Assignment Pentagon How to Excel in a

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“Should be stamped ‘MUST READ’ and provided to every person headed for a job
in the Pentagon.”
—Gen. John A. Wickham, U.S. Army (Ret.)

“A wealth of practical information.”

—Marine Corps Gazette

“The kind of information you’d get in an informal conversation with an old

Pentagon hand.”
—Armed Forces Journal International

“All military services should add it to their recommended reading lists.”

—U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings
 Assignment: Pentagon
How to Excel in a Bureaucracy

Fifth Edition

Maj. Gen. Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.)

Col. Daniel M. Gerstein, USA (Ret.)

Potomac Books
An imprint of the University of Nebraska Press
© 2020 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska

Cover designed by University of Nebraska Press; cover image: Alamy Stock Photo /
Hoberman Collection.

All rights reserved. Potomac Books is an imprint of the University of Nebraska

Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Smith, Perry M. (Perry McCoy), author. | Gerstein, Daniel M., 1958–
author.
Title: Assignment: Pentagon: how to excel in a bureaucracy / Maj. Gen. Perry M.
Smith, USAF (Ret.), Col. Daniel M. Gerstein, USA (Ret.).
Description: Fifth edition. | [Lincoln]: Potomac Books, an imprint of the University
of Nebraska Press, [2020] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019054495
ISBN 9781640123564 (paperback)
ISBN 9781640123724 (epub)
ISBN 9781640123731 (mobi)
ISBN 9781640123748 (pdf)
Subjects: LCSH : Pentagon (Va.) | United States—Armed Forces—Management. |
United States. Department of Defense—Management.
Classification: LCC UA 26.A 745 S 7 2020 | DDC 355.60973—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019054495

The publisher does not have any control over and does not assume any
responsibility for author or third-party websites or their content.
To Connor, McCoy, and Serena, who lifted me up so many times
during those years I worked in the Pentagon. Their gentle reminders
that what I was doing was important helped me overcome the
setbacks, the down times, and the frustrations that are part of
everyday life in the Building.
To Kathy, Sarah, and Rachel, who saw Pentagon service from a
different vantage point, and for the members of the Armed Forces
who have to implement the policies and directives that come out of
this five-sided building.
 Contents

List of Illustrations
Preface to the Fifth Edition

Part 1. An Introduction to the Pentagon

1. A View of the Building
2. Realities and Myths of the Pentagon
3. Pentagon Truisms
4. The Strange Language of the Puzzle Palace

Part 2. The Key Players

5. Where Were You When the Page Was Blank? The Agony and the
Ecstasy of the Action Officer
6. The Branch and Division Chiefs: A Forgotten Breed
7. Flag Officers, Senior Civilians, and Political Appointees: The Need
for Leadership
8. The Services
9. The Joint Staff
10. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
11. The Interagency Arena
12. Working with Defense Contractors
13. The Pentagon’s Constituents

Part 3. Running the Pentagon

14. The Complex Pattern of Rivalry and Competition
15. Understanding the Process (and Keeping the Gears Turning)
16. In Search of Research, Development, and Innovation
17. Operating in the Tank: A View from the Inner Sanctum
18. How to Give and Receive Briefings in the Pentagon

Part 4. Enjoying the Tour

19. Rules of Thumb: Helpful Hints on How to Get Ready to Work,
Survive, and Thrive
20. Difficult Bosses
21. Military Ethics in the Pentagon
22. The Heartbreak of House Hunting
23. Family, Cultural, Academic, and Job Opportunities
24. Conclusions: Back to the Future

Appendix A: Recommended References

Appendix B: Transition into the Pentagon Checklist
Appendix C: Interviewing
Appendix D: Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations
Appendix E: Department of Defense
Index
About Maj. Gen. Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
About Col. Daniel M. Gerstein, USA (Ret.)
 Illustrations

1. Layout of the Pentagon

2. Organization of the Joint Staff
3. Organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
4. Organization of the Department of Defense
 Preface to the Fifth Edition

Since the first edition of Assignment: Pentagon was published in

1988, great changes have occurred in the international environment,
our national security strategy, and the manner in which the
Pentagon functions and contributes to the security of the United
States.
The first edition was written when the Cold War was in full swing,
the Reagan administration had been pumping funds into the
Department of Defense for seven years, and the American military’s
renaissance was moving forward at almost a breakneck pace.
The second edition was published in 1992. The world had changed
dramatically in just four years. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the Gulf
War of 1991 was successfully prosecuted, and the Soviet Union had
collapsed and broken into pieces. The Cold War was over, and
almost everyone understood that a new era had begun.
Likewise, the third edition was written at a key point in our
nation’s history and published in the early years of the new century.
The military had been significantly downsized, and the percentage of
the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to national defense
was cut in half (from 6 percent under Reagan to 3 percent at the
end of the Clinton administration). With no single enemy on which to
focus, planning and policy making were more complex and seemed
less pressing. The military forces were much smaller, but the
commitments had increased, and as the new century got under way,
all of the Services had been drastically overextended.
The fourth edition reflected changes in the Pentagon resulting
from our nation and military being immersed in fighting the two
longest wars in American history. Following the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, the United States once more turned to its top
political and military executives for inspiration and leadership. On
that fateful day two hijacked airliners slammed into the World Trade
Center in New York City, one crashed into the Pentagon, and another
smashed into the farmland of western Pennsylvania. At least 189
people died at the Pentagon that day. Terrorists brought war to the
United States in a frightening and dramatic fashion. In the ten years
prior to the attack, much had been done to counter terrorism at
home and abroad, but this surprise attack on Washington and New
York was a stark reminder to Americans that much more had to be
done.
This fifth edition has been updated to reflect the realities of the
world today. The military has emerged from the longest conflicts in
our history and entered a growing competition with near-peer
competitors, Russia and China. These realities also reflect that for
some fifteen years the United States and its military have focused on
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, confronting a different kind of
enemy and military engagements that vacillated between small-unit
engagements and nation-building. During this fifteen-year period,
thoughts of and preparations for large-scale military warfare have
taken a backseat to the more immediate operations. The military’s
equipment has aged dramatically because of the high operational
tempo of the last decade and a half and must be recapitalized or
modernized to be ready for addressing the challenges of today and
tomorrow.
Several cultural and structural changes have occurred, such as the
growing importance of special operations forces, the creation of the
U.S. Cyber Command, the perceived inadequacy of the Department
of Defense research, engineering, and procurement systems to
deliver timely capabilities for the Joint force, and the inclusion of the
National Guard Bureau as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In late 2019 the world was confronted with a global pandemic
caused by a novel coronavirus. The rapid spread of the virus
affected 210 countries and territories. The U.S. military was not
immune to these affects. Military training was canceled, and
operations were scaled back. The aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt
was ordered to Guam after the ship’s captain was relieved following
the release of a letter to his superiors warning of the infection of
members of the crew—over a quarter tested positive for the virus.
The military also provided Defense Support to Civil Authorities
(DSCA) such as the deployment of the U.S. Navy hospital ships
Comfort and Mercy, support to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), and the construction of makeshift hospitals by the
U.S. Army Corps for aiding affected communities. National Guard
forces also supported the states’ governors.
Still, the magnitude of the national emergency exposed
weaknesses in our nation’s preparedness and response capabilities
and demonstrated our broader vulnerability. In the aftermath of
Covid-19, we should expect to see a reevaluation of many of our
national systems. The military should expect to receive scrutiny
during this examination. Some have even questioned whether the
definition of national security needs to be changed. Others have
questioned whether federal spending should be reconsidered to
more highly prioritize public health. No doubt, it will fall to the
Pentagon’s leadership to navigate this uncharted territory.
While the great fight against fascism and communism defined the
first fifty-eight years of the Pentagon and the most recent seventeen
years were defined by efforts to defeat terrorism, the history of the
next seventy-five years has yet to be written. Undoubtedly the men
and women serving in the Pentagon—the uniformed military,
government civilians and contractors—will play a major role in
shaping America’s future.

