gun power only to kill; the

Nigerian state’s mission is nothing but shed blood; usage of gun is for the mad person

while usage of thought is the rational ones, etc the followers of IMN are often heard

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citing examples from their leader’s stories of various detentions and miraculous things

that happened as a result as evidence of toying the right path and needfulness for

doggedness.

Similarly on /11/11/2014 it was reported by Republic Reporters New York that Sheikh

El-Zakzaky claimed that: Attempt on Sheikh Zakzaky’s life Sponsored by CIA,

MOSSAD, and SSS of Nigeria-Islamic Movement Leader Cautions President Good

luck Jonathan. As in many instances from interview sources and audio and video clips

available to this study, the IMN leaders have severally claimed expositing plans of

Nigerian government or its security agencies; that is to say claiming to have informers

and insiders among government officials and security agents. During his visit to the

graves of those that were killed in the clash between the IMN and the NA in 1999,

Elzakzaky generally reaffirmed Funtua Declaration message (see Appendix), as

IMN’s position by saying that There is no government except that of Allah and we are

never going to offer our allegiance to them (them in his speech is always referring to

the constituted authorities of the Nigerian state), wadannan matakai da hukumomi suke

dauka na cutarwa da kuma gallazawa, suna taimaka ma Da’awar ne, amma su ba su

sani ba. Wato suna tallata Da’awar sakamakon abin da suke yi, amma su ba su sani

ba. (all these suppressive actions of the state only end up aiding and complementing

our Islamism missions, but they don’t know, meaning they are rather advertising our

Islamic clarion call as a result of their actions, but they don’t know). Also ,El-Zakzaky

said in a video clip on the 23rd August, 2012 that:

…I have heard on many occasions some people saying that nobody

is more powerful than government, so we are more powerful than
her, certainly if you ask who the ones that are more powerful than
government are? Then here we are!

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The grandeur of all is the general and familiar narrative among the IMNers that Sheikh

Usman Bin Fodio has already predicted and assure the coming of Shiekh Ibrahim El-

Zakzaky in his book “Bushral-Ahbab” where he predicted that a messiah will come

from the Maghreb whose name is Ibrahim-el-Maghreb, (Ibrahim of Maghreb), his year

of birth will be 1370 Hijrah, he will be of broad forehead and bold eyes, he will visit

the Medina city of the prophet regularly during his life time. This narrative and belief

has been in fact the reason for many to be IMN and El-Zakzaky’s fanatics.

Regarding these assertions however, D1 and Isa Lawal Ikara have asked this question

that why should the IMN have problem with Nigerian state’s suppressive activities

since it boosts the morale of their mission? Why not support, embrace and praise it?

These questions are all indirectly questioning the sincerity of the statements, rather

they see such as narratives that are purposely carved out to control the minds of the

people. Whether these narratives are true or false is not the issue here, the most

interesting for this research is the use and utilization of such narratives to control the

minds of both IMNers and other publics in favour of the IMN.

IMN’s vehement opposition against the Nigerian state makes it more

popular and attractive to especially young people and others with
grievances against the Nigerian state either for its secular nature or
enduring irresponsibility on the part of leaders. (Interview with B2)

Just like yellow journalism and political talk in media and politics respectively,

narratives are interpreted as politics of signification which occurs only through

discourse-that is to say to discuss a subject (1983). This is in fact the reason why

believe that such discursive formations are mere deliberate attempts to ridicule the

image of the Nigerian state in the eyes of the followers with the motive of gaining

more followership, allegiance and loyalty against basically the Nigerian state and the

IMN’s major rival in Nigeria the Sunni sect. they are utilised by the IMN as Geoffrey

230
(2017) would argue, in order to serve as creative narratives and memories such that

public spectators and the IMN members can be mobilised as disruptive agents of

Nigerian state’s politics.

In line with King and Walker, (2014), activists also try to develop tactics that help

them undermine the symbolic resources of their opponents and persuade their

audiences of the moral superiority of their claims. Ultimately, the success of both types

of actors depends greatly on In one of his seminal works Analytic Activism: Digital

listening and the New Political Strategy, Karpf, (2013); (2016) alongside other

insightful contributions like Cammaerts, (2007), Gauja and Orr (2015), Micheletti,

(2015), and Chadwick, (2017), argued that apart from new media’s ability to provide

a platform for disorganized masses, dissents and dissidents to be heard, it also and

most importantly enables them to listen to sentiments from their leaders and other

groups and networks both within and across their national confines. For Karpf, here

lies a sea of data-a newly quantified form of supporter sentiment through which

political and social movements and groups can now utilize new tools in form of

comments, e-petitions, “likes," smileys and hashtags to measure this data (in terms of

support or otherwise) to make decisions and shape campaigns. This development in

group strategy is what Karpf would call Analytic Activism (see literature review for

broader understanding).

True to it, these significations as Hall rightly puts above, have succeeded in

constructing, producing, and maintaining meanings for constituents and antagonists,

against the Nigerian state and IMN’s major rival-the Sunni sect. The implication for

this is that other antagonists get to be mobilized alongside the IMN followership and

other audiences get to be bewitched and therefore automatically mobilized against

231
holding the bias that the Nigerian state is nothing but an enemy of progress and

freedom of worship and human right. The leaders’ insistence on painting such picture

to the members of the IMN end up promoting civil disobedience, abuse of the rights

of other obedient citizens, loyalty to the leadership of the IMN to the detriment of

loyalty to the state, as King & Walker, (2014) aptly puts it:

Attaining strategic advantages depends greatly on actors’ abilities to

shape the perceptions of others. Actors must be able to win the
public’s hearts and minds if they are to gain positions of prominence
and to influence the rules of the game that shape who wins or loses.
Much strategic action evolves from these contests over shaping key
audiences’ perceptions.

Through all these means the IMN ends up with Narrative Control. This is clear looking

at the group’s history and dynamic clever narratives based on certain considerations

and knowledge of the field and of its opponents. (See Appendix). During the time or

at a place where the IMN has been allowed to operate freely especially when new

regimes come on board, the leadership and followers altogether from time to time or

during their gatherings normally brags that the Nigerian state is nothing and it cannot

do anything, but whenever they are being suppressed or clamped down at, they claim

that it is because they are a minority that’s why their rights are being infringed on. And

by virtue of such outcry the group usually enjoys the support and intervention and

sympathy of other groups both within and outside Nigeria. In support of this point D2

The leadership of the IMN has succeeded in setting a precedence for

its followers to manipulate actions and in-actions in such a way that
onlookers are made to believe that the IMN is a dissident and
oppressed group which is always right on any issue and against
anybody. This very important feature is what bred the group’s total
disrespect for constituted authorities apart from theirs. (Interview
with D1)

This strategy tallies with Volkogonov (1986) on how propaganda is used as a strategy

of psychological warfare. The IMN through these narratives has succeeded in

232
attracting the sympathy and support of many, home and abroad as well as

condemnations of the Nigerian state.

The also took IMN advantage from the Nigeria state military regimes repressive and

dominant attitude against vocal opposition and other groups like Islamic movements.

A1 agrees with Barr. Lawal Jahun and Hamza Lawal that this tendency has

successfully depressed the open growth of vibrant civil society but has however

created conditions where radical Islam has utilized as a chief channel for the effective

underground mobilization of dissent and youthful anger and hate against the Nigerian

authorities and regime. Under such conditions which lasted throughout the prolonged

period of military rule in Nigeria, has succeed in providing the IMN with a cause to

champion radical politico-religious ideologies and has exacerbated the tendencies for

civil disobedience and antagonism against the Nigeria state.

Considering this background, therefore, it because easy for the IMN to mobilize its

followers using different stories and narratives thereby quoting from the books of

history and experiences as well as other sources such as drama on the past heroes that

fought and won against the status-quo, stories and histories of martyrs, pictures of

brevity etc. Foremost among these narratives is El-Zakzaky’s usual and constant

examples of persecutions and imprisonments on several occasions and of the fact that

the IMN if it stood for falsehood could not have survived after over Forty years of

struggle turbulence and state suppression. These examples many members cite in their

day-to-day discussions and arguments with non-members or even between and

amongst themselves to show that the IMN is still undeterred and will never be; and to

also show that the Nigeria authorities (its proves) are for falsehood while the IMN and

its leader is in the path of truth.

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 Members of the IMN are deliberately incited by their leadership
against non-members and against the state and other rival groups.
(Discussion with I2)

The national security implication of such framing process is that these narratives and

framings have succeeded in eroding the supposed legitimacy of the Nigerian state and

its security apparatuses. It no doubt incites the followers of IMN against the Nigerian

state thereby causing hatred, disobedience and denounce of allegiance to the Nigerian

state. This was a case in point, for example, when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS)

convoy was blocked by the IMN foot soldiers when they were vividly seen carrying

light weapons and making comments that represent the image of the Nigerian Army

as stooges of Saudi Arabia, America and Israel. On a similar vein, the IMN leader’s

usual claim of having inside knowledge of government secret operation this motivates

members and strengthens their loyalty to IMN and disloyalty and hatred of the

Nigerian state. Narratives have appeared effective means for mobilization and

resilience of the IMN, it also has proven to have grave consequences for the security

of the Nigerian nation.

So, to answer the questions of what strategy, why the strategy and how it affects the

Nigerian national security, narrative as a political signification is the strategy used by

the IMN under the umbrella of the grand strategy of Framing Process. The essence of

the strategy is to serve as a tool of the IMN for mobilization, conviction, influence,

attack and counter-attack in the process of its struggle for the expansion of public space

in Nigeria. So far the strategy has proved effective because it has made the IMN to be

more resilient. In terms of its impact on the Nigerian national security, the strategy

poses direct threat because it has constantly triggered civil disobedience,

234
misrecognition of constituted authorities of the Nigerian state, violations of the rule of

law as well as violence against the Nigerian state and other publics.

5.4 Usbu’ul Wahda (Unity Week)

As an Arabic term Usbu’ul Wahda means Unity Week. According to G1 and Isa Lawal

Ikara and other literary sources, the IMN is fond of organizing a programme where

representative of different other groups is invited for an interactive session (See

Appendix). During the programme any representative is given the opportunity to

speak; either to preach, give advice or even lament over any issue concerning Nigerian

state and its citizens. Towards the end of the programme the IMN leader closes with

his own speech either as response to issues raised or on other issues (See Appendix

H24, 25 & 26).

Being an initiative of the IMN and as an interactive medium, the Unity Week to gives

the IMN more popularity, legitimacy among the people and also intergroup solidarity.

The group's ability to invite different groups across all walks of life in Nigeria gives

the group the opportunity to sell out to other participants its ideologies and biases.

Though it is unclear whether there is over the years, remarkable progress regarding the

agenda of the meeting because one would ask the question as to why there isn’t still

appreciable harmony among different religious associations in Nigeria, however, A1

and A2, E1 and E2 believe that is for the purpose of attracting greater strength through

more followership and sympathy. Be that as it may, more number of respondents in

corroboration with extant literature believe that such unity week has been contributing

tremendously to the peaceful co-existence between and among different religious and

non-religious groups in the country (See Appendix H 24, 25, & 26). They further argue

235
that the unity week of the IMN directly compliments the general security interest of

the Nigerian state.

However, considering that the traditional, securitization or even human security

approaches would not perceive the Usbu’ul Wahda as threatening the security of the

Nigerian state, nevertheless it is arguable (as in other non-directly threatening activities

of the IMN) that where as in the short run it is beneficial to the Nigerian security, but

in the long run, if the IMN it may appear to be a tactic by the IMN to give an impression

of being peaceful, while in the real sense it is just a process of deceiving the enemy so

that the Nigerian state and its other domestic enemies like the Sunni Islam cannot

fathom its real intent. This latter apprehension about the IMN on the issue of Usbu’ul

Wahda has really been reiterated severally in the cause of gathering data by A1, B1,

B2, C1, C2, D2, E1, I1, I2, and I3. Usbu’ul Wahda has been a promising strategy for

the IMN for resilience but one with minimal implication for national security.

Anyone can wish to say that the Unity week of the IMN has its own
politics, but in genuine terms, it really helps to minimize differences
and conflict among warring groups of the Nigerian state. (Interview
with Isah Lawal Ikara).

But in a counterview another respondent puts that:

The Unity week of the IMN is between and among like minds of the
IMN, and therefore, it doesn’t change anything except that it is like
a conspiratorial meeting against the supremacy and respect for the
Nigerian constitution. If I may ask you, Why would the IMN sphere
head a meeting of unity and then later engage in battle with
community people or even the Nigerian state? (Interview with B2)

Considering therefore, the IMN as a Rational Actor, behaves rationally by virtue of its

ability to aim outcomes priority, options, cost and benefits or consequences, choice, in

the sense of the design of its choices. The priority here is IMN’s strategic thought on

the reality that aligning with other groups is an option which benefits it with the

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outcomes being understood, greater support, solidarity, and rivalry tendencies hence

ultimate resilience, while the option of distancing these groups will be a certainty for

the groups to align with the enemies of the IMN including the Nigerian state as the

only possible outcome hence weakness of the IMN rather than resilience.

Therefore, to answer question one of the research is to say that Usbu’ul Wahda (Unity

Week) is another strategy used by the IMN as an element of the Framing Process grand

strategy. To answer question two, the Usbu’ul Wahda is also an effective strategy for

the IMN because it gives it the advantage of securing the support of other groups in

the state-this way the IMN grows to become more resilient. In response to question

three, the Usbu’ul Wahda does not pose direct threat to the Nigerian national security,

rather, it helps promote cooperation, peace and unity. However, as an integral part of

the activities and strategies of the IMN, the Usbu’ul Wahda poses long term threat to

the Nigerian national security because it empowers the IMN in holistic terms.

