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The Dispositional Architecture
of Epistemic Reasons
This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic

reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical
theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various
contemporary debates in epistemology.
In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the
dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and
defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic
justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional
view has the resources to provide an acceptable account of the notion of
the basing relation. In the second part of the book, the author examines
how his theory of epistemic reasons bears on the issues involving
perceptual reasons. He defends dogmatism about perceptual justification
against conservatism and shows how his dispositional framework
illuminates certain claims of dogmatism and its adherence to justification
internalism. Finally, the author applies his dispositional framework to
epistemological topics including the structure of defeat, self-knowledge,
reasoning, emotions, and motivational internalism.
The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons demonstrates
the value of employing metaethical considerations for the justification of
beliefs and propositions. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced
students working in epistemology and metaethics.
Hamid Vahid is Professor of Philosophy at the Institute for Research in

Fundamental Sciences, Iran. He is the author of Epistemic Justification
and the Skeptical Challenge (2005) and The Epistemology of Belief (2009).
Routledge Studies in Epistemology
Edited by Kevin McCain
University of Alabama at Birmingham, US
Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University, Canada
Knowing and Checking

An Epistemological Investigation
Guido Melchior
Well-Founded Belief
New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation
Edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy
Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology

Edited by Michael Klenk
Social Epistemology and Relativsm

Edited by Natalie Alana Ashton, Martin Kusch, Robin McKenna and
Katharina Anna Sodoma
Epistemic Duties
New Arguments, New Angles
Edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford
The Ethics of Belief and Beyond

Understanding Mental Normativity
Edited by Sebastian Schmidt and Gerhard Ernst
Ethno-Epistemology
New Directions for Global Epistemology
Edited by Masaharu Mizumoto, Jonardon Ganeri, and Cliff Goddard
The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons

Hamid Vahid
For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.

com/Routledge-Studies-in-Epistemology/book-series/RSIE
The Dispositional
Architecture of Epistemic
Reasons
Hamid Vahid
First published 2021
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Hamid Vahid
The right of Hamid Vahid to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-0-367-50986-6 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-05240-1 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon
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Contents
Acknowledgments viii
Introduction 1
PART I
The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons 11
1 Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework 13

1.1 The Ontology and Typology of Reasons: An
Opinionated Introduction 13
1.1.1 Possessed Reasons and Rationality 21
1.2 The Treating Requirement: From Doxastic States to
Competences 22
1.3 The Treating Requirement: From Available Reasons
to Possessed Justifying Reasons 25
2 A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic

Justification 35
2.1 The Relationship Between Propositional and
Doxastic Justification 36
2.2 Analyzing Dispositions and Disposition
Ascriptions 43
2.3 Propositional and Doxastic Justification: A
Dispositional Analysis 45
3 Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation 58

3.1 The Problem of the Basing Relation 58
3.1.1 Acting for a Reason and the Problem
of Causal Deviance 60
vi Contents
3.1.2 The Problem of Causal Deviance and the
Epistemic Basing Relation 62
3.2 Dispositions and the Problem of Deviant Causal
Chains 68
Appendix: Propositionalism: Normative and Motivating
Reasons 78
PART II
Perceptual Reasons 81
4 The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience 83

4.1 Nondoxastic Justification: A Rough Sketch of the
Territory 83
4.2 Internalism and Externalism: The Epistemic Value
of Perceptual Experience 86
4.2.1 Some Externalist Accounts of Perceptual
Justification: Burge on Perceptual
Entitlement 88
4.2.2 Some Internalist Accounts of Perceptual
Justification: Dogmatism and Conservatism 98
5 Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification 109

5.1 Wright’s Conservative Account of the Value of
Perceptual Experience 110
5.2 Deontological Justification and Conservatism 113
5.2.1 Deontological Conservatism 115
5.3 Deontological Conservatism vs. (Some) Other
Conservative Views 118
5.3.1 Entitlement to Trust a Source of Information 119
5.3.2 Full-Blooded Entitlement 121
6 Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual

Reasons 129
6.1 Challenging Dogmatism: Divorcing the Rational
and the Justified 129
6.2 Defending Internalism: The Dispositional Structure
of Perceptual Reasons 134
6.2.1 Belief: Accessing Reasons in Doxastic Terms 135
6.2.2 Experience: Accessing Reasons in
Nondoxastic Terms 138
6.3 Dogmatism and the Challenge of Cognitive
Penetration 144
Contents vii
PART III
Consequences 155
7 Higher-Order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure

of Epistemic Defeat 157
7.1 Taxonomy of the Defeaters: Rebutters and
Undercutters 157
7.2 The Dispositional Structure of Epistemic
Defeat 163
7.3 Higher-Order Evidence and State-Given
Reasons 168
8 The Nature of Inference 173

8.1 The Nature of Inference: Problems and
Proposals 174
8.2 The Dispositional Account of Reason-Possession
and the Taking Condition 178
8.2.1 Logical Knowledge 181
8.2.2 Reasons and Reasoning 182
9 The Epistemic Value of Emotions 186

9.1 The Perceptual Model: The Epistemic Value
of Emotions 186
9.2 Emotions as Reasons: For and Against 189
9.3 Emotions as Possessed Reasons 195
10 Motivational Internalism and Motivating Reasons 200

10.1 Motivational Internalism: The Debate 201
10.2 Motivational Internalism and the Dispositional
View of Motivating Reasons 206
10.3 Applying the Framework 207
11 Self-Knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the