The idea for the original Assignment: Pentagon came to General

Smith when he had just taken over as director of plans for the U.S.
Air Force. He was dictating a welcoming letter for the officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who were headed to Washington
and wanted to suggest that they read three or four books to help
them get ready for the work ahead. One of the books he looked for
was a practical guide that covered the Pentagon’s rules of the game
and helpful hints that couldn’t be found in a manual or a regulation.
He was disappointed in this search as he found there was no such
guide.
When General Smith was the commandant of the National War
College, during the last three years of his military career, it occurred
to him that if someone were to write a practical guide to the
Pentagon, it should probably be someone who had worked there for
many years and who had a broad background in the affairs of the
four most significant uniformed Services. In this regard he was
indeed most fortunate; he has had the privilege of being closely
associated with these four Services during much of his lifetime. Born
into an Army family at West Point, New York, in the middle of the
Great Depression, he was by six months of age living with his
parents in Panama. At age six, he watched the Japanese bomb Pearl
Harbor. At age twelve, he got caught in a food riot in Naples in 1946,
and he watched one of the biggest Communist demonstrations in
the postwar period on May Day, 1947, in Milan, when the Italian
Communist Party was at the height of its power and enthusiasm. He
first visited the Pentagon during the late 1940s, when his father
worked there as an Army colonel. Smith joined the military at age
seventeen, attended the United States Military Academy (USMA), and
graduated in 1956.
After twenty-one years with the U.S. Army, he spent the next
thirty years as an Air Force officer. His wife of more than sixty years,
Connor Dyess Smith, is the daughter of a Marine Corps officer who
was the only person in history to have earned both the Carnegie
Medal (for civilian heroism) and the Congressional Medal of Honor.
(He was killed in the Marshall Islands on February 2, 1944.) As you
would expect, his family’s relationship with the U.S. Marine Corps
has been a close and warm one. The U.S. Navy named a destroyer
(DD 880) in honor of Connor’s father, A. James Dyess, and the Navy
demonstrated great hospitality toward Connor and the entire family
for many years. Smith’s years at the National War College as a
young faculty member and later as commandant increased his
knowledge of and respect for each of the four military Services.
Two experiences in the 1990s have further enriched his
understanding of the Pentagon. When he was a full-time military
analyst for CNN during the Gulf War of 1991, he learned how willing
most Pentagon officials were to share information with someone in
the media whom they trusted. Years later a new group of Pentagon
officials came to his assistance when he covered the outbreak of the
Iraq War in 2003 for CBS Television and CBS Radio News.
 Colonel Gerstein also has strong ties to the Pentagon, having
served almost ten years in the Building, from the rank of captain to
colonel. His uniformed Pentagon service has included tours on the
Army and Joint Staffs in positions that also required he work
regularly with other elements of our government, Congress, allies,
and coalition partners. He has also served as a senior government
civilian political appointee in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Policy.
After graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1980,
Gerstein served in the Army for twenty-six years in a variety of
command and staff positions. His experiences in the Pentagon
include supporting the development of negotiating positions for the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, as well as a
tour as a special assistant and speechwriter for the director of
strategic plans and policy on the Joint Staff, where he also served on
the Holbrooke Delegation, which negotiated the peace settlement in
Bosnia. During this Joint Staff tour he cowrote the first draft of the
first Joint Vision 2010 and assisted in developing the National
Military Strategy. He has also served on the Army Staff in a variety
of positions, dealing with programming and budget, Army and Joint
Transformation, and support to the senior Army leadership.
Throughout his uniformed career, he has had extensive experience
with Joint and interagency issues.
After retiring from uniformed service, Gerstein went into industry,
where he had the opportunity to see the Pentagon from the point of
view of the industrial part of the military-industrial complex. After
several years in industry, Colonel Gerstein returned to the Pentagon
as a senior government civilian and political appointee, serving as
the principal director for countering weapons of mass destruction in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy).
Two other opportunities to view the Pentagon from the outside
helped to provide important perspectives and context that have been
included throughout this fifth edition. After departing OSD (Policy),
Dr. Gerstein served as the deputy undersecretary and later as acting
undersecretary in the Science and Technology Directorate in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). He frequently worked
closely with Pentagon officials to collaborate on issues and look for
ways to leverage Pentagon investments for Homeland security
purposes, in other words, working to leverage the Pentagon’s
massive research and development enterprise. Finally, after
departing DHS, Dr. Gerstein joined the RAND Corporation, a federally
funded research and development center (FFRDC), where he
supported a variety of Pentagon offices with analysis of issues from
arms control to Homeland defense to low-yield nuclear weapons to
cybersecurity.
While many believe Pentagon duty is a curse to be avoided and
have prided themselves on avoiding such an assignment, Gerstein
believes his duty in the Pentagon actually helped prepare him for
operational assignments. The knowledge he gained working on the
Army’s programming and budgeting in the Pentagon was key to
being able to field new capabilities and compete for resources in his
brigade command. Likewise, serving on the Holbrooke Delegation’s
negotiating team provided even more direct benefits: it prepared
him for taking command of a battalion in Bosnia.
Returning to the Pentagon several years after retirement from
active duty as a political appointee brought his Pentagon experience
full circle. Gerstein reflects that he did not fully appreciate the role of
senior political appointees or the civilian workforce during his
Pentagon assignments while in uniform. Interestingly, these roles
serve different purposes that can be in conflict if not managed
appropriately. Political appointees are charged with helping execute
the president’s agenda, while the civilian workforce assures vital
continuity that the uniformed military cannot always provide due to
frequent rotations.

Assignment: Pentagon was written to help people who are headed

for the Pentagon for their first assignment and who would like the
kind of informal advice they might get over a cup of coffee or on a
Sunday afternoon with a friend who worked in the Building. But this
book is also designed to be more than just a practical guide to a
strange new environment. It is written for people who are interested
in how that monstrous five-sided building-on-the-Potomac operates
but who have no expectation of working there. Military people in the
field, scholars, members of the media, defense contractors,
congressional staffers, military attachés, and others will likely also
find this guide useful.
In our democratic society, it is important that the interaction
between those who work in the Pentagon and those who do not is
productive. Unfamiliarity with the Pentagon’s rules of the game,
particularly on the part of those who have never worked there,
makes dialogue and understanding difficult. For instance, scholars
who do extensive research and interviewing often miss some
important subtleties of the Pentagon. Their resulting research and
analysis may be 95 percent accurate, but they overlook the key 5
percent that makes the difference. In football terms, they may have
the playbook, but they miss the audibles.
In writing Assignment: Pentagon, our secondary goal was to assist
those who would work with, but not in, the Pentagon. We had as a
tertiary goal that this book would help those who study national
security issues in war and staff colleges as well as those taking
courses in defense policy and national security affairs at the
undergraduate and graduate levels in colleges and universities.
Along the way and somewhat unanticipated were the hundreds of
favorable comments received about how well portions of
Assignment: Pentagon apply to all large organizations, including
large military headquarters, large government departments and
agencies, and even large corporate organizations.
In fact, some activities that take place in the Pentagon are
conducted better there than anywhere in the business world. Let us
suggest a few examples. First, sophisticated, computer-based
simulations and war games are important ways for leaders to
examine complex issues and polish their anticipatory skills. The
military Services and the Joint Staff, using both in-house talent and
first-rate contractors, lead hundreds of war games and political
military simulations every year based on scenarios that sometimes
reach out as far as twenty-five years into the future. Next, although
many corporations use electronic brainstorming to enhance the
innovation, planning, and problem-solving processes, no one does it
better or more thoroughly than the military. Finally, the Pentagon’s
techniques of strategic planning are both well integrated and very
sophisticated. Using trend analysis, Delphi exercises, forecasting
methods, alternate futures, scenarios, wild card analyses, and
decision analysis, the military Services, unlike so many other
government and corporate organizations, take strategic planning
seriously and integrate strategic planning into the decision-making
processes.

Just as the world has changed since the late 1980s, so too has life in
the Pentagon changed dramatically in many ways. Technology
changed radically. Video teleconferencing, PowerPoint presentations,
electronic brainstorming, and use of the internet were major
innovations that changed the work methods and capacity not only of
action officers but also of more senior officials. Because of the
serious downsizing of all the staffs (with the exception of the Joint
Staff), everyone became more dependent on outside contractors to
do much of the analytical work that the Building’s government
professionals—both military and civil servants—had previously done.
Despite the changes, the Pentagon has also seen great stability
and continuity. The day-to-day life of those who work in the Building
has not changed dramatically. Everyone remains very busy.
Suspenses continue to be short. The political appointees provide
strategic direction and implement the policies of the administration.
The civil servants provide the continuity and sanity to an often-
chaotic process. The military professionals bring vast operational
experiences, and people who are successful tend to return for
second and third Pentagon tours.
When approached about preparing a fifth edition, we realized that
while the foundations of the first four editions remained sound,
updates were needed. As with the other editions, we have relied on
a vast network of friends and acquaintances to provide insights, to
share experiences, and to grade our paper. We have gleaned insights
from across the military departments and the Joint community and
collected inputs both from uniformed and civilian sources and from
those outside of the Department of Defense (DOD) who have close
ties to the defense and security sector. We acknowledge their
assistance up front and thank them deeply for it.
In terms of the book’s content, we provide several up-front
disclaimers and overarching themes to guide the novice to the
Pentagon. Several readers actually suggested them. One example of
such feedback offered the following:

First, you might want to explain—almost like an anthropologist

would—how the Services remain different tribes, much like
those in the Amazon. They have different belief systems,
worldviews, assumptions, etc. The Army, for example, still
defines conflict largely in human terms. As a result, it believes
technology is a helpful enabler, but it doesn’t believe its role is
necessarily central in modern warfare. Most airmen have a
much higher opinion about the critical importance of technology,
but they don’t always stop and think that their colleagues might
disagree. Making it clear what some of those differences are—
from a cultural perspective—would be helpful. There is the
danger of stereotyping here, but again, the typical Marine does
have an attitude toward territory (it’s always valuable; owning it
is always our most desired endstate) that is different from [that
of] Air Force and Navy pilots, for example. A clear exposition of
these differences will help the new arrival realize the need for
flexibility in thinking and empathy in dealing with colleagues
from different tribes.
Second, you might want to remind the reader that there is a
military-industrial-and-congressional complex that exists here,
and how the interplay of these three forces shapes the way
decisions are made. In other words, new arrivals need to know
that decisions, for the most part, are made on the merits, but
they’re also made because of bureaucratic imperatives, the very
way we’re organized, and the cultural biases we bring to the
table. This is “real world” decision making, and we think it
would be helpful if you foot-stomped the point in your text. The
 new arrivals can then have a sense of perspective about just
how influential they are going to be, and they’ll have a better
sense on how to answer congressional queries/questions-for-
the-record (another topic you might want to discuss).
Finally, you already make some recommendations on how
newcomers should prepare themselves for their duties, but you
should also discuss the specific briefing, writing, and—yes—
PowerPoint skills that they will definitely need. Also, it would be
useful to accrue any type of Operations Research/Operations
Management training that is available. Since analysts and their
“intellectually rigorous” methods ultimately rule the roost here,
it is important that newcomers learn to set up/define problems
in an analytically useful way.

This feedback was very useful to us and helps to ensure that

Assignment: Pentagon remains a living document. Along the way
these many suggestions and thoughts have been incorporated to
keep the book current and add perspective.
Some of the things we say in this book might be viewed as
controversial; however, we do not in any way want to disparage the
great work of the dedicated professionals who serve in the
Pentagon. But we do believe that honesty—much as one sees in the
military’s candid after-action reviews—can be useful for continued
growth.
We hope this book is valuable over both the short and the long
term and, with periodic updating, will be a useful guide for many
years to come. With that idea in mind, we would like to solicit
comments, criticism, suggested changes, and additions from those
who do us the honor of reading Assignment: Pentagon. Feel free to
email us:

Maj. Gen. Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.)

genpsmith@aol.com
Col. Daniel M. Gerstein, USA (Ret.)
dmgerstein@msn.com
 Part 1

An Introduction to the Pentagon

 1

A View of the Building

The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between
the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by
fools and its thinking done by cowards.
—Sir William Butler

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an international corporation

with an annual outlay of almost $750 billion—that is, approaching
three-quarters of a trillion dollars—and more than 3 million military
and civilian personnel stationed in nearly every country in the world.
This figure includes more than 1.4 million men and women on active
duty and 718,000 civilian personnel, as well as another 1.1 million
that serve in the National Guard and Reserve forces. The
department’s capabilities allow it to conduct operations ranging from
humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to full-scale combat with
conventional and nonconventional weapons. In addition, the
department has a full range of services, from transportation to
communications to medical support. It can employ these capabilities
in virtually every corner of the globe on time lines that no other
nation or corporation can begin to match in either speed or scope.
The Pentagon is DOD’s headquarters, and the 25,000 people who
work in the Pentagon serve within the corporate headquarters of this
cabinet-level department.
Given the assorted capabilities that fall within DOD’s purview, it
should come as no surprise that the work done within the city-sized
Pentagon is extremely complex. A broad range of strategy, policy,
planning, budgeting, and operational experts manage its daily
business of running current operations and anticipating future
requirements and contingencies. Every day it is impossible to see a
news article that does not mention something with implications for
the men and women of our Armed Forces and thus for the
Pentagon.
While most of us who serve or have served in uniform prefer to
think of ourselves as warfighters and would likely pick duty in a line
unit, such as a combat brigade, on an Aegis cruiser, or in a flying
squadron, over a tour in the Pentagon as a desk jockey, the reality is
that most senior officers will do at least one tour in the Pentagon.
Moreover, those who are successful will likely do several. For those
rising to the flag officer rank, a tour in the Pentagon is a certainty.
Another certainty is that being assigned to the Pentagon will
stretch an individual’s capabilities and probably cause some initial
feelings of panic. Despite having the best-trained Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines in the world today, few will come to their first
Pentagon assignment with the requisite skills. In addition, making
the transition in scale and complexity is also likely going to be a
challenge for many. The transition from commanding a single entity,
such as a battalion or squadron, with its relatively well-defined
structure, budget, and missions, to assisting in the development of
the military’s response to, for example, relief efforts for the Gulf
Coast following Hurricane Katrina, or to advising the secretary of
defense on the policy options for dealing with a recalcitrant North
Korea can be overwhelming.
The Pentagon also has the distinction of being one of the largest
bureaucracies in the world. For students of public administration,
political science, management, sociology, bureaucratic politics,
defense policy, and the economics of national security, the Pentagon
provides a veritable gold mine of case studies and insights. But just
as with any bureaucracy (or any foreign culture), you must learn the
Building’s rules, distinct behavior patterns, and even its unique
language to be successful there. We hope this book can help those
who would like to “break the code” for gaining substantive access to
the Building and understanding how the place operates.
For this reason a fundamental understanding of the bureaucracy is
imperative. The bureaucratic politics model seems to work best for
explaining the workings of the Pentagon. Entrenched bureaucracies,
fighting hard to enhance (or at least maintain) their policy and
budgetary positions, are the norm. The major bureaucratic players
are the military Services, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) Staff, and the major defense agencies.
Over time the power has ebbed and flowed across various parts of
the Pentagon bureaucracy. The secretaries of the military
departments or Services remain significant actors, although their
influence was somewhat diminished as a result of the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and,
more recently, from changes Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
mandated in 2001 to shift some authority and responsibility from the
Services to OSD.
Some observers thought that the OSD Office of Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) had wrested too much authority
from the Services, particularly regarding acquisition decisions. A
change in the law resulted in the disestablishment of AT&L and
establishment of two undersecretary-level organizations that now
have the responsibilities and authorities of the former organization.
Secretary of Defense James Mattis oversaw the establishment of the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, or the OUSD (A&S), and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, or OUSD (R&E).
This move also subtly returned important responsibilities—
particularly in acquisition authority—to the Services.
After Mark Esper received confirmation as the new DOD secretary
in 2019, he continued his practices from his time as secretary of the
Army and brought them to his new role as SECDEF, holding “night
court” sessions to discuss budgetary issues and look for
opportunities for efficiencies. How this will affect the role of the
Services has yet to be determined. But it goes without saying that
each defense secretary has set the tone for how the department
functions (or doesn’t function).
Since the budgets of the military departments are very large and
the results of deterrence and defense policies are difficult to
quantify, there are literally hundreds of ways to assess military
capability and performance and to slice up the budgetary pie.
Systems analysis has matured considerably since the 1960s, and the
use of decision analysis in the form of Mission Area Analysis (MAA)
has progressed significantly in recent years. One of the big
advantages of decision analysis over systems analysis is that it can
give the decision-maker an answer to his or her “what if” questions
in a day or two, whereas most systems analysis requires many
weeks or months. Applying these analytical techniques has resulted
in the development of comprehensive systems for creating strategies
and policies, allocating resources, and making decisions. Suffice it to
say, those newly arrived workers at the Pentagon and even those
who simply do business with the Pentagon, but are not assigned
there, must become proficient in these complex and perhaps even
arcane systems. Making a point successfully and prevailing on this
bureaucratic “battlefield” demand it.
Despite the maturation of these analytical techniques, many
unknowns and uncertainties still prevent analysis from providing
definitive answers. With the Soviet Union’s demise, trying to figure
out which nations or nonstate actors would seriously threaten our
national interests became more complex; we should expect this
trend to continue into the mid-twenty-first century, as technology
has enabled smaller nations and even nonstate actors to acquire
sophisticated and potentially threating capabilities.
In addition, trying to ascertain what action will deter these nations
or nonstate actors from taking aggressive action and what weapon
systems can best defeat them in war will remain a tough job indeed.
Making the transition from a threat-based resourcing model to a
capabilities-based system has been challenging for the Pentagon in
this post–Cold War and now post-9/11 world.
As we begin this journey, it is also useful to introduce the key
players in the bureaucratic politics model and what motivates and
constrains them. Later we will discuss these key actors in more
detail, but a brief mention at this point is helpful.
The Service chiefs are four-star officers who serve for four
consecutive years in the top military job in their respective Services.
The chiefs must serve many constituencies, and their flexibility is
constrained significantly as they try to steer a steady course through
the minefields of everyday policy making. Their role is to satisfy the
responsibilities (outlined in Title 10 of the U.S. Code) that specifically
direct the organizing, training, and equipping of their Services. Their
role, however, is not to serve in the operational chain of command or
to direct the movement of forces in the field. This position takes
both some getting used to and some restraint to ensure that the
Services are supporting the warfighters but not interfering in their
operational business. All chiefs must serve their active-duty forces,
Reserve forces, military families, retired servicemembers, and their
families. Service chiefs also have responsibilities to Congress,
particularly with the key committees that concentrate on defense
issues. All chiefs have major responsibilities to the chiefs of their
comparable Services in allied nations that look to them for assistance
and support. Of course, each chief must lend support to the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the commanders in the
field, and the secretary of defense. Where Service chiefs stand
depends on where they sit, and chiefs are neither picked for nor
excel at self-abnegation. For instance, even if Service chiefs wish to
take a major initiative in divestiture, they find it extremely difficult to
do so.
Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has become the most
important and influential military leader in the United States. The
chairman’s primary role is to provide professional military advice to
the president and the secretary of defense. The usual term is two
years, but it is normal for a chairman to serve two terms. The
chairman also serves many constituencies and is torn on many
issues between the strong and legitimate needs of one constituency
versus the similarly strong and legitimate needs of another. Arguably,
the most talented staff in the Pentagon—the Joint Staff—is under
the CJCS, but it is still somewhat smaller than the staffs of the
military Services in Washington (the Marine Corps is an exception).
In addition, whenever the Services wish to call on the help of
experts in the field, it is easy to do so, because each Service has
tens of thousands of officers and professional civil servants in the
field. When the Services decide to combine forces against the Joint
Staff, their opposition can be powerful.
 Although all the officers on the Joint Staff are supposed to be
“purple suiters” and are expected to give their full loyalty to the Joint
Staff and the chairman, some cannot and others do not. A
fundamental dilemma that the Goldwater-Nichols Act addresses only
in part is that all Joint Staff officers (except those close to
retirement) have to look to their Services for their next assignment,
their next job beyond that, and their next promotion. Thus, the
chairman can at times face a problem of divided loyalties on the
Joint Staff. These divided loyalties on the Service staffs’ part,
however, are generally not a problem for the chiefs of staff of the
four Services.
The secretary of defense has a luxury many other key players do
not have: SECDEF’s strong and talented staff has a high percentage
of professional civilians with long experience in the Building.
However, SECDEF’s staff is not as large as the staffs of the Services.
In addition, some members of SECDEF’s staff are military personnel
who also serve as conduits for insider information back to their
Services. So, the secretary has a modest loyalty problem, one that is
shared with the chairman.
The defense agencies have many permanent civil servants who
provide good continuity to policy and a fine institutional memory to
these agencies. The heads of these defense agencies pay a price for
this large professional long-term staff, however; they find it very
difficult to move an agency in any major new direction during the
two or three years they are in charge. Defense agencies have
specific responsibilities for supporting the department and its
missions. The defense agencies have continued to grow in number
and scope. Two- or three-star active-duty officers head many of
them, while senior civilians run the others. Most of these agencies
work in relative obscurity until some event occurs that brings them
to the public’s attention. For instance, the Pentagon procurement
scandal of 2003 brought attention to the Defense Investigative
Service and the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the
controversial eavesdropping debate concerning domestic spying
authorities in 2005 brought the National Security Agency to the fore.
Employing about one hundred thousand people, most of whom are
professional civil servants, these agencies include the following:

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Defense Commissary Agency
Defense Contract Audit Agency
Defense Contract Management Agency
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Defense Information Systems Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Legal Services Agency
Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Defense Security Service
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Missile Defense Agency
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
National Security Agency
Pentagon Force Protection Agency

The military Services occupy the preeminent position of power and

influence among all the Pentagon bureaucracies, but their strong
position is offset somewhat by the rivalries between and among
themselves. When the Services can agree and simultaneously
coordinate their efforts, they have enormous power even in the face
of major opposition. The example of the Panama Canal Treaty during
James “Jimmy” Carter’s presidency illustrates this point. At the time,
frequent polls indicated a majority of the American people were
opposed to the treaty, but since the chiefs were unanimous in their
support and were willing to say so publicly, the treaty received the
additional votes in the Senate needed to achieve ratification. If even
one chief had opposed the treaty, it is highly unlikely the treaty
would have received the Senate’s consent.
The biggest change that has taken place recently in the power
equation in the Pentagon occurred as a result of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986. Congress in general has been suspicious of any
consolidation of power in the Pentagon since DOD’s creation in 1947.
In addition, members of Congress have enjoyed the opportunity to
play one Service against another in hearings and during the
budgeting process. Strong inter-Service rivalries not only enhance
the power of Congress, they also contribute to continued strong
civilian control of the military. By the late 1970s, however, many
members of Congress had begun to see disadvantages in the weak
position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
somewhat substandard caliber of the officers who were being
assigned to Joint billets (as compared to the quality of the officers
on the Service staffs). With a strong push by some key congressional
representatives and senators and an aggressive group of staffers on
the Hill, as well as with support from such experienced individuals as
David Jones (a retired general and chairman of the JCS), the
Goldwater-Nichols bill was passed in the fall of 1986.
Since Goldwater-Nichols, the chairman’s position has been
enhanced considerably, and although the power of persuasion is still
the chairman’s principal weapon in bureaucratic wars, the CJCS
enters each discussion from a stronger position by far than that of
anyone who occupied the position from 1947 to 1986. The Joint
Staff has evolved into the most competent staff in the Pentagon. The
chairman now has a strong vice chairman, and if in the years ahead
officers serving as vice chairman move up to be chairman, that
would certainly enhance the power and prestige of those
subsequently filling the role of vice chairman. Any new chairman
who has just moved up from vice chairman would hit the ground
running, and no power would slip away during the transition period.
When the Marine Corps’s General Peter Pace became chairman in
2005, it was the second time a vice chairman was moved up to the
top military position.
In addition to organizational changes, however, attitudes and
loyalties are important. The military Services will likely remain the
primary area of personal commitment and loyalty for uniformed
officers. Subtle changes are taking place, however, with a chance for
greater Service cooperation as more officers gain experience in the
Joint arena. Having spent a considerable part of our careers in Joint
and international assignments in which we felt obliged to take
positions not in the narrow interests of our own Services, we both
believe we returned to our Services with a broader and less
parochial viewpoint. Although not necessarily considered career-
enhancing moves in the past, this pattern for serving in Joint
assignments has become the trend for the future and is seen as a
prerequisite for promotion to flag rank.
The preceding discussion represents a mere introduction to the
Pentagon and some of its key positions; it does not provide the
detailed history of the Building or the people who have served in its
corridors. As this book is more of a practical guide than a historical
reference, you may want to delve more deeply into the Pentagon’s
history and even into the history of our national security strategy.
Even after beginning your tour, you may find occasions to conduct
research into a specific topic or even to gain a different perspective
on an issue. Various important references can assist you in these
endeavors.
One of the best ways to learn about the Pentagon is to talk to
those who have served there. We strongly recommend you take
maximum advantage of veterans of the Pentagon. Try to talk with a
wide variety of people to gain a broad understanding of the Building
and its work environment. If fortunate enough to have access to
senior civilians and military officers, you should work to gain the
benefit of their experiences. But do not limit yourself to senior
people. Everyone’s experience in the Pentagon will be slightly (and
sometimes vastly) different. An action officer (AO) may have
experiences and in some instances even responsibilities that far
exceed his or her rank. It is also useful (even for senior people) to
understand the role and tools the AO employs in accomplishing daily
duties. In addition, the office in which one works will determine the
set of experiences you take away from a Pentagon tour. The view
from a Service staff will be considerably different than that from the
Joint Staff or OSD Staff. Therefore, we recommend you cast the net
widely and try to talk with as many people as possible when you
begin your tour of duty.
 And do not limit yourself to seeking out only those currently
serving. In many cases retired DOD officials are not only extremely
knowledgeable but also feel less constrained by time and
bureaucratic factors than do people who are still working in the
Building. Many academic departments at the Service academies also
keep in close touch with activities in the Building, as do the various
war college and staff college faculties.
Those of you who are especially curious may want to do some
research prior to your arrival at the Pentagon or even once you have
assumed your new position. Several sources of information are
readily available. Today you can find a great deal of online
information about DOD, the Pentagon, or even your specific
assignment simply through an internet search. The Building also has
many libraries, some onsite and some virtual, that contain a wealth
of information. The Pentagon Library—the largest and most widely
used—contains more than three hundred thousand volumes and
seventeen hundred periodicals. The Pentagon Library has powerful
search capabilities via the internet at https://www.whs.mil/library/.
Another good source of information is the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC), which has a marvelous file of books,
articles, studies, analyses, and databases that you will likely find
quite useful. Many of the files are classified, but others are not. For
instance, almost all the research at the various war colleges is
unclassified and available through DTIC.
Another outstanding source of information and perspective can be
found in the various centers for military history of each of the
Services, the Joint Staff, and OSD. You would be astounded at the
information these offices have. Prior to departing the service, many
senior personnel provide interviews that are later transcribed and
archived. They also contain historical texts concerning key national
security events. Remember that whenever you face a difficult
challenge with an issue, it is likely these facilities have already
amassed a substantial collection of information that could be helpful.
You will also find the people running these offices to be very willing
to share their experiences and references with you.
 When the Army was looking at updating doctrine for its
counterinsurgency and nation-building operations in 2003 for
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army Center
for Military History’s staff provided papers and documentation
discussing previous operations in Germany and Japan in the
aftermath of World War II, as well as operations in Korea, Vietnam,
and Haiti.
Other good sources of information on the Pentagon, on national
security, or on specific topics are research groups and think tanks,
because they stay current while constantly competing for, winning,
and fulfilling contracts. In addition, many think tanks conduct
research that is not funded by the government. Too many to name,
they range from the left-leaning Center for American Progress to
several right-leaning groups, such as the Heritage Foundation and
the American Enterprise Institute. There are also many think tanks
that concentrate on specific issues. For example, the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) promotes “innovative
thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment
options.”
The Institute for Defense Analyses, the RAND Corporation, the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and the Center for Army Analysis,
to name a few, serve OSD, the Joint Staff, Army, Navy (including the
Marine Corps), and Air Force. Other analytical entities such as the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional
Research Service (CRS) provide analysis specifically to Congress.
Many commercial companies provide important research as well as
analytical and technical support to various parts of the Department
of Defense. Within each organization are people who not only have
considerable talent and expertise but also stay in touch with current
affairs in the Building.
Many universities around the country do substantive research for
the Pentagon. Being able to call upon some of the best minds in the
country is quite an asset for the Department of Defense. Thus, an
inquiring scholar can often find considerable expertise within his or
her own academic community.
 In addition, many experts work on their own and serve as
consultants to industry, to research groups, and to the military
Services and agencies themselves. There is also an informal and
complex network, with people who are involved in myriad activities
who would be willing to share their thoughts and experiences. Any
scholar with the time and the inclination can tap into these nets. A
good place to start is with the National Defense University and its
various colleges, the Service war colleges and schools, and research
groups.
 2

