29
Humility
June Price Tangney
Although humility is commonly equated with
a sense of unworthiness and low self-regard,
true humility is a rich, multifaceted construct
that is characterized by an accurate assessment
of one’s characteristics, an ability to acknowl-
edge limitations, and a “forgetting of the self.”
In this chapter, I describe current conceptions of
humility, discuss the challenges in its measure-
ment, and review the scant empirical work ad-
dressing it directly and indirectly. I also will
discuss briefly interventions for enhancing
humility.
History of the Psychology of Humility:
Still at the Point of Humble Beginnings
Scientific study of humility is still in its
infancy. A review of the empirical literature
from the last 20 years yields only a handful
of research studies with any consideration of
this long-revered construct. Furthermore, in
virtually every case where humility is ad-
dressed, it has been tangential to the main re-
search focus.
Why has humility been neglected so long?
Two factors come readily to mind. First, the
concept of humility is linked to values and re-
ligion in many people’s minds. As a field, for
411
many years, mainstream psychology steered
clear of such value-laden topics as religion, vir-
tue, and (with the exception of Kohlberg’s
work on forms of moral thinking) morality. In
their zeal to establish psychology as a bona fide
science, psychological scientists embraced no-
tions of objectivity and fact. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the virtues as a group have been
relatively neglected in psychology. Until very
recently, wisdom, gratitude, and forgiveness,
for example, all represented “black holes” in
the literature based on a century of psycholog-
ical science.
A second factor undoubtedly contributing to
the neglect of humility is the lack of a well-
established measure of this construct. If you
can’t measure it, you can’t study it. Psychology
and the sciences in general are chock full of ex-
amples of how an advance in measurement can
lead to a dramatic expansion in empirical re-
search. For example, after years of neglect, the
scientific study of shame virtually exploded in
the early 1990s—shortly after the development
of several psychometrically sound, easily ad-
ministered measures of individual differences
in proneness to shame (Harder & Lewis, 1987;
Hoblitzelle, 1987; Tangney, 1990). As discussed
in greater detail later, measurement remains a
significant challenge in the area of humility.
412 PART V. SELF-BASED APPROACHES
Contrasting Conceptions of Humility
Another challenge facing psychological scien-
tists interested in humility centers on the vary-
ing definitions of the construct. For many, hu-
mility simply means holding oneself in low
regard. For example, in the Oxford English
Dictionary (1998), humility is defined as “the
quality of being humble or having a lowly opin-
ion of oneself; meekness, lowliness, humble-
ness: the opposite of pride or haughtiness.” In
other dictionaries, humility is defined largely as
a state of being “humble,” which in turn is de-
fined, for example, by Funk & Wagnalls Stan-
dard College Dictionary (1963) as “lowly in
kind, state, condition, etc.; of little worth; un-
important; common. . . . Lowly in feeling; lack-
ing self-esteem; having a sense of insignificance,
unworthiness, dependence, or sinfulness; meek;
penitent” (p. 653). From this “low self-esteem”
perspective, humility certainly does not stand
out as one of the more attractive virtues. For
example, most of us would have difficulty ap-
preciating a friend’s efforts to strengthen our
character by “humbling” us (e.g., making us
lower in state or condition, reducing possessions
or esteem, abasing us).
The “low self-esteem” conception of humility
is prevalent not only in dictionaries but also in
the psychological literature (e.g., Klein, 1992;
Knight & Nadel, 1986; Langston & Cantor,
1988; Weiss & Knight, 1980), as well as in com-
mon parlance. Nonetheless, it is clear that when
“experts” (e.g., philosophers, theologians, soci-
ologists, psychologists, and other “wise” per-
sons) delve into the broader significance of hu-
mility, they have a different—and much
richer—notion of this construct.
Emmons (1998) clearly articulated this alter-
native view of humility by stating:
Although humility is often equated in peo-
ple’s minds with low self-regard and tends
to activate images of a stooped-shouldered,
self-deprecating, weak-willed soul only too
willing to yield to the wishes of others, in
reality humility is the antithesis of this car-
icature. To be humble is not to have a low
opinion of oneself, it is to have an accurate
opinion of oneself. It is the ability to keep
one’s talents and accomplishments in per-
spective (Richards, 1992), to have a sense of
self-acceptance, an understanding of one’s
imperfections, and to be free from arrogance
and low self-esteem (Clark, 1992) (p. 33).
