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THE RISK OF SKILLED SCIENTIST RADICALIZATION
AND EMERGING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREATS
Copyright © 2017. IOS Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.
The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest
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The Risk of Skilled Scientist
Radicalization and Emerging
Biological Warfare Threats
Edited by
Maurizio Martellini
Secretary General, Landau Network Fondazione Volta, Como, Italy
and
Jason Rao
Advisory Chair, Health Security Partners, Washington DC, US
Amsterdam • Berlin • Washington, DC

Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on The Risk of Skilled Scientist
Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats
Como, Italy
29 November – 2 December 2016
© 2017 The authors and IOS Press.
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or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher.
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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
v
Preface
Maurizio MARTELLINI, Ph.D. a,1 and Jason RAO, Ph.D. b
a
Landau Network Fondazione Volta (Como, Italy)
b
Health Security Partners (Washington, DC, USA)
Introduction
The main objective of this Advanced Research Workshop titled “The Risk of Skilled
Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats” was to assess the
risk and ability for radical terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, to recruit highly-
skilled scientists. Indeed, over the past years, it has become increasingly clear that the
Islamic State is both willing and capable of online recruitment of Westerners to their
cause. Through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media, the Islamic State has been
able to attract recruits previously thought unlikely to espouse jihad.
This workshop was one-of-a-kind in that it brought together unique perspectives
from the social science community and the scientific technical community to discuss
the risks of the radicalization of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
skilled scientists.
Preface
Skilled scientists are not immune to the appeal of terrorist groups. Indeed, terrorist
groups not only consist of combatants but also consist of leaders, financiers, ideologues,
military trainers, and scientists, all of whom are part of a complex eco-system. The split
between al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) can be thought of as an outcome of a
community of jihadis made up of bourgeois and thugs. AQ promotes an inclusive ide-

ology among its members, avoiding sectarianism. It values meritocracy and rigorous
training (military and education). This translates into large scale sophisticated opera-
tions whose main objective is to target political, military, and economic targets. On the
other hand, the Islamic State has promoted a sectarian ideology and ‘equal opportunity’
among skilled and unskilled jihadis, which translates into indiscriminate attacks against
civilians and non-civilians alike. In assessing the risk of radicalization of highly-skilled
scientists, this is a key difference must be taken into account.
With respect to the potential radicalization of scientists outside of organized terror-

ist organizations, of particular concern is the issue of “lone wolves” (i.e. an individual
who prepares and commits violence alone, outside of any command structure and with-
out material assistance from any group).
In drawing on lessons learned from past cases, A.Q. Khan is an important example
of scientist radicalization. His motives were rooted in nationalism. However, he was
1
Corresponding author. Landau Network Fondazione Volta, Como, Italy; E-mail: maurizio.martellini@
fondazionealessandrovolta.it.
vi
not a frustrated young student, but rather an established scientist with familial, commu-
nity, and professional ties. Another example is Bruce Ivins, who was the alleged perpe-
trator of the Amerithrax attack against government and media officials post 9/11. Sci-
entists like A.Q. Khan and Bruce Ivins not only shed light on the challenges posed by
“lone wolf actors” but also highlight the potential consequences of a better executed
plan by an organized group.
If the objective is to undermine the Islamic State, then the physical and digital ca-
liphates must also be considered and combated simultaneously. Digital propaganda
facilitates a physical caliphate by attracting fighters to the Islamic State’s territory, and
the existence of a physical caliphate facilitates digital propaganda by allowing the Is-
lamic State (IS) to create and disseminate an organized narrative. While it is often mis-
taken that all IS propaganda is overwhelmingly violent and militaristic, much of their
produced visual media focuses on themes like governance, religion, commerce, regula-
tion, policing, and helping the poor. Through this narrative, the Islamic State is attract-
ing people to the caliphate with the promise of a new kind of society.
Recent studies indicate the over-representation of engineers and medical doc-

tors within terrorist groups. This phenomenon was present also in the first Intifada
between the Palestinian authority and Israel. To prevent the radicalization of highly-
skilled scientists and engineers, communities and societies must better integrate these
individuals into the broader global scientific enterprise and reward and promote science
as a peaceful and diplomatic tool to improve the conditions of their countries.
Many assessments of IS access to potentially dangerous resources seem often to

over-emphasize material resources (i.e. critical materials, infrastructure, and human re-
sources) and underestimate immaterial factors such as knowledge, skills, capital, and
time. Although there is basic CBRN knowledge available in the open literature, history
has shown that the deployment of an effective CBRN weapon requires more than basic
skills and a considerable amount of so-called “tacit knowledge”. The acquisition of
tacit knowledge takes time and requires sustained team work. With IS losing its territo-
ry and its safe haven, the short-term prospects that IS might resort to a complex CBRN
operation is decreasing while the risk of “low-tech” operations with vehicles or knifes
is increasing.
Of particular concern is the “DoItYourself (DIY) Bio” community, which is a

growing global movement thanks to easy access to materials and equipment that can be
ordered online. However, despite the de-skilling of biotechnology and the easy acquisi-
tion of equipment and raw materials, working with living (micro)organisms requires a
certain level of expertise and DNA manipulation aimed to create more virulent patho-
gens remains a challenge (highlighted by Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt in the 90s). To pre-
vent both unintentional and nefarious events, community self-regulation could help.
This includes creating a monitoring mechanism, educating the DIY-bio community,
and creating codes of conduct for DIY-bio. External controls such as DNA synthesis
and strain repository regulations, custom control, and law enforcement have an im-
portant role to play as well.
While the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) addresses the risk of biological
proliferation by state actors, it is limited. The BWC needs to be strengthened to reduce
vii
the risk of non-state actors. Non-state actors may develop low level biological weap-
ons (BW) using commercially available and naturally-occurring zoonotic agents target-
ing animal health and the food supply. Scientists need to be involved in the policy dis-
cussion if biotechnology advances will make it easier for non-state actors to develop a
BW. The question is if the need for tacit knowledge will start to disappear as biotech-
nology moves forward.
Overall, an intentional biological attack seems to be the most consequential of

challenges among the whole spectrum of CBRN events because, even if it might have
a low probability of occurring, its consequences could be catastrophic. However, histo-
ry showed that this risk of intentional misuse is lower than the risk natural and acci-
dental outbreaks. Whether intentional or unintentional, robust public health systems
(specifically infectious disease prevention, detection, and response infrastructure) is by
far the best preparation for a possible biological event.
On the chemical side, the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is an efficient tool
for the detection of alleged use of chemical weapons because it provides time sensitive
and actionable information. Evidence suggests that IS has attained crude chemical
weapon capability, in the form of sulfur mustard and chlorine, and has developed
homemade rockets for delivery. It also suggested that IS has the ability to conduct
chemical weapon attacks on a wide geographical area. However, their capability at pre-
sent is rather limited and the real danger is long term.
The issue of the WMD delivery systems, meaning not only CBRN materials, but
also CBRN devices, IEDs, etc., needs to be taken into account because there is no in-
ternational mechanism to deal with dual/multi-use items nor any chemical-biological
terrorism convention or non-proliferation treaty (the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Conventions are just disarmament treaties).
Strategic trade control systems’ main objective is to rule sensitive trade exchanges
between states, but not between states and non-state actors. This means that WMD pro-
liferation activities within a state by individuals or organisations not involving cross-
border movements are not under the scope of strategic trade control regimes or systems.
A way ahead could be developing verifications systems especially for bio, defining
guidelines/MoU to counter/reduce the risk of license shopping, raising operators’
awareness, and increasing exchanges of information between state authorities on
WMD-related operators and activities. A reference entity in this framework is the
UN1540 Committee, which should be strengthened in order to counter IS’s activities.
In addition, a robust bio-surveillance system at the border should be set up in critical
areas, such as the Hindu Kush, Central Asia, Mesopotamia, etc.
As a preventive measure, returning foreign fighters need to be closely monitored,

as they are likely to end up in many places, especially in countries with weaker links
and law-enforcement systems. Some recommendations include:
i. Bolster the role of scientific communities (specifically academic institutions,

scientific societies/associations, and other non-governmental scientific enti-
ties) in the countries of concern in order to avoid scientists’ potential dissatis-
faction and consequent radicalization;
viii
ii. Strengthen values around culture of responsibility and safe/secure science for
peace, starting from the level of lower education institutions (not limited only
to the level of the academic and professional associations);
iii. Better intelligence sharing, especially between Europe and Arab countries,
since the returning fighters may end up as refugees in other counties or in any
place where they can seek refuge;
iv. Protect high risk bio and chemical facilities as they are easy targets;
v. Strengthen potentially vulnerable areas: capacity building in areas potentially
under threat, including detection capabilities & border security; and
vi. Develop a strategy to monitor disruptive technologies.
Countering terrorist organizations requires a comprehensive approach, both inside

the area of their operations as well as in the home countries of foreign fighters, with
strong cooperation among the members of the international community across the mili-
tary, intelligence, policy-making, and scientific communities.
The key to mitigating and combating radicalization is two-fold: governance and

youth empowerment. Dissatisfaction with local politics was necessary for groups like
IS to take root. Preventing radicalization of scientists requires intervention at an early
stage in their education and careers, including providing trans-national and global op-
portunities for professional development as well as technical training on topics such as
culture of responsibility and dual-use reach of concern. An enduring end to political
violence and terrorism of the kind represented by IS will require reconciliation, partici-
pation, and ultimately representation of the relevant political communities.
ix
Contents
Preface v
Maurizio Martellini and Jason Rao
Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats 1

Mohammed al Sharaa and Sinan Muhi
Synthetic Biology, Microbiology, DIY Bio, …: How Easy It Is to Create a Bio
Threat 6
Veronica Baldo
Strategies for Undermining the Digital and Physical Caliphates 19
Seth Cantey
Islamic State’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability: An Open Source
Intelligence Approach 30
Simeon Dukić
Responsible Science 42
Alastair Hay
A.Q. Khan: Self-Radicalization of a Scientist 51
Jonathan Katz
The Prospects of Jihadism Amidst a Withering Caliphate 59
Nelly Lahoud
Examining the Narratives of Radical Islamists and Other Extremely Violent
Groups: The Case of the “Islamic State” 64
Francesco Marone
The Shifting Jihadist Galaxy 74
Andrea Plebani
Designing Systems for Terroristic Indicators Analysis Based on Visible, Social
and Dark Web Data Sources 82
John Soldatos
Educational Outreach to Combat Radicalisation of Scientists: A Study
of the Aum Shinrikyo Cult 94
Michael I. Thornton
Subject Index 105

Author Index 107
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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats 1
M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2017
© 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-1
Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge and

Emerging Biological Warfare Threats
Mohammed al SHARAA a,1 and Sinan MUHI b
a
D.G INMA
b
Biological Expert
Abstract. The efforts of preventing the spread of WMD expertise are often labeled
as “scientists’ redirection” are essential to redirect the scientists’ skills and exper-
tise to peaceful civilian activities. Such redirection efforts have historically boosts
these activities for securing WMD materials. Human expertise in WMD science
and technology poses as high a risk as acquires WMD materials. Thus, states
should strengthen their efforts on ensuring personnel reliability to prevent unau-
thorized access to WMD-related materials. Delays in securing WMD expertise can
be more alarming than comparable delays in securing WMD materials. In this pa-
per, the efforts of the Iraqi government to reduce the threat of proliferation of dual-
use expertise and materials have presented.
Keywords. WMD nonproliferation
Introduction
Redirection and other engagement programs have difficulty without adequate political
support. This work does not yield the immediate, tangible “scorecard” accomplish-
ments that come from securing WMD materials. However, the materials for many bio-
logical weapons are so prevalent that controlling WMD expertise is the best hope of
nonproliferation. Thus, securing WMD materials is a tactical response while securing

WMD expertise is more of a strategic activity because it deals with the ability of pro-
ducing WMD weapons.
Iraq starts its biological program at the end of the 1970s. Many scientists and tech-
nicians have engaged in this program. In 1991, the program was destroyed according to
the Security Council Resolution 687 under the supervision of the UNSCOM [1]. After
2003, the environment was completely different. In addition to the unstable security
situation, the chaotic looting, destruction of the physical infrastructure for most of the
government institutions, along with much of the rest of the country’s economic infra-
structure. Equipment was stolen or vandalized beyond repair. Government research fa-
cilities, factories, and even university laboratories all met similar fates. Identifying
WMD experts was far more difficult in Iraq. Many of them left Iraq and the others are
unemployed.
1
Corresponding author. Iraqi National Monitoring Authority for nonproliferation, P.O. Box 2004, Bagh-
dad-Iraq; E-mail: AlsharaaMJH@consultant.com.
2 M. al Sharaa and S. Muhi / Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge
Legislation and Instructions to Protect Sensitive Biological Materials
The Republic of Iraq Constitution, Article 9 (1E) has noted that “The Iraqi Govern-
ment shall respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations regarding the non-
proliferation, non-development, non-production and non-use of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons, and associated equipment, materials, technologies, and de-
livery” [2].
According to this article many of the related laws, regulations, instructions, poli-
cies and strategies have been adopted to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons
and their means of delivery:
• Environmental Protection and Enhancement Law No. 27 2009.

• Animal Health Law No. (32) 2013.
• Quarantine Law No. (76) 2012.
• Counterterrorism Law No. (13) 2005.
• National Monitoring Authority for non-proliferation law No. (48) 2012.
• Instructions for the implementation of the international nonproliferation trea-
ties and conventions 2014.
• Bio-risk management policy in Iraq.
• Bio-risk management strategy in Iraq.
• Bio-risk management law in Iraq.
• National action plans for Bio-risk management in Iraq.
• National strategy for countering WMD threats.
• National Action Plan for countering WMD threats.
A number of subordinate regulations, instructions and guidance have adopted for the
relevant ministries and institutions.
The Role of the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA)

The Iraqi National Monitoring Authority for non-proliferation (INMA) is a governmen-

tal agency established as the interface between the Iraqi government and the United
Nations Special Commission in 1991. In 2004 its activities have been redirected for
implementing Iraq’s obligations under non-proliferation and disarmament international
treaties and conventions as well as the Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).
In May 2012, the Iraqi parliament approved the Iraqi National Monitoring Authori-
ty for non-proliferation (INMA) law No. (48) [3]. The law establishes the National Au-
thority to ensure non-exploitation of Iraqi territories for any prohibited activities. IN-
MA seeks to achieve its goals through the following means:
• Establishing and maintaining a national regime for monitoring and inspection

to comply with the obligations under non-proliferation treaties and conven-
tions including nuclear, chemical, biological, means of delivery, and the rele-
vant dual-use items and technologies.
M. al Sharaa and S. Muhi / Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge 3
• Developing a comprehensive mechanism to ensure prevention of converting

peaceful activities into any prohibited activities, including the production,
possession, use, storage, export and import, shipping and transportation.
• Developing capacity-building programs for the Iraqi agencies to reduce the
CBRN threats and prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and related materials.
Measures
The Iraqi government has taken a series of measures and practical steps to protect sen-
sitive biological materials, in particular pathogens and biological toxins, and prevent
their acquisition by terrorists. In addition, appropriate domestic controls over related
materials and effective border controls have been established to prevent their illicit traf-
ficking, which includes the following:
• Establish and upgrade the regulatory framework.