Realities and Myths of the Pentagon

Common sense is the knack of seeing things as they are.

—E. C. Stowe

The Pentagon is a vibrant city, a unique subculture, a way of life. It

has its own momentum, language, and lifestyle, almost like the
starship Enterprise. More than twenty-five thousand people, civilian
and military, work in the 3.7 million square feet of office space. Even
eighty years after it was designed, it remains one of the largest
office buildings in the entire world. It is twice as large as the
Merchandise Mart in Chicago and has three times the office space of
the Empire State Building in New York. The U.S. Capitol, the most
impressive structure in the nation’s capital (with the possible
exception of the Washington National Cathedral), could fit in one of
the five wedges of the Pentagon.
The Defense Post Office handles more than a million pieces of mail
monthly, not including the internal papers, memorandums, and
circulars and countless emails that make up most of the written
communication in the Building. More than two hundred thousand
telephone calls are made each day from the more than eighty
thousand telephones (almost double the forty-four thousand phones
of a few years ago). In a very real sense, the Pentagon is a medium-
size U.S. city with services you would expect in a community of this
size.
The Pentagon has its own police force, restaurants, coffee shops,
libraries, and retail areas, as well as a medical and dental facility.
Whole organizations in the Pentagon, including internet providers,
plumbers, and carpenters, maintain the facilities. As you might
expect for such an important and historic government workplace,
the Pentagon also offers tours.
Fig. 1. Layout of the Pentagon.

The Pentagon: Some Realities

Most insiders refer to the Pentagon simply as the Building or, more
affectionately, as the Puzzle Palace. When they are in a more critical
mood, they call it the Largest Day Care Facility in the World, the
Squirrel Cage, the Fudge Factory, or the Five-Sided Wailing Wall.
Since it was first occupied early in World War II, the Pentagon has
been one of the most efficient office buildings in the world to
navigate. Even though it has more than 17.5 miles of corridors, it
takes less than ten minutes at the normal, brisk Pentagon walk to
get from any one office to another. Working within this famous
building are many professionals with great talent, resilience, and
dedication.
Years ago one could walk all around the Pentagon in concentric
circles in the corridors on each of the floors. The Pentagon’s
renovation, however, has made it impossible to walk the concentric
corridor path; paths are now largely confined to the ten spokes that
emanate from the center of the Pentagon or to the A (innermost)
ring and the E (outermost) ring. The major renovation began in
1999 and is largely complete, although smaller renovations and
enhancements, particularly for force protection, are ongoing. In fact,
this needed renovation contributed to the Pentagon’s ability to
absorb the hijacked airplane’s impact on 9/11, because the aircraft
hit a renovated portion with reinforced floors and several other
safety features.
To understand the Pentagon, one must understand the U.S.
military, including its history, culture, numerous subcultures, lifestyle,
language, dreams, mentality, family life, passions, servicemembers’
calling, nomadic nature, and value system. Much has been written
about the “military mind,” and most if not all of it is misleading. To
many, especially among American intellectual elites, the military
professional might be considered authoritarian, reactionary, and
bounded by a strong macho culture. The harsher critics see the
military as an anti-intellectual group unreceptive to constructive
criticism from both the outside and the inside. These critics
sometimes suggest that many military professionals, fearing they
could not find work in the outside world, tend to cling to the security
of a regular monthly check and guaranteed pension. A whole body
of literature is highly critical of the military and its parochial and
wasteful proclivities.
In reality, the American military reflects the values, hopes,
dreams, aspirations, weaknesses, and strengths of American culture.
Although at one time it was well isolated from American society,
since the early 1940s the military has become a significant aspect of
U.S. culture.
 The military has been a force for instituting social change as well.
Racial integration in this country began in the U.S. military under
President Harry Truman and helped to advance opportunities for
African Americans and other minorities. The integration of women
into the military and the lifting of the combat exclusion policy on
January 24, 2013, provided greater opportunities for women to serve
on an equal footing with their male counterparts. More recently, the
repeal of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy by President Barack Obama
has allowed gay, lesbian, and transgender service personnel to serve
openly.
The military has also provided important opportunities for
educating and training the less privileged and for broadening the
individual American’s experience in international affairs and culture.
Such educational experience gave rise to a popular song World War
I–era song, “How Ya Gonna Keep ’Em Down on the Farm (After
They’ve Seen Paree)?”
Our military is a vast meritocracy, and as such it reflects
something fundamental to the American experience and the
American dream—equality of opportunity. Our military has never had
a coup mentality; the “man on horseback” who might plan a military
takeover of the government has been a rare (some would argue
nonexistent) phenomenon throughout our history. Our military
leaders’ abiding commitment to civilian control must be understood
to grasp how the Pentagon works and how it might differ from
defense ministries in some other locations around the globe.
What is it, then, that gives the Pentagon a special flavor? Let us
list a few aspects, using the “bullet” format of the “point paper” that
is so commonly used in the Building to give the busy officials
information in a condensed and useful format:

urgency and level of importance of issues and actions

unexpectedness of some of the questions
camaraderie among those who make things happen
close contact between action officers (the standard name for
Pentagon staff officers) and many senior individuals, who are
 busy and demanding, but are for the most part understanding
and accessible
amazing number of issues addressed daily
requirements for extensive coordination
frequent frustration in trying to get support for almost any
position
occasional “crashes” when individuals of various ranks work
through the night or a weekend to deal with a crisis
pressures, deadlines, and the inability of most people to get to
the bottom of their in-boxes
generous fiscal support (even if at times it has been uneven
due to government shutdowns and continuing resolutions)
generous and overwhelming support of our key constituency,
the American people