Templeton (1997) presents a similar conceptu-
alization of humility:
Humility is not self-deprecation. To believe
that you have no worth, or were created
somehow flawed or incompetent, can be
foolish. Humility represents wisdom. It is
knowing you were created with special tal-
ents and abilities to share with the world;
but it can also be an understanding that you
are one of many souls created by God, and
each has an important role to play in life.
Humility is knowing you are smart, but not
all-knowing. It is accepting that you have
personal power, but are not omnipotent. . . .
Inherent in humility resides an open and
receptive mind. . . . it leaves us more open to
learn from others and refrains from seeing
issues and people only in blacks and whites.
The opposite of humility is arrogance—the
belief that we are wiser or better than oth-
ers. Arrogance promotes separation rather
than community. It looms like a brick wall
between us and those from whom we could
learn. (pp. 162–163)
For many, there is a religious dimension to
humility—the recognition that “God infinitely
exceeds anything anyone has ever said of Him,
and that He is infinitely beyond human com-
prehension and understanding” (Templeton,
1997, p. 30; see also Schimmel, 1997). Here, too,
the emphasis is not on human sinfulness, un-
worthiness, and inadequacy but rather on the
notion of a higher, greater power and the im-
plication that, although we may have consider-
able wisdom and knowledge, there always are
limits to our perspective. Humility carries with
it an open-mindedness, a willingness to admit
mistakes and seek advice, and a desire to learn
(Hwang, 1982; Templeton, 1997).
Also inherent in the state of humility is a
relative lack of self-focus or self-preoccupation.
Templeton (1997) refers to a process of becom-
ing “unselved,” which goes hand in hand with
the recognition of one’s place in the world. A
person who has gained a sense of humility is
no longer phenomenologically at the center of
his or her world. The focus is on the larger com-
munity, of which he or she is one part. From
this perspective, the excessively self-deprecating
person can be seen, in some important respects,
as lacking humility. Consider the person who
repeatedly protests, “Oh, I’m not really very
good in art. I never did very well in art class at

school. Oh, this little painting that I did really
is nothing. I just whipped it together last night.
It (my painting) is really nothing.” Such appar-
ently humble protests betray a marked self-
focus. The person remains at the center of at-
tention, with the self as the focus of con-
sideration and evaluation.
In relinquishing the very human tendency
toward an egocentric focus, persons with hu-
mility become ever more open to recognizing
the abilities, potential, worth, and importance of
others. One important consequence of becoming
“unselved” is that we no longer have the need
to enhance and defend an all-important self at
the expense of our evaluation of others (Hall-
ing, Kunz, & Rowe, 1994). Our attention shifts
outward, and our eyes are opened to the beauty
and potential in those around us. As Means,
Wilson, Sturm, Biron, and Bach (1990) ob-
served, humility “is an increase in the valuation
of others and not a decrease in the valuation of
oneself” (p. 214). Myers (1979) effectively cap-
tured these latter two elements of humility,
stating:
The true end of humility is not self-
contempt. . . . To paraphrase C. S. Lewis,
humility does not consist in handsome
people trying to believe they are ugly, and
clever people trying to believe they are
fools. . . . True humility is more like self-
forgetfulness. . . . It leaves people free to es-
teem their special talents and, with the same
honesty, to esteem their neighbor’s. Both
the neighbor’s talents and one’s own are
recognized as gifts and, like one’s height,
are not fit subjects for either inordinate
pride or self-deprecation. (p. 38)
In the theological, philosophical, and psycho-
logical literatures, therefore, humility is por-
trayed as a rich, multifaceted construct, in sharp
contrast to dictionary definitions that emphasize
a sense of unworthiness and low self-regard.
Specifically, the key elements of humility seem
to include:
• an accurate assessment of one’s abilities and
achievements (not low self-esteem, self-
deprecation)
• an ability to acknowledge one’s mistakes,
imperfections, gaps in knowledge, and limi-
tations (often vis-à-vis a “higher power”)
• openness to new ideas, contradictory infor-
mation, and advice
CHAPTER 29. HUMILITY 413
• keeping one’s abilities and accomplishments—
one’s place in the world—in perspective
(e.g., seeing oneself as just one person in the
larger scheme of things)
• a relatively low self-focus, a “forgetting of
the self,” while recognizing that one is but
part of the larger universe
• an appreciation of the value of all things, as
well as the many different ways that people
and things can contribute to our world
What Humility Is Not
Humility is a rich psychological construct that
is related to, but conceptually distinct from, fa-
miliar constructs such as narcissism, modesty,
and self-esteem. Clearly, from the foregoing
discussion, humility is not low self-esteem
(Ryan, 1983), nor is it an underestimation of
one’s abilities, accomplishments, or worth. Fur-
thermore, as explained subsequently, humility
is related to, but distinct from, modesty and
narcissism.