• Establish and maintain appropriate effective measures to secure biological ma-
terials in production, use, storage, and transport.
• Establish and maintain effective physical protection measures.
• Establish and maintain effective border controls and law enforcement efforts
to prevent the illicit trafficking.
• Establish and maintain effective national export and import controls regime
based on EU regulations.
• Develop appropriate capacity building programs and the exchange of best
practices.
• Cooperate with the relevant ministries and institutions to raise awareness and
strengthen national capacities in security culture.
National Biological Emergency Plan and CBRN Teams

INMA drafted the National Biological Emergency Plan in 2013. The National Security
Council approved the plan in 2015. INMA is working with other ministries to review
and assess the gaps in the ministries resources. INMA successfully established the na-
tional policy CBRN team and the CBRN response teams within the ministry of interior
and the ministry of defense. CBRN response teams have responded to all the accidents
since 2015 both in the military and civilian attacks.
The National Bio-Risk Management Committee
Iraq established the National Bio-risk Management Committee, which aims to enhance
biological safety and security measures, raise the level of national capacity for counter-
ing and mitigating biological threats, as well as preventing unauthorized persons from
accessing valuable biological material. The Committee was also tasked to develop a
legal framework that promotes an effective bio-risk management system in Iraq in ac-
cordance with international standards.
4 M. al Sharaa and S. Muhi / Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge
Scope of the National Programs
The proliferation of scientific knowledge has attracted terrorist organizations to acquire

sensitive information from scientists with chemical, biological, and nuclear knowledge.
The widespread availability of getting such expertise became a pressing threat to global
security. National redirection programs have many goals, including:
• To prevent the proliferation of Iraqi WMD expertise.

• To prevent the exploitation of Iraqi expertise in fields related to weapons of
mass destruction or prohibited purposes.
• To redirect the scientists’ skills and expertise to productive civilian applica-
tions.
• To enable the former expert to serve in the economic and technology rebuild-
ing of Iraq.
Many of the biological scientists with dual-use expertise left Iraq after 2003. The
remaining scientists with different backgrounds and from different institutions are en-
gaged in different research activities focusing on various fields, such as industrial, pub-
lic health, environmental, agricultural, universities, etc. There are some direct programs
and other indirect as follows:
• Establishment of Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), which brought

together many experts from the former Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization and
research centers from former military industrial commission (MIC).
• USA launched the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry (IICSI)
program from 2003 to 2005 to support the peaceful, civilian employment of
Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers formerly worked on weapons of
mass destruction programs.
The programs worked extensively with the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technol-
ogy (MoST), which has absorbed numerous WMD personnel from the former Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission and the Military Industrial Commission, both of which
played important roles in Iraq’s WMD programs.
After 2012, INMA has worked to implement several programs for health, envi-
ronment, agriculture, higher education and science and technology ministries with the
support of various international programs. These programs concentrated on:
• Biosecurity and Biosafety.

• Bio-risk assessment.
• Dual-use items and technology control.
• Centers of Excellence programs to mitigate CBRN accidents.
• Upgrading bio labs and transfer the best practices.
Challenges
There are many challenges to be drawn from controlling the biological dual-use exper-
tise and knowledge threats [4]. Biological weapons-related dual-use materials are im-
ported, produced, transported and handled under many different circumstances, posing
M. al Sharaa and S. Muhi / Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge 5
a high risk to the community. An effective legislation, instructions, policies, and strate-
gies are essential to mitigate and reduce the possibility of using illegal activities. The
biological activity controls over related materials, knowledge, and technologies are a
complicated process. It requires long-term monitoring and verification. Attention
should be given to identify and understand the extent of the dual-use knowledge and
capabilities and their potential links to biological weapons proliferation. The financial
allocations are essential for the continuity and sustainability of the programs. New ap-
proaches should be developed to ensure nonproliferation of prohibited activities [5].
Securing WMD expertise is a strategic goal since it deals with the expertise with the
capability to produce WMD, so it needs to elaborate international strategy to set up
proposals and models for short-term and long-term projects [6].
Conclusion
The conclusions mentioned in this paragraph are based on the Iraqi experience. It may
be utilized to address the long-term challenges that come with controlling the biologi-
cal dual-use knowledge threats and redirection programs.
• Sharing of experiences and effective practices are essential instruments to as-

sist promoting the implementation of the biological dual-use expertise and
knowledge threats.
• Providing enough financial allocations to ensure the continuity of monitoring
and capacity building programs.
• Control measures should be selected based on the specific requirements of the
legislation and regulations, and risk assessment and properly maintained, ex-
amined and tested to ensure their effectiveness
• Raising awareness, education and training tools providers should be aware of
potential proliferation threats, and they should have in place a risk assessment
and mitigation framework and may include an array of items including inter-
national guidance, manuals, self-assessment tools, and training modules.
• Specific tools should be established in the industry to allow assessments of
technology falling under a control list. The likelihood of sensitive information

leaked and whether permissions are required.
References
[1] United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Compendium of Iraq’s Proscribed
Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, Biological and Missile areas, June 2007.
[2] Constitution of Iraq, 2005.
[3] Iraqi Official Gazette Al Waqaa Number 4252, 2012.
[4] Arturo Casadevall, Susan A. Ehrlich, David R. Franz, Michael J. Imperiale, and Paul S. Keim, Biode-
fense Research: A Win-Win Challenge, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and
Science, Volume 6, Number 4, 2008.
[5] Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Preventing the Development and Use of Biological Weapons, Biosecurity and Bio-
terrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 7, Number 1, 2009.
[6] Meeting Report, Strategies for Managing Dual Use Research of Concern Progress at the National Level,
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 7, Number 1, 2009.
6 The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats
IOS Press, 2017
doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-6
Synthetic Biology, Microbiology, DIY

Bio, …: How Easy It Is to Create a Bio
Threat
Veronica BALDO 1
Insubria Center on International Security
Abstract. Men have always tried to improve their own lifestyle taking advantage
of and adapting natural resources to their needs. This happened also with living
organisms. Starting from farming and breeding, developments brought about the
ability of knowingly modifying the organisms’ DNA that contains the instructions
to grow and develop every living organism, arising genetic engineer, biotechnolo-
gy and synthetic biology. Synthetic biology, in particular, is a multidisciplinary ar-
ea that allows the creation of artificial living organisms starting from synthetically
produced DNA material. This ability could be used for good or malicious purposes,
rising dual use issues. This scenario has been complicated by the DoItYourself-
biology (DIY-Bio) movement’s birth, because this is spreading the use of biotech-
nology beyond the traditional academic and industrial institutions and into the lay
public, increasing concerns about biosafety, biosecurity and ethics, even though it
has been shown that working with living organisms, especially to create a biothreat,
is not that effortless. The continuous improvements of synthetic biology and DIY-
bio should be strictly monitored and regulated in order to guarantee a safe and se-
cure world.
Keywords. Genetic engineer, biotechnology, synthetic biology, biothreat, bio-

weapon and biosecurity
Introduction
From the origin of human mankind, men have always tried to adapt and use natural
sources to improve and ease their own lives. This happened also with living organisms
as plants and animals, starting farming, agriculture, and domestication of livestock an-
imals. From these first steps to improve useful characteristics of living organisms,
technological advances have brought about the ability of wittingly modifying the DNA,
the molecule coding for all the information needed to growth and develop every living
organisms, giving rise to biotechnology, genetic engineering, and more recently, syn-
thetic biology. These strictly related disciplines allow modifying living organisms’
characteristics, making them useful in different fields, such as medicine, agriculture,
environment and energy.
Since these technologies are dealing with living organisms and pathogens, as well
as their uses/applications, it gave rise to some concerns about safety and security, based
1
Veronica Baldo, Insubria Center on International Security, via Natta 14, 22100 Como, Italy; E-mail:
veronica.baldo1977@gmail.com; veronica.baldo@uninsubria.it.
V. Baldo / Synthetic Biology, Microbiology, DIY Bio, . . . : How Easy It Is to Create a Bio Threat 7
on the perceived risk of harmful organisms being released, either deliberately or acci-
dentally, into the environment. Moreover, the coming of synthetic biology, together
with internet dissemination of information on DNA and on how to manage living or-
ganisms, makes it possible to create new living organisms, even dangerous ones, or to
enhance existing pathogens to create more harmful ones creating a dual-use concern.
In the last two decades another actor has been added to this scenario that is Do-it-
yourself-biology (DIYbio), a global movement spreading the use of biotechnology be-
yond the traditional academic and industrial institutions and into the lay public.
The combination of synthetic biology that is de-skilling biotechnology and DNA

manipulation with the DIY-bio is making it harder to control the use of these advanced
technologies in terms of biosafety, biosecurity, and ethics. Moreover, all the materials
and equipment needed to work with living organisms, in particular microorganisms, are
available on line and/or can be effortlessly purchased. Manuals to handle and work
with living organisms are on line as well, and the DNA can be ordered by mail and de-
livered wherever you need it. The DIY-bio community could find places to work in
community labs, hackerspaces or at home. What cannot be found so easily is the exper-
tise and the know-how to manage organisms for pursuing good or bad purposes. It
seems even harder to create a biothtreat, referring specifically to tacit knowledge. In
fact, the hardest part of working with living organisms is the acquisitions of tricks and
problem solving abilities, something that is usually learned by working side by side
with experts. However, even though it will be possible for almost anyone to work with
and modify (micro)organisms to create harmful pathogens, the last steps in creating a
bioweapon from these pathogens could be very hard to realize. In fact, the scaling up
and the creation of a weapon to harm a large number of people has not yet been real-
ized or, at least, a working methodology is not known.
Even though the weaponization of living organisms is really hard to obtain and, as
known right now, not yet realized, it cannot be ignored that future advances and devel-
opments will make it possible. Therefore, it is really important to constantly monitor
both research in the bioweaponization direction and in the creation of smaller, but not
less frightening and hazardous unintentional or malicious threats.
The following summarizes the technological advances and the risks connected
with modern biotechnology and synthetic biology especially from a biosecurity point of
view.
New Available Bio-Technologies
Biotechnology Developments
Mankind has been modifying living organisms since around 12,000 B.C., when humans
first began to domesticate plants and animals through artificial selection. Selective
breeding, hybridization, and grafting have been used to improve and adapt plants and
animals to human needs. These processes are now known to change organism DNA
that is the molecule that carries the genetic instructions used in the growth, develop-
ment, functioning, and reproduction of all known living organisms.
8 V. Baldo / Synthetic Biology, Microbiology, DIY Bio, . . . : How Easy It Is to Create a Bio Threat
Only since 1973 has genetic engineering and DNA manipulation been applied to
modifying living organisms directly using specific biotechnology techniques. In fact, in
the latter part of the 20th century, artificial manipulation, modification, and recombina-
tion of DNA in order to modify an organism or population of organisms were made
through recombinant DNA technology (or gene cloning), in which DNA molecules
from two or more sources are combined either within cells or in vitro and are then in-
serted into host organisms in which they are able to propagate [1].
The use of genetic engineering gave rise to modern biotechnology, which is the
use of living systems and organisms to develop or make products, or “any technologi-
cal application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to
make or modify products or process for specific use” [2]. In particular, these new tech-
nologies have been used to synthesize medically useful substances, such as human in-
sulin, human growth hormone, alpha interferon, and a hepatitis B vaccine. Furthermore,
genetic engineering has been used in agriculture for food production to increase the
shelf life of vegetables, to grow pesticide-producing and herbicide resistant crops and
to improve nutritional values of cereals, like rice.
The birth of this new biotechnology was due to the innovative tools to cut specific
DNA sequences (Hamilton Smiths), separate and paste fragments (Berg, Boyer and
Cohen). Moreover, in 1977 Frederick Sangers developed a method for sequencing
DNA, greatly increasing the genetic information available to researchers. Then, Poly-
merase Chain Reactions (PCR), developed by Kary Mullis in 1983, allowed small sec-
tions of DNA to be amplified and aided identification and isolation of genetic material.
In the meanwhile, the techniques to insert the manipulated DNA into organisms
and organisms’ genome have also been developed and since the genetic code can be
translated and expressed in every existing living organism, it is possible to produce or-
ganism proteins in the host that are naturally synthesized in others. In other words, by
incorporating foreign DNA from a mammalian gene, for example, into a bacterium, re-
searchers can obtain an almost limitless number of copies of the inserted gene. Fur-
thermore, if the inserted gene is operative/functional (i.e., if it directs protein synthesis),
the modified bacterium will produce the protein coded by foreign DNA [1]. For exam-
ple, the human protein insulin, used by diabetic patients, is produced using the tech-
nique of recombinant DNA by bacteria or yeast and easily purified to make it available
for medical purposes.
Biotechnology is evolving so fast that new techniques are available and DNA ma-
nipulation is becoming easier and, thanks to faster, simpler, and cheaper DNA amplifi-
cations and synthesis, is improving synthetic biology applications and achievements. In
the early 21st century, innovative genetic engineering techniques emerged that centered
on gene editing for higher eukaryotes (such as mammals). Gene editing, based on the
technology of the so called CRISPR-Cas9, allows researchers to customize a living or-
ganism’s genetic sequence by making very specific changes to its DNA [1]. Further-
more, DNA synthesis allows the direct construction of genetic material starting from
information and raw chemicals [3], enhancing biotechnological evolution and giving
rise to the so-called synthetic biology.
Synthetic Biology
Synthetic biology is, by definition, the design and construction of new biological parts,
devices, and systems, and the re-design of existing, natural biological systems for use-
ful purposes [4]. Synthetic biology, combining elements of engineering, chemistry,
computer science, and molecular biology, seeks to assemble the biological tools neces-
sary to redesign the living world. This is different from genetic engineering that is the
simple addition or modification of a single gene using conventional genetic engineering
techniques. On the contrary, adding a whole suite of genes or creating an entirely new
genetic code that does not exist in nature is synthetic biology, as well as using syntheti-
cally-created nucleic acids, parts, and devices [5–7].
Different approaches, not mutually exclusive, could be used to create new parts or
entire living organisms, such as:
1. Removing cells’ inefficiencies, which are a byproduct of the haphazard nature

of evolution, to make the target pathway/process/product the more efficient as
possible, without wasting energy and metabolites in unnecessary processes;
2. Combining genetic sequences in useful ways, for example mixing genes from
different organisms and/or species to improve the production process;
3. Designing new “living organisms/machines” from scratch, starting from the
design and synthesis of new genomes (DNA) to make non-existing organisms
with the required characteristics [6].
As per biotechnology applications, synthetic biology is also involved in considerable

activity in a number of areas:
1. Health and medicines: new drugs synthesis (Artemisinin project to treat malar-
ia), program cells to precisely detect and kill cancer cells, innovative diagnos-
tic kits;
2. Agriculture and food: higher nutritive vegetables, food created in laboratories
more efficiently than growing in the land;
3. Energy and environment: biofuels production, creation of new organisms able
to digest and decompose pollutants;