Transparency Procedure 215
11.1 The Transparency Procedure and
Self-Knowledge 215
11.2 The Treating Requirement: The Epistemic
Relevance of the Transparency Procedure 222
Index 229
Acknowledgments
The main ideas of this book trace back to the time when I was thinking
about the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification a
few years ago. I remember being struck by the similarities of this debate
with the debate in metaphysics (semantics) over the analysis of disposi-
tion sentences. This was followed by an eye-opening acquaintance with
the literature on reasons and normativity and coming to appreciate the
significance of the subtleties involving reasons for such epistemological
questions as the function of epistemic reasons and the nature of epistemic
justification where, once again, dispositions seemed to play a very impor-
tant role. Subsequently, I tried to bring the results of such reflections to
bear on a number of problems in epistemology and ethics.
In the course of thinking about these issues, I have benefitted enor-
mously from conversations with many people as well as their written
comments on precursors of various portions of this book. These include
(in alphabetical order): Robert Audi, Alexander Bird, Paul Boghossian,
Patrick Bondy, Adam Carter, Ruth Chang, Stew Cohen, Catherin Elgin,
Jesper Kallestrup, Robert Moran, Duncan Pritchard, Christine Tappolet,
Marcus Valeris, Tim Williamson, and Elia Zardini. Most of all, I would
like to thank Muhammad Legenhausen for his intellectual generosity and
for his sage advice and comments on the drafts of almost all the chapters
in this book. Thanks also to Mohsen Javadi for being a constant source
of support and assistance for many years. I owe a substantial debt to
Youcef Nedjadi whose unfailing support and encouragement throughout
many years of friendship have been invaluable.
I would also like to thank the Institute for Research in Fundamental
Sciences (IPM) and its director, Mohammad Javad Larijani, for providing
a pleasant environment to finish this work. I am likewise grateful to my
(current and former) colleagues at IPM for many inspiring philosophical
discussions and for providing such a fruitful atmosphere over many years:
Arash Abazari, Ebrahim Azadegan, Laleh Ghadkpour, Ahmad Hemmati,
Ali Hossein Khani, Omid Karimzadeh, Kaveh Lajevardi, Mostafa Moha-
jeri, Mahmoud Morvarid, Nasir Mousavian, Mehdi Nasrin, Ali Saboohi,
Amir Saemi, Sajed Tayebi, Ali Yousefi, and Mohsen Zamani.
Acknowledgments ix
Parts of Chapter 1 have been published as Vahid (2019). A version
of Chapter 2 has been published as Vahid (2016). A version of Chapter
3 was published as Vahid (2020). Parts of Chapter 4 was published as
Vahid (2012), and a version of Chapter 5 has been published as vahid
(2017). I would like to thank Springer, Wiley, and Taylor & Francis for
giving permission to reprint to this material.
Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to my family, who had to endure my
long working hours and cheerfully put up with me while I was engaged
in working on this book.
Introduction
Hamid Vahid
The thesis of this book is primarily concerned with the conditions under
which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs, but it derives its
motivation from considerations that are currently the focus of the meta-
ethics literature on reasons and normativity. When we deliberate about
adopting an attitude or performing an action, our choices are usually
made in the light of the reasons that we have at our disposal. Such rea-
sons are supposed to guide, explain, and justify those actions and atti-
tudes (including emotions). To discriminate between the various ways in
which reasons impact our actions or affect our attitudes, philosophers
distinguish between different types of reasons, namely, normative, moti-
vating, and explanatory reasons. Normative reasons are considerations
that justify and recommend performing an action or adopting an atti-
tude. They are often contrasted with motivating reasons, which are the
reasons in the light of which or for which the agent acts or forms an
attitude, thereby explaining what she does.
It has been claimed that normative reasons are comprised of facts or
states of affairs. For example, we might say that the fact that it is cold
inside the room is a good reason to close the window. This very same
consideration can, however, motivate and guide an agent to close the
window. In such (good) cases, normative and motivating reasons turn
out to be identical, and the agent is said to have acted for a good reason.
This has led some philosophers to deny that normative and motivating
reasons constitute different reasons, namely, those that are objectively
good and those that motivate. Rather, the same considerations can play
two roles.
The issue of how normative reasons bear on the rationality of actions
and beliefs, particularly when combined with the thesis that rational-
ity requires us to respond to our reasons correctly, is disputed among
philosophers. According to evidentialism about epistemic justification or
rationality, a belief is said to be justified insofar as it fits one’s evidence.
Such evidence, however, is a subset of one’s reasons viz., reasons that one
possesses. But what is it to possess a reason? Reflections on examples as
well as theoretical considerations show that reason-possession not only
2 Introduction
involves the satisfaction of an epistemic condition requiring the subject
to be aware of her reasons but that it also requires her to ‘treat’ them
as reasons. To see this, we only need to consider cases where an agent is
non-culpably unaware of the objective normative reasons that are rel-
evant to whether or not he should perform an action or form a belief.
Thus, consider the following example where an agent, Smith, is drinking
water from a spring. Unbeknownst to him, however, the water contains
E. coli. Even though this constitutes a good reason for Smith not to drink
the water or believe that it is safe, he is nevertheless rational if he does.
What such examples show is that what objective reasons there are, in
fact, and what objective reasons we take to exist can come apart. More-
over, it seems that rationality only requires responding to the latter type
of reasons – viz. perspectival (or ‘apparent’) reasons that may or may not
coincide with the relevant objective reasons. This seems to suggest that
reasons that justify actions or attitudes are those that are possessed by the
agent, that is, those that fall within his or her ken, which is also why she
can be said to be guided by them.
But what is it that constitutes the possession of reasons? To be more
concrete, the goal is to see what it is to possess a reason (r) for holding a
belief or doing some action. An obvious, initial condition to possess r, as
we just saw, is for it to be cognitively accessible or available to the sub-
ject. One can understand this (epistemic) requirement either in normative
terms as involving justified belief or in non-normative terms involving
such presentational states as ‘seemings’ and experiences or merely dox-
astic states such as beliefs. We may, however, remain neutral for the time
being on which of those states best represents a subject’s access to her
reason (r) and only require that the reason be cognitively available to her
in the minimal sense that it appears to her that r is the case.
It should be obvious, however, that the mere availability of reasons is
not sufficient for possessing them as the following version of the water
example makes clear. In this version, Smith is aware that the water con-
tains E. coli, but he reasonably believes that it is harmless. Again, given
his states of mind, Smith’s belief that it is safe to drink the water cannot
be described as irrational. Neither should he be taken to be culpable if
he proceeds to drink it. So, despite the fact that he is aware that (r) <the
water contains E. coli>, he still fails to possess r as a reason for believ-
ing that it is unsafe to drink the water. R still fails to impact the rational
status of Smith’s belief about the safety of the water. In order to be guided
by such considerations, Smith must do more than be aware of them. It is
generally thought that what is missing here is that Smith fails to ‘treat’ or
‘take’ r as a reason for believing that it is unsafe to drink the water. Only
then can we say that the subject is guided by his reasons. He must con-
sider or ‘see’ them as (normative) reasons that favor a particular course
of action. When this happens, we say that the agent is ‘treating’ those
considerations as reasons, or, alternatively, that he is in a ‘treating-state’
Introduction 3
vis-à-vis those considerations and the relevant action. It follows, then,
that to possess r as an epistemic reason for a proposition (p), r should not
only be available to the subject but should also be treated as a reason for
p by that subject. So what we need to do first is to provide an account of
what the treating requirement consists in.
A simple answer would require that the agent believe that r is a reason
for or favors doing some action or forming an attitude (ϕ-ing). But this
faces the over-intellectualization charge as many agents, including young
children and unsophisticated adults can respond rationally to reasons
while lacking the concept of a reason. Here is one way of dealing with
this problem. Consider two subjects S1 and S2. S1, but not S2, is in posses-
sion of knowledge or information that E. coli in water is a reason for not
drinking the water. So it is only S1 who is in possession of the information
that the presence of E. coli in water positively bears on whether it is safe
to drink the water. We can see this information as endowing S1 with a
potential epistemic advantage over S2, namely, the potential to possess r
as a reason or evidence for not drinking water or believing that it is safe
when becoming aware that it is contaminated by E. coli. This potential
(but real) difference manifests itself (with severe physical consequences)
when both S1 and S2 come to learn that the water they are going to drink
contains E. coli. Of the two, only S1 comes to possess r as a reason to
refrain from drinking the water or believing that it is unsafe.
A different way of describing the epistemic difference between S1 and
S2 is to say that, in virtue of treating r as a reason for ϕ-ing, S1 comes to
have a disposition, which S2 does not, namely, the disposition to pos-
sess r as a reason for ϕ-ing. This dispositional property manifests itself,
with severe consequences, when both S1 and S2 are apprised of the truth
of r. This is very much like saying, for example, of a lump of sugar that
it has the dispositional property of being soluble in water in virtue of its
molecular structure which, for example, a piece of paper lacks because
it lacks that molecular structure. The important thing about the notion
of ‘treating’ is that we can treat a consideration as an H without having
the concept of an H or representing it as an H. Of course, if the agent
is sophisticated enough, he would be in a position to appreciate how r
positively bears on ϕ-ing.
We can, however, abstract away from these considerations and simply
say that by satisfying the treating requirement, the agent will be in a
‘treating-state.’ However, unlike other views of the treating requirement,
the account presented here takes the satisfaction of this requirement vis-
à-vis some reason r and ϕ-ing to mark the transition from the availability
of r to the agent with the agent’s coming to possess r as a reason to ϕ.
What is crucial in our account is that the transition has a dispositional
structure. Being in a treating-state vis-à-vis r and some action (ϕ-ing) is
not to be identified with a disposition. Rather, it is what grounds a dis-
position in the subject, namely, the disposition to possess r as a reason
4 Introduction
for ϕ-ing in response to the (available) r just as the molecular structure of
glass grounds its disposition to break in response to being struck. More
formally, the state of treating r as a reason to ϕ is the categorical basis
of the agent’s disposition to possess r as a reason to ϕ in response to the
(available) r.
Since dispositions are generally understood in terms of their character-
istic manifestations in response to appropriate test or stimulus conditions,
we can view the possession of reason by an agent as the manifestation
of the agent’s disposition (grounded in her being in a treating-state) in
response to an (available) normative reason r. Furthermore, when the
agent acts for this (possessed) reason, the reason provides an explanation
of her action and, if it is a good reason, it justifies it as well. As with dis-
positions in general, one can have a disposition to possess r as a reason
for ϕ-ing but never manifest it. However, when r is made available to the
agent, functioning as a stimulus, then barring the presence of the relevant
interferers, it results in the disposition’s manifestation.
Summing up, only possessed reasons can justify beliefs or actions. But
to possess a reason (r) to ϕ, one must not only be aware of r but also treat
r as a reason for ϕ-ing. As we saw, reason-possession has a dispositional
structure where one’s awareness of r functions as its stimulus and the
possession of r as a reason is the manifestation of a disposition that is
grounded in the subject’s being in a pertinent treating-state. Focusing on
reasons for belief, we can, thus, say that the subject comes to possess r
as a reason for believing that p in virtue of being in a particular treating-
state when r is made available to her. So, on our view, reason-possession
is construed as the manifestation of an epistemic disposition, grounded in
a treating-state, when the relevant reason is made available to the subject.
As it turns out, the view helps with a number of outstanding issues
in epistemology and metaethics. To begin with, it provides a unified
framework where one can see how such notions as possessing a reason,
propositional justification, doxastic justification, and the basing relation
are related to and interact with one another. The view also incorporates
independently plausible and non-ad hoc analyses of propositional and
doxastic justification as well as the basing relation. It also provides a bed-
rock explanation of the structure of epistemic defeat and shows how it
can naturally incorporate the phenomenon of higher-order defeat. More-
over, when the framework is applied to the case of perceptual reasons
(perceptual experience), the payoff is quite impressive. As it turns out,
it can provide a basis to adjudicate between internalist and externalist
theories of perceptual justification. It can provide a principled validation
of the internalist intuitions about epistemic justification as highlighted
by such cases involving demon world and clairvoyant scenarios. It can
also show why the phenomenon of cognitive penetration poses no threat
to such internalist accounts as dogmatism. And, as regards the internal-
ist accounts, it provides a basis for arbitrating between dogmatism and
Introduction 5
conservatism. It can offer a principled justification for the epistemic role
of, what dogmatists call, the ‘presentational’ or ‘phenomenal’ force of
perceptual experience. It can also authenticate the dogmatist claim that
perception can provide immediate justification for the beliefs to which it
gives rise.
Theoretical reasoning is another area where our account can help
illuminate some of the concerns it raises, in particular, the problem of
explaining what distinguishes theoretical reasoning from mere causal
processes. Another question that our account can illuminate concerns the
question of whether emotions can provide us with evaluative knowledge
of the world. A positive response to this question is particularly plausible
if emotional experience is likened to perceptual experience. Motivational
internalism is another issue that can receive some support from our dis-
positional view. Applying the framework, we can explain how moral
judgments and beliefs can be inherently motivational while accounting
for the commonplace cases that are said to undermine it. Finally, our view
can explain the epistemic significance of the so-called ‘Evans’s procedure’
as appealed to by some accounts of self-knowledge.
****
This is how the book unfolds. The first part of the book is concerned with
delineating what will be called the ‘dispositional architecture of epistemic
reasons.’ Chapter 1 articulates a view about what it is to possess a reason,
in particular, reasons of the epistemic variety. After outlining the basic
picture of reasons and normativity that I will be presupposing in this
book, I consider some cases where an agent is non-culpably ignorant of
the objective normative reasons that are relevant to whether or not she
should form a belief or perform an action. What such cases show is that
what objective reasons there are, in fact, and what objective reasons we
take to exist can come apart. This seems to suggest that reasons that jus-
tify actions or attitudes are those that are possessed by the agent, that is,
those that fall within her ken. Here, I will be concerned with the require-
ments that have to be met if such reasons are to discharge this function.
I shall begin by motivating a particular condition, namely, the ‘treating
requirement’ that has been deemed to be necessary for possessing rea-
sons. I explain and criticize some of the existing accounts of the treating
requirement for reason-possession. I will suggest a dispositional account
of reason-possession in which the treating condition features prominently
and proceed to clarify certain outstanding issues that arise with the view
presented. The conditions delineated in this chapter form the backbone
of the thesis that epistemic reasons have a dispositional architecture.
Since it is reasons that one possesses that provide propositional justi-
fication for one’s beliefs, we need an account of how propositional and
doxastic justification are related to one another. Chapter 2 provides such
an account. According to the received view, basing one’s belief p on the
6 Introduction
grounds that provide propositional justification to believe that p is suf-
ficient for the belief to be doxastically justified even though some epis-
temologists are inclined to reverse the direction of explanation. In this
chapter, I propose to see the debate in a new light by suggesting that the
best way to understand the relationship between these species of justifica-
tion is by viewing propositional justification as a(n) (epistemic) disposi-
tional property that a subject can have with doxastic justification as its
manifestation. I show how the debate in metaphysics over the question
of how disposition statements should be analyzed runs parallel to the
epistemological debate, and bring some of the results in the dispositions
debate to bear on the epistemological question. I end by offering some
tentative remarks regarding the order of priority of these two species of
justification.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the problem of basing relation. There are
currently two major approaches to this problem, namely, the causal and
doxastic theories. Almost all epistemologists believe that causation must
play a role in articulating the notion of the basing relation. The causal
account, however, faces the serious problem of the deviant causal chains.
In this chapter, I shall suggest that, since the obtaining of the basing rela-
tion is what distinguishes propositional from doxastic justification, we
may have a better grasp of this notion if we could clearly see how those
two species of justification are related to one another. It will be argued
that the view defended in Chapter 2 has the resources to resolve the
problem of causal deviance, thus, providing an acceptable account of the
notion of the basing relation. This account is then extended to cover cases
where beliefs are based on inadequate grounds.
Part II explores the consequences of applying the framework of Part I
to the case of perceptual reasons. In this part, I will be particularly con-
cerned with the epistemic value of perceptual experience. Part II seeks to
provide a resolution of the problem of nondoxastic justification, which
concerns the question of how a causal transition between experience
and belief could assume a normative dimension, that is, how perceptual
experience serves to justify beliefs about the world. Chapter 4 provides
the background to this debate by examining the externalist and inter-
nalist accounts of perceptual justification. It begins by evaluating Tyler
Burge’s externalist account of perceptual justification, which, among
other things, introduces a new type of positive epistemic status or war-
rant, namely, ‘entitlement.’ I will argue that Burge’s notion of entitlement
cannot be of any help in resolving the problem of nondoxastic justifi-
cation. This chapter also introduces two competing internalist theories,
namely, dogmatism (liberalism) and conservatism. Given the existence of
different varieties of liberalism or conservatism, I shall suggest a frame-
work to make sense of the differences involved and argue that, instead of
focusing on one particular species of conservatism, we should recognize
varieties of conservatism (liberalism). My conclusion is that no theory of
Introduction 7
justification need be conservative/liberal tout court. Whether a theory of
justification is dogmatist/conservative depends on which dimension of
evaluation is taken to be salient. Some of the implications of this finding
are then investigated.
Chapter 5 critically examines Crispin Wright’s version of epistemic
conservatism. In particular, I shall pay attention to his notion of entitle-
ment. Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addi-
tion to evidential warrant, we have a species of non-evidential warrant,
namely, entitlement, which forms the basis of a particular view of the
architecture of perceptual justification. It will be argued, however, that
the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright’s account is not the stan-
dard truth-conducive justification but, what is known as, the deontologi-
cal conception of justification. Deontological justification has features
that make it a better candidate for representing a conservative architec-
ture. These results will be reinforced by showing how the deontological
framework can make better sense of a recent theory of justified (reason-
able) belief that takes its inspiration from Wright’s conservative account.
Thus understood, we may see the dogmatism-conservatism controversy
as actually an extension of the older debate over which conception of
justification, truth-conducive or deontological, can best represent the
epistemic status of our belief-forming practices.
Having criticized conservatism in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 is devoted to
a defense of dogmatism by examining some of its salient features in the
light of the account of the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons
developed in the first part of the book. I explain how certain well-known
features of dogmatism, such as its claim about the ‘immediacy’ of per-
ceptual justification, naturally fall out from the dispositional structure of
perceptual reasons. While dogmatists often defend their position by way
of examples, I show how the dispositional framework provides a princi-
pled defense of the dogmatists’ main theses. One such claim is that experi-
ence provides justification in virtue of its phenomenal character, which in
turn grounds its representational content. Dogmatism further states that
perceptual experience justifies belief in its content in virtue of presenting
that content with ‘presentational force.’ I show how these features of per-
ceptual experience can be adequately explained within the dispositional
framework. Next, given dogmatism’s adherence to justification internal-
ism, I consider some recent attempts to undermine justification internal-
ism by means of distinguishing between rationality and justification and
confining the internalist intuitions to the domain of rationality. I show
how our dispositional account of the structure of perceptual reasons can
thwart such attempts. Finally, I respond to an important problem raised
for dogmatism by the phenomenon of cognitive penetration.
Part III considers further applications of the dispositional frame-
work. The topics that will be discussed include the structure of defeat,
self-knowledge, reasoning, emotions, and motivational internalism. In
8 Introduction
Chapter 7, I will be concerned with the question of the varieties of defeat-
ers and their mechanism of defeat. Discussions of epistemic defeat can
be conducted along a number of dimensions. One set of issues concerns
the type of entities that are said to have defeating power as well as their
targets. Here, it is, for example, customary to distinguish propositional
from mental state defeaters. A second set of issues involves the varieties
of defeaters and the mechanism by which they discharge their undermin-
ing function. There are, of course, lots of subtle details associated with
both sets of questions. In this chapter, I will be particularly interested in
finding out if the phenomenon of higher-order defeat can be accommo-
dated within a general account of epistemic defeat. This chapter argues
that these issues are best handled within the dispositional framework of
epistemic reasons and reason-possession.
Chapter 8 deals with the nature of theoretical reasoning or inference,
that is, the process of revising one’s beliefs for a reason. But inference is
more than mere causation. The question of what it is exactly that distin-
guishes theoretical reasoning from mere causal processes constitutes the
so-called ‘problem of inference,’ namely, the problem of what an inferring
process consists in. Paul Boghossian has located the distinguishing fea-
ture of inference in, what he calls, the ‘taking condition’ requirement. He
thinks that any adequate account of inferences must have the resources
to accommodate and explain the ‘taking condition.’ In this chapter, hav-
ing argued against John Broome’s rule-following account of reasoning,
I appeal to the dispositional account of the structure of epistemic rea-
sons to argue for a way of explaining the ‘taking condition’ so that it is
immune to the objections raised against it.
In Chapter 9, I will be concerned with the epistemic value of emotions.
Like perceptions, emotions are usually considered to be passive mental
states with both phenomenal and intentional aspects. It is now widely
believed that emotions have indispensable epistemic roles to play in our
cognitive lives. To cash out their epistemic value, philosophers sometimes
liken emotional experience to perceptual experience and claim that emo-
tions can provide us with evaluative knowledge of the world. This claim
has, however, been subjected to some serious objections, leading some
theorists to deny that emotions can, like perceptions, be reasons. In this
chapter, I shall argue that many of these objections arise from a fail-
ure to appreciate certain features of reasons, especially the distinction
between the reasons there are and the reasons one possesses. After criti-
cizing some of the attempts to show that emotions can be reasons, I show
how the adoption of the dispositional account of reason-possession can
help defuse the objections raised against the evidential value of emotions.
Chapter 10 offers an alternative defense of motivational or judgment
internalism. Notwithstanding the Humean theory of motivation, it seems
to many that, when it comes to moral motivation, thoughts about moral-
ity directly impact our motivations. These observations have led to an
Introduction 9
internalist/externalist divide among philosophers with regard to the nature
of the link between moral judgment and motivation. The view, known as
‘motivational’ or ‘judgment’ internalism, holds that moral judgments or
beliefs are inherently motivational. The externalists, however, point out
that motivational internalism is clearly undermined by the commonplace
cases of motivational failure involving agents suffering from, say, depres-
sion, weakness of will, confusion, and the like. In response, the internal-
ists have sought to tone down their claim by either limiting the scope of
their thesis to agents who are not suffering from psychological defects
or by simply denying that some such cases are possible. In this chapter, I
shall defend the unrestricted version of motivational internalism against
the aforementioned objections. It will be argued that the reason why the
standard accounts of motivational internalism are vulnerable to such
objections is that they take the link between moral judgments and moti-
vation to have a linear structure. In opposition, I shall argue that the link
is best understood as emerging from within the dispositional structure of
(possessed) motivating reasons and that, thus understood, the externalist
counterexamples can be easily accommodated as falling naturally from
the way dispositions, in general, behave.
Chapter 11 sets out a different strategy to account for what is known as
‘Evans’s procedure’ in answering the question of how we acquire knowl-
edge of our thoughts. Theories of self-knowledge all seek to explain or
explain away the features of epistemic privilege and first-person author-
ity that are usually associated with such knowledge. In this chapter, I
shall focus on a particular claim, namely, the ‘transparency thesis,’ that
is invoked in some accounts of self-knowledge. It is claimed that the
procedure that follows from this thesis constitutes the core of our self-
attributions. Theories that appeal to such a procedure are, however, often
accused of failing to justify their epistemic credentials. In this chapter, by
relying on the considerations of the previous chapters, I provide a new
interpretation of the transparency procedure that wears its epistemic cre-
dentials on its sleeve. It will be argued that the dispositional framework
can make epistemic sense of the transparency procedure.
Part I
The Dispositional
Architecture of Epistemic
Reasons
1 Possessing Reasons
A Dispositional Framework
Hamid Vahid
Epistemic reasons are meant to provide justification for beliefs. In this

chapter, I will be concerned with the requirements that have to be met if
reasons are to discharge this function. It is widely recognized, however,
that only possessed reasons can justify beliefs and actions. But what are
the conditions that have to be satisfied for one to possess reasons? I
shall try to motivate a particular condition, namely, the ‘treating’ require-
ment that has been deemed to be necessary for possessing reasons. In
Section 1.2, I explain and criticize some of the existing accounts of the
treating requirement for reason-possession. In Section 1.3, I will suggest
a dispositional account of reason-possession in which the treating condi-
tion features prominently. I begin, however, by providing an opinionated
introduction to some of the issues in the recent literature in metaethics
about reasons and rationality which I will presuppose in this book.
1.1 The Ontology and Typology of Reasons: An Opinionated