The concept of modesty focuses primarily on
a moderate estimate of personal merits or
achievements. As such, modesty does not cap-
ture other key aspects of humility such as a
“forgetting of the self” and an appreciation of
the variety of ways in which others can be
“worthy.” Rather, use of the term “modesty”
often extends into issues of propriety in behav-
ior and dress, where the notion of humility is
less relevant. Thus, modesty is both too narrow,
missing fundamental components of humility,
and too broad, relating also to bodily exposure
and other dimensions of propriety. One might
view modesty—in the sense of an accurate,
unexaggerated estimation of one’s strengths—
as a component of humility. But it does not tell
the whole story.
The construct of narcissism is perhaps most
closely related to humility. People who are nar-
cissistic clearly lack humility. It is not clear,
however, that an absence of narcissism can be
equated with the presence of humility. In con-
ceptualizing narcissism, social psychologists
tend to focus on grandiosity, an exaggerated
sense of self-importance, and an overestimation
of one’s abilities. But there’s much more to the
clinical conceptions of narcissism. Clinical the-
orists, drawing on a long history of “object re-
lations,” typically use the term narcissism to
refer to a distinctly pathological form of self-
focus and fluctuating self-regard, which stems
from fundamental defects in the self system
414 PART V. SELF-BASED APPROACHES
(e.g., Kohut, 1971). When clinicians refer to a
person with narcissism, they generally have in
mind a seriously disturbed individual who ex-
hibits pervasive adjustment difficulties that go
hand in hand with a DSM-IV (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1994) diagnosis of person-
ality disorder. This is not simply an over-
confident, conceited dolt, but rather someone
with a damaged sense of self. Attempts to shore
up the self with unrealistic fantasies of grandi-
osity inevitably alternate with a grinding sense
of emptiness and self-loathing. Other hallmarks
of narcissism include a pervasive self-focus and
a corresponding inability to focus on and em-
pathize with others.
Narcissistic individuals clearly lack many of
the essential components of humility. But it is
not clear that people who score low on a mea-
sure of narcissism necessarily embody humility.
People low on narcissism may or may not make
accurate assessments of their abilities and
achievements. For example, low-self-esteem,
self-deprecating individuals are neither narcis-
sistic nor paragons of humility. Similarly, peo-
ple without narcissistic tendencies may or may
not have the wisdom to keep their places in the
world in perspective (e.g., seeing themselves as
one person in the larger scheme of things).
They may or may not have a deep appreciation
for the unique gifts and talents of others.
In defining complex constructs such as hu-
mility, as well as in developing measurement
instruments, it is important to specify how the
focal construct differs from other related but
distinct concepts. As underscored by Campbell
and Fiske (1959), discriminant validity is a crit-
ical component of measurement validation. It is
important to know not only that a measure cor-
relates well (positively or negatively) with
(measures of) other relevant constructs in a the-
oretically meaningful way. It is also important
to demonstrate that the measure does not cor-
relate too highly with (or behave identically to)
established measures of some other construct.
Measures that are “confounded” by items
tapping other nonfocal constructs not only pre-
sent conceptual ambiguity but also impede sci-
ence by blurring the boundaries between con-
structs, inadvertently precluding the possibility
of studying functional relations among them.
For example, in the case of forgiveness, it is im-
possible to examine meaningfully the functional
relationship between empathy and forgiveness
if one uses a forgiveness measure that includes
items tapping empathy. In short, it is important
to decide where to draw the conceptual line.
Measurement of Humility: Two Levels of
Measurement, Two Levels of Questions
Halling et al. (1994) observed that doing re-
search on humility is humbling. Quite possibly,
the quest for a reliable and valid measure of
humility is the most humbling aspect of re-
search on this topic. By its very nature, the con-
struct of humility poses some special challenges
in the area of measurement. As a consequence,
psychological scientists have yet to develop a
well-validated tool for assessing humility. This
is a glaring gap in the literature, because with-
out a solid assessment method, the science
pretty much comes to a halt. It is also worth
noting that psychologists are most likely to de-
velop strong, meaningful measures when those
measures are informed by theory. Although we
have some clear definitions of humility, com-
prehensive theories or models need to be de-
veloped and refined, which in turn would form
a solid foundation for assessment.
