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The Standing of Victims in the Procedural Design of the International
Criminal Court
The Standing of Victims in the
Procedural Design of the
International Criminal Court

By

Tatiana Bachvarova

LEIDEN | BOSTON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Bachvarova, Tatiana, author.

Title: The standing of victims in the procedural design of the International
Criminal Court / by Tatiana Bachvarova.
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill Nijhoff, 2017. | Based on author's
thesis (doctoral - Middlesex University, London, England, 2015). |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017012367 (print) | LCCN 2017015444 (ebook) | ISBN
9789004338616 (E-book) | ISBN 9789004338609 (hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Victims of crimes (International law) | International
Criminal Court | Criminal procedure (International law) | Locus standi.
Classification: LCC KZ7495 (ebook) | LCC KZ7495 .B34 2017 (print) | DDC
345/.0122--dc23
lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017012367

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

isbn 978-90-04-33860-9 (hardback)

isbn 978-90-04-33861-6 (e-book)

Copyright 2017 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and
Hotei Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without prior written permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided
that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite
910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

In deepest loving memory of my grandfather Panayot for his
wisdom and insatiable thirst for knowledge

⸪
Contents

Foreword xi
William Schabas
Foreword xv
Georghios M. Pikis
Acknowledgements xvi
Table of Cases / Jurisprudence xvii

Introduction 1

1 Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 10

The Victim Definition and the Presumption of Innocence 11
Application of Rule 85 14
The First Criterion: Natural Persons 17
Identification Requirements 18
Deceased Persons 23
Disappeared Persons 38
The First Criterion: Legal Persons 40
The Second Criterion: Harm 51
Definition of Harm 52
Types of Harm 53
Harm Sustained by Legal Persons 61
The Third Criterion: Jurisdiction 62
The Fourth Criterion: Causal Link 63

2 Classification of Victims’ Rights 68

General and Specific Rights 72
Rights of Uniform Applicability and Case-Dependent Rights 76
Express and Implied Rights 77
Imperative and Non-Imperative Rights 83
Conditional and Non-Conditional Rights 85
Passive and Active Rights; Rights of a Mixed Character 87
Positive and Negative Rights 90
Rights Employed in Person; Rights Exercised in Person and through
Another; Rights Effectuated Exclusively through Another 91
Any-Victim Rights and Group-Specific Rights 99
Service Rights and Procedural Rights 103
Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Rights 105
Rights Falling within Several Classifications 106
viii Contents

3 Purpose and Quintessence of Article 68(3) 108

Article 68(3) Participation Scheme and Existing Models of
Victims’ Intervention 108
icc’s Participatory Scheme and Intervention of Interested Persons in
Ongoing Litigation 115
Genesis and Overall Rationale of Article 68(3) 116
‘Personal Interests’ Requirement 121
Personal Interests of Victims Warranting Access to the
Proceedings at Hand 123
Personal Interests of Victims Warranting Intervention
Subsequent to Their Admission as Participants 125
The Requirement ‘Are Affected’ 127
The ‘Appropriateness’ Criterion 131
Appropriate Stages of the Proceedings 132
Appropriateness of the Intervention 136
Manner of Participation 136
Uniform Predetermination of Modalities of Participation 137
Contextual (‘Casuistic’) Determination of Modalities of
Participation 140
Views and Concerns 141
Presentation of Views and Concerns 142
Non-Evidentiary Character of Views and Concerns 144

4 Duality of Victim-Witness Status 146

Duality of Status at the Domestic Level 148
Duality of Status at the International Level 150
Duality of Status in the Context of Trials of Mass Atrocities 156
Acquiring Duality of Status 160
Applications for Participation and Written Statements;
Disclosure-Related Issues 162
Access to Victims’ Applications for Participation;
Disclosure of Applications of Dual Status Individuals 165
Views and Concerns as Compared to Testimony 169
Admissibility and Probative Value of the Testimony of
Dual Status Individuals 173
Impact of Information from Dual Status Individuals on
Their Victim Standing and Trustworthiness 183
Withdrawal of Victim Standing. Overview. Consequences and
Possible Remedies 187
Practical Matters Occasioned by the Participation of Dual Status
Contents ix

Individuals 189
Role of the Registry in the Protection of Dual Status
Individuals 191
Exchange of Information Concerning Dual Status
Individuals 193
Contact between Dual Status Individuals, the Parties and
Other Participants 196

