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“In The End of the Rhetorical Presidency, Diane Heith has written a well-crafted and
entirely readable discussion of the Trump presidency as understood through his efforts
at rhetorical leadership. It is useful for anyone interested in understanding Donald
Trump’s relationship to the history and practices of presidential rhetoric. Heith notes
that much of what Trump has done and is doing as president is consistent with broad
patterns of that leadership, but also finds that his presidency reveals an important
struggle between the hyper-individualized and importantly institutional valences of
the office.Trump’s tendency to favor individual over institutional aspects has damaged
his ability to govern even while concentrating attention on his rhetorical style.”
Mary E. Stuckey, Pennsylvania State University
“Diane Heith’s new study of presidential communication examines how and why
President Trump has barreled through one executive branch norm after another on
his way to dominating Washington policy-making and the never-ending news cycle.
This vital work, sure to be a winner with students and scholars, offers an effective and
accessible analysis of White House self-marketing during a roller-coaster presidency
like no other.”
Stephen Farnsworth, University of Mary Washington
“Donald Trump has forever altered the rhetorical presidency and Diane Heith’s
absorbing work demonstrates exactly how he did so. Anyone interested in the nar-
rowing of the public presidency because of the splintering of partisans – and the
future of presidential communication – will want to read this topical book.”
Brandon Rottinghaus, University of Houston
“For those struggling with whether Trump is an anomaly or a glimpse of things to

come for the institution of the presidency, Diane Heith offers important and much-
needed insight. She captures the struggle within the Trump presidency between the
institutional and the individual, and shows how the individual is winning. Students
of the presidency will benefit enormously from Heith’s situating Trump’s rhetoric in
the larger context of recent presidents, clearly showing where Trump is well within
institutional structures, and where his devolved approach to rhetorical leadership is
truly unprecedented.”
Donna R. Hoffman, University of Northern Iowa
THE END OF THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY?
The End of the Rhetorical Presidency? Public Leadership in the Trump Era explores one of
the most disruptive aspects of the Trump presidency.
Since the FDR administration, presidents developed the capacity and skill to use
the public to influence the legislative arena, gain reelection, survive scandal and secure
their legacy. Consequently, presidential rhetorical leadership has its own norms and
expectations. Comparing President Trump’s communications apparatus as well as
rhetoric (including Twitter) to previous presidents, Diane Heith demonstrates how
Trump exercises leadership by adhering to some of these norms and expectations, but
rejects, abandons and undermines most. Heith argues that his individual, rather than
institutional, approach to leadership represents a change in tone, language and style.
She concludes that the loss of skill and capacity represents a devolution of the White
House institution dedicated to public leadership, especially in the legislative arena.
More significantly, the individual approach emphasizes weakening the ability of the
press and other political elites to hold the president accountable.
This book will appeal to students and scholars of the presidency as well as general
readers who quest for a deeper understanding of the Trump White House.
Diane J. Heith is Professor of Government and Politics at St. John’s University. She is
the author of several works on the presidency, public opinion, campaigns and elections,
and the media including, The Presidential Road Show: Public Leadership in an Era of Party
Polarization and Media Fragmentation (2013), and Polling to Govern: Public Opinion and
Presidential Leadership (2004). She is co-author of Presidents and the American Presidency
(2018) and the 2016 Presidential Election Guide (2016) and co-editor of In the Public
Domain: Presidents and the Challenges of Public Leadership (2005). Her work has appeared
in The New York Times, Public Opinion Quarterly, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Political
Science Quarterly, The Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, The Journal of Women,
Politics and Policy, White House Studies and Congress and the Presidency.
THE END OF
THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY?
Public Leadership in the
Trump Era
Diane J. Heith
First published 2021
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Taylor & Francis
The right of Diane J. Heith to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this title has been requested
ISBN: 978-0-367-52254-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-52250-6 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-05717-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
For Owen and Steve, three is always the magic number
CONTENTS
List of Figures x
List of Tables xi
Preface xii
Acknowledgments xv
1 Influences on Opportunities for Leadership 1
2 The Tools of the Rhetorical Presidency 25
3 A Different National Voice 52
4 Friends, Foes, Frenemies and Public Leadership 68
5 Individual Leadership as Communication Strategy 83
6 Rhetorical Leadership during Impeachment 108
7 Public Leadership after Donald Trump 136
Index 148
FIGURES
1.1 Systemic Influences on Presidential Leadership as the

Media Evolves 8
2.1 Obama White House Web Links 35
2.2 Trump White House Web Links 36
2.3 White House External Web Links 37
5.1 Legislative Content in Rhetoric 89
5.2 Unilateral Content in Rhetoric 91
5.3 Comparing Presidential Approval 95
6.1 Tweeting during Impeachment Crisis 118
6.2 Content of Impeachment Tweeting 120
6.3 Impeachment Tweet Content 121
6.4 Nixon Approval during the Watergate Crisis 128
6.5 Clinton Approval during Impeachment 129
6.6 Trump Approval Rating 130
TABLES
2.1 Communications Staff Positions 27

2.2 2016 Campaign Staff Postings 28
2.3 Public Leadership Efforts 32
3.1 National Addresses 54
3.2 Presidential National Speech 55
3.3 Comparing Presidential National Speech 58
3.4 Comparing National to Local Speech (within Presidents) 60
3.5 Local Addresses 61
3.6 Twitter Speech 63
3.7 Trump Twitter Speech Comparison 64
5.1 Status of Top 2016 Campaign Promises 86
5.2 Legislative Content 86
5.3 Unilateral Content 93
5.4 Margin of Victory in Reelection 100
6.1 Tone of Trump’s Impeachment Twitter 118
6.2 Comparing Impeachment Tweets to Trump Rhetoric 119
6.3 Clinton Partisan Impeachment Support 131
7.1 2020 Candidates’ Twitter Followers 145
PREFACE
The first week of February 2020 saw the public presidency on full display. On
Sunday, February 2, President Trump gave an interview on Fox News during
the Super Bowl pregame show; according to Nielson, 10.3 million watched the
President, up from 8.1 million in 2019. On February 4, President Trump delivered
the State of the Union address, unusual for its large number of guests highlighted
by the President and included the awarding of the Presidential Medal of Freedom
to radio host Rush Limbaugh. On Wednesday February 5, the Senate acquitted
President Trump in his impeachment trial, however, he was the first impeached
president to receive a vote to convict from a member of his own party. On Thursday
February 6, President Trump upbraided Utah Senator Mitt Romney for his vote,
first on Twitter and then at the National Prayer Breakfast, saying
I don’t like people who use their faith as justification for doing what
they know is wrong. Nor do I like people who say, “I pray for you,”
when they know that that’s not so. So many people have been hurt, and
we can’t let that go on.
He continued to discuss the consequences of impeachment in an impromptu

interaction with reporters on the way to Marine One, “Well, I think there’s a lot
of evil on that side. They’ve gone crazy. They’ve gone totally crazy; it’s too bad.…
But they’re not constructive people.”
Thus, in this first week of February (which also included the debacle of the
Democratic Iowa caucus delay in awarding delegates), the President employed the
standard rhetorical outreach used by presidents to exercise public leadership for
decades. In addition to the traditional large and small speeches produced in con-
cert with his Communications staff, President Trump also tweeted and retweeted
Preface xiii
146 times, employing a new tool for presidential leadership, which includes no
input from staff. Illustrating a singular rhetorical style, President Trump dimin-
ished, demeaned and cursed his opponents in a 62-minute extemporaneous
White House East Room harangue before supporters. The event was open to
reporters but was not a press conference. The only questioning during the week
from reporters took place with Marine One’s helicopter blades spinning so loudly,
uncomfortable questions were easily ignored.
This one fraught week in February reflects the central tensions in this book.
President Trump’s election and presidency has been disruptive: to the political
system, to norms, to expectations and to the presidency.The exercise of rhetorical
leadership was an area of institutional expansion for the presidency, until President
Trump. Presidents since FDR have advanced the use of the public, as well as an
institution to support that usage, to achieve their goals, primarily in the legislative
arena. By embracing the individual over the institution, most aspects, albeit not all,
of President Trump’s rhetorical leadership efforts are strikingly different, particu-
larly in comparison to his immediate predecessors.
Investigating the state of the Trump communications apparatus, as well as his
use of it, reveals an institution responsive to the pressures that gave rise to the
traditional public presidency. Moreover, President Trump’s electoral circumstances
alongside the media environment in which he worked still shape the strategies
available to the President as they similarly shaped his predecessors’ context for
leadership. Given the narrowness of President Trump’s victory and the compli-
cated and disaggregated media environment he faced, the choice of a base-driven
strategy was a given, not a disruption. Moreover, by comparing the tone of pres-
idential rhetoric, I find the institution remains present in long-standing presiden-
tial behaviors, like the State of the Union. Even when President Trump’s rhetoric
and performance seems utterly different on the national stage, statistical analysis of
the tone and content suggest his efforts to exercise national leadership inhabit the
existing leadership continuum.
Nevertheless, outside of the rare national exercises of rhetorical leadership
which maintain the traditional public presidency, most of President Trump’s pub-
lic leadership takes a vastly different path than his predecessors’ efforts to man-
age public outreach for legislative success, reelection and legacy management.
President Trump’s local speeches, use of Twitter, poor press relations and impeach-
ment management reveal a struggle between the individual and institution long
abandoned by other administrations. Presidents since FDR expanded the tools
and mechanisms to use the public to achieve legislative success by expanding the
capacity to appeal. The expanded capacity arises from a cadre of speechwriters
crafting presidential language, efforts to manage the message across the Executive
Branch, monitoring and using public opinion poll data and managing the message
dispensed by the president personally and via the press. In contrast, President
Trump abandons, rejects and ultimately undermines 80 years of institutional growth
that created an apparatus to employ the president’s singular extraconstitutional tool.
xiv Preface
President Trump abandons, rejects and ultimately undermines his own institution
in favor of individual control and individual performance. As a consequence,
President Trump’s ability to wield the public presidency narrowed. President
Trump powerfully applied the rhetorical presidency toward constituency man-
agement and maintenance but not expansion of the initial electoral coalition,
which is necessary for reelection. His use of Twitter and efforts to demean and
diminish the press and his opponents effectively served the critical goal of man-
aging scandal, but at the expense of what public leadership traditionally served:
pursuing the president’s agenda in Congress.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I did not intend to write this book. In the fall of 2016, as I talked to my students
and friends (and really anyone who found out I was a political scientist) about
the campaign and then candidate Trump, I struggled for language to describe not
only the campaign but also the potential Trump presidency. As 2016 transitioned
to 2017, and the country transitioned to the Trump administration, I noticed
my language was littered with “usually,” “typically,” “normally,” “most candidates,”
“most presidents,” as well as the corresponding “unexpected,” “unusual” and
“unprecedented.” I went on sabbatical in 2017–2018. During that time, I planned
to enjoy my post–department-chair break working on two entirely different and
unrelated projects. Instead, I spent 2018 rubbernecking the Trump presidency; as
I watched this administration unfold, I found myself reflecting on those adjectives
and adverbs I used to explain the campaign and beginnings of the Trump era.
How unusual was President Trump? How significant was his behavior? As analy-
ses swung between polemics on either side, I increasingly pondered what I knew
about presidential behavior, in particular, presidential leadership of the public. As
critics bemoaned and supporters rejoiced over the “kill someone on 5th Avenue”
presidential style, I looked for the familiar. Where was the institution of the pres-
idency? How had the unusual, unexpected, not politically correct and often rude
and/or crude persisted beyond the candidate-centered nature of the campaign
into the institution of the presidency?
And so, this book was born. From the first, I wanted this book to be grounded
in the literature of presidential leadership, and specifically leadership of the public.
I have focused on aspects of the public presidency for my entire academic career,
whether concentrated on polling usage or communication strategies and, as such,
firmly believed the theoretical underpinnings of the field could indeed explain
what so many in the public sphere believed to be inexplicable.
xvi Acknowledgments
Writing a book is such a solitary experience in the moment but is never

done in a vacuum. So many special individuals helped make this book possible.
St. John’s University gave me perhaps the most valuable commodity: time, in
the form of a sabbatical and then a course reduction. Routledge Senior Editor
Jennifer Knerr also gave me time and encouragement as I missed my initial dead-
line after recognizing that impeachment had to be included here. Her support in
this second time as author and editor has been invaluable. Charlie Baker, Nick
Downing and Claire Toal took excellent care of me and my work during the
production of this book. Government and Politics graduate students Kirin Taylor,
Aliyah Headley, Barbara Irala and Jacqueline Mancini were incredibly helpful col-
lecting all sorts of data, namely President Trump’s speeches. At St. John’s, Meg
O’Sullivan helps with absolutely everything, making it all run smoothly. Within
the profession, so many friends offered support and a willing ear: Fred Cocozzelli,
Frank Le Veness, Barbara Koziak, Lori Cox Han, Donna Hoffman, Alison Howard,
Lara Brown, Tim Groeling, Meena Bose, Brandon Rottinghaus and Dan Ponder.
Shirley Anne Warshaw asked important questions about an early draft of the pro-
posal. Rod Hart and DICTION gave me a new way to evaluate the presidency
eight years ago and it continues to be essential for answering questions I want to
ask. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters provide an immeasurable service which
I continue to mine with the American Presidency Project. Katie Dunn Tenpas
offered invaluable insight and clarity regarding staffing and polling. I am grateful
to three scholars who went above and beyond, offering advice on the manuscript
despite a very short turnaround time: Jennifer Hopper, Mary Stuckey and Stephen
Farnsworth. Personally, everyone should have a squad of support like mine. Even
though they don’t all know each other and are never in the same place, their sup-
port and friendship buoys me: Kristin Le Veness, Laura Lopez, Anne Geller, Randi
Singer, Lisa Gill, Justine Keil and Mindy Wigutow. My family continues to be the
reason why I do what I do and how I am able to manage it. I am grateful for them
all: Steve Kline, Owen Kline, Rosalyn Heith, Elliott Heith, Eric Heith. I hope that
my work inspires our next generation: Owen, Sascha Kline, Serena Kline, Penny
Heith, Coco Heith, Joshua Kline, Jackson Kline and Jefferson Kline.
1
INFLUENCES ON OPPORTUNITIES
FOR LEADERSHIP
When Donald Trump accepted the Republican nomination for president in