Introduction
Reasons feature prominently in our lives. We do things and believe things
for reasons and we appeal to such reasons to explain and justify our
actions and attitudes. It is not only the cognitive attitudes for which
appeals to reasons are made. We regret and fear things for a variety of
reasons. Reasons also guide our actions. We appeal to them when delib-
erating about a possible course of action. This is not, of course, to say
that all actions and attitudes are rational. In practice, people often act
and believe for reasons that are not good reasons. In those circumstances,
they are either wrong about matters of fact or mistakenly take a certain
consideration to support a particular attitude or a particular course of
action when, in fact, it does not. They are, nevertheless, said to have
acted for reasons that explain their actions and attitudes. To separate and
distinguish the various layers in which reasons can influence actions and
attitudes, philosophers recognize three types of reasons: normative, moti-
vating, and explanatory reasons.1
14 Dispositional Architecture
Normative reasons are standardly referred to as considerations that
favor (disfavor) and justify certain actions (attitudes) while motivating
reasons are said to be those considerations in the light of which an agent
acts. Explanatory reasons are reasons that explain why someone acts or
believes by making the action or belief intelligible. For example, we might
say that the fact that it is raining is a good reason to carry an umbrella.
This very same consideration can, however, motivate and guide an agent
to carry an umbrella and also explain why he has done just that. This is
not, of course, to say that these reasons always coincide, which is pre-
cisely why philosophers are forced to distinguish between ‘reasons to ϕ’
(normative reasons), ‘reasons for which’ (motivating reasons), and ‘rea-
sons why’ (explanatory reasons). For our purposes in this book, I shall
focus on normative and motivating reasons.2
According to many philosophers, the notion of a normative reason is
the most central of all normative concepts. T. M. Scanlon, for example,
maintains that:
truths about the reasons are fundamental in the sense that truths
about reasons are not reducible or identifiable with non-normative
truths, such as truths about the natural world of physical objects,
causes and effects, nor can they be explained in terms of notions of
rationality or rational agency that are not themselves claims about
reasons. Reasons might be fundamental in the further sense of being
the only fundamental elements of the normative domain, other nor-
mative notions such as good and ought being analyzable in terms of
reasons.
Scanlon (2014, 2)
The view that reasons are both fundamental and primitive has come to be
known in the literature as ‘Reasons First.’
Alternatively, other philosophers have sought to provide definitions of
‘normative reason’ in terms of other normative terms such as ‘ought’ and
‘good.’ John Broome, for example, initially takes ‘a reason for S to ϕ’ to
mean an explanation of the normative fact ‘why S ought to ϕ.’ However,
this definition cannot be entirely correct because normative reasons often
have only pro tanto (contributory) weight, thus, rendering them inca-
pable of determining what one ought to do or believe in a particular situ-
ation. Accordingly, Broome (2013) proposes to define ‘normative reason’
as something that plays a role in the weighing explanation of why S ought
(ought not) to ϕ. Some philosophers have instead proposed to understand
reasons as evidence. Thus, Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star (2008, 2009)
have suggested that a fact counts as a reason for S if and only if the fact
is evidence that S ought to ϕ. Still others (e.g., Finlay 2006) have argued
that a fact is a reason for S to ϕ if and only if it explains why S’s ϕ-ing
would be good in some respect and to some degree. I am not, however,
Possessing Reasons 15
going to adjudicate between these proposals since this issue would not be
relevant to our purposes in this chapter and the rest of the book.3
What is, however, relevant to the central question of this chapter per-
tains to the metaphysics of reasons, that is, whether reasons are facts,
states of affairs, or other entities. An important debate in this area is
between the factualist and the non-factualist views of what reasons are.
Factualism, that is, the view that reasons are facts is widely accepted for
normative (justifying) reasons.4 This is the claim that reasons for acting,
believing, and other attitudes are facts (must be true), for only then can
we make sense of their counting in favor of actions and attitudes. How-
ever, as is customary in philosophy, things are not so straightforward, for
there seem to be cases in which some consideration (r) is a reason one
has to do something despite r being false. This has led some philosophers
to distinguish between (normative) reasons there are to do something
and reasons one has to do that thing.5 This distinction is also important
in regard to the question of rationality for it seems that it is only the
reasons one has that bear on the rationality of one’s actions or attitudes.
For example (Parfit 1997), no one is going to take me as irrational or
irresponsible for failing to leave a building that, unbeknownst to me, has
caught fire. Although there is a good reason for me to leave the building
(viz. its being on fire), as long as I am not aware of (or ‘have’) that reason,
it will not bear on what is rational for me to do.
However, the notion of ‘having a reason’ is obscure. Mark Schroeder
(2008) distinguishes between the ‘pleonastic’ and ‘non-pleonastic’ senses
of ‘have.’ For example, the sentence ‘S has a golf partner’ illustrates the
pleonastic sense of ‘have’ for the sentence does not express the thought
that there is someone with the property of being a golf partner, and S is
in possession of that person. The idea is merely that someone stands in
the ‘golf partner of’ relation to S. Likewise when it is stated that I had
a reason to leave the building that is on fire, the claim involves only a
pleonastic sense of ‘have.’ It is merely remarked that the fact that the
building is on fire stands in a ‘reason for’ relation to me. However, since I
am not aware of this fact or reason, I do not have it (in a non-pleonastic
sense). Or, consider the following case (Schroeder 2008) involving two
persons, Ronnie and Freddie who like dancing. Freddie, but not Ronnie,
knows that there will be dancing at the party tonight. So it is Freddie, but
not Ronnie, who has this reason to go to the party in the non-pleonastic
sense.
Schroeder further denies, what he calls, the ‘Factoring Account’ of hav-
ing reasons, according to which to have a reason to do something consists
in there independently being a reason to do that thing as well as one
possessing that reason. According to such an account, reasons one has
are always facts. However, while Schroeder accepts that the normative
reasons there are facts, he denies this in the case of the normative reasons
one has. Along with many other philosophers, he thinks that the latter
can be falsehoods. Accordingly, corresponding to the two senses of ‘have’
as described, he draws a distinction between an objective and a subjective
sense of ‘reason.’ This means that ‘reason’ is ambiguous, and the locu-
tions of ‘having reasons’ and ‘there being reasons’ employ different senses
of ‘reason.’ Pace the Factoring Account, the subjective reason relation is
not a restriction on the objective relation.
The idea behind the preceding claims can best be illustrated by the so-
called error cases where, despite being guided by false beliefs, the agent’s
actions and attitude appear to be rational and blameless, thus, making it
hard to deny that they have been done for reasons. To see this, consider
Bernard Williams’s (1981) famous case where an agent (Bernie) is at a
cocktail party holding the glass that he believes to contain the gin and
tonic that he had just asked of the bartender. Unbeknownst to him, how-
ever, the glass contains gasoline. The fact that the glass contains gasoline
is a good reason for Bernie to set his glass down, but this is not a reason
that he has because he is not aware of it. We know, however, that he is
thirsty and wants to drink, which is why he has asked for a gin and tonic.
Moreover, he thinks that the glass contains gin and tonic. These consid-
erations allow him to deliberate whether to take a sip. Indeed, we would
reasonably expect him to do so. That would seem to be the rational thing
for Bernie to do. He can even be criticized in case he fails to take a sip.
As Schroeder (2008) remarks, these are the earmarks of having a rea-
son to do something. It is worth noting, however, that our question here
is whether Bernie has a normative, rather than a motivating, reason to
drink from the glass. We are not concerned with whether Bernie is moti-
vated to take a sip, for even if he is not, his failure to drink would still be
critcizable because of the reason he has.
The difference between factualism and non-factualism regarding nor-
mative reasons is best brought out by raising the question of what reason,
if any, Bernie has to take a sip. Non-factualists claim that there are no
good factualist candidates in such cases. For example, the reason cannot
be the fact that Bernie believes that the glass contains gin and tonic. We
do not normally base our actions and beliefs on facts about what we
believe. Such facts do not feature in the list of a fully informed bystander
who is preparing a list of pros and cons of Bernie’s taking a sip.6 Neither
can Bernie’s reason be whatever it is that justifies his false belief that the
glass contains gin and tonic (e.g., that the glass contains clear liquid, that
he is in a normal bar, that there is nothing unusual about the bartender,
etc.). Again, these considerations are not what would prompt Bernie to
take to sip. Moreover, as reasons, they are not as strong as the consider-
ation that the glass contains gin and tonic, which seems to implausibly
imply that were Bernie in a good case where his glass did contain gin and
tonic, he would be more rational to take a sip than he is in the current
scenario (Comesana and McGrath 2014). In the absence of any other
plausible candidates, non-factualists claim, we are forced to conclude
that the reason Bernie has to take a sip is the content of his false belief
that his glass contains gin and tonic.
The same considerations apply in the case of Freddie and Ronnie
where Freddie happens to know (truly believe) that there is going to be
dancing at the party. Unlike Ronnie, it would be rational for Freddie to
go to the party:
But once we noticed that the relevant difference between Freddie and
Ronnie is that Freddie and not Ronnie believes that there will be
dancing at the party, why should we hold that it matters, for this dif-
ference, whether there really is going to be dancing at the party? If
according to our best judgments about the case, Ronnie and Freddie
differ in this way whether or not there is, in fact, going to be danc-
ing at the party, then we should allow that what matters for whether
Freddie has the reason to go is not whether it is the case at all, but
merely whether he believes it.
(Schroeder 2008, 66)
So, according to the non-factualists, what matters for whether one has a
reason is not whether one’s belief is true, but only whether one has the
belief in question.
The distinction between objective and subjective normative reasons is
intended to make sense of the error cases already described. While objec-
tive normative reasons depend on how things are independent of the
agent’s beliefs, subjective normative reasons are the considerations that,
given an agent’s point of view, justify or rationalize acting. The two senses
of the word ‘reason’ are not, however, completely independent since sub-
jective reasons are understood in terms of objective reasons. An agent
has a subjective reason to ϕ just in case the agent has some beliefs, which
are such that, if true, the agent has an objective reason to ϕ. To conclude,
according to the non-factualist, whenever an agent ϕ’s, there must be a
subjective reason, or a proposition that she takes to be a reason to ϕ, for
which she ϕ’s, even if there is no objective reason to ϕ. Of course, in the
good or veridical cases where the agent’s belief is correct, the reason for
which she ϕ’s coincides with her objective normative reason.
In response to these arguments, the factualists (e.g., Alvarez 2018a,
2018b) typically take the routes of either denying that, in error cases,
false beliefs can generate genuine normative pressure to do things or sim-
ply deny that in such cases one acts for a reason though they concede
that the action is motivated by one’s false beliefs. Needless to say, the
non-factualists take the intuitions about both the rationality of actions in
error cases as well as the reasons for which the actions are done to be too
sacrosanct to be so easily given up. They find it entirely implausible to
deny that, in error cases, the agent has either a normative reason to act or
believe or is rational were she to act on what she takes to be her reason
given that her situation is phenomenologically no different from when
her beliefs happen to be true. Nevertheless, one should acknowledge the
intuitive plausibility of the factivity requirements on reasons-discourse.
So, the non-factualists need to say more about this issue beyond insist-
ing on their position. It is, thus, worth briefly reflecting on this question
before we leave the topic of normative reasons. The dispute can best be
articulated by considering a remark that Schroeder (2008) makes in the
context of the question of specifying one’s reasons.
Suppose, going back to the gin and tonic example, we ask Bernie to
prospectively specify his reason for taking a sip from the glass. He would
naturally respond by saying that the glass contains gin, which is what
he asked for. Suppose, however, that we tell him about the gasoline in
the glass and now ask him to specify what his reason would have been
had he taken a sip. This time, on pain of implying that the glass actually
contains gin, he would switch to a psychological mode and say the reason
would have been that he believed that the glass contained gin. This seems
to imply that not only Bernie was wrong about the facts, he was also
wrong about what he took to be his reason. This holds for all the error
cases and seems to go against our previous claim about the unsuitability
of such mental states as normative reasons. Schroeder’s own response
is that it is not Bernie’s reason that has changed but only the way he is
willing to describe it. Likewise, Stephen Finlay (2014) has argued that the
agent’s switch to ‘believe’-sentences, when specifying his or her reasons,
does not mean that belief states are cited as reasons. Instead, the role of ‘S
believed,’ in S’s specification of his or her reasons, is to cancel its factive
implications.
An interesting account along these lines has been developed recently by
Tim Henning (2018). Following Urmson (1952), Diessel and Tomasello
(2001), and Potts (2005), Henning claims that verbs like ‘believe’ and
‘think’ have, what Urmson calls, ‘parenthetical’ uses. The idea is that the
prefix ‘S believes’ in typical utterances of ‘S believes that p’ plays the role
of a side mark in that it does not contribute to ‘what is said’ by the utter-
ance. Rather, the parenthetical uses of ‘S believes that p’ are equivalent
to the corresponding utterances of the form ‘In S’s opinion, p.’ The claim
is that, in a typical utterance of such sentences, one can discern two con-
tents: the content that <p> and the content that <S is of the opinion that
p>. <P> is the at-issue content of the utterance which can be the target of
challenge or rejection while the psychological content, <S is of the opin-
ion that p>, reports S’s opinion and is regarded as a background content.
Which content is at issue depends, however, on the context.
The claim is that in uttering ‘In S’s opinion, p,’ it is the psychological
content that is asserted, not the at-issue content (<p>). The at-issue con-
tent is said to be ‘subject-oriented,’ and it is this content that in embed-
ded contexts contributes to or composes the truth-conditional content
of the whole sentence. According to Henning, the parenthetical view can
explain Bernie’s choice of the ‘believe’-sentence when specifying his rea-
son to drink ex post viz., ‘I believed the glass contains gin.’ The thought
is that the at-issue content of this specification is the same as that of
Bernie’s ex ant specification of his reason, namely, <the glass contains
gin>. And, it is this content that specifies Bernie’s reason. However, since
this content is no longer asserted, Bernie no longer commits himself to
the truth of the proposition that the glass contains gin. Nevertheless, Ber-
nie does assert something, namely, the background psychological content
that he believes the glass contains gin and tonic. This way, we can explain
both our intuitions about the factivity of normative reasons and the exis-
tence of such reasons in error cases.
Let us now turn to motivating reasons and see how they fare in regard
to the factualism/non-factualism debate. Motivating reasons, we may
recall, are the reasons for which or in the light of which we act or believe.
Much of what we said about subjective normative reasons in regard to
the factualism debate is also true of motivating reasons. This is not sur-
prising because motivating reasons are the reasons that motivate agents.
But reasons that motivate agents are normative reasons of some kind.
We sometimes act and believe for good reasons. Indeed, it must be pos-
sible for one’s motivating reasons to be normative reasons.7 So it may
well be that motivating reasons are also subjective reasons. However, it
is less plausible to think that subjective reasons are always motivating
reasons because while to have a motivating reason, one must be actually
motivated, this is not necessary for having a subjective normative reason.
According to factualism about motivating reasons, the reason in the
light of which one acts is always some fact.8 Of course, it is only when
this fact is appreciated that the agent is motivated to act. But the cor-
relation between motivating and normative reasons is not always that
straightforward. We also act for bad reasons as in cases where the reason
for which we act fails to be a normative reason because one’s reason fails
to be a fact (though it would count in favor of the action if it were a
fact). Once again, the factualists’ typical response would be to deny that
in such cases the agent acts or has any reasons at all. Obviously, the non-
factualists would find this response too uncompromising to be plausible.
This is particularly clear in the cases of believing for false reasons. Sup-
pose it is now 2 pm, and I reasonably believe that my flight leaves at 5 pm
after checking the flight schedule. On the factualist account, I believe for
a reason, namely, the fact that my flight leaves at 5 pm. Suppose I then
proceed to do some shopping and stop checking on the flight, and it so
happens that in the meantime, the flight is delayed. According to the
factualist, I no longer believe for a reason, despite my belief being still
rational. Many would find the factualist’s verdict farfetched.9
To conclude this section, I am inclined to side with the non-factualists
both regarding subjective normative reasons as well as motivating rea-
sons. Accordingly, in so far as the question of the metaphysics of reasons
is concerned, it would be wise for non-factualists to adopt ‘propositional-
ism’ about reasons, namely, the view that subjective normative reasons
and motivating reasons are the contents of one’s beliefs viz. propositions.
These propositions can be true or false. When they are true, that makes
them facts. So this position can be upheld by those who take objective
normative reasons to be facts. It thus allows a space for the possibil-
ity of acting for good (normative) reasons, something that any adequate
account of motivating reasons must satisfy (see also the Appendix to
Chapter 3).
Such a position also has the added advantage that it can be nicely
extended to epistemology and the case of epistemic reasons. Thus far, we
have treated reasons for action and reasons for beliefs and attitudes on
a par. According to Joseph Raz (2011), the distinction between practical
and epistemic reasons is best thought of as a distinction between two
kinds of normative reasons with the former owing their normative force
to their relation to values and the latter owing it to their relation to the
truth. So, in the light of what we have said so far about practical reasons
(normative and motivating), we may also consider the reasons for which
a subject believes something to be also subjective reasons for that subject
to believe it. Sometimes those reasons are true, in which case they are
also objective reasons to believe it. When this happens, we have ‘propo-
sitions [that] are objective reasons when true, subjective reasons when
believed, and motivating reasons when, by being believed, they play a
certain role in bringing about another belief or in maintaining that other
belief’ (Schroeder 2015, 241). Moreover, when the subject has subjec-
tively sufficient reasons to believe p, she will have propositional rational-
ity or justification to believe that p, and if she proceeds to form a belief
for those reasons (motivating reasons), she will be doxastically rational
or justified in believing that p.
Finally, a word about the notion of rationality before we probe deeper
into the issue of what possession (or having) of reasons consists in. Scan-
lon (2003) has drawn a distinction between the notions of ‘substantial’
and ‘structural’ rationality. The idea is that many normative claims are
substantive claims about the reasons one has to act or believe some-
thing. So, if our beliefs are not adequately grounded, they will not be
rational (justified) in the substantive sense.10 However, there is also
another sense of ‘rationality’ which pertains not to one’s reasons, but
to relations between one’s attitudes. This ‘structural’ sense of rational-
ity concerns the structure of our attitudes and how they are related to
one another. Accordingly, even if one holds the belief p in response to
inadequate reasons and so one’s belief fails to be substantively rational,
one is still rationally required (in the ‘structural’ sense) to believe the
most evident consequences of p. It is, however, substantive rationality
that we will be mostly concerned with in this book. So we are going to
take it as our guiding principle that (substantive) rationality consists in
correctly responding to one’s reasons. As it stands, however, this principle
has been denied by some philosophers as it leaves many questions about
both reasons and rationality unanswered. A proper defense of this prin-
ciple, it turns out, requires probing more deeply into the question of what
having or possessing reasons consists in (beyond the epistemic condition
already explained). It is the task of this chapter to articulate these issues
and provide answers to the questions they raise. As I said, I will be mostly
concerned with epistemic reasons, but the points raised will be equally
applicable to practical reasons.
1.1.1 Possessed Reasons and Rationality