5.5 Public processions

At different times and occasions The IMN (especially during public processions), is

known for conducting its activities in ways in form of public processions and

demonstrations. Yaum Arba’een trek and Ashura: The Yaum Arba’een usually on the

10th of the Islamic month of Muharram is a day that members of the IMN from all

nooks and crannies of Nigeria trek to finally converge at the IMN headquarters

Husainiyyah Baqiyyatullah Centre at Zaria. The different activities relating to the

events that happened in Karbala and the eventual killing of Imam Hussain are carried

out Lectures, talks, performances, drama etc. On the 20th of the Islamic month of

Jimada Thani, the sisters’ forum organizes what the IMN referred to as Yaum Zahra

(Zahra day) to celebrate the birthday of Fatima daughter of Muhammad the prophet of

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Islam. During this festive period, different activities including lectures, drama, and

eating and drinking are undertaken. Nisf Sha’aban which falls around the 15th of the

Islamic month of Sha’aban is a day that the IMN organizes different show-off events

to celebrate the birth of the last Imam of the Twelver Shiites Imam Mahdi. On that day

different kinds of drama are staged but the most important is the parade rehearsal

conducted by the Hurras wing of the movement.

The IMN for example, celebrates a number of annual religious

festivals in which other Muslims do not. Such festivals include:
Maulud of the Prophet and hoisting of flag, Maulud of Ali, Maulud
of Fatima, Ashura 10th Muharram, 40th day celebration of the
martyrdom of Imam Hussain, Quds day (last Friday of Ramadan),
Martyr’s day

They also organise a number of occasional festivals: Women’s

Forum, Fudiyya Schools’ Graduation ceremony, etc. (Interview with
C2)

DeNardo, (2014) and Paturel, (2012) have argued that:

the motivation behind individual’s participation in demonstrations

even when it has the potential for being dangerous to their lives and
health has a great deal of relationship with the movement’s choice
of strategy.

The issue of concern however, for many Nigerians during these activities is IMNs

disrespect for roads and traffic laws in the course of conducting their public

processions, violating constitutional laws and regulations, infringing on the rights of

road users and inhabitants of areas where these activities are conducted. But for this

study, these concerns are secondary. What matters is the finding that the IMN utilizes

such events and activities in order to display massive followership and therefore a form

of show of strength.

For many respondents, the massive turnout is an indirect message to other rival groups

such as the Sunni and the Nigerian state itself that the movement has come of age and

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therefore cannot be taken for granted. This is confirmed from the songs chants and

brags that the members often engage in during the processions and events. Although

in his work Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion,

DeNardo, (2014) is referring to formal political organizations like the revolutionary

communist party, yet there are, based on his explanations shared characteristics

between these formal political organizations and somewhat loosely organized or even

unorganized resistance movements that seek to either influence or change the status-

quo. DeNardo is therefore of the opinion that the choice of strategy by such kinds of

dissidents boils down to surveying the political situation and then identifying strategy

that accomplishes the most. This for him calls for such primary considerations as

Group principles, tangible concessions and harboring groups and people with though

markedly dissimilar objective or strategic choices.

This argument is perfectly in line with Adam’s argument where he opined in his article

titled Shia Processions and the Competition for Religious Public Space in Northern

Nigeria 1980-2015, that, “the religious procession which is very popular among the

members of IMN in Nigeria was the main strategy employed by the movement to

create a public space for itself”. Adam (2015). Even though different explanations have

been provided especially in the words of G1 and Isa Lawal Ikara, as justification for

the public processions, but overwhelming opinions in addition to logic, have it that the

IMN at the time when it was Muslim Students Society, until the mid-period of Islam

Only, there was nothing like public processions in their activities, but given that the

political atmosphere was increasingly becoming tense and competitions were growing

higher, the IMN had to devise a means for deterrence to government and a form of

show of strength in the Nigerian political Action Field. This again couples with the

theoretical postulation of the Strategic Action Field.

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 As a result of IMN’s frequent country wide and local processions
and ceremonies leading to road blockades, untold hardships and
unnecessary frictions and conflicts are usually caused by the group
on road users or community members of the affected areas.

That is to say that the IMN uses what would be regarded as the
interpretive frame in Strategic Action Field which presupposes that
competitive actors in order to gain advantage over their competitors
tend to employ a domineering approach that will send deterrence
signals to their co-competitors or rivals. This entails the group’s
encapsulated-shared view from its competitive stand point. As a
double edge sword, participation in demonstration can either be
deterring due to repressive tendencies or enhance the movement’s
support hence greater resilience. DeNardo, (2014) and Paturel,
(2012).

This way the IMN embarks on its Public Procession strategy from its own reference

rather than from its competitor’s stand point. (see chapter three-strategic toolbox for

full theoretical reference).

The IMN is very famous for its road blockade, illegal use, abuse, and
misuse of public and other private properties during their regularly
held processions. (Interview with E1)

Regarding the security implication of the IMN public processions, there has been

series of debates and unfolding arguments among scholars and other Nigerians.

Basically there are two opposite views; one is that these public processions have great

negative consequences for Nigerian national security, and the other saying that the

IMN have right to hold public processions. Protagonists of the issue’s view coincides

with the position of G1 and Isa Lawal Ikara on the fact that public processions have

not been prohibited by the Nigerian constitution and so is a constitutional right of the

IMN, more over that all other religious and non-religious groups have their own way

of engaging either in public procession or yet a similar public outing or action that can

also be likened to infringement on the right of others.; the Izala for example block

highways and minor roads to conduct Friday prayer or their annual gatherings; the

Qadiriyyah and Tijjaniyyah Sufi brotherhoods also conduct their annual public

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processions to celebrate the birthmonth of the prophet or their sectarian founders like

Shiekh Abdulkadir Kailani and Sheikh Ahmad TIjjani and Ibrahim Inyaas El-

Khaulakhy. In similar spirit also, they argued that political rallies and party gatherings

are sometimes held at the expense of the rights of others.

On the other hand, IMN’s public procession antagonists led by the Nigerian state have

constantly accused the IMN of holding public processions in violation of the laws of

the land and the rights of others as well as breach of national security. But like Barr.

Lawal Jahun and Hamza Lawal and I1, I2, and I3 would argue, the fault of IMN’s

public processions must be shared between the IMN and the Nigerian state, because

for the them, it is the Nigerian state which was overtime reluctant and lackadaisical to

regulate public conduct that promoted such acts which has had to grow to such

alarming points. Hamza Lawal corroborates with I3 by specifically opining that:

Poor response and thin spread of security agencies to adequately

contain IMNs security threats end up boosting the group and making
it more popular and developed capacity for continuous law
breaking. (Interview with Hamza Lawal)

However, be that as it may, the overwhelming juxtapositions on the IMN’s public

processions is that it violates public rights, and if security means freedom from threat

of any form, then such procession poses threats to national security especially

considering that as a result of it there has been various clashes between the IMN and

Nigeria’s security apparatus which has always left indelible marks of loss of lives and

properties of IMN and non-IMN members alike.

The acquisition and display during processions, of light weapons as

well as IMN’s usual denial of other peoples right of way, mounting
of blockades and checkpoints thereby restricting movement of
innocent citizens, forceful claim of others mosques, is a clear breach
of public peace and security as well as convenience. (Interview with
C1).

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Similarly, its aftermath also leads to other countries and actors meddling into the

affairs of the Nigerian state at large in violation of both of Westphalia Treaty of 1846

on sovereignty and the UN’s principles of Non-Intervention. So while Public

Procession is a strategy that boosts the IMN and makes it more resilient, it is also an

activity that inflicts on the security interest of the Nigerian nation.

But on the other hand, it is believed by C2 that the attitude of the Nigerian security

operatives towards the IMN has been itself a factor that further compounds the

problem thereby indirectly promoting acts of threat in the Nigerian polity. He pointed

that on many occasions members of community and other individuals and religious

groups have variously reported IMN members to security operatives on the dangers,

threats and harm they inflict on them, but the security would often not take any action

even of calling the IMN members to order. The second problem associated with the

activities of the Nigerian security operatives is the securitizing action of the Nigerian

Army (N/A). In the cause of their confrontation with the IMN members and in their

attempt to restore order, they end up killing members of the group and destroying their

properties.

Barr. Lawal Jahun draws the attention that, though the IMN is at fault for illegal road

blockades but:

In trying to exercise its right of ensuring the safety of the COAS and
right of way as well as duty of insurrection, suppression and action
in aid of civil authorities to restore order, inappropriate and
unproportioned force was used against the IMN members leading to
their massive killing. (Interview with Barr. Lawal Jahun)

Such act is a violation of their fundamental rights to life hence Barry Buzan would say

that this way the state who is supposed to deter others from threatening it has ended

up being a threat to itself.

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In response therefore, to questions one, two and three which ask What and Why the

IMN strategies, and how they affect the Nigerian national security, another strategy is

Public Procession. This strategy has proved effective for the IMN in terms of how it

serves as a deterrence to other groups and a show of strength to the Nigerian state. But

in terms security, this strategy has caused serious violations of the rights of other

publics, vandalization of public and private properties as well as undermining the

security interests of the Nigerian state. But to a lesser extent also the state has a share

in the problem given its negligence in some instances and overuse of force in others.

5.6 Mut’ah (Temporary Marriage)

Mut’ah is a kind of temporary marriage which had its roots in Islam during the time of

the prophet Muhammad (SAW). It was said that the Muslims during war periods were

permitted to make arrangements for temporary marriage by paying a token of dowry

to the proposed lady. There were arguments regarding the continued legitimacy of the

Mut’ah marriage in our contemporary time (whether it is still permissible or not is a

topic for another day), but the most important thing about Mut’ah in this study is the

fact that the IMN by virtue of its Shi’a creed inclination has adopted Mut’ah as one of

its legitimate activities. Being that the IMN is the only known group that practice this

kind of marriage, this research gathered that there are many members of the IMN who

have executed Mut’ah among themselves and have even given birth to children as a

result.

The most attractive issue to this study is not the Mut’ah marriage itself but the way

that it has over the years served as a recruitment magnet for the IMN. There aren’t

hardly any quantitative facts on exact number or idea of the number of Mut’ah

marriages that has taken place between IMN members, this is for two reasons. One,

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nobody is taking statistics not even IMN itself, second, due to the contentious nature,

open criticisms and rejection of the Mut’ah marriage by majority of other Muslims,

the marriage became a very much closed affair and secretive to the extent that

sometimes it is only made known to the couples or some few trusted IMNers. In fact,

in the cause of data collection, I was told by E2 that there is an IMN school in Ilorin

Kwara state of Nigeria where children born through Mut’ah are taken to. All efforts

however to trace the school proved abortive.

So it is either the school does not exist at all or because of the secretive nature of the

affair it is difficult to trace. This however leaves food for further research to ascertain

the validity or otherwise of the claim for better understanding of the problem. That

notwithstanding however, all the interview sources and document review sources of

this study (except G1, Isa Lawal Ikara and H) have confirmed that Mut’ah is practiced

(though secretly) and that a lot of young people have been attracted to the IMN through

Mut’ah.

Mut’ah takes place whenever any Shi’ite-IMNer decides that he

needs a temporary spouse, he meets her, they arrange on different
issues and finally take their refuge where they feel safe. (Interview
with E1)

Yes! there is no doubt we practice Mut’ah. Even though I am single,

but I know of my girlfriend who was once involved in Mut’ah
marriage with one of our fellow brothers. They even have a kid who
has recently been enrolled in one of our Fodiyyah schools. But
regarding your question on people getting attracted to IMN partly
because of Mut’ah, that I don’t know! (Interview with Isa Lawal
Ikara)

More than anything else, including economic advantage, people tend to be best

attracted by sexual pleasure and romantic life. This has resulted in making the IMN to

secure the submission, large followership obedience and sacrifice of especially young

people from all nooks and cranny of Nigeria. The strategy of Mut’ah by the IMN may

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have been accidental or conscious, but whichever way it is today obvious that

thousands of members have successfully joined the IMN solely because of it. This kind

of Marriage has, therefore, emboldened the IMN with more human and capital

resources.

The IMN regarding Mut’ah marriage has proved being a rational actor which has

knowledge of what is going on in the field and about its competitor (see also SAF in

strategy toolbox chapter). It takes advantage of the field by capitalising on the

weakness of the subjects of completion to know that a lot of youths would naturally be

attracted by romantic and sexual provisions that are devoid being labelled as crime,

taboo or religious sins as is the case with prostitution. This strategy has equally drawn

from SWOT because the whole issue is about knowledge of the weakness of the system

and the opportunities available in relation to the existing threats and completion facing

the group.

There are varying views about whether such marriage has any security threat. But

majority of the respondents have opined that it could lead to social insecurity because

the more Mut’ah marriages, the more children are born and the more vulnerable and

nuisance the children will become either due to absence of parents or due to full time

parenting as the case may be. For example, a security expert said that:

The problem with that kind of marriage (referring to the Mut’ah), is

that it creates serious long term social problem because it involves
giving birth to children whose chances to pass through proper
parenting is indeed slim due to the condition and nature of the
marriage that took place way back between their parents. In some
religion or culture, those children are tantamount to bustards. They
end up becoming thugs, thieves, touts, and poorly or uneducated at
all, and we all know what we are talking about here concerning the
security of societies where they belong. Nigeria with children of
Mut’ah, is in a long term security mess. (Interview with A2)

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This is a social argument with many dimensions but of course there are tendencies that

those given birth to through Mut’ah may end up as abandoned and less privileged

children who may in turn grow to be open to all sorts of crimes that may come their

way thereby constituting serious social security threat to the Nigerian nation. The

Mut’ah marriage is therefore no doubt among the foremost strategies of the IMN to be

resilient in the Nigerian body polity and in its struggle against the Nigerian state or it’s

any other perceived rival. But to be scientific is to conclude that though the Mut’ah

does not pause direct threat to Nigerian national security, its threat may be a long term

one which can bring about the emergence of a reserve army of radicalized people who

like the IMN do not see anything good about the Nigerian state and may therefore end

up in constant struggle with it for influence, supremacy, political and political

relevance.