5 icc’s Evidentiary Procedure and Victims’ Role Therein 199

The Role of the Parties in the Processing of Evidence on the
Merits of the Criminal Case 201
The Role of the Chamber in the Fact-Finding Mechanism 205
Victims’ Role in the Fact-Finding Process on the
Merits of the Criminal Case 212
The Essence of Reparation Proceedings in a Nutshell and
Victims’ Role in Related Evidence Gathering 226

Concluding Remarks 232

Bibliography 237
Index 245
Foreword

The second recital in the Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court declares that ‘during this century millions of children, women
and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity’. This is the first of nearly twenty references to victims
in the Rome Statute. The first mention of victims is in the lynchpin of the en-
tire Statute, article 15, assuring their right to participate before the Pre-Trial
Chamber in proceedings by which the Prosecutor launches investigations pro-
prio motu.
The word ‘victim’ does not appear in the Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal, which is the first operational instrument of international crimi-
nal justice. Nevertheless, victims of Nazi atrocity participated in Nuremberg
trial, admittedly to a rather limited extent. They were present as witnesses
rather than as genuine parties in the trial. Their contribution was not central to
the case for the Prosecution, relying as it did on documentary evidence, films
and admissions. In all, there were fewer than forty prosecution witnesses in the
great trial. Several were perpetrators themselves, like Höss, the commandant at
Auschwitz, Otto Ohlendorf, the head of the Einsatzgrüppen B, and Erich von
dem Bach Zelewski, the butcher of Warsaw.
But when the victims testified, their contribution was sometimes quite riv-
eting. They brought a unique and very moving element to proceedings that
were often quite tedious. One of the highlights of the trial was the testimony
of Marie-Claude Vaillant Couturier. A resistance fighter, she had spent three
years in Nazi concentration camps. She stood through much of her testimony,
speaking in a manner that was steadfast and determined, forthright and cou-
rageous, as the French prosecutor Charles Dubost directed her evidence with
brief questions:

We arrived at Auschwitz at dawn. The seals on our cars were broken, and
we were driven out by blows with the butt end of a rifle, and taken to
the Birkenau Camp, a section of the Auschwitz Camp. It is situated in
the middle of a great plain, which was frozen in the month of January.
During this part of the journey we had to drag our luggage. As we passed
through the door we knew only too well how slender our chances were
that we would come out again, for we had already met columns of living
skeletons going to work; and as we entered we sang ‘The Marseillaise’ to
keep up our courage.
xii Foreword

We were led to a large shed, then to the disinfecting station. There our
heads were shaved and our registration numbers were tattooed on the
left forearm. Then we were taken into a large room for a steam bath and a
cold shower. In spite of the fact that we were naked, all this took place in
the presence of ss men and women. We were then given clothing which
was soiled and torn, a cotton dress and jacket of the same material.

She described the brutality of the forced labour, participation in which was the
only way to avoid immediate execution:

During the work the ss men and women who stood guard over us would
beat us with cudgels and set their dogs on us. Many of our friends had
their legs torn by the dogs. I even saw a woman torn to pieces and die
under my very eyes when Tauber, a member of the ss, encouraged his dog
to attack her and grinned at the sight.

Vaillant Couturier also spoke for those victims who did not survive:

When we first arrived, whenever a convoy of Jews came, a selection was

made; first the old men and women, then the mothers and the children
were put into trucks together with the sick or those whose constitution
‘appeared to be delicate’. They took in only the young women and girls as
well as the young men who were sent to the men’s camp.
Generally speaking, of a convoy of about 1,000 to 1,500, seldom more
than 250 – and this figure really was the maximum – actually reached the
camp. The rest were immediately sent to the gas chamber.
At this selection also, they picked out women in good health between
the ages of 20 and 30, who were sent to the experimental block; and
young girls and slightly older women, or those who had not been selected
for that purpose, were sent to the camp where, like ourselves, they were
tattooed and shaved.