Theoretically, humility could be assessed at
two distinct levels—at the level of states and at
the level of dispositions. A dispositional assess-
ment would focus on stable, individual differ-
ences in humility. In this context, humility
would be viewed as a component of one’s per-
sonality, as a relatively enduring disposition
that a person brings to many different kinds of
situations. In contrast, a state measure would
focus on feelings or experiences of humility “in
the moment.” Personality and individual differ-
ences aside, most of us have humility in some
situations but not in others.
Regarding dispositional humility, a few op-
tions presently are available to researchers, but
each has significant drawbacks. In several earlier
studies, humility has been operationalized as
low self-esteem (e.g., Weiss & Knight, 1980),
but this clearly is inconsistent with broader con-
ceptualizations of humility. In fact, theoreti-
cally, scores on self-esteem measures such as
the Rosenberg (1965) and Janis and Fields
(1956) scales should be positively correlated
with (although not identical to) individual dif-
ferences in humility. Consider the types of
items included on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (rated on a scale of 1 to 5, from “always
false” to “always true”): “I feel that I’m a per-

son of worth, at least on an equal plane with
others” and “I feel I have a number of good
qualities.” The person with a true sense of hu-
mility would be expected to endorse such items
positively, not negatively.
Taking a different approach, Farh, Dobbins,
and Cheng (1991) and Yu and Murphy (1993)
operationalized workers’ “modesty” by compar-
ing self-ratings to ratings made of them by
knowledgeable others (e.g., supervisors and co-
workers). Those who rated themselves lower
than their supervisors were viewed as showing
a “modesty bias.” Here, too, there are some
conceptual ambiguities with such “self versus
knowledgeable other” comparisons. Given that
humility theoretically entails an accurate as-
sessment of one’s abilities, one could argue that
high humility should be indexed by high levels
of agreement between self and other, not self-
deprecating discrepancies.
Emmons (personal communication, Decem-
ber 4, 1998) attempted to develop a self-report
measure of humility. Using a forced-choice for-
mat to circumvent social desirability biases, Em-
mons developed an array of theoretically de-
rived items tapping the diverse components of
humility described previously. The measure is
well crafted in design and content. Unfortu-
nately, Emmons’s initial analyses of the mea-
sure’s internal reliability were disappointing,
and he is now rather skeptical that this con-
struct can be adequately assessed via self-report.
With regard to experiences of humility “in
the moment,” currently there is no established
self-report measure of state humility. But Ex-
line, Bushman, Faber, and Phillips (2000) re-
cently developed a technique for experimentally
inducing a sense of humility by asking people
to write about “a time when they felt humble
or experienced a sense of humility” versus “a
time when they felt important or had a sense
of importance.” Based on results from an initial
study, some complications arise in using this
technique to prime humility. Specifically, peo-
ple receiving humility instructions wrote two
very different types of narratives. The majority
of persons described instances in which they felt
bad about themselves for doing something stu-
pid or wrong. For this group, the instructions
seemed to prime a sense of humiliation or
shame rather than a sense of humility. A
smaller subset of respondents described events
that seemed more directly to the experience of
humility—for example, situations that evoked a
CHAPTER 29. HUMILITY 415
“forgetting of the self” or that caused respon-
dents to see themselves in a broader context.
Thus, in using the Exline et al. (2000) priming
technique, it is important to distinguish be-
tween stories involving humiliation versus hu-
mility themes. In addition, some modifications
to the instructions may be necessary in order to
more consistently elicit stories of “true” hu-
mility rather than shaming experiences.
No doubt, psychologists will continue efforts
to develop psychometrically sound measures of
both state and dispostional humility in the
years to come. It is worth noting that research-
ers generally rely on self-report methods for as-
sessing personality traits. In the case of humil-
ity, however, there is a potentially serious catch.