4. Other industrial sectors as bioelectronics [6].
In 2002 synthetic biology gained its first considerable achievement. Cello et al. [8]
showed that it is possible to obtain a completely functional poliovirus, starting from a
chemically synthesized DNA in the absence of a natural template and using a cell-free
extract to express the virus genome and develop the virus itself. Eight years later, Craig
Venter’s laboratory created a bacteria (Mycoplasma mycoides) from a chemically syn-
thesized genome, capable of continuous self-replication [9], and in 2014 a fully func-
tional eukaryotic chromosome was designed and expressed in yeast [10].
Synthetic biologists are convinced that, with enough knowledge, they will be able
to write programs to control the genetic components, programs that would let them not
only alter nature but guide evolution as well [7].
Moreover, the tools evolved, thanks to genetic engineering and synthetic biology,
are everyday becoming cheaper to get and easier to use. For example, there is a “con-
tinuously growing collection of genetic parts that can be mixed and matched to build
synthetic biology devices and systems” (BioBricks) and the equipment required to
work with DNA and living organisms can be easily bought on line, even on common e-
commerce platforms (Amazon, eBay…). In addition, with the growth of the internet
and the standardization of many biotechnological procedures, the tools for doing syn-
thetic biology are increasingly becoming more accessible.
Synthetic Biology Concerns

Synthetic biology key concerns are safety and security, based on the perceived risk of
harmful organisms being released into the environment. Synthetic biology risk con-
cerns also have ethical and societal implications, pertaining to the creation of novel life
forms [11].
Last but not least, synthetic organisms could be specifically created for malevolent
purposes, raising concerns about biosecurity. In fact, several pathogenic viruses, in-
cluding 1918 influenza virus [12] and the infectious poliovirus as previously mentioned,
can be synthesized using only published DNA sequence information and mail-ordered
raw materials [8]. Such developments have led to the concerns that ‘biohackers’ could
create/recreate known pathogens and perhaps make them even more virulent. Faster
and cheaper DNA synthesis is one of the key points of synthetic biology. Furthermore,
the availability of DNA sequence data and explanations of molecular biology tech-
niques online, combined with the ease of getting a DNA sequence synthesized by a
specialized company, means that these technologies are becoming available to an in-
creasingly wide range of people. For example, the iGEM (International Genetic Engi-
neer Machine) competition is dedicated to undergraduate students and brings together
students from across a range of disciplines to work collaboratively to design and build
biological systems. This kind of experiment is demonstrating the accessibility of the
technology to undergraduates and not experienced students across the world [11].
DIY(DoItYourself)-Bio
The easy access to increasingly powerful biotechnological tools promotes the devel-
opment of the so called DoItYourself-bio that is a global movement spreading the use
of biotechnology beyond the traditional academic and industrial institutions and into
the lay public. The idea for a popular movement of amateur biotechnologists began
around 2000, after a working draft of the human genome was completed by the Human
Genome Project [13]. In 2005, Rob Carlson described how he built a molecular biology
laboratory in his garage buying all the equipment required easily on-line [14]. At the
same time the DIYbio.org was launched on the web, organizing events and perfor-
mances with simple biological experiments. Carlson and people working at the origin
of DIY-bio were experts in the field of synthetic biology, but in just a few years, DIY-
bio has become a community of hobbyists that has become organized and set up dedi-
cated laboratories in commercial spaces, giving rise to the so called “community labs”.
These labs usually sustain themselves on volunteers, membership donations, and paid
classes [13]. Most of the DIYers do their work within shared labs, and, even when they
work in their home exclusively they share and discuss their work online, keeping other
community members informed about their research.
Lately, DIYers have also attracted private capital and contributed to biotechnology
development as technical and scientific achievements, new business achievements, and
contribution to public awareness and education, promoting DIYbio from being a spon-
taneous movement of hobbyists to a movement of valuable stakeholders in biotechnol-
ogy and synthetic biology.
Needs to Manipulate Live Organisms – Equipment and Biological Materials

In order to first work with living organisms, bio-laboratory equipment is required, such
as machines to amplify the DNA (PCR machine), micro-centrifuge, gel electrophoresis,
incubators etc., and they can be easily bought on line or built thanks to manuals made
available for free. Also, laboratory reagents can be found on line and manuals to handle
them are easily accessible. Regarding the DNA, the required sequence can be ordered
on line and delivered where needed. Living (micro)organisms are present in nature or
can be obtained from laboratories, and instructions on how to handle them are on line
for free, but their use and proper managing necessitate knowledge and practical skills.
Moreover, all the equipment and reagents can be readily available in laboratories,
such as the ones where the DIY-bio community is working: community labs, hack-
erspaces, academic lab and corporate/government laboratories. Therefore, all the raw
materials and equipment required to handle living organisms for both good and malev-
olent purposes, and to manipulate, enhance and create new pathogens or toxins, are re-
ally simple to source.
Know-How Expertise
Having access to technological devices/equipment and biological material is not
enough to manipulate living organisms. In fact, even though synthetic biology is de-
skilling DNA manipulation, making processes more systematic and more reproducible,
it is still hard to reproduce biological experiments and re-create simple living organ-
isms and personal skills do not become irrelevant [15]. In fact, expertise and trainings
are also needed.
The iGEM (International Genetic Engineer Machine), mentioned before as a com-

petition where even undergraduate students play with biotechnology, tends to demon-
strate the challenges of successfully performing synthetic biology experiments and
proves the ongoing need for guided instruction and collective experiences [15]. In fact,
iGEM teams receive considerable guidance from senior faculty members and, while
iGEM is a collaborative exercise, biologically trained students still tend to work be-
neath ones who have the central roles in daily laboratory activity [15]. Therefore col-
lective and tacit knowledge are pivotal to perform wet-lab experiments.
In particular, what is called tacit knowledge is essential and it refers to the typical
trial and error problem solving and the master apprentice style relationship. Usually
this is a long process that happens working shoulder to shoulder with expert scientists
and provides tricks and tools not easily available without expertise.
Therefore all these factors influence successes of synthetic biology experiments

and notwithstanding it is easy to gather that, it is really hard to obtain the hoped results,
especially working with living organisms.
Living (Micro)Organisms Creation or Modification

Starting from scratch, such as DNA/genome sequence, the process to create new (mi-
cro)organism or modify existing ones are similar:
1. Design of the DNA needed to create new functions or enhance processes in a

chosen organism;
2. Order the desired DNA sequence from a DNA synthesis company that mails
the DNA directly to the lab, where scientists amplify it;
3. Assemble the DNA sequences in a fully functional genome to be expressed in
the chosen (micro)organism and to be inserted in the organism for the produc-
tion of the new organism or the enhanced or modified one;
4. Test new organisms for the appropriate characteristics.
All these passages are tricky and pose really hard challenges and, even though syn-
thetic biology is de-skilling DNA manipulation and biotechnology in general, there are
not standardized procedures for every single passage and especially tricky ones require
really specific skills and knowledge. Therefore, some biological techniques are not
necessarily becoming easier, as demonstrated by the fact that a lot of experiments
should be repeated many times before getting a valuable result.
These skills and knowledge are usually used for good purposes, as described above
(second paragraph), but these technologies are considered dual-use. In fact, if malevo-
lent people manage them, synthetic biology could be used to create new patho-
gens/toxins or enhance the virulence and toxicity of existing ones. Moreover, new
technologies could bring to spread pathogens as a weapon to infect high number of
people, or to attack crops or livestock, as will be discussed below.
Lastly, there could be the risk of nefarious actors seeking to do harm with the tools
available in the community labs or in their own home/garage laboratory. Working in a
community lab is controlled by strict rules about access, suspicious activities, danger-
ous pathogens, that can put at risk the entire lab [13].
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Issues
“Synthetic biology strives to make the engineering of biology easier and more predict-
able.” [11]
One of the main fears about synthetic biology is that this discipline is de-skilling
biology, biotechnology and DNA manipulation. These phenomena could give rise to
pathogen/toxins enhancement or creation if managed by wrong, malicious hands and
used by terrorists to produce biological weapons. Moreover, the continuous growth of
DIY-bio offers more and more accessibility to tools, equipment, and dual-use
knowledge to bioterrorist seeking to do harm. DNA synthesis is becoming cheaper and
can be outsourced, easily ordered by mail and delivered wherever you need it, to make
it easier also for biohackers to get it synthesized and used to radically redesign new
pathogens/toxins. Terrorists pursuing biological weapons for high consequence, mass
casualty attacks able to incapacitate people, livestock and crops, could use these new
pathogens/toxins or the enhancement of already existing ones. But, even though it
looks easy to get raw materials and a bit harder to gain knowledge to modify properly
and consciously living organisms, how is it to weaponize biological material?
Bio-Weaponization Issues
As mentioned before, synthetic biology, as well as other technologies, could be the

subject of deliberate misuse. One peculiarity of these biological issues is that dangerous
and harmful raw material is already spread all over the world. DNA sequences of mor-
tal viruses or bacteria are already accessible on line. But, highly dangerous pathogens
stocks are under strict surveillance in few facilities around the world, where access con-
trol is strictly regulated. On the other hand, new technologies as synthetic biology make
possible misuses of the DNA-synthesis (synthetic biology) technology as well give ris-
ing to both known and unforeseeable threats to our biological safety and security [3]. In
particular, DNA synthesis when combined with other advances, such as the develop-
ment of internet and overnight shipping, challenges the existing recombinant-DNA-era
safety front on two aspects:
1. Physical decoupling of the design of engineered genetic material from the ac-
tual construction and resulting use of the material (DNA can be readily de-
signed in one location, constructed in a second place and delivered to a third);
and
2. Effective alternative route to those who would seek to obtain specific patho-
gens for the purpose of doing harm.
Today, as mentioned before, really dangerous pathogens are available in nature in

unknown natural reservoirs and are really hard and dangerous to obtain (Ebola virus).
Otherwise, they are locked in a very small number of facilities (smallpox virus) or they
no longer exist in nature (1918 influenza virus).
As a consequence, the current approach to biological security depends in part on

limiting access to such pathogens. Even so, the sequence information that defines the
genome encoding pathogens is readily available on line and DNA synthesis, therefore,
could be used to obtain the genetic material encoding these pathogens. As previously
mentioned, additional expertise is required to obtain pathogens from DNA sequences,
but this work might not be subject to any review or oversight through existing safety
framework [3].
Once pathogens or toxins are obtained by malevolent hands, the last step to make
pathogens or any biological agents dangerous for people, animals or crops, is the
weaponization of biological material, in order to spread it and/or harm the largest num-
ber of people as possible.
This last step involves, first of all, the scale-up and storage of the agent in a stable
manner, and developing a suitable mechanism to disperse the product properly [16]. In
order to be successful without destroying the pathogens, or person undertaking these
activities, each of these individual steps are likely to require specific information, ex-
pertise and ‘know-how’ in varying degrees.
Historically a number of biological weapons programs are understood to have sty-

mied or failed to create or optimize effective weapons in part because of a deficit of
‘know-how’ [17,18]. This limitation is particularly acute in the weaponization step

which is notably where a number of authenticated instances of bioterrorism [18,19]
have been collapsed of being rendered of limited utility, leading Vogel (2006) [20] to
suggest that this step is where “critical tacit knowledge for bioweapons development
primary resides.” [21]. In this context, weaponization is referred to the process of opti-
mizing the delivery of a pathogen in a manner that effectively generates significant
physiological effect. However, the utility of biological weapons is not limited to mass
infectivity per se, and terrorists or state actors could be attracted to biological weapons
for their psychological effects in order to attract attention, create fear, and undertake
economic or political sabotage [22], objectives that do not require optimized weapon-
ization [21].
Bioweapon programs in the US and USSR lasted many years and were very well
funded; however, they were not successful in achieving their goals of producing a
working weapon. The Soviet program was successful in its early stages, where they de-
veloped bombs and spray tanks working with classical agents, but their work on devel-
oping weapons based on new pathogens that did not exist in nature only reached the
research and development stage. Moreover, they failed in producing bioweapons-
specific ballistic or cruise missiles. On the other hand, the US program was also able to
weaponize classical agents and produce a few bombs and spray tanks, but none of the
weapons developed met military requirements. One explanation for these failures is
that unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, which use materials that are quite stable and
have predictable behavior, biological weapons rely on microorganisms that are living,
can mutate, and are sensitive to their environment and to the way in which they are
handled [23].
Another example of biological weapon program was Aum Shinrikyo. Aum Shin-
rikyo started as a peaceful cult that provided a livelihood to its founder, Chizuo
Matsumoto, while purporting to help followers to achieve enlightenment. After years of
yoga classes and meditation, this movement, established to save the world, turned into
an apocalyptic cult and started both biological and chemical programs to pursue its
plans of destruction. Aum strove for both biological and chemical weapon programs
and different attacks were performed with both types of newly-created weapons. It
found a successful path for developing chemical weapons causing 13 deaths and about
6,000 injuries during a sarin attack at the Tokyo subway in 1995. Aum also tried to in-
duce harm using biological agents, such as the botulinum toxin produced by Clostridi-
um botulinum and anthrax from Bacillus anthracis, but it did not develop effective bio-
logical weapons, maybe because chemical weapons capabilities are more accessible
than biological capabilities as a means of killing substantial numbers of people. As al-
ready mentioned, biological weapons require more tacit knowledge, while chemists
may be adequately positioned to develop weapons after consulting relevant documenta-
tion [18].
These experiences show how hard the creation of massive weapon using biological
material is and, especially, how difficult the weaponization process and the successful
spread of pathogens and toxins are to cause massive death are.
Other Biosecurity Concerns About Biotechnology and Synthetic Biology