When she had finished her examination in chief, the judge invited the defence
lawyers to cross examine. Hanns Marx, who was counsel to Julius Striecher
but on this occasion was standing in for Ludwig Babel, the lawyer for the ss,
struggled to weaken the testimony with some perfunctory questions but, to the
extent that the transcript is a faithful guide, soon gave up the effort in the face
of Vaillant Couturier’s determined responses.
Several victim witnesses described the horrors of the concentration camps,
including Jean-Frédéric Veith, Victor Dupont, François Boix, Alfred Bala-
chowsky, Severina Shmaglevskaya, Samuel Rajzman and Hans Cappelen.
Foreword xiii

Perhaps­the most dramatic testimony in the entire trial was delivered by Avrom
Suzkever, a Jewish poet who initially requested, bit unsuccessfully, to address­
the Tribunal in his native language, Yiddish. Testifying in Russian, one of the
official languages, Suzkever described in great detail the anti-Semitic pogrom
in Vilno, where he lived. At one point, he told of how his wife had given birth
in a ghetto hospital:

In the evening when the Germans had left, I went to the hospital and
found my wife in tears. It seems that when she had had her baby, the
Jewish doctors of the hospital had already received the order that Jew-
ish women must not give birth; and they had hidden the baby, together
with other newborn children, in one of the rooms. But when this com-
mission with Muhrer came to the hospital, they heard the cries of the
babies. They broke open the door and entered the room. When my wife
heard that the door had been broken, she immediately got up and ran to
see what was happening to the child. She saw one German holding the
baby and smearing something under its nose. Afterwards he threw it on
the bed and laughed. When my wife picked up the child, there was some-
thing black under his nose. When I arrived at the hospital, I saw that my
baby was dead. He was still warm.

The defense lawyers had no questions for the witness. Suzkever’s poignant tes-
timony was filmed and is available on Youtube.
Because of the great transformation in our view of the role that victims
are to play in international criminal proceedings – the subject of this won-
derful book – we may perhaps be tempted to exaggerate the importance of
the testimony at Nuremberg of Vaillant Couturier, Suzkever, and the others. It
consumed a bare fraction of the time in the courtroom and is not reflected in
any way in the judgment. Perhaps their testimony weighed significantly in the
minds of the judges, rather like the dramatic film footage of Nazi atrocity that
was screened in the courtroom early in the trial.
There can be no doubt, as Tatiana Bachvarova explains, that witness par-
ticipation did not become an important feature of atrocity trials until the
Eichmann case in the early 1960s. The contrast between those proceedings
and the great trial at Nuremberg before the International Military Tribunal has
been drawn by many writers. It was the first indication that the pendulum was
swinging away from trials based mainly upon documentary evidence and the
testimony of perpetrators and experts towards the place they hold today as an
important forum for victims. Actually, the ad hoc tribunals that were rather
hastily established in the early 1990s by the United Nations Security Council
were not much of an improvement on Nuremberg. But it was soon recognized
xiv Foreword

that in this respect they were somewhat out of step with broad trends within
criminal justice in a general sense, recognizing and indeed insisting upon en-
hanced participation for victims at many if not all stages of the proceedings.
Providing victims with a voice is also a function of other transitional justice
mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions. I vividly recall the
testimony of victims at hearings of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation,
speaking before their own communities about the atrocities that had been
inflicted upon them. In many instances, especially when sexual and gender-
based crimes were involved. This involved matters that are intensely private
and unbearably painful to discuss in a public setting. And yet the ability not
only to speak about victimization but also to have it acknowledged by neigh-
bours, friends and fellow citizens was an important stage in reclaiming the ele-
ments of fundamental human dignity.
Dr Bachvarova’s study represents a most important contribution to the aca-
demic literature on the International Criminal Court. She has taken a topic
that is in a sense well known yet that has received too little attention by schol-
ars. This study, then, develops our understanding of the participation of vic-
tims in important ways. It will provide great assistance to judges, lawyers and
other practitioners. But it is also, in a very real sense, a tribute to the victims
themselves.

William Schabas
1 March 2017
Foreword

I have known Tatiana Bachvarova for many years. I met her when I served as a
judge at the International Criminal Court. On very many occasions I discussed
with Tatiana a multitude of subjects on various aspects of the law and human
rights.
Tatiana is intellectually gifted with a charismatic personality. She is apt to
go at the roots of a subject under consideration with a view to identifying its
constituent elements.
I have read her book “The Standing of Victims in the Procedural Design of
the International Criminal Court”. I evaluate her book as stated below.
In the first place, the book is very well written. The wording used conveys
what she wants to say very clearly.
Victims of crimes amenable to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court have, compared to other judicial proceedings, unique rights both in the
investigatory as well as in the judicial process. To my mind, the subject is anal-
ysed in the book in its proper perspective and comprehensively.
The rights of victims before the International Criminal Court are worth ex-
amining in detail as they may provide a precedent for other judicial authorities.
In my judgment, the book covers thoroughly every aspect of the subject
dealt with. My estimation of the book is high. I recommend its reading by ev-
eryone interested in the administration of justice.