To the degree that a key component of humility
is a “forgetting of the self,” self-reflection and
self-report of one’s level of humility may be
oxymoronic. What do we make of a person who
views him- or herself as someone with “unu-
sually high humility”? As Halling et al. (1994)
point out, “One can reflect on one’s own ex-
perience of fear, isolation, or self-rejection, but
the attention during the experience of humility
is directed toward others” (p. 121). Similarly,
Singh (1967) observed that “true humility is
freedom from all consciousness of self, which
includes freedom from the consciousness of hu-
mility. The truly humble man never knows that
he is humble” (p. 4).
There are good reasons for psychologists’
preference for self-report measures of person-
ality traits. Traits such as humility are not eas-
ily inferred from quick observation. Also, sys-
tematic behavioral observational methods are
cumbersome and time-consuming. So there is a
strong preference for paper-and-pencil ques-
tionnaires that require little time and training
to administer and score. But humility may rep-
resent a rare personality construct that is simply
unamenable to direct self-report methods. Thus,
the present bottom line is that the measurement
of humility remains an unsolved challenge in
psychology.
Psychological and Social Implications
of Humility: Relevant Empirical Research
Researchers have yet to directly address the
psychology of humility and develop a theory-
based, reliable, and valid measure. Some in-
sights can be gleaned, however, from related ar-
416 PART V. SELF-BASED APPROACHES
eas of psychological research. In this section, I
provide a brief review of relevant findings from
related literatures.
Basic research on the self and its operations
suggests that humility may be a relatively rare
human characteristic. The pervasiveness of
“self-enhancement biases” is underscored in the
social psychological literature (Baumeister,
1998; Greenwald, 1980). From this literature,
we learn that the self is remarkably resourceful
at accentuating the positive and deflecting the
negative. For example, research consistently
shows that people are inclined to take credit for
“their” successes but blame other factors for
“their” failures and transgressions (Baumeister,
Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Snyder, Higgins, &
Stucky, 1983; Zuckerman, 1979). As another
example, people are more likely to notice, think
about, and remember positive information
about themselves, with negative information
being “lost in the shuffle” (Mischel, Ebbesen, &
Zeiss, 1976). Indeed based on this self-
enhancement literature, one might infer that
humility is quite antithetical with human na-
ture.
Nonetheless, people apparently can control
the degree to which they self-enhance in re-
sponse to situational demands. On this point,
Tice, Butler, Muraven, and Stillwell (1995)
demonstrated that people adjust their self-
enhancement according to the nature of the so-
cial setting, showing more modesty in the com-
pany of friends than strangers.
Whether with friends or strangers, some de-
gree of humility may be beneficial. The benefits
of modesty—especially “moderate” modesty—
have been underscored in numerous studies
(Baumeister & Ilko, 1995; Bond, Leung, & Wan,
1982; Forsyth, Berger, & Mitchell, 1981; Jones
& Wortman, 1973; Robinson, Johnson, &
Shields, 1995). People like and feel less threat-
ened by others who are modest about their
achievements, whereas boastful, arrogant be-
havior often results in social disapproval. The
benefits of modesty seem to extend beyond pos-
itive evaluation in purely social contexts. In an-
swer to the objection that “you can’t get ahead
without tooting your own horn,” Wosinka, Da-
bul, Whetstone-Dion, and Cialdini (1996) have
provided some evidence that modesty can be at-
tractive in work contexts, as well.
Likewise, tendencies toward self-enhance-
ment, grandiosity, and narcissism bode poorly
for long-term adjustment, especially in the in-
terpersonal realm (Ehrenberg, Hunter, & Elter-
man, 1996; Means et al., 1990). Although much
has been written about the benefits of various
“positive illusions” (Brown, 1993; Taylor &
Brown, 1988, 1994), researchers also have
shown repeatedly that tendencies toward self-
enhancement are problematic. Specifically, psy-
chological maladjustment is associated with the
degree to which people rate themselves more
favorably than others rate them (Asendorpf &
Ostendorf, 1998; Colvin, Block, & Funder,
1995). Joiner and Perez (2000) also found that
people who are immodest (relative to how oth-
ers rate them) are more inclined toward physical
aggression than are their more modest peers.
Along the same lines, researchers have shown
that narcissistic individuals are sensitive to in-
terpersonal slights, quick to anger, and less in-
clined to forgive others (Exline & Baumeister,
2000; Exline, Campbell, Baumeister, Joiner, &
Krueger, in press; Sandage, Worthington,
Hight, & Berry, 1999; Tangney, Boone, Fee, &
Reinsmith, 1999). From these findings, one
might infer that a sense of humility inhibits an-
ger and aggression and fosters forgiveness.