It is controversial how normative reasons bear on the rationality of
actions and beliefs. The question becomes particularly pressing when the
standard conception of normative reasons is combined with the thesis
that rationality requires that we correctly respond to our reasons. As we
have seen, we can easily conceive of cases where an agent is non-culpably
ignorant of the objective normative reasons that are relevant to whether
or not she should perform an action. To illustrate, consider the following
example (due to John Broome 2007).
Fish Smith is having fish for lunch. Unbeknownst to him, however,

the fish contains salmonella. Even though this constitutes a
good reason for Smith not to eat the fish, he is nevertheless
rational if he does.
What such examples show is that what objective reasons there are in fact
and what objective reasons we take to exist can come apart. Moreover,
it seems that rationality only requires responding to the latter type of
reasons – viz. perspectival (or ‘apparent’) reasons that may or may not
coincide with the relevant objective reasons. This seems to suggest that
reasons that justify actions are those that are possessed by the agent, that is,
those that fall within her ken.
But what is it that constitutes the possession of reasons? Focusing
mainly on the possession conditions of epistemic reasons, our goal, in this
chapter, is to provide an account of what it is to possess a reason (r) for
holding a belief in a proposition p. An obvious initial condition to pos-
sess r is for it to be cognitively accessible or available to the subject. One
can understand this requirement either in normative terms as involving
justified belief or in non-normative terms involving such states as ‘seem-
ings,’ presentational states, or merely doxastic states such as beliefs.11 For
our purposes in this chapter, however, I shall remain neutral on which of
those states best represents a subject’s access to her reason (r) and only
require that the reason be cognitively available to her in the minimal
sense that it appears to her that r is the case.
It should be obvious, however, that the mere availability of reasons
is not sufficient for their possession as the following version of the fish
example makes clear. In this version, Smith is aware that the fish he is
going to eat has salmonella, but he reasonably believes that it is harmless.
Again, given his states of mind, Smith’s belief that it is safe to eat the fish
cannot be described as irrational. So, although he is aware that (r) <the
fish contains salmonella>, he still fails to possess r as a reason for believ-
ing that it is unsafe to eat the fish. R still fails to impact the rational status
of Smith’s belief about the safety of the fish. It is generally thought that
what is missing here is that Smith fails to ‘treat’ or ‘take’ r as a reason for
believing that it is unsafe to eat the fish.12 It follows then that to possess r
as an epistemic reason for p, r should not only be available to the subject
but should also be treated as a reason for p by that subject. So what we
need to do first is to provide an account of what the treating requirement
consists in. To set the stage, however, I shall begin by briefly examining
some of the existing accounts of the treating requirement in the literature.
1.2 The Treating Requirement: From Doxastic States

to Competences
The most straightforward account of the treating condition is to require
the subject to believe that r is a reason for p, that is, to believe that
r favors or is positively relevant to p. Such an account, however, faces
the over-intellectualization objection: ‘We can have rational beliefs and
desires, and act rationally, without having any beliefs about reasons.
Young children respond rationally to certain reasons or apparent rea-
sons, though they do not have the concept of a reason’ (Parfit 2011, 118).
A natural reaction to this problem is to go de re. The idea is that a subject
S possesses r as a reason for p iff (i) it appears to S that r, and (ii) r’s truth
would give S an objective normative reason to believe that p. However, as
Kurt Sylvan (2015) observes, (i) and (ii) are neither necessary nor jointly
sufficient for possessing r as a reason for p. Suppose S knows that p and
p logically entails q. In that case, p is an objective reason to believe q.
But this entailment relation between p and q may be too complex to be
appreciated by S. So although both (i) and (ii) are satisfied, S would still
fail to possess p as a reason for believing that q precisely because S fails
to appreciate that p positively bears on q and, thus, fails to treat p as a
reason for the belief that q.
Condition (ii) is not necessary for reason-possession either because it is
possible to rationally treat the consideration r as an objective reason to
believe that p even if it would not be an objective reason to believe that p
if true. Consider the following example, due to Sylvan, where the propo-
sition ‘Fs are Gs’ appears to a scientist to be a law of nature while, in fact,
every time an F appeared to him to be a G involved some sort of illusion.
In fact, Fs are nomologically guaranteed not to be Gs. The scientist is then
correctly told that X is an F. Given his background beliefs, he rationally
takes this fact as an apparent reason for believing that X is a G while the
fact that X is an F is an objective reason to believe that X is not a G.
I shall now consider two similar responses to the problem of articulat-
ing the treating requirement due to Errol Lord (2018) and Sylvan (2015),
both of which appeal to the agent’s competences and their manifesta-
tion. According to Lord’s account of the ‘treating requirement,’ which he
chooses to call the ‘practical condition,’ to treat some consideration r as
a reason is (to be in a position) to manifest certain kinds of dispositions
one has when one believes that r is a reason, the most salient of which is
the disposition to (competently) use r as a premise in reasoning. Our dis-
positions to use facts as reasons, says Lord, must involve our know-how
to use them as reasons. Of course, one can have a disposition but not be
in a position to manifest it. So, in addition to the epistemic condition on
possession, there is also a practical condition. However, taking the former
as a background condition, Lord comes up with the following account of
reason-possession.
Possession What it is for agent A to possess reason r to ϕ provided

by fact f is for A to be in a position to manifest knowl-
edge about how to use r to ϕ.
So the treating requirement obliges the agent to be in a position to

manifest the know-how. This know-how is a competence that disposes
one to get things right and which ‘involves a sensitivity to the grounds
of the various reasons without demanding that one have explicit beliefs
about reasons’ (Lord 2018, 121). It is this sort of competence that is man-
ifested when one comes to possess a reason. It seems then that all Lord is
doing is to replace belief about reason-relations with one of its relevant
associated dispositions. A similar account has also been propounded by
Sylvan, on which I choose to focus in this section because it is more fully
worked out.
Sylvan’s suggestion is that reason-possession is not a matter of norma-
tive knowledge that a subject might have. The reason why the scientist in
the above example seems rational to treat X’s being an F as an objective
reason for believing that it is a G is that all the Fs he had observed had
appeared to him to be Gs. It is possible, however, that there are beings who
lack the ability to project inductively from past experiences and are, thus,
unable to treat a new x that is an F as an objective reason to believe that
it is a G. What distinguishes the two cases, says Sylvan, is that the scientist
possesses a kind of (fallible) competence or disposition that the beings
in the latter scenario lack. He calls such dispositions objective ‘reason-
sensitive’ competences. What those beings lack is a disposition such that,
when faced with an instance of F, to treat it as an inductive reason for
being a G. Moreover, the subject’s transition from knowing that something
is an F to knowing that it is a G should not be a matter of luck. Instead,
it must manifest his more general inductive competence to treat F-like
considerations as inductive evidence for G-like considerations. Eventu-
ally, Sylvan proposes the following competence-based account (C) of
reason-possession.13
(C) S possesses r as a reason to ϕ iff (i) it appears to S that r, (ii) S is

attracted to treating r like an objective reason to ϕ, and (iii) this
attraction manifests S’s relevant reason-sensitive competence to
treat r-like considerations like objective reasons to do ϕ-like things
only if they are, when true, objective reasons to do ϕ-like things,
where to treat r as an objective normative reason to ϕ is to be disposed

to respond to r in the ways that would be favored if r were an objective
normative reason to ϕ.
Unlike the previous accounts of reason-possession (and the treating
requirement), (C) correctly highlights the role of dispositions in such
accounts. However, despite its many virtues, it is questionable whether
it can capture the perspective intuition behind the treating requirement.
As noted earlier, the whole point behind the necessity of a treating condi-
tion in an account of reason-possession is that it is difficult to see how,
in the absence of the subject’s appreciating how her reasons bear on her
beliefs, those reasons could impact the epistemic status of those beliefs.
And the question is whether (C) can adequately reflect this feature of
reason-possession. To explain, recall the example of the beings who lack
the ability to project inductively from past experiences. It is quite con-
ceivable that neuroscientists could implant inductive disposition-creating
chips inside their brains such that whenever they believe that an x is an F,
they come to be disposed to believe that it is a G. But we do not want to
say that these subjects can now ‘appreciate’ how their reasons bear induc-
tively on their beliefs. Adding further and more general dispositions to
ground the less general dispositions would not help either. The rationale
behind the treating requirement is that a subject must have a perspective
on her reasons if she is to possess them and it is not clear that compe-
tences of the sort required by (C) can provide such a perspective.
Since Sylvan’s account heavily draws on Ernest Sosa’s views of compe-
tences, the worry may also be expressed within the framework of Sosa’s
virtue epistemology (e.g., Sosa 2011). Suppose an agent S is attracted to
treat r like an objective reason to believe p and that this attraction mani-
fests S’s reason-sensitive competence to treat r-like considerations like
objective reasons to believe p-like propositions. By Sosa’s lights, this
is an apt performance on the part of S (in the same way that an archer’s
hitting a target is an apt performance as it manifests the archer’s relevant
competence). But is this sufficient to reflect the appreciation intuition
behind the treating requirement? To answer this question, let us assume
that, instead of being aptly attracted to treat r as a reason for believing p,
S actually has an apt belief that r supports p where an apt belief is a true
belief that is reliably produced (by an intellectual virtue).
The thought is that if it turns out even an apt belief about the sup-
port relation falls short of capturing the appreciation intuition behind
the treating condition, then so does the dispositional account embedded
in the condition (ii) in (C). And that, indeed, seems to be the case because
an apt belief about the support relation between one’s reasons and the
relevant beliefs does not require one to have an epistemic perspective on
those reasons. An apt belief is independent of whether the subject takes a
perspective on the reliability of the faculty that produces that belief. The
subject is not required to have access to her reasons. Even the adding of
a second-order competence, requiring the subject to aptly believe that
she aptly believes that her reasons support p, would still leave her in the
dark about the grounds of her belief that p: ‘Given Sosa’s understanding
of animal knowledge as not requiring access to one’s reasons for knowl-
edge, one might very well aptly believe that one aptly believes that p, but
be totally unaware of the grounds for which one believes that p’ (Mir-
rachi 2015, 358). The subject would still fall short of having a reflective
engagement with the truth. Accordingly, if neither apt belief nor even an
aptly formed apt belief about the support relation between one’s reason r
and belief that p can capture the intent behind the treating requirement,
then neither can the mere dispositional, nondoxastic state that is required
by (ii).
On Sosa’s account, it is only ‘reflective’ knowledge that needs the per-
spectival endorsement of the adequacy of the grounds of one’s beliefs.
Unlike animal knowledge, reflective knowledge requires the subject to
recognize that the target belief was produced by a reliable faculty or com-
petence. One version of such knowledge requires that one ‘defensively’
aptly believe a particular proposition such that one is able to defend the
aptness of one’s belief against the relevant skeptical doubts. Perhaps,
then, we should demand that to meet the treating requirement, the sub-
ject defensively aptly believe that her reasons support p. However, this
would render (C) vulnerable to the over-intellectualization objection that
it was expressly designed to avoid. So it seems that Sylvan’s account faces
a dilemma. Either a subject is required to have some sort of reflective
grasp of the appropriateness of her reasons such that she can defend her
beliefs in the face of attack in which case (C) would be vulnerable to the
over-intellectualization charge, or the subject is merely required to have
an apt belief (or even an aptly formed apt belief) about the appropriate-
ness of those reasons (let alone be in a mere dispositional state) in which
case (C) would fail to capture the intent behind the treating requirement.
Let us see if we can do better.
1.3 The Treating Requirement: From Available Reasons