If the risks linked to the bio-weaponization are restricted, at the moment, by technical
limitations, it is not possible to exclude that pathogens and toxins, new or enhanced
ones, could be used to scare, create panic or blackmail people, as happened in 2001
with the anthrax letters, sent to American TV, media and senators, when 5 people died
out of 23 cases (19 confirmed, 4 suspected). Even though the 2001 anthrax cases have
not been ascribed as terrorist attacks, especially linked to the 9/11 ones, the case spread
terror and panic all over the country. Furthermore, going forward, these biological
agents could be used in a bioterroristic attack since anthrax spores can be easily found
in nature, produced in a lab, and last for a long time in the environment. Moreover, an-
thrax makes a good weapon because it can be released quietly and without anyone
knowing. The microscopic spores could be put into powders, sprays, food, and water
and because they are so small, you may not be able to see, smell, or taste them [24].
Conclusion
Biotechnology, genetic engineering and even more synthetic biology developments

give rise to great concerns, as already mentioned, related to ethics, security and safety,
because one of its objectives is to produce novel living organisms that can be used for
good purposes or misused to frighten or harm people.
In response to these concerns, a range of different options for intervention have

been suggested to avoid future catastrophic or scaring events, especially from a biose-
curity point of view:
1. Prevention is one of the first steps: trying, for example to identify unauthor-
ized possession, loss, theft, misuse or diversion of biological hazardous
agents;
2. Screening of customers by DNA synthesis companies;
3. Oversight of new biotechnologies, DNA synthesis technology and its com-
mercialization;
4. Educating scientists about biosecurity issues and formation of a professional

society for synthetic biology;
5. Biosafety, Biosecurity and Biorisk management manual for synthetic biology
laboratories;
6. Preparedness in case of natural or deliberate release of hazardous biological
material (pathogens or toxins);
7. Regulations generated from dialogue between interested stakeholder, such as
policy maker, security managers and scientists themselves.
Among the risks mentioned above, it is crucial to recall that since synthetic organ-
isms could be radically different from those known today when released into the envi-
ronment (accidentally or on purpose), they could have unintended detrimental effects
on the environmental or on human health. Such (micro)organisms might have unpre-
dictable and emergent properties when released in the environment, even though right
now it is easier for synthetic organisms to survive in an artificial environment than in a
natural environment.
As mentioned in the Synthetic Biology: Scope, applications and implications [11],

regulation will play an important role in the development of synthetic biology and in
preventing, foreseeing and responding to biological catastrophic events, particularly in
terms of public attitudes toward the emergency applications. It will be really important
to maintain an open dialogue between the regulators and researchers (both academic
and industrial), ensuring that the regulators are given adequate support to maintain this
continued dialogue so that advances and innovations are covered by regulations and the
public is kept informed as well.
Therefore, law enforcement personnel must work closely with public health agen-
cies to prevent, identify and investigate potential biological threats; ultimately, it is the
specific responsibility of law enforcement authorities to protect individuals and com-
munities against threats that may arise through the misuse of this promising technolo-
gy [3].
It will be really important, among other things, to monitor developments and ad-
vances in detection technologies, because they could contribute to the process of inves-
tigating alleged violations, thus reinforcing the norm, or could be used for identifying
potential threats in a rapid and effective manner.
In support of all these considerations, it highlights the crucial role of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention as reported by Revill and Jefferson (2013) [21], in
particular under Article XII of the BWC, as it has become an established practice to
conduct a quinquennial review of the Convention which takes “into account any new
scientific and technological development relevant to the Convention”. In particular,
science and development potential uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention
should be surveyed. Moreover, measures for strengthening national biological risk
management, voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible
conduct by scientists academia and industry should be promoted, as well as education
and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology. Last-
ly, science and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilat-
eral organizations such as the World Health Organization and the World Organization
for Animal Health (OIE) should be put in the scenario as well.
In this complicated arena, it is important to consider also DIYers that come from
all walks of life, that may lack formal education, and are not overseen by institutional
reviewer boards; the policy and science communities fear that they may be more likely
to cross ethical boundaries, even though the DIYbio community is trying to spread a
culture of responsibility (DIYbio Code of Ethics). Moreover, biosafety and environ-
mental concerns arose about DIYbio, because hazardous living organisms could be ac-
cidentally released in the environment and harm DIYers, people or the environment. In
contrast to this, it is important to specify that DIY-bio community is not an anonymous
threat to public biosafety and biosecurity. Rather the movement provides a new channel
for public science engagement and education and a broad opportunity for economic and
scientific innovation. The community is already actively engaged in developing codes
of conduct, safety protocols, and discussing the various regulations that may affect it.
To harness this community’s potential to provide biotech innovation, education, and
awareness, policymakers should treat the community as a valued stakeholder within the
larger biotech community and include it in the future discussions [13].
Even if it is really hard to build a bioweapon, but not impossible, and a biological
weapon was disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by
factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with
which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the re-
sulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as
antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack [25]. (Jeffer-
son. the myth and realities of synthetic bioweapons).
Therefore, monitoring to prevent also smaller, but not less frightening and hazard-
ous, unintentional or malicious biological threats and getting prepared in case of bio-
logical threat, natural or not, are two of the most important steps to pursue in order to
protect men and environment.
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security, Nature Biotechnology, 25 (2007), 627–629.
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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats 19
IOS Press, 2017
doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-19
Strategies for Undermining the Digital and

Physical Caliphates
Seth CANTEY, PhD 1
Washington and Lee University
Abstract. This chapter explores mutually reinforcing steps that governments in the
United States and Europe have taken to counter the Islamic State (IS) on- and of-
fline. It argues that while operations since 2014 have significantly reduced the
group’s attractive power and military capacity, additional measures against the
digital and physical caliphates can and should be taken. The chapter outlines strat-
egies that would build on recent successes against IS, recognizing that the group’s
ultimate demise will be a long-term project requiring measures beyond what West-
ern states can or should do alone.
Keywords. Islamic State, online, digital caliphate, propaganda, strategy, territory
Introduction
The Islamic State (IS) has distinguished itself from otherwise analogous groups by
dominating both physical and digital territory.2 Since at least 2014, IS has acted more
like a proto-state than a typical terrorist organization, taking territory, establishing a
formal army, and governing millions of people.3 Meanwhile, the group has become the
undisputed heavyweight champion of online jihad, producing and disseminating pro-
fessional-grade media products to a global audience at an unprecedented rate. This has
led to the emergence of what analysts have variously called the digital or virtual cali-
phate.4
As scholars and policymakers craft strategies to counter IS, it would be a mistake

to consider the digital and physical challenges that the group poses separately. Success
and failure on the battlefield and online are intimately connected and mutually reinforc-
ing. Online propaganda, inspiration, and recruitment have facilitated a physical cali-
phate by attracting supporters to IS-held territory. The physical caliphate, in turn, has
enabled IS to present itself as a ‘strong horse’ (to use Usama bin Laden’s term) in digi-
tal operations. For much of 2014 and 2015, IS saw this dynamic as a virtuous, even di-
vinely-inspired cycle.
1
Politics Department, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA. USA; E-mail: canteys@wlu.edu.
2
Cohen, Jared. “Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online.” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 94, No. 6. 2015.
3
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 2. 2015.
4
Atwan, Abdel Bari. Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate. University of California Press. 2015; Seamus
Hughes, “Countering the Virtual Caliphate.” Written testimony before the US House of Representatives For-
eign Affairs Committee. 2016; Harleen Gambhir, “The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’S Information Warfare.” In-
stitute for the Study of War. 2016.
20 S. Cantey / Strategies for Undermining the Digital and Physical Caliphates
The logic that applies to the virus, however, applies to the remedy. Just as early
success online contributed to early success on the battlefield, and vice-versa, more re-
cently policies that have undermined the physical caliphate have undermined the digital
one. Consequently, in recent years the stream of foreign fighters and other supporters to
Iraq and Syria has receded, diminishing the capacity and morale of IS, as well as the
attractiveness of the idea for which it fights.
This chapter elaborates upon these observations in two principal ways. First, it ex-
plains the importance of physical territory to IS identity and the challenges that losing
territory creates for the group on- and offline. This section evaluates policies currently
underway to attack the nexus of the digital and physical caliphates. Second, the chapter
identifies strategies that would build on recent success. This section engages difficult
questions about the ongoing fights in Syria and Iraq, and it proposes further refining
existing approaches to counter-narratives. The chapter concludes by putting the
measures addressed throughout into broader strategic context, arguing that defeating IS
will ultimately depend on more than what Western states can or should do alone.
Current Strategies On- and Off-Line
IS identity is inherently tied to physical territory. This connection is reflected even in

the group’s name. ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah means “The Islamic State,” where the ref-
erence to ‘state’ is physical rather than symbolic or aspirational. The group’s previous
name, ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām (The Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant) also referenced physical territory, as did its name before that (ad-Dawlah
al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq, The Islamic State in Iraq) and before that (al-qāʿidah fī 'l-ʿIrāq,
al-Qaeda in Iraq).
From the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014 until May 2016, IS asserted le-
gitimacy on the basis of its control and governance of physical space.5 In the first issue
of the English-language magazine Dabiq, published in July 2014, the group called for
Muslims around the world to emigrate to IS-held territory in the Middle East. “Rush O
Muslims to your state…The land is for the Muslims… hijrah to the land of Islam is ob-
ligatory.”6 This emphasis on physical geography and the auto-translocation of believers
has been central to the group’s messaging online.
Focus on territorial governance has also been constant. Though violence is perhaps
the most recognizable characteristic of IS propaganda, a study of more than 9,000 visu-
al media products from January 2015 to July 2016 found that non-violent images were
even more common. 7 A majority of images focused on religious practice, policing,
helping the poor, regulating commerce, and other quotidian affairs of state. Because IS
believes that governance generates legitimacy, it has sought to attract families, not just
fighters. For some the message has been “Come and fight and die for God;” for others
it has been “Come and live under the caliphate.”
5
Gambhir, Harleen. “The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’S Information Warfare.” Institute for the Study of War.
2016.
6
Dabiq, Issue 1, p. 11.
7
Milton, Daniel. “Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts.” Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point. 2016.
S. Cantey / Strategies for Undermining the Digital and Physical Caliphates 21
Physical Caliphate Under Fire
Responding to IS advances across northern Syria and Iraq, and recognizing the im-
portance of physical territory to the group’s attractive power, in 2014 the United States
launched Operation Inherent Resolve. Over the next three years, coalition partners
dropped tens of thousands of bombs on IS-held territory; supplied local partners with
intelligence, logistical support, and weaponry; and committed special operations forces
and limited ground troops to roll back IS-held physical space.
These kinetic measures inflicted heavy losses on the group. By the end of 2016, of-
ficials claimed that up to 50,000 IS fighters had been killed in action, numbers that they
called conservative.8 According to Defense Department statistics, by the same time IS
had lost more than 60% of the territory it once held in Iraq and 28% of the territory it
once held in Syria.9 Military pressure has continued into 2017. As this volume goes to
press, the Iraqi-led campaign to liberate Mosul has made significant progress, and Iraqi
officials claim that IS now controls just 7% of Iraq. Preparations for the campaign to
liberate Raqqa are underway.
As battlefield losses piled up for IS in late 2015 and 2016, the narrative of success
that the group continued to convey online became increasingly disconnected from facts
on the ground. Claims of expansion became less credible as both the amount of territo-
ry that the group controlled and its ability to broadcast its message receded. IS visual
media output peaked in August 2015 with more than 700 products. By August 2016,
production had fallen to under 200.10
The world noticed. What was once a flood of foreign fighters to the caliphate,
peaking at some two thousand recruits per month in 2015, has since become a slow-
moving stream.11 Recent estimates suggest that IS is attracting as few as 50 recruits per
month to Iraq and Syria, far from the number needed to replace battlefield casualties.
This reduced inflow of foreign fighters has exacerbated a range of problems – none
more important than military capacity – in what has become a dwindling physical cali-
phate.
For certain fighters, none of this will matter. Some fraction of the men and women
fighting for IS actively seek martyrdom, where death in the service of God is the pri-
mary goal. But this is not the only reason for which people fight. Interviews with for-
mer IS members reveal that many were inspired by the group’s early momentum and
wanted to play an active role in history. Others sought brotherhood or a sense of com-
munity, or they believed that life under sharīʿah would be utopian.12 For these people,
military losses can be and often have been demoralizing.
8
Starr, Barbara. “Military: 50,000 ISIS fighters killed.” CNN Politics. December 9, 2016.
9
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0814_iraq/docs/20161209_ISIL%20Areas%20of%20
Influence_August%202014%20through%20November%202016_Map.pdf?ver=2017-01-06-094734-253.
10
11
Witte, Griff, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley. “Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic
State Loses Its Edge.” The Washington Post. September 9, 2016.
12
Neumann, Peter. “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors.” The Interna-
tional Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. 2015.
Beyond attacking military positions and rank-and-file soldiers, the United States
and coalition partners have targeted key individuals at the nexus of the digital and
physical caliphates. Counterterrorism measures, including but not limited to drone
strikes, have eliminated more than a dozen high-ranking IS media specialists from the
physical – and therefore also from the digital – battlefield. These include individuals
that followers of IS developments will recognize, like IS spokesman Abu Muhammad
al-Adnani and Abu Muhammad al-Furqan, as well as lesser-known but still influential
virtual combatants like Junaid Hussain, Neil Prakash, and Reyaad Khan. 13 Though
these individuals have been replaced in the IS hierarchy, their talents have not. Reports
suggest that officials “have been surprised that the Islamic State has failed to replace
[such individuals] with hackers of comparable ability.”
Attacking the Digital Caliphate
Beyond the physical world, the United States and coalition partners have targeted IS
online. Reductive strategies have sought to reduce the amount of extremist material
available to potential sympathizers by removing content from the web. Additive strate-
gies have sought to promote online alternatives to extremist messaging, drawing on a
range of voices and techniques.
Reductive strategies have generally taken two forms: the removal of entire content
distribution platforms and the removal of specific content. Analysts familiar with IS
websites know that these are as ephemeral as they are prolific, always subject to attack
by governments, private-sector actors, and activist hackers. Other content distribution
platforms, such as the short-lived IS smartphone app “Dawn of Glad Tidings” (or simp-
ly “Dawn”) have also been subject to fast removal from the web.
The most successful online campaign against IS has involved Twitter. In 2014 and
2015, the group and its sympathizers used the popular microblog to great effect, hijack-
ing hashtags and posting up to 200,000 tweets per day.14 In response, Twitter partnered
with governments and private-sector entities, drawing on dedicated human capital and
data analytics to disrupt IS use of the platform. Technology used by companies like
Google and Facebook to remove pornography and copyright-protected material was

refashioned by Twitter to remove imagery of IS-perpetrated violence. In recent years,
the company has suspended hundreds of thousands of IS-directed and inspired ac-
counts, and the IS presence on the platform has declined precipitously. 15 Other compa-
nies have learned lessons from the case and applied lessons in their own online battles
against IS.
Despite much success, reductive strategies will not cripple the digital caliphate: IS
is likely to remain strong online for the foreseeable future. Indeed, in recent years the
group has adapted, spreading its presence far and wide across social media platforms.
IS now has an active online presence on Facebook, Google+, Instagram, justpaste.it,
13
Goldman, Adam and Eric Schmitt. “One by One, ISIS Social Media Experts Are Killed as Result of
F.B.I. Program. The New York Times. November 24, 2016.
14
Greenberg, Jon. “Does the Islamic State Post 90,000 social media messages each day?” Politifact.com.
February 19, 2015.
15
Woolf, Nicky. “Twitter suspends 235,000 accounts in six months for promoting terrorism.” The Guardi-
an. August 18, 2016.
Kik, last.fm, Silent Circle, Snapchat, surespot, Telegram, Threema, Tublr, Twitter,
WhatsApp, WordPress, Quora, Zello, and other platforms. All of this is in addition to
its presence on the dark web. The group’s most prominent social media presence today
is on Telegram, an encrypted app that allows for the creation of private message groups
of up to 5,000 and broadcasting to unlimited audiences. IS could abandon Telegram in
favor of another tomorrow.
IS use of multiple social media platforms and increasing reliance on encrypted