In an attempt to answer the questions as to what are the strategies of the IMN and why

the strategies are resorted to as well as how they affect the Nigerian national security,

the Mut’ah Marriage as an aspect of Framing Process grand strategy has been

identified as a strategy of the IMN, rationale behind it is that it has been so far for the

IMN an effective strategy for resource mobilization, expansion and coverage all of

which translates into greater resilience due to massive influx of young people that join

the movement on daily basis. It does not pose direct threat to the Nigerian national

security, but tends to be a promise for long term security threat to Nigeria because of

the social problems it is likely to cause in the polity.

5.7 Summary of findings

In relation to question one of the research, the IMN uses fodiyyah schools, narrative

as politics of signification, Usbu’ul Wahda, public processions and Mut’ah as sources

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of framing process Strategy. Pertaining to question two of the research, all of these

strategies have been effective sources of resilience for the IMN in the Nigerian

political landscape especially that they are all born as IMN’s initiatives from its

knowledge of the political environment.

To meet the third question of the study, the implication of these strategies to the

Nigerian national security is that Fodiyyah Philosophy and Mut’ah Marriage hold long

term threat, Narratives as politics of signification short and long term, unity week

(Usbu’ul Wahda) indirect and public procession hold short term security threat to the

Nigerian national security.

Framing process
strategies

Fodiyyah philosophy
Mut’ah marriage Long-Term threat

Narratives Short & Long term threat

National Security

Unity week Indirect threat

Public procession Short-term term

Figure 5.1 Framing process strategies implications on National security

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 CHAPTER SIX
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is a continued presentation and analysis of data which was collected as

response to the three questions of the study.

The mobilizing Structure strategy is essentially when a rational actor/competitor uses

existing structures of a competitive political environment to his advantage. Existing

structures can be political systems, institutions, actors, space, ideas etc. The IMN has

and is still using this strategy especially by exploring contacts, friendships, solidarity

and links with other groups to forge solidarity relationships or form blocks of anti-state

struggle. This mega strategy has given the IMN the opportunity for external support

and linkages, and to come out of isolation thereby achieving greater resilience in its

struggle against the Nigerian state and yet other competing existentialities.

The chapter comprise of four different strategy themes of the IMN. These are

Iran/Hezbollah Influence; Intergroup (Victimhood) Solidarity; International Groups

and Organizations; Corporate Registration: Ancillary Organs as IMN and; Paradigm

Shift; From Islamism to Realpolitik. While each of these strategy theme is analysed

alongside its implication on the Nigerian national security within the framework of

PPT, SAFs and ST, the analysis process is characterised by the convergence of data

from In-depth Interview, FGD and Document Review sources.

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6.2 Iran/Hezbollah Influence

Vertovec, (2009) believes that:

Something like a transnational public sphere has certainly rendered

any strictly bounded sense of community or locality obsolete. At the
same time, it has enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and
identity that do not rest on an appropriation of space where
contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount.

According to Karmon, (2007), by exporting its model of Islam and of a political

regime, Iran aspires to strengthen its hold in the main theatres within the Arab world

and yet other lesser theatres among the Shiites of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and radical

Islamic movements in Africa and Central Asia and to re-incorporate it into a modern

Iranian Empire. The linkage between the acceptance of the Iranian ideology and

becoming an Iranian satrap is the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. The acceptance of this

principle entails the acceptance of the temporal leadership of the Supreme Leader of

the Islamic Revolution – the Leader of Iran. Shmuel Bar, (2009)

Despite provisions of the Westphalia treaty of 1648 which gives states their sovereign

rights as well the UN’s resolution on non-interference, which prohibits meddling into

the affairs of other countries, the phenomenon of foreign interventions through

different kinds of external influences is even more rampant in our contemporary

international interrelationships. More so, the proliferation of transnational affairs has

made this phenomenon to become even more exacerbated thereby opening new vista

of relationships and influences and proxyships-Iran/Hezbollah, Saudi

Arabia/Hamas/Al-Qaeda, U.S/Al-Qaeda/Human right groups, etc. (Alao, 2009),

In Nigeria to be precise, the intimate relationship between the Iranian Islamic Regime

and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. Gent, (2003) would

249
view the influence of IRI on the IMN from the stand view of power politics; which

inclined to the idea of subjecting an influence to the power and influence seeking tussle

between two rival powers. For him the exacerbation of rivalry between these

competing powers pushes them to search for proxies beyond their confines in order for

them to spread their tentacles either for the purpose of outcompeting one another or

countering one another’s influence and power. This sort of containment endeavour can

be likened to the sectarian proxy war that is currently reigning in Nigeria between the

Iran-led Shi’a block and the Saudi-led Sunni block.

Before the Iranian revolution, Iran use to be a bastion of peace and stability. But after

the revolution Iran Became a country that sought to use every form of conflict to its

advantage. It has built over the years, proxy armies including Hezbollah in Lebanon

and affiliates in Syria and Iraq and cells all over the region. Brett, (2016). It has backed

the Houthi rebels in Yemen that are undermining the legitimate government of Yemen

and the security of the people of Yemen. All this happen under its commitment to the

doctrine of Vilayet e Faqih. This doctrine goes beyond the borders of Iran. It goes

contrary to international laws and conventional doctrines. It considers people who

happen to be of the Shi’a sect as automatic subjects of the supreme leader rather proud

citizens of their respective countries, all in its bid to become a regional power

Many scholars and security experts are of the belief that though Iran is an Islamic

republic whose domestic and foreign policy are being considered as driven by religious

ideology, the real guiding principles of Iran however is Realpolitik. Religion whenever

used by Iran is just a disguise tool to achieve foreign policy interest. Hezbollah for

example which is Iran’s proxy for Iran’s regional and extra-regional strategic interests,

is a good case in point. An even more revealing case was when in the early 1990s Iran

250
tactically sidelined regional and even sectarian solidarity to support Christian Armenia

against its fellow Azrabejanian Shi’ite Muslims during the Nagorno Karbala war.

Similarly, Iran’s refusal to object its foremost foes’ aim (the US) of toppling the

Taliban Islamist regime is another proof to show that Iran mostly uses religion as a

tool to disguise her Realpolitik interest all over the world.

On the 14th of December 2015, a statement was issued from the Iranian supreme leader

Ayatollah Khameini, through the deputy leader’s Head of Supreme Office for

International Affairs said that: Nigerian Government is responsible for the safety of

prominent Nigerian Shi’a leader Shiekh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. Regrettably, in recent

days we see a suspicious episode taking place in Nigeria and the Regime is likely to

be clandestinely involved. Iran’s statement further warned that the violence between

the military and followers of the Shi’a Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) is

unacceptable!!

During the arrest and detention of the IMN leader sheikh Ibrahim
Elzakzaky following the groups clash with IMN on December 12-14,
2015, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah Sheikh Hassan
Nasrallah made provocative statements while Iranian leader and its
spiritual leader Ayatollah Khameini both issued press statements
through the Iranian ambassador to Nigeria by threatening to
intervene directly if the Nigerian government does not release the
IMN leader. (Interview with D2)

By exporting its model of Islam and of a political regime, Iran aspires to strengthen its

hold in the main theatres within the Arab world and yet other lesser theatres among

the Shiites of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and radical Islamic movements in Africa and

Central Asia and to re-incorporate it into a modern Iranian Empire. Ely, (2012). The

linkage between the acceptance of the Iranian ideology and becoming an Iranian satrap

is the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. The acceptance of this principle entails the

251
acceptance of the temporal leadership of the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Islamic

Republic (IIR)

There are a number of literature, traces of incidences and activities that combine to

serve as pieces of evidences of communication and influence of the IIR with the IMN.

These reasons are what equipped different observers and analysts to on the one hand

conclude that the IMN is being influenced by the IIR and on the other taking advantage

of advance its own interests and motives. As at the time when the leader of the IMN

Shiekh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky was released from prison, his house in the hinterland of

Zaria city was already confiscated by the Abacha regime and was prohibited from

staying in the city, therefore he had nowhere to go. It was then that the house at

Gyallesu quarters in the Kongo area of Zaria and the Shi’ite Centre at along Sokoto

Road Sabon Gari Local Government where purchased by a cooperation of the Iranian

embassy and the Shi’ite Lebanese businessmen of Kano undercover and handed over

to him. The Adoption of Iranian Islamic Revolution’s approach as a model for political

influence (Vilayet Faqih), has coupled with the Iranian Republics Mission and claim

of the export of the revolution. The IMN as admitted by some interview response and

certain literature, is a faction of Shi’a sect in Nigeria, this (as noted also in the history

of IMN in the historical chapter), is what is responsible for the IMN’s adoption of the

many aspects of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and Regime founded by Ayatollah

Khomeini. Ideology, allegiance, nature of political activism, motive of the revolution,

strategies of expansion and adaptation etc.

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 For quite a very long time, the IMN became popular with
confrontation with its immediate community and Sunni Sect by
engaging in provocative acts and activities such as forceful taking
over of mosques owned by the non-Shi’a Muslims. The radical
political and ideological stance of the Iranian Shiite politics which
the IMN leadership is answerable to, is largely connected to such
confrontational character of the IMN. Hamming, (2014) and
McAnenny (2014)

Doukhan, (2016), Winds of war in Nigeria and the ‘tropical Shi’ism zone who

corroborates with Modell, (2015) Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere:

Realities and Recommendations, Hassan (2015), An Introduction to Islamic

Movements and Modes of Thought in Nigeria, McAnenny (2014), Iran in Africa: A

Tutorial Overview of Iran’s Strategic Influence In Africa, Hamming, (2014), Diffusion

of Islamic Discourse: Saudi and Iranian Influence in Lagos and Cape town, Zenn,

(2013) The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria, Ostien,

(2012) A survey of the Muslims of Nigeria’s North Central geo-political zone, Ely,

(2012) The Iran/Hezbollah Strategic and Terrorist Threat to Africa, Alao, (2009)

Islamic Radicalization and Violence in Nigeria. Karmon, (2007), Iran’s Role in the

Radicalization of the Sunni-Shia Divide, believed that the IMN is deeply involved with

the IIR and Hezbollah as IIR’s proxy.

Obaji (2015) for example claimed that:

The IMN also operates an official English language website, with

similar versions in the Hausa language and Arabic. Issues such as
Shia perspectives of Sunni Islam, radicalism, terrorism, nationalism,
and secularism, as well as the discourses of Khomeini and the current
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, are regularly presented on the
website.

…similarly, organized Hezbollah networks operate elsewhere

around the world, including in Africa. While the precise numbers are
unknown, Hezbollah raises significant funds within the Lebanese
diasporas communities in Africa

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Despite the fact that the IMN has, through its leader, Shiekh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky

severally denied being funded from Tehran, there is record showing that many of the

group’s members including the leader himself trained in Iran. However, all sources

exhausted in the course of this study could not prove any evidence of money exchange

either by hand or through bank account except that they use light weapons (see

Appendix H7) coupled with the fact that there are a number of evidences of Indirect

funding through businesses, Lebanese Merchants’ support etc. Yes, it is possible to

say that it is a normal thing for people to go abroad and train, but the regularity,

intimacy and level and magnitude of communication between the IIR and the IMN

what many would not assume to be ordinary or even normal.A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2,

Isa Lawal Ikara and E1 and E2’s submission, for example coincided with the literature

above on the claim that Lebanese diasporas who operate in West Africa are involved

in all sorts of unregulated economic activities which extends to such criminal dealings

like arms, money laundering, drug trafficking, conflict diamond trading etc. through

these means the Lebanese are suspected to raise huge funds for Hezbollah’s secret and

intelligence operations in the interest of IIR. A shipload of Arms across the Nigerian

waters was once traced to Elzakzaky’s disciple-one Mallam Jega (though they later

fell out with Elzakzaky).

There is no tangible evidence to present regarding IMN’s being

funded directly by external bodies or Iran in particular, but we
suspect that they are being funded indirectly by best Iran and
Hezbollah through educational scholarships and training of Hurras.
(Interview with C2)

Similarly, on May 30, 2013 for example, the government of Nigeria in the Northern

city of Kano seized from Hezbollah cell piles of explosives and ammunitions.

Therefore, the Hezbollah is serving as IIR’s mighty proxy power and Shi’a ideological

expansion agent throughout Shiite communities in the West African sub-region and in

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Northern Nigeria in particular. According to some respondents, there are many

Hezbollah close associates or even operatives who disguise themselves as

businessmen but as a cover for both Hezbollah fundraising activities thereby serving

as mediators of both information and funding between the Hezbollah and the IMN

group in Nigeria.

