Husserl and the Algebra of Logic:

Husserl’s 1896 Lectures

Mirja Hartimo

Axiomathes
An International Journal
in Ontology and Cognitive
Systems

ISSN 1122-1151

Axiomathes
DOI 10.1007/
s10516-011-9166-8

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Axiomathes
DOI 10.1007/s10516-011-9166-8

INVITED PAPER

Husserl and the Algebra of Logic: Husserl’s 1896

Lectures

Mirja Hartimo

Received: 8 June 2010 / Accepted: 11 May 2011

Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract In his 1896 lecture course on logic–reportedly a blueprint for the

Prolegomena to Pure Logic–Husserl develops an explicit account of logic as an
independent and purely theoretical discipline. According to Husserl, such a theory is
needed for the foundations of logic (in a more general sense) to avoid psychologism
in logic. The present paper shows that Husserl’s conception of logic (in a strict
sense) belongs to the algebra of logic tradition. Husserl’s conception is modeled
after arithmetic, and respectively logical inferences are viewed as analogical to
arithmetical calculation. The paper ends with an examination of Husserl’s
involvement with the key characters of the algebra of logic tradition. It is concluded
that Ernst Schröder, but presumably also Hermann and Robert Grassmann influ-
enced Husserl most in his turn away from psychologism.

Keywords Husserl’s 1896 lectures
Idea of logic
Algebra of logic

Psychologism
Ernst Schröder
Hermann Grassmann
Robert Grassmann

1 Husserl’s Antipsychologism in the Prolegomena

In the Prolegomena to pure logic Husserl argues against any view of logic that does
not have a foundation in an objective, formal, a priori, and theoretical discipline.
According to Husserl, any view of logic without such foundation is psychologistic.
His argument against this very specific form of psychologism consists of a negative
and a positive part. The negative part comprising most of the book claims, at its
most extreme, that without such a foundation relativism and skepticism will follow.
Without such foundation there could be no science; nothing could count as
knowledge or as truth. Thus the psychologistic views of logic are ultimately

M. Hartimo (&)
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: mirja.hartimo@helsinki.fi

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self-refuting. The book finishes with a positive part, in which Husserl describes the
idea of pure logic, which sciences and logic in the more general sense should have
as their foundation in order for us to avoid skepticism.
Husserl’s argument against psychologism in the Prolegomena is directed
primarily against the conceptions of logic in which logic in the strict sense is not
an objective discipline that is independent from empirical and psychological
considerations. Husserl’s own Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) falls prey to
psychologism precisely because of this: in it Husserl advocates a view that logic is a
technique, a Kunstlehre, a method of symbolic operations, not a theory. Husserl’s
earlier view of logic is thus psychological according to his own understanding of the
term (for an excellent discussion of the sense in which Husserl’s early work can be
thought to be psychological, see Miller 1982, 19–23). Mohanty (2008, 63) has
distinguished between various different sub-species of what he calls naturalistic
psychologism: They are logical psychologism, that is, psychologism with regard to
logic, psychologism with regard to the theory of numbers, psychologism in the
theory of meaning, psychologism in the theory of truth, epistemological psychol-
ogism, and psychologism applied to metaphysics. Casted in these terms, Husserl’s
aim in the Prolegomena is primarily a refutation of logical psychologism, which is
inextricably interwoven with psychologism with regard to the theory of numbers1
and with psychologism in the theory of meaning, as well as truth. This is not to say
that Husserl is not concerned with other species of psychologism elsewhere, but
only that the main target of the argument of the Prolegomena is specifically logical
psychologism.
Whatever term we use for Husserl’s antipsychologism in the Prolegomena, the
idea of pure logic is the cornerstone of Husserl’s conception. It establishes the
formal conditions for the sciences and truth. Husserl’s account of the idea of logic
also forms the subject matter for the clarification of the essence of logic in the
second volume of the investigations.
Much of the secondary literature on Husserl has been devoted to the question of
possible influences behind Husserl’s rather radical arguments against psychologism
in the Prolegomena. I do not want to go into that debate in any further detail except
for making a remark that given the role of logic for Husserl’s argument, one cannot
intelligibly address these influences without examining the development of
Husserl’s conception of logic and mathematics. Here I agree with Mohanty who
observes that: ‘‘Husserl’s rejection of the Brentanian psychologistic theory of
numbers, as of mathematics and logic in general, is not due to the influence of
Frege, but rather due to his evolving conception of the nature of mathematics and
logic’’(2008, 58).