apps and websites hosted outside of the United States may seem daunting. These inno-
vations do reflect the group’s ability to adapt, and they pose unique challenges for law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. At the same time, they reflect an increasingly
difficult media landscape for IS. The group is spreading its digital presence across plat-
forms because it understands the risks of disproportionate attention to any single plat-
form. Encrypted messages are more difficult to detect, but they reach far fewer people.
Removing websites in other countries can be difficult, but this challenge offers oppor-
tunities to partner with foreign states. In short, while reductive strategies are not silver
bullets, in at least some cases they are having their intended effects.
Additive approaches to countering IS online have also involved governments, non-

governmental organizations, and the private sector. Rather than removing IS-content
from the web, the principal goal of additive approaches has been to produce and dis-
seminate narratives that counter those promulgated by IS. As with reductive strategies,
additive approaches have improved over time. Early efforts, such as the U.S. State De-
partment’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (2011–2016), often
involved direct engagement with extremists through posting English-language counter-
IS content online. Approaches today are more sophisticated. Increasingly, entities part-
ner with credible local sources to craft and deliver messages in local languages – espe-
cially Arabic.
In the United States, the recently-formed Global Engagement Center (GEC) is the
best example of an entity pursuing an additive approach to counter IS online. Formed
in March 2016, the GEC describes itself as “an interagency [organization]…charged
with coordinating U.S. counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences.” 16 For the
GEC, this involves work in four core areas: partnerships, data analytics, content, and
interagency engagement. Drawing from the GEC website, partnerships seek to em-
power “positive messengers … to deliver messages that resonate with at-risk popula-
tions. [Partners] including NGOs, schools, young people, social and civil society lead-
ers, religious leaders, governments, and others.” Reliance on data analytics seeks to
guide and inform messaging efforts, including by measuring their effectiveness. In
terms of content, the GEC is pursuing collaborative, thematic campaigns with counter-
IS coalition nations and others, where “direct engagement with violent extremists has
been reduced in favor of partner-driven messaging and enhancing [partner] content ca-
pabilities.” Finally, interagency engagement refers to the GEC’s coordination of opera-
tions across various United States national security agencies.
Non-governmental organizations also hold promise. In Europe, the Vienna Obser-

vatory for Applied-Research on Terrorism and Extremism (VORTEX)17 is a cohort of
16
https://www.state.gov/r/gec/.
17
http://vortex.univie.ac.at/news/.
researchers at the University of Vienna who monitor and analyze Arabic-language ex-
tremist content online. VORTEX has done important work in a number of areas, in-
cluding by partnering with organizations and governments abroad. For example, in re-
cent years the group partnered with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), an Indonesian Muslim
organization claiming more than 50 million members, to produce and promote theolog-
ically rigorous alternatives to IS narratives across Southeast Asia. More recently, the
group has produced professional-grade media products with the look and feel of IS
productions, but that convey very different messages. Some of these have drawn on the
experiences of former extremists, including those who have traveled to the physical ca-
liphate.
Challenges and Policy Recommendations
For all of the recent success in battling IS on- and offline, formidable challenges re-
main. Recent history has proven that military gains against insurgencies, even dramatic
gains, can be fleeting. The existence of IS, which rose from its own ashes in 2011, is
testament to this fact. Moreover, regardless of how long dismantling the physical cali-
phate takes, the digital caliphate appears set to endure.
This means that the coalition fighting IS must constantly reevaluate its on- and of-
fline strategies. To that end, this section identifies key questions and tradeoffs that poli-
cymakers must consider going forward. In doing so, it proposes policy refinements that
would build on recent success.
Answering the Kurdish Question
One of the key obstacles to articulating end-game scenarios for the conflicts in Syria
and Iraq has been identifying the role that an important ethnic minority – the Kurds –
will play in regional politics when (or even before) violence in the region subsides.
This unresolved question is complicated by the fact that Kurdish armed groups have
been exceedingly important to the fight. In Iraq, the Peshmerga have been essential to
rolling back IS-held territory, especially in and around Mosul. In Syria, the Kurdish
People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the United States’ preferred force to dislodge IS
from Raqqa.
Complications abound. Turkey vociferously objects to international support for the

YPG based on that group’s ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The latter,
which has battled Ankara since 1984, has been designated a terrorist organization by
Turkey, the EU, and the United States. Turkey also fears what the Kurds expect – and
might get – for their participation in Syria and Iraq: independence. The key considera-
tion here is that Kurdish autonomy could lead to the sacrifice of Turkish geography.
Tensions also exist between the Kurds and the governments in Syria and Iraq. In
addition to fighting IS, the YPG has battled the Assad government since the war in Syr-
ia began in 2011. Though Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad recognized each other after the
fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, disagreements over oil rights and revenue sharing
flared in 2011 and 2012. The unequal distribution of Iraqi oil, and its disproportionate
share in Iraqi Kurdistan, mean that Baghdad is unlikely to be receptive to Kurdish in-
dependence.
In this context, the Western-led anti-IS coalition faces important questions. First,
should the YPG lead the fight to dislodge IS from Raqqa? Second, to what extent are
YPG operations in Syria and Peshmerga operations in Iraq likely to exacerbate ethnic
tensions? Third, should the United States support an independent Kurdish state in re-
turn for Kurdish efforts during the war? These questions are interrelated and involve
tensions between short- and long-term objectives.
Because the United States and its international partners have resisted sending large
numbers of ground forces into Syria, and unless that reality changes under President
Trump, the Western-led anti-IS coalition will have few options to combat IS on the
ground. This contrasts with the situation in Iraq, where the United States has more than
a minimal troop presence and coordinates military operations with the Iraqi army. If
ever military coordination with the Assad regime were considered, despite its war
crimes, those prospects have waned or disappeared entirely since American airstrikes
against the Shayrat airbase in April 2017.
In a military-strategic environment without any good options, the entity best posi-
tioned to combat IS in Raqqa is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a YPG-led coali-
tion that formed in 2015. While this 80,000-plus-member force has shown promise, in-
cluding through battlefield success, its ethnic composition complicates prospects for
clearing – and especially holding – territory. Residents of Raqqa, an overwhelmingly
Sunni Arab city, have reason to be skeptical of Kurdish territorial ambitions, as well as
the character of YPG, and thus SDF, military operations. They like others in the region
recognize that Kurdish military operations are not altruistic. Kurdish generals and polit-
ical officials have indicated intent to hold territory that they clear in the anti-IS cam-
paign.18
To mitigate this problem, several steps should be taken. First, policymakers and
regional partners should push for the continued integration of Arab, especially Sunni
Arab, forces into the SDF. Ideally these would be Syrian nationals, but even the tempo-
rary integration of conventional forces from regional Sunni Arab armies would be
worthwhile. Such continued integration would enhance the ratio of Arabs to non-Arabs
in the SDF, reducing the (correct) sense among most Syrians that the SDF is Kurdish-
led. This could make local populations, especially in Raqqa, more receptive to SDF
clear-and-hold operations.
Second, the United States and others should provide increasingly lethal weaponry
to the SDF, despite objections from Turkey. This is not a policy decision that should be
taken lightly, especially given YPG ties to the PKK. The step would undoubtedly com-
plicate diplomatic relations with Turkey, which over the long term are a strategic pri-
ority for the United States and other Western powers. Though unlikely, it could lead to
the expulsion of United States military personnel and even the closing of United States
military bases in the country. That said, unless the United States and others change
course and send ground forces to Syria, alternative approaches seem infeasible. Though
18
George, Susannah and Qassim Abdul-Zahra. “Mosul Fight is Already Redrawing the Map of Northern
Iraq”. Associated Press. August 27, 2016.
repairing relations with Turkey would take time, diplomatic, economic, and other tools
are available for this purpose. As the symbolic capital of the caliphate, and the principal
city from which IS plots attacks against Western cities and interests, Raqqa must be
cleared.
Ethnic tensions similar to those that complicate politics and military operations in
Syria also play in Iraq, though tensions on that side of the border have flared more be-
tween Kurds and Shia than between Kurds and Sunnis. The Peshmerga have earned a
deserved reputation for being excellent fighters, though often at the expense of Shia
militias in addition to IS. What is clear to many analysts of the broader fight in Iraq is
not necessarily clear to Kurdish commanders on the ground. The anti-IS coalition will
be most effective if the Kurds play a support role to the Iraqi army and Sunni Arab
forces. This is especially true in the battle for Mosul, a city estimated to be around 60%
Sunni. As in Raqqa, Kurds will play a key role in clearing the city. Attempts to hold
non-Kurdish areas would be counterproductive.
All of this speaks to a paradox with potentially transformational consequences.

The recent upheaval in the region has created a window and justification for Kurdish
independence unlike any in the past century. One of the most important steps that poli-
cymakers in the United States and others in the anti-IS coalition could take to resolve
these conflicts would be to pursue a grand bargain with Kurdish leaders. Such a bargain
would need to hold all parties to binding commitments – before, during, and after the
violence. Kurds would need to agree to operate in support roles where appropriate, as
dictated by the coalition. They would need to play pivotal roles in liberating territory in
Syria and Iraq that they would not hold. They would need to moderate territorial ambi-
tions dramatically, recognizing that Western support for formal, legal Kurdish autono-
my would come at high diplomatic cost to the United States and other Western powers,
and higher cost to regional governments. But the product would be a Kurdish state.
Refining Counter-Narratives
As outlined above, recent years have seen improvements both in the crafting of mes-
sages designed to undermine IS narratives and their on- and offline delivery. Increased
focus on local languages, especially Arabic, and partnerships with organizations and
individuals familiar with relevant populations have been especially important. Never-
theless, policy refinements involving target audiences, messages, and messengers could
further improve this aspect of the struggle against IS.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the question of how broadly counter-narratives should

be disseminated is critical. Some analysts have argued in favor of an expensive net,
claiming that these messages need to be spread as far and wide as possible. According
to this logic, all counter-IS publicity is good publicity. Others have pushed back, argu-
ing that in some cases counter-narratives may inadvertently spark interest in IS that
otherwise would not have emerged. When that happens, the effect of such messaging
will not just have been neutral, but counterproductive.
Advocates of broad-based counter-narratives have responded to such concerns

with the analogy of sex-education, doubling down on the claim that information is
power. If students are going to be exposed to sex, the argument goes, they should at
least be informed. Though some will misuse information, on balance society will bene-
fit. This analogy can be drawn out further to the distribution of birth control. Students
may have more sex if schools pass out condoms, but passing out condoms is good poli-
cy because it raises awareness of the risks of unsafe sex.
Though well-intentioned, this analogy falls apart in the present case. The differ-
ence is that while nearly all students will eventually be exposed to sex, only a small
minority of people will be exposed to IS narratives. Some will protest that IS has dom-
inated headlines in recent years, but this rebuttal misses the point. Exposure to the news
is not exposure to the narrative, which in most cases requires seeking IS content online.
The risk of proactively pushing back against IS arguments, then, especially in popula-
tions unlikely to be exposed to them in the first place, is that doing so can generate cu-
riosity that may never have been piqued. This can generate a search for explanations
that may otherwise never have been sought.
To be sure, likely exposure to IS narratives will vary by time and place, where
proximity to IS-held territory may be the best predictor. Though presenting counter-
narratives to people living under IS control is next to impossible, focusing efforts on
cities and towns recently liberated from IS control is essential. In some ways, it may be
useful to think about geographic counter-messaging in terms of concentric circles ema-
nating from IS-held population centers. Physical proximity to the group likely corre-
lates with exposure to its message. After all, IS indoctrination in its most potent form
happens offline. IS dominates what people living under its control see, read, watch, and
hear.
As for counter-narratives themselves, most have focused on undermining IS reli-

gious authority. Efforts have varied widely in terms of sophistication, where simpler
strategies have pointed to verses from the Qur’an or hadith in hopes that sacred text
will be convincing in and of itself. The problem with this approach is that for every
peaceful verse a violent verse can also be found. “There can be no compulsion in reli-
gion” (Qur’an 2:256) is easily met with “Kill the polytheists wherever you find them”
(Qur’an 9:5). More nuanced approaches have sought to contextualize scripture by
drawing on religious authorities to respond directly to IS claims (a point revisited be-
low).
Pushing back against IS theological claims is right and proper. The group is theo-
logically rigorous in its own publications and media products, and it would be a mis-
take to cede this territory or let it go unaddressed. At the same time, the content of me-
dia products that seek to counter IS narratives can and should be expanded. Content
need not focus exclusively or even primarily on theology: a range of alternatives is
available. Footage of coalition military advances (especially by Sunni Arab groups),
testimonials from people who have escaped the caliphate, and confessions of former IS
fighters represent just a few ways that IS can be accurately, if unflatteringly, portrayed.
Real-life depictions of life under the caliphate would likely go further to dissuade po-
tential sympathizers than religious counter-narratives would alone.
Finally, as alluded to above, the messenger matters. The key here is that assump-
tions about which messengers matter in which contexts should be revisited. Organiza-
tions like VORTEX have acted on observations that by now seem intuitive: engage-
ment by Western governments and others who are not Muslim and do not speak Arabic
will be less effective than local alternatives with local credibility. Consequently, VOR-
TEX and others have partnered with scholars of Islam who are fluent in Arabic, from
the Middle East and elsewhere, to directly rebut specific IS claims regarding religious
doctrine and the group’s claim to religious authority generally. This has unequivocally
been an improvement over past approaches involving direct engagement with extremist
claims by Western governments.
Still, refinements can and should be made, and those crafting counter-narratives
may have something to learn from IS in this regard. A recent study by West Point
found that fewer than 1% of IS media products involved leadership-level figures. 19 Ac-
cording to the report, “Islamic state releases contain lots of “average” fighters convey-
ing the group’s message. They may be Iraqi and Syrian locals speaking in Arabic or
recently arrived foreigners from abroad… This gives the whole Islamic State enterprise
an aura of inclusiveness and breadth.” Expanding the range of counter-narrative mes-
sengers to include normal Muslims without special training or unique claims to credi-
bility may also prove fruitful.
Conclusion
This chapter has addressed strategies for undermining the digital and physical cali-
phates, arguing that policymakers must be aware of how these are connected to effec-
tively counter IS. The measures addressed throughout have been increasingly effective
over time and should be continued in current or refined form, as outlined above. As
governments continue to adapt, building on the momentum of recent successes, there is
reason to believe that the physical caliphate can be dismantled in the short to medium
term. This does not mean that all territory in Iraq or Syria will be cleared of IS mem-
bers or sympathizers; that will be a long-term objective. It does mean, however, that
claims to legitimacy based on territorial governance will not be credible. In that con-
text, attracting individuals to specific territory will be a tough sell.
Going forward, policymakers must recognize that gains against IS cannot be en-
during in the absence of broader changes unrelated to kinetic or online operations. Dis-
lodging IS from cities, even strategic cities like Mosul and Raqqa, will not be the most
difficult part of defeating the group. In this sense, the strategies discussed here have
been tactical. While important for reducing IS momentum and liberating millions from
the group’s brutal reign, they have not touched on the underlying grievances and condi-
tions that enabled IS to take root and flourish. The related challenges of poor govern-
ance, impunity, weak states, corruption, and sectarianism, among others, will require
long-term commitments. The United States will have a role to play, as will other states
outside the region, but primary responsibility for addressing these problems must lie
with the governments and peoples that they most affect. Rolling back IS can create
space for the development and implementation of broader solutions. It will not be a
panacea.
19
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30 The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats
IOS Press, 2017
doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-30
Islamic State’s Weapons of Mass