to Possessed Justifying Reasons
We might be able to find some clues for analyzing the treating require-
ment by looking at a different, though functionally similar, concept. To
possess a reason (r) for believing that p and to believe that p for that
reason seem to be aiming at the same target. Reason-possession, as we
have seen, crucially involves the satisfaction of the treating requirement
but to believe for a reason, one is required to satisfy the so-called basing
relation condition. When a subject S possesses a reason r that adequately
supports a proposition p, S is said to have propositional justification for
believing that p. However, when S forms her belief on the basis of r,
the belief is said to be doxastically justified. The obtaining of the basing
relation, thus, marks the transition from having propositional justifica-
tion for a belief to being doxastically justified in holding that belief. So,
although there is a long-standing dispute in epistemology as to how the
notion of basing is to be analyzed, we have, at least, a clear sense of
the epistemic level at which it is supposed to operate. Now, given that the
satisfaction of the treating requirement must be prior to the obtaining of
the basing relation, then, if the latter marks the transition from propo-
sitional to doxastic justification, the satisfaction of the treating require-
ment must indicate the transition from some prior epistemic level or stage
of the subject to the epistemic level where the subject has propositional
justification.
To see what this prior epistemic level might be, let us go back to our
fish example. Consider two subjects S1 and S2. S1, but not S2, is in pos-
session of knowledge or information that salmonella in a fish is a reason
for not eating the fish. The information, thus, suggests that the presence
of salmonella in a fish positively bears on whether to believe that it is
safe to eat the fish and to act accordingly. Furthermore, this information
endows S1 with a potential epistemic advantage that S2 lacks. S1 has the
potential to possess a reason about whether to believe that it is safe to
eat a particular fish that turns out to contain salmonella. This potential
(but real) epistemic difference manifests itself (with grave physical con-
sequences) when both S1 and S2 are apprised of the information that the
fish they are going to eat has salmonella. Both S1 and S2 have available to
them the evidence or reason (r) <the fish contains salmonella>, but only
S1 possesses r as evidence, thereby, having propositional justification (in
virtue of its possessing) to believe that (p) <it is not safe to eat the fish>.
As long as S1 and S2 are unaware of the presence of salmonella in a fish,
their epistemic differences remain only as a potential epistemic advan-
tage that S1 has over S2. We may view this potential epistemic difference
in terms of an epistemic disposition that S1 has but S2 lacks very much
like the dispositional property, say, of fragility, that a piece of glass has,
in virtue of its molecular structure, that a piece of metal lacks because it
lacks that molecular structure. This difference in dispositions, however,
manifests itself, with real consequences (both practical and epistemic),
when the evidence (r) is made available to both S1 and S2. The preced-
ing observations suggest that just as the obtaining of the basing relation
marks the transition from propositional to doxastic justification, so the
satisfaction of the treating requirement marks the transition from the
availability of evidence or reason to a subject to the subject’s being in
possession of that reason or evidence to believe some proposition, with
the transition itself having a dispositional structure.
To explain, recall that dispositions are generally analyzed in terms
of their characteristic manifestations in response to appropriate test or
stimulus conditions. Furthermore, it is also thought that dispositions, in
general, have categorical or causal bases that underlie them and provide
the truth-makers for their associated true conditionals. It is, of course,
controversial whether all dispositions have categorical bases and how
such bases are related to them. But, for our purposes here, we can ignore
these complications and characterize a dispositional property in terms of
its causal or categorical basis and its manifestation in response to appro-
priate stimulus conditions. Thus, to say, for example, that salt is soluble
is to say that it has a causal basis (molecular structure) in virtue of which
it dissolves when placed in water. How the ascriptions of dispositions to
objects relate to their characteristic conditionals is an important question
to which I shall return in the next chapter.
We can now present our dispositional analysis of the treating require-
ment in a more precise manner. When a subject meets the treating
requirement, he is in a (mental) state whereby he appreciates how some
particular reason r favors, supports, or positively bears on a particular
proposition p. Whether such a state involves a belief or other attitudes
is not of concern to us at this stage. We may thus neutrally describe a
subject who meets the treating requirement as being in a ‘treating-state.’
We can now arrive at the following account of the treating requirement:
(T) The state of treating r as a reason to believe p is the categori-

cal basis of the subject’s disposition to possess r as a reason to
believe p in response to (the available) r.
In other words, a treating-state functions as the categorical basis of an

epistemic disposition to possess r as a reason the way, say, the molecular
structure of salt functions as the categorical basis of its disposition to
dissolve.14 When r is made available to the subject (the stimulus condi-
tion), the disposition manifests itself in the subject’s coming to possess r
as a reason for p, thus, having propositional justification for believing
that p.15 We may, thus, say that S1 comes to possess r as a reason for
believing that p in virtue of being in a particular treating-state when r
is made available to him whereas S2 manifests no such property even
when r is made available to her much in the same way that we may say
of salt that it dissolves in virtue of its molecular structure when placed
in water whereas no such manifestation obtains when a piece of metal is
placed in water. So our dispositional account of reason-possession con-
strues it as the manifestation of an epistemic disposition, grounded in a
treating-state when the relevant reason is made available to the subject
(see Figure 1.1).16,17 The crucial point (e.g., Lord 2018) about the notion
of ‘treating’ is that one can treat a consideration as an H without having
the concept of an H or representing it as an H. Likewise, it is possible to
treat some fact (r) as a reason without having the concept of a reason. A
dog, for example, can treat the sound of the window cracking open late
at night as a reason to bark until its owner comes to check it.
Our account of reason-possession differs from both Lord’s and Syl-
van’s. To start with, on their accounts, the satisfaction of the treating
requirement is identified with a particular disposition. I do not identify
being in a treating-state with any disposition. Rather, being in a treating-
state is what grounds a certain disposition, namely, the disposition to
possess a reason. Moreover, since the disposition in question is grounded
in the agent’s being in a treating-state, it is immune to the kind of objec-
tions that were earlier leveled against those accounts. The agent’s being
in a treating-state ensures that she will be guided by the reasons she pos-
sesses when the grounded disposition is manifested.
Before I conclude this chapter, a few clarificatory remarks are in order.
As noted at the beginning, our aim has been to identify the conditions
that have to be satisfied in order for one to possess reasons. (T), however,
treats the two notions of ‘treating’ and ‘reason-possession’ as interdefin-
able, and so seems vulnerable to the charge of circularity. Here, it is use-
ful to distinguish between two notions of circularity, ‘metaphysical’ and
‘conceptual.’ (T) is obviously not circular in the former (more fundamen-
tal) sense of circularity for it takes a treating-state to be the categorical
basis or the ground of the disposition to possess a reason (for believing)
some proposition. Whatever this categorical basis of the disposition to
possess is, it is metaphysically more fundamental than possession, and
hence can permissibly be employed in a metaphysical analysis of posses-
sion. So the perceived (metaphysical) circularity in (T) is only apparent.
dpr
A(r) rp
------g
(t)
Figure 1.1 Possessing a reason: ‘A(r)’ – stimulus – denotes ‘being aware of reason
r,’ ‘t’ denotes ‘being in a treating-state’ functioning as the ground
(g) of disposition (dpr), ‘dpr’ denotes ‘having disposition to possess r
as a reason to believe p,’ ‘rp’ – response – denotes ‘possessed reason.’
(I shall shortly indicate how this picture connects to the bigger picture
of the underlying structure of epistemic justification (propositional and
doxastic).)
This, however, still leaves us with the question of the conceptual circu-
larity of (T), for it treats the concepts of ‘treating’ and ‘reason-possession’
as interdefinable. But conceptual circularity would be problematic only
if we aim at a reductive analysis of such concepts. There has, however,
been a growing tendency to tolerate circular analysis for some funda-
mental concepts as long as they are informative and well-behaved. As
Peter Strawson has put it, ‘[t]he philosophically interesting or important
concepts tend to remain obstinately irreducible, in the sense that they
cannot be defined away, without remainder or circularity, in terms of
other concepts’ (1995, 16). This seems to be true of many important
analyses of philosophically significant concepts. For example, Grice’s
analysis of sentence meaning in terms of the speaker’s intentions and
beliefs was deemed to be circular given the way psychological states such
as beliefs and intentions are normally understood. The Griceans were,
however, quick to point out that circularity only undermines reductive
analyses and that Grice’s analysis can be seen in a non-reductive light
where our semantic and psychological concepts fit in ‘a closed curve in
space’ (Schiffer 1972, 15).
A better and more realistic model of philosophical analysis is to seek
the elucidation of the concepts rather than their reductive dismantling.
We can thus conceive of an elaborate system of connected concepts where
the function of each concept in the network could be identified by identi-
fying its connections with other concepts in the network. If we adopt this
model, ‘there will be no reason to be worried if, in the process of tracking
connections from one point to another of the network, we find ourselves
returning to, or passing through, our starting point’ (Strawson 1992, 19).
Accordingly, to elucidate such concepts as ‘treating’ and ‘reason-posses-
sion,’ it would be sufficient to trace the complex connections between
these notions and those of, say, propositional justification, basing, and
doxastic justification. We may then see that we cannot fully elaborate
on the concepts of ‘treating’ and ‘reason-possession’ without reference
to each other and to other concepts. In other words, we grasp them by
getting a grip on the network of the concepts to which they belong. Their
philosophical elucidation would require the identification of their con-
nections with other concepts. If the network (circle) is sufficiently large
and informative (as it is the case here with the involvement of such con-
cepts as the ‘basing relation,’ ‘propositional and doxastic justification,’
etc.), the charge of conceptual circularity would lose its bite.
Another point that is worth highlighting is that (T) is consistent with
the propositionalist view about reasons (as argued in Section 1.1) that
takes reasons and evidence to be propositions rather than beliefs in those
propositions. If I am asked why I believe that it has rained, I simply say
that because (r) <the streets are wet> rather than because <I believe that
the streets are wet>. This is compatible with what (T) says. The justify-
ing reason for my belief that it has rained is, according to (T), the reason
I possess, namely, (r) <the streets are wet> rather than my belief that r.
Of course, my reason must be available to me if I am to possess it (the
stimulus condition). But, on its own, my awareness of r, or my belief that
r, cannot function as my reason unless, as was argued, I also satisfy the
treating requirement. According to (T), my awareness of r plays only
an enabling role for me in order to possess it as (or, as Tim Williamson
(2000, 179) puts it, in order for it to ‘provide’ me with) a reason for
holding the relevant belief. So, by taking the (possessed) reason (r) itself
to be the sole player of the justifying role, while recognizing the essential
contribution of one’s attitude towards r (as the stimulus) in enabling one
to possess that reason, (T) seems to be able to do justice to the intuitions
behind both the propositionalist and the psychological approaches to the
ontology of reasons. Earlier, I hinted about how our account of reason-
possession connects with the bigger picture of the structure of epistemic
justification. In order to provide the background for the next two chap-
ters, the following brief remarks are in order.
When a subject comes to possess a reason r (in accordance with (T))
for believing a proposition p, this, in turn, grounds a further epistemic
dispositional property, namely, ‘having propositional justification for
believing that p.’ Going back to the fish example, when S1 comes to pos-
sess (r) <the fish contains salmonella> as a reason for believing that (p)
<it is not safe to eat the fish>, he comes to have a further epistemic prop-
erty (having propositional justification for believing that p) that S2 lacks.
This epistemic difference between S1 and S2 would then become con-
spicuous if they both ‘decide’ to believe that p. We would be inclined to
give S1 credit for his epistemic achievement but criticize S2 for forming a
belief without having any evidence or reason to support it. It thus seems
that what was at first a real but potential epistemic difference between
S1 and S2 (with respect to the epistemic status of their potential beliefs
that p) fully manifests itself in our epistemic assessment of their cognitive
behavior when they form the belief in question. S1’s belief, but not S2’s, is
regarded as doxastically justified.
We may redescribe the situation by saying that, prior to forming their
beliefs, S1 had an (epistemic) dispositional property (namely, having
propositional justification) that S2 lacked (because she did not possess
r as evidence). This dispositional property then fully manifests itself as
doxastic justification when S1 forms the relevant belief. So the idea is that
the best way to understand how propositional and doxastic justification
relate to one another is by seeing them in terms of a(n) (epistemic) dis-
positional property and its manifestation, respectively, with the stimulus
condition consisting of the subject’s believing the relevant proposition. It
is, however, in virtue of possessing r (as a reason) that S1 comes to have
the epistemic dispositional property (having propositional justification).
Possessed r thus functions as the way a categorical basis functions for the
physical disposition it grounds (more on this in the next chapter). Two
things follow from the preceding observations. First, the treating require-
ment is a fundamental component of reason-possession (which is what is
expressed by (T)) with the reason-possession itself being understood as
what grounds a further epistemic (dispositional) property, namely, ‘hav-
ing propositional justification.’ When the subject forms the relevant belief
for the reason she possesses, that dispositional property is manifested
as the subject’s being doxastically justified. Second, given that, on our
account, it is the subject’s possessing a reason that grounds the disposi-
tional property of having propositional justification, reasons are more
fundamental than justification since they are what ground it. The next
chapter is intended to argue for these claims.
To conclude, after some introductory remarks about the ontology and
typology of reasons, we identified the notion of substantive rationality in
terms of correctly responding to reasons. It was noted, however, that only
possessed reasons can provide justification for beliefs, which prompted
us to identify the conditions that have to be satisfied if a subject is to
possess a reason (r) for believing a proposition (p). It was argued that for
that to be the case r must not only be available to the subject, the subject
must also ‘treat’ r as a reason for believing that p. This, in turn, raised the
question of what it is to treat r as a reason or, to put it differently, to be
in a treating-state vis-à-vis r and p. In response, a dispositional analysis
of reason-possession was suggested, which construed it as the manifesta-
tion of an epistemic disposition, grounded in a treating-state, when the
relevant reason is made available to the subject. It was further suggested
that the possession of r by the subject, in turn, grounds a further epis-
temic dispositional property, namely, ‘having propositional justification’
to believe that p. This dispositional property then fully manifests itself as
doxastic justification when the subject forms the relevant belief. But how
are we to understand the relationship between propositional and doxas-
tic justification and the role played by the reasons that are possessed by
the subject in providing such justification? These questions will be con-
sidered in the next chapter.
Notes
1. See, for example, Alvarez (2010).
2. Explanatory reasons explain actions and attitudes, and they come in dif-
ferent varieties. Some explanatory reasons are causal as when we say that
extreme cold weather was the reason why pipes burst last night. Some are
teleological reasons as when we say avoiding bankruptcy is the reason why
the company has decided to lay off some of its workforce. On some accounts
of reasons, all reasons are explanations. However, while motivating and
explanatory reasons explain non-normative facts, normative reasons explain
normative or evaluative facts, that is, ‘why A ought to ϕ’ and ‘why A’s ϕ-ing
would be good in some respects,’ respectively.
3. See, for example, Brunero (2018) for a helpful overview.
4. See, for example, Parfit (2011), Scanlon (1998) and Dancy (2000).
5. See, for example, Schroeder (2008, 2011) and Comesana and McGrath
(2014).
6. Schroeder (2008). See also Comesana and McGrath (2014).
7. Dancy (2000) calls this the ‘normative constraint.’
8. See, for example, Hornsby (2008), Hyman (2011) and Alvarez (2018b).
9. See, for example, Sing (2019).
10. For the time being, I use ‘rationality’ and ‘justification’ interchangeably. I
return to the question of whether the two are the same in Chapter 6.
11. See, for example, Schroeder (2011) for an account in terms of ‘presentational
mental states’ which include beliefs and experiences.
12. See, for example, Scanlon (1998), Schlosser (2012), Sylvan (2015) and Lord
(2018).
13. Sylvan (2015, 2016) and Sylvan and Sosa (2018).
14. I have said that we do not, for our current purposes, need to identify what
sort of attitude the treating-states involve. This raises the question of how to
explain the dispositions they ground. So far, I have relied on our intuitions in
cases where being in a treating-state makes a difference to whether a subject
possesses a particular reason. Shortly, I shall present some methodological
remarks that are meant to address this question. The idea is that an illuminat-
ing explanation of such dispositions need not involve a non-circular analysis
of their nature. Rather, a more realistic model of philosophical analysis is
one that involves the elucidations of concepts rather than their reductive
dismantling.
15. As it stands, (T) might have some puzzling implications in so far as it helps
itself to the notion of ‘disposition to possess a reason.’ The thought is that
one can have a disposition to possess a reason as a reason to believe p with-
out in fact yet possessing that reason as a reason to believe p. It is quite pos-
sible that there are weak-willed people who have strong reasons for holding
a belief and yet fail to be motivated by them. So a weaker version of (T) that
recognizes this fact would be more plausible. This is actually the motivation
behind Sylvan’s (2015) appeal to the notion of ‘being attracted to treat R like
an objective reason’ in his account (C). Accordingly, ‘dispositional posses-
sion’ maybe a more accurate description of what (T) entails. However, while
acknowledging this point, for ease of expression (too many occurrences of
‘disposition’ in one sentence), I am going to leave (T) as it is though admon-
ishing the reader to bear this point in mind.
16. It is important to distinguish between the ground of a disposition and the dis-
position itself as when we say, for example, that salt’s disposition to dissolve
is grounded in its molecular structure. Likewise, being in a treating-state,
with respect to a reason r and a proposition p, grounds the subject’s disposi-
tion to possess r as evidence or reason to believe that p. It is the treating-
state, not the disposition it grounds, that reflects the fact that the subject
appreciates the force of his reason. So my account is not vulnerable to the
objection that was raised against Sylvan’s proposal.
17. Since the manifestation of a disposition involves a process running from a
stimulus to a response, it is always possible that the response comes about
without that particular disposition being manifested (this is generally known
as the problem of the deviant causal chains). Thus, a subject might be in two
treating-states with respect to a reason (r) and two distinct propositions p
and q. When she is exposed to r, she comes, by (T), to possess r as evidence
or reason. But which proposition r is a reason for depends on which disposi-
tion it is that is manifested. She would possess r as a reason for believing that
p, rather than q, if her possession of r is the manifestation of the disposition
that is grounded in the treating-state involving r and p (rather than q). Chap-
ter 3 will expand on these points.
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Press.
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dock and F. Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge,
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in China 6, 3: 358–368.
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31–56.
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Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4: 215–242, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Press.
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ety (Supplementary Volume), 71: 99–129.
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Elle tourne quelques feuillets, fait semblant elle aussi de
s’absorber dans leur lecture. Qu’en pense-t-elle ? D’ailleurs il affecte
de s’en désintéresser ; mais il l’observe à la dérobée. Elle parcourt
— trop vite au gré de Vaneau, — des strophes, lui rend son carnet
en disant :
— C’est joli. C’est plein de sentiment.
Ah ! le sentiment ! C’est la spécialité, pourrait-on dire, de Vaneau,
tant il pense à l’amour, — au clair de lune, — de quelque jeune fille
romantique vêtue de blanc et blonde. Est-ce qu’enfin il l’aurait
trouvée en cette jeune fille brune ? Il insinue :
— Je vais passer trois jours chez mes parents, dans une petite
ville assez grande pour trois mille habitants. Je veux faire à Paris
mon chemin dans la littérature. Vous y reverrai-je ? Puis-je vous
écrire ? Voulez-vous me donner votre nom, votre adresse ?
Il ajoute :
— Je travaille chez un avoué comme troisième clerc. Tenez, voici
un crayon, du papier…
Elle semble hésiter. Vaneau maintenant est persuadé que ce
n’est que pour la forme. Enfin elle s’exécute avec une jolie moue.
Elle s’appelle Lucie Norvins. Elle rentrera vers le milieu de la
semaine prochaine à Paris où elle habite rue Pavée.
— C’est dans le quartier du Temple, vous savez ?
— Oui… oui ! fait Vaneau qui se souvient de ses premières
errances, par des soirs de brume et de vent, dans ces rues étroites.
Il fait jour. De n’avoir pas dormi Vaneau a mal à la tête, mais
qu’est-ce que cela peut lui faire ? Il songe seulement que chaque
tour de roue le rapproche de Cravant. Elle est là tout près de lui. Il la
voit, lui parle. Tout à l’heure elle s’en ira ; la reverra-t-il jamais ? S’il
pouvait lui dire tout ce qu’il pense ! Mais les mots ne viendraient
pas ; il faudrait faire de grands gestes, peut-être se jeter à genoux
sur ces petites lattes toujours sales.
D’ailleurs la blonde s’agite, se réveille en se frottant les yeux. A-t-
elle vraiment dormi ? N’a-t-elle pas entendu ? Vaneau s’en moque.
— Où sommes-nous donc, Lucie ? demande-t-elle.
Puis elle fait l’étonnée en apercevant Vaneau dans leur
compartiment.
— Nous ne sommes pas loin de Cravant, mademoiselle ! répond-
il à la place de Lucie.
— Oh ! vous pouvez dire « madame » ! minaude-t-elle.
— Une amie, sans doute ? songe Vaneau.
Elles descendent. Il s’accoude à la portière refermée. Elles
passent sur l’autre quai.
Il voudrait voir le visage de Lucie se décolorer soudain, qu’elle
tirât son mouchoir, sinon pour s’essuyer les yeux qu’elle aurait pleins
de larmes, du moins pour l’agiter longtemps. Il lui écrira. Mais lui
répondra-t-elle ?
Deux coups de sifflet, Vaneau va partir. Il part.
Et voici qu’elle se met à sourire parce qu’un homme d’équipe,
roulant une brouette, lui dit :
— Attention, la jolie demoiselle !
IV
Est-ce pour fêter le retour de Vaneau dans sa ville natale que les
cloches sonnent si joyeusement ? Transporté hors du temps et de
l’espace par cette nuit de commencement d’amour, il lui faut
retrouver les mêmes rues qui lui paraissent beaucoup moins larges
encore avec leurs pavés frustes. Il passe le front haut en Parisien
qui sait ce que sont les grands boulevards, en jeune homme qui n’en
est plus à sa première aventure. Il ne doute plus de rien. Avec Lucie,
comme tout lui sera facile !
Il n’a pas encore quitté son pardessus qu’il aurait dû déjà
répondre à beaucoup de questions. Son père et sa mère voudraient
que la vie lui fût moins dure qu’elle ne l’a été pour eux.
— Est-ce que tu es content là-bas ? Tu travailles peut-être trop ?
Il ne faut pas te fatiguer. Est-ce qu’ils te donnent à manger à ta
suffisance ? Sinon il faudrait nous l’écrire. Et ton linge, c’est toujours
Jeanne qui s’en occupe ? Il vaudrait peut-être mieux que tu nous
l’envoies ici, une fois par semaine, comme fait le Jean des Bide. Ça
ne coûte pas cher ; et puis cet argent-là se retrouve parce qu’à Paris
les blanchisseuses brûlent tout. Est-ce que tu as assez d’argent ? Je
crois que tu peux te retourner tout de même avec vingt francs que
nous t’envoyons par mois.
Il ne répond que du bout des lèvres. Il voudrait être seul, pour
écrire à Lucie. Mais c’est jour de grand nettoyage dans toutes les
maisons comme si c’en était fini de la poussière que l’on fait en
remuant les cendres dans la cheminée, de la boue et de la neige
que l’on rapportait sur ses vêtements. La matinée n’y suffit pas.
Après le déjeuner Vaneau s’en va dans les bois où personne ne
le dérangera, muni d’une enveloppe et de quelques feuilles de
papier à lettres.
Quelle après-midi comme il n’y en a point à Paris ! Ces
bourgeons, ces premières feuilles, ce soleil ! La sève du monde
circule jusqu’au bout des branchettes les plus minces. Au pied d’un
jeune chêne il s’assoit, et tout de suite il écrit sans chercher les
mots, tant ils se répandent comme la sève de son âme.
Sa lettre finie il embrasse d’un seul regard les coins, l’horizon
familiers. Un étang luit dans un pré. Une ferme isolée avec ses
volets verts fermés entre un jardin et un pigeonnier, au bord d’un
chemin rouge de bruyères. Deux toits de tuiles sombres derrière des
cimes d’arbres claires. Des rochers aigus comme des cornes,
comme des dents prêtes à mordre. Des routes âpres, tortueuses,
balayées en toute saison par le vent qui ne s’égare jamais. De vieux
souvenirs arrivent de loin. Retours de vacances qui sentent la fumée
des pipes et des cigarettes dans les gares et, tout le long du
parcours, la fumée de la locomotive ; promenades du jeudi dans les
sentiers boueux ou gelés, quand on se précipite sur les haies pour
s’y disputer les branches les plus chargées de prunelles aigres, nuits
d’été dans les dortoirs où il fait si chaud que l’on boit l’eau tiède des
cuvettes… Mais ils s’en vont vite et peut-être pour toujours, comme
chassés par lui qui ne veut plus penser qu’à Lucie. Elle sera son
Elvire. Un peu plus loin à l’horizon, derrière un mamelon bleuâtre au
sommet duquel se profilait la silhouette d’une chapelle, un grand lac
sur les bords duquel aurait pu rêver Lamartine s’étendait entouré de
joncs, de rochers, de genêts, de sapins et de bouleaux. Dès le retour
de l’automne les brumes du ciel doublaient son visage mélancolique,
et l’on aurait pu longer ses rives incertaines en songeant à des
amours à jamais irréalisables. Sur la mousse jaunie, au pied d’un
arbre dont les feuilles partent l’une après l’autre, une jeune fille à qui
la vie eût pesé serait venue s’asseoir, attendant que sur la route un
nuage de poussière lui annonçât l’approche du héros désiré. Elle
joindrait les mains. Elle, c’était Lucie. Et Vaneau se magnifiant lui-
même s’imaginait traversant des contrées au galop d’un coursier
plus rapide que le vent.
Il se lève. Il n’est plus l’enfant dont l’âme, lors des départs pour le
collège, se déchirait comme une étoffe trop mince, le jeune homme
qui marchait le front baissé, conscient de sa solitude. Il est depuis
cette nuit plus riche d’amour que le plus fortuné des hommes. Il n’est
plus seul au monde. Il a cherché longtemps. Bien des fois il a
désespéré. Enfin il l’a trouvée.
Il l’a trouvée ? Pas encore. Il la crut à jamais perdue pour lui