1
Husserl writes in 1895, 1896 (Husserl 2001a, 241), and in the Prolegomena (§21) that arithmetic and
logic should not be distinguished. His formulation from 1895 is ‘‘Und so werden wir uns mit der zunächst
wohl befremdlichen Auffassung Lotzes befreunden müssen, dass die Arithmetik nur ein relativ
selbständiges und von alters her besonders hoch entwickeltes Stück der Logik sei’’(ibid., 271–272). This
should not be understood in the sense of Fregean logicism as a claim that arithmetic should be reduced to
logic, but rather in the sense that for Husserl logic has an algebraic form that can also be found in
arithmetic.

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Mohanty further assumes that Hilbert and Cantor played an important role in
Husserl’s development (ibid., 58). There are no signs of any kind of interaction
between Husserl and Hilbert in the 1890s. The first signs of interaction between the
two date to 1901 when Husserl received a position in Göttingen. Thus I find
Mohanty’s assumption about Hilbert’s role somewhat far-fetched. However,
Mohanty’s claim about Cantor is easy to accept: Cantor was Husserl’s colleague
in Halle at the time, and they discussed for example Cantor’s view of Schröder
(Schuhmann 1977, 52). Moreover, in his 1896 lectures Husserl explains Cantor’s
results to his students (e.g., 2001a, p. 117). But what I want to emphasize here is that
more than to Cantor, Husserl’s conception of logic is indebted to Ernst Schröder and
other algebraists. Indeed, in the Foreword to the Logical Investigations when
explaining the development of his views Husserl says so referring to the algebraic
tradition as ‘mathematicizing logic’: ‘‘I then came to see in ‘mathematicizing logic’
a mathematics which was indeed free from quantity, while remaining nonetheless an
indefeasible discipline having mathematical form and method, which in part dealt
with the old syllogisms, in part with new forms of inference quite alien to
tradition’’(Husserl 2001b, 1–2).
According to Husserl’s own testimony (in the Foreword to the second edition of
the Logical Investigations), the Prolegomena is a mere reworking of his lecture-
courses given at Halle in the summer and autumn of 1896 (2001b, 5). It is not
entirely obvious what he means by this, since he lectured on logic only in the
summer of 1896 (Husserl 2001a, xi). However, the 1896 lecture course is certainly
the best candidate for what Husserl refers to in the Logical Investigations. In it we
can find the most detailed and explicit exposition of what Husserl means by logic
understood as an independent, purely formal theory of inference. Moreover,
contrary to most of Husserl’s later writings Husserl is relatively explicit about his
sources. Husserl’s approach is a version of algebra of logic that has been earlier
developed by for example Schröder, the Grassmann brothers, and Boole. Husserl
refers explicitly and appraisingly also to Bolzano, Lotze, Twardowski, and Frege,
and one can hear echoes from their work in Husserl’s own views. However, the
references to these characters are all related to issues other than Husserl’s
conception of logic in the strict sense as formal theory of inference.

2 Husserl’s Lectures on Logic 1896

The lecture course starts with an introduction, in which Husserl explains the purpose
and the motivation for his logic lectures. First of all, logic in the strict sense is
needed for the foundation for the sciences (Husserl 2001a, 4–5). By means of it
Husserl seeks to capture the essence of sciences (ibid., 6). Echoing Bolzano he uses
the term Wissenschaftslehre for the study of the systematic orderings of truths and
objects in the sciences. (He also uses the Bolzanian term Begründung for the
relationship between the truths.) The ordering is independent of any individual
science. Indeed, in order to acquire an understanding of the Wissenschaftslehre, the
notion of pure logic has to be clarified (ibid., 19). Ultimately, Husserl’s explanation