Georghios M. Pikis,
Formerly (a) President of The Supreme Court of Cyprus
(b) Judge of The International Criminal Court, Appeals Division
Acknowledgements

I am immensely indebted to Professor William A. Schabas for the privilege to

work under his invaluable supervision, for his inspiring guidance throughout
my work, unremitting support and belief in me.

With sincere gratitude to the remarkable person and brilliant legal mind Judge
Georghios M. Pikis for our fascinating discussions and for his insightful com-
ments on this monographic paper.

My heartfelt gratitude goes to the most outstanding parents, Ekaterina and

Emil, and to my beloved grandparents for their exceptional personalities, un-
conditional love and unwavering support in my pursuits.

With special thankfulness to Ms Lindy Melman of Brill | Nijhoff for her

kindness,­encouragement and support, to Ms Bea Timmer and Ms Saskia van
der Knaap for their kind and fruitful cooperation, to the book cover designer
and to everyone else at Brill | Nijhoff who contributed to the preparation of the
manuscript for production.
Table of Cases / Jurisprudence

International Criminal Court

Situations
Central African Republic (car)
Comoros (Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the
Kingdom of Cambodia)
Cote d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of the Congo (drc)
Georgia
Mali
Republic of Kenya
Uganda

Cases
The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (Abu Garda)
The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Al Mahdi)
The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus
(Banda and Jerbo)
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Bemba)
The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo (Gbagbo)
The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (Gbagbo and Blé Goudé)
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Katanga and
Ngudjolo)
The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen (Kony
et al.)
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga)
The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana
The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Muthaura and
Kenyatta)
The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Ngudjolo)
The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (Ntaganda)
The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (Ongwen)
The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang
(Ruto et al.)
The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Ruto and Sang)
xviii Table of Cases / Jurisprudence

Other Jurisdictions. Relevant Jurisprudence

African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone, Comm. № 223/98 (2000)
Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v. Chad, Comm. № 74/92
(1995)
Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, Communication № 25/89, 47/90, 56/91,
100/93 (1995)
Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, Communication No. 225/98 (2000)
Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93,
164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (2000)

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

Ayder and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 23656/94, Judgment
Brudnicka and Others v. Poland, №. 54723/00, echr 2005-II, Judgment
Comingersoll s.a. v. Portugal, Application № 35382/97, Judgment
Dombo Beheer b.v. v. The Netherlands, Application № 14448/88, Judgment
Freedom and Democracy Party (özdep) v. Turkey, Application № 23885/94, Judgment
Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, Application № 22774/93, Judgment
Kiliç v. Turkey, Application № 22492/93, Judgment and Partly dissenting opinion of
Judge Gölcüklü
Kişmir v. Turkey, Application № 27306/95, Judgment
Kurt v. Turkey, Application № 24276/94 [1998] echr 44, Judgment
Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, Application № 22535/93, Judgment and Partly dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Gölcüklü
McKerr v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 28883/95, Judgment
Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, (1991) 13 ehrr 360 87/20, Judgment
Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria, Application №
15153/89, Judgment

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (eccc)

kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Trial Chamber Judgment
kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Supreme Court Chamber, Appeals Judgment
kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Trial Chamber’s Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint
Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to Make Submissions
on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts
and Witnesses Testifying on Character
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan (Case 002), Decision on Request to Recall Civil Party
Tccp-187 for Review of Procedure Concerning Civil Parties’ Statements on Suffering
and Related Motions and Responses (E240, E240/1, E250, E250/1, E267, E267/1 and
E267/2)
Table of Cases / Jurisprudence xix

Human Rights Chamber of the Commission on Human Rights for

Bosnia and Herzegovina
E.M. and S.T. against the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on admis-
sibility and merits Case No. CH/01/6979
Avdo and Esma Palic against the Republika Srpska, Decision on admissibility and merits
Case No. CH/99/3196 and Dissenting opinion of Mr. Vitomir Popovic to the Decision
on admissibility in the case of Avdo and Esma Palic against the Republika Srpska

Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)

Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment on Reparations and Costs, Series C
No. 15
Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Series C No. 144
Acosta-Calderón v. Ecuador, Judgment on the Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C
No. 129
Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment on Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 91
El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment on Reparations and Costs. Series C
No. 28
Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Judgment on Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 39
Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Series C No. 148
Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment on Reparations and Costs, Series C
No. 42
‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia, Judgment on the Merits, Reparations and Costs, Se-
ries C No. 134
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment on the Merits, Reparations and Costs,
2006, Series C No. 160
Montero-Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Judg-
ment on Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C
No. 150
Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Series C No. 124, Judgment on the Merits and Repa-
rations and Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade to the Judgment on the
Merits and Reparations
Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment on Reparations Series C No. 116
‘Street Children’ (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment on Reparations and
Costs, Series C No. 77
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment on the Merits, Series C No. 4

International Court of Justice (icj) and Permanent Court of Justice

Factory at Chorzów, Judgment № 8 and Interpretation
Factory at Chorzów, Judgment № 13
xx Table of Cases / Jurisprudence

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

Advisory Opinion, i.c.j. Reports 2004, p. 136
Elettronica Sicula s.p.a. (elsi), Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 1989, p. 15
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 1997, p. 7
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 2010
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, i.c.j. Reports
2007, p. 43
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Judgment (merits), i.c.j. Reports 1986, p. 14
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean
Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 2007, p. 659
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Separate opinion of
Judge Owada to the Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 2003, p. 161

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (icty)

Aleksovski Appeal Judgment
Čelebići Appeal Judgment
Gotovina et al., Decision on Conflict of Interest of Attorney Miroslav Šeparović
Gotovina et al., Reasons for decision granting prosecution’s motion to cross examine
four proposed rule 92bis witnesses and reasons for decision to hear the evidence of
those witnesses via video-conference link
Radislav Krstić Trial Judgment
Kupreskić et al. Appeal Judgement
Limaj et al. Trial Judgement
Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment
Simić et al., Decision on the Prosecution Motion to Resolve Conflict of Interest Regard-
ing Attorney Borislav Pisarevic
Tadić, Appeals Chamber Judgment on allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel,
Milan Vujin
Tadić Appeal Judgment

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ictr)

Akayesu Trial Judgment
Gacumbtsi Trial Judgment
Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement
Musema Trial Judgment and Sentence
Musema Appeal Judgment
Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement
Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgment
Rutaganda Appeal Judgment
Table of Cases / Jurisprudence xxi

Special Court for Sierra Leone (scsl)

Brima et al., Decision on the Prosecutor’s motions for immediate protective measures
for witnesses and victims and for non-public disclosure
Fofana, Decision on the Prosecutor’s motions for immediate protective measures for
witnesses and victims and for non-public disclosure
Hinga Norman, Decision on the Prosecutor’s motions for immediate protective mea-
sures for witnesses and victims and for non-public disclosure
Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao Trial Judgment

Special Tribunal for Lebanon (stl)

Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Ibrahim Mohamed Ali Al Amin, Decision on Interlocutory Ap-
peal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings
Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Has-
san Sabra (Ayyash et al.), Decision of the Pre-Trial Judge on Victims’ Participation
in the Proceedings
Ayyash et al., Decision of the Pre-Trial Judge on the vpu’s Access to Materials and the
Modalities of Victims’ Participation in Proceedings
New tv S.A.L. and Al Khayat, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal
Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings

United Nations Compensation Commission (un Compensation

Commission)
First Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages above usd 100 000 (Category ‘D’
Claims) (S/AC.26/1998/1), Part 1, Report and Recommendations by the Panel of
Commissioners
Special Instalment of Deceased Detainee Claims, Report and Recommendations by the
‘D1’ Panel of Commissioners
Governing Council’s Decision 3 (S/AC.26/1991/3)
Governing Council’s Decision 7 (S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1)
Governing Council’s Decision 10 (S/AC 26/1992/10)
Governing Council’s Decision 12 (S/AC.26/1992/12)
Governing Council’s Decision 218 (S/AC.26/Dec.218 (2004))

United Nations Human Rights Committee (un Human Rights

Committee)
Eduardo Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.7/30, u.n. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40)
at 130 (1982)
John Khemraadi Baboeram, Andre Kamperveen, Cornelis Harold Riedewald, Gerald
Leckie, Harry Sugrim Oemrawsingh, Somradj Robby Sohansingh, Lesley Paul Rahman
and Edmund Alexander Hoost v. Suriname, Communication No. 146/1983 and 148 to
154/1983, u.n. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/40/40) at 187 (1985)
xxii Table of Cases / Jurisprudence