In one of the few studies to explicitly address
the psychology of humility, Exline et al. (2000)
found results suggestive of a link between hu-
mility and forgiveness. People who were suc-
cessfully primed to experience humility (e.g.,
who wrote personal accounts of a non-self-
deprecating humility experience) were slower to
retaliate in response to provocation on a labo-
ratory task. In contrast, individuals primed to
feel morally superior judged another person’s
transgression more harshly and as less forgiv-
able.
Humility not only implies an accurate as-
sessment of oneself (neither unduly favorable
nor unfavorable) but also entails a “forgetting
of the self,” an outwardly directed orientation
toward a world in which one is “just one part.”
This process of becoming “unselved” may have
significant psychological and physical benefits.
Clinicians have long noted the links between
excessive self-focus and a broad range of psy-
chological symptoms, including anxiety, depres-
sion, social phobias, and so on. As Baumeister
(1991) argues, there are many advantages to
“escaping the self,” not the least of which is a
relief from the burden of self-preoccupation
(Halling et. al., 1994) and the “Western” im-
perative to defend the vulnerable self. Even in
the area of physical health, researchers suggest

that excessive self-focus is a risk factor for cor-
onary heart disease (Fontana, Rosenberg, Burg,
Kerns, & Colonese, 1990; Scherwitz & Canick,
1988).
Interventions to Enhance Humility?
Psychologists have not developed interventions
aimed specifically at promoting humility, al-
though many therapies include components
that may do so. A focus on “humility promo-
tion” is most likely to be observed in the treat-
ment of narcissistic personality disorder. For ex-
ample, cognitive-behavioral therapy of the
disorder may include efforts to reduce the cli-
ent’s egocentric bias—correcting “cognitive dis-
tortions” regarding the centrality and impor-
tance of the self relative to others, reducing
self-serving biases, and so forth. Beyond the
treatment of narcissism per se, many psycho-
therapies inevitably touch on philosophical and
existential issues centrally relevant to a sense of
humility. Insight-oriented, humanistic, and ex-
istential therapies are especially likely to include
examination and exploration of one’s place in
the world. Finally, a common goal in virtually
all “talk” therapies is to help clients develop a
realistic assessment and acceptance of both their
strengths and their weaknesses.
Outside of the therapist’s office, parents,
teachers, heroes, and community leaders all
play a role in modeling (or not modeling) a
sense of humility for the subsequent genera-
tion. Throughout their early years, children
learn important lessons about themselves, the
world, and their place in the world. As they ma-
ture, a sense of humility may be further fos-
tered by exposure to different peoples and
cultures, by life-changing events (a life-
threatening illness, a serious accident, birth of
a child, dissolution of a marriage), by religious
beliefs, or via other types of “transcendental”
experiences.
Future Directions
As one of the classic “virtues,” humility has a
well-deserved place in positive psychology. Al-
though little research has directly examined
causes and consequences of humility, psycho-
logical science provides a good deal of indirect
evidence supporting its presumed virtues. Con-
CHAPTER 29. HUMILITY 417
sistent with age-old wisdom, a sense of humility
appears beneficial for both the individual and
his or her social group. But this is nearly virgin
territory, and many intriguing questions re-
main. In what specific domains is a sense of hu-
mility adaptive? And via what mechanisms?
Are there circumstances in which humility is a
liability? Are there important gender and/or
cultural differences in the meaning and impli-
cations of humility? How can parents, teachers,
and therapists foster an adaptive sense of hu-
mility? Certainly at the top of the research
agenda is the need for continued efforts to de-
velop a well-articulated theoretical framework
and associated psychological measures of both
state and dispositional humility. Armed with a
solid conceptual and measurement base, scien-
tists will no doubt develop a clearer picture of
this long-neglected source of human strength.
Acknowledgments Many thanks to members
of our “humility” reading group—Luis ClaviJo,
Rosangela Di Manto, Andy Drake, Ronda Fee,
Ramineh Kangarloo, Jean No, and Justin Rez-
nick—for their invaluable insights, and to Bob
Emmons for his wisdom and advice. Preparation
of this chapter was supported in part by a grant
from the John Templeton Foundation. Portions
were adapted from Tangney (2000).