Cleveland, Ohio, he presented a strikingly forbidding picture of America. In keep-
ing with his campaign in the year prior, his speech at the Convention reflected
why he was running while also showcasing how he was running. “I have joined
the political arena so that the powerful can no longer beat up on people that can-
not defend themselves. Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I
alone can fix it” (July 21, 2016). Maya Angelou contended, “when someone shows
you who they are, believe them the first time”; her words are no less a truism for
voters regarding political candidates running for office.Whether American voters,
pundits and partisans believed it or not, candidate Trump’s rhetoric revealed who
he was, how he would exercise public leadership and how he would use rhetoric
to lead.1
To say that Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was unexpected, is a massive
understatement. As a candidate, simply not being a career politician was unusual.
There have been other candidates for president with successful nonpolitical
careers; however, most of those candidates ran, won and served in lesser posi-
tions before running for president.The businessman running for president quickly
became the least unusual aspect of the Trump candidacy, becoming a footnote to
the style, promises and approach Donald Trump offered.
Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric was startling. His view of the United
States was negative, but even the negativity was different from typical can-
didates. His policy prescriptions and views of other groups and countries
were presented in a manner turning political correctness on its head. The oft-
repeated line from his campaign announcement regarding Mexico, immigration
and trade epitomized the unexpected Trump style and approach to rhetoric and
policy:
2 Influences on Leadership Opportunities
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that
have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us.
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.2
The rest of his announcement flowed in a manner that rapidly becomes a familiar
part of his campaign rhetoric.
Style
Exaggeration: “Wow. Whoa. That is some group of people. Thousands.”
Isolation: “The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else’s problems.”
Individualism: “I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me,
believe me, and I’ll build them very inexpensively, I will build a great, great wall
on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall.”
Name-Calling: “How stupid are our leaders? How stupid are these politicians to
allow this to happen? How stupid are they?”
Defensiveness: “But, Mr. Trump, you’re not a nice person. That’s true. But actually
I am. I think I am a nice person. People that know me, like me. Does my family
like me? I think so, right. Look at my family. I’m proud of my family.”
Braggadocio: “Nobody would be tougher on ISIS than Donald Trump. Nobody.”
Substance
Military Idolatry: “We have wounded soldiers, who I love, I love—they’re great—
all over the place, thousands and thousands of wounded soldiers.”
Make America Great Again: “Sadly, the American dream is dead. But if I get elected
president, I will bring it back bigger and better and stronger than ever before, and
we will make America great again.”
The Deep State: “So I’ve watched the politicians. I’ve dealt with them all my life. If
you can’t make a good deal with a politician, then there’s something wrong with
you.You’re certainly not very good. And that’s what we have representing us.They
will never make America great again. They don’t even have a chance. They’re
controlled fully—they’re controlled fully by the lobbyists, by the donors, and by
the special interests, fully.”
During the campaign, the list of unexpected rhetorical style grew to include:
sexism, misogyny, press baiting and personal attacks, straight from the candi-
date’s mouth. His Republican opponents during the nominating phase were
stunned by the direct attacks, particularly during the debates. Neither they, nor
Hillary Clinton, his Democratic opponent in the general election, ever effectively
responded or stemmed the attacks. Moreover, the press coverage garnered by
the “street-fighting” style generated an enormous advantage in name recognition
and attention. Protests by his fellow Republicans and by Clinton did not alter the
Influences on Leadership Opportunities 3
intense media attention garnered by Trump’s refusal to play by the normal rules of
the game.
The rhetorical approach Donald Trump used to win the presidency would
inevitably appear in the White House. Who Donald Trump showed the nation in
2016 was who he was, and the pomp, ceremony and seriousness of the job was not
going to change him or his approach. His supporters knew that and celebrated
it. Other political elites, members of the press and even Trump himself suggested
he would become more presidential after taking the oath of office. April 2016,
Trump said, “You know, I tweeted today, @realDonaldTrump. I tweet.… Don’t
worry, I’ll give it up after I’m president. We won’t tweet anymore. I don’t know.
Not presidential.”3
When Trump or anyone else uses the term “presidential,” they refer to
expectations of behavior. The expectations from the public, the press, political
insiders, Washington elites, and foreign leaders narrow the range of behavior
for the president as a political actor. Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles argue that
a larger political and cultural understanding of the presidency adds norms to
expectations of behavior, moving expectations of “presidential” to constructs
of “presidentiality.”4 Presidentiality, while rooted in fictional and cultural por-
trayals, adds to the factors that shape public understanding of the president’s
behavior, particularly the public side of the presidency. Stephen Heidt notes,
that studies of “presidentiality” as well as the “symbolic presidency” demon-
strate how “popular culture representations of the presidency influence public
attitudes and expectations of the candidate and office holder.”5 As candidate
and as President, Donald Trump embraced presidentiality, while rejecting and
dismissing being presidential.
The transition that takes place between election day and the inauguration is
not just about transfer of power between one administration and the next, it also
reflects how the president-elect must move from an individual actor to one part
of an institution. All presidents bring their leadership and management style to the
White House. Those styles, particularly when coupled with the president-elect’s
policy goals, often clash with the institution of the White House. The institu-
tion of the presidency refers to the norms, behaviors, people and offices that
have evolved to create an apparatus to garner power for the “glorified clerk,” as
Richard Neustadt famously described the pre-FDR presidency.6 The institution
provides the capacity for presidential action.The coupling of institutional capacity
with the technological ability to connect to the public gained power for the office
via public leadership. Candidate Trump’s difficulty being “presidential” as well as
his views of “presidentiality” certainly would influence his tenure as president.
The question, in 2016 and now, was how these behaviors and attitudes would
shape and disrupt the institution and the office, as at the heart of the Trump cam-
paign and his acceptance speech, and indeed, his leadership style, is the individual,
as he revealed to all in his convention speech July 2016: “I am your voice … I
alone can fix it … I will restore law and order.”
Evaluating Rhetorical Leadership

President Trump took the oath of office on January 20, 2017; his inaugural address
reflected the complex environment in which he sought to lead. Moreover, that
speech heralded the conflicted governing style that would emerge over the course
of Trump’s presidency. On the one hand, like all presidents, Trump celebrated the
unity of the nation around common cause:
We, the citizens of America, are now joined in a great national effort
to rebuild our country and to restore its promise for all of our people.
Together, we will determine the course of America and the world for
years to come. We will face challenges. We will confront hardships. But
we will get the job done.7
On the other hand, the new President also celebrated his very different view of
the United States, its challenges and how he intended to lead:
Today’s ceremony, however, has very special meaning. Because

today we are not merely transferring power from one Administration
to another, or from one party to another – but we are transferring
power from Washington, DC and giving it back to you, the American
People. For too long, a small group in our nation’s Capital has reaped
the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost.
Washington flourished – but the people did not share in its wealth.
Politicians prospered – but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The
establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country.Their
victories have not been your victories; their triumphs have not been
your triumphs; and while they celebrated in our nation’s Capital, there
was little to celebrate for struggling families all across our land.… This
American carnage stops right here and stops right now.… That all
changes – starting right here, and right now, because this moment is
your moment: it belongs to you. It belongs to everyone gathered here
today and everyone watching all across America. This is your day. This
is your celebration. And this, the United States of America, is your
country. What truly matters is not which party controls our govern-
ment, but whether our government is controlled by the people. From
this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment
on, it’s going to be America First.8
President Trump entered office with challenges to his ability to lead as a national
figure. Losing the popular vote and winning with a narrow Electoral College
victory encourages different leadership strategies than a large Electoral College
victory coupled with a secure popular victory.9 Moreover, President Trump faced
a complicated, and noisy, media environment, across multiple platforms in order

to reach an audience to mobilize. While the electoral and media environments
were challenging, the President’s attitudes and skill regarding the communication
apparatus represented the biggest disruption and/or limitation to his ability to
employ the traditional rhetorical presidency as well as to employ the rhetorical
presidency traditionally.
The Power of the Campaign

What separates campaigning from governing is primarily the difference in out-
come. A campaign ends with victory or loss in an election. Governing can have
discrete outcomes, e.g., a legislative victory, or an executive order, but never just
one; there are many decisions and outcomes over a president’s tenure. Translating
the newly elected president’s electoral coalition into a governing coalition to
achieve the president’s legislative agenda represents a core behavior of the modern
presidency, and the first steps in governing behavior.10
A president’s electoral and governing coalitions each reflect strength from a
variety of groups, across a panoply of issues. Over time, the governing coalition
expands and contracts in response to decisions made, success achieved and fail-
ures suffered. The more the governing coalition is different from the electoral
coalition, the more difficulty the president will have achieving legislative success.
Members of Congress, as Richard Fenno noted in 1973, devote their time, atten-
tion and policy support primarily to their core supporters, i.e., friends, donors,
primary voters, but cannot ignore their constituency derived from the constitu-
tion.11 Members of Congress are encouraged to recognize the bifurcated nature of
their representation; each member represents their district and/or state which the
institution then aggregates into representation for the nation by virtue of voting.
In contrast, it is the president’s rhetoric that serves as the aggregator for dispa-
rate coalitional voices. It is the president’s rhetoric that points the nation toward
unified goals, unified actions and unified beliefs. However, the ability to unify, or
“go national,” depends significantly on where the president begins: meaning the
president’s electoral circumstances.
Challenged by the Coalition

The president’s electoral coalition influences the rhetorical leadership strate-
gies available to the White House.12 The electoral coalition emerges from the
campaign and is emblematic of the relative strength of partisanship, polarization
and candidate campaign skills. Essentially, the electoral component of this model
underscores how important public support is for a successful presidential agenda.
The electoral component is not a reflection of mere popularity; it is not an answer
to a poll question. Instead, the electoral component of the model rests on the
two-way street of representation and banks on the presidential desire for r eelection.
David Mayhew noted that the desire for reelection creates an “electoral con-
nection,” between members of Congress and congressional behavior.13 Similarly,
presidents seek to maintain, and ideally expand, their initial electoral coalition
in order to be reelected.14 Voters reinforce the presidential electoral coalition by
expecting presidents to keep their campaign promises.15
The strength and depth of the electoral coalition defines the approach avail-
able for the exercising of rhetorical leadership. A president entering office with
a strong Electoral College victory and/or a large popular vote total will be able
to draw on the broad coalitional support across groups and issues.16 In contrast,
a president entering office with a weak electoral victory via a narrow Electoral
College outcome and/or popular vote total will be unable to innately and ini-
tially appeal to the nation writ large.17 Instead, an electorally challenged presi-
dent will need to employ rhetorical strategies designed to consolidate their base
and grow the coalition from the inside out. Challenged presidents are unable to
employ national rhetorical strategies because they lack a comfortable majority or
a built-in national base.
President Trump entered office on January 20, 2017 with a weak electoral
victory. After a tumultuous campaign, Donald Trump earned 57 percent of the
available Electoral College votes, but only 46 percent of the popular vote, two
percentage points less than his opponent, Hillary Clinton. Of his three prede-
cessors, only George Bush had as challenged an initial electoral coalition. Bill
Clinton earned 68 percent of the Electoral College vote and while he earned
under 50 percent of the popular vote, it was not less than what his opponents
earned. Barack Obama received 67 percent of the Electoral College votes, and
53 percent of the popular vote. President George W. Bush earned 50.3 percent
of the available Electoral College votes and earned less than 50 percent of
the popular vote, which was also less than his opponent, Al Gore. Although
Trump’s Electoral College vote total is significantly larger than Bush’s 50.3
percent, it does not meet the criteria used in The Presidential Road Show to
demonstrate a healthy, national majority. Moreover, Trump compounded his
challenge, earning just 46 percent of the popular vote, well under 50 percent
and lower than George W. Bush’s popular vote total. Only President Clinton,
as part of a three-person race, had a smaller percentage of the popular vote.
Aggregating 1992 differently: if the percentage Ross Perot received was evenly
divided between Clinton and Bush, Clinton receives a healthy 52 percent of
the popular vote. Of course, a split more favorable to Bush could have cost
Clinton the election. President Trump faced a challenged electoral environment
as president; much of that challenge stemmed from the disparity between the
Electoral College outcome and the popular vote, which was wider than even
the controversial election of 2000.
As a result, like President Bush, President Trump should exercise rhetorical
leadership by focusing on his base.To illustrate the hypotheses for empirical analysis
of President Trump’s rhetorical outreach:
H1: President Trump will target multiple audiences and employ coalition
base rhetoric.
The New World Online

The fluidity of the flow of news between media platforms, as well as the prolif-
eration of platforms, creates fragmentation in the media environment President
Trump faces. Fragmentation both vertically and horizontally yields an industry
that cannot easily serve as gatekeepers. Fragmentation also means that it is difficult
to control or coordinate presidential messaging across a multiplicity of platforms.
As noted earlier, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a fragmented media environ-
ment. In fact, the change in the media environment, or the end of the broadcast
era,18 begins during the Clinton administration. Between 1996 and 2004, the
online world became the new political frontier and new types of political activity
occurred on websites and through blog punditry. Connections between citizens,
elites and the media narrowed as expression rules the day.19
For the presidency, the online world represented an opportunity to bypass
traditional gatekeeping. During the presidential campaign, presidential hopefuls
could go around the party gatekeepers for fundraising and coalition building via
increasingly sophisticated online platforms that offered a direct opportunity to
connect with more than the party base during the nominating and general elec-
tion phases.20 After winning election, former campaign operatives become White
House staffers bringing their online skills to presidential messaging and outreach.
The Obama White House raised the bar in terms of direct interaction. In terms
of messaging, using websites, YouTube and other platforms, President Obama
connected to audiences by going around the national, political media.21 More
powerful and more connective platforms, like Facebook, Twitter and Reddit
emerged after 2004; but it was not until the 2016 presidential campaign that the
transformational power of these platforms for the political world seemed obvious.
In 2013, I argued that the rise of the online world would expand the contin-
uum of rhetorical leadership strategies available to the president.22 The presence
of social media platforms offered a new, discrete mechanism for direct citizen
elite contact that would create a new mode of presidential behavior. In particular,
the new media platforms would allow national and targeted presidential message
dissemination without travel. Figure 1.1 illustrates how social media changes the
mechanisms available to a president for message dissemination. Moving from the
standard broadcast model employed between 1960 and 1995 to a proliferation
of print, television and the introduction of the Internet in the 1990s, offered the
White House new means of connecting with their audience, particularly for the
challenged president. However, that mechanism encouraged travel, to connect
with constituents and to receive local media coverage.The addition of local media
FIGURE 1.1 Systemic Influences on Presidential Leadership as the Media Evolves