Miango v. Zaire, Communication No. 194/1985, u.n. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) at 218
(1988)
Individual opinion of the member Christine Chanet, concerning communications
Nos. 717/1996 and 718/1996 and co-signed by Mr. Fausto Pocar concerning commu-
nication No. 718/1996 in the case of Mrs. Maria Otilia Vargas Vargas (represented by
Fundacion de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas) v. Chile, Communication No.
718/1996, u.n. Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/718/1996/Rev. 1

usa-Germany Mixed Claims Commission

Administrative Decision i, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. vii, United
Nations (2006), p. 21
Administrative Decision ii, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. vii, United
Nations (2006), p. 21
Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. vii, Unit-
ed Nations (2006), p. 35
Decision of the Umpire in the case of Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry Company,
Ltd. (United States) v. Germany (Sabotage Cases, October 30, 1939) and the Supple-
mental Opinion of the American Commissioner, October 30, 1939, Reports of Inter-
national Arbitral Awards, vol. viii, United Nations (2006), p. 465
Introduction

Victims’ role as protagonists on the international criminal justice scene is

among the manifold issues prompted by the inception of the International
Criminal Court (‘the icc’, ‘the Court’) which have garnered the attention of the
international community. The part assigned to victims at the first permanent
international criminal jurisdiction necessitates a comprehensive discussion
and a scrutinized examination as an intriguing and thought-provoking legal
phenomenon.
The standing of victims at the icc reflects the aspiration of the interna-
tional community towards the recognition of the victim as an autonomous
stakeholder on the plane of international criminal justice. Viewed in a histori-
cal context, the position of victims as independent participants is unfamiliar
to the Court’s predecessors. Such a legal standing neither existed at the post-
World War ii tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo nor at the more recent ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (‘the icty’) and Rwanda (‘the ictr’).
At the trials taking place in Nuremberg and Tokyo due to a variety of reasons,
not least because most victims had perished or had fled to other c­ ontinents,
the tribunals heard the voices of the perpetrators1 and not of the victims.2
­Subsequently, the first criminal justice forum that afforded Holocaust victims
the possibility to share their experience with the world was the Eichmann
trial.3 Therefore, this trial is widely acknowledged as having launched an ‘era
of testimony’ for victims of mass atrocities4 that marks to a great extent also
the icty’s and ictr’s proceedings.

1 Susanne Karstedt, ‘From Absence to Presence, From Silence to Voice: Victims in Internation-
al and Transitional Justice Since the Nuremberg Trials’, International Review of Victimology,
vol. 17: 9 (2010), pp. 9–30, at p. 13; Giuseppe Zago, ‘The Role of Victims at the International
Criminal Court: Legal Challenges from Tensions between Restorative and Retributive Justice’,
Diritto Penale Contemporaneo (2014), p. 13.
2 Yet, the plight of victims was not left unmentioned. As commentators note, in his closing
statement the French prosecutor Auguste Champetier De Ribes ‘beseeched the judges to
convict the defendants and “to heed the voice of innocent blood crying for justice”’ – see
Luke Moffett, ‘Elaborating Justice for Victims at the International Criminal Court’, Journal of
International Criminal Justice, vol. 13 (2015), pp. 281–311, p. 282 and footnote 1 referring to the
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (imt), Transcripts vol. xix, p. 569.
3 Eric Stover, Mychelle Balthazard and K. Alexa Koenig, ‘Confronting Duch: civil party partici-
pation in Case 001 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, International
Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93: 882 (June 2011), pp. 503–546, p. 510.
4 Ibid.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004338616_002