Destruction Capability: An Open Source
Intelligence Approach
Simeon DUKIĆ 1
Abstract. Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state

groups has been a crucial goal for the international community in preserving glob-
al peace and stability. Nevertheless, recent allegations suggest that radical jihadi
groups have gained access and used unconventional weapons in the Middle East.
Namely, there are statements and reports by intelligence officers, politicians and
experts that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has gained access to interna-
tionally prohibited weapons. By systematically using open source intelligence
(OSINT) this paper will assess Islamic State’s weapons of mass destruction capa-
bility. It will look at allegations in relation to the possession and use of weapons of
mass destruction. It will argue that open source information reveals that the group
has produced and employed crude forms of sulphur mustard. Moreover, it will
show, based on two case studies that OSINT provides valuable information in ex-
amining incidents where chemical weapons have likely been used. Before present-
ing its arguments and findings the paper briefly defines open source intelligence
and analyses areas where it provides value. It also examines ISIL’s intentions to
develop and utilize weapons of mass destruction.
Keywords. Open source intelligence, Islamic State, weapons of mass destruction
Introduction
The threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism originat-
ing from non-state groups, particularly extremist jihadi organisations, is a major con-
cern for global peace and security. The international community, and specifically the
Security Council of the United Nations, has reacted to this danger by enacting Resolu-
tion 1540, which obliges states to draft, implement and enforce legislation to prevent
the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist networks. However, the
resolution by itself has not been able to prevent the spread of WMD as shown by recent
allegations that the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) developed rudimentary
chemical weapon capabilities. Namely, John Brennan, the former head of the CIA, has
stated that ISIL fighters have developed the capacity to produce small amounts of chlo-
rine and mustard agent [1]. Moreover, the former Director of National Intelligence,
James Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services in Capitol Hill that extremists have
used toxic chemicals as means of warfare on the territory of Syria and Iraq [2].
A November 2016 report by IHS Conflict Monitor, a subsidiary of IHS Markit, an

information analytics company, has identified 52 uses of chemical agents since
1
Simoen Dukic, Jane Sandanski 19/1–14, Skopje 1000, Macedonia; E-mail: simeon.dukic@gmail.com.
S. Dukić / Islamic State’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability: An OSINT Approach 31
2014 [3]. To substantiate its findings IHS Conflict Monitor used open source infor-
mation from social media, local news reports, and IS propaganda. This paper examines
the value of open source intelligence (OSINT) in uncovering and verifying alleged ISIL
chemical weapons capability in Iraq and Syria. It argues that OSINT is an important
tool for identifying likely uses of chemical weapons. Due to a large amount of chemical
weapon incidents in the Middle East the use of open sources can be instrumental for
relevant organisations and institutions to discern cases where there is a higher probabil-
ity that chemical agents were utilized.
In order to achieve its goal the paper first defines open source intelligence and
briefly introduces its use and (increased) relevance in recent history. Second, the article
confirms the intentions of ISIL to obtain WMDs from open sources. Specifically, it
presents the so called “Laptop of Doom” and the statements made by a Muslim Dutch
fighter on social media. Third, it introduces allegations and facts about extremist
group’s WMD capability. Fourth, the paper analyses case studies where open source
information has been crucial in presenting a strong probability that chemical weapons
have been developed and used by ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the paper exam-
ines challenges and limitations of open source intelligence when conducting online re-
search on the WMD capabilities of the jihadi organisation.
Open Source Intelligence
Traditionally, intelligence has been viewed as an activity which is derived from confi-
dential sources and through covert methods. However, with the recent technological
developments and proliferation of mobile devices there has been an increased debate on
the value of open source intelligence. Richard A. Best Jr. and Alfred Cumming argue
that the current ability to quickly process vast amounts of data, and the simplicity asso-
ciated with its sharing have increased the utility of open source information compared
to secret data, making it the core component of intelligence analysis [4]. Furthermore,
Allen Dulles, a former prominent Director of Central Intelligence, has stated that dur-
ing peacetime around 80% of the information supplied to intelligence agencies comes
from open sources and through overt means [5]. However, what is open source intelli-
gence, and what is its added value in intelligence collection and processing?
Definition
US Intelligence Community Directive No. 301 defines open source information as any
publically available information that anyone can lawfully obtain by request, purchase,
or observation. Moreover, it adds that open source intelligence is the insight produced
from publically available information that is collected, exploited and disseminated in a
timely manner and addressed to a specific audience dealing with a particular intelli-
gence requirement [6]. This information can be found in print and digital form includ-
ing (social) media, public data (such as official government reports, statements etc.),
academic literature, commercial imagery, human experts, grey literature, niche com-
mercial sites and leaked documents [7]. However, there presence of information in the
public domain does not mean that this data is readily available to everyone due to legal,
monetary and other practical restrictions associated with its collection [8].
32 S. Dukić / Islamic State’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability: An OSINT Approach
Value
The value of open source intelligence has been widely disputed by intelligence officers
and experts. The general perception on the value of open source intelligence during the
Cold War within the US intelligence community has been marginal. It was regarded
that information in the public domain has little use, and that secret and covertly collect-
ed data have exclusive benefit to the decision making processes of intelligence agencies.
Moreover the term “open source intelligence” was regarded as an oxymoron by practi-
tioners because only confidential information was regarded as real intelligence.
To be able to assess the value of open source intelligence, one needs to examine
the purpose of intelligence. According to Stevyn Gibson there are generally two agreed
functions: (1) providing actionable data to support decision making, and (2) minimiz-
ing ambiguity in a timely manner [9]. In order to achieve these goals intelligence offic-
ers needs different sources of information and various collection methods to acquire
information that answer specific questions. Hence, as long as open source data can pro-
vide relevant and actionable data to answer specific intelligence questions in a timely
manner, then it should be regarded as an important source of information.
There are five specific areas where OSINT provides value to the intelligence pro-
cess. First, open source data is crucial for giving context to (already) acquired infor-
mation. This is important because looking at pieces of information in isolation could
lead to misguided conclusions. Second, OSINT supplies data that could be used for
corroborating, verifying and challenging gathered data. Third, open source information
could be used to uncover new actionable data that fulfil a particular intelligence re-
quirement. Fourth, collecting OSINT compared to secret information is generally
cheaper and faster. Finally, OSINT is constantly available in large volumes [10].
These benefits have not gone unnoticed by policy makers within US institutions.
Mainly the utility of OSINT was emphasized in the reports of the 9/11 and WMD
Commissions, which were set up to examine the intelligence failures associated with
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
programme, respectively. Their work advocated for the development of a system that
systematically exploits open source data [11]. Based on their recommendations the
Open Source Directorate was opened within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in
2005 that would use modern information processing tools to collect open source infor-
mation [12]. This suggests that OSINT is becoming an integral part of the intelligence
cycle which aims to provide insight for decision makers to address specific policy
questions.
Intentions
Before addressing ISIL’s WMD capability, the paper first briefly examines their inten-
tions to use such weapons by examining open source information. ISIL’s extreme retal-
iatory violence is a significant characteristic of the jihadi group. It has been constantly
expressed with brutal acts such as the beheading of dozens of Syrian and Kurdish sol-
diers, journalists, and other hostages, the burning of a Jordanian pilot, and massacring
various groups on the territory it gained control. In light of this brutalism would the ex-
tremist group hesitate to develop and use of weapons of mass destruction to further
spread its goals? This section examines the findings of the so called “laptop of doom”
and the statements made by ISIL fighter Omar Yilmaz to show ISIL’s intent to use un-
conventional weapons.
In August 2014, journalists Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa reported on a sto-
ry about a laptop given to them by a commander of a Syrian rebel group, which they
had seized from ISIL militants in the north of Syria. According to the documents on the
laptop it belonged to a Tunisian fighter Muhammed S. who studied chemistry and
physics in his home country [13]. The laptop contained around 146 gigabytes of docu-
ments, pictures and video in French, English and Arabic. Among the files was a 19-
page guide to safely weaponize bubonic plague from infected animals and a video
guide on the steps to obtain and produce ricin, a deadly toxin, from castor beans [14].
In addition to this guide the laptop contained a 26-page fatwa issued by Saudi jihadi
cleric Nasir al-Fahr, which approves the use of weapons of mass destructions as a last
resort if Muslims cannot defeat the unbelievers. Most of the files found on this comput-
er had been downloaded from open sources on the internet, which emphasizes the easi-
ness with which one could acquire material that contains practical and ideological in-
structions for conducting unconventional terrorist attacks. The laptop of doom, as the
journalists have named it, is an important indication of the radical group’s intent to re-
cruit semi-skilled people to acquire WMDs and wage jihad.
The intent to acquire and use WMDs can also be inferred from the information
presented on the social media accounts of ISIL fighters. One former Dutch soldier
turned jihadi militant, Omar Yilmaz, pointed out on his Tumblr profile, a micro-
blogging platform, that the group has come in the possession of chemical weapons
agents that were produced by the Assad regime [15]. Moreover, in another post he stat-
ed that the militants were prepared to use them because the Syrian government has al-
ready conducted chemical weapons attacks [16]. At the time of this writing Yilmaz’s
profile has been deactivated from Tumblr, but using archiving websites one could still
access the posts mentioned above [17]. The confessions of this infamous militant show
that the group does not shy away from using internationally prohibited weapons.
Allegations on Capabilities
After confirming ISIL’s intentions to use weapons of mass destruction to terrify, inca-
pacitate, and deter its enemies, it is necessary to analyse their capabilities to do so.
Many prominent politicians, policy makers and experts have stated that the group has
already acquired and used chemical weapons in the territory they control. Hamish de
Bretton-Gordon, a former British Army colonel with expertise in CBRN terrorism, has
warned that ISIL has started producing its own mustard gas and has gained access to
some of Assad’s undeclared stockpile [18]. Moreover, former French Prime Minister
Manuel Valls has warned that the group has plans to smuggle these weapons in Europe
and plan an attack [19]. The section analyses some allegations made in relation to the
group’s possession and use of unconventional weapons on the territory of Syria and
Iraq.
34 S. Dukić / Islamic State’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability: An OSINT Approach
Possession
One of the most serious and widely discussed allegations was ISIL’s theft of around
40 kg of lowly enriched uranium compounds from the University of Mosul in Iraq [20].
This was confirmed by the Iraqi UN Ambassador Mohamed Ali Alhakim in a letter ad-
dressed to former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. The Ambassador wrote that the
extremists have seized control of nuclear material that could be used in the manufactur-
ing of weapons of mass destruction [21]. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this
amount poses any danger of being converted into a nuclear explosive device. The low-
grade uranium was used for research purposes at the university; hence, ISIL fighters
and/or scientists need to have substantial knowledge, raw material, technology and fi-
nancial resources to enrich the uranium, weaponize it, and attach it to a delivery mech-
anism for it to be converted into a nuclear bomb [22]. Lacking these qualities, it is
highly unlikely that the jihadi group would be able to produce a nuclear explosive that
inflicts serious physical harm. However, there are risks associated with this theft;
namely, ISIL militants could use it create a simple radiological device called a “dirty
bomb” where explosives are combined with the radioactive material. Nevertheless, the
radioactivity released in this manner is relatively small and has limited negative health
effects [23].
Other allegations suggest that ISIL fighters have captured chemical weapons from
the former Iraqi and Syrian programmes. The Islamic State controlled a part of Iraq’s
territory where Al-Muthanna, the site where the former Iraqi chemical weapons pro-
gramme, was located. It has been reported that the bunkers contained nearly 2000 emp-
ty shells contaminated with mustard gas and around 600 one-tonne mustard contain-
ers [24]. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that ISIL was able to get any of this material
because the United Nations Special Commission and the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission inspectors reported twenty years ago that the
material at Al Muthanna had been degraded. Additionally, the bunkers where the UN
Special Commission destroyed the agent are sealed, which means that getting access to
them would be extremely difficult and dangerous [25]. Thus, it is highly unlikely that
ISIL acquired any chemical weapons from this compound.
In Syria there are testimonies that Nusra Front fighters, a rebel group with close
ties to al-Qaeda, captured a base controlled by Syrian Army named Regiment 111 in
December, 2012 [26]. Nevertheless, when the group split, fighters that joined ISIL
were in possession of the unconventional weapons. At that time Syria was not a party
to Chemical Weapons Convention and it had a significant stockpile of chemical agents.
According to a former ISIL fighter the base contained swaths of ammunition and ar-
mament including a cache of chemical weapons. Specifically, there were barrels with
chlorine, sarin, and mustard gas. Three months later the same operative suspects that
ISIL fighters used the agents in the first reported chemical attack during the Syrian war
near the town of Aleppo [27]. However, it is difficult to claim with certainty based on
these allegations that ISIL has under its possession chemical weapons because even its
operative testifying on this matter did not have material evidence that the chemical
weapons stolen at Regiment 111 landed in the hands of the jihadi group.
Finally, it has been reported that ISIL has developed crude chemical weapons ca-
pabilities and home-made delivery systems. This allegation is substantiated by the
claim that among the thousands of fighters that have been arriving to Syria and Iraq are
also skilled scientists with degrees in physics, chemistry and biology that can produce
deadly weapons [28]. One of the most infamous scientists that joined ISIL was Abu
Malik, who also participated in Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons programme.
CBRN experts believe that these individuals could manufacture chemical weapons be-
cause material is relatively easy to acquire, and producing the lethal chemicals is not
complicated [29]. The theory that ISIL is producing its own chemical weapons has also
been supported by an investigation at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPWC). After an analysis of a sample of mustard gas taken from the territo-
ry of Syria and Iraq the head of the organisation, Ambassador Uzumcu, stated that the
results showed that the substance was of a poor quality likely to have been produced by
ISIL scientists [30]. The availability of skilled individuals and the relative simplicity to
attain and produce chemical material make allegations of ISIL produced chemical ca-
pability serious. Additionally, the confirmation of rudimentary capabilities by the head
of the OPCW and US intelligence officials has made CBRN terrorism threat a high
possibility.
Attacks
Local non-governmental organisations and media outlets have recorded incidents of