lorsque, le surlendemain de son retour à Paris, il reçut cette lettre :
Cher monsieur Louis,
Excusez je vous prie si je ne vous ai pas répondu plus tôt

mais cela m’a été impossible je vous adresse toutes mes
félicitations pour votre lettre elle est parfaite de lyrisme et de
poésie surtout pour une rencontre en chemin de fer vous vous
emballez facilement je le vois moi je dirai tout simplement que
vous ne m’avez pas déplu ne vous piquez pas surtout mais
quant au moral si je dois en juger par votre lettre vous avouerez
qu’il n’est pas brillant sous les rapports de la timidité vous êtes
un peu trop positif pour un poète et légèrement prétentieux pour
vous figurer qu’à la première figure que je vois je vais en tomber
amoureuse oh ! que non ! je m’emballe difficilement je vous
l’avoue il faut pour me séduire un tout autre langage que celui
que vous employez excusez ma lettre si elle est un peu trop
sévère c’est pour vous apprendre à me connaître.
Recevez mes meilleurs sentiments.
« Diable ! se dit Vaneau, je suis allé trop loin, et j’ai fait fausse
route, et j’ai forcé la note. J’ai voulu fanfaronner de loin, moi qui
n’oserais pas l’effleurer du bout des doigts. J’y gagne qu’elle me
prenne pour une espèce de Don Juan qui n’en est plus à sa
première conquête et se croit irrésistible. Hélas ! Mais expliquons-
nous vite. »
En même temps il ne pouvait s’empêcher de juger l’écriture et le
style de Lucie. Hum ! Il ne voyait plus en elle la jeune fille distinguée
qu’il avait cru trouver : ses doigts ne devaient pas être familiers avec
le porte-plume. Bah ! Il suffisait à Vaneau qu’elle fût jolie.
Il avait plus d’un tour dans son sac. Le résultat ne se fit pas
attendre. Deux jours après il recevait de Lucie une autre lettre :
Monsieur Louis très-cher,
Je vois avec plaisir que votre style a changé et j’ose vous le

dire je préfère de beaucoup celui-ci à l’autre précédent vous
dites que ma lettre vous a fait l’effet d’une douche un peu froide
dame ! vous ne vouliez pas je suppose que je vous saute au
cou comme vous me le demandez je vous envoie ma photo
peut-être vous rappellera-t-elle l’original vous qui me trouviez le
genre espagnol cette photo ne fera que confirmer votre opinion
et en échange m’enverrez-vous la vôtre je serai heureuse de
posséder votre image quant au mot positif qui vous choque je
m’en aperçois je vais vous l’expliquer quoique cela soit bien
inutile car vous l’avez compris, je ne pouvais pas aller me jeter
dans vos bras surtout après une seule entrevue voilà ce qui
vous explique ce mot positif car vous me dites que vous êtes
épris d’idéal et votre première lettre n’était guère idéale au point
de vue de l’amour éthéré quant à vos vers ils sont charmants et
j’ose vous dire que j’adore la poésie surtout dans le genre de
celle-là mes compliments ils sont exquis et je serai bien
heureuse de les relire encore enfin monsieur l’accusé mon
tribunal vous a entendu et ma bouche de juge vous absout.
Recevez mes amitiés sincères.
Il y avait un mieux sensible. « J’ai réparé ma maladresse ! »