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of the aim of the logic lectures has a rather Aristotelian flavor: the whole study is
necessitated by our need to know:
When we raise ourselves to the abstract [realm] we give up the sensuous fullness
of intuition, the freshly pulsing life of the individuals, in which we certainly
immediately participate. But without abstraction, no concept, without concept,
no law, without law no insight into the ground, no theory, no science, and
without science no philosophy. The turning away from the green valleys and
fields of life full of self-denial to the grey, leathery, sober theory is the only way
to satisfy our highest and purest interest in knowledge (Husserl 2001a, 30)2,3
Criticizing psychologistic conceptions of logic Husserl makes it clear that by
logic he means a pure theory of objective relationships that is independent from any
methodological considerations. While Husserl’s over-all conception of the role of
logic in the foundations of the sciences appears to be heavily indebted to Bolzano
Husserl does not follow Bolzano in his conception of pure logic. As Stefania
Centrone puts it ‘‘[a]lthough Husserl’s Logikvorlesung of 1896 follows in many
respects the model of Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre, in the concluding section on
the ‘doctrine of inferences’ its base is the algebra of classes of Boole-Schröder
rather than Bolzano’s proof theory’’ (2010, 128). For short, Husserl wants to
develop axiomatic theories of inferences analogously to the theories in arithmetic
(Husserl 2001a, 30).
Having explained his motivation to provide the needed foundation for the
sciences Husserl proceeds to a detailed criticism of the psychologistic conceptions
of logic, and discusses the following issues: (1) whether logic is independent or
dependent on some other discipline, and if the latter, then on what discipline (2)
whether logic is an art or science, (3) whether it is a formal discipline, or whether it
also deals with the content of knowledge, and (4) whether it is a demonstrative or
empirical science (Husserl 2001a, 31). Many of his Prolegomena arguments against
psychologism derive from here. If possible Husserl is even more pointed in his
criticism about confusing the subjective and the objective than what he will later be
in the Prolegomena. Already here he holds that relativism and skepticism are
consequences of the subjective tendency of the psychological logic (ibid., 33–34).
Like in the Prolegomena Husserl holds that logic should be independent, a science
rather than a method, purely formal, and demonstrative (ibid., 32–45).
Before his systematic discussion of the lecture course Husserl emphasizes various
important distinctions. The first distinction to be made is the one between subjective
2
Die sinnliche Fülle der Anschauung, das frische pulsierende Leben des Individuellen, das unserer
unmittelbaren Teilnahme sicher ist, geben wir freilich auf, wenn wir uns zum Abstrakten erheben. Aber
ohne Abstraktion kein Begriff, ohne Begriff kein Gesetz, ohne Gesetz keine Einsicht aus dem Grunde,
keine Theorie, keine Wissenschaft, und ohne Wissenschaft keine Philosophie. Die entsagungsvolle
Abwendung von den grünen Tälern und Gefilden des Lebens zur grauen, ledernen, nüchternen Theorie ist
eben das einzige Mittel, um unsere höchsten und reinsten Erkenntnisinteressen zu befördern.
3
Rollinger (2003) argues against Mohanty’s view that ‘‘[i]t would certainly be amiss to say, along with
one of the most prominent commentators [Mohanty] on Husserl’s work in logic, that the later motifs of
his transcendentalism, such as the view that ‘scientific objectivities are idealization of the life-world,’
were already present in his early logic’’(p. 200). Given the quoted passage, Mohanty’s conception appears
rather well grounded.

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acts and the objective content. Husserl explains that the former is a real part of the act
whereas the latter is not. The same objective content can be shared by a myriad of
different subjective acts (ibid., 44–47). Next, Husserl distinguishes between the
thoughts and the being, that is, the objective content of a sentence and the fact that
something is so and so (ibid., 47–48). Husserl complains about the lack of an
appropriate term for the objective contents. Bolzano called them ‘‘Vorstellungen an
sich,’’ or objective Vorstellungen, which is the term Husserl also occasionally uses.
Husserl’s discussion at this point shows unambiguous realism about concepts: he
points out, for example, that Röntgen discovered, but did not create the concept of
Röntgen ray (ibid., 49). The third distinction Husserl emphasizes here, but not so much
in the Prolegomena, is the distinction between names and sentences. Corresponding to
names there are objects and corresponding to sentences there are states of affairs.
Husserl then launches to the main part of the course. He follows the traditional
order: the first part is dedicated to concepts, second to propositions (for the fear of
psychologism he discusses propositions instead of judgments), and the third to
inferences. In following I will briefly sketch the line of the argument in the first two
parts, and then focus on the part on inferences, where Husserl explicitly formulates
the theory of inference. The first two parts of the lecture-course are discussed briefly
by Mohanty (2008, 52–57) and in more detail by Rollinger (2003). The theory of
inference is discussed in detail by Centrone (2010), though she does not conclude
anything on the basis of her otherwise excellent explications.