alleged chemical weapons use. For example, the Syrian Network for Human Rights
(SNHR), an NGO which documents violations against Syrian civilians, has reported
139 chemical weapon attacks on Syrian territory since UN Security Resolution 2118,
which condemned and prohibited the use of chemical warfare in the country, was
passed in September 2013 [31]. In its finding it has attributed a minority of attacks,
around 3%, to ISIL fighters. Although this is a small percentage, it is still alarming be-
cause it points to ISIL’s determination to use chemical agents for warfare. Another
NGO called the Syrian Archive has collected 392 verified videos which suggest chemi-
cal weapons use [32]. These videos include allegations of both Syrian government and
ISIL unconventional weapon incidents.
ISIL has allegedly targeted different groups with its chemical arsenal including
Peshmega, Syrian and Iraqi government forces, rebel groups, and civilians. Nonethe-
less, at the time of this writing there has been one official finding by an international
body that chemical agents were used by the terrorist group. Namely, the Joint Investi-
gative Mechanism (JIM) set up by the UN and the OPCW with a mandate to identify to
the greatest extent possible individuals, entities and groups who organised, sponsored,
or were otherwise involved in the use of chemical weapons, concluded in its third re-
port that chemical toxins were used on three occasions on the territory of Syria [33].
The JIM investigated 29 out of 116 incidents where chemical weapons were allegedly
employed from which only nine of the most severe events for which forensically verifi-
able data was available were further examined. Based on the evidence collected and
processed the leadership panel of the investigatory body found that ISIL used sulphur
mustard on August 21st 2015 in Marea, a city 35 km north-east of Aleppo [34]. The
fact-finding mission stated that there had been around 50 artillery projectiles filled with
different payloads fired at the city from the east, or north-east, which are areas con-
trolled by ISIL. The Mechanism reported that artillery shells were filled with a dark
viscous liquid, which is believed to be sulphur mustard [35]. One should note that alt-
hough the agent is often referred to as mustard gas, it comes in a liquid form. Moreover,
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EXPLANATION OF THE PLATES TO VOL. I.
PLATE I.
Fig. 1. The Saw used by carpenters. (Taken from
Chirurgia è Græco in Latinum conversa, Vido Vidio
interprete Lutetiæ Parisiorum, p. 115.)
2. A small Saw. (Ibid.)
3. The Modiolus, or ancient Trephine. (Ibid.)
4. The Terebra, or Trepan, called Abaptiston. (Ibid. p.
116.)
5. The Auger used by carpenters. (Ibid. p. 116.)
6. The Terebra, or Trepan, which is turned round by a
thong bound tight about its middle. (Ibid. p. 117.)
7. The Auger, or Trepan, which is turned round by a
bow. (Ibid. p. 118.)
8. A Terebra, or Trepan, which is turned round by a
thong on a cross-beam. (Ibid. p. 119.)
9. A Terebra, or Trepan, which has a ball in its upper
end, by which it is turned round. (Ibid. p. 120.)
10. A Terebra, or Trepan, which is turned round by a
cross piece of wood, or handle, on its upper end. (Ibid. p.
120.)
PLATE II.
Fig. 1. A Terebra, or Trepan, turned round
by a handle in its middle. (Ibid. p. 122.) It
resembles the centre-bit of modern artisans.
1. A hole into which the iron head is fixed.
2. Upright part, three inches long.
3. Cross part, one inch long.
4. The part which is grasped in turning
the instrument.
5. Cross part, an inch long.
6. Upright part.
7. A ball fixed to the top.
a. b. c. Different forms of the iron head
fixed in the hole 1.
Fig. 2. Scalper rectus, or straight

Raspatory. (Ibid. p. 123.)
3. Scalper in medio recurvatus, or bent
Raspatory. (Ibid. p. 123.)
4, 5, 6. Ancient Modioli, as represented by
Pott (Injuries of the Head, p. 153).
PLATE III.
Figs. 1 and 2. A Scalper, or Raspatory, with which
the moderns scrape the bone. (Chirurgia è Græco,
&c., p. 125.)
3. Scalper cavus or scooped Raspatory. (Ibid. p.
126.)
4. A Lenticular. (Ibid. p. 127.)
5. A Malleolus, or Mallet. (Ibid. p. 126.)
6. A Lever, by which modern surgeons protect the
dura mater, and raise a depressed bone. (Ibid. p.
128.)
7. The ancient Meningophylax. (Ibid. p. 128.)
8. Forfex excisoria, or Cutting Scissors. (Ibid. p.
129.)
9. A Forceps, used for extracting bones. (Ibid. p.
130.)
FOOTNOTES:
[1] It is necessary to inform my readers in this place, that,
owing to its bulk, it has been judged expedient by the Council of
the Sydenham Society to divide the work into two separate parts
or volumes.
[2] This is the view which is taken regarding the origin of
Grecian medicine by Schulze, in his Historia Medicinæ. He is a
most learned and trustworthy authority on the history of medicine,
but in the present instance his judgment is biassed by the opinion
which was generally held in his age with respect to the origin of
Grecian philosophy. At that time it was customary to follow the
later Platonists in tracing the rise of philosophy to Egypt. Lord
Monboddo, in his work on Ancient Metaphysics, strongly
espouses this opinion, which, in fact, was the established belief of
learned men down to a late period. Kant advocated the views
which are here adopted.
[3] See in particular the introductory chapters to Ritter’s
History of Ancient Philosophy; Thirlwall’s History of Greece, c. xii.;
Grote’s History of Greece, P. I., c. xvii. The opinion now generally
held on this subject may be explained in few words. The Homeric
poems are beyond all doubt of Grecian origin, for it cannot be
shown that the ancient Egyptians or Babylonians had anything
resembling a regular epos. Now, as Mr. Grote well observes,
“from the poetry of Homer to the history of Thucydides, and the
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, was a prodigious step, but it
was the native growth of the Hellenic youth into the Hellenic man,
and what is of still greater moment, it was brought about without
breaking the thread either of religious or poetic tradition—without
any coercive innovation or violent change in the mental feelings.
The transition of Grecian mind from its poetical to its
comparatively positive state was self-operated, and accomplished
by its own inherent and expansive force—aided indeed, but by no
means either impressed or provoked, from without.”—L. c.
[4] Plato, Menex.
[5] Celsus mentions Pythagoras, Empedocles, and
Democritus, as the most distinguished of the philosophers who
cultivated medicine.—Præfat.
[6] “Hippocrates primus ab studio sapientiæ disciplinam hanc
separavit.”—Præfat.
[7] See the authorities quoted at Paulus Ægineta, Vol. I., p.
73, Syd. Soc. edition; also in particular Xenophon’s Memorabilia,
iii., 13; and Pausanias, ii., 2. The most complete list which is
anywhere given of the ancient Asclepia, is that contained in
Schulze’s History of Medicine, i., 24. It is to be regretted, however,
that the references to Pausanias are made according to the
pages of an old edition, instead of books and chapters, so that
one experiences some difficulty in finding the passages referred
to. The number of Asclepia in Greece noticed by him is sixty-four.
Plutarch states in positive terms that all the Temples of Health
were erected in high situations, and where the air was
wholesome.—(Quæst. Rom.) On the practice of medicine in the
Ancient Temples of Health, see further Sprengel, Hist. de la Méd.,
e. v. Sprengel, however, does not acknowledge so candidly as he
ought to have done his obligations to his predecessor Schulze.
[8] Philostratus, Vita Apollonii, i., 9; Strabo, Geogr., xiv.
[9] Pausanias, vii., 21.
[10] This I have reason to know is the belief of the learned and
estimable author of the Isis Revelata.
[11] Aristides, Orat. in Æsculap., viii. It may be proper to state
that Sprengel, in referring to this passage (Hist. de la Méd., p.
160. French edition), falls into the mistake of saying that these
medicines were prescribed to Aristides himself.
[12] Galen, de Administ, Anatom., ii.
[13] Censura Operum Hippocrat., p. 184.
[14] Hist. de la Méd., i., 5, p. 175, French edit. Schulze, in like
manner, depreciates the anatomical knowledge of the
Asclepiadæ, and holds that it had been overrated by Galen.—
Hist. Med., i., 2, 5.
[15] Comment, in Libr. de Artie, iii., 28; de Decret. Hippocrat.
et Platon., viii., I.
[16] Polit., iii., 399; ed. Tauchnitz.
[17] Geograph., xiv., 2.
[18] De Sanitate tuenda, i.
[19] L. c.
[20] Galen, Opera, tom. iv., ed. Basil, 35.
[21] Aristotle, Polit., vii., 4. Notwithstanding the high
compliment which Aristotle here pays to the professional
reputation of Hippocrates, there can be no doubt that he does not
always make proper acknowledgment for the many obligations
which he lies under to the Coan sage. Galen states repeatedly
that the greater part of Aristotle’s physiology is derived from
Hippocrates.
[22] See some ingenious observations on these mythical
genealogies in Grote’s History of Greece., vol. i., p. 593. He holds
that they are altogether unworthy of credit, or at least that there is
no test whereby one can separate the true from the false in them.
Clinton, indeed, in his Fasti Hellenici, attaches more importance
to them; but apparently Mr. Grote’s judgment on them is perfectly
just. See further vol. ii., p. 53, etc.
[23] Noctes Atticæ, xvii., 21.
[24] That Hippocrates drew the rudiments of his medical
knowledge from the reports of cases collected in the Asclepion of
Cos, is attested by good authorities. See Strabo, Geogr., xiv.;
Pliny, H. N., xxix., 2.
[25] On the introduction of the gymnastic exercises into the
practice of medicine, see Schulze, Hist. Med., i., 2, 8. The author
of the VI. Epidem. condemns Herodicus for using exercises in the
treatment of acute diseases. Herodicus is frequently mentioned in
the Dialogues of Plato. See Protagoras, § 20; and de Repub., iii.
Plato says, that being in ill health, he wore out first himself and
afterwards many others, by combining gymnastics with medicine.
[26] Somnus alludes to this fiction, and quotes Andreas as an
authority for it. See also Pliny, H. N., xxix., 2. Tzetzes calls it the
Temple of Cos, and not of Cnidos, which was burned.
[27] See Plato, Protagoras.
[28] Galen, Comment. in Libr. de Nat. Human.
[29] Suidas in voce Hippocrates.
[30] It was a common practice in ancient times to kindle great
fires as disinfectants or deodorizers. We have entered pretty fully
upon this subject in our Commentary on Paulus Ægineta, Vol. I.,
p. 274. There can be no doubt that it was the established practice
of the profession in the days of Hippocrates. The names of Acron,
Empedocles, and Hippocrates are particularly famous as having
successfully adopted the practice. See Aëtius, v., 94; Paulus
Ægineta, l. c.; Pliny, H. N., xxxvi., 69; and Plutarch, De Iside et
Osiride.
[31] Hist., iii., 87.
[32] It deserves to be mentioned further, as adding probability
to the present narrative, that it was quite common in ancient times
for the Asclepiadæ to be publicly consulted by cities and States
respecting the general health of the inhabitants, and this both for
the prevention and cure of diseases. See Aristid. Opera, i., p. 81.
[33] Galen, in many parts of his works, alludes to the
professional services of Hippocrates during the great plague
described by Thucydides. He mentions decidedly that Thucydides
gives only those symptoms which would strike a common, that is
to say, a non-professional man; whereas Hippocrates describes
the disease accurately like a professional man, but gives few of
those symptoms which appeared most interesting to Thucydides.
—De Difficult. Respir., ii., 7.
[34] Thucydides mentions that the mortality of the plague was
greatly aggravated by the influx of the people from the country
into the city, and the crowding of them in ill-ventilated huts. (ii.,
52.) Mitford, in describing the plague of Athens, remarks that the
want of sewers in ancient times must have contributed very much
to the severity of the disease. (Hist. of Greece, vol. ii., p. 195.) He
refers (l. c.) to Strabo (Geogr. v.) for proof that the Romans were
the first people who constructed sewers.
[35] See Xenophon, Cyropæd., i. and viii.
[36] Galen, Comment in libr. de Artic. iii.
[37] Xenophon, Anabasis, i. It has never been clearly
determined whether he was in the suite of Artaxerxes the king, or
of his brother Cyrus, before the battle of Cunaxa, in which the
latter was killed, and the former being severely wounded, was
attended professionally by Ctesias. Diodorus Siculus, indeed,
says decidedly that he was taken prisoner on the occasion. (Bibl.
ii., 32.) But we are certain, from the authentic narrative of
Xenophon, that he was not taken prisoner in the battle, nor is it
likely that he was one of those who were kidnapped afterwards,
otherwise the historian would certainly not have omitted the name
of so distinguished a personage. Besides, had he been brought to
Babylon in this way, as a captive, Artaxerxes was not likely to
have intrusted his royal life to a person who had been so lately
the professional attendant on his rebel brother.
[38] See Thucyd., ii., 48.
[39] De Prisca Medicina.
[40] See in the next section, under xxiii. Though I have not
admitted the treatise here referred to into the list of genuine
works, it will be seen below that it possesses considerable
evidence in its favor, and that beyond doubt it is very ancient.
[41] Aphor., I., 1.
[42] See Galen, Opera, tom. v., p. 488; ed. Basil.
[43] This is clearly defined and stated by Aristotle, Phys., i.
See also Boethius in Præd., p. 113; ed. Basil.
[44] This is the more remarkable, as it does not appear to
have been the established creed of the greatest literary men and
philosophers of the age, who still adhered or professed to adhere
to the popular belief in the extraordinary interference of the gods
with the works of Nature and the affairs of mankind. This at least
was remarkably the case with Socrates, whose mind, like that of
most men who make a great impression on the religious feelings
of their age, had evidently a deep tinge of mysticism. See
Xenoph. Memor., i., 1, 6–9; Ibid. iv., 7, 7; also Grote’s History of
Greece, vol. i., p. 499. The latter remarks, “Physical and
astronomical phenomena are classified by Socrates among the
divine class, interdicted to human study.” (Mem., i. 1, 13.) He
adds, in reference to Hippocrates, “On the other hand,
Hippocrates, the contemporary of Socrates, denied the
discrepancy, and merged into one the two classes of phenomena
—the divine and the scientifically determinable,—which the latter
had put asunder. Hippocrates treated all phenomena as at once
both divine and scientifically determinable.” (p. 499.) He then
quotes the memorable passage in the treatise “On Airs,” etc. It
does not appear, however, that in ancient times the charge of
Atheism was ever brought against him. It has been urged against
him by modern fanatics, but scarcely deserves a serious
refutation. See Schulze (Hist. Med., i., 3, 2), and Ackerman (Hist.
Lit. Hippocr., pp. xii, xiii; ed. Kühn). By such persons, whoever
does not join in their anthropomorphical notions of a first cause is
held up for an Atheist.
[45] For the medicine of the ancient Jews, Egyptians, and
Babylonians, see the introductory chapters of Sprengel’s Hist. de
la Méd. The medicine of the Hindoos, as given in the “Susruta” of
D’Hanvantare, abounds in superstitious practices.
[46] Epidem., vi.
[47] Epidem., i.
[48] De Diæta in Morb. Acut., Prognost., 15. See the argument
to the Appendix to the former work.
[49] See Galen, Oper. tom. v., p. 106; ed. Basil.
[50] See De Morbis, pluries; de Prisca, Med., 22.
[51] De Superfœt. et pluries.
[52] De Ratione Victus in Acut. There is some doubt, however,
whether the σκαμμώνιον of Dioscorides be the Convolvulus
scammonia. Some rather take it for the C. sagittifolius.
[53] De Superfœt. et alibi.
[54] De Morb. Mulier.
[55] De Fract., Aphor. et alibi.
[56] Galen, Meth. Med., v., 3; Comment. in Libr. de Humor.
See further in illustration, Œconom. Hippocrat. under
Παροχετεύειν and 'Αντίσπασις; and Schulze, Hist. Med., i., 3, 4,
10.
[57] See Epidem., i, and iii.; Aphor., i., 16; and De Diæta
Acutor., passim.
[58] See de Morbis, ii.; and Le Clerc, Hist. Med., 1, 3, 20.
[59] See the work “On the Articulations,” pluries.
[60] See in particular Venesect. adv. Erasistrat., Comment. in
Lib. de Offic. Medic.
[61] De Dyspn., ii., p. 181; ed. Basil. This brevity of style,
Galen, in another passage of the same work, pronounces to be
characteristic of all the old writings. In fact, when the materials of
writing were scarce and dear, it is not likely that authors would
indulge in an extravagant use of them.
[62] Coray, Traité de Hippocrat. des Airs, etc., Discours
préliminaire, pp. l., lvii.
[63] Dionysius Halicarnassensis de iis quæ Thucyd. propria
sunt, et de Platon. judicium.
[64] Opus supra laudatum, p. clxxiv.
[65] See the editions of Horace by Bentley and Tate, pluries.
[66] See in Bentley’s Horace. The poet himself in several of
his pieces, alludes to the separate publication of the various
books, as i., 97; vi., 1; ii., præfat.; et pluries.
[67] See Middleton’s Life of Cicero, pluries.
[68] See the editions by Ast, Bekker, and Stallbaum, and the
ancient authorities there referred to.
[69] See the preliminary dissertation prefixed to Buhle’s
edition; also Schneider’s edition of the Historia Animalium,
Epimetrum iii.
[70] He mentions, in his commentary on the treatises entitled
“On Regimen in Acute Diseases,” that, from the marks of
confused arrangement about it, he was persuaded the author had
left it in an unfinished state, and that it had been published after
his death. See Opera, tom. v., p. 70; ed. Basil.
[71] See Galen, de Crisibus, i., 6.
[72] Galen, Gloss., tom. v., p. 705; ed. Basil. As frequent
mention of the commentators will occur in the course of this work,
I will here subjoin a complete list of them, with a few brief notices
of them, more especially of a chronological nature, derived
principally from the following sources: Ackerman, Bibliotheca
Græca; Dietz, Præfatio in Scholia Apollonii, etc.; Littré, Op.
Hippocrat., tom. i., pp. 80–132; Daremberg, Cours sur l’Histoire et
la Littérature des Sciences Médicales.
Herophilus, the famous anatomist of Alexandria;
flourished about from 310–280 a.c.
Xenocrates of Cos, quoted by Erotian as an authority
on the Prognostics; nearly contemporary with
Herophilus.
Philinus of Cos, contemporary with Herophilus, and
probably a disciple.
Bacchius, contemporary with Philinus.
Glaucias immediately after Bacchius; flourished
probably between 290–260 a.c.
Zeuxis the Empiric, immediately after Glaucias and
before Zeno; probably from 270–240 a.c. See
Daremberg.
Heraclides Tarentinus, somewhat later than Bacchius,
probably between 260–240 a.c.
Zeno the Herophilean, the contemporary and rival of
Heraclides; probably the same as Zeno of
Laodicea.
Apollonius Biblas, the contemporary and rival of Zeno.
Callimachus, according to Daremberg, an immediate
disciple of Herophilus.
Epiceleustus of Crete, of uncertain date.
Apollonius Ophis, of uncertain date.
Lysimachus of Cos, uncertain.
Euphorion, uncertain.
Heraclides the Erythrean, rather uncertain; but,
according to Daremberg, a contemporary with
Heraclides Tarentinus. The same as Heraclides the
Herophilean. (Strabo, Geogr., xiv.)
Epicles, uncertain.
Eurycles, uncertain.
Philonides of Sicily, uncertain.
Ischomachus, uncertain.
Cydias, uncertain.
Cinesias, uncertain.
Demetrius, the Epicurean.
Diagoras, uncertain.
Nicander the Poet of Colophon, from 150–120 a.c.
Apollonius Citiensis; Daremberg places him between
80–52 a.c. See also Dietz and Littré.
Asclepiades of Bithynia, contemporary with Pompey the
Great; about 60–40 a.c.
Thessalus, the famous Methodist; about 50–70 p.c.
Erotian flourished in the reign of Nero, from 50–70 p.c.
His Glossary still preserved.
Sabinus, of uncertain date, but probably not long
anterior to Galen, by whom he is frequently quoted.
(Op., tom. v., p. 433.)
Metrodorus, disciple of Sabinus.
Rufus or Ruffus Ephesius, contemporary with Sabinus.
Several of his works remain, but no portion of his
Commentaries on Hippocrates.
Marinus, the celebrated anatomist, about the beginning
of the second century p.c.
Quintus, the Empiric, probably about from 110–130 p.c.
Lycus, the Macedonian, the disciple of Quintus; from
120–140 p.c. See Daremberg.
Lycus, of Naples, date rather uncertain.
Artemidorus, a favorite of the Emperor Hadrian; often
blamed by Galen for his alterations of the text;
about 120–140 p.c.
Dioscorides (not the author of the Materia Medica), an
associate of Artemidorus.
Numesianus, somewhat later than Dioscorides.
Dionysius, about the time of the last.
Pelops, the disciple of Numesianus.
Satyrus, the disciple of Quintus.
Phecianus, the disciple of Quintus.
Julian the Alexandrian, the immediate predecessor of
Galen, who frequently animadverts on his writings.
Galen, flourished between 150–190 p.c.; wrote
Commentaries, still in existence, on the following
works:—On the Nature of Man; on Regimen in
Health; on Regimen in Acute Diseases; on the
Prognostics; on the First Book of the Prorrhetics;
on the Aphorisms; on the First, the Third, and the
Sixth Books of the Epidemics; on the Treatise on
Fractures; on the Articulations; on the Physicians’
Establishment or Surgery; on the Humours;
fragments of the Commentaries on Airs, Waters,
Places, and on the Aliment. Besides these, he
wrote several other Commentaries, which are lost.
Domnus, of uncertain date, after Galen.
Attalion, like the last, cited in the Commentary attributed
to Oribasius.
Philagrius, of uncertain date, quoted by Theophilus.
Gesius, of uncertain date.
Asclepius, of uncertain date, quoted by Theophilus.
(Dietz, tom. ii., p. 458.)
Stephanus, the Athenian, supposed by Dietz to have
lived in the reign of Heraclius, that is to say, in the
earlier part of the seventh century. According to
Dietz, not the same as Stephanus Alexandrinus.
Palladius, probably about the seventh century; his
Commentary on the book “On Fractures,” published
by Foës, and a considerable portion of his
Commentary “On the Sixth Epidemic,” by Dietz.
Joannes Alexandrinus, probably near the time of
Palladius; part of his Commentary “On the Nature
of the Young Man,” published by Dietz.
Theophilus, or Philotheus, surnamed Protospatharius,
probably flourished in the seventh century p.c. See
the Annotations of Dr. Greenhill, in his excellent
edition of the work “De Corporis Humani Fabrica;”
Oxford, 1842. Several of his Commentaries on the
Aphorisms, published by Dietz.
Meletius, of uncertain date; part of his Commentaries on
the Aphorisms, published by Dietz. See also Anec.
Gr., ed. Cramer.
Damascius, of uncertain date; a few of his
Commentaries on the Aphorisms, published by
Dietz.
[73] Œuvres d’Hippocrat., tom. i., p. 171.
[74] See Schulze, Hist. Med., i., 3, 1.
[75] It will be proper to give this Class:—
1. De Aëre, Aquis, et Locis.
2. De Natura Hominis.
3. De Locis in Homine.
4. De Humoribus.
5. De Alimento.
6. De Morbis popularibus.
7. Prognosticon.
8. Prædictionum, ii.
9. De Victu Acutorum.
10. De Fracturis.
11. De Articulis.
12. Mochlicus.
13. De Vulneribus Capitis.
14. Officina Medici.
15. Aphorismi.
[76] Censura Librorum Hippocrateorum, Vratislaviæ, 1772.