pensa Vaneau. Il fut envahi par une joie folle. Son Elvire était
retrouvée. Quel dommage qu’ils fussent séparés par plus de
cinquante lieues ! Et les lettres succédèrent aux lettres, lui la
pressant de revenir, elle faisant la sourde oreille : Je ne sais pas au
juste quand je rentrerai à Paris car comme je ne m’ennuie pas ici j’ai
prolongé mes vacances de huit jours. « Quelle idée, soupirait
Vaneau, de prendre ses vacances à cette époque de l’année ! Il est
vrai que c’est ce qui m’a valu de la rencontrer. » Ce sera sans doute
la semaine prochaine en tout cas je vous écrirai le jour de mon
départ en attendant vous pouvez continuer de m’écrire ici comme je
vais être heureuse de vous revoir car j’espère qu’étant à Paris tous
les deux nous nous verrons. « Voyons ! A quoi pense-t-elle ? se
demandait Vaneau. Mais évidemment ! » Dites, voulez-vous me faire
un plaisir allez donc chez Chamberlin vous faire photographier et
vous m’enverrez votre photo avant que je m’en aille dites faites-moi
ce plaisir je vous ai bien donné la mienne moi et je voudrais du
moins si je ne vous vois pas avoir votre photo c’est un désir bien
naturel je suppose. Certes et Vaneau en était infiniment ému ; mais il
n’osait pas écrire à Lucie que pour lui c’eût été une trop forte
dépense : à son tour de faire la sourde oreille.
Quatre jours après : Vous me demandez quand je rentre à Paris
cela ne va pas tarder du moins je le pense aujourd’hui je vais à
Saint-Germain-des-Champs à côté de Chastellux chez une jeune
fille qui m’a invitée à passer la journée du Dimanche avec elle cher
Louis, vous avez l’air de m’attendre avec impatience je ne vous ai
pas encore dit quel était mon métier je suis fleuriste et plumassière
pour la mode vous voilà renseigné. « Tant pis ! se dit Vaneau. Mais
cela m’est bien égal ! J’admire néanmoins qu’elle me jette cela au
tournant d’une phrase comme un renseignement d’importance nulle.
Au fond elle doit s’imaginer que je suis riche, fils de bourgeois
cossus d’une petite ville. Clerc d’avoué, ce doit être à ses yeux une
belle position. Peut-être même songe-t-elle au mariage ; c’est à
cause de quoi elle juge bon de me prévenir sans avoir l’air d’y
toucher qu’elle n’est qu’une ouvrière, afin que nous n’allions pas plus
loin si j’estime que nos situations sociales ne cadrent pas. Elle m’a
rappelé au respect des convenances. Je me l’étais imaginée d’après
mes rêves sensible au charme de la poésie et prête à se donner tout
de suite à qui lui lirait un sonnet d’amour : cette deuxième illusion
elle me l’a fait perdre, mais elle m’affirme qu’elle aime les vers, en
tout cas les miens. Jamais Jeanne ne m’en a dit autant. » J’espère
que vous attendrez patiemment mon retour à Paris sinon écrivez-
moi le comme cela je n’y penserai plus puisque vous en ferez autant
donc écrivez-moi si je puis compter sur votre foi ou sur votre amour.
« Mais, sur les deux ! » J’attends une lettre lundi matin car je serai
rentrée de Saint-Germain en attendant le bonheur de vous voir
recevez de celle qui vous est fidèle de loin le meilleur baiser qu’elle
puisse vous donner en ce moment. Qu’aurait pu faire Vaneau, sinon
d’être ravi au septième ciel ? A distance il suivait avec une émotion
infinie la mystérieuse croissance d’un sentiment dont il se flattait
d’avoir jeté le germe dans une âme de jeune fille. Pour la première
fois il recevait un baiser d’amour. Par la poste sans doute, mais que
lui importait la réalité ! Lucie lui écrivait encore : Quelles bonnes
promenades nous ferons lorsque nous serons réunis ! Et pourtant il
semblait bien qu’elle prît plaisir à retarder l’instant de la réunion. Des
soirs passèrent et des dimanches où il erra de nouveau, allant et
venant d’un bout à l’autre de la rue Pavée : peut-être était-elle
rentrée sans avoir eu le temps de le prévenir ? Mais en vain il levait
les yeux : dans quelle maison et à quel étage habitait-elle ? Deux
jours après c’était une autre lettre : Comme vous avez peu de
patience vraiment vous ne pensez qu’à une chose c’est mon retour à
Paris croyez bien que moi aussi j’y pense allons soyez content je
serai sans doute la semaine prochaine à Paris je pense partir cette
semaine patientez encore quelques jours seulement. Mais quelques
jours ajoutés à quelques autres formèrent un mois. Vaneau
commençait à se demander : « Avec ses baisers, ses promenades,
ne se moquerait-elle pas de moi ? Ne ferais-je pas mieux de rompre
dès maintenant ? »
Il allait se replier sur lui-même pour mieux goûter la tristesse de
cette liaison d’une nuit, quand il reçut un samedi matin une courte
lettre :
Deux mots seulement pour vous dire que si vous pouvez sortir
dimanche après-midi je serai libre venez demain à deux heures rue
Pavée deux heures précises je serai à la fenêtre au no 20 je
descendrai quand je vous verrai je serai au premier étage.
V
Il était un peu plus de midi. Vaneau mettait les bouchées

doubles. On le servait d’ailleurs à souhait car le dimanche les clients
n’abondent point dans les petits restaurants du quartier Saint-
Georges. Les habitués restent chez eux, aux quatre coins de Paris,
plusieurs dans la banlieue qu’ils prennent pour de la campagne
parce qu’ils y trouvent un peu moins de poussière que Chaussée
d’Antin et quelques arbres de plus qu’au square de la Trinité.
Vaneau tranquille avait toute une table pour lui seul. Il était sorti dès
neuf heures du matin pour respirer dans les rues désencombrées
sur les quais où circulait la fraîcheur du mois de mai. Jeanne avait
dû partir vers onze heures avec son père : Il s’agissait d’une maison
à louer dans une forêt des environs de Paris où les promeneurs
affluaient durant toute la belle saison. Il y aurait de beaux bénéfices
à réaliser pour qui voudrait y vendre le dimanche de la viande froide,
de la charcuterie, du pain, du vin, de la bière.
Il ne cessait point de regarder l’horloge suspendue au-dessus du
comptoir. Il partit, ne fit qu’un saut des boulevards aux Halles, suivit
la rue Rambuteau et ne se sentit rassuré que lorsqu’il se vit à
l’entrée de la rue des Francs-Bourgeois. Il tira sa montre : il allait
être une heure et quart !
— Je n’en ferai jamais d’autres ! songea-t-il. Ce n’est pas moi qui
arriverai en retard à un rendez-vous.
Il marcha lentement. Mais ce trajet qui lorsqu’il avait peur d’être
en retard lui paraissait interminable, s’était prodigieusement
raccourci. En très peu de minutes il fut au coin de la rue Pavée. Par
acquit de conscience il leva les yeux vers la fenêtre du premier
étage où Lucie lui avait dit qu’elle se tiendrait. Si elle avait été elle
aussi en avance ? Mais non. Il erra en regardant sa montre. Les
aiguilles n’avançaient plus. Tout à l’heure elles avaient marché trop
vite : maintenant elles se reposaient. A deux heures précises on le
revit rue Pavée. Il tressaillit. Cette fois elle était à la fenêtre,
accoudée à la barre d’appui son chapeau déjà mis. Elle lui fit signe
de continuer vers la rue Saint-Antoine. Elle le rejoignit un peu
essoufflée.
— Dieu ! s’écria-t-elle, que je suis étourdie ! J’ai oublié mon porte-
monnaie. Je retourne.
Vaneau eut un geste dédaigneux qui signifiait :
— De quoi vous occupez-vous jeune fille de peu de foi ?
Il lui serra une de ses mains qu’elle avait moite. Il dit :
— Je ne comptais plus sur vous. Mais je n’ai pas cessé d’y
penser. J’ai eu bien des heures d’insomnie.
Elle était plus jolie encore que pendant cette nuit mémorable.
C’est aujourd’hui que Vaneau s’il l’avait pu se serait jeté à ses
genoux tant elle était son vivant idéal. Elle lui répondit en riant :
— Vous êtes exigeant. D’abord je suis restée à Voutenay plus
longtemps que je ne pensais, et depuis mon retour je n’ai pas pu
m’échapper une minute. Ma belle-mère…
Vaneau l’interrogea du regard.
— Oui, celle que vous avez vue avec moi. Mon père s’est
remarié il y a cinq ans. Elle me surveille. Elle n’a guère qu’une
trentaine d’années ; elle est jalouse de moi parce que quand nous
sommes ensemble c’est toujours moi que l’on regarde. J’ai dû
attendre, pour vous écrire. Allons ! Plaignez-vous encore ! C’est que
vous me disiez de très jolies choses dans vos lettres !
Ils allaient, jeunes, insouciants, heureux. Il écoutait le frou-frou de
sa jupe. Les pointes de ses bottines avaient l’air de jouer à cache-
cache. Elles se couvraient peu à peu de poussière. Pour la première
fois de sa vie Vaneau se promenait avec une jeune fille dont il était
profondément amoureux.
Dans les rues, de Montmartre à Montrouge, d’Auteuil à
Ménilmontant, d’autres jeunes gens par ce dimanche de soleil et de
liberté s’en allaient. Mais la chaleur devenait anormale. Lucie signala
de gros nuages.
Ils arrivèrent sur les quais. Les platanes font ce qu’ils peuvent
pour être des arbres comme les autres : ils poussent la bonne
volonté jusqu’à avoir des feuilles. La Seine est un fleuve important à
cause de tous les petits bateaux qu’elle fait vivre et des boîtes en
bon alignement où l’on peut acheter beaucoup de livres pour pas
cher. Ils entrèrent dans un petit café. Assis à côté d’elle il lui prit la
main. Puis le patron tournant le dos, Vaneau brusquement se
pencha vers Lucie et l’embrassa.
— C’est du joli ! dit-elle. N’y revenez pas, ou vous aurez affaire à
moi !
— Mais c’est ce que je demande ! riposta-t-il.
Il essayait de plaisanter. Mais il n’avait pas l’habitude de dire aux
jeunes filles les mots qui les font éclater de rire. Il sentait qu’il
n’aurait pas osé prononcer une seule des belles phrases dans
lesquelles se résume toute une vie sentimentale. Il aurait eu peur
que pour le coup Lucie n’éclatât de rire. Il avait fallu pour qu’il se
décidât à ce geste si simple qu’il fît appel à tout son courage. Jamais
il ne pourrait aller plus loin.
La bière était fraîche. Elle moussait délicieusement. Chaque fois
qu’elle en buvait Lucie gardait un instant au coin des lèvres comme
un peu de moustache.
Le Luxembourg leur offrit ses allées ombreuses, ses terrasses
ensoleillées. Il en était à se représenter le Quartier Latin comme un
centre où ne fréquentent que des artistes. Certains dimanches il y
avait rencontré des jeunes gens qui, pipe aux lèvres, gourdin au
poing, drapés dans une cape, abritaient sous de longs cheveux et
des feutres pointus tout leur génie. Nul doute qu’ils ne fussent des
privilégiés à qui de vieux parents du fond des provinces envoient
chaque mois l’argent nécessaire pour qu’ils aient le temps de ne
penser qu’à la poésie.
Elle lui raconta qu’elle s’était ennuyée là-bas quinze jours durant.
Il avait plu. Le ciel restait tout gris. Elle avait hâte de rentrer à Paris.
Elle répétait comme si d’autres eussent été moins fortunés que
Vaneau consciente de la beauté de son visage :
— Vous en avez de la chance !
Certes, oui ! Jamais il n’eût rêvé cette aventure. Mais qu’il
regrettait de n’avoir pas à ce moment été près d’elle ! Ensemble ils
seraient allés sur des routes mornes ; ils se seraient assis dans un
champ à l’abri derrière une haie. Il lui aurait récité des vers
mélancoliques. Elle soudain pâmée se serait appuyée sur sa
poitrine, et dans ses yeux il aurait vu se penchant sur elle courir les
nuages grisâtres d’un ciel romantique.
La chaleur augmentait encore. Les nuages se rassemblaient.
Lucie cette fois affirma :
— Il va faire de l’orage !
Ils écoutèrent une musique militaire. En même temps que les
bugles et les saxophones Lucie fredonnait l’air de valse.
A l’heure de l’apéritif il la mena par hasard à la taverne du
Panthéon presque déserte, presque silencieuse. On y vivait un peu
dans l’autrefois grâce au plafond où des peintures essayaient de
résumer la vie des « artistes » d’hier : ceintures rouges, pantalons
bouffants, chacun sa grisette ! On s’y souvenait de Tholomyès et de
Blachevelle, surtout de Schaunard, Colline et Rodolphe de la Vie de
bohème, des jeunes filles aux cheveux blonds serrés au-dessus de
la nuque par un ruban bleu, de la délicieuse Musette que Vaneau
s’imaginait à la ressemblance de Lucie.
Certains dimanches d’hiver c’était là qu’il avait souffert à voir tant
de jolies femmes dont pas une ne faisait attention à lui. Aujourd’hui
lui-même était assis à côté de Lucie qui regardait dehors inquiète. Il
faisait sombre, presque nuit. Tout à coup la lumière jaillit des
ampoules dissimulées dans les feuillages artificiels des chapiteaux.
De larges gouttes de pluie s’écrasèrent sur le boulevard en même
temps qu’au-dessus de son absinthe Vaneau arrosait les deux
traditionnels morceaux de sucre.
— Qu’est-ce que je vous avais dit ! s’écria Lucie.
Ennuyée qu’il fît de l’orage elle était heureuse d’avoir deviné
juste.
— Ce ne sera rien ! dit Vaneau. Dans cinq minutes il fera soleil.
En attendant, la pluie tombait à torrents. Irrités d’être déchirés
par les éclairs les nuages tantôt grondaient sourdement, tantôt
laissaient dans toute sa force éclater leur colère. En un clin d’œil la
taverne fut remplie d’hommes qui n’avaient que des cannes, de
femmes qui n’avaient que des ombrelles. Qui peut prévoir qu’il fera
de l’orage un troisième dimanche de mai ? D’abord Lucie s’amusa
de ce sauve-qui-peut. Puis comme il pleuvait toujours elle s’énerva.
— Comment vais-je faire pour rentrer ? dit-elle. Je dois être à
sept heures à la maison. Je ne peux pas m’en aller à pied. Ils croient
que je suis chez mon amie Sidonie. Dire que j’ai été surprise par
l’orage ? Ils me répondront : « Mais tu n’avais qu’à demander de
l’argent à Sidonie pour prendre un fiacre ! »
Vaneau tressaillit. Était-ce un appel indirect à son porte-
monnaie ? Mieux valait ne rien répondre.
Les aiguilles de la petite horloge tournaient. La pluie tombait.
Lucie le regardait de travers avec une moue des lèvres comme pour
lui dire :
— Mais enfin décidez-vous donc !
Vaneau commençait à être inquiet. Est-ce que l’orage n’aurait
pas pu attendre ? Il allait l’apéritif payé lui rester deux francs. Et puis
jamais encore il n’avait pris de voiture. Seuls les riches pouvaient se
passer cette fantaisie. Lucie devait être riche, habituée aux fiacres.
Une angoisse l’étreignit. Il n’avait pas assez d’argent pour sortir avec
une de ces jeunes filles de Paris qui ne sont pas embarrassées pour
trouver des messieurs élégants qui sur les tables jettent des louis
comme lui pose une pièce de cinquante centimes.
A la fin Lucie fit mine de se lever pour partir, le front plissé. Il
souffrit d’une autre angoisse à songer que jamais plus il ne la
reverrait. Il se leva pour de bon, paya. Du seuil de la taverne il arrêta
tant bien que mal un cocher qui passait, ruisselant sous l’averse.
Tout de suite elle se rasséréna et dit très vite :
— Au coin de la rue Saint-Antoine et de la rue Pavée.
Vaneau assis tout près d’elle se souvint du fiacre où prennent
place Mme Bovary et Léon. Mais il n’avait pas l’assurance de Léon.
Il sentait Lucie contre lui. Quelquefois un cahot les jetait presque l’un
sur l’autre. Tout de suite il se relevait. L’idée de la « note à payer » lui
gâtait sa joie. Lucie était tout à fait heureuse.
— Quel dommage, dit-elle, que je sois obligée de rentrer ! On se
promènerait longtemps ainsi.
Vaneau frémissant se garda d’insister. D’un gentil mouvement
elle se pencha pour lui offrir ses lèvres. Vaneau oublia tout. La
voiture s’arrêta. Elle descendit en disant :
— Je vous écrirai pour vous donner rendez-vous.
Elle disparut. Il descendit à son tour, laissa au cocher les deux
francs qui lui restaient. Sous la pluie il marcha trois quarts d’heure
pour rentrer la bourse vide, l’âme pleine de joie.
VI
Ensuite la vie de Vaneau se composa de rendez-vous attendus