References
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diag-
nostic and statistical manual of mental disor-
ders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Asendorpf, J. B., & Ostendorf, F. (1998). Is self-
enhancement healthy? Conceptual, psychomet-
ric, and empirical analysis. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 74, 955–966.
Baumeister, R. F. (1991). Escaping the self: Alco-
holism, spirituality, masochism, and other
flights from the burden of selfhood. New York:
Basic Books.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert,
S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook
of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 680–740). New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Baumeister, R. F., & Ilko, S. A. (1995). Shallow
gratitude: Public and private acknowledgement
of external help in accounts of success. Basic and
Applied Social Psychology, 16, 191–209.
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A., & Wotman, S. R.
(1990). Victim and perpetrator accounts of in-
418 PART V. SELF-BASED APPROACHES
terpersonal conflict: Autobiographical narratives
about anger. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 59, 994–1005.
Bond, M. H., Leung, K., & Wan, K. C. (1982). The
social impact of self-effacing attributions: The
Chinese case. Journal of Social Psychology, 118,
157–166.
Brown, J. D. (1993). Coping with stress: The ben-
eficial role of positive illusions. In A. P. Turn-
bull, J. M. Patterson, S. K. Behr, D. L. Murphy,
J. G. Marquis, & M. J. Blue-Banning (Eds.),
Cognitive coping, families, and disability
(pp. 123–137). Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes.
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Conver-
gent and discriminant validation by the
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological
Bulletin, 56, 81–105.
Clark, A. T. (1992). Humility. In D. H. Ludlow
(Ed.), Encyclopedia of Mormonism (pp. 663–
664). New York: Macmillan.
Colvin, C. R., Block, J., & Funder, D. C. (1995).
Overly positive self-evaluations and personality:
Negative implications for mental health. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 1152–
1162.
Ehrenberg, M. F., Hunter, M. A., & Elterman,
M. F. (1996). Shared parenting agreements after
marital separation: The roles of empathy and
narcissism. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 64, 808–818.
Emmons, R. A. (1998). The psychology of ultimate
concern: Personality, spirituality, and intelli-
gence. Unpublished manuscript, University of
California at Davis.
Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000.). [Narcis-
sism, grudges, and forgiveness]. Unpublished
raw data, Case Western Reserve University.
Exline, J. J., Bushman, B., Faber, J., & Phillips, C.
(2000, February). Pride gets in the way: Self-
protection works against forgiveness. In J. J. Ex-
line (Chair), Ouch! Who said forgiveness was
easy? Symposium conducted at the annual
meeting of the Society for Personality and So-
cial Psychology, Nashville, TN.
Exline, J. J., Campbell, K. W., Baumeister, R. F.,
Joiner, T. E., & Krueger, J. (in press). Bringing
ourselves down to size: Toward a positive psy-
chology of humility. American Psychologist.
Farh, J. L., Dobbins, G. H., & Cheng, B. S. (1991).
Cultural relativity in action: A comparison of
self-ratings made by Chinese and U.S. workers.
Personnel Psychology, 44, 129–147.
Fontana, A. F., Rosenberg, R. L., Burg, M. M.,
Kerns, R. D., & Colonese, K. L. (1990). Type A
behavior and self-referencing: Interactive risk
factors? Journal of Social Behavior and Person-
ality, 5, 215–232.
Forsyth, D. R., Berger, R. E., & Mitchell, T. (1981).
The effect of self-serving versus other-serving
claims of responsibility on attraction and attri-
butions in groups. Social Psychology Quarterly,
44, 59–64.
Funk & Wagnalls. (1963). Standard College
Dictionary. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World.
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fab-
rication and revision of personal history. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 35, 603–618.
Halling, S., Kunz, G., & Rowe, J. O. (1994). The
contributions of dialogal psychology to phe-
nomenological research. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 34, 109–131.
Harder, D. W., & Lewis, S. J. (1987). The assess-
ment of shame and guilt. In J. N. Butcher &
C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Advances in personal-
ity assessment (Vol. 6, pp. 89–114). Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Hoblitzelle, W. (1987). Attempts to measure and
differentiate shame and guilt: The relation be-
tween shame and depression. In H. B. Lewis
(Ed.), The role of shame in symptom formation
(pp. 207–235). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hwang, C. (1982). Studies in Chinese personality:
A critical review. Bulletin of Educational Psy-
chology, 15, 227–242.
Janis, I. L., & Fields, P. B. (1956). A behavioral as-
sessment of persuasibility: Consistency of indi-
vidual differences. Sociometry, 19, 241–259.