Source: From Diane J. Heith, The Presidential Road Show: Public Leadership in an Era of Party Polarization and Media Fragmentation, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2013
coverage, alongside appearances in targeted media outlets like magazines Runner’s

World (Bush) and Ebony (Obama) offered presidents avenues to meet constituents
where they were outside of politics.
Similarly, social media offers a mechanism to meet constituents where they are
online. Presidents in the post-2016 world have an array of media with which to
connect with constituents, well beyond what the previous media environments
offered. Consequently, as Figure 1.1 highlights, social media, i.e., Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram and the like, changes presidential behavior regardless of electoral com-
position. The challenged and national president alike no longer need to travel to
influence constituents and exercise leadership as it was possible to reach a national
audience or a targeted audience directly via social media.Thus, the Trump era offers
a test for my prediction regarding the changing media marketplace.
H1 Adjusted: President Trump will target multiple audiences, employ

coalition base rhetoric and use social media in lieu of travel.
The Media Environment for Presidential

Leadership
In the twentieth century, presidents gained the ability to reach a mass audience in
synchrony, thanks first to radio and then television. Although the US government
owns the airwaves through which the media transmit, the requirement to provide
airtime to candidates and the president has never been onerous for media cor-
porations. Rather, covering political events routinely provides the staples of con-
tent in any newsroom. The press role as messenger and transmitter of information
placed the press smack in the middle of the president–public relationship. Prior
to the 2000s, citizens were dependent on the press to provide information about
the president and the presidential agenda; there was no other way to obtain it.
Citizens watched the president on television live, but pre- and post-speech there
was media commentary to critique and contextualize every word and gesture from
the president. The press served as gatekeepers to information, and that gatekeeping
afforded the press a means to influence presidential opportunities for leadership.
The insertion of the press into the public–president relationship always rested on
the gatekeeping function of media control. As that dominance transformed, so too
did the role and ability of the press to frame the political environment offering an
opportunity to shift the interdependence in favor of the president.
The State of the Press

In terms of presidential leadership, the press aids the president by transmitting
information. However, the act of transmission does not occur in a vacuum. The
press views its function as evaluating government behavior in order to serve the
representative role of the public. The press provides the information citizens need
to vote; candidates and sitting office holders cannot be adequately evaluated with-
out accurate reporting of their behavior, actions and outcomes. The value of the
press for the public is immeasurable as information is the glue that holds a repre-
sentative democracy together.
The view of the press as a political institution and as a source of information
about politicians and political events has waxed and waned over time. Walter
Cronkite, CBS News anchor, was once the most trusted individual in America,
according to a 1972 poll.23 No reporter or network anchor holds that moniker
today, or has in recent memory. Individuals, news organizations and the press
overall lost significant stature, which influences their role in the political envi-
ronment.
Some of the loss of stature rests on the changing ways in which Americans get
their political news and the effects of those changes on the economics of the news
business. According to the Pew Research Center, there were five key changes to
the industry during President Trump’s tenure: (1) newspaper circulation fell pre-
cipitously, despite the fact that newspapers like the New York Times and Washington
Post have seen increases in revenue and digital circulation and subscriptions;24
(2) in terms of income, legacy media platforms (newspapers, network television
and radio) saw declining revenue, while cable television revenue increased;25
(3) digital ad revenue increased, but Google and Facebook profited rather than the
media organizations;26 (4) correspondingly, the legacy media platforms, including
local news, all experienced declines in audience while cable television and digital
native news (existing online only) increased audience size;27 (5) however, traffic to
news websites remained stable as has the time spent on these sites suggesting less
time per visit “as Americans increasingly say they prefer social media as a pathway
to news.”28
The changes in how and where Americans get their news, which evolved over
the tenures of Presidents Bush and Obama, solidified during President Trump’s
administration. Although Americans still prefer to get their news from television,
that preference over other sources, particularly online sources, is shrinking. Not
surprisingly, individuals who prefer to get their news by watching it, select televi-
sion, while readers go digital (explaining the loss of print newspaper circulation).29
Moreover, the preferences of television versus online access correlates strongly
with age30 and race.31 Moving beyond traditional news sources finds more
Americans aware of the political sphere online; some two-thirds of Americans get
news on social media, at least occasionally.32
The net effect of these changes to the business of the press is to make the
press vulnerable and dependent. The press, as an industry, needs the president as a
continuous source of news. Moreover, the press, as an industry, is hyperconscious
of the fluctuations of audience share. Unlike in the broadcast era, the multiplicity
of platforms from traditional newspapers to digital outlets for newspapers to
digital-only sites, plus television, radio and social media gives the audience a
choice. The online sourcing of information has been incredibly disruptive to the
media industry, financially but also in terms of their traditional roles as gatekeep-
ers. The press no longer controls or even mediates the frame of political news. The
changing attitudes regarding press performance suggest why.
Views of the Press

Prior to the start of the 2020 campaign, the public’s view of the press and the way
in which it covers politics, and particularly the president, was mixed. Social media
users report “exhaustion” from political posts and discussions.33 More concerning,
however, are the feelings regarding the press and the product they put into the
political sphere. For the press to serve the democratic need for accountability,
or speaking truth to power, as the phrase goes, trust is critical. For the roles of
evaluating the job performance of the president and the vetting of presidential
candidates, trust is critical. By 2020, trust in news accuracy declined significantly.
The decline in trust spanned platform and source. Inaccuracy in reporting leads
the concerns with news, especially on social media.34 The divide exists across age
and race, but is largest by partisanship, with Republicans much more critical of the
role and performance of the press than Democrats and Independents.35 Overall,
the attitudes toward the press are conflicted.
Although a minority of Americans (21%) express high levels of trust

in the information they get from national news organizations, most are
confident in the accuracy of news content: 71%, including majorities of
both parties, go into a national news story expecting it will be largely
accurate. At the same time, though, a similar portion of Americans (68%)
lack confidence in news organizations’ willingness to admit when they
have made mistakes. And many Americans tend to feel disconnected
from the news media. A little more than half (58%) say news organi-
zations don’t understand people like them, and about the same share
(56%) says they do not feel particularly connected to their main sources
of national news.36
The lack of trust and belief in the press extends to the quality of the information
placed in the political sphere. Polls show that the public does not blame the press
for “fake news” or misinformation but they do expect the press to fix the prob-
lem.37 The caveat to outright blame, however, is the concern from “journalists
inserting their own views into coverage.”38 Most of the worry about misleading
or inaccurate news focuses on “fully made-up news as well as altered v ideos and
images.” However, a significant percentage of Americans are concerned about
both unchecked breaking news (erroneous information) and biased factual infor-
mation (slanted information).39 The trust in individual members of the press,
media institutions and even the coverage itself has declined among Americans.
Moreover, these changes in attitudes sit on top of the economic challenges faced
by old and new media to adapt to the digital world.
President Trump and the Press

Focusing on the influences from the president’s electoral coalition and media
environment explores how the White House adapts to its environment. There
is another component to understanding how presidents and their staffs adjust to
their environment: the lens by which they view the political sphere. For rhetor-
ical leadership, there is a communications apparatus to deploy with 80 years of
institutional growth. How presidents staff and use the institution of the White
House influences the effectiveness of that institution.Thus, behind the daily inter-
actions and behavior of the White House exists the president’s attitudes toward
institutional norms and behaviors. For the most recent presidencies, acceptance
of norms and institutional behavior did not require much investigation. President
Nixon preferred written reports, while President Reagan liked charts and meet-
ings.40 President Bush disdained most aspects of rhetorical leadership, particularly
the polling apparatus, while Presidents Clinton and Obama fully acknowledged
using poll data.41 Nevertheless, over time, the institutional features associated with
rhetorical leadership grew despite the personality quirks and preferences that
shaped individual White House usage.
President Trump actively campaigned on disruption. What was not clear in
his 2016 campaign was that his intent to reject and rescript norms and a ttitudes,
as well as the boundaries of issue positions, extended to the institution of the
presidency. President Trump had very different views of political norms in

Washington regarding the press and the institution of the presidency, even of
his role in the political sphere. Moreover, without practical political experience,
President Trump relied on his lifetime skills as a wealthy business person, a reality
television star and the successful outcomes from the campaign. Evaluating these
attitudes and skills are important for understanding Trump’s White House, in a
way not relevant to understanding previous administrations.
Given the changes to the media industry, it is reasonable to expect changes to
the relationship between the president and the press, particularly in terms of the
mutual interdependence that long existed. Historically, the relationship between
the president and the press is forged during the campaign. As with his predeces-
sors, the campaign–press relationship in 2016 created patterns of behavior that
offered challenges to the exercising of presidential leadership and existed along-
side the challenges stemming from the changes to the industry. In addition, from
the president’s perspective, the press represents an impediment, an obstacle to get
around, in order to connect with the public and other political players without
critique or evaluation.42
President Clinton used town hall meetings with citizens in both his campaigns
and while president to connect with the public directly. Clinton also preferred
one-on-one interviews, not with journalists but with purveyors of “soft news”
like Larry King on CNN.43 More importantly, during the campaign, staffers cre-
ated what became known as the “war room,” a rapid-response team devoted to
managing any candidate, individual or press attack. Specifically, the
Clinton staff was prepared to send volleys of propaganda to any journalist

or opinion-maker in America … [to] hand[le] the mainstream press, and
its military motif was certainly emblematic of Clinton’s overall attitude
toward older, conventional media, to the Washington press corps, in
particular.44
The press was something to manage, to avoid and, to some degree, was the
enemy.
For President George W. Bush, opinions about the presidential–press rela-
tionship formed long before he ran for governor or for president. He saw
firsthand the role the press played for the president, while his father, George
H.W. Bush was in office, first as Vice President and then as President and then
again when he ran for reelection in 1992. Press perceptions and portrayals of
President George H.W. Bush greatly influenced his unsuccessful bid for reelec-
tion. Not only was the Clinton campaign effective at managing charges from
the Bush team as well as from the press, and was much better than the Dukakis team
in 1988, but the press coverage of Bush and of his handling of the economy
greatly influenced the outcome in 1992. Marc Hetherington found that the
relentless press coverage of a down economy and Bush’s handling of the
economy, despite the economic indicators suggesting an economic revival,

greatly influenced voter attitudes.45
In addition to the coverage of his father, the George W. Bush team also carried
with it the 2000 election debacle and the role the press played in mangling the
call. In the wake of the Clinton impeachment scandal, when George W. Bush took
office, the press remained in its feeding-frenzy, salacious style of coverage until the
terrorist attacks on 9/11 changed everything for the Bush administration and for
the press. Like his predecessor, President Bush’s White House believed the press
was something to manage and avoid. Management in the period prior to the Iraq
War meant manipulation in the press and of the press, as the White House top
staffers offered anonymous source information and quotes to get the Bush admin-
istration perspective unfiltered into news coverage. These interactions ultimately
led to the outing of CIA officer Valerie Plame and the conviction on obstruction
of justice of Scooter Libby,Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff.
The Obama team during the 2008 campaign and during his administration
was less contemptuous of the press yet perhaps more intent on going around
the press. The Obama White House explicitly used their campaign structure as a
model for the communications apparatus, and that included mechanisms to avoid
and manage the press.46
Using the campaign as a model, the Obama administration expanded the

capacity of White House communications efforts to lead directly.Through
its use of new media, and new outlets of the “old” media, the Obama
administration attempted to employ the last component of campaign
strategy that had eluded previous administrations as it sought to diminish
the media’s capability to filter presidential messages. The Obama com-
munications strategy represents the culmination of the “campaigning to
govern” strategy, institutionalized. However, the net result in the short
term was, ironically, a loss of control over the narrative as the press became
significantly more confrontational over the first two years.47
By the time, Donald Trump ran for the presidency, the president–press rela-
tionship was at a low ebb.48 Moreover, the contentiousness between candidates
and the press rose to new heights during the 2016 campaign, beginning with the
“invisible primary” phase during the summer of 2015. Coverage of the expected
frontrunners, Hillary Clinton, Jeb Bush and the second-tier candidates like Marco
Rubio, Chris Christie and John Kasich, was relentlessly negative but fell into
expected norms of press behavior. The press focused on fundraising, poll results,
endorsements, as was routine in the early phases of the nomination process. All
that changed when Donald Trump and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders entered
the race.
Donald Trump, but also Sanders, received a tremendous amount of free press.
Wells et al. argue that the press fascination with candidate Trump stemmed from
three phenomena: (1) representing the “third age” of political communication,
Trump encapsulated the focus on entertainment as politics, “transform[ed]
notoriety, a brand name, and pop-culture persona into populist hero”;
(2) he emerged out of the public eye and tabloid journalism and not the
political party; (3) his campaign united celebrity culture with “contemporary
anxieties over e conomics, immigration, terrorism, global politics, social frag-
mentation, and White working-class stagnation.”49 Thomas Patterson argues
the free pressa rising from the overwhelming volume of Trump’s coverage,
likely stemming from the fascination Wells et al. cite, yielded less criticism or
analysis of Trump as a candidate and more unfiltered representation of his
campaign’s message.
Two basic indicators drive press coverage during campaigns: poll standing and
fundraising.50 During the latter half of 2015, Trump had neither high poll num-
bers nor deep coffers beyond his personal wealth, until after the media coverage
frenzy. Trump’s poll numbers did not match his press coverage until right before
Iowa.51 Nevertheless,
journalists are attracted to the new, the unusual, the sensational – the type
of story material that will catch and hold an audience’s attention. Trump
fit that need as no other candidate in recent memory. Trump is arguably
the first bona fide media-created presidential nominee. Although he sub-