3 On Concepts

In the first part on concepts, echoing Frege, Husserl discusses issues such as
reference and meaning. He also introduces the scholastic distinction between
syncategorematic and categorematic expressions, and he uses the terminology of
independent and non-independent parts of a whole (e.g. Husserl 2001a, 55–57).
Husserl further distinguishes between relationships, combinations, series and
manifolds (Husserl 2001a, §§22–23). He proceeds to discuss the concept of set,
subordination, infinitely large cardinals and ordinals, etc. Following Bolzano and
Cantor he defines a finitely large set as one that has no equally large proper subset.
Husserl’s discussion of negation shows influence from scholastic logic, even though
a reference to Bolzano as well as to Twardowski and Locke can be found here too.
Husserl discusses also identity and equality, and finally equinumerosity. Two
concepts have equally large extensions when there is a one-to-one correlation
between them [es besteht gegenseitig eindeutige Korrespondenz], yet the extensions
can be different (e.g., cardinals and ordinals). The extensions of two concepts can
also be unequal so that one is larger than the other. However, Husserl adds that:
‘‘We cannot say of all concepts that they have equal or unequal extensions, because
all concepts cannot be compared in this respect. We cannot compare the set of
syllogisms and the one of triangles with each other (Bolzano); we are lacking a
principle that would enable the mapping’’ (Husserl 2001a, 117). ‘‘Nicht von allen
Begriffen können wir sagen, sie hätten gleiche oder ungleiche Weite, weil nicht alle
Begriffe in dieser Hinsicht überhaupt vergleichbar sind. Wir können nicht die

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Menge von Syllogismen und die von Dreiecken miteinander vergleichen (Bolzano);
es fehlt an einem Princip, das eindeutige Zuordnung ermöglichte’’ (Husserl 2001a,
117). This distinction between the concepts that can be compared to each other and
those that cannot, appears to be related to the distinction between the conceptual and
purely logical inferences Husserl establishes below.

4 On Propositions

In the second part on propositions Husserl discusses the formation of complex

sentences from simple sentences (here he explicitly refers to Frege’s Über Sinn und
Bedeutung [1892], cf. p. 134), categorical form of the sentences, extensional and
intensional interpretation of the copula, negative categorical sentences, the meaning
of negation, and quantification. Every now and then he wanders off to long
discussions of primarily Sigwart and Brentano. Echoing e.g., Frege’s similar
laments, Husserl’s own analysis of the difficulties is that the spoken language
misleads in formulating the proper logic: ‘‘The last two lectures on the most
influential German logicians have shown you what kinds of difficulties theoretical
logic is fighting, how the grammatical incompleteness of the spoken expression as
well as incompleteness of the research methods step into the way of elimination and
fixing of the fundamental and primitive forms of sentences’’ (Husserl 2001a, 175).
During the lectures Husserl comes to the following conclusion about the general
affirmative sentences: They are not simple sentences, but they include an existential
claim and a double negation, for example ‘‘All men are mortal’’ is a combination of
two sentences, that there are men, and second, that there are no men that are not
mortal (ibid., 181–182). This takes Husserl to discuss the concept of existence, in
particular existence in mathematical statements such as ‘‘All triangles have three
angles’’. According to Husserl, the mathematical triangle certainly does not exist in
real Wirklichkeit. ‘‘Nobody claims that there are real objects that correspond to
rigorous mathematical concepts. However, we still can express general affirmative
judgements about these non-existing triangles’’ (ibid., 183). After a closer analysis
Husserl claims that the mathematical objects exist on the basis of definitions.
Whether they exist in reality does not interest a mathematician (ibid., 183–184).
‘‘Wie wir es in der Geometrie mit geometrischen Existenzen zu tun haben, so in der
Mythologie mit mythologischen’’ (ibid., 184). Husserl’s realism about concepts is in
his 1896 lecture-course connected to structuralism about mathematical objects. The
existence of mathematical objects is relative to the structure, which defines them.
Husserl then goes on to a long discussion of Brentano and Sigwart on existence and
truth, after which he concludes that existence and truth are concepts that are related
to each other, and further indefinable (ibid., 220–221).