2 Introduction

Although the ad hoc tribunals are commended for ‘bringing a sense of jus-
tice’ to victims,5 the lack of a role beyond that of witnesses is perceived as
‘objectifying’ victims and turning them into mere instruments for securing
convictions.6 Yet, in comparison to the virtually non-existent victims in the
courtroom before the post-World War ii tribunals, the gradual appearance
as witnesses before the icty and the ictr represents a step forward towards
the introduction of victims as protagonists in proceedings adjudicating mass
atrocities. Hence, by allowing victims some form of involvement (albeit con-
fined to that of witnesses)7 the ad hoc tribunals ‘paved the way for the inclu-
sion of victims in the narrative’.8
The progressive ascent of victims on the international arena blossomed out
into their recognition as independent stakeholders before the icc. The Court’s
founding document – the Rome Statute (‘the Statute’),9 introduces the first
codification of the entitlement of victims to partake in international crimi-
nal proceedings of their own volition.10 As such, the icc is the first forum at
the international level for the participation of victims of the most heinous
crimes in a capacity distinct from that of witnesses.11 The Court is also the first
international criminal justice institution empowered to adjudge claims for

5 Karstedt, supra note 1, p. 21.

6 Stover et al., supra note 3, pp. 513–514.
7 See further Gerard J. Mekjian and Mathew C. Varughese, ‘Hearing the Victim’s Voice:
Analysis of Victims’ Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceedings of the International
Criminal Court’, Pace International Law Review, vol. 17:1 (Spring 2005), pp. 1–46, p. 15, foot-
note 52, where it is averred that the ictr afforded victims a greater inclusion through dif-
ferent levels of quasi-participation, that is, participation in an informal way (in town-hall
settings where victims were given the possibility to act as judges and jury with respect to
low level perpetrators).
8 Valentina Spiga, ‘No Redress without Justice. Victims and International Criminal Law’,
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 10:5 (2012), pp. 1377–1394, p. 1378.
9 For the sake of brevity, any reference throughout the text to ‘article’ denotes ‘article of the
Rome Statute’, as well as any reference to ‘rule’ denotes ‘rule of the icc’s Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence’, unless stated otherwise.
10 Victim-participants at the icc are also referred to as ‘courtroom participants’ – see Stover
et al., supra note 3, p. 513.
11 Along the same lines, it is observed that ‘[a] victim’s primary status is that of a person who
has suffered; he may also have the secondary status of a person who has seen or heard
things. The one does not exclude the other, but the injury suffered is enough in itself to
justify the entitlement of such a person to express his concerns and complaints to the
Court.’ – Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and Role of the Victim’
in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary, vol. ii, Oxford University Press (2002), pp. 1387–1419, p. 1397, citing Elisabeth
Introduction 3

­reparations for the harm sustained as a result of the commission of crimes un-
der its jurisdiction. Thus, the icc’s regime provides for two separate avenues,
independent of one another, i.e proceedings on the merits12 and reparation
proceedings, on which victims may embark.13
Although the participation of victims of their own accord has largely been
praised as a laudable development in international criminal justice, it holds
equally true that ‘every good and perfect thing carries within it the seeds of its
destruction through an excess of its virtue’.14 Not surprisingly, victims’ involve-
ment at the icc has originated divergent, often conflicting perceptions among
academics and practitioners. While certain interpretations of the standing and
participation of victims before the Court sound overly indulgent, others tend

Guigou, Address of the French Ministry of Justice at the International Colloquium on

‘L’Acces des victimes á la Cour pénale internationale’, 27 April 1999.
12 The expression ‘proceedings on the merits’ is used interchangeably throughout the text
with ‘proceedings on the merits of the criminal case’ and denotes proceedings adjudicat-
ing the individual criminal responsibility of the alleged offender(s).
13 The independent character of proceedings on the merits and of reparation proceedings
has also been endorsed in the Court’s jurisprudence. See e.g. The Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga), Decision on the admissibility of the appeals against Trial
Chamber i’s ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repa-
rations’ and directions on the further conduct of proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-2953,
14 December 2012 (Lubanga, Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 14 December 2012),
para. 69, according to which ‘a request for reparations pursuant to rule 94 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence is not dependent upon either the filing of an application for
participation pursuant to rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or being granted
the right to participate in the proceedings in relation to the accused person’s guilt or in-
nocence or the sentence.’
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (eccc) have observed in
the same vein in The Prosecutor v. KAING Guek Eav alias Duch, Case File/Dossier No.
001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC (eccc, Case 001). See, in particular, Case 001, Trial Chamber, De-
cision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party
Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning
of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character, 9 October 2009 (eccc,
Case 001, tc, Decision of 9 October 2009), para. 38, where it is noted that ‘a civil action is
not a prerequisite for victim participation in criminal proceedings before the icc.’
Commentators observe along the same lines. See ‘Victim Participation at the Case
Stage of Proceedings’, War Crimes Research Office (February 2009), p. 2, noting that ‘the
icc victim participation scheme is not designed as an efficient means of combining the
victims’ claims for civil damages with a criminal action.’
14 Steven J. Twist, ‘The Crime Victims’ Rights Amendment and Two Good and Perfect
Things’, Utah Law Review (1999), pp. 369–382.
4 Introduction