The nature of these funding cut across all financial activities is ranging from,

mortgage, Import and Export, Bureau de Change, small scale financing, provision of

financial support, economic opportunities, subsidies and as well as serving as avenue

for employment to the IMN-Shi’as in Nigeria. All interview respondents except G1

and Isa Lawal Ikara have alluded to the fact that all these forms of infiltrations in the

IMN do help in further shaping the movement to become more resilient. This is in

addition to the tracking of direct communications and correspondences (in times of

crises) between the IMN leader and the Iranian leadership and agents by the Nigerian

DSS (Interview with A1 and A2, confirmed B2 not in exact words though). In the same

vein, Obaji (2015) wrote that:

Not surprisingly, Iranian officials were the first outside Nigeria to react. The country’s

foreign ministry called the violence “unacceptable,” the official IRNA news agency

reported, and officials summoned the Nigerian chargé d’affaires in Tehran to protest

against the deadly clashes. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also called his Nigerian

counterpart, Muhammadu Buhari, to say that he expects the Nigerian government to

compensate the families of the dead and injured. (see Appendix H13)

The popular view according to the interview responses and supporting literature in this

study, the IMN exploits its relationship and support of IIR and its Hezbollah proxy a

catalyst for home advantage thereby deterring its challengers and state repression.

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Though the Nigerian state did not out rightly succumb, but the issuing of warning and

subsequent statements by the IIR during the NA-IMN clash (quoted above), as well as

the series of direct involvements of the IIR into the IMN clearly puts the IMN at an

advantaged position against the competitive Nigerian environment in which it lives

and sends a message across showing that the IMN has the IIRs backing in case the

need arises. (we have seen in the literature review section of this study; similar cases

of other groups as being supported by other states (see also Appendix H6)).

Using the lenses of chess game strategy where Centre control of the middle ground of

the battlefield (political/competitive environment in the case of Nigeria), is dominated

by the Pawn players in order to have control of the four central (super) squares of d4,

d5 and e4, e5 and as well monitor movements surrounding the centre for the purpose

shielding and easy attacks. What this means in practical terms is that the IMN is using

the Iran/ Hezbollah influence to shield itself as well as to deter the Nigerian state and

other competing groups from attacking the IMN. The IMN is staying far away from

the battlefield while external influences engaging the centre on its behalf.

Therefore, the IIR influence in the IMN is a strategy which emboldens IMN in its

competition and rivalry with the Saudi supported Sunni-Izalah sect in Nigeria. The

objective of the strategy is resilience, the resource of the strategy is Iran and

Hezbollah, and the outcome is Iran and Hezbollah’s greater support and cooperation.

On the other hand, according to A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, D1, D2, E1 and E2, the

communications between the IMN leadership and the IIR according to them were not

just personal or religious but issues that have diplomatic and security implications.

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In fact, as reply an article titled: External Dynamics of Zaria Incident I and II, the IMN

responded by accusing the writer of unfair accusation of inviting the IIR to interfere

into the internal affairs of the Nigerian state, saying that why did anybody not seem to

see the Saudi regime as an intruder when it supported and further urged the Nigerian

president to deal with the IMN? (see Appendix K).

However, as much as it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the IMN and its leader

has great connections and is largely influenced by Iran and to some extent Hezbollah,

it is equally doubtful if the group has any secret dealings of weapons or stockpiling

apart from guns which they surely acquire and other light weapons (as stated

elsewhere), it may not be swallowed hook-line and sinker considering the fact that

only four respondents alongside the literatures quoted above are of the opinion that the

IMN is stockpiling arms in connection with Iran and its proxy Hezbollah.

But we can as well ask the question that how come all these underground and covert

activities were not be confirmed by both open and secret security agents of Nigeria

interviewed during this study? Yes, they too have anyway admitted that both

incidences reported here, of interception of arms on Nigerian waters in Lagos and the

seizure of Hezbollah cells of explosives and ammunitions in Kano have happened, but

no one could confirm that these arms, explosives and ammunitions have any

connection with the Shi’a group called Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) lead by

Shiekh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky.

Actually, there is still inability to verify the claim that the IMN is
heavily armed- this is because the Nigerian Army cordon search in
the Husainiyyah Baqiyyatullah- headquarters of the IMN and the
leaders house at Gyallesu Zaria, revealed that only such light
weapons as few guns, catapults, bows and arrow and sticks were
found. (Interview with E1)

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For these reasons we can conclude that the IMN is certainly being influenced by the

IIR and its Hezbollah proxy in terms of education, Shi’a ideology, revolutionary,

physical and intellectual training and support. Therefore, it is obvious that intervening

and meddling in the affairs of Nigeria by the IIR and its Hezbollah proxy group has

serious security implications. First, it makes the citizens of Nigeria vulnerable to alien

ideologies that are at par with their national interest; the transnational transactions and

communications and exchanges that freely take place between the three is poses direct

threat to the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. This is a clear violation of the provisions

of the UN Non-intervention principles which assumes basically for the fact that the

gravity of the international situation and the increasing threat to universal peace due

to armed intervention and other direct or indirect forms of interference threatening the

sovereign personality and the political independence of States.” UNGR (1960:1)

In addition, and most importantly, the IMN seen clearly as being supported if not

instigated in its activities in Nigeria by the IIR irrespective of the implications of such

actions. Anyone would support the fact that during the 2014 and 2015 NA-IMN clash,

the IMN members have no doubt been extra-judicially killed, but at the same time the

IIR was being totally supportive of IMN on at a time when the IMN was unanimously

accused of triggering the clash through its illegal and civil disobedient actions and

activities in Nigeria.

Such kinds of actions and response identified and confirmed above between the IIR

and the IMN no doubt leaves much to be desired for the Nigerian state in terms of the

security of lives of its IMN and non-IMN citizens; regime; international and the

general security of the Nigerian state as a whole-because securitization theory sees

such relationship as existential threat and therefore, unhealthy to the Nigerian national

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security. Although the Iranian/Hezbollah influence is an advantageous strategy to the

IMN because it emboldens the IMN to be more resilient against the Nigerian state or

other of its contenders, such kinds of actions and responses no doubt leaves much to

be desired for the Nigerian state in terms of the security of lives of its IMN and non-

IMN citizens; regime; international and the general security of the Nigerian state as a

whole.

To answer question one therefore is to say that Iran/Hezbollah is a strategy used by

IMN. To answer question two is to say that the strategy is used by IMN to acquire

more power and political relevance and support for competitive advantage and greater

political influence and relevance both at the global stage and in Nigerian political space

all of which mean greater resilience, and to answer the third question of the research,

is to say that this strategy inflicts direct threat to the Nigerian national security by

virtue of the meddling, intrusion and sovereignty undermine of Nigeria by external

Iran and Lebanon and by the group Hezbollah.

6.3 Inter-Group (Victimhood) Solidarity

The IMN on different occasions has paid solidarity visits and homage to other dissent

and anti-state social movement & domestic groups including Christian Association

Nigeria (CAN), Biafra movement etc. On different occasions, especially in post-

conflict period and festive periods, the IMN is known for crossing its traditional

Islamic boundaries to extend its magnanimity to these kind of groups.

Initially, in fact when the IMN faction broke away from other Sunni factions, with

whom the journey was started together, the IMN then quickly bean to establish

friendship the Tijjaniyyah and Qadiriyyah Sufi orders (See JCI, 2015) that are

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themselves being criticized by the same Sunni Muslims. This happened to the extent

that the IMN which does not own its mosques utilizes the Tijjaniyyah and Qadiriyyah

mosques for their daily prayers although this did not last very long and they started

fighting to the extent that sometimes lives were lost. So the IMN either on festive

periods or during mourning or condolences do pay visits to different groups including

joining Christians for solidarity service in their churches. Some the different headlines

below can confirm such: Zuru, (2015) The Purpose of our Visit to your Congregation

on this Christmas Day; Rajab, (2015) Youths of the Islamic Movement take peace

message to churches in Zaria; Gashua, (2016) Members of IMN Celebrated Christmas

with Christians in Kaduna; Gashua, (2017) Members of the IMN rejoice with the

Christians in Jos as they celebrate New Year 2017 (See also Appendix H).

As a form of soliciting the sympathy of other groups and organizations, such

sympathies happen in different ways and manner. In many instances, the IMN despite

being Islamic organizations have paid solidarity visits to churches Christian

Association of Nigeria (CAN). Also because of the magnanimity that the IMN shows

to such struggles as the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB) in

times of peace, the MOSSOB has in different occasions held solidarity rallies either

demanding for the release of the detained IMN leader and members or for giving

justice to the group. For A1, A2, B1, B2, and E2, all the groups that engage solidarity

with the IMN are share anti-state opinion and therefore the solidarity became

reciprocal between them. It is a simple case of what might be interpreted as

Victimhood Solidarity.

During interview with A2 he showed a video clip where some members of the IMN

paid a Christmas celebration visit to Fatima Cathedral Church in Jos North Local

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Government of Plateau state. After they (IMN members) sang and chanted happy

birthday to you Yesu (meaning Jesus) together with the Christian church members,

then the entourage leader of the IMN read their message thus:

Our leader Mal. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky is the one who taught us this
kind of magnanimity to show kindness and love to other fellow
human beings irrespective of their religious inclination. Regardless
of anything we all are fellow humans; at the minimum therefore, our
interaction should be such that we celebrate and or mourn together.
So today 25th of December 2016, being your Christmas celebration
day, we hereby come to celebrate together with you. So, we sincerely
say happy birthday to you people.

In fact, we recall that when our members were brutally killed by the Nigerian Army in

Zaria, Reverend Father Marafa who is here, followed our individual houses to condone

with us. This shows that you people are humans and you believe in humanity.

However, despite the fact that our leader Mal. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky is still in detention,

he nevertheless instructed us to come and celebrate with you the birth of our beloved

Jesus Christ.

Given its original conservative Islamic ideology, IMN’s embracement of non-Islamic

groups may seem to be a serious contradiction, (though according to El-Zakzaky Islam

is a religion of peace and tolerance), but it should however be understood from the

angle of IMN’s strategy that is to say apart therefore from the solidarity exchange

between the IMN and these groups, the IMN uses such strategy to expand its sphere

of influence and popularity thereby checkmating the influence of its Sunni rival in

Nigeria. This strategy conforms to mobilizing structure element of the PPT because

the IMN draws advantage from certain elements of the political system in order to

advance its own interest. This also has been the case with the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood which makes use of other Salafiyyah groups in the Egyptian society to

mobilise in its interest (as we have seen in the literature review section in chapter one).

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This strategy as Fligstein, & McAdam (2011) would argue that the IMN’s knowledge

about field actors in terms of incumbent-challenger power relationship, i.e. the

knowledge about who their friends, their enemies, and their competitors gives them

the ability to analyse who occupies those roles in the field and with what degree of

influence and advantage. This is the reason why the IMN has been able mobilise other

groups in line with victimhood so that it increases its competitive advantage as well as

strength.

By the Christmas message alone the IMN is sure of securing the Christians in its favour

and solidarity whenever necessary. This is an effective strategy which the IMN uses

to gain the solidarity and instigate other groups against the Nigerian state thereby

becoming more and more resilient.

In terms of the security implication of the IMN’s inter-group solidarity, the 1999

constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, these groups have the right

to intermingle, but the questions remain what is the security concern? C1, C2, D1 and

D2 are for example of the expert opinion that these groups have the freedom to

associate, but their freedom stops where they share the opinion to disobey the rules

and regulations as well as laws of the Nigerian federal republic. This they say is

because in most cases, they share opinions on civil disobedience and law breaking.

This said, we can discern that it is not as if these groups directly discuss and share

opinions that undermine national security, but, whenever any one of them goes against

the interest of the Nigerian state or when the IMN goes into physical clash with

Nigerian Army, these groups automatically support the IMN against the state

irrespective of the legality or legitimacy of the action of the IMN. As effective and

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beneficial as this strategy is to the IMN, it can be said that it has long term implication

for national security.

To answer the three research questions, the IMN uses Intergroup (Victimhood)

Solidarity as a source of strategy. Through this strategy, the IMN has become more

resilient because its ability to identify with other groups makes it to be supported

against its completion with Nigerian state. This strategy does not however pose direct

threat to the Nigerian national security but nevertheless has tendency for long term

security threat as an integral part of the IMN.

6.4 International Groups and Organizations

In many instances, International Organizations such as International Islamic Human

Rights Commission (IHRC), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International (AI), etc,

and such other Shi’a Islamist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, etc share with the

IMN solidarity, sympathy and support especially in times of crises for the IMN.

The IHRC has in different circumstances written reports and filed cases against the

Nigerian state in favour of the IMN in the International Court of Justice (See IHRC

2014). See also Amnesty International’s Report titled: Nigeria–Unearthing the Truth:

Unlawful Killings and Mass Cover-Up in Zaria. All these provide the understanding

that the IMN has great deal of understanding, relationship hence support of

International Organizations and groups. Similarly, like C1, C2, D1, D2, E1, E2, would

put, the IMN uses different symbolic actions such as inviting other groups, to Free El-

Zakzaky rallies, human rights campaigns, etc as a collective bull work against the

Nigerian state whenever the IMN is in trouble.

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This perspective tallies with what Keck, & Sikkink, (1998); (1999); (2004) and

subsequently Norman, (2017), Graddy-Lovelace, (2017), Cogburn, (2017) because of

the transnational dimension of the interconnectedness and influence between domestic

and foreign civil groups and societies through social and other media platforms. In

other similar works, Riker, & Sikkink, K. (2002) (2002) and Rodrigues, (2003) for

example, provide supplementary arguments by showing how activists in transnational

advocacy networks and social and political movements seek to make demands and

claims of right on behalf of other organizations or movements across boundaries.

Similarly, Jarzabkowski, & Fenton, (2006) similarly draws attention to the normally

ignored implications and consequences of pluralism in relation to strategizing practice

of organizations. This for Jarzabkowski, end up having serious consequences for the

goals and objectives of such organizations most especially for the fact that pluralism

in group study entail divergent issues that affect them both within and outside. This

very perspective can partly be likened to Political Process argument where concern

over political environment and transnational influence respectively influence the

goals, workings, processes, operations and outcome of the practices of groups or

organizations.