avec impatience et trop souvent manqués. Il ne pouvait pourtant pas
de six à sept heures du soir stationner devant l’entrée d’un immeuble
sur un trottoir fait pour faciliter la circulation. Il était obligé d’aller et
venir ; lorsqu’il faisait trop chaud et qu’il pouvait disposer de vingt
centimes il prenait sur le zinc d’un bar ou d’un marchand de vins une
mominette avec un morceau de glace qu’on lui offrait par-dessus le
marché, ou de l’eau fraîche qui coule d’un long robinet nickelé. Mais
c’était assez d’un moment de distraction pour qu’il ne vît pas sortir
Lucie. Elle se hâtait alors de rentrer. Elle ne devait pas aimer
attendre ne fût-ce qu’une demi-minute. Il n’oserait jamais lui dire :
— Quand vous ne me voyez pas je ne suis pas loin. Vous
n’attendriez pas longtemps, allez !
Lucie savait que c’est le rôle des hommes, jeunes, mûrs, ou
vieux. Ces soirs-là Vaneau se mourait d’incertitude : que pensait-elle
de lui ? La reverrait-il jamais ? Ne s’était-elle pas moquée en lui
donnant ce rendez-vous ? Comme il regrettait d’être rivé au travail
de neuf heures du matin à six heures du soir et de gagner seulement
cinquante francs par mois !
Mais pour qu’il reconquît sa joie il suffisait que le surlendemain,
qu’une semaine après il pût rester avec elle seulement un quart
d’heure.
Elle avait beau ne pas être la jeune fille qu’il avait cru d’abord : il
marchait à ses côtés comme un serviteur près de sa reine. Comme
on venait d’entrer dans la morte-saison elle était une semaine ici une
semaine là. Gros embarras pour Vaneau qui devait continuellement
apprendre à connaître des rues et des maisons à entrées parfois
trompeuses si différentes les unes des autres. Quelquefois encore
elle restait chez elle et ne sortait que pour aller livrer.
Il fallait que Vaneau se contentât de ces entrevues si courtes que
vraiment l’on ne trouve rien à se dire. Elle lui écrivait :
— J’ai à vous parler.
Et Vaneau ne doutait point qu’il ne s’agît cette fois d’un aveu
définitif. Il attendait avec fièvre six heures du soir. Elle souriait quand
elle le voyait mais n’avait rien d’important à lui dire. Il l’invitait à se
reposer, à prendre quelque chose dans de tout petits cafés où il
pouvait espérer qu’il n’y eût pas de garçon, donc pas de pourboire à
donner. Mais elle était presque toujours pressée de rentrer. Quand il
y avait une horloge elle la regardait souvent. Elle parlait de sa belle-
mère qui devait se douter de quelque chose, qui lui disait chaque
soir qu’elle rentrait un peu plus tard que de coutume :
— D’où est-ce que tu viens donc encore, Lucie ?
Elle ne voulait point que Vaneau l’accompagnât jusqu’à la rue
Pavée ; la belle-mère aurait pu brusquement apparaître, les voir
ensemble. Tout aurait été perdu.
Des phrases qu’il risquait sur ses aspirations, ses projets
littéraires demeuraient à peu près sans écho. Sans autre volonté
bien nette que celle d’écrire quelque chose, n’importe quoi, qui le
rehaussât aux yeux de Lucie, il parlait tour à tour de se mettre à un
drame en cinq actes et en vers, à une pièce d’ombres pour un
théâtre de Montmartre, même de composer des chansons,
élégiaques ou satiriques, pour des cabarets. Pour se faire connaître
il comptait même un peu sur elle. Elle était fière que son père fût en
relations avec quelques chansonniers et d’avoir avec lui ses entrées
libres le samedi soir au Concert de l’Époque, boulevard
Beaumarchais. En attendant il produisait sonnets sur sonnets qu’il
recopiait pour en faire hommage à Lucie. Peut-être ne cherchait-elle
même pas à trouver le temps de les lire. Il ne la pressait point
comme on peut le voir écrit dans des livres de devenir sa maîtresse
tant il tremblait à la seule pensée de toutes les brusques décisions
qu’il lui faudrait prendre. Il ne demandait qu’une chose : pouvoir
continuer ainsi des années à la voir, en se contentant de
l’embrasser.
Il croyait apprendre peu à peu quels étaient ses véritables
sentiments. Elle avait eu déjà des relations avec des jeunes gens.
Elle ne s’en cachait point. Elle s’en serait même vantée si elle n’eût
deviné que ce pouvait être douloureux pour lui.
Elle avait connu un sculpteur et un employé de grand magasin.
Une jeune fille quand elle n’est pas laide et qu’elle ne s’y refuse pas
a vite fait de nouer au restaurant à midi plus de relations qu’il n’en
est besoin ; dans la rue aussi livrée au hasard de toutes les
rencontres. Lucie n’était pas de celles qui disent non. Le sculpteur
était pauvre, naturellement. L’employé gagnait bien sa vie. Elle
n’avait connu l’un qu’après l’autre. A combien de mois, d’années de
distance, elle ne le disait pas. Elle était allée une fois pour n’y rester
que deux minutes dans l’atelier du sculpteur. Elle retrouvait
l’employé dans des bals qu’elle fréquentait avec sa belle-mère. Mais
celle-ci — par jalousie, disait Lucie, — était intervenue, avait mis le
holà.
Elle devait aimer tous les plaisirs de Paris, les soirées dans les
théâtres, les soupers après minuit, les promenades en voiture, sans
oublier les bals. Comment Vaneau eût-il pu lui offrir cela ? Elle lisait
beaucoup de feuilletons, n’aimait point les crudités de Zola. Son
père bijoutier en chambre allait tous les ans, au mois d’août, à la
mer. Elle l’y accompagnait. Cette année elle ferait pour Vaneau le
sacrifice de ce voyage. Elle lui paraissait douce, gentille, pas
exigeante, ne le poussant point à la dépense. Peut-être était-ce le
sculpteur qui l’y avait habituée ?
Certains soirs où il l’accompagnait elle était avec son amie

Sidonie. Pour de mystérieuses raisons de contraste parce que l’une
était blonde il fallait que l’autre fût brune. Lucie aurait pu naître dans
l’Espagne voluptueuse et chaude où les gitanes, sorties des fraîches
cavernes, dansent au rythme des castagnettes sèches et des
bourdonnantes guitares. Sidonie au contraire ne venait-elle pas des
pays où la brume fait paraître plus bleus et plus rêveurs les yeux des
jeunes filles, des pays où l’on fait de si jolies chansons sur les
bouleaux et les pigeons ? Comme Lucie pourtant elle était née à
Paris et vivait dans une chambre au dernier étage d’une maison rue
de Charenton. Elles allaient presque toujours ensemble d’un atelier
à l’autre et paraissaient unies par la plus franche amitié.
Cet été fut délicieux pour Vaneau. Plus rien ne comptait pour lui
que ses rendez-vous avec Lucie. C’était en pensant à elle qu’il
noircissait d’une plume distraite du papier timbré.
Si les soirées en semaine étaient trop courtes, ils eurent
quelques après-midi de dimanches depuis deux heures jusqu’à la
nuit. Nul orage ne vint les assombrir, les gâter comme la première.
Mais il faisait chaud. C’étaient de ces après-midi où l’on se demande
à quoi servent les arroseurs municipaux : aussitôt mouillé le pavé est
sec. Mais il faut que tout le monde vive, les arroseurs comme les
autres ; c’est à cause de quoi sans doute même les jours de pluie ils
se répandent par les rues avec leurs lances. On se demande à quoi
servent les hautes maisons à six étages : nulle part il n’y a d’ombre.
C’est à croire que Paris est le centre, non seulement de la France
mais de la terre et qu’il se trouve juste sous le soleil ! On se
demande ce que fait le vent. Tassés dans les squares, alignés le
long des boulevards, les arbres ne remuent pas plus leurs feuilles
que si elles étaient en zinc. Le vent doit être riche : il ne reste pas à
Paris l’été. Il doit aller passer la saison comme le père de Lucie au
bord de la mer. Ensemble ils s’assirent sur des bancs de squares,
sur des impériales d’omnibus. De nouveau ils allaient jeunes,
insouciants, heureux. De Paris elle connaissait tout. Une fois comme
aucune horloge n’était en vue elle dit :
— Il va être quatre heures.
— Où voyez-vous cela ? demanda Vaneau.
— Mais à ces camelots qui crient la Patrie.
Minces détails mais devant lesquels un provincial comme
Vaneau restait bouche bée. Elle connaissait aussi pour y être allée
avec son père beaucoup de restaurants fameux, de jour et de nuit.
Une autre fois pour très peu d’argent grâce au tramway ils
allèrent jusqu’aux Lilas. Vaneau s’imaginait un village où les
chaumières n’auraient été que des prétextes, où le lilas eût régné de
toute la puissance de son parfum. Mais il retrouva presque les
mêmes maisons, les mêmes rues qu’à Paris. Sur une place deux
manèges de chevaux de bois munis de criards instruments de
Barbarie tournaient peuplés de pâles jeunes gens, de filles avec des
fleurs qui n’étaient point du lilas, dans les cheveux. On respirait
surtout l’odeur des pommes de terre frites. N’importe Vaneau était
heureux, Lucie semblait plus joyeuse que jamais. C’était la
promenade que tous les amoureux ont rêvé de faire, que toutes les
romances ont chantée. Il y est question d’yeux bleus comme les
bleuets, de lèvres rouges comme les coquelicots que l’on voit au
milieu des blés jaunes. Sans doute il y avait d’autres endroits plus
charmants dans les environs de Paris où Ville-d’Avray, Meudon,
Sèvres, Clamart apparaissent comme au détour d’un couplet. C’est
là que se trouvent les bois, le fleuve avec ses guinguettes et ses
fritures. Mais y aller coûte trop cher. Et puis c’était si joli, ce nom : les
Lilas !
Dans l’arrière-salle d’un café désert à bonne distance des
manèges de chevaux de bois où l’on n’entendait que bourdonner
des mouches, ils s’assirent l’un en face de l’autre. La patronne, une
vieille femme à cheveux blancs, faisait si peu de bruit en marchant
qu’on eût dit qu’elle allait pieds nus ; elle les laissa quand elle eut
déposé sur la table une canette. Par les carreaux d’une porte qui
ouvrait sur une cour et sur un petit jardin, Vaneau voyait les feuilles
d’un grand arbre. Il se mit à penser aux arbres de son pays, dont les
racines sont rivées entre de la terre dure et de rochers plus durs
encore, aux soirs de mai où il respirait les parfums du lilas à l’heure
où les jeunes filles montent le soir à l’église pour le mois de Marie. Il
prononça quelques paroles : Lucie éclata de rire.
Il commença timidement par lui prendre la main. Puis il changea
de place pour être assis à côté d’elle. Tout à coup enhardi il se mit à
l’embrasser plusieurs fois de suite. Elle ne se défendait pas ; elle riait
d’un rire énervé. Ses cheveux se défaisaient. L’heure venue elle dut
se recoiffer tant bien que mal.
Quand ils partirent ce fut comme s’ils allaient au-devant de leur
destin ; du moins Vaneau le pressentait-il obscurément. Par des
ruelles chaudes ils s’en furent vers des champs pauvres d’herbe et
d’ombre. Dans la plaine on ne voyait pas un seul bois mais
beaucoup de rangées d’arbres, des cheminées d’usines ; on devinait
des trains aux fumées de leurs locomotives. A l’ombre d’un talus ils
s’étendirent. Elle dit :
— Maintenant, laissez-moi dormir.
Vaneau ne songea pas à lui désobéir.
Quand il fallut reprendre le tramway, quelque peu avant la
tombée du crépuscule, elle était moins gaie que tout à l’heure ; ce
devait être la faute de cette heure trouble, énervante. Vaneau était
satisfait. Il ne doutait plus que Lucie ne l’aimât vraiment.
Mais tous ses dimanches ne se ressemblaient pas. Il y en eut où

il fallut qu’il allât bon gré mal gré dans ces bois qui lui paraissaient
vides puisqu’il ne pouvait s’y promener avec Lucie. Mais comme on
lui payait son voyage il lui était impossible de toujours refuser. C’était
plutôt un parc coupé en rectangles par de nombreuses avenues qui
dans cent ans seront toutes bordées de cabanes à lapins, de toits à
poules et de villas. Déjà de-ci, de-là s’élevaient des bicoques en
planches qui commandaient des portions de terrain encloses dans
des treillages de fil de fer. Là des Parisiens passaient tous leurs
dimanches de printemps et d’été, en bras de chemise, à arracher
des souches, à bêcher, à semer. Ils prenaient l’apéritif sur des
guéridons de fortune et fumaient force pipes et cigarettes. Les
promeneurs le long des avenues ne se hâtaient pas. Ils n’avaient
qu’à se fier aux écriteaux munis de flèches indicatrices pour arriver
au restaurant du Pas-de-la-Mule où de onze heures du matin jusqu’à
dix heures du soir ce n’étaient que joyeuses chansons, que chocs de
verres et, parfois, quand la société n’était pas triée sur le volet, cris
et bris de vaisselle. Lavaud ne se gênait pas pour faire concurrence

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The Ethics of Belief and Beyond

The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.

ISBN: 978-0-367-50986-6 (hbk)

1 Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework 13

2 A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic

3 Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation 58

4 The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience 83

5 Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification 109

6 Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual

7 Higher-Order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure

8 The Nature of Inference 173

9 The Epistemic Value of Emotions 186

10 Motivational Internalism and Motivating Reasons 200

11 Self-Knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the

Epistemic reasons are meant to provide justification for beliefs. In this

1.1 The Ontology and Typology of Reasons: An Opinionated

1.1.1 Possessed Reasons and Rationality

Fish Smith is having fish for lunch. Unbeknownst to him, however,

1.2 The Treating Requirement: From Doxastic States

Possession What it is for agent A to possess reason r to ϕ provided

So the treating requirement obliges the agent to be in a position to

(C) S possesses r as a reason to ϕ iff (i) it appears to S that r, (ii) S is

where to treat r as an objective normative reason to ϕ is to be disposed

1.3 The Treating Requirement: From Available Reasons

(T) The state of treating r as a reason to believe p is the categori-

In other words, a treating-state functions as the categorical basis of an

Il l’a trouvée ? Pas encore. Il la crut à jamais perdue pour lui

Cher monsieur Louis,

Excusez je vous prie si je ne vous ai pas répondu plus tôt

Recevez mes meilleurs sentiments.

Monsieur Louis très-cher,

Je vois avec plaisir que votre style a changé et j’ose vous le

Recevez mes amitiés sincères.

Il y avait un mieux sensible. « J’ai réparé ma maladresse ! »

Il était un peu plus de midi. Vaneau mettait les bouchées

Ensuite la vie de Vaneau se composa de rendez-vous attendus

Certains soirs où il l’accompagnait elle était avec son amie

Mais tous ses dimanches ne se ressemblaient pas. Il y en eut où

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