Frequently Heard Myths about the Pentagon

Any list of myths, realities, truisms, or rules of thumb about the
complex, multidimensional environment that is the Pentagon must
be accompanied by some words of caution. Much that happens in
that complex building is situational, and although there are many
constants, there are also many variables. People may treat an issue
one way at a certain point in time, but later the same people may
treat that issue quite differently because of changed attitudes,
outside forces, an altered budgetary climate, shifting congressional
support, or a different international environment. Since the past is
not always prologue and precedent often does not apply, you need
to remain somewhat skeptical about—or at least questioning of—any
advice that we (or anyone else) might give about operating
effectively within the Building. Keeping this caution in mind, please
join us in exploring several myths about the Building with which you
may have to deal in the weeks, months, or years ahead.
Everybody works fourteen-hour days. Most of the employees work
between eight and ten hours a day. The mass of workers hustling to
work between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. and surging out of the building
between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. attests to this fact. When the time for
commuting (including walking to and from faraway parking places) is
added to the workday, the time away from home averages around
eleven hours. As in all large organizations, you will encounter a
certain percentage of “goof-offs” (perhaps 3 to 5 percent), but on
balance you will find this group is more talented, dedicated, and
effective than almost any other in any government office building in
the world. Some people do work twelve-hour days or longer on a
regular basis. This group comprises some 10 to 20 percent of the
Pentagon workforce. Some staffs, however, are caught up in a
habitual pattern of longer hours. The section of the Army Staff that
works for the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans (the G-3)
would be one example. A relevant joke goes like this: One
afternoon, a couple of officers from the G-3 went on a fishing trip.
Out of nowhere, a horrific storm came up and stranded them on a
deserted island, and within one week they were working nights and
weekends.
Weekend work is required. Some offices certainly do have regular
weekend work, which was common throughout the Vietnam War and
Desert Storm, but that is the exception and not the rule. During
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, several offices in the Pentagon
were participating in video teleconferences on Saturdays to
coordinate support for the efforts in theater. Sunday work has
become rare except in those offices and command posts that must
stay open constantly. Saturday and Sunday “loyalty checks,” where
you are expected to be in the Building irrespective of whether there
is important work to do, are less prevalent today than they were in
the frenetic days of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara or
through the workaholic days of President Jimmy Carter. As you might
expect, such offices as the National Military Command Center (NMCC)
serve as the operations centers for key staff in the Building. These
offices are staffed twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The
people who serve in these facilities generally have vastly different
schedules, such as four days on and four days off, with twelve-hour
shifts on their duty days. These facilities also provide a means to
contact key personnel anytime and anywhere, no matter where they
may be located. You would do well to understand how these facilities
function and how to contact key personnel through these centers
during travel or nonduty periods.
Everybody hates working there. This myth is probably the most
widely held one of all. First, many people have committed
themselves to spending much of their professional lives working in
the Pentagon. They often make that commitment because they love
their work, find it interesting and enjoyable, and feel they can make
an important contribution to national security or public policy.
Second, while military members usually complain they would rather
be out in the field, out with the fleet, or out flying airplanes, quite a
few quietly extend their tours or volunteer to return after being away
for a while. Third, the reward structure is different in the Pentagon
than in the field. Commanding and leading might be more fun than
writing a policy paper, but both are vital to national security and
accomplishing the department’s mission. In fact, the policy paper
may even have greater impact. Of course some people do hate the
place and think the best view of the Pentagon is from their rearview
mirror on the way out of town permanently. But clearly that group is
a minority.
Everyone is so busy that no one has time to think or plan. Those
who manage their time well, have a great deal of energy, and
“discipline” their in-boxes and telephones do have time to
conceptualize, think, and plan. It really helps if you have a quick
mind and are well read, self-confident, and experienced in working
within large organizations. It also helps if you have many talented
people working with you, which, happily, is the case in most offices
in the Building. We also found that weekends provide a great
opportunity to do some thinking and reflecting on your own. You will
also likely find it is useful to develop a personal reading list and use
the weekends to continue to build your personal and professional
capabilities. This does not have to be a drill; rather, try to reserve
some time to build up your “cerebral hard drive.”
Bosses tend to ride a good horse until it drops. Superb AOs do
tend to get loaded down with work, but most division and branch
chiefs strive to distribute the workload so that the best people don’t
get burned out with too many demanding actions piled on top of one
another. On some occasions, however, when someone develops an
expertise in a subject, he or she is always in demand. In these
cases, and for the length of time that this action stays in the
limelight, that person leads a fast-paced life of high adventure. Our
advice would be to enjoy the times when your expertise is in
demand and you can contribute to an important issue of the day. At
the same time, look for opportunities to engage your boss if you feel
like the “work-life meter” has become too far out of balance. Most
bosses will be sympathetic if a superstar AO asks to take time to
watch his or her child’s soccer match.
The junior people in the Pentagon only make coffee. Clearly, if you
work in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a
Marine captain, some of the more menial tasks will fall your way.
Generally speaking, however, plenty of real work needs to be done;
thus, people of all ranks are productively engaged. As a captain,
Gerstein was identified to work in the Army’s Strategic Plans and
Policy Directorate based on expertise he had developed in
conventional arms control. In his position he regularly briefed the
senior Army and Joint leadership on potential arms control proposals
for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is full of power-mad
bureaucrats. The OSD got a bad name during Robert McNamara’s
time as secretary of defense in the 1960s. Several so-called whiz
kids whom McNamara had recruited treated the veteran Pentagon
officials (both military and civilian) with contempt. The management
style of the secretary of defense, the SECDEF’s deputy, and the
undersecretaries determines the role and the power of the staff who
work directly for them. In fact, many have discussed Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s and his close advisers’ manner of
interacting with senior military officers and how they ran the
Pentagon; some have drawn unfavorable comparisons to the
McNamara years in this regard. When Robert Gates succeeded
Rumsfeld in November 2006, most Pentagon officials quietly
applauded. Today the situation has improved. Most people who work
in OSD are not only competent but also easy to work with.
Unfortunately, past transgressions on occasion have occurred, and
many fixate on these shortfalls. It is also important to keep in mind
the role of OSD as the senior headquarters in the Pentagon. OSD is
not supposed to simply rubber-stamp the programs and policies of
the Services, Joint Staff, and defense agencies. In fact, it is really
through OSD that one of the most important principles of our
democracy is assured: civilian control of the military. OSD, in
reporting to the secretary of defense, and the president together
constitute the National Command Authority.
Joint papers are so watered down through compromise, they are
best described as multihumped camels. When the Joint Staff and all
four Services agree on an issue, strong, punchy papers are written;
however, when they disagree, there can be much compromising and
waffling. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 upgraded the role of the
JCS chairman, created a strong vice chairman, and strengthened the
incentives for Joint duty, all of which made a considerable difference
in the quality of the work and the power of the Joint Staff. The Joint
Staff officers no longer must spend so much time accommodating
the positions of all four Services. Thus, the papers tend to be more
concise and not filled with watered-down compromises.
No one really has a handle on how the place works. Admittedly,
Pentagon duty is complex, and getting a grip on everything would be
nearly impossible. However, within the various areas are experts who
clearly understand the issues. Their role is to have a command of
the facts and to make recommendations to decision-makers. Also,
some people have served in the Building for a long time and in
various positions, and they really have a sense for the place both in
general and in considerable detail. Often they are senior civilians
who have served at high levels for many years. Executive
administrative assistants who know how to get things done and
know where the bodies are buried are a very special breed. A few
officers in the pay grades of O-6 through O-9 (colonel/captain
through lieutenant general/vice admiral) with five or more years of
Pentagon experience also have their fingers on the pulse of the
Building. You can always find a sizable number of experienced staff
officers. By the three-year mark in their Pentagon tours, most of
these AOs have a fine grasp of what is important and how to get
things done. Finally, many very sharp enlisted personnel have an
excellent store of institutional memory. Many of them have served in
Washington for extended tours and have a canny feel for how to get
things done. If you are fortunate enough to have the opportunity to
sit at the feet of these kinds of people and you take the time to
listen to them carefully, the benefits can be extraordinary.
 3

Pentagon Truisms

Knowledge and intelligence are two separate and distinct attributes. You must
possess both to succeed in a big way.
—E. B. Gallaher

With so many ambitious, hardworking, and intelligent people

employed in the complex environment of the Pentagon, much
wisdom and insight are available to help ease the burden of those
who may be new to the scene. Here we will share with you some of
this wisdom, offered with a note of caution: these rules could be
wrong or misleading in certain situations. Thus, all the truisms
outlined below should be accepted with a bit of skepticism and at
least adjusted to suit your specific situation. But in our experience,
most of this stuff is valid most of the time.