In the first place, the solidarity of these international groups and organizations is

interpreted as symbol of a just and legitimate cause and, therefore, the IMN has the

right to exercise its right within and without Nigeria. Unlike in the classical period,

factors of globalization and democracy in the contemporary period have aided and

emboldened strategies of the IMN to take advantage of democratic rights & privileges

to become more internationalized than ever before thereby boosting its survival,

success and resilience in its struggle for political change in Nigeria.

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The friction and struggle between Non-State actors and nation states has taken renewed

dimensions in the age of globalization leading even many times to the network,

solidarity and bandwagoning of the non-state actors against states and their regimes.

(Koahene & Sikkink) What it means here is that the IMN’s successful utilization of

Mobilizing Structure macro strategy gives it additional competitive advantage hence

resilience in the Nigerian political terrain.

Eight interview respondents (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, D1, and D2), Two FGDs (I 2

and 3) and, Documents obtained from Nigerian Security apparatus have attested to the

grave national security threat associated with the IMN’s foreign organization’s support

strategy. B2 specifically opined that:

On several occasions the IMN has invited especially AI and HRW to

write reports that unjustifiably indict the Nigerian state and, in many
instances, tarnish her image in the international system without any
remorse or respect to Nigeria’s integrity and sovereignty. Don’t
forget! The basis for such positions have been used to sanction or
wage war against countries. The false cases of Iraq, Libya etc are
still fresh in our minds. This is how dangerous and harm such kind
of relations could cause a country and its peoples. (Interview with
B2)

Well, as valid as the above argument can be, the point does not stop at such inputs, this

is because Isa Lawan Ikara, F2 and I1 have counterviews on that. One of the contenders

to the above position clearly puts that:

The IMN in Nigeria has been reduced to a vulnerable group as our

members are being killed and arrested almost on daily basis without
even the opportunity for fair hearing or justice. Many influential
groups within the state have connived with the state ensure our
annihilation. Our friendship with any group whether domestic or
international is always on the basis of justice and fairness. If it were
you, what will you resort to in your own indigenous country where
you are hated and killed for speaking the truth and seeking justice?
(Interview with Isa Lawan Ikara)

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It is quite interesting to understand that among all the views presented there isn’t any

that denies the fact of contact and friendship of the IMN with international

organizations. But from the response by Isa Lawan Ikara, it can be seen that the IMN

is conscious of its relationship and periodic invitation of foreign groups whenever it

has problem or is in trouble in Nigeria. It is not a topic for this research however, to

ascertain whether it is just or fair for the IMN to do that, but it is an objective of the

study to assess the nature of implication of such relations to the Nigerian national

security.

As argued above therefore, especially using securitization theory, it is arguable that

the meddling into the affairs and the permeation of the security of the Nigerian state

as a result of IMN’s invitation or attraction, is an existential threat. This is because it

makes the integrity of the Nigerian state questionable as argued by B2 above, and it

poses potential danger of external aggression against the security interest of Nigerians

and the Nigerian state regime as well.

So to answer Question one of the research, the IMN uses International groups and

organizations as strategy resilience.

To answer question two is to say that this strategy helps the IMN securing the support

of international organizations against the position of the Nigerian state in its

competition with the IMN. Such international support means more resources, more

network, greater advantage-hence greater resilience in its competition with the

Nigerian state and yet other competing groups within the polity.

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Regarding the third question on security implication, the IMN through this strategy, as

a result of meddling in its affairs of the Nigerian state by external actors, the Nigerian

national security and sovereignty is being directly undermined and threatened.

6.5 Corporate Registration: Ancillary organs as IMN

The IMN is an informal organisation which does not have registration with the

Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission as a body, but the movement has succeeded

in registering some of its specialized organs stated above i.e., ISMA Medical, Al-

Mizan Newspaper, Dab’i Publications etc.

It can be understood, therefore, that for the IMN to have registered its organs without

registering the mother body-the IMN, from the inset, it must have done so against any

impeding force that may come to crush the movement. In more real terms here, we can

see that after the December 2015 incidence between the Nigerian Army and the IMN,

the Kaduna state government has passed a law banning the IMN from operation in

Kaduna state. In line with this, the Kaduna state government has provided that the IMN

is a persona non-grata especially that it is not registered with the CAC. This position

of IMN’s non-registration with the CAC has also been unanimously confirmed during

interview by all the sources of this study including documents without a single

reservation.

Though, sources of the IMN through Isa Lawal Ikara has said the IMN leader El-

Zakzaky, has severally argued that any genuine religious movement does not need to

be registered before it can be considered legitimate, that Islamic Movement is a

religious affair which requires only faith as precondition for membership. They also

further argued that that is why they name the IMN as Movement in Nigeria not

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Movement of Nigeria; it means it is an independent movement taking place inside

Nigeria but not belonging to Nigeria.

One of the IMN respondents made this point categorical when he said that:

The Nigerian government is so daft that it doesn’t know the

difference between a formal organization and a movement; we
(referring to the IMN) are Harakah. And when you say Harakah in
Arabic language, it means Movement in the direction of Islamic
development. Therefore, does anyone who propagates Islam need
someone to register him? They keep spreading that we are not
registered, after all the fora under our movement are duly registered
with the so called Corporate Affairs Commission. They think we are
fools… (interview with Isa Lawan Ikara)

On the other hand, one respondent puts that:

The IMN has deliberately refused to register with the Nigerian

Corporate Affairs Commission as a legal entity that can sue and be
sued. But its ancillary organs are registered. (Interview with A2)

Critically speaking, it can be asked that if an Islamic movement does not need to

register with the CAC of its country of origin, then why is it that its ancillary organs

are registered? Aren’t those organs part of the Islamic agenda? Through these few

critical questions alone, and looking at the two positions, it is discernible that the issue

that IMN’s non- registration with CAC is not contested by either of the respondents,

but the bone of contention is the motive of the non-registration. Therefore, using the

Rationalist Choice Model, it will be understood that IMN’s non registration is not by

accident, rather it is a deliberate conscious and rational action taken to imply

deliberate calculative strategies by virtue of the connectedness between the groups

goals and the expected outcome. Scott, (2000). Be that as it may, IMN’s registration

of its organs means that it’s a conscious strategy; it means that the IMN still operates

through its sub-structures, continues to conduct its activities informally, generate more

human and capital resources while unnoticed, and maintains its membership without

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any room to attract any more sanction. This strategy is very important to the IMN

because it makes the IMN to be adaptable to sudden systemic shocks thereby

developing alternative strategies for resilience. All this also is within the macro

strategy framework of Mobilizing Structures element of PPT.

The success of these strategies of the IMN has traditionally been underestimated or

even undetected through the usual celebration of many of its rivals that the movement

has been crushed. This fact is parochial because it does not seem to understand that the

IMN is a rational actor in the competitive field of Nigerian politics which is conscious

of the possible action of its contender-the Nigerian state as well as the possible

consequences of the actions of the contender.

In terms of security, the ban of the movement by the Kaduna state government can be

interpreted from the angle of securitization theory as a securitizing move against a

detected existential threat. The treatment of the IMN as existential threat was

evidenced in the various submissions during the sittings of the JCI as posing serious

threats to the security of lives and properties primarily in the Northern part of Nigeria

and as well the group’s various clashes with security apparatuses of the Nigerian state.

In explicit terms, the IMN through some of its activities like public processions and

celebrations, vandalization of public properties during public activities, depriving

people from using public roads during its mass-public outings, outright violation of

traffic and road rules and indeed the actions of some of its members like the Hurras

stop-for-search, restricting people from movement around their leader’s house at

Gyallesu Zaria, display and threatening of the use of light arms and guns, attack on

rival communities, groups or individuals etc were found indeed threatening to the

immediate and even remote populace of Northern Nigeria (JCI 2016).

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All these in corroboration with sources of this research are sufficient and concrete

reasons to put that the securitization moves by the Kaduna state government which

largely manifested itself as ban of the IMN is reasonable, but strategy would have it

that it is not sufficient to provide the much desired security in Nigeria because the IMN

sub-groups which are registered with the CAC remain legitimate and can, therefore,

give the group the strength to bounce back in the long run. This Mobilizing Structures

strategy of the IMN gives it greater resilience with minimal security threat to the

Nigerian state.

This strategy as Akpuru Aja (1999), in Mbachu & Yesufu (2011) has outlined in his

seven (7) fundamental elements of Strategy is a form of Information control: IMN’s

ability to engage in timely and accurate control of information in the course of

strategizing equips the it with the necessary capacity and ability to take crucial

decisions in competitive situations.

Specifically, therefore, the answer to question one of this research is that, the IMN

uses Ancillary organs registration as a strategy resource.

To answer the second question of the research, what this mean for the IMN is that its

ability to dissolve its corporate registration into its organs gives it immunity from being

banned or sued as single entity. This strategy has proved effective because even after

banning of the IMN movement in Kaduna state on the ground that it’s not registered

as IMN with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), all its ancillary

organs which have been duly registered with CAC in their different respective names

other than IMN have continued to legally operate as indirect IMN outposts.

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In response to question three, this strategy though, may have long term effect on the

Nigerian national security, does not pose direct threat to it.

6.6 Paradigm Shift: From Islamism to Realpolitik

Some Islamist movements still choose to use rejectionism (through violence or

withdrawal) as a strategy of opposition, but increasingly others seek to affect change

from within existing political systems. According to Balfour and Pioppi (2008), the

“reformist-revolutionary divide could also be misleading in an authoritarian context

and is likely to change over time within the same movement”

As stated in the historical section of this study the ultimate aim of the IMN’s struggle

in Nigeria, the IMN’s principle, according to El-Zakzaky, is systemic revolution from

secular to Islamic political system. According to Sanusi (2001), “the theory (of Qutb)

defined the character of what has come to be known as the Muslim brothers led by

Ibrahim Zakzaky, a group whose declared goal is the establishment of an Islamic state

in Nigeria which can only be on the ashes of jahiliyya”( Sanusi, 2001).

The IMN during the hey days of its Islam Only (IO) has constantly opposed the secular

state, rejected the constitution, abandoned the state schooling system, shunned civil

employment, and confronted the security agents (Ibrahim, 2015). This is evident as in

table 4.4 below; the IO period as it then was, was characterized by the total rejection

of the Nigerian secular state and what it stands for without any form of compromise.

As a stage in the historical evolution of the IMN, the IO period was one that

experienced turbulence. It was during the IO that the first split of the MSS struggle

took place between what is now Sunni and Shi’a- IMN, it was then that the now

IMN got formal and deep contacts with the Islamic Republic of Iran and eventually

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became fully Shi’itised and adopted Shi’ism as its own ideology, it was also the period

which the now IMN pursued full Islamic course and sought revolution without option,

and yet it was the period when rivalry between the Sunni and the Shi’a faction of Islam

became intensified with each faction being supported and influenced by a foreign

master (Iran in the case of IO/IMN and Saudi Arabia in the case of the Sunni faction-

see literature review section and historical background on this).

But as time goes, certain factors such as the growing competition between the global

Shi’a and Sunni which has taken its toll beyond the Middle East into countries like

Nigeria, declining political influence of the IMN compared to its Sunni counterpart as

well as the realistic realization of the impossibility of Islamizing Nigeria, have

combined to make the IMN have a re-think and eventual paradigm shift from its earlier

Islamist ideology during the IO period to Realpolitik based on competition for political

influence, relevance and public space against its Sunni counterpart and even the

perceived oppression of the Nigerian state against it. In fact, this is however believed

by many scholars to be a reflection and manifestation of the Shi’a/Sunni vendetta

globally.

…what Khomeini has in mind is radical displacement of Sunni Islam

in a way which compels it to give way to Shiism. Such a distorted
image of Sunni Islam created by Shiite clerics enabled Shiites to feel
that, when they fight against Sunni Muslims, they are fighting form
light against darkness. (Interview with E1)

In any case Rubin (2013) on the other hand would argue that it is a form of Islamic

moderation in view for political inclusion in the Nigerian political system. But this

position would be countered by C2, D1, D2, and G1, and G2 admitted that many IMN

members have registered, acquired voter card and have voted in the 2015 general

elections in Nigeria. This also is a confession that the group has defied its earlier

272
position during the Islam Only period. A good example was the IMN’s rejection of

Sharia implementation in Nigeria despite the group’s insistence for an Islamic political

system during it IO period. This is clear evidence that the IMN group is distancing

itself because its major rival (the Sunni sect) was at the helm and centre of the Sharia

agitation around the year 2000. For them, the moderation comes as a result of the need

for attaining political influence and greater resilience in the midst of competition for

political space in Nigeria.

The competition and eventual confrontation between the IMN and the Sunni sect

became obvious; the relationship between the two groups became intense with each

side trying to maximize opportunities and benefits. In order therefore for the IMN to

checkmate the growing influence of the Sunni according to interview sources, this is

the reason why in spite of the continued clash and negative narratives of the IMN

against the Nigerian state the IMN is re-strategizing by gradually shifting its paradigm

and silently infiltrating all works of the Nigerian politics and society. This for many

has relationship with IMNs strategy of Confusing the Enemy through the Shi’a concept

of Taqiyyah, that is to say; while the IMN maintains open criticism and mobilization

of its members against the Nigerian state, it is believed that such is just a strategy to

divert the attention of onlookers, confuse the enemy, where as in the real sense its

members (as shown in the IMN period in the table) are noticed to be active in all

political and governmental aspects that will give it comparative advantage in the

Nigerian political space amidst competition.