sequently tapped a political nerve, journalists fueled his launch.52
Lawrence and Boydstun note that the “new, unusual, the sensational” phe-
nomenon that was Donald Trump captures a critical aspect or even flaw in press
coverage: the power of being interesting.53
Candidates who remain “interesting” to reporters are more likely to get

through the press filter. For example, the candidate who veers off message
is more newsworthy than the candidate who sticks to her teleprompter
to deliver the same speech reporters have heard countless times.Whether
by plan or by accident, Donald Trump exploited this press tendency,
delivering his signature controversial lines in speeches that departed
from his prepared remarks.54
The free press coverage was critical to Trump surviving the gauntlet that was
the 17-person Republican nomination process. Julia Azari goes so far as to argue
that the press in fact helped nominate Trump. As she notes, party elites never
converged on a single candidate; without an “establishment” candidate, messaging
becomes the coordinating feature to bring the party together.55 In the absence
of the traditional party role, the press, particularly Fox News, served to provide
the coordinating role and disseminate Trump’s distinctive message. Furthermore,
Azari argued, the press greatly aided Trump as she contends that “the media’s main
institutional role comes from repeating, rather than challenging, promises, frame-
works, and narratives.”56 Both aspects, coordinating and disseminating alongside
validating rather than challenging, were necessary for Trump to succeed.
What then did President Trump learn from his successful stint as Candidate
Trump? It was not that a successful campaign team could manage the press. As
Azari notes, Trump had neither a skilled campaign operation nor organizational
support.57 He learned that being interesting, sensational and disruptive kept media
attention focused like a laser. He learned that lies were often challenged in the
press but those same lies often served as a litmus test across the citizenry. Salena
Zito of the Atlantic famously summed up the differences between the press and
his supporters arguing: “The press takes him literally, but not seriously; his sup-
porters take him seriously, but not literally.”58 Moreover, from his time as a reality
star, Trump already knew that it was his name on the ticket, his identity that drew
attention, but also that the press outreach was necessary.
Trump’s dislike of the press was slow in coming. When he announced

his presidential candidacy, journalists embraced him, and he returned the
favor. Trump received far more coverage, and far more positive coverage,
than did his Republican rivals. Only after he had secured the Republican
nomination did the press sharpen its scrutiny and, as his news coverage
turned negative, Trump turned on the press. Trump tweeted that the
“election is being rigged by the media, in a coordinated effort with the
Clinton campaign.”59
Thus, the 2016 campaign established, albeit a bit earlier than typically occurs,
the tension-filled, interdependence that all presidents ultimately face with the press.
What was unexpected and unprecedented in the president–press relationship was
the presidential strategy to undermine the role of the press as a cornerstone of
democracy. Trump went further than challenging the fairness of the election pro-
cess to challenging the integrity of journalists, their media platforms and their
product. Trump denigrated journalists and their coverage of him often during the
campaign; his revulsion of the press hit a new low shortly after taking office as
president, when he called the press, an “enemy of the people” on February 17,
2017. Consequently,
H2: President Trump will employ old and new mechanisms to go around
the mainstream press.
Approaches to Leadership Within the

White House
Once the Brownlow Committee asserted that, “the President needs help,” FDR
and all the subsequent presidents expanded the institution of the presidency.
The president added policy expertise via the National Security Council and the
Domestic Policy Council. The White House gained political expertise as well, to
use when dealing with legislators, groups and other political entities. Legislative
Affairs, the Political Liaison and the Communications Office contain the growth
in institutional expertise to manage the exercising of leadership. Over the twen-
tieth century and into the twenty-first, a public relations machine emerged, and
regardless of party, or personal preference, became a cornerstone of presidential
leadership. A veritable army of staff served to write speeches, photograph and film
the president, design photo ops and travel opportunities all in service of the presi-
dent’s legislative agenda. The communications apparatus served to institutionalize
“going public” leadership tactics, regardless of whether it was effective for mobi-
lizing Congress to the president’s preferred legislative option.
Fundamental to going public is the underlying perception and acceptance
that the public is the president’s singular and most valuable tool. The key to the
public as a tool is the institutional apparatus developed to support its use. The
expansion of the public relations arm of the White House flowed inevitably from
the candidate-centered behavior that earned the White House for every president
since Jimmy Carter in 1976. Candidates became president-elect by virtue of
individual and not party appeals, targeted and designed messaging, via polling and
other marketing tools, using speeches and ads to reach voters. Performance skills,
like debating and orating, mattered. How a candidate looks on television mattered.
Party insiders played less of a role for achieving the nomination and independent
voters emerged as the key to victory. Ultimately, the successful campaign orga-
nization carried the day. For candidates, campaign staff were the trusted road
warriors, there from the beginning when no one else believed. All these facets
expanded the role for campaign skills and campaign staff inside the White House
and inside governing efforts.
Individualism vs. Institutionalism

President Trump, in contrast to his predecessors, did not have a slick, machine-
like campaign experience. His campaign ran on a shoestring, with few advisors.
He completely replaced his nomination campaign staff before, during and after
the convention. And the 2016 convention was not the boring, carefully scripted,
media show that reporters and the public expect. Time and time again, over the
course of the general election, the Trump campaign put out fires and dealt with
problems that would have destroyed other candidates. The campaign staff was not
very skilled and the candidate was prone to language and behavior for which
other candidates and politicians would be shamed into apologizing profusely.Yet,
Trump did not apologize, was not shamed, and won.
The lessons learned from that pyrrhic victory were similar to those of other
presidents and vastly different in key ways. The expected lessons: the campaign
staff are the president’s most trusted and faithful advisors, how the press defines
the issue or candidates matters, the candidate and not the party matters, and “I
won.” These lessons learned expanded the institution of the presidency since the
Nixon administration. The campaign staff form the basis of the communications
apparatus as well as often being the closest advisors to the president. Moreover,
the campaign approach of selling, crafting and polling for messaging represents the
skillset of the advisors closest to the president.Thus, the campaign mindset frames
the aspects of the institution that have specific winner-take-all components, spe-
cifically the legislative agenda. The role of the press in shaping the campaign
informs the recognition that a similar approach and staff is required to shape and
frame presidential messaging. Moreover, the recent push–pull of the relationship
between the president and the press is also present in the campaign. Can the
candidate reach voters without the press or opponents’ critiques? Similarly, can
the president persuade the public toward the president’s preferences and how
much press management has to occur to achieve that outcome? Again, staff and
institutional behavior is key here. Presidents need a skilled Press Secretary and
Communications staff to monitor and coordinate all outreach, inside and outside
the Executive Branch, just as they need staff to coordinate and monitor campaign
messaging.
The last two expected lessons focus on candidate-centered behavior from

an internal perspective. Once a candidate becomes the party nominee at their
national convention, the party begins to fall in line behind the candidate’s agenda,
even after a raucous battle for the nomination.The convention serves as an oppor-
tunity for the party to come together and unite behind the candidate. However,
once president, the party belongs to the president and the president’s preferred
policy options drive legislative messaging with the public. Moreover, the fact
that the candidate won gives the president a perceived mandate over the party, if
not the country, as the campaign forged a coalition of independents, core party
supporters and leaners. A candidate cannot win with just the party and the newly
elected president usually knows it. Consequently, presidents and their staffs cre-
ated institutional behavior devoted to time tracking and monitoring their per-
sonal electoral coalition, in addition to and separate from the party.60
The campaign of 2016 revealed additional insight to President Trump, which
he brought to his White House and approach to governing. The unexpected les-
sons President Trump learned from his campaign for president: (1) it does not
matter what you say, even if it isn’t true, as all coverage is good coverage; (2) the
Trump core, in terms of issues and voters, stemmed from a different, yet powerful
bloc of the Republican party, heretofore underutilized or only obliquely high-
lighted; (3) name calling and nastiness was effective strategy – against opponents
and against the press; (4) crafting language, massaging images and rhetoric, and
even outright lying dominated short news cycles, and the corrected version was
rarely relevant or believed; (5) and perhaps most important, there is an “I” in vic-
tory, and this was not a team sport. Whether these attitudes were part of Trump’s
view of the world prior to the campaign or not is a chicken-and-egg question
not needing answering; what is significant is how these attitudes influenced his
presidential leadership.
The individual has always been present in the presidency, particularly in the
selling of the president and the agenda. Stephen Farnsworth argues that personal-
ity has become a key way in which presidents attempt to manage the complicated
environment they face.61 Character becomes the base of the White House com-
munication strategy as it also becomes a central aspect of how the public eval-
uates the president.62 However, Farnsworth notes that President Trump uses the
personal differently, as he has not sought to maximize popularity or likeability.63
Trump’s personal or individual approach, according to Farnsworth is a reflection
of the media moment.64
Fundamentally then, to explain the Trump version of the rhetorical presidency
is to focus on the individual vs. the institution.Trump celebrates and venerates the
individual.Yet, presidential leadership rests on and requires an effective institution.
What happens when the immovable object meets the unstoppable force? Can
the public be mobilized without the institution? How much of the public can be
mobilized without the institution? Can an individualized style of leadership yield
legislative success? In 1960, Richard Neustadt argued that without the expansion
of expertise, without moving beyond the constitutionally defined presidency, the

president is merely a clerk.65 Scholars in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, repeatedly
investigated the power of the plebiscitary presidency, the rhetorical presidency,
the going public president; whatever it was called, the argument rested on the
president relying on campaign skills and tools, far beyond a winning personality
and effectiveness on television.66 Planning, strategy and technology were the keys
to campaigning to govern.
More importantly, the victory by the campaign team typically translated what
the campaign staff was good at to the White House. In contrast, President Trump
didn’t believe his campaign won; he believed he won. An attitudinal shift, from a
team or institution devoted to persuasion and selling the president to a team of
one, will have significant consequences for the strategy of public leadership but
also the success of public leadership. A shift from the institution back to the indi-
vidual is a devolution in institutional behavior.
The institution of the public presidency is persistent and demanding. The
norms of public behavior for the president persist due to the pressure of expec-
tations. Congress expects agenda leadership; the public expects both the fantasy
and pageantry of a monarch or entertainer; while the press counts on a story to
tell. All of these pressures keep the institutional apparatus humming within the
White House. Presidents may press for change, in style, in technology usage, but
ultimately those changes are small incremental changes stemming from campaign
success or in response to a public failure, like a scandal or a mistake. Fundamen-
tally, as much as candidate Trump pressed for change and disruption, the endur-
ance of institutional behavior is expected. Thus,
H3: The institution of the Trump communications apparatus will look like
his predecessors, with expansion and adaptation to account for the rise of
social media.
A New Way or the Loss of the Old Way?