People Truisms
The individual with the most rank in the room generally has the least
knowledge of a specific issue. It is imperative to understand that
senior leaders generally have a broad understanding of many
different issues, while the action officers primarily deal with a single
specific issue and have a much more in-depth understanding of that
issue. This knowledge is important for the AO to develop and indeed
is expected. However, there is a time and place for imparting many
of these details to senior leaders. What is most useful is to develop
the capability to distill the information into the essence of the issue.
Therefore, the AO must develop the ability to condense an action
into a format that will be transmittable and in sufficient detail for the
senior leader to understand the situation and apply his or her
judgment to the issue. Think of reducing your action to an elevator
speech; if you only had three minutes, what would you say to the
decision-maker?
If you are going to get moved to the “second team,” it will
probably happen in the first few months. Life in the Pentagon is not
unlike combat—the risks are the highest when you have not yet
learned how to operate well enough to dodge the missiles and
bullets aimed your way. Early in the game you may do major
damage to your future effectiveness in the Pentagon if you “bomb
out” giving a briefing, preparing a paper, or engaging in a discussion
at an important meeting. For instance, if you brief a general or
admiral prior to an important meeting and fail to relay some key
point or a warning that some assistant secretary is about to attack
him or her, that general or admiral may not want to be briefed by
you again. If that official is one of your immediate bosses, that
decision may considerably limit your ability to contribute from that
point forward. If the boss no longer trusts you or values your advice,
you may spend most of your time dealing with backwater issues.
A subtle point here needs emphasizing. Many people roam the
Building and wonder why they never get any “hot actions.” The
reason is usually because they failed a couple of times when they
“ran some hot papers,” and the bosses are afraid to give them other
important actions for fear they will fail again. Consequently, the
bosses often ignore or heavily discount their advice and input. To
return to the combat pilot analogy, you may remain a wingman for
your entire tour and never get checked out as a flight leader.
It is better to be overprepared than underprepared. “Overstaff”
your first few actions and be sure that you identify all the issues,
completely coordinate the papers, provide background papers and
point papers that cover each issue, and practice your briefing before
your best colleagues in the office. Don’t assume that if you were a
good briefer at Benning, Pendleton, Norfolk, or Nellis, you will
automatically be a great briefer in the Pentagon. Also, listen carefully
to the constructive criticism you get from colleagues and branch and
division chiefs. If you don’t understand why they suggest that you
change a slide or raise an issue that you think is unimportant, ask
them! They might understand an obscure but important point that
you don’t. Also, before giving a briefing, brainstorm with your
colleagues and ask questions that the boss might ask (these
sessions are often called “murder boards” or “dry runs”). Probe
deeply for minefields and warn your boss about them. Don’t be
afraid to prepare; even the most senior people do so.
Whatever you do, don’t leave important issues out of the briefing
package of materials based on the assumption that you will have
time to brief the boss adequately before the meeting. Often the
briefing will be canceled, or you will have only a few minutes to give
your thirty-minute briefing. If the information is not in the package
of briefing materials that the boss carries into the meeting and can’t
be found when needed, then you have failed to deliver the message.
You can’t pull the trigger for your boss. You can give your boss
plenty of ammo. You can arm him or her with the best weapons. You
can help your boss aim. But if the boss is too insecure, too weak,
too ambitious, too lazy, or too tired, he or she will not pull the
trigger or win the argument in a key meeting. Understanding this
truism can help you get over and rationalize the great
disappointment you might feel if your boss lets you and your
organization down despite your very best efforts to help. Also, if you
send your bosses into fights with insufficient ammunition, they will
return with wounds and scars. It is wise to save your boss’s strength
for the important battles. Finally, if you mount your bosses on white
chargers and send them into the valley of death too often, they may
not be willing to mount up when you really need them to do so.
Planners tend to mortgage the present for the future, and
operators tend to mortgage the future for the present. The military
Services, Joint Staff, and the secretary of defense could do better
planning and programming for the department if they knew when
and where the next war was coming. Because they don’t, they must
make their decisions about how much to spend for immediate
military capability and how much to spend on longer-term research
and development (R&D) that will make us ready for future
challenges. In other words, is this year like 1922 or 1939? The
operators tend to think it is 1939, while the planners tend to think it
Another random document with
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 Neck and shoulders 10
Legs and feet 15
Hind quarters 10
Back and loins 10
Tail 5
Coat with frill 20
Size 5
Total 100
General Appearance.—A lithe, active dog,
presenting an elegant, pleasing outline, and
exhibiting strength, speed, and intelligence.
Head.—Moderately long, covered with short, soft
hair; skull flat, moderately wide between the ears
and tapering to the eyes; very little stop; skin on
head very tightly drawn; muzzle of fair length, tapering to the nose,
which should always be black; mouth a bit overshot. Eyes of fair
size, not prominent, placed rather wide apart, almond-shaped, and
set obliquely; they may be any shade of brown, the darker the better.
Ears small, covered with short, soft hair, and carried semi-erect
when at attention, at other times thrown back.
Neck.—Long, arched, and muscular; chest deep
and narrow in front, but wide behind the shoulders.
Back.—Short and level; shoulders oblique; loins
rather long, slightly arched, and powerful.
Legs.—Fore legs straight and
muscular, with a fair amount of flat bone; hind legs
sinewy; hind quarters drooping slightly, very long
from hips to hocks; stifles well bent; hip bones rather
wide and ragged, and hocks well bent; pasterns
long, springy, and lighter in bone than rest of leg;
feet with soles well padded, and the toes arched
and compact.
Tail.—Moderately long, carried low when quiet, gaily when
excited, and almost straight when running.
 Coat.—An important point. It should be abundant except on head
and legs; the outer coat straight, hard, and rather stiff, the inner coat
soft and furry and very dense, so as to make it difficult to find the
skin; the frill very abundant; hair on tail very profuse, and on hips
long and bushy; fore legs slightly feathered; hind legs below hocks
smooth.
Color.—Immaterial.
Height.—Dogs, 21 to 24 inches; bitches, 2 inches
less.
Weight.—Dogs, 45 to 60 pounds; bitches, 40 to
50 pounds.
Defects.—Domed skull; high-peaked, occipital bone; heavy,
pendulous ears; full, soft eyes; heavy, feathered legs; short tail.
THE COLLIE (SMOOTH-COATED).

J. Carver’s, Newburg, N. Y.

Ben.

Origin, Uses, Scale of Points,

etc., same as the rough collie,
except in matter of coat, which
should be hard, dense, and quite
smooth.
 THE DALMATIAN (COACH-DOG).

J. Dickman Brown’s.

Perry.

Origin.—Probably indigenous to Dalmatia, a province of Austria,

but records of the sixteenth century describe such a dog as
belonging to Spain. The latest authentic trace is to Denmark, where
it was used for drawing carts. Resembles the pointer in form.
Uses.—Simply to follow the coach or equestrian.
* Scale of Points, Etc.
Value.
Head and eyes 10
Ears 5
Neck and shoulders 10
Body, back, chest, and loins 10
 Legs and feet 15
Coat 5
Color and markings 30
Tail 5
Symmetry 10
Total 100
General Appearance.—Strong, muscular, active; free from
coarseness; capable of speed and great endurance.
Head.—Fair length; skull flat, broad between ears; moderate stop,
and not in straight line from occiput to nose; no wrinkles; muzzle long
and powerful; lips clean cut, fitting jaws closely. Eyes moderately
wide apart, medium size, round, bright. In black-spotted dogs eyes
are dark; in livers, light or light brown (yellow). Rims around eyes
black in black-spotted varieties, and brown in the liver-spotted ones,
never flesh-colored. Ears set on high, rather wide at base, tapering,
carried close, thin, fine, always spotted. Nose black in blacks, brown
in livers.
Neck and Shoulders.—Neck fairly long, arched,
light, tapering, not throaty; shoulders sloping and
muscular.
Body, Back, Chest, and Loins.—Chest very
deep, not too wide; ribs well sprung, never rounded;
powerful back; loins strong and arched.
Legs and Feet.—Fore legs perfectly straight,
strong in bone; elbows close to body; cat-footed, tough pads; hocks
well let down. Nails in black-spotted ones are black and white; in
liver-spotted, brown and white.
Tail.—Not too long, tapering well to end, carried
with slight curl upward, never curled; the more
profusely spotted, the better.
Coat.—Short, dense, hard, fine, sleek, and
glossy, never woolly nor silky.
 Color and Markings.—Ground color is pure unmixed white. The
spots of the black-spotted variety are black, in liver-spotted variety
are brown; should not intermingle, but be distinct, and about size of
ten-cent silver piece on body; on head, face, ears, legs, and tail,
much smaller.
Weight.—Dogs, 55 pounds; bitches, 50 pounds.
 THE GREAT DANE.

G. A. Burt’s, Parkersburg, W. Va.

Major McKinley II.

