Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion

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Ars Disputandi

ISSN: 1566-5399 (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rjpt17

Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion

Weaver Santaniello

To cite this article: Weaver Santaniello (2007) Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion, Ars
Disputandi, 7:1, 136-138, DOI: 10.1080/15665399.2007.10819958
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2007.10819958

© 2007 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &


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Ars Disputandi
Volume 7 (2007)
: 1566–5399

Weaver Santaniello Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion


 
, 
By Julian Young

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; 242 pp.; hb. £ 45.00,


pb. £ 17.99; : 0–521–85422–9/0–521–68104–9.

[1]
In Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion, Julian Young offers a detailed, book
by book interpretation of Nietzsche’s reflections on religion and religious commu-
nitarianism. In his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche views Greek tragedy
as a mechanism that gathers people collectively in view of their gods, and argues
that modern-day nihilism can only be saved by reviving such an ancient festi-
val. Although some readers believe that Nietzsche abandons these views after
his Wagnerian influence, Young argues the opposite through a careful analysis
of The Birth of Tragedy in relation to Nietzsche’s later publications. And while
many simply regard Nietzsche as an atheist, Young does not view Nietzsche as
a non-believer, radical individualist, or immoralist, but as a nineteenth-century
religious reformer belonging to a German Volkish tradition of conservative com-
munitarianism.
[2]
Concerning religion, Young’s fundamental argument is that although
Nietzsche rejects the Christian God, he is not ‘anti-religious.’ Rather, Nietzsche is a
religious thinker precisely because he adopts Schopenhauer’s analysis of religion
as an intellectual construction that addresses the existential problems of pain
and death, and gives authority to community-creating ethos. Nietzsche views
Dionysian pantheism as a solution to the problems of pain and death, and argues
for the flourishing of a new ‘festival,’ based on a humanity-affirming religion
modeled on that of the ancient Greeks.
[3]
Young’s insights are well-argued and presented. The most fascinating
aspect of his book is the manner in which he connects Nietzsche’s religious and
political views, which are indeed intertwined. Disenchanted with scholarly inter-
pretations, such as Walter Kaufmann’s, that promote Nietzsche as an ‘apolitical’
thinker – far apart from the modern world – Young attempts to place Nietzsche’s
ideas in the heart of (positive) Volkish tradition, without turning him into the
godfather of Nazism (202). Young acknowledges that Kaufmann’s heart was in
the right place, more than fifty years ago, when attempting to portray Nietzsche
as apolitical in order to sever any possible ties of Nietzsche to Nazism. However,
according to Young, a sanitized Nietzsche, compatible with a liberal humanist
outlook, is also a misinterpretation of the nineteenth-century philosopher.
[4]
Politically, Young situates Nietzsche in the romantic-Volkish tradition
because Nietzsche views modernity as a sick culture, and wants to return to the
Golden Age of Greece; he rejects democracy; he deplores stateism; and detests

c June 26, 2007, Ars Disputandi. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows:
Weaver Santaniello, ‘Review of Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion,’ Ars Disputandi [http://www.ArsDisputandi.
org] 7 (2007), paragraph number.
Weaver Santaniello: Review of Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion

the private pursuit of goods that have come to replace the primary commitment
to fostering community. Further, like many Volkists, Nietzsche is concerned with
small ‘spiritual’ things in relation to bodily hygiene (such as diet, dress, and dance);
he is a pantheist similar to Volkish thinkers such as Hölderlin and Schelling; and
he also rejects democracy and yearns for a hierarchical society ruled by a wise and
strong leader. But as Young stresses throughout his book, the heart of Nietzsche’s
Volkish thinking lies in the return of communal religion; a reintegration of the Volk
through the establishment of one communal faith (210).
[5]
Young strongly insists that Nietzsche does not share the wicked as-
pects of some Volkish thinkers. Unlike Nazis’ such as his sister Elisabeth, Alfred
Bäumler, and Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche was anti-antisemitic, anti-militaristic, and
anti-nationalistic, rejecting German nationalism in favor of European cosmopoli-
tanism. Thus, regarding Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi or Nazi would be erroneous.
[6]
Most all of Young’s primary observations concerning Nietzsche’s re-
ligious and political views seem accurate, including his notion that Nietzsche
respects the cosmopolitanism of the medieval Church, wanting to replace the
Christian God with Greek ones. But less convincing is Young’s radical view that
‘Nietzsche values social stability and cohesion at least as much as he values in-
dividual creativity,’ and that he wants to resolve the tension between the ‘free
spirit’ and the ‘herd type’ through the creation of communal religion (88–89).
Writing against philosophers such as John Rawls and Philippa Foot, who regard
Nietzsche as an ‘immoral elitist’ because he cares little about anything other than
‘exceptional types,’ Young argues that Nietzsche values the exceptional type only
as a means to flourishing a total social organism (135). Young correctly states that
Nietzsche regards himself as an ‘immoralist’ in the sense that he rejects Christian
morality, and that he is paternal and patriarchal, not immoral. For instance, Young
shows that Nietzsche indeed places women in subordinate roles, not because he
is ‘immoral,’ but because he believes that most people best flourish in subordinate
positions, and that this positively contributes to a healthy society. Even if Young
is correct in this observation – and I think he is – it does not logically follow
that Nietzsche values the ‘free spirit’ (which women can be) and the herd animal
equally, nor does it follow that Nietzsche is neutral concerning any preference
toward his infamous distinction of master (noble) and slave (Christian) moral-
ity (135). Young indeed acknowledges that as individuals, Nietzsche views free
spirits as having greater value (because they are few and far between), but also
claims that as a type the exceptional individual is of no greater value than the herd
type because both are necessary to the communities’ survival as a whole (97–98).
Perhaps Young is correct. But perhaps it might be more accurate to state that
Nietzsche indeed values ‘a people;’ he wants the production of more free-spirits
to join and rule the herd that will always exist. Put that way, Nietzsche does
not ‘value’ both equally; the free-spirit is the desirable exception that creates new
values, the mob will always be in abundance. Nietzsche truly ‘values’ the former,
and ‘accepts’ the latter.
[7]
Parenthetically, two minor comments: the first is that Young’s book and
bibliography could have referenced more contemporary book-length entries on

Ars Disputandi 7 (2007), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org


Weaver Santaniello: Review of Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion

Nietzsche and Religion and Nietzsche and Politics, especially National Socialism.
The second is that the title of the book does not do the work justice. It should
have alluded, in some way, to the political threads woven throughout, which
significantly contribute to the book’s originality and strength.
[8]
Overall, Young’s book challenges readers to examine and rethink many
common assumptions concerning Nietzsche’s views. He writes well and with
conviction—supporting his arguments with Nietzsche’s texts, and he makes a
valuable attempt to shatter casual observations about a thinker who always
wanted to be ‘read well.’ Young reads Nietzsche well, and his book is valu-
able to Nietzsche scholarship, and to a wide range of readers in German history
and philosophy. Young plants Nietzsche firmly in the heart of German intellectual
history, where he belongs.

Ars Disputandi 7 (2007), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org

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