President Trump was a different kind of candidate and entered office wanting to
be a different kind of president. How different, if at all, is one of the questions
driving this research. Over 50 years of scholarship about the public presidency
highlighted the mutable features as well as the enduring aspects. Mutable features
of the public presidency are those based in context, based in the environment,
reflecting changes outside the presidency.The rise in partisanship and polarization
encouraged, but did not create, a candidate-centered, campaign-styled approach
to public leadership. The change in the media, from the rise of new technology
to the expansion and contraction of the industry, these changes force presidential
adaptation. Changing mores in terms of behavior online and in the public, require
and promote adjustment in public actions from politicians as well as from citizens.
President Trump rode a wave of discontent with Washington, with political cor-
rectness and with demands for tolerance and inclusion all the way to the White
House. This was the mutable context in which President Trump would try to
achieve his agenda.
All presidents take office shaped by their electoral coalition, the state of the
media, and by the public environment driving the political sphere. The institu-
tional apparatus within the White House designed to manage these shifting grains
of sands endured over 50 years of contextual change. The need to translate an
electoral coalition to a governing one is an enduring feature.The need to respond
to the press regardless of the state of the industry or the presence of new technol-
ogy is equally enduring. The hulking presence of the presidential approval rating
is a continual grade of performance and a reminder that like winter, the reelection
campaign is coming. Consequently, presidents need to make speeches. Presidents
need those speeches to be favorably received. The public needs to approve of the
president’s policies as well as the president. Presidential performance matters for
influencing Congress, although how significantly is debatable.
These enduring demands, from the press, from the public and from other politi-
cal actors, created an apparatus first for response and then for management. In order
to lead, president after president sought to control the uncontrollable. Regardless of
party, of ideology, of circumstance, modern presidents have in common the limita-
tions of the constitutional demands of the office, coupled with high expectations and
the only truly national representative relationship. These ties bind together modern
presidents and connect administration after administration. The institutional design
and capacity was so enduring, political scientists who study the Executive Branch
created the White House Transition project to provide a standard explanation of
each White House staff office for each new administration.
The subsequent chapters explore how during President Trump’s tenure, the
White House response to the mutable challenges faced by the President remained
within the theoretical expectations of presidential and institutional behavior. How-
ever, the subsequent chapters also explore the starkly different response to the
enduring nature of the public presidency. Nevertheless, in both areas, President
Trump’s personal behavior as president undercut the institution designed to achieve
his goals, undermined his ability to harness the power of the public presidency and
questioned the value of the rhetorical presidency for presidential leadership.
Chapter 2 captures the institutional changes to the size, experience and exper-
tise of the Trump communications apparatus. Traditionally, the central aspects of
managing presidential efforts to lead the public rest with the speechwriters, the
Press Secretary and the staffers who coordinate the President’s travel schedule.
New to the White House is attention to social media.This chapter highlights how
the President’s Twitter usage has altered the responsibilities of public management
within the White House, granting the President a singular control.Thus, the chapter
also explores the difference in perception and role of the president within the
institution. The capacity to lead the public shrank and a competition between
individual and institutional action emerged. The White House communications
apparatus was no longer the epitome of management and control, undertaking a
haphazard approach to selling presidential policy.
The mixed outcome of the 2016 election ensured a complicated leadership
environment for President Trump. The size of his Electoral College victory, when
coupled with a popular vote loss, stymied any desire to exercise a fully national
leadership approach to rhetorical outreach. Chapter 3 delineates the ways in
which President Trump employed the traditional aspects of the rhetorical presi-
dency, within the narrowed institutional apparatus. Although President Trump did
employ a “national voice” in his few national addresses, he utilized a different rhe-
torical tone in local speeches than in national speeches. The addition of Twitter as
a means of public leadership offered the President a new tool for the presidential
rhetorical toolbox – one neither national nor local – offering opportunities to
exercise a different form of leadership.
Chapter 4 turns to the presidential management of the press. Concurrent with
the decrease of the institution designed to manage the press, President Trump
increased the use of direct public leadership, bypassing the press much more exten-
sively than did any other previous administration. However, the President also
increased impromptu interactions generating a continuation of the heightened
attention witnessed during the 2016 campaign. Thus, the direct, individual exercise
of leadership extended beyond public leadership to press management. President
Trump’s relationship with the press is poor; that is not beyond the scope of the
press–president relationship. It is the mechanism the President has chosen to manage
the press and his political environment that is extraordinary: destroying the freedom
of critique that serves to hold the president accountable to the citizenry.
As part of his rhetoric, President Trump mentioned his campaign promises
frequently. However, very little of the rhetorical output of the Trump White
House served to achieve the President’s stated legislative goals; instead it reflected
his unilateral achievements. Chapter 5 demonstrates how the change in insti-
tutional behavior, capacity and management negatively influenced efforts to go
public for a legislative agenda, while improving opportunities for a base-driven
electoral strategy. Using the public presidency to highlight successes for reelec-
tion purposes is hardly unique to President Trump. The difference demonstrated
in this chapter is how little of the public rhetoric of the President was deployed
in targeted “going public” efforts. The public leadership output of the President
and his White House was so overwhelmingly reelection focused, it amounted to
a major shift in institutional mission.
Rhetorical leadership often serves as the front line in scandal and crisis manage-
ment as presidents work to rescript the narrative and shift the blame. 6 focuses
on the exercise of rhetorical leadership during President Trump’s impeachment
by the House of Representatives, and the subsequent trial in the Senate. President
Trump relentlessly used Twitter to do both as he excoriated White House staffers
who testified and House Democrats who impeached him while simultaneously
working to keep House and Senate Republicans united.
Chapter 7 concludes by focusing on disruption and the significance of
President Trump’s devolved approach to rhetorical leadership. How disruptive are
the changes to the institution dedicated to public leadership and how significant
are these changes for the presidency? Will President Trump’s preference to pub-
lically lead alone, via Twitter, with limited vetting and input from staff, persist
beyond his administration? By abandoning the institution, preferring individua
lized rhetorical efforts, President Trump isolated himself from disparate voices
as well as the protections that vetting of content provide. Moreover, the unique
nature of Trump’s type of disruption highlights its limitations as a permanent shift
in presidential leadership. The institution will survive.
Notes
1. Roderick Hart, “Donald Trump and the Return of the Paranoid Style,” Presidential
Studies Quarterly, June 2020; Hart, Roderick P., Civic Hope: How Ordinary Americans
Keep Democracy Alive, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018; Hart, Roderick P.,
Trump and Us: What He Says and Why People Listen, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2020; Jardina, Ashley, White Identity Politics, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2019; Johnson, Paul Elliott, “The Art of Masculine Victimhood: Donald Trump’s
Demagoguery,” Women’s Studies in Communication 40, 2017, (3): 229–250; Blake Abbott,
“Unpresidented:Articulating the Presidency in the Age of Trump,” in Reading the Presidency:
Advances in Presidential Rhetoric, Stephen J Heidt and Mary Stuckey, eds., New York:
Peter J. Lang, 2019, pp. 150–170.
2. Donald Trump, Campaign Announcement, June 16, 2015.
3. Nick Gass, “Trump Says He Won’t Tweet as President,” Politico, April 25, 2016,
www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/2016/04/
trump-no-tweeting-president-222408.
4. Trevor Parry-Giles and Shawn J. Parry-Giles, “The West Wing’s Prime-Time Presiden-
tiality: Mimesis and Catharsis in a Postmodern Romance,” Quarterly Journal of Speech,
2002, 18:2, 202–227.
5. Stephen Heidt, “Introduction:The Study of Presidential Rhetoric in Uncertain Times:
Thoughts on Theory and Praxis,” in Reading the Presidency:Advances in Presidential Rhetoric,
Stephen J Heidt and Mary Stuckey, eds., New York: Peter J. Lang, 2019, p. 8.
6. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents:The Politics of Leadership
from Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Free Press, 1960, rev. ed, 1990.
7. Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address, Washington, DC, January 20, 2017.
8. Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address, Washington, DC, January 20, 2017.
9. Diane Heith, The Presidential Road Show: Public Leadership in an Era of Party Polarization
and Media Fragmentation, Boulder. CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013.
10. Lester Seligman, L and Cary Covington, The Coalitional Presidency, New York: Dorsey
Press, 1989.
11. Richard Fenno, Home Style: House Members in their Districts, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1978.
12. Heith, The Presidential Road Show.
13. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1974.
14. Diane Heith, Polling to Govern: Public Opinion and Presidential Leadership. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2004; Heith, The Presidential Road Show.
15. Seligman and Covington, The Coalitional Presidency; James Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency:
Hitting the Ground Running, Chicago, IL: Dorsey Press: 1988.
18. Jeffrey Cohen, The Presidency in the Era of 24-Hour News, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008.
19. Karen Mossberger and Caroline Tolbert, “Digital Democracy: How Politics Online
is Changing Electoral Participation,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and
Political Behavior, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Davis 2005; Wright 2012.
20. Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis, Campaigning Online: The Internet in U.S. Elections,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
21. Diane Heith “Obama and the Public Presidency: What Got You Here Won’t Get You
There,” in The Barack Obama Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects, edited by Colin Campbell,
Bert A Rockman and Andrew Rudalevige, CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2011a.
23. On the Media Interview with Ben Zimmer on the Myths of Walter Cronkite, July 31,
2009, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20090804011021/www.onthemedia.
org/transcripts/2009/07/31/07.
24. Michael Barthel, “5 Key Take Aways About the State of the News Media in 2018,” Pew
Research Center, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/23/key-takeaways-state-
of-the-news-media-2018/July 23, 2019.
25. Barthel 2019.
26. Barthel 2019.
27. Barthel 2019.
28. Barthel 2019.
29. Amy Mitchell, “Americans Still Prefer Watching to Reading the News – and Mostly
Through Television,” Pew Research Center, December 3, 2018, www.journalism.
org/2018/12/03/americans-still-prefer-watching-to-reading-the-news-and-mostly-
still-through-television/.
30. Mitchell 2018.
31. Sara Atske, Michael Barthel, Glen Stocking, and Christine Tamir, “7 Facts About
Black Americans and the News Media,” Pew Research Center, August 7, 2019, www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/07/facts-about-black-americans-and-the-news-
media/.
32. Katerina Eva Matsa, “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018,” Pew Research
Center, September 10, 2018, www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-so-
cial-media-platforms-2018/.
33. Monica Anderson and Dennis Quinn, “46% of U.S. Social Media Users are ‘Worn
Out’ by Political Posts and Discussions,” Pew Research Center, August 8, 2019, www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/08/46-of-u-s-social-media-users-say-they-are-
worn-out-by-political-posts-and-discussions/.
34. Matsa 2019.
35. Jeffrey Godfried, Galen Stocking, and Elizabeth Grieco, “Partisans Remain Sharply
Divided in their Attitudes About News Media,” Pew Research Center, September 25,
2018, www.journalism.org/2018/09/25/partisans-remain-sharply-divided-in-their-
attitudes-about-the-news-media/.
36. Godfried, Stocking and Grieco 2018.
37. Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Sophia Fideli, Mason Walker, and Galen Stocking,
“Many Americans Say Made-Up News is a Critical Problem That Needs To Be Fixed,”
Pew Research Center, June 5, 2019, www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-
say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/.
38. Mitchell, Gottfried, Fideli, Walker, and Stocking 2019.
39. Mitchell, Gottfried, Fideli, Walker, and Stocking 2019.
40. Diane Heith, Polling to Govern: Public Opinion and Presidential Leadership. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2004.
41. Heith, Polling to Govern; Diane Heith, “The White House Public Opinion Apparatus
Meets the Anti-Polling President,” in In the Public Domain: Presidents and the Challenge
of Public Leadership, edited by Lori Cox Han and Diane J. Heith, Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2005; Diane Heith, “The Virtual Primary Campaign:
Connecting with Constituents in a Multimedia Age,” for the Conference volume a rising
out of the symposium, The 2008 Road to the White House and Beyond, edited by Meena
Bose, College Station,TX:Texas A and M Press, 2011b; Heith, The Presidential Road Show.
42. Richard Davis and Diana Owen, New Media and American Politics, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
43. Edwin Diamond and Robert Silverman, White House to Your House: Media and Politics
in Virtual America, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
44. Joseph Hayden, Covering Clinton:The President and the Press in the 1990s, Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2002, p. 7.
45. Marc Hetherington, “The media’s role in forming voters’ national economic evalua-
tions in 1992,” American Journal of Political Science 40 (2), 372–402.
46. Heith, Obama and the Public Presidency.
47. Heith, Obama and the Public Presidency, p. 124.
48. Stephen Farnsworth, Presidential Communication and Character: White House News Man-
agement from Clinton and Cable to Twitter and Trump, New York: Routledge, 2018.
49. Chris Wells, Dhavan V. Shah, Jon C. Pevehouse, JungHwan Yang, Ayellet Pelled, Frederick
Boehm, Josephine Lukito, Shreenita Ghosh, and Jessica L. Schmidt, “How Trump
Drove Coverage to the Nomination: Hybrid Media Campaigning,” Political Communi-
cation, 2016, 33:4, 669–676.
50. Thomas Patterson, “News Coverage of the 2016 General Election: How the Press
Failed the Voters,” Shorenstein Center on Press and Politics, December 7, 2016, https://
shorensteincenter.org/news-coverage-2016-general-election/.
51. Patterson, News Coverage.
52. Patterson, News Coverage.
53. Regina G. Lawrence and Amber E. Boydstun, “What We Should Really Be Asking
About Media Attention to Trump,” Political Communication, 2017, 34:1, 150–153.
54. Lawrence and Boydstun, “What We Should Really Be Asking.”
55. Julia R. Azari, “How the News Media Helped to Nominate Trump,” Political Commu-
nication, 2016, 33:4, 677–680.
56. Azari, “How the News Media Helped to Nominate Trump,” p. 679.
57. Azari, “How the News Media Helped to Nominate Trump.”
58. Selena Zito, “Taking Trump Seriously, not Literally,” The Atlantic, September 23, 2016.
59. Thomas Patterson, New Coverage of Donald Trump’s First 100 Days, Shorenstein Cen-
ter on Press and Politics, May 18, 2017, https://shorensteincenter.org/news-coverage-
donald-trumps-first-100-days/.
60. Heith, Polling to Govern.
61. Farnsworth, Presidential Communication and Character.
63. Farnsworth, Presidential Communication and Character, p. 179.
65. Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leader-
ship from Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Free Press, 1960, rev. ed, 1990.
66. Lowi, Theodore J., The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled, Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1985; Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1987; Mary Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-In-Chief,
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991; Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of
Presidential Leadership (4th Edition ed.), Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997.
2
THE TOOLS OF THE
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY
One of the enduring features of the modern presidency is growth. Since the
Brownlow Committee famously concluded, “the President needs help,” the size
of the White House staff increased and ultimately stabilized between 475 and 500
staffers.1 Moreover, the number of staff dedicated to selling the president’s agenda
via print, radio, television and online increased as the opportunities to directly
connect with the public increased. Along with the growth in institutional capacity
of the White House staff dedicated to the public presidency, the skill set of these
staffers increased as well. Typically, the Communications staff, which includes the
polling apparatus, the speechwriters, the webpage and social media gurus as well
as the public relations strategists, come right out of the successful presidential
campaign, unlike the rest of the White House staff and Executive Office of the
President; since the staffers devoted to the rhetorical presidency have been with
the president through the slog of a campaign the top staffers have already forged
a rapport and trusted relationships. The combination of trust and success stem-
ming from the campaign victory encourages the expansion of the role and power
of these individuals for the president’s success and agenda. Dating back to the
Nixon administration, over 50 years and eight administrations, the institution of
the public presidency has remained present, employed, and repeatedly expanded.
Although the style and approach to using the public to achieve leadership and
agenda success differed across presidents, what remained similar was the belief in
planning and strategy rooted in polling and public relations tactics.The goal of the
Communications team was support from the public and other Washington actors
for the president’s agenda and it was achieved by analysis and use of poll data, by
careful crafting of presidential messages, coupled with an effort to manage presen-
tation and evaluation of that agenda in the press. The expectations and behaviors
of the press, other political actors, namely Congress, as well as interest groups,
26 The Tools of the Rhetorical Presidency
challenge any administration’s goal of language and presentation management.

The pressures presented by other political actors reinforced behaviors over time
and across administrations designed to achieve consistent and coherent White
House messaging.
Although the apparatus and the capacity of the rhetorical presidency exists
in the Trump White House the output and outcomes from the White House
are vastly different. While the goals of the rhetorical presidency may be present
in the institution amongst the staff, the apparatus is not working hand in glove
with the president. In startling contrast to previous administrations and previous
presidents, President Trump is at war with his own institution. In essence, the
Trump apparatus is a devolution of institutional capacity in favor of individ-
ual action. A communication apparatus still exists writing speeches, creating
photo ops and constituency travel opportunities but without the skill of past
administrations. There is no efficacy in the line of the day or use of the poll-
ing apparatus to design rhetoric as those efforts, the driving force of previous
presidential leadership, is now diminished as a leadership tool in favor of the
individual actions of the president. President Trump makes news, connects with
his constituency and advances his agenda via individual, primarily spontaneous
or contemporaneous action via Twitter, interviews, press conferences or press
interactions (e.g., exiting or entering events or transportation and calling in live
to Fox television shows).
The reversion from institutional to individual changes the dynamic and power
of designed public leadership. It increased a haphazard approach to selling presi-
dential policy. It introduced errors, mistakes and falsehoods, into what had been
slickly produced, highly crafted events, statements and policies. Fundamentally, the
extra-constitutional power derived from the leadership of the public has shrunk
during the Trump administration. The Trump efforts to lead the public is smaller
and narrower and stymied by internal competition between individual and insti-
tutional action.
Has Anyone Seen the Rhetorical Apparatus?