Origin.—Probably indigenous to Germany, where it was formerly

known under the various names of Ulmer, German mastiff, and
boarhound.
Uses.—Companion and guard for foresters and gamekeepers,
also for attacking the wild boar and other beasts.
 * Scale of Points, Etc.
Value.
General appearance 3
Condition 3
Activity 5
Head 15
Neck 5
Chest 8
Back 8
Belly 4
Tail 4
Fore quarters 10
Hind quarters 10
Feet 8
Coat 4
Size (height) 13
Total 100
General Appearance.—Large and muscular, strongly but
elegantly built; movements easy and graceful; not so heavy as the
mastiff, nor too much of the greyhound type.
Head.—Long, very little indentation between
eyes; skull not too broad; muzzle broad, strong, and
blunt; cheek muscles well developed; nose large,
bridge arched; lips blunt, not hanging too much over
the sides; lower jaw slightly projecting. Eyes small,
round, deeply set, sharp expression. Ears small,
greyhound-like, usually cropped.
Neck.—Rather long, strong and muscular, well arched, no dewlap.
Chest.—Not too broad, very deep in brisket.
Back.—Not too long; loins arched.
Stern.—Reaching to hocks, strong at root, ending fine with a
slight curve; should never curve over the back.
 Belly.—Well drawn up.
Fore Quarters.—Shoulders sloping; elbows well under, straight;
legs heavy-boned, strong, and quite straight.
Hind Quarters.—Thighs muscular; hocks well let down, as in the
greyhound.
Feet.—Large and round; toes well arched and close; nails very
strong and curved.
Hair.—Very short, hard, and close.
Height (minimum).—Dogs, 30 inches; bitches, 28
inches.
Weight (minimum).—Dogs, 120 pounds; bitches,
100 pounds. Nothing under these should compete.
Color.—Various shades of gray, red, black, pure
white, or white with patches of above colors; also brindles and
mottled colors.
 THE HOUND (BASSET).

(From Modern Dogs.)

Origin.—Probably of French origin, yet closely allied to the

dachshund, though larger and heavier in every particular.
Uses.—Having a very keen nose, is used for the
general purposes of the smaller hounds, viz., for
rabbits.
* Scale of Points, Etc.
Value.
Head, skull, eyes, muzzle, and flews 15
Ears 15
Neck, dewlap, chest, and shoulders 10
Fore legs and feet 15
Back, loins, and hind quarters 10
 Stern 5
Coat and skin 10
Color and markings 15
Character and symmetry 5
Total 100
Head.—Closely resembling the bloodhound’s; long,
narrow, heavy flews; occiput prominent; forehead wrinkled
to the eyes, which should be kind and show the haw.
Teeth small, and the protruding of the upper jaw is not a
fault. Ears so long that in hunting the dog treads on them,
set low, hang loose in folds, ends curl inward, thin and
velvety.
Neck.—Powerful, with heavy dewlaps; elbows must
not turn out; chest deep and full; body long and low.
Legs and Feet.—Fore legs short (about 4 inches),
close-fitting to chest; massive paw, each toe standing out
distinctly.
Stifles.—Well bent; quarters muscular, giving the dog
a barrel-like shape and a peculiar waddling gait.
Stern.—Coarse underneath, and carried hound fashion, i.e.,
carried gaily.
Coat.—Short, smooth, fine, and glossy; skin loose and elastic.
Color.—Black, white and tan, with black patches on back; also
sometimes hare-pied.
Weight.—Thirty to forty-five pounds.
 THE HOUND (BEAGLE).

H. L. Kreuder’s, Nanuet, N. Y.

Frank Forest.

Origin.—This breed seems to be little else than a diminutive

foxhound; has long been in existence; probably one of the oldest of
British dogs.
Uses.—Hunting rabbits, and generally run in packs of
five to ten couples; they are merry little fellows, sturdy
and gamy, with a most musical tongue and a very keen
nose.
* Scale of Points, Etc.
Value.
 Skull 5
Ears 15
Eyes 10
Muzzle, jaw, and lips 5
Neck 5
Shoulders and chest 10
Back and loins 15
Ribs 5
Fore legs and feet 10
Hips, thighs, and hind legs 10
Tail 5
Coat 5
Total 100
Head.—Skull moderately domed. Ears set on low,
long and fine in leather, rather broad and rounded at
tips, absence of all erectile power. Eyes full,
prominent, rather wide apart, soft and lustrous.
Muzzle medium length, squarely cut; stop well
defined; jaws level; lips either free from or with
moderate flews; nostrils large.
Neck and Throat.—Neck free in action, strong, yet not loaded;
throat clean, free from folds of skin.
Shoulders and Chest.—Shoulders somewhat sloping, muscular,
but not loaded; chest moderately broad and full.
Back, Loins, and Ribs.—Back short and strong; loins broad and
slightly arched; ribs well sprung.
Fore Legs and Feet.—Fore legs straight, plenty
of bone; feet close, firm, either round or hare-like.
Hips, Thighs, and Hind Legs.—Hips muscular;
stifles strong and well let down; hocks firm.
Tail.—Carried gaily, well up, medium curve, and
clothed with a decided brush.
 Height.—Fifteen inches.
Color.—All hound colors admissible. (See Foxhound.)
Defects.—Flat skull; short ears, set on too high, pointed at tips;
eyes yellow or light color; muzzle snipy; thick, short neck; elbows
out; knees knuckled over; long tail with “tea-pot” curve.
Disqualifications.—Eyes close together and terrier-like; thin rat-
tail, with absence of brush; short, nappy coat.
 THE HOUND (BLOODHOUND).

J. L. Winchell’s, Fair Haven, Vt.

Champion Victor.

Origin.—In Barbour’s “Bruce” (1489) we find the earliest mention

of the bloodhound, where it is called the “sleuthhund.” However, little
can be learned definitely of its origin.
Uses.—Having scenting powers to a marvelous degree, it is used
in trailing wounded deer, slaves, sheep-stealers, escaped convicts,
etc.
Disposition.—Contrary to general impressions, the modern
bloodhound is of a most equable disposition, kind and gentle, and
quite apt to be timid, excepting when on the trail; then it is extremely
dangerous.
 Scale of Points, Etc.
Value.
Head 15
Ears and eyes 10
Flews 5
Neck 5
Shoulders and chest 10
Back and ribs 10
Legs and feet 20
Color and coat 10
Stern 5
Symmetry 10
Total 100
Head.—This is the most distinguishable feature of the dog; it is
domed, blunt at occiput; jaws very long and wide at nostrils, hollow
and very lean at cheek; brows very prominent, and the general
expression is grand and majestic; skin covering cheeks and
forehead wrinkled to a wonderful degree.
Eyes and Ears.—Eyes hazel, rather small,
deeply sunk, showing haw, which is deep red. This
redness, some claim, is indicative of cross with
mastiff, Gordon setter, or St. Bernard. Ears long,
and will overlap when drawn over front of nose,
hang close to cheek, never inclined to be pricked;
leather thin, covered with soft hair.
Flews.—Very long and pendent, falling below mouth.
Neck.—Long, so as to enable the dog to easily drop his nose to
the ground; considerable dewlap.
Chest and Shoulders.—Chest wider than deep; shoulders
sloping and muscular.
Back and Back Ribs.—Wide and deep, the hips being wide or
almost ragged.
 Legs and Feet.—Legs must be straight and muscular; feet as cat-
like as possible.
Coat.—Short and hard on body, silky on ears and top of head.
Color.—Black and tan or tan only; the black extends to the back,
sides, top of neck, and top of head; the tan should be of deep, rich
red; there should be little or no white.
Stern.—Carried gaily in gentle curve, but not raised above back;
lower side is fringed with hair.
Defect.—Absence of black.
 THE HOUND (DACHSHUND).

J. H. Snow’s, Philadelphia, Pa.

Fritz.

Origin.—The origin of this dog is lost in antiquity. A dog

resembling it very closely is to be found on the monument of
Thothmes III., 2000 b.c. The modern dog is essentially German.
Uses.—Hunting rabbits and hares, tracking
wounded animals and badgers.
* Scale of Points, Etc.
Value.
Head and skull 12
Jaw 5
Legs and feet 20
Loins 8
 Body 8½
Symmetry and quality 11
Ears 6½
Chest 7
Skin and coat 13
Stern 5
Color 4
Total 100
Head and Skull.—Long, level, narrow; peak well developed; no
stop. Eyes intelligent and rather small; follow body in color. Ears
long, broad, soft, set on low and well back, carried close to head.
Jaws strong, level, square to the muzzle; canines recurvant.
Chest.—Deep, narrow; breast-bone prominent.
Legs and Feet.—Fore legs very short, strong in bone, well
crooked, not standing over; elbows well muscled, neither in nor out;
feet large, round, strong, with thick pads and strong nails. Hind legs
smaller in bone and higher; feet smaller. The dog must stand equally
on all parts of the foot.
Skin and Coat.—Skin thick, loose, supple, and in great quantity;
coat dense, short, and strong.
Loins.—Well arched, long, and muscular.
Stern.—Long and strong, flat at root, tapering to
tip; hair on under side coarse; carried low except
when excited.
Body.—Length from back of head to root of tail
two and a half times height at shoulder; fore ribs well sprung; back
ribs very short.
Color.—Any color; nose to follow body color; much white
objectionable.
Symmetry and Quality.—The dachshund should be long, low,
and graceful, not cloddy.
Weight.—Dogs, 21 pounds; bitches, 18 pounds.