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Table 6.1
Showing the Periodic Distribution of IMN’s Positions on Issues of National
Allegiance and Patriotism in Nigeria between the Span of Late 1970s/Early 1980s-
Date.
S/No. Indicators of National Muslim Islam Only- Islamic
Allegiance Students Post Funtua Movement of
Society (MSS) declaration Nigeria
Brotherhood (‘Yan (IMN)
Brothers)
Shiites

1. Elections No Issue No Yes

2. National Population Census N/A No Yes
3. Western Education Yes Partial Yes
4. Participation in Civil Service & No Issue No Yes
Politics
5. Loyalty to state, constitution & Yes No Relative
constituted authorities
6. Specialised Organs Registration No No Yes
7. National I.D. Card N/A No Yes
8. National Anthem No Issue No No
9. National Flag No Issue No No
10. Public Holidays/Celebrations* No Issue No No

Source: Author’s device from interviews and literature survey data.

Therefore, all these activities of the IMN which tend to attract the Nigerian states

security attention are nothing other than strategies of confusing the enemy by the

group. That is to say these activities are merely to catch the eye of the Nigeria state,

direct its attention, and engage it physically and through such other impressions as

anti-state movement while in the real sense members of the group are busy silently

infiltrating all spheres of the Nigeria government, economy and society until it gains

strange hold. A respondent stressed this point by opining that:

274
 …Another important principle of Shiism is Taqiyyah or
dissimulation. This is the stratagem that Shiites employ to disguise
or hide their true feelings, thoughts or intentions. They consider it
so integral to their faith so much so that they maintain that it
constitutes the ninth-tenth of the entire religion. (Interview with E1)

So, although the Taqiyyah has religious roots in Shi’ism, it can be said here that it has

influenced the political strategies of the IMN to engage in what may be called political

Taqiyyah i.e. hiding their political identity.

Notably also, the enduring tension between the IMN and the Sunni Islam in Nigeria

apart from it being ordinarily considered as anathema to mainstream Islam, has taken

a security dimension given the periodic clash between the two. Therefore, the IMN

whose sectarian ideology is Shi’a driven is viewed as a subversive attempt backed by

the IIR with the aim of changing the nature and character of the Nigerian people in

favour of Shi’ism.

We have seen in the literature review section, how Gulen movement does similar thing

in the state of Turkey and ever abroad though the only difference between IMN and

the Gulen movement is the intensity of the quiet penetration strategy of the Gulen

without having to out rightly engage the authorities for the purpose of confusing the

enemy.

There is often boast by the IMN especially its leaders of the group’s
infiltration into the Nigerian SSS and other security and public
service organs. (Interview with C2)

Similarly, the adage that friend of my enemy is my enemy of the IMN against the Sunni

Islamic sect is very much similar to the position of the Gulen movement against the

Refah party- the IMN which sees the Nigerian state as its enemy also place the Sunni

which is friendly with Nigerian state as its enemy too. The IMN in fact accuse the

Sunni as pitting it (IMN) against the Nigerian state. In accordance with the view of

275
A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, E1, E2 and I3, the IMN’s current silent infiltration is even

more dangerous to the Nigerian national security than its physical confrontation of the

Nigerian state apparatus as well as its other activities, this they say is because such

underground move is a sell out one which is tantamount to treasonable felony because

the security confidentialities, and national secrets are being shared with other

international actors like Iran which will at the long run certainly undermine national

security at the minimum or even lead to regime displacement. So the Paradigm Shift

strategy of the IMN is a silent resilience weapon but which poses serious regime threat

to Nigeria’s democracy.

This shows that IMN as a rational actor/competitor in the Nigerian political landscape,

is conscious and has analysed well its weaknesses and strengths as well as well as

opportunities and threats. Its thoughts and actions of paradigm-shift is evidently in line

with Akpuru Aja (1999), in Mbachu & Yesufu (2011) supposition of accurate and

effective timing as one of the seven (7) fundamental elements of strategy, and, putting

strategy into action as a process of strategic thought process. (See chapter three-

strategy toolbox).

A security respondent specifically opined that:

They had built a militant base of radicalized youths that enforced

their brutal occupation of the areas they chose; they were also
reported to have infiltrated government at its highest level. One
expert on their modus operandi even warned of how they posed
greater threat than Boko Haram insurgents. (Interview with A1)

All the above analysis therefore, answers the three research questions by finding that:

one, the IMN uses Paradigm-shift from Islamism to realpolitik as an aspect of

Mobilizing Structure strategy; two, the rationale behind such strategy is to outcompete

its challenges for survival and resilience in the Nigerian body polity and which has

276
proved effective for the IMN, and; three, such strategy has been effective for the IMN

but poses direct threat to the Nigerian national security.

On the research question what are the strategies used by IMN, here it is Paradigm Shift:

From Islamism to Realpolitik. On why the IMN resorts to such strategy, is to say that

the need for political influence, continued relevance and survival desire in the midst

of changing political environment vis-à-vis its Sunni rivals growing political influence

are what pushed the IMN to pursue such strategy. On the security implication of the

strategy, it poses direct threat to the Nigerian national security.

6.7 Summary of findings

In relation to question one of the research, the IMN through Mobilizing Structures;

uses the strategies of Iran/Hezbollah Influence, Intergroup Victimhood Solidarity,

International Organizations, Ancillary Organs and Paradigm Shift from Islamism to

Realpolitik.

Pertaining to question two of the research, these strategies have emboldened the IMN

to gain wider international connections, support and solidarity in the course of its

struggle in the competitive Nigerian political arena especially against its major

competitor-the Nigerian state.

To meet the third question of the study, the practice of these strategies by the IMN

have short and long term negative effects in terms of loss of lives and property, and,

external aggression and meddling respectively, both which leaves the narrow and

broad interest of the Nigerian national security and sovereignty with much to be

desired. Specifically, Iran/Hezbollah Influence, Intergroup solidarity, and

International organization strategies pose both long and short-term security threat to

277
the Nigerian state, Ancillary organs as IMN and Paradigm Shift strategies hold indirect

and long-term security to the Nigerian state respectively.

Mobilizing structures
strategies

Iran/Hezbollah influence
Intergroup solidarity Short & Long term threat
International organizations

Ancillary organs Indirect threat

National Security

Paradigm Shift Long-term term

Figure 6.1 Mobilizing structures strategies implications on National security

278
Table 6.2
Showing Grand Summary of Research Findings
Strategies Effective Not Effective Direct Security Threat Minimal/Indirect Security Threat
Political Opportunity Strategies
1 The Academic Forum, ✓ ✓
2 Martyrs Foundation, ✓ ✓
3 the Hurras, ✓ ✓
4 ISMA Medical Care Initiative, ✓ ✓
5 Resource Forum, ✓ ✓
6 Communications ✓ ✓
7 Sisters Forum ✓ ✓
Framing Process Strategies
8 Fodiyyah Schools ✓ ✓
9 Narrative ✓ ✓
10 Usbu’ul Wahda (Unity Week) ✓ ✓
11 Public Processions ✓ ✓
✓ ✓
12 Mut’ah ✓ ✓
Mobilizing Structures Strategies
13 Iran/Hezbollah ✓ ✓
14 Inter-group (Victimhood) Solidarity, ✓ ✓
15 International Groups and Organizations ✓ ✓
16 Corporate Registration: Ancillary Organs as IMN ✓ ✓
17 Paradigm Shift: From Islamism to Realpolitik ✓ ✓
Source: Authors compilation from survey data

279
 CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents conclusion and recommendations of the research. While the

conclusion part draws from the discussion chapters to significantly provide

implications of the research findings in relation to the objectives of the study, the

recommendations are put up as suggested remedies to the Nigerian state as well as

future research.

It used both primary and secondary sources of data and has adopted both Political

Process and Securitization Theories to explore that the IMN has basically uses three

types of strategies derivable from PPT which combine make the group resilient. These

are Political Opportunity, Framing Process, Mobilizing Structure and Confusing the

Enemy.

7.3 Conclusion

The study has identified and analysed the strategies of the Islamic Movement in

Nigeria and the implications of such to Nigerian national security.

Considering the objectives of the research and from the forgone discussion, it is

conclusive that through its activities, the IMN threaten Nigerian national security

through loss of lives and property, and, external aggression and meddling either as

short or long run, directly or indirectly as the case may be.

280
However, the IMN does so in a manner that a combination of the elements of Political

Opportunity, Framing Process and Mobilizing Structures strategies, translate for the

IMN into sources of resource mobilization vis-à-vis patronage, domestic and external

support and solidarity and wider popularity, political space and influence, as effective

resilience strategies.

Through Political Opportunity strategies (PO), which entail Academic Forum, Martyrs

Foundation, Hurras, ISMA Medical Care Initiative, Resource Forum,

Communications Forum and Sisters Forum, it means that the IMN takes advantage of

weaknesses of the Nigerian political system to engage in activities, programmes or

formulate group policies that in one way or the other attracts more followership to it,

serve as opportunity to gain more resources, or give it the opportunity to gain higher

ground or better resistance capacity in its struggle with either the Nigerian state or with

any other rival in the contentious Nigerian body polity. Therefore in any case, the PO

are soft power strategies which make the IMN to become more resilient but which end

up threatening the Nigerian national security because of their various level tendencies

and potentialities as the case may be with each, to cost the Nigerian lives, properties

and national sovereignty.

As against PO strategies which tend to heavily capitalize on existing weaknesses of a

political system, Framing Process strategies i.e., fodiyyah schools, narrative, Usbu’ul

Wahda, public processions and Mut’ah, are usually creations of the IMN which were

initiated purposely as means to withstand or get competitive advantage, adapt to the

dynamo-competitive Nigerian political environment, survive state suppression, and as

well gain greater legitimacy as a competitor. By way of these FP strategies, the IMN

281
poses (except in the case of public processions and unity week), long term or indirect

threat to the Nigerian national security.

As a third category of strategy, the IMN also utilizes Mobilizing Structures (MS)

strategies in terms of Iran/Hezbollah Influence; Intergroup (Victimhood) Solidarity;

International Groups and Organizations; Corporate Registration: Ancillary Organs as

IMN and; Paradigm Shift; From Islamism to Realpolitik. But unlike the PO and FP

strategies, the MS strategies are purposely utilized by the IMN through exploitation

and soughting of like-minded, sympathetic or solidarity avenues and opportunities. In

other cases like corporate registration and paradigm shift, the IMN used its knowledge

of the political system and as a rational actor to defy expectations of other competing

actors. The FP strategies has proved quite effective for the IMN in its desire to gain

advantage in the competitive Nigerian political arena. However, as much as these set

of strategies have proved effective, it constitute high level threat both directly and

indirectly and in the long run too, to the Nigerian national security.

Therefore, even though, the IMN grows more resilient with all its strategies, these

strategies would continue to pose direct, indirect, short and long term threats to the

Nigerian national security.

On a more general note therefore, rather than the popular conviction that the IMN

stockpiles arms in view of pushing of its political interest, the group rather makes use

of soft power mechanisms in order to gain political supremacy and advantage in the

competitive Nigerian political arena.

282
7.4 Recommendations

This study considering that the IMN mainly capitalizes on both the weaknesses of the

Nigerian state and its securitization moves to become resilient and in certain cases

threaten national security, recommends that the Nigerian state should identify those

weaknesses and improve on them so that its citizens will not see reason to engage with

groups whose activities threaten national security. Similarly, the Nigerian state when

faced with security challenge by either the IMN or any other group within the state

should resort to the use of force only as a last resort. This means that the Nigerian state

will have to employ soft strategies that will end up weakening and disarming these

problematic groups.

Similarly, since the IMN has shown evidence of picking a strategy which tallies and

gains sympathy and as well enjoys favour from the contemporary emerging trend of

Global Activism Consensus Network, then the Nigerian state should consider a

strategic calculus of matching, containing and check-mating the IMN through the use

of media and other education outlets in order not gradually lose its domestic base

support as well as the so called international recognition and legitimacy both which

are potential existential threats to national security, prosperity or even survival.

7.4.1 Future Research

The concept of strategy be explored further to integrate and take into cognisance the

dynamics and multi-dimensional character of different kinds of political groups that

tend not only to compete with or struggle with constituted national powers, but also

threaten national security. This dimension of group strategy if well explored will help

in early detection of group tendencies for the purpose of their effective handling and

management.

283
Effect of the struggle between IMN and the Nigerian state on Diplomatic relations

between Nigeria and domestic groups influencing countries especially the one between

Iran & IMN; Investigation into the nature of fluid threat in relation to national security

policies and programmes; Dynamics of foreign influence in domestic groups in the

context of national security.

284
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 APPENDICES

Introduction

The essence of this section is to present (outside the main body of the work), some
relevant background, additional or supplementary data, facts and information which
supports any aspect of the research-which for avoidance of disruption has not been
presented in the main text. The appendices to this dissertation include additional
information about the interviews, FGD, document and literature review and historical
background. This is because in all these aspects, new information has been added.
In order to make it simpler to navigate, the Appendix, as Best, & Kahn, (2016)
presuppose, is categorized and labelled A-Z based on heading. Each of the heading is
started on a new page, based on issue type. In addition, for ease of reference in the
main text, each item within a heading is numbered between 1-10.
In the following pages, there are four (4) categories of issues. Each sample is a
representation of its larger category which for certain reasons are not presentable in
their totality. Appendix A presents pre-field work items which include introductory
letter of data collection offered by the researcher’s university of study, sample of
interview questions, coding convention used, transcription steps followed, sample of
interview transcription and sample of document review summary sheet; Appendix B
comprises of sample of pictures from field work; Appendix C features documents on
IMN; Appendix D presents pictures of IMN on different issues.
Similarly, according to Creswell, & Creswell, (2017), …your appendix should follow
the same rules for formatting and organization used in the main text of your thesis,
therefore, the chosen format and order of the appendices presentation, is guided by the
logic of order of occurrence of the activities or items contained in each appendix
category. For example, data collection letter was first obtained before fieldwork
preliminaries and fieldwork proper, so also, fieldwork precedes transcription etc.