The easiest way to evaluate the health, strength and effectiveness of any insti-
tution is to examine its composition and its output. To explore rhetorical lead-
ership, there are several offices that encapsulate the effort to sell the president
and the presidential agenda. The administration office tasked with rhetorical
management is Communications; within that, depending on the particular
White House management approach are: the travel office, the press office and,
in recent years, a digital media office. In addition, all the president’s corre-
spondence inside and outside government counts for rhetorical leadership, and
is managed accordingly. The Trump White House has fewer people working
within it and they are producing less designed oratory to manage the presi-
dent’s message.
The Tools of the Rhetorical Presidency 27
Communications Staff
In 2017, there were 377 staffers in the White House Office (WHO) within the
Executive Office of President Trump’s White House.2 This is 22 percent smaller
than President Obama’s 2009 office. Of the 377 staffers working in the WHO
in 2017, 79 worked in service of rhetorical leadership. As Table 2.1 showcases,
the offices for Speechwriting and Correspondence, Travel and Press Management
represent the largest allocation of rhetorical institutional capacity, with 52 percent
of staffers in those three offices.
However, by 2018, although the total WHO had grown in size by 41 staffers to
418, the increase did not come in the form of increased capacity for rhetorical
leadership as those offices only increased by a single staff member. Despite
the offices of Speechwriting and Correspondence, Travel and Press Manage-
ment remaining the largest allocation of rhetorical institutional capacity, with
now 53 percent of staffers in those three offices, the distribution of staffers
changed. The Press Office shrank considerably in staff size, while the number
of staffers handling speechwriting and correspondence increased. The ramifi-
cations of the change in staff allocation will be discussed in the forthcoming
sections.
As noted earlier, the Trump White House staff is significantly smaller than the
presidential average, and his predecessor’s White House.3 There are two variants
of explanation for the smaller size: (1) President Trump is keeping his campaign
pledge to reduce the size of government4; and (2) President Trump was unable to
staff his White House with high-quality individuals and was plagued by high staff
turnover.5 Typically, the Communications staff represents a place of continuity as
the bulk of staffers come from the campaign. Table 2.2 reveals the distribution
of Trump’s campaign staff; 33 percent of his campaign staff came to the White
TABLE 2.1 Communications Staff Positions
Categories 2017 2018
Communications 8 10
Strategy 1 2
Digital 7 8
Speechwriting/Correspondence 14 20
Travel 14 14
Press and Press Secretary 13 8
Media 5 2
Regional 7 3
Public Liaison 5 4
Political Affairs 2 5
Analysis 1 1
Video 2 3
Total 79 80
28 The Tools of the Rhetorical Presidency
TABLE 2.2 2016 Campaign Staff Postings
Staffers
White House Staff* 13

Cabinet/Executive Branch Staff* 4
Other Government Offices 1
RNC 3
Lobbyists 5
Consultants 7
Foreign Policy Advisors 4
Total 37
Note
* Several staffers changed positions or left; this count is based on first posting in 2017
House, but only four explicitly worked for Communications. More significantly,
the offices plagued by high-level staff turnover were directly related to rhetorical
leadership. By 2019, six Directors of Communications and three Press Secretaries
served President Trump. In comparison to other presidents, this level of turnover
is extraordinary and has significant influence on the skill, expertise and consis-
tency available to serve leadership behavior.6
Efforts to lead the public revolve around presidential oratory. The Inaugural,
the state of the union and other speeches presented either in the Oval Office
or on Capitol Hill represent the apex of designed leadership. The Commu-
nications staff, the strategists and the speechwriters, work tirelessly to create
these moments. Many presidents work alongside their staff, tinkering, editing
and even writing important speeches. President Obama was in particular a
“tinkerer” with his speeches and his speechwriters. Obama speechwriter Adam
Frankel notes,
On most speeches, we’d get line edits without any overarching feedback
on the quality of the draft. (He was too busy to offer it, and we didn’t
expect it.) But if a speech were mediocre, he’d let us know. “Pedestrian,
but serviceable,” he once told us. And he’d also let us know if he thought
we’d done a particularly good job.7
These national speeches, steeped in ceremony, no longer represent the bulk of

presidential rhetorical efforts. Quite simply, presidents no longer rely on national
efforts as their primary mechanism to exercise leadership. Instead, Presidents
Clinton, Bush and Obama traveled around the country giving speeches sur-
rounded by less ceremony, exercising a different mode of rhetorical leadership.
Giving speeches for a national or international audience requires massive plan-
ning and design. Local speeches typically require less pageantry and receive less
media coverage so require less time to produce. However, the sheer volume of
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Joachim ja Susen neiti panivat kumpikin viisautensa liikkeelle ja

keksivät mitä hullunkurisempia selitysehdotuksia — kukaan ei voinut
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saaneet lämpömäärän, vastalämmitetyssä vieraskamarissa
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Sehän on tietysti minun mieheni, Eke — bäck [Eke = tammi, bäck =
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Hän katsoi hullunkurisen näköisenä sisaren tyttären silmiä

tavattomasti muistuttavilla, pyöreillä, teeskentelemätöntä
hämmästystä osoittavilla sinisilmillään Joachimiin, niin että tämä heti
purskahti nauruun ja alkoi melkein ihmetellä miten hän ei heti noin
sattuvasta kuvauksesta tuntenut tuota kunnon kapteenia.
Mutta kaikki kolme Skytten sisarusta olivat aivan loukkaantuneita,

he katselivat vain polvihinsa ja Beata kuiskasi Fritz nuorukaiselle,
"että hän ei voinut käsittää Netti tätiä".
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hänen nuoruutensa päivinä kuului vain asiaan ettei saanut olla
hentomielinen kun puhui omasta puolisostaan".
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harmistuneena.
"Varmaankaan ei…" Fritz pysähtyi vähän aikaa ja näytti siltä kuin

hän sitä ei olisi lukenut majuurskalle miksikään niin suureksi eduksi.
"Mutta täti Skytte hän nyt onkin harvinaisen totinen".
Ilta kului, mutta kukaan ei tahtonut käydä levolle; niin harvoinhan

sai nähdä nuorisoa Munkebodassa. Karin Maria sai Joachimin
hakemaan harppunsa alas päätyhuoneesta, jonka jälkeen hän lauloi
pari Geijerin laulua, jotka olivat aivan uusia, sekä ihailun "Laakson
ruusu" ja "Kukkaset".
Kaikki istuivat juhlallisina, melkeinpä hartaina pitkin seiniä yhtäkkiä

ikäänkuin kaikkeen nauruun ja lörpötykseen väsyneinä. Lotti täti
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Joachim oli huomaamatta siirtynyt ja istui nyt Agnetan takana.

Ajattelematta mitä teki oli hän laskenut kätensä Agnetan tuolin
selustalle ja yhtäkkiä tunsi Joachim kuinka tytön kaula tietämättään,
taipui sitä vasten. Hän ei liikahtanutkaan, istui hiljaa kuin hiiri, tytön
pehmeän niskan luottavaisesti, hänen mielestään melkein hyväillen
yhä nojatessaan hänen käteensä.
Pyöreät, valkeat olkapäät puolihämärässä, sinistä "huonekalun

päällystää vasten näyttivät vieläkin valkoisemmilta — olisiko siinä
ollut Susen tai kuka muu tyttö tahansa, ei hän olisi epäillyt
hetkeäkään painaessaan huulensa niille; se olisi ollut vain tavallinen
satunnainen kohteliaisuus, aivan kuten oli sopivaa. Mutta kuinka
lienee ollut — kun siinä oli Agneta, niin ei hän hennonnut. Kenties
enin pelosta, että joku voisi sen nähdä ja voisi tehdä tavalla tai
toisella jonkun leikillisen tai epähienon muistutuksen, joka — sen
tunsi hän yhtäkkiä aivan varmasti — tänä hetkenä olisi ollut hänelle
varsin epäedullista. Ainoa hyväily — jos sitä edes siksi voi
nimittääkään — jonka hän serkullensa soi, oli että hän taivuttausi
hänen ylitsensä ja antoi kasvonsa koskettaa hänen pehmeitä
hiuksiaan.
"Pikku Agneta", mutisi hän vielä kerran. Tämä köyhä,

yksinkertainen hyväilysana oli ainoa, joka nyt vieri hänen huulillensa
— hänen, jolla muutoin oli aina valmiina niin monia paljon ilmaisevia,
ihastelevia nimityksiä kauniille sukupuolelle.
Agneta kuuli sen ja yhtäkkiä tuntien hänen läheisyytensä kohotti

hän heti taaksepäin taipuneen päänsä ja istui viimeisen laulun ajan
suorana kuin kynttilä, hieman vain kumartuen tuntiessaan hänen
katseensa.
Karin Maria lopetti parilla pitkällä värähtelevällä soinnulla; Joachim

nousi Agnetan tuolin takaa ja sanoi äänellä, jota Agneta ei oikein
tuntenut — pikaisesti, pontevasti ja hätiköiden sanoissaan.
"Nyt tanssimme me"!
Kukaan ei pannut vastaan. Kapteenin rouva Ekebäck istui heti

pyytämättä, kuin käskystä, klaveerin eteen. Joachim, yleisessä
hälinässä, toisten raivatessa tuolia ja pöytiä pois lattialta, otti
Agnetan erityisesti häntä pyytämättä käsihinsä ja alotti tanssia erästä
saksalaista valssia, joka viime aikoina oli käynyt hyvin yleiseksi
myöskin täällä maaseudulla.
Agneta tanssi tahdottomasti soiton tahdissa, joka ikäänkuin
keinutellen häntä kiidätti. Sädehtivät ruskeat silmänsä katsoivat
hymyillen Joachim serkun lämpimiin sinisiin. Kaiken aikaa kuin he
tanssivat tuntui kuin olisivat he olleet vain kahden kesken — poissa
oli pakko, kainostelu, pelko ja teeskentely heidän väliltään.
Valssi loppui. Joachim veti Agnetan, joka yhtäkkiä horjahti,

likemmä luokseen, koettaen itse pysyä vakavasti jaloillaan. Hänestä
tuntui yhtäkkiä pyörryttävän, kuin olisi hän tyhjentänyt yksin
pullollisen champanjaa.
"Kiitos! Kiitos"! mutisi hän ja pusersi kiihkeästi hänen käsiänsä,

tietämättä oikeastaan mitä sanoi ja teki.
Susen neiti oli loukkaantunut. Hän ei voinut käsittää miksi tuon

ainoan kavaljeerin — tietysti ei hän lukenut nuorta Fritziä miksikään,
— päähän yhtäkkiä oli pistänyt tanssia tuon "tyttö lepukan" kanssa,
siihen sijaan kuin tapa, käytös, yksinkertaisin kohteliaisuus olisi
vaatinut pyytämään ensiksi hänet. Hän istui jäykkänä, käsivarret
kupeille painettuina, pitäen nenäliinaansa hienosti sormiensa välissä,
sillä välin nuoren Fritzin kömpelösti pyytäessä Karin Mariaa ja
Beatan ilomielin pyörähdellessä setä Fagerholmin kanssa, joka pää
kallellaan tanssiessaan tarpeettomasti notkutteli sääriään jos
jonnekin päin. Salin ovella seisoi mamseli Fiken uudessa, mustassa
bombasiini-puvussaan ja tuuditteli ruumistansa sävelten mukaan,
kädet lanteilla, edestakaisin majuurin turhaan pyrkiessä
vastapuoleiselta ovelta lattian poikki, joka nyt, kuinka olikaan, oli
tanssivia täynnä ja alati ystävällisesti nyyköttäessä päätään ja väliin
rohkaisevasti huutaessa: "Nytkös me tanssimme mamseli Fiken —
nyt sitä mekin pyörähtelemme…"
Juuri heidän pysähtyessään oli Agneta tavannut äitinsä kylmästi
ihmettelevän ja suuttuneen silmäyksen — hän ymmärsi heti, mitä se
merkitsi ja pelästyi pahanpäiväisesti. "Susen!…" kuiskasi hän, vielä
vetäen henkeään ja katsoi rukoilevasti Joachimiin. "Susen istuu"!
Joachim oli niin iloinen että hän olisi voinut nauraa ääneen. Hän
puristi Agnetan käsiä, jotka vielä tahdottomasti lepäsivät hänen
käsissään ja meni kohteliaasti neiti Susenin luo.
"Luutnantti Skytte siis ei varmaankaan minun itseni vuoksi jätä niin

yhtäkkiä tanssitoveriaan", pisteli Susen neiti kohteliaan happamesti.
"Mutta neiti"! Joachim katsoi niin nuhtelevaisesti kuin mahdollista

ja vei tuntehikkaasti käden sydämelleen. "Tietysti olen valmistaunut
siihen, että neiti käsittää minut väärin. Olimme pannut vedon,
serkkuni ja minä", lisäsi hän vakavasti, niin kovasti että naiset
sohvassa voivat myös sen kuulla.
Neiti Susen ei ollut vaikea lepytellä: hän ehdotteli kohteliaasti että

luutnantti ja hän opettaisivat tytöille polkkaa: "Se on ainoa mitä me
nyt viitsimme tanssia Kristianstadissa", selitti hän vähän ylpeästi.
Beata oli heti hyvin huvitettu siitä: kiltti kapteenitar soitti edelleen ja
he alkoivat kaikki — mamseli Fiken myös — "opetella askelia", joita
Susen neiti sininen hame edestä sievästi nostettuna niin ylös — että
koruommellut sukkasiteet vilahtelivat, hyväntahtoisesti ja innokkaasti
näytti.
Agneta vain ei ollut mukana. Hän oli kohta valssin jälkeen hiipinyt
etehiseen ja istuutui puolipimeän yläkerran rapulle, pakkasta
huomaamatta.
Joachim oli nähnyt hänen katoavan ja aavistaen syyn, yhtäkkiä
hermostuneena, sietämättömän ikävän valloittamana, saada nähdä
hänet jälleen, läksi hän — kuin muut parhaallaan olivat polkan
touhussa — häntä etsimään.
"Agneta", kuiskasi hän matalasti. Hän ei keksinyt häntä kohta,

etehisen pöydällä olevan yksinäisen, liekkuvan ja savuavan
raanilampun himmeässä valossa.
Agneta ei vastannut, mutta nousi heti ja nojasi kaidepuuta vasten.
Seuraavassa tuokiossa oli Joachim hänen vierellänsä ja samassa