5 On Logical and Conceptual Inferences

Husserl’s lectures culminate in the third part of the lecture course on inferences. The
theory of inferences provides us the conception of logic that is independent, a science

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rather than a method, purely formal, and demonstrative, as what Husserl called for in
the beginning of the lecture course (Husserl 2001a, 32–45). It thus seems well
justified to claim that the final part is the culmination of the lecture-course.4
According to Husserl, inferences are typically understood in a very subjective
sense. However, contrary to the tradition, Husserl emphasizes that the theory of
inference is about objective relationships rather than about subjective acts of
inferring. In its objective sense inference is in fact a causal proposition (kausaler
Satz), and every causal proposition can be described as an inference (ibid., 234).
The totality of all inferences is a closed but an infinite manifold of truths. It is
impossible to enumerate all inferences (i.e., causal propositions), and to represent
them in logic. However, logic deals with the laws that govern causal propositions
independently of the specificity of the field to which they belong. Indeed, the logical
inferences are purely formal; they depend only on the forms of the sentences in the
premises and the conclusion (ibid., 235).
Husserl discusses also alogical (alogische), conceptual inferences as opposed to
logical inferences. At this point he defines logical inferences by means of the idea of
free variation: Logical inferences are the ones where the hypothetical truth is
independent of the peculiarities of the matter, and will remain valid if the specifics
are freely varied. For example ‘‘Wenn alle A B sind und S ein A ist, so ist auch S ein
B’’. The letters can be freely varied, which shows that the combination is logical.
This is not the case in the following example: Hans is bigger than Kunz who is
bigger than Wilhelm, thus Hans is bigger than Wilhelm. Here the inference relies on
the specificity of the sentences. The names can be arbitrarily varied without
changing the truth of the sentence. But the relationship between the sizes has sense
(Sinn) only for whatever has a size. ‘‘a \ b. b \ c, therefore a \ c’’ ‘‘does not
belong to the general logical domain, it is restricted to the domain of quantities’’
(ibid., 239).5 Consequently, Husserl divides the relationships and combinations into
two classes: into those that are generally logical, and those that are grounded on
some other concepts, such as color, sound, spatial extension, time, etc. The
relationship between concept and object, combination of individual objects to an
Inbegriffe, combination of many predicates to a conjunctive predicate, combination
of many sentences to conjunctive, disjunctive or hypothetical sentences are all
logical. Examples of alogical combinations are before-after, left–right, combina-
tions of vectors to a picture, of fields to a bodily construction, etc. Respectively the
laws are divided into logical and alogical ones: ‘‘In logische Gesetze gehen nur
logische Beziehungen und Verknüpfungen ein, sie konstituieren sich ausschlieblich
aus den allgemein logischen Kategorien und dem, was in ihnen gründet. In
alogische Gesetze gehen auch andere Begriffe ein und sind aus ihnen nicht
fortzuschaffen, etwa durch Verallgemeinerung’’(ibid., 241). The rules of inferences
are divided respectively. Given Husserl’s earlier distinction between manifolds that
can be mapped to each other and those that cannot, one is tempted to think that the

4
For some reason Mohanty 2008 does not discuss the third part on inferences at all. His discussion of the
1896 lectures is only about the parts on concepts and sentences (2008, 52–57).
5
In German: ‘‘gehört nicht in das allgemein logische Gebiet, er ist eingeschränkt auf das Gebiet der
Gröben’’(2001a, 239).

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distinction between logical and conceptual inferences is based on that distinction.

Thus conceptual inferences are the ones where the subject matter provides the
principle that enables comparison between the manifolds. To be more specific, the
subject matter provides the sort in respect of which the comparison is carried out.