[77] De Elementis, i., 9.
[78] Tom. v., p. 442; ed. Basil.
[79] Galen, who is a most unexceptionable judge in such a
case, says that the language of Hippocrates inclines to the Attic,
and that some had held it to be Old Attic. (Tom. v., p. 525; ed.
Basil.) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, another admirable critic, says
that Herodotus is the most excellent standard of the Ionic (and so,
by the way, Photius also says, under the head of Ctesias) and
Thucydides of the Attic. (De Platon. Judicium.) Now, since we
have already made it appear that there is a most striking similarity
between the language of Hippocrates and Thucydides, the
judgment of Dionysius is evidently in accordance with that of
Galen on this point. Indeed, as briefly stated in the text, the Attic
was nothing more than a new development of the Ionic, and
scarcely more different from it than the English language in the
age of Pope is from the same in the age of Milton. It is to be
borne in mind that the name Ionian was originally applied to the
Thracians and the inhabitants of Attica, who were evidently
closely allied to one another in consanguinity. It was in Thrace
that learning and civilization first sprang up under the auspices of
Thamyris, Orpheus, and Musæus, by whom the elegant arts were
transplanted to Athens. (See Hesychius, in voce Iones;
Eustathius, ad Iliad., ii.; Diogenes Laertius, Prœfat.; also Hermes
Philologus, p. 23, by the author of this disquisition, whose mind
now reverts with great delight, ad studia quæ adolescentiam
alebant.) The inhabitants of Asiatic Ionia and the adjoining islands
were colonists from Attica. (Thucyd., i., 12; Herodotus, viii., 44;
Heraclides, de Polit.) From what has been stated it will readily be
understood that the only standard of polite Greek was the Ionic,
with its offspring the Attic. The Æolic and Doric dialects, although
used in certain scientific and popular compositions, such as
Bucolics and certain philosophical treatises, were never looked
upon as being fashionable and learned dialects.
[80] De Artic., i.
[81] See his Historia Literaria Hippocratis, in the Bibliotheca
Græca of Albertus Fabricius, or in vol. i. of Kühn’s edition of
Hippocrates.
[82] Galen, tom. v., p. 17; ed. Basil.
[83] Apologie, etc.
[84] Hippocratis nomine quæ circumferuntur scripta ad
temporis rationes disposuit Christianus Petersen, p. prior.
Hamburgi, 1839.
[85] Prædict., i.; Coacæ Prænot.; de Loc. in Hom.
[86] De Carne.; de Part. Sept.; de Part. Oct.; de Superf.; de
Dent.
[87] De Flat.
[88] De Morb. Popul., i., iii.; de Morb., i.; de Affect.; de Morbo
Sacro; de Insan.; de Veratr. Usu; de Victu Acut.; de Victu Sal.;
Præn.; Prædict., ii.; Aphor.; de Aëre, Locis, et Aq.; de Insom.; de
Hæmorrh.; de Fistul.
[89] De Nat. Puer.
[90] De Prisca Med.
[91] De Nat. Hom.; de Humor.; de Nat. Oss.; de Corde; de
Corp. Sect.; de Gland.; de Visu; de Alim.; de Usu Liquid.; de
Affect. Intern.; de Morb. Popul., ii., iv., etc.; de Morb., ii., iii.; de
Morb. Mulier.; de Nat. Mulieb.; de his quæ ad Virg. Spect.; de
Steril.; de Vulner.; de Judic.; de Dieb. Judic.
[92] De Morb., iv.; de Genitura; de Remed. Purgant.
[93] De Victu Sanor. libri tres.
[94] Tom. ii., pp. 32, 33.
[95] Œuvres d’Hippocrate, tom. i., p. 263.
[96] See Stephanus, Comment. in Prognost. Hippocrat., tom.
ii., p. 61, ed. Dietz.; and Galen, tom. v., p. 328, ed. Basil.
[97] The well known story regarding the concealment of
Aristotle’s library by his heir, Neleus of Scepsis, and its restoration
by Apellicon, is faithfully related by Strabo, Geograph., ix. In this
passage Strabo states, that before the restoration of the library by
Apellicon, there were but few of Aristotle’s works in the hands of
the peripatetic philosophers, and these principally his exoteric
works. But that the treatise “On the History of Animals” was an
exoteric work, can admit of no question. This is confidently
maintained by the learned Schneider in the prolegomena to his
edition of this work. Indeed, as he suggests, there is no good
reason for doubting that the treatise “On the History of Animals”
had been published by Aristotle in his lifetime. (Epimetrum, ii.)
See also Buhle’s dissertation prefixed to his edition of Aristotle’s
works. I need scarcely add that, it being thus shown that all the
most learned authorities on the literature of Aristotle’s works are
agreed that the History of Animals, in which is contained this
disputed fragment on the veins, was published before the time
when the Hippocratic Collection is supposed to have been made,
M. Littré’s conclusions on this head must fall to the ground.
[98] The death of Aristotle is referred to a.c. 321. Now this is
just about the date of the foundation of the Royal Library at
Alexandria, and very near the age when Herophilus flourished.
These (M. Littré’s) positions clearly made out, it would follow that
the dates of the treatises in the Collection come down very near
to the foundation of the Alexandrian Library.
[99] See Hengstenberg’s Commentary on the Psalms, pluries.
[100] Although this piece be admitted into the first class, it also
merits a place here.
[101] Prænotiones or Prognostica; Aphorismi; Epidemiorum, i.,
iii.; de Diæta Acutorum; de Aëre, Aquis, et Locis; de Capitis
Vulneribus.
[102] De Prisca Medicina; de Articulis; de Fracturis; Mochlicus;
Jusjurandum; Lex; de Ulceribus; de Fistulis; de Hæmorrhoidibus;
de Officina Medici; de Morbo Sacro.
[103] Prorrhetica, i.; Coacæ Prænotiones.

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist

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With respect to the potential radicalization of scientists outside of organized terror-

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As a preventive measure, returning foreign fighters need to be closely monitored,

i. Bolster the role of scientific communities (specifically academic institutions,

Countering terrorist organizations requires a comprehensive approach, both inside

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Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats 1

Subject Index 105

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nonproliferation. Thus, securing WMD materials is a tactical response while securing

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• Environmental Protection and Enhancement Law No. 27 2009.

The Role of the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA)

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• Establishing and maintaining a national regime for monitoring and inspection

• Developing a comprehensive mechanism to ensure prevention of converting

• Establish and upgrade the regulatory framework.

National Biological Emergency Plan and CBRN Teams

The National Bio-Risk Management Committee

Scope of the National Programs

The proliferation of scientific knowledge has attracted terrorist organizations to acquire

• To prevent the proliferation of Iraqi WMD expertise.

• Establishment of Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), which brought

• Biosecurity and Biosafety.

• Sharing of experiences and effective practices are essential instruments to as-

technology falling under a control list. The likelihood of sensitive information

Synthetic Biology, Microbiology, DIY

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New Available Bio-Technologies

1. Removing cells’ inefficiencies, which are a byproduct of the haphazard nature

As per biotechnology applications, synthetic biology is also involved in considerable

to digest and decompose pollutants;

Synthetic Biology Concerns

Needs to Manipulate Live Organisms – Equipment and Biological Materials

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