Joiner, T. E., & Perez, M. (2000). Threatened ego-
tism and self-reported physical aggression
among undergraduates and their roommates.
Manuscript submitted for publication.
Jones, E. E., & Wortman, C. (1973). Ingratiation:
An attributional approach. Morristown, NJ:
General Learning Press.
Klein, D. C. (1992). Managing humiliation. Journal
of Primary Prevention, 12, 255–268.
Knight, P. A., & Nadel, J. I. (1986). Humility re-
visited: Self-esteem, information search, and
policy consistency. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 38, 196–206.
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New
York: International Universities Press.
Langston, C. A., & Cantor, N. (1988). Social anx-
iety and social constraint: When making friends
is hard. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 56, 649–661.
Means, J. R., Wilson, G. L., Sturm, C., Biron, J. E.,
& Bach, P. J. (1990). Theory and practice:
Humility as a psychotherapeutic formulation.
Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 3, 211–
215.
Mischel, W., Ebbesen, E. B., & Zeiss, A. R. (1976).
Determinants of selective memory about the

self. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psy-
chology, 44, 92–103.
Myers, D. G. (1979). The inflated self: Human il-
lusions and the biblical call to hope. New York:
Seabury.
Oxford English Dictionary. (1998). [On-line].
Available: http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/oed-
bin/oed-id?id⫽191647477
Richards, N. (1992). Humility. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Robinson, M. D., Johnson, J. T., & Shields, S. A.
(1995). On the advantages of modesty: The ben-
efits of a balanced self-presentation. Communi-
cation Research, 22, 575–591.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent
self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Ryan, D. S. (1983). Self-esteem: An operational
definition and ethical analysis. Journal of Psy-
chology and Theology, 11, 295–302.
Sandage, S. J., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Hight, T. L.,
& Berry, J. W. (2000). Seeking forgiveness: The-
oretical context and an initial empirical study.
Journal of Psychology and Theology, 28, 21–35.
Scherwitz, L., & Canick, J. C. (1988). Self-reference
and coronary heart disease risk. In B. K. Hous-
ton & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Type A behavior pat-
tern: Research, theory, and intervention
(pp. 146–167). New York: Wiley.
Schimmel, S. (1997). The seven deadly sins. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Singh, S. K. (1967). Untitled [On-line]. Available:
www.humboldt1.com/⬃jiva/humility.html
Snyder, C. R., Higgins, R. L., & Stucky, R. (1983).
Excuses: Masquerades in search of grace. New
York: Wiley-Interscience.
Tangney, J. P. (1990). Assessing individual differ-
ences in proneness to shame and guilt: Devel-
opment of the self-conscious affect and
attribution inventory. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 59, 102–111.
CHAPTER 29. HUMILITY 419
Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical per-
spectives, empirical findings, and directions for
future research. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 19, 70–82.
Tangney, J. P., Boone, A. L., Fee, R., & Reinsmith,
C. (1999). Individual differences in the propen-
sity to forgive: Measurement and implications
for psychological and social adjustment. Fairfax,
VA: George Mason University.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and
well-being: A social psychological perspective on
mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193–
210.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1994). Positive illu-
sions and well-being revisited: Separating fact
from fiction. Psychological Bulletin, 116, 21–27.
Templeton, J. M. (1997). Worldwide laws of life.
Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press.
Tice, D. M., Butler, J. L., Muraven, M. B., & Still-
well, A. M. (1995). When modesty prevails: Dif-
ferential favorability of self-presentation to
friends and strangers. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 69, 1120–1138.
Weiss, H. M., & Knight, P. A. (1980). The utility
of humility: Self-esteem, information search,
and problem-solving efficiency. Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 25, 216–
223.
Wosinska, W., Dabul, A. J., Whetstone-Dion, R.,
& Cialdini, R. B. (1996). Self-presentational re-
sponses to success in the organization: The costs
and benefits of modesty. Basic and Applied So-
cial Psychology, 18, 229–242.
Yu, J., & Murphy, K. R. (1993). Modesty bias in
self-ratings of performance: A test of the cul-
tural relativity hypothesis. Personnel Psychol-
ogy, 46, 357–363.
Zuckerman, M. (1979). Attribution of success and
failure revisited: or The motivational bias is
alive and well in attribution theory. Journal of
Personality, 47, 245–287.