6 Theory of Logical Inferences (Propositional Inferences)

To find the laws that govern the sentences in the inferences, Husserl proposes
proceeding the way arithmeticians do. Curiously he raises the question of
completeness: Initially arithmeticians had no conception about the completeness
of their field. Arithmetic has developed through analysis of already used
arithmetical laws and a systematic proof (of completeness) is missing: ‘‘How do
the arithmeticians know that the combinations that they enumerate comprise all that
are thinkable for numbers in general?’’ (Ibid., 243). Husserl’s answer is that we do
not know for certain. Nevertheless, mathematics is an a priori science (ibid., 244).
The task in the theory of inference as well as in arithmetic is to build an
axiomatic theory with which all thinkable problems could be solved in an ordered
procedure. The difficulty is to show for every step that all the inferences themselves
fall under laws that are already fixed as basic laws, and if this is not the case to show
that the number of basic laws should be extended. Arithmetic gives us the model
how this can be done (ibid., 245) Husserl then shows what one can do in arithmetic
with the commutativity of addition: a ? b=b ? a. By means of substitution many
other sentences can be formulated on its basis. It can also be used when solving
arithmetical equations. This kind of procedure and grounding is not restricted only
to arithmetic, but is possible wherever the domain is axiomatic (ibid., 246). Thus the
practical nature of arithmetical procedure, namely calculating, must find its direct
analogue in the formal discipline of inferences (ibid., 247). Calculation is an
operation on signs and not on the concepts themselves. The grounding lies in the
arithmetica universalis, in the algebra, ‘‘nicht viel anders als in der Ihnen praktisch
bekannten numerischen Arithmetik’’(ibid., 247). Husserl then proceeds to describe
calculation in a manner very similar to the end of the Philosophy of Arithmetic
claiming that ‘‘the thought operations and operations on signs are exactly parallel’’
(ibid., 248). There are no deductive inferences that would not have the
corresponding combinations of signs. This way the pure game on signs leads
always to propositions that can be interpreted as truths. (ibid., 248).
On the basis of the model given by arithmetic Husserl then explains what an ideal
theory of inference looks like: It has primitive axioms that are independent from
each other. Then there are propositions, theorems (Lehrsätze), that is, derived laws
of inference. These derivations are themselves inferences or webs of inferences. But
if we solve any such web into elementary inferences, then we come back to the first
theorems and to only those inferences that fall under the axiomatic principles. The
second proposition can have in its proof a form that is shown to be valid in the
previous proposition. ‘‘Kurz, welchen Beweis man in der Theorie auch prüfen und
analysieren mag, man wird immer in der Reihe der Axiome oder der vorher
erwiesenen Gesetze solche finden, die ihn rechtfertigen’’(ibid., 250).

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Next Husserl discusses the general principles needed in proofs. Centrone (2010)
provides a detailed analysis of them, so I will here only list them shortly.
The axioms of his theory are the following:
(i) Inference from general to particular.
(ii) Modus ponens.
(iii) Rules of conjunction introduction and elimination.
(iv) Principle of distributivity of universal quantification over implication.
Husserl uses Schröder’s notation, according to which a conjunction between A
and B is expressed by juxtaposition AB, disjunction by A ? B, conditional A€B,
negation with A0 or a long dash above the negated sentence letter, universal
quantification P, and existential quantification R.
Husserl then formalizes the whole theory (with slightly modified principles) by
giving several logical axioms and derives by means of the principles several
theorems. Centrone lists them all and also discusses in detail four of Husserl’s
proofs (see Centrone 2010, 128–141). What Centrone does not mention is that in the
end of his exposition Husserl also stipulates that XX : X and X ? X : X (2001a,
261). These are Boole’s laws of inner weaving and inner joining that were
advocated by Robert Grassmann in his Formenlehre (1872). These distinguish the
algebraic system of logic from arithmetic. As I will explain below, Robert
Grassmann emphasized the importance of these two laws to Husserl in two letters in
November 1895 and February 1896. In both of the letters he accused Schröder to be
utterly unscientific for not having them (Husserl 1994a, 160, 163–164).
In the end of his lecture course Husserl starts elaborating on the theory of
conceptual inferences (see §66), but he never gives a full or explicit account of it. In
it the basic form of judgement is ‘‘Cea’’ which means that a certain object has a
predicate a. The theory of conceptual inferences amounts to a theory of classes,
parallel to the theory of logical inferences. In other words, Husserl suggests
‘‘conceptual’’ versions of the same principles and axioms as in his theory of logical
inferences (Centrone 2010, 141–146). The theory of conceptual inferences appears
to aspire to be a typed version of purely logical inferences.
To summarize, the 1896 lectures show that Husserl has already acquired many
insights that will later resurface in the Logical Investigations. These include his
criticism of psychologism, many insights about meanings and objects, and the
theory of wholes and parts. Moreover, Husserl maintains a similar view of the
theory of inferences in his 1902 lecture course on logic, which he held in Göttingen
2 years after the publication of the Logical Investigations.
The 1896 lecture-course shows also a work in progress; many times Husserl
contradicts his own earlier views and wanders off to examine views about which he
does not seem to be sure what to say. While many pieces, or better, moments of
Husserl’s Logical Investigations are already in place, the distinction between
grammar and logic proper has not yet been developed. Likewise, there is no clear
notion of categorial intuition, and accordingly Husserl’s conception of truth appears
to be unfinished. For example, Husserl defines the anschaulichen Vorstellungen to
be subjective. The distinction between intuitive and conceptual according to him
does not belong to logic but has something to do with subjective versus objective