306
Appendix A: Interview Questions

1. What are the strategies used by IMN in the course of its struggle in Nigeria?

2. Why does the IMN strategize in Nigeria?

3. How do the strategies of the IMN affect the Nigerian national security?

307
Appendix B: Transcription Coding Conventions Used

Code Meaning

I Interviewer

P Participant
( )
Non-verbal and other information from the
field notes
Spelling
Spelling that resembled how it was spoken,
contracted forms or spelt out forms, e.g.,
Yeah, Hmmm, Uuuh, Ammm, Huuuh etc
Italics
Words that the respondent emphasise in
their talk
…
Pauses
[ ]
Overlapped/Interpretations
“ “
Words stressed by the speakers
---------
Indicates a section of the transcript has been
skipped

308
Appendix C: Sample of Interview Transcription

I: Asslamu alaikum warahmatullAh

P: Wa’alikumussalam warahmatullAh
I: I’m quiet glad meeting you after been hearing of you since my secondary school days
(smile)
P: (Laughter). Nice meeting you too.
I: Sir I will first of all like to learn a brief about your biography before we delve in to
the issues.
P Well… like you know I’m an indigene of Kaduna state but born and brought up in
Plateau state, I attended both my primary and secondary education in Plateau state
before later when my father was transferred back to Kaduna state, I then got admission
into the prestigious Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria where I obtained my first and
second degree in Political Science. I started working with the Nigerian Institute of
Management and later moved to the Ministry of Internal Affairs where I am still.
I: OK, thankyou sir for that. Sir, I would like to start by asking you straight away,
whether you believe that the IMN in Nigeria (given their endurance and seeming daily
increase in political influence), relies on certain strategies; if yes, what are these
strategies? and what do they mean to them?
P: Uuuuh…, actually, you need to know that the IMN is not like any other religious
group; But generally speaking the IMN you are talking about relies mostly on its
routine activities to strategize. it has different tendencies in it which give it multiple
advantages in terms what kind strategy it applies to what issue that faces it.
I: What specific activities are you specifically referring to here sir?
P: No, I mean you cannot easily see clearly that the IMN is posing to be undertaking a
particular strategy for you to note, but if you know them very well you know that such
routine activities of as their usual processions, various issue based fora, and their silent
infiltrations in government are deliberate strategies used by them in Nigeria.
I: Sir but of what benefits are these strategies to the group?
P: Of course you must know that comparing the infant stage of the IMN and today, you
know that the group has generally grown bolder and stronger to withstand greater
challenges and competition.
I: what in your view is the implication of such strategies to the Nigerian national
security?
P: Well, I feel that security agencies are in a better position to answer you on this.

309
Appendix D: Data Collection Letter

310
Appendix E: Field Work Pictures

1. Researcher at one of Interview Scenes

2. Researcher with an Interviewee

311
3. Researcher with another Interviewee

312
Appendix F: Sample of Reviewed Documents on IMN

S/N Newspaper Vol No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name . No(S) Address
1 Daily Trust 31 21 Tight Security In Zaria As Shiites Mourn Imam Hussain 16 Friday, January 4, Maryam Ahmadu
2013 Suka Kaduna
2 Daily Trust 7 35 The Iran Syndrome 35 Sunday March 3, Ahmadinejad Iran
2013
3 Daily Trust 31 70 Iran Battles Plaque Of Gaint Mutant Rats With Teams Or 31 Friday March 15, Reuters, Iran
Army Snipers 2013
4 Daily Trust 31 73 Sheikh Zakzaky Wants Varsity Name After Abdullahi 9 Wednesday March Garba Muhamad,
Fodio 20, 2013 Birnin Kebbi
5 Daily Trust 31 77 Islamic Group Urges Boko Haram To Release French 7 Tuesday, March Christiana T. Alabi,
Hostages 26, 2013. Kaduna
6 Daily Trust 31 78 Sheikh Zakzaky Condemns Killing Of Syrian Scholar 9 Wednesday March
27, 2013
7 Daily Trust 16 38 Islamic Group Donates Laptops To Students 13 Saturday March Aliyu M.
20, 2013 Hamagam, Minna
8 Daily Trust 16 38 Boston: Why Arabs Like Me Are Horrified 48 April 20, 2013 Nadi El-Awady
9 Daily Trust 31 90 Islamic Group Hold Conference On Moral Instruction 11 Friday April 12 Femi Akinbla
2013 Lagos
10 Daily Trust 31 81 Filling A Niche For Islamic Banking 19 Monday April, Kristano Ang.
2013
11 Daily Trust 31 83 Myamar Mosque Blaze Kills 13 Children 28 Wednesday April
3, 2013
12 Daily Trust 31 93 Iran President Visit Niger. 32 Wednesday, April,
2013.
13 Daily Trust 33 27 Zakzaky Laments Corruption Bad Governance 12 Tuesday October Isa Sa’idu Zaria
22, 2013

313
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
14 Daily Trust 16 67 Iran, Six Powers May Be Nearing A Nuclear Deal 58 Sunday November 23,
2013
15 Daily Trust 37 8 Organization Organize Holiday Camps For Children 63 Sunday December 22, Muideen Olaniyi
Abuja 2013 Abuja
16 Daily Trust 34 20 Re:Islam And Revolution (III) 68 Friday Feb. 28, 2014 Mohammad Qaddam
Sadq Isa
Mohammadaq@Gmail
17 Daily Trust 34 15 Re: Islam And Revolution (II) 68 Friday Feb, 21, 2014 Mohammad Qaddam
Sadq Isa
Mohammadaq@Gmail
18 Daily Trust 34 11 Islam And Revolution (III) 72 Friday Feb, 21, 2014 Adamu Adamu
Adamuadamu@Daily
Trust.Com
19 Daily Trust 34 5 Islam And Revolution (I) 64 Friday Feb. 7, 2014 Adamu Adamu
Adamuadamu@Daily
Trust.Com
20 Daily Trust 34 6 National Day: Iran Counts Successes, 35 Years After 28 Monday Feb. 10, 2014 Romke W. Ahmad
Revolution
21 Daily Trust 34 9 Iran Offers Scholarship To Kano Indigenes. 40 Thursday Feb. 13, Abdulkadir Badsha
2014 Mukhtar, Kano
22 Daily Trust 34 2 Jonathan Seeks Closer Ties With Muslim Mission 14 Friday Feb.4, 2014 Romke W. Ahmad
23 Daily Trust 34 10 Re: Islam And Revolution (I) 58 Friday Feb.14, 2014 Mohammad Qaddam
Sadq Isa
Mohammadaq@Gmail
24 Daily Trust 34 10 Islam And Revolution (II) 64 Friday Feb.,14, 2014 Adamu Adamu
Adamuadamu@Daily
Trust.Com
25 Daily Trust 34 13 Iran Nuclear Talks Open In Vienna 26 Wednesday Feb.19, Mohammad Jauad Zarif
2014
26 Daily Trust 34 20 Nigerian Constitution Us Islamic CAN Delegates 5 Wednesday April 2, Nuruddeen M.
2014 Abdullah; Jos

314
S/N Newspaper Vol No Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name . . No(S) Address
27 Daily Trust 34 15 Oran Canvasses For Establishment Of Trade To Strengthen 27 Friday June 20, 2014 Romke W. Ahmad
Trade With Nigeria.
28 Daily Trust 35 11 Nigeria Partner Iran To Provide Affordable Housing 53 Monday June 30, Mustapha Suleiman
2014
29 Daily Trust 35 5 Iran Desiro Us Of Ending Sanction Anyhow Nematzaden 44 Friday June 27, 2014 Engr. Mohammad
R. Nematzadeh
30 Daily Trust 35 6 Iran Rejects U.S Action In Iraq As Militants Capture Towns 30 Monday June 23,
2014
31 Daily Trust 34 9 S/Arabia, Iran May Clash Over Iraq Crisis 40 Thursday June 19,
2014
32 Daily Trust 34 2 Eagles Paid & 10,000 Bonus For Iran Draw 61 Wednesday June 18, Orkula Shaagee Sao
2014 Paulo, Brazil
33 Daily Trust 37 62 Islamic Group Visits Abuja Idps, Offers Free Medical 46 Tuesday June 23, Abdullateef
Services 2015
34 Daily Trust 10 33 Army/Shiite Clash: El-Zakzaky Must Be Tried El-Rufai 23 Sunday Dec. 27, 2015
35 Daily Trust 18 78 Army/ Shiites Clash 14 Saturday Dec. 19, Isa Sa’idu, Zaria
2015
36 Daily Trust 38 96 Attacks Blamed On Islamists Kill 10 Tuareg Fishters In Mali 47 Monday Dec. 28,
2015
37 Daily Trust 38 96 Muslim A Unity Pivotal In Fight Against Violence: Iran’s 47 Monday Dec. 28,
President. 2015
38 Daily Trust 38 97 Senate Panel Meets With Shiites Today Over Zaria Violence 3 Tuesday Dec. 29,2015 Ismail Mudashim
39 Daily Trust 38 97 Why Mr. President Should Be Deeply Worried By That 25 Tuesday Dec. 29,2015 Alhasi Kyari
Unfortunate Inciden In Zaria Involving Army And An Islamic Sandabe
Sect.

315
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name & Address
Name No(S)
40 Daily Trust 38 98 I Warned Zakzaky Against Blocking Roads 4 Wednesday Dec. 30, Maryam Ahmadu Kaduna
Gumi 2015
41 Daily Trust 38 98 Ulama’s Visit To Al-Rufai A Sectarian Agenda 12 Wednesday Dec. 30, Maryam Ahmadu, Kaduna
Shiite 2015
42 Daily Trust 37 99 Shiites To Seek Legal Redress Over Zaria Clash 6 Thursday Dec 31, Rakiya A. Muhammad
2015
43 Daily Trust 10 99 Shiites Meet Rep Demand Probe, Zakzaky’s 12 Thursday Dec. 31, Musa Abdullaho Krishi
Release 2015
44 Daily Trust 18 99 I Warned Zakzakys Against Block In G Roads 40 Thursday Dec. 31, Yudu Lawal
Shelck Gumi 2015
45 Daily Trust 38 99 Iran Conducts Pro Vocative Rocket Tests Near Is 46 Friday Dec. 31, 2015
Ships
46 Daily Trust 38 90 Northern Govs Urge Calm, Meet Over Army 4 Friday Dec. 18, 2015 Maryam Ahmadu Kaduna
Shiites Stand Off
47 Daily Trust 38 90 Shiites Hold Special Prayers For Leader 4 Friday Dec. 18,2015 Yusha’u – A Ibrahim Suka
Kaduna
48 Daily Trust 38 90 Investigate Army/Shiites Clash CEDRA 4 Friday Dec. 18,2015 Andrew Agbese Kaduna
49 Daily Trust 38 90 Suttan Cautions Against Use Of Effective Face 4 Friday Dec. 18, 2015 Maryam Ahmadu Kaduna
50 Daily Trust 38 90 El-Zakzaky Handed Over For Prosecution 5 Friday Dec. 30, 2015
Buratai
51 Daily Trust 38 90 500 Injured Shiites Detained With Out 8 Thursday Dec 31, Maryam Ahmadu Suka
Medication 2015 Kaduna
52 Daily Trust 38 90 EU Wants Urgents Inquiry Over Zaria Killings 10 Thursday Dec. 31, Abdulateef Salau
2015

316
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
53 Daily Trust 38 90 Kaduna To Set Pane 11 Thursday Dec. 31, Andrew Agbese,
2015 Kaduna
54 Daily Trust 38 90 NCC Wants Inquiry Over Zaria Killings 14 Friday Dec. 31, 2015 Mustapha Suleiman
55 Daily Trust 38 90 NSCIA, CAN Demand Inquiry Over Zaria Killings 58 Friday Dec. 18, 2015
56 Daily Trust 38 90 The External Dynamics Of Zaria 66 Friday Dec. 18,2015 Mohammed
57 Daily Trust 38 87 Zaria Killings NSCIA Calls For Probe Panel 3 Tuesday Dec.15, 2015 Ismail Mudashir
58 Daily Trust 38 87 We Arrested Zakzaky’s Wife- Army 5 Tuesday Dec. 15, Shehu K. Goro/Isa
2015 Sa’idu, Zarira
59 Daily Trust 38 87 We Are Not Against The Shiite Muslims Sect NA 5 Tuesday Dec. 15, Maureen Onochie
2015
60 Daily Trust 87 Shiites Killings: Army’s Assassination Claims Laushable 13 Tuesday Dec. 15, Abbas Jimoh
MURIC 2015
61 Daily Trust 87 Iran Urges Nigeria To Prosted Shia Population’ 36 Tuesday Dec. 15,
2015
62 Daily Trust 38 87 Imbrosho Of Zaria And C Consequence Of Negligence 8 Thursday Dec 15, Usman Mohammed
2015
63 Daily Trust 38 87 Army Siege In Zaria 10 Thursday Dec. 15, Bikisu Lukman,
2015 Gombe
64 Daily Trust 10 32 Scores Die In Army, Shiite Clash In Zaria 23 Sunday December 20, Mahmoud T. Bichi
2015 Kaduna
65 Daily Trust 38 31 Iran Earns More For First Time In Almost 50 Years 34 Monday September
28, 2015