to be unduly restrictive.15 Either way, whether stemming from ardent propo-

nents of or vociferous opponents to the enhanced role of victims on the inter-
national criminal justice scene, any view that goes to extremes would fail to
decipher the right balance between the restorative and the retributive objec-
tives at the core of the icc’s system. Admittedly, it would be equally wrong to
reject the idea of victims’ participation altogether or to overdraw it beyond the
contours engraved by the Court’s founders. The quintessence of the standing
of victims necessitates an objective examination from the balanced viewpoint
of a dispassionate observer, as intended by this monographic paper.
The novel nature of victims’ participation is, however, only one aspect of
the multifaceted topic of victims in the context of the icc. The role allotted to
them does not exist on its own, in isolation. As independent participants, vic-
tims form an integral part of the icc as a coherent and a dynamic whole. Con-
sequently, victims affect, converge and interact with the other components of
the icc’s synergy. Given the above, the position of victims must be contem-
plated in the context of the Court’s procedural mechanism and overarching
criminal justice imperatives.
For this purpose, the present study examines the standing of victims to-
gether with the role accorded to the other stakeholders in proceedings. More
specifically, the position of victims is illuminated against the backdrop of the
mission pursued by the parties and the Chamber in charge, including their re-
spective role in the icc’s ingenious fact-finding process. The holistic approach
adopted herewith provides a useful insight into the Court’s multilayered archi-
tecture and proceedings. Contemplating the role of victims and related con-
tentious matters in the context of the entire criminal justice system enhances
the better understanding of its dynamics and may be conducive to the smooth
unfolding of proceedings and functioning of the icc’s machinery as a whole.
Further, the profound analysis of the place of victims in the Court’s design
entails a parallel with the legal regime and practices of other jurisdictions, in-
cluding beyond the criminal justice domain. The comparative analysis with
domestic and supranational institutions affords a broader perspective into
the ideas, standards and prevailing trends concerning victims. Viewed com-
paratively, the icc’s legal framework, proof-gathering style and model of vic-
tims’ participation appear to be infused with universal ideas and precepts
underpinning modern legal systems. Consequently, a glimpse from a wider
horizon proves central for the richer analysis and meticulous interpretation of

15 Concrete manifestations of each of these views are subject to critical discussion in rel-
evant parts of the monographic paper.
Introduction 5

f­ undamental characteristics of the icc’s system and of the standing of victims

therein.
Bearing in mind this objective, the monographic paper suggests an in-depth
comparative discussion of the frameworks, practices, relevant developments
and trends at the international setting. To the extent useful for further eluci-
dating the issues under consideration, close attention is paid to the constitu-
tive instruments and practice of international(ized) criminal jurisdictions,
in particular, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘the stl’), the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘the eccc’), the icty, ictr and their
successor – the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (‘the Residual
Mechanism’), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘the scsl’). Mention is also
made of relevant provisions of East Timor’s Special Panels for Serious Crimes
in the District Court of Dili (‘the East Timor’s hybrid court’), as well as of the
nascent Kosovo Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution, i.e. the Kosovo Spe-
cialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (‘the Kosovo tribunal’).16
Where necessary, the comparative glance glides beyond the criminal justice
realm and touches upon other adjudicative bodies on the supranational plane,
including the Permanent Court of International Justice,17 the International
Court of Justice (‘the icj’) and the International Arbitral Tribunal, as well as
human rights institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights (‘the
ECtHR’, ‘the European Court’) and its Inter-American and African counterparts.
The comparative analysis likewise draws on a variety of domestic jurisdic-
tions. Depending on their relevance to the topics under examination, recourse
is made to legal systems from Europe, Latin America, the usa, as well as to
national jurisdictions from other corners of the world, such as Australia, China,
South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, etc.
Finally, the present study does not purport to comprise all manifold ques-
tions that the participation of victims at the icc originates. Such an objective
is neither feasible nor necessary. Rather, the monographic paper contributes to
the debate by addressing the core, most complex and contentious matters en-
suing