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(2001a, 76), which is a distinction between psychological and logical. In the Logical
Investigations Husserl will also abandon the traditional order of discussing logic
starting from concepts, then moving to propositions and in the end focusing on
inferences.
All kinds of influences can be detected in the 1896 lecture course. Its overall aim
to be Wissenschaftslehre sounds very Bolzanian indeed. Husserl has later explained
that his study of Lotze’s conception of Plato’s theory of ideas is what inspired him
to accept Bolzano’s otherwise peculiar views. Husserl also uses the method of free
variation in obtaining concepts. He owes the method of variation to Bolzano and in
a way to Lotze as well (Beyer 1996; Centrone 2010). Bolzano and Twardowski also
were proponents of the study of parts and wholes, which Husserl applies everywhere
throughout the lecture-course. Husserl also refers to Frege’s Über Sinn und
Bedeutung in his discussion of sentences functioning as non-independent parts of a
presentation (p. 134). However, if we keep in mind Husserl’s main argument against
psychologism in the Prolegomena, we should focus on Husserl’s conception of
logic in the strict sense, i.e., as the purely formal, demonstrative theory instead of
the discussions that some might categorize as belonging to philosophy of language.
Husserl’s conception of logic follows Schröder’s Vorlesungen. Also the notation
that he uses belongs to the algebra of logic tradition.

7 Husserl and the Algebraists of Logic

Since the evolvement of Husserl’s conception of logic and mathematics led him to
abandon his earlier conception of logic, I will here briefly discuss Husserl’s
relationship with the key figures of the algebra of logic tradition trying to trace
possible sources for Husserl’s view.
The algebra of logic originates in George Boole (1815–1864) in his Mathemat-
ical Analysis of Logic (1847). His aim was to provide an algorithmic alternative to
the traditional Aristotelian approach. Logical theories, according to the algebra of
logic tradition, were thought to have a similar structure as the ordinary algebra.
Instead of classifying different kinds of syllogisms, the aim was to represent logic
by means of a deductive theory. While Boole is the finder of the algebra of logic
tradition, Ernst Schröder was the most important representative of the tradition in
Germany. Schröder’s work in turn was greatly influenced by the brothers Hermann
and Robert Grassmann and also by Peirce’s logic of relations (Peckhaus 1996,
2004a). Hermann Grassmann (1809–1877) is the older and more original of the
brothers, famous for his Ausdehnungslehre (1844, 1861). He worked in collabo-
ration with his brother Robert Grassmann (1815–1901) who published a book called
Formenlehre (1872), which presents a system close to that of Boole’s. Volker
Peckhaus has shown that Schröder was first acquainted with the essentials of the
algebra of logic through Grassmann’s Formenlehre and not through Boole
(Peckhaus 1996, 225).
Husserl was familiar with the Grassmanns’ work already in the 1880s. Hermann
Grassmann’s son and Robert Grassmann’s nephew, Hermann Grassmann Jr, was
Husserl’s good friend. They had gone to school together in Leipzig, and Hermann

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Grassmann Jr. gave his father’s Ausdehnungslehre (1844) to Husserl as a gift