317
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
66 Daily Trust 38 74 Shiites Begin Arba’een Symbolic Trek Today 10 Thursday November Maryam Ahmdu
26, 2015 Suka Kaduna
67 Daily Trust 38 91 Zaria Killings: Senate Panel To Meet In The Zakzaky, 3 Monday 21, 2015 Ismail Mudashir
Buratai Kaduna
68 Daily Trust 38 91 Army Killed By 3 Remaining Brothers Zakzaky’s Son 8 Monday Dec 21, Francis Arinze
2015 Kaduna
69 Daily Trust 38 91 El-Rufai’s Speech On Zaria Killings Biased One –Sided 12 Monday Dec. 21, Ibrahim Kabiru Sule
–Shiites 2015 Kaduna
70 Daily Trust 38 91 The External Dynamics Of Zaria Incident (1) 61 Monday Dec. 21,
2015
71 Daily Trust 38 91 Shiites/Army Clash: Inte Must Avoid 2009 Mistake 67 Monday Dec. 21, Kashim Shettima
2015 Kaduna
72 Daily Trust 38 94 NHRC Inaugurates 5-Man Panel Over Zaria Killings 10 Tuesday Dec. 22, Maureen Onochie
2015
73 Daily Trust 38 94 Eanada Wants Transparents Probe Of Zaria Killings 10 Tuesday Dec. 22, Abdulateef Salau
2015 Kaduna
74 Daily Trust 38 92 Shi’ite , Military Clash Worries NASS Rep Kurfi 13 Tuesday Dec. 22, Dicksoms S. Adama
2015 Kaduna
75 Daily Trust 38 92 Lawyers, Rights Activists Condemn Military Killing Of 42 Tuesday Dec. 22, John Chuks Azu
Protesters. 2015 Onitsha
76 Daily Trust 38 92 Small Brush With Shi’ites 44 Tuesday Dec 22, Musa Aliyu Kaduna
2015
77 Daily Trust 38 92 The Blood Bath In Zaria 49 Tuesday Dec 22, Abu Najakku
2015 Kaduna
78 Daily Trust 38 93 Reps Meet Buratai Over Zaria Clash 8 Wednesday Dec. 23, Musa Abdullahi
2015 Krishi & Ibrahim
Kabine Sule

318
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
79 Daily Trust 38 93 Zaria Clash: Civil Society Urges Army Chief To Set Aside 8 Wednesday Dec. Adelanwa Bamgboye
23, 2015 Kaduna
80 Daily Trust 38 93 The Genocide Of Members Of The Islamic Movement In 29 Wednesday Dec. Umar Abubakat Abuja
Nigeria. 23, 2015
81 Daily Trust 38 94 Zaria Clash: 191 Arraigned As HRW Urges Probe 5 Thursday Dec. Andrew Agbese &
24,2015 Ronald Mutum
Kaduna
82 Daily Trust 38 94 Zaria Clash: Cisvil Society Urges Army Chief To Step 53 Thursday Dec. Abdullahi Musa
Aside 24,2015 Kaduna
83 Daily Trust 38 95 We Complied With Rules Of Engagement In Zaria Sta Off- 4 Friday Dec. 25, Maryam Ahmadu Suka,
GOC 2015 Kaduna
84 Daily 38 95 The External Dynamic Of Zaria Indicident (II) 68 Friday Dec 25, Mohammed Sidq Isa
Trust 2015 Kaduna
85 Daily 18 79 How I Lost 5 Family Members In Army/ Shiites Clash 4 Saturday Dec. 26, Abubakar Zaki
Trust 2015 Kaduna
86 Daily 18 79 Shiites Returning Home, 3 Rescued After 72 Hours 5 Saturday Dec. 26, Andrew Agbese
Trust Under Rubble 2015 Kaduna
87 Daily 18 79 Questions About The Army / Shiite Clash 35 Saturday Dec. 26, Barr. Ahmad
Trust 2015
88 Daily 38 88 Protests Spread Over Zakzaky’s Arrest. 15 Wednesday Dec. Yusha’u A Ibrahim
Trust 16, 2015 (Kaduna), Andrew
Agbese & Maryam
Ahmadu Suka (Zaria)
Habibu Umar Aminu
(Kastina)
89 Daily 38 88 Iranian President Calls Buhari Over Zaria Killings 7 Wednesday Dec. Ibrahim Kabiru Sule
Trust 16, 2015
90 Daily Trust 38 88 Silence Over Zaria Shiite Killings Criminal Sani 10 Wednesday Dec Ismaila Muhashir
16, 2015 Kaduna

319
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
91 Daily Trust 38 88 We Arrested Zakzaky Wife-Army 56 Wednesday Dec. 16, Ahmadu Usman
2015 Kaduna
92 Daily Trust 38 88 Zaria Tragedy A Nation In Need Of Healing 60 Wednesday Dec. 16, Timawus Mathias
2015 Kaduna
93 Daily Trust 10 31 Scores Die In Army Shiites Clash In Zaria 1, 4 Sunday Dec. 13, 2015 Isa Sa’idu Zaria
94 Daily Trust 10 32 El-Zakzaky Must Be Tried –El-Rufai 1, 4 Sunday Dec. 20, 2015 Andrew Agbese &
Maryam Ahmadu
Suka Kaduna
95 Daily Trust 10 32 Army/Shiites Clash: Govt. Must Apportion Blame, Do 2,8,9 Wednesday Dec. 20, Isa Sa’idu Zaria
Justice Sarkin Sudan Zazzau 2015
96 Daily Trust 39 29 Britain Backs Inquiry Into Army Shifts Clash. 9 Thursday, February Andrew Agbese,
11, 2016 Kaduna
97 Daily Trust 39 30 189 Shi’ites Remanded In Prison 19 Thursday, February Andrew Agbese,
11, 2016 Kaduna
98 Daily Trust 39 37 Zakzaky’s Absence Stalls Public Hearing 10 Thursday, February Andrew Agbese,
23, 2016 Kaduna
99 Daily Trust 39 38 Free Zakzaky, Re-Open Lawlessness And Terror 25 Thursday, February Andrew Agbese,
24, 2016 Kaduna
100 Daily Trust 39 39 Shiites/Army Clash: Zakzaky’a Absence Stalls Panel 10 Thursday, February Andrew Agbese,
Proceeding Again. 25, 2016 Kaduna
101 Daily Trust 39 72 Amry/Shite Clash: ‘347 Buried At Midnight 6 Tuesday April 12, Andrew Agbese,
2016 Kaduna
102 Daily Trust 39 72 Jran Gets Russian 30 Tuesday April 12, Andrew Agbese,
2016 Kaduna
103 Daily Trust 39 82 Army/ Shi’ite Report Soon To Be Released NHRC 32 Tuesday April 26, Maureen Onochie
2016 Abuja

320
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
104 Daily Trust 39 84 Four Journalists Jailed On Security Charges 41 Thursday, April 28,
2016
105 Daily Trust 18 97 Army Journalists Jailed Commission Of Inquiry Adjourns 10 Saturday, April 30, Maryam Ahmadu
Public Hearings. 2016 Kaduna
106 Daily Trust 39 85 Re: Shocking Revelations Of Army/Shiites Clash 44 Friday April 24, 2016 Abdulmumin Giwa
107 Daily Trust 10 34 Shiites Decay Detent Ion Of Injured Members. 13 Sunday Jan. 3, 2016 Maryam Ahmadu
Suka, Kaduna
108 Daily Trust 39 1 Senate Panel Visits Kaduna Today Over Zaria Killing 8 Monday Jan. 4, 2016 Ismail Mudashir
109 Daily Trust 39 1 Pro, Anti Zakzaky Poster Flood Zaria. 10 Monday Jan. 4, 2016 Isa Sa’odu, Zaria
110 Daily Trust 39 1 Jran Vows ‘Fivine Vengeance’ On S/Aravia Over Al- 51 Monday Jan. 4, 2016
Nimr Execution.
111 Daily Trust 39 2 Shiites Demand Disclosure Of Zakzaky’s Health Condition 8 Tuesday Jan. 5, 2016 Musa Abdullahi
Krishi
112 Daily Trust 39 2 Oil Rises On Saudi Iran Tension 21 Tuesday Jan. 5, 2016
113 Daily Trust 39 2 Bahrian, Sudan, UAE Join S/Arabia In Diplomatic Row 38 Tuesday Jan. 5, 2016 Abdulateef Salau
Against Iran
114 Daily Trust 39 2 Senate Panel Visits Kaduna Today Over Zaria Killings 44 Tuesday Jan. 5, 2016 Ma’asi Caleb,
Eakwa
115 Daily Trust 39 3 Female Shiites Demand Release Of Zakzaky, Others 11 Wednesday Jan. 6, Maryam Ahmadu –
2016 Sule Kaduna
116 Daily Trust 39 3 Cutting Iran Ties Can’t Hide Saudi-Rouham 37 Wednesday Jan. 6,
2016

321
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
117 Daily Trust 39 4 Female Shiites Demand Release Of Za Kzaky, Other 62 Thursday Jan. 7, 2016
118 Daily Trust 39 5 AGF Asks NSCIA To Formalize Request For Zakzaky 10 Friday Jan. 8, 2016 Adelanwa
Release. Banmboye
119 Daily Trust 39 5 Army Retutes Photo Captions On Arms Seizure From 11 Friday Jan. 8, 2016 Maryam Ahmadu
Shiites Suka
120 Daily Trust 39 5 Witness Discount Iran Claims Of Saudi Airstrine On 31 Friday Jan. 8, 2016
Embassy In Yemen.
121 Daily Trust 10 35 Saudi FM Warns Of Additionar Measures Jains Iran 14 Sunday Jan. 10, 2016
122 Daily Trust 39 6 Shiites Women In Jos Demand Release Of Zakzaky 8 Monday Jan. 11, 2016 Hir Joseph & Lam
Sadiq, Jos
123 Daily Trust 39 7 Army Withdraws From Shiites In Zaria 12 Tuesday Jan. 12, 2016 Isa Sa’idu Zaria &
Maryam Ahmadu
Suka Kaduna
124 Daily Trust 39 8 FG Sues For Pease Over Iran-Saudi Arabia Row 7 Wednesday Jan. 13, Abdulateef Salau
2016
125 Daily Trust 39 9 Iran Frees US Navy Sailors Held In Gulfater Incursion 357 Thursday Jan. 14,
2016
126 Daily Trust 39 10 Shiites Submit Memoranda To Human Right Commission 14 Friday Jan. 15, 2016 Maryam Ahmadu –
Sule Kaduna
127 Daily Trust 39 10 Wakilan Sarkin Musulmi Sun Gana Da Zakzaky 78 Friday Jan. 15, 2016
128 Daily Trust 10 36 Kaduna Appoints Gambarim Yadudu Others To Probe 4 Sunday Jan. 17, 2016 Andrew Agbese, Jos
Army, Shiites Clash
129 Daily Trust 10 36 Iran Frees-Four American Prisoners, Including Reporter 48 Sunday Jan. 17, 2016
And Poster: State Television
130 Daily Trust 39 11 Miclear Deal: ‘New Chapter For Tehranas Sanctions End 34 Monday Jan. 18, 2016

322
S/N Newspaper Vol. No. Title Of Article Page Date Author’s Name &
Name No(S) Address
131 Daily Trust 10 12 Iran Condemns Us Sanctions Over Missile Test 20 Tuesday Jan. 19, 2016
132 Daily Trust 39 12 Oil Hits 2003 Low, Below & 28 As Iran Sections Lifted 21 Tuesday Jan. 19, 2016
133 Daily Trust 39 12 Nigeria Oil Reports To India Threatnened By Iran Entrance 22 Tuesday Jan. 19, 2016 Daniel Adugbo
134 Daily Trust 39 13 Army/Shiite Clash: We Acted By Rules Of Engagement 6 Wednesday Jan. 20, Maurine Onochie
COAS 2016
135 Daily Trust 39 13 Khamenei Welcomes Sanctions Relief Warns Of US 37 Wednesday Jan. 20,
Deceit. 2016
136 Daily Trust 39 83 Army/ Shiite Clash: Probe Panel For Inauguration Friday 8 Saturday Jan 23. 2016 Andrew Agbese
Kaduna
137 Daily Trust 39 16 Iran Eyes Buying 114 Being Jets As Sanctions End 26 Monday Jan. 25, 2016

323
Appendix G: Sample of IMN Pictures

1. Academic Forum

2. Academic Forum

324
3. Communication Forum Publication (Al-Mizan Newspaper)

4. IMN Fodiyyaha School

325
5. IMN Fodiyyaha School Graduation ceremony

6. Hisbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warning Nigerian government on IMN

(Foreign Influence)

326
7. IMN possession and usage of Light Weapons

8. IMN leader El-Zakzaky saying there is no govt. except that of

Allah (Propaganda)

9. IMN Propaganda

327
10. IMN Propaganda 3

11. IMN Propaganda

12. IMN Road Blockade

328
13. IMN Road Blockade

14. Iran Influence in IMN

15. IMN ISMA Medical Care Initiative at work

329
16. IMN ISMA Medical Care Initiative providing voluntary Service

17. IMN ISMA Medical Care Initiative providing voluntary Service

18. Map of Ngeria

330
19. IMN Resource Forum

20. IMN Resource Forum

21. IMN Resource Forum

331
22. IMN Shuhada Foundation

23. IMN Sisters Forum

24. Sisters Forum

332
25. IMN Unity Forum

26. IMN Unity Forum

27. IMN Unity Forum

333
28. IMN Hurras

334
Appendix H: IMN Website

335
Appendix I: Nigerian Security vs IMN

336
Appendix J: IMN defies ICJ in reply

337
Appendix K: Iran Intelligence

338
 Appendix L: El-Zakzaky’s Funtua Declaration message of Non-allegiance to the
Nigerian state and constitution

339

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