— kumpikaan ei koskaan voinut heistä sanoa, kuinka se oikeastaan
oli käynyt — lepäsi Agneta hänen sylissänsä, lähellä, lämpimästi
hänen rintaansa vasten.
"Agneta, omani, armahaiseni", kuiskasi Joachim onnellisesti,

sydämellisesti hänelle.
Tämä ei vastannut, mutta katsoi puoli pimeässä häneen — hellästi

hieman arasti, ikäänkuin uteliaana. Joachim tunsi nyt, että pikku
Agneta yhdessä ainoassa päivässä kiihkeän, vihdoinkin täydellisesti
käsitetyn rakkautensa lämpösätehissä oli kasvanut hänen
käsissänsä naiseksi. Ja tuo kuuma, melkeinpä raaka kiihko, joka
ensin tanssissa oli soaissut hänen silmänsä kaikelle, mitä hänen
ympärillänsä tapahtui, niin ettei hän tuntenut kenenkään muun
olemassa oloa kuin Agnetan, suli täällä — hiljaisuudessa ja
yksinäisyydessä vienoksi hellyydeksi ja tuokion tuskallisesti
värähteleväksi sydämellisyydeksi.
Sitä kesti vain hetken. Ovi aukeni alhaalla — tanssin hälinää ja

ääniä kuului. — Agneta nyhtäsihe vavisten hänen sylistään ja kiiti
äänettömästi ylös yläkerran rappuja.
VI.
Aikasin seuraavana aamuna, kun vieraat vielä nukkuivat ja kun

juhlallista kahvi ja aamiaispöytää, takkavalkean leimutessa, katettiin
salissa, näki Joachim, astuessansa alas rappusia Agnetan peiteliina
harteilla akkunan ääressä seisovan ja solmivan myssynsä nauhoja.
Hän hätkähti, he eivät olleet vaihtaneet sanaakaan sitte eilisillan,

kun hän rappusten puolipimeässä oli tuokioksi sulkenut hänet
sylihinsä. Kun Agneta vähän ajan perästä oli tullut sisälle —
seurueen juuri alkaessa erota — ei hän hetkeksikään saanut
tilaisuutta katsoa hänen silmiinsä ja tyttö oli vain kaikkien muiden
keralla sanonut hänelle pikaisesti, tuskin kuultavasti hyvää yötä.
Joachim lähestyi häntä epäillen — tyttö seisoi alasluoduin silmin,

eikä ollut huomaavinaankaan häntä…
"Menetkö ulos? … näin aikasin…" oli kaikki mitä hän,

kummallisesti hämmentyneenä hoksi sanoa.
Agneta ei kohottanut silmiään vetäessään kotona neulotuita

lapasia käsiinsä.
"Niin, minun täytyy ennen aamiaista rientää Niilo Maunun Gunillaa
pyytämään lampaan keritsemiseen, niin on äiti käskenyt".
Joachim aukasi etehisen oven ja sanomatta sanaakaan otti hän

hattunsa ja seurasi häntä.
He kävivät vaieten. Auringon valo välkehti vaaleasti vihoittavilla

pelloilla ja metsässä, joka vähän alkoi jo vivahtaa punaruskealle.
Routa ei ollut vielä maasta lähtenyt, ja syviä rattaan jälkiä peitti vielä
aamusin hapras, valkoinen jää, joka heidän astuessansa murtui kuin
ohut lasi.
He kävivät äänetönnä, rinnatusten yhä edelleen. Yhtäkkiä,

ikäänkuin sisällisestä käskystä kumartui Joachim pikaisesti ja katsoi
myssyn sisälle, suoraan Agnetan kasvoihin. Hänen silmänsä olivat
täynnä suuria kyyneleitä, jotka olivat valmiina vierähtämään.
"Mutta Agneta", kuiskasi hän. "Hyvänen aika miksikä?" Hän tarttui

hänen käteensä, joka hervotonna riippui hameella ja kumartui.
"Agneta, miksikä Herran nimessä itket?" kysyi hän vielä kerran,

päättäväisemmin, levottomasti.
"Siksi… siksi…" nyyhki hän "siksi kun Joachim serkku ei sano

sanaakaan minulle".
"Mutta Agneta", alkoi Joachim lämpimästi, "käynhän tässä

vierelläsi, ollen iloinen vain siitä että saan käydä rinnallasi" — hän
puristi hellästi pientä kintaan peittämää kättä — "ja vaieta. Mitäs sitte
voisin sanoa, joka olisi kylliksi hyvää?"
Agneta vaikeni valkean, kovaksi kovoitetun hattunsa varjossa. Ja

koko hänen kasvoistansa ei Joachim nähnyt muuta kuin hiuskutrit
edestä ja nenän, pienen, pyöreän, pehmeän nenänipukan, joka
näytti niin uhkarohkealta.
Ja tuon omituisen vuorovaikutuksen kautta, joka on kahden

rakastavan välillä, arvasi hän mitä Agneta ajatteli.
"Sinä tahdot… tahdot, että sanoisin… sen mitä en saanut

sanotuksi eilen…?"
Agneta kohottiihe vähän, hieman ylpeästi, ikäänkuin

näyttääksensä, että nyt oli se hänelle yhdentekevää. Mutta Joachim
ei antanut tämän tekeydytyn välinpitämättömyyden itseänsä
eksyttää: hymyillen kumartui hän ja veti hänen kätensä luokseen.
"Rakas tyttöseni, onhan jo kaikki sanottu suutelossa", oli hän juuri

sanomaisillaan, mutta muisti yhtäkkiä, ettei hän koskaan oikein ollut
suudellut häntä — ei koskaan muuta kuin hänen poskeansa, ja
jalkapöytäänsä ja kättänsä. Hän hymyili, pysähtyi ja nostaessaan
hänen kätensä ja painaessaan sitä silmäänsä vasten, mutisi hän
kerran toisensa perästä matalasti ja hillitsemättömästi:
"Minä rakastan sinua… Mutta minähän rakastan sinua…"
Agneta nosti kasvonsa häneen päin, punastuen hennosti

värähtelevin huulin. Katse lepäsi hänen katseessaan: lämpimänä,
ihailevan hellänä, teeskentelemättömän sydämellisenä.
Ja Joachim kietoi kätensä lujasti hänen harteillensa, taivuttausi ja

painoi huulensa hänen hienolle — raikkaalle, kylmänä huhtikuun
aamuna hieman kostealle poskellensa — ja hänen pehmeille,
puoleksi avatuille huulillensa, jotka ujosti sulkeutuivat suuteloa yhä
kestäessä. Ei pistänyt heidän kummankaan päähän ensin silmätä
ympärilleen, jos he todellakin olivat yksin. Ei se ollut tarpeellistakaan,
täällä kivisellä, rouhkoisella, jäätyneellä kanervikkokankaiden ja
peltotilkkujen läpi mutkikkaasta luikertelevalla, ylenemistään
ylenevällä tiellä ei löytynyt näin aikasin aamusella ainoatakaan
sielua.
"Ja välitätkö sinä todellakin minusta, kurjasta, syntisestä

paholaisesta?" kysyi Joachim nöyrästi, mutta aivan tarpeettomasti,
kuullaksensa, vain hänen vielä kerran vakuuttavan sitä.
"En välitä koskaan kenestäkään muusta, en koskaan

maailmassa", mutisi Agneta kiihkeästi ja yhtäkkiä, ikäänkuin omaa
kiivauttansa peläten, sulki hän sädehtivät ruskeat silmänsä.
"Entäpä Stjernestä?" Kysyi Joachim riemuiten, vallattomasti

kiusoitellen. Mutta seuraavassa tuokiossa katui hän katkerasti, että
oli sanonut tämän nimen. Agnetan kasvoille solui hetkeksi sellainen
inhon ja pelästyksen kiusallinen ilme, että niitä tuokion aikana tuskin
olisi entisiksi tuntenut.
"Mutta Agneta, Agneta", kuiskasi hän lämpimästi. "Ethän vain

pelänne
Mitäpä hän voisi tehdä sinulle — nyt?"
"Äiti", kuiskasi hän yhtäkkiä epätoivoisena. "Et tiedä miten

järkähtymätön äiti on, kun hän kerran on luvannut jotain".
"Ja sinä aijot todellakin taipua hänen tuumiinsa?" huusi hän

kiivaasti.
Agneta katsoi ylös. "En", sanoi hän hiljaa, mutta niin selvästi, että
se kuului melkein ankaralta. "En — en koskaan".
"Etkö luule että olisi parasta", alkoi Joachim, epäillen vähäisen
väliajan perästä, "että ratsastan puhumaan itse Stjernen kanssa,
ennenkuin Lotti täti… Eihän meidän tarvitse sanoa heti sitä Lotti
tädille", lisäsi hän hiljaisemmin meikein houkutellen.
"No niin", lausui Agneta keveämmin, "puhu ensin Stjernen kanssa.

Kun sanot hänelle, että minä en tahdo, että en mitenkään voi… en
voi edes kuvitellakaan sitä… niin täytyy hänen luonnollisesti minusta
luopua." Hän katsoi tuskallisesti Joachimiin. "Etkö luule niin?"
"Sanos minulle Agneta," Joachim pysähtyi keskelle mäkeä ja

katsoi häntä vakavasti silmiin.
"Oletko varma siitä, että hän välittää sinusta — sinusta itsestäsi,

rakkaudestasi, tarkoitan? Onko hän joskus suoraan sanonut,
puhunut tunteistaan kanssasi?"
Agneta vaikeni hetken ja sanoi sitte hiljaa.
"On."
"Sanot sen niin kummallisesti Agneta," lausui hän yhtäkkiä

levottomasti, valmiina tarkkaamaan hänen mielensä joka
vivahduksen.
"Niin siksi… siksi… Minusta on niin vastenmielistä ajatella häntä"

lausui hän tulisesti.
"Sano minulle nyt kaikki", kehoitti Joachim yhtä innokkaasti,

melkeinpä tuskallisesti. "Kerro kaikki".
"Oi, ei siinä ole paljon kertomista". Melkein vaistomaisesti koki hän

hillitä ääntään ja ikäänkuin haihduttaa omien sanojensa vaikutusta.
"Niin oltiin joulukesteissä Råsnäsissä, he olivat juoneet paljon ja sitte
aivan viimeiseen tanssiin tuli hän minua pyytämään. En uskaltanut,
tietysti kieltää".
"Oliko hän juopunut"? kysyi Joachim suoraan. "Enpä sitä juuri

luulisi, hänhän sietää vaikka kuinka paljon, se mies".
"En tiedä tarkoin oliko hän juovuksissa", sanoi Agneta

ajattelevaisesti, "mutta selväkään hän ei ollut, vaikka hän vei minua
paljon varmemmin kuin moni muu, jonka kanssa olin tanssinut".
Joachim pusersi Agnetan kalvosta kovemmin. Hän tajusi yhtäkkiä,

ensikerran miten tuo — että nuoren tytön, kuten yleisenä tapana oli
täytyi tanssia kenen hyvänsä, puolijuopuneen kavaljeerin kanssa,
joka vain suvaitsi häntä pyytää, ja kukapa sitte ei ollut ainakin osaksi
eli kokonaankin juovuksissa joulukekkereissä? — että se todellakin
oli mitä mieltä kuohuttavin epäkohta.
"Ja koko ajan kun me tanssimme", jatkoi Agneta matalammalla

äänellä, hieman vaikeasti, ikäänkuin muisteleminen olisi vaivannut ja
hävettänyt häntä, "katsoi hän minuun. Ja yhtäkkiä, ennenkuin
aavistin eli voin sitä estää, kumartui hän ja kuiskasi… jotain… ja",
hän kävi punaiseksi kuin veri, "ja hän tarttui korvaani kuin tahtoisi
hän purra minua…"
"Sellainen raaka…" Joachim noitasi. "Mitä sanoi hän"?
"Oh, en sitä niin tarkoin muista. Agneta katsoi häveten maahan,

pelästyneenä ja kumminkin mielissään siitä että Joachim voi omistaa
asian niin. Ja minä olin aivan kuin pois laidoilta, niin nolostuin ja
kauhistuin. Jotain että olin niin soma, että hän juuri siinä paikassa
olisi tahtonut syödä minut suuhunsa… Kenties se ei ollut niin
vaarallista, hän tietysti oli humalassa… Mutta hän pelästytti minut —
voi, miten häntä pelkäsin! Jo vain hänen silmänsä… Muutoinhan hän
aina on niin siivo ja kohtelias…
"Hän on raaka intohimoinen lurjus, sellainen hän on!" huusi

Joachim kalpeana, raivostuneena, kun hänen pienen Agnetansa oli
avutonna täytynyt kuulla niin hävyttömän karkeaa rakkauden
tunnustusta, jollaista kohtelias herrasmies tuskin voisi tarjota
katuneitosellekaan. Sillä tytön katkonaisesta, kainostelevasta
kertomuksesta ymmärsi hän kokemuksiensa nojalla enemmän, kuin
hän viattomuudessaan oli käsittänyt eli aavistanut. "Miehen kunnian
vuoksi täytyy minun otaksua hänen olleen humalassa, muutoin
tuollainen menettely kunniallista säätyläistyttöä kohtaan on
enemmän kuin anteeksiantamatonta. Mutta luota minuun, olen
pakoittava sen kolhon pyytämään anteeksi sekä sinulta että minulta".
"Ei", huusi Agneta yhtäkkiä aivan pelästyneenä, että hän oli tullut
jonkun roskajutun tahi riidan aloittajaksi. "Et saa virkkaa noista
tyhmyyksistä hänelle mitään. Kiellän sinua siitä, juoksen järveen
häpeästä, jos hän saa tietää että minä muistan vielä ja olen
kumminkin, kun tapaan hänet, aivan yhtäläinen häntä kohtaan kuin
ennenkin. Mutta mitä olisin voinut tehdä"? hän kääntyi Joachimiin.
"Enhän voinut sanoa äidille mitään, sitä en olisi kehdannut. Ja
hänhän kosi minua kohta sen jälkeen", lopetti hän vähän
katkonaisesti.
"Luuletko että se kenties tapahtui siitä syystä"? kysyi Joachim

kopeasti. "Parantaakseen nenäkkäisyyttään…"
"Ei", sanoi Agneta rehellisesti. "Luulen todellakin että hän on…

että hän on… rakastunut minuun", lopetti hän hyvin päättäväisesti.
Ja kun Joachim ei vastannut, lisäsi hän ujosti, vähän lapsellisesti
ylvästellen.
"Senhän aina huomaa. Tarkoitan, tuntee sanomattakin kun

mies…"
Hän lopetti yhtäkkiä Joachimin hymyilevästä katseesta

loukkaantuneena ja heilahutti niskaansa taaksepäin.
"Luuletko kenties ettei kukaan koskaan ole välittänyt minusta",

sanoi hän suuttuneesti ja tavallaan hyvin arvokkaasti.
"Jumala tietää, että luulen juuri päinvastaista. Minähän", hän otti

sovitellen hänet syliinsä ja kuiskasi: "minähän itse olen aivan hulluna
sinuun".
Agneta oli aivan unohtanut lampaankeritsemisasiansa Niilo

Maunun
Gunillalle. Hän huomasi äkkiä kauhuksensa että he jo kauan aikaa
sitte
olivat sivuuttaneet polun, joka kanervikkokankaan poikki johti tuvalle.
Hän vetäysi pian, melkeinpä nyhtäsi itsensä irti Joachimin sylistä.
"Jumalan tähden, Joachim serkku", huudahti hän huolestuneena

ja hänelle tuli yhtäkkiä hyvin kiire. "Kaikella muotoa, riennä kotiin,
niin että olet kotona ennen minua. Mitä ihmettä äiti ja
Fagerhjelmiläiset sanovat. Ja Susen…" ei hän voinut olla
singahuttamatta sitä hänelle kääntyessään takaisin.
"Sinä sitten oletkin surkein pelkuri raukka", mumisi toinen,

vastenmielisesti hänet jo luotaan päästäen.
"Pelkuriko"? Agneta heilahutti päätään taaksepäin ja loi ylpeästi
komeat ruskeat silmänsä häneen. "Saatpa vielä nähdä olenko
pelkuri, kun kerran sitä kysytään"!
VII.
Samana iltapäivänä kun sotaneuvos vihdoinkin oli sanonut hyvästit

ja kun he jo onnellisesti ja hyvin vaelsivat Kristianstaadia kohti,
ratsasti Joachim Marieholmaan. Aamullinen katkeruus oli pysynyt
koko päivän yhtä kiihkeänä, niin ettei hänellä ollut lepoa eikä rauhaa
ennenkuin oli saanut puhua Stjernen kanssa.
Kun hän ratsasti kivitettyyn umpipihaan, jonka suuren portin

päällystää koristi hiekkakivestä hakattu vapaaherravaakuna, veti
hänen huomionsa heti puoleensa olento, jota merkillisempää hän
mielestään koskaan ei ollut nähnyt. Ylhäällä portin vastapäätä
olevilla päärappusilla seisoi pieni naishenkilö, kömpelöä
hiekkakivistä kaidepuuta vasten nojautuneena. Hänen harteillaan oli
vanha topattu silkkiviitta, josta pumpulitukut siellä täällä pilkistelivät
esille ja pitkulaisessa päässään, terävine koukkunenineen ja
tuikeasti paistaville silmineen oli korkea, ympyriäinen hattu, jonka
suuri, kovin kulunut höyhentöyhtö oli ainakin viisitoista vuotta vanha.
Toisessa kädessään oli hänellä pitkä kävelykeppi, jollaiset olivat
käytännössä "rococo"-aikakautena ja toisella kädellään oli hän
kerännyt helmansa ylös, niin että jalat pitkävartisissa puukengissä
näkyivät. Joachim tietysti oli kuullut kylliksi hänestä, niin ettei hänen
edes tarvinnut tuokiotakaan epäillä sitä että edessänsä seisoi kautta
koko Höingen kihlakunnan kuuluksi käynyt vapaaherratar Malviina
Stjerne.
Hän puhutteli ankarasti, kuten tuntui, erästä kurjaa

torpparipaholaista, joka hattu kädessä seisoi rappusten edessä. Kun
Joachim ratsasti pihaan otti hän vanhanaikuisen, saksien muotoisen
jalokivillä koristetun "lorgnetin" ja piti sitä silmiensä edessä.
"Kuka hän on"? kysäsi hän mahtipontisesti.
Joachim nosti kohteliaasti hattuansa ja kumarsi satulassa.

"Luutnantti Skytte Munkebodasta". vastasi hän tottuneesti,
"armollisen vapaaherrattaren nöyrin palvelija".
"Vai nuori Skytte…" hän tarkasteli häntä edelleen yhtä

häikäilemättömästi. "Ei ole hullumpi, ei ole hullumpi kautta kunniani!
Hän siis kai tuntee minut"?
Joachim ei voinut olla hymyilemättä vastatessansa kohteliaasti:
"Ei löydy ainoatakaan koko Skånessa ken ei tuntisi

vapaaherratarta".
Hymyily solahti samassa vapaaherrattaren ruskeaihoisten

linnunkasvojen yli, ympyriäisen hatun alla.
"Se ilahduttaa minua", sanoi hän nyykähyttäen. "Siltä sen pitää

kuulua"!
Joachim käyden vähän hämilleen näki heti, että vapaaherratar

varsin hyvin oli käsittänyt hänen pilkallisen vastauksensa, mutta että
hän ei siitä vähintäkään närkästynyt.
Käden liikkeellä käski vapaaherratar torpparin huolehtimaan
hevosesta ja Joachim asteli hitaasti rappuja ylös.
"Luutnantti kai tahtoo tietystikin tavata poikaani"? kysyi hän

käyttäen kohteliaampaa ääntä kuin äsken.
"Niin". Joachim kumarsi kohteliaasti ja suuteli hänen kättänsä, joka

oli kylmä ja luiseva kuin linnun kynsi.
"Hän tulee heti, näin hänet juuri tallissa, kulkiessani siitä ohi".
Vapaaherratar puhellessansa työnsi itse raskaan tammioven auki ja
pyysi vieraansa astumaan sisälle.
Etehisessä oli heitä vastassa eräs palvelija, jonka vapaaherratar

kumminkin heti paikalla lähetti herra paroonia etsimään. Sitte potkasi
hän pitkällistä harjoitusta osoittavalla näppäryydellä raskaat
puukengät jaloistaan, ja laski hameensa alas ja alkoi — kuten
Joachim kohtausta kuvatessaan jälestäpäin sanoi — "näyttää
ihmismäisemmälle".
Salissa, joka oli pitkulainen kuin taidekokoelma, vanhoine,

valkeine kullattuine rococohuonekaluineen pyysi emäntä vierastansa
istumaan, istuutuen heti itsekin ja alkaen purkaa kultalankaa; tämä
oli ollut hänen ensi nuoruutensa aikana yleistä, ja oli, kuten
pahansuovat ihmiset sanoivat, ainoa käsityö jota hän osasi tehdä.
Sanottiin myös, ja uskottiinkin yleisesti, että vapaaherratar Malviina
Stjerne, syntyisin Leijonklo, ei ollut koskaan oppinut lukemaan eikä
kirjoittamaan. Tämän taitamattomuuden syynä, jota peittääkseen
hän kumminkin vastoin "suoraa" luonnettansa teki kaikkensa,
pidettiin osaksi hänen vanhempainsa eriskummallisuutta ja
Rousseaulaisten kasvatusohjeiden sekavaa käsitystä, osaksi hänen
omaa sairaloisuuttaan kasvuaikana, joka olikin tämän kasvatustavan
tehnyt mahdolliseksi ja jonka nojalla sitä oli voitu puolustaa. Tosiasia
kumminkin oli, ettei kukaan, huolimatta hänen laajalle levinneistä,
monimutkaisista asioistaan, voinut ylvästellä nähneensä hänen
kädellään kirjoitettua ainoatakaan sanaa, eli hänen koskaan lukevan
kirjaa.
Mutta hän oli matkalla aamusta aikasesta iltaan myöhään,

ratsastaen, venäläisellä juoksijallaan talosta taloon, torpasta
torppaan koko tuolla suurella tiluksellaan, jonka hän
kakskymmenneljävuotisena, miehensä kuoltua oli ottanut hoitoonsa
velkaisena ja puti puhtaaksi pantuna ja joka nyt oltuaan kohta
neljäkymmentä vuotta hänen hallittavanaan, sodasta,
vallankumouksesta ja hallitsijasuvun vaihtumisesta, taloudellisesta
pulasta ja lisäveroituksesta huolimatta kannatti paremmin kuin
mikään muu talo koko länsi Göingen kihlakunnassa. Poikaansa
kohteli hän aina kuin alaikäistä, ja kun Joachim nyt näki äidin, voi
hän varsin hyvin käsittää, kuinka Niilo Olavista todellakin, hyvästä
ymmärryksestään ja verrattain hyvistä tiedoistaan huolimatta oli
voinut tulla sellainen kun hän oli: tylsä, raskasmielinen ja
epäitsenäinen. Äiti oli aina siitä päivin kun poika oli vuoden vanha
kukistanut hänen tahtonsa, sitonut hänen kätensä.
"No, miten siellä Skyttelässä voidaan"? Vapaaherratar ei

seurustellut enää kenenkään kanssa, eikä liikkunut koskaan
missään, mutta hän oli utelias kuin joskus nainenkin voi olla ja tiesi
kaikki, mitä monen pitäjän piirissä tapahtui, "No kuinkas pieni miniäni
siellä kasvaa ja varttuu"?
Joachim katsoi tarkasti häneen. "Tarkoittaako vapaaherratar

serkkuani, neiti Agneta Skytteä"?

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The End of the Rhetorical Presidency?

The Rhetorical Presidency New Edition Jeffrey K. Tulis

The Future of the Presidency Journalism and Democracy

Dreams Derailed Undocumented Youths in the Trump Era

Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency Case

Corruption and Illiberal Politics in the Trump Era 1st

Rhetorical Public Speaking: Social Influence in the

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The Great Shift Psycho Spiritual Manual for Survival

“For those struggling with whether Trump is an anomaly or a glimpse of things to

ISBN: 978-0-367-52254-4 (hbk)

1 Influences on Opportunities for Leadership 1

2 The Tools of the Rhetorical Presidency 25

3 A Different National Voice 52

4 Friends, Foes, Frenemies and Public Leadership 68

5 Individual Leadership as Communication Strategy 83

6 Rhetorical Leadership during Impeachment 108

7 Public Leadership after Donald Trump 136

1.1 Systemic Influences on Presidential Leadership as the

2.1 Communications Staff Positions 27

He continued to discuss the consequences of impeachment in an impromptu

Writing a book is such a solitary experience in the moment but is never

When Donald Trump accepted the Republican nomination for president in

Evaluating Rhetorical Leadership

Today’s ceremony, however, has very special meaning. Because

a complicated, and noisy, media environment, across multiple platforms in order

The Power of the Campaign

Challenged by the Coalition

The New World Online

FIGURE 1.1 Systemic Influences on Presidential Leadership as the Media Evolves

coverage, alongside appearances in targeted media outlets like magazines Runner’s

H1 Adjusted: President Trump will target multiple audiences, employ

The Media Environment for Presidential

The State of the Press

Views of the Press

Although a minority of Americans (21%) express high levels of trust

President Trump and the Press

Clinton staff was prepared to send volleys of propaganda to any ­journalist

Using the campaign as a model, the Obama administration expanded the

the first bona fide media-created presidential nominee. ­Although he sub-

Candidates who remain “interesting” to reporters are more likely to get

Trump’s dislike of the press was slow in coming. When he announced

Approaches to Leadership Within the

Individualism vs. Institutionalism

The last two expected lessons focus on candidate-centered behavior from

of expertise, without moving beyond the constitutionally defined presidency, the

A New Way or the Loss of the Old Way?

challenge any administration’s goal of language and presentation management.

Has Anyone Seen the Rhetorical Apparatus?

TABLE 2.1 Communications Staff Positions

Categories 2017 2018

TABLE 2.2 2016 Campaign Staff Postings

White House Staff* 13

These national speeches, steeped in ceremony, no longer represent the bulk of

luki hän kirjoitusarkin puolikkaasta, jonka majuurska auliisti oli tätä

Joachim ja Susen neiti panivat kumpikin viisautensa liikkeelle ja

"Mutta, Herranen aika!" huusi kapteenitar, heilutellen notkeasti

Hän katsoi hullunkurisen näköisenä sisaren tyttären silmiä

1 Influences on Opportunities for Leadership 1

2 The Tools of the Rhetorical Presidency 25

3 A Different National Voice 52

4 Friends, Foes, Frenemies and Public Leadership 68

5 Individual Leadership as Communication Strategy 83

6 Rhetorical Leadership during Impeachment 108

7 Public Leadership after Donald Trump 136

1.1 Systemic Influences on Presidential Leadership as the

2.1 Communications Staff Positions 27

Clinton staff was prepared to send volleys of propaganda to any journalist

the first bona fide media-created presidential nominee. Although he sub-