already before Husserl went to Berlin to study with Weierstrass. Hermann
Grassmann Jr. worked as a teacher of mathematics in Halle at the time Husserl was
there. He was a family friend and spent for example Christmas often with the
Husserls. Hermann Grassmann Jr. also asked his uncle Robert Grassmann to give
advice to his philosopher-mathematician friend. Consequently Robert Grassmann
sent two letters to Edmund Husserl in November 1895 and February 1896.6 In his
letters Robert Grassmann, besides himself and his brother, advocates Aristotle as the
only sharp logician. Curiously, in both of the letters Robert Grassmann complains
that Schröder allows in his logic formulas such as a - a = 0, and a/a = 1, while
these should not be permissible in logic. In logic a ? a=a and aa = a should hold
(Husserl 1994a, 160, 164). In other words, Robert Grassmann claims that Schröder
did not maintain Boole’s laws of inner joining and inner weaving that we saw above
Husserl included in his logic lectures of 1896.
While it is possible that Husserl’s interest in the algebra of logic tradition was
influenced directly by the Grassmanns, it appears likelier that Husserl’s adherence to
the tradition was mainly due to Schröder. In 1891 Husserl wrote a published review
of the first volume of Ernst Schröder’s Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik. In it
Husserl criticizes the ‘‘logical side’’ of Schröder’s presentation but praises its
‘‘technical side’’. According to him, ‘‘[t]hrough the invention of new methods, and
the improvement of methods previously given, he documents that excellence as a
mathematician which science has long recognized in him. And in as much as in the
calculus we have a substantial enrichment of the old logic, the laudable algorithmic
results of the author turn out to the advantage of that discipline itself, and in a
manner which I certainly would not like to see underestimated’’ (Husserl 1994c,
71). After this Husserl engaged in a published debate about intensional and
extensional logic with Andreas Heinrich Voigt, in which the applicability of the
algebra of logic tradition to intensions was debated. Moreover, Husserl and
Schröder sent their works to each other in 1898. In Husserl’s Briefwechsel we can
find a letter from Schröder who complains that he has not had time to comment on
Husserl’s very interesting piece of writing and in which he sent his article On
Pasigraphy to Husserl. Husserl apparently already had the German version of the
paper ‘‘Über Pasigraphie, ihren gegenwärtigen Stand und die pasigraphische
Bewegung in Italien’’ published in the Verhandlungen des ersten internationalen
Mathematiker-Kongresses in Zürich vom 9.–11. August 1897 (Husserl 1994b, 245).
Husserl also studied the British algebraists. He lectured on their work in his 1895
lectures ‘‘Über die neueren Forschungen zur deduktiven Logik’’. In those lectures,
Husserl traces the roots of the general deductive conception of logic to Leibniz and
Lambert. He discusses then William Rowan Hamilton, Augustus de Morgan, and

6
Husserl also owned many books by Robert Grassmann: Formelbuch der Denklehre, Die Logik und die
andern logischen Wissenshaften, Formelbuch der Formenlehre oder Mathematik and all the published
parts of the Das Gebäude der Wissenschaften (Husserl 1994a, 159). However, most of them are not cut
open. Only the ‘‘Denklehre’’ (the first part, second half of ‘Gebäude des Wissens’) is completely opened,
of the other volumes only the preface is cut open (I owe this information to Carlo Ierna at the Husserl
Archives, Leuven).

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finally George Boole in great detail. Thus, it is also possible that Husserl’s
conception of logic was directly influenced by Boole as well.
Jean Van Heijenoort notoriously opposed the algebraic tradition to Frege’s
concept-script. The algebraic tradition from Leibniz to Boole, De Morgan, and
Jevons, according to him, copies mathematics ‘‘too closely, and often artificially’’
whereas Frege ‘‘freed logic from an artificial connection with mathematics but at the
same time prepared a deeper interrelation between these two sciences’’ (1967a, p. vi).
Frege is celebrated for having discovered quantification theory that Boole did not
have (1967b). However, as we saw above, Husserl included a theory of quantification
into his approach. In so doing he is again following Schröder who introduced R and
P into his 1891 Vorlesung. Within the algebra of logic tradition quantification was
developed independently of Frege by Charles S. Peirce and Peirce’s student Oscar
Howard Mitchell, whom also Schröder credits in his Vorlesung (Peckhaus 2004b).
The later representatives of the algebra of logic tradition include Whitehead, C.
I. Lewis, Löwenheim, and Tarski (Peckhaus 2004a, 558).
Thus, we may conclude that Husserl obviously adhered to general tenets of the
algebra of logic tradition. However, it is more difficult to single out whom in
particular Husserl is indebted to. Schröder’s influence on Husserl appears greatest
and most direct, but through Schröder and/or directly, Husserl was probably also
influenced by the Grassmanns, Boole, and Peirce. Accordingly, when considering
the question of who influenced Husserl in his development towards an antipsycho-
logistic view of logic these characters are the ones we should mention. Husserl read
their works, interacted with them, and learned from them. Husserl also used their
results in developing his own view of logic as a theoretical discipline, a view that
represents the algebra of logic tradition.
It should be noted that in the Logical Investigations Husserl takes an additional
step towards even a more general account of logic: he discusses an overall theory of
theories in the context of which individual theories should be examined and
compared to each other. On this occasion he mentions Cantor, Riemann,
Grassmann, Hamilton, and Lie to be developing something of the sort (2001b,
§§69, 70). Thus the algebraic theory of inference he maintains in his logic lectures
appears to be embedded into a more general framework. Husserl’s idea is that in it
the individual theories could be related to and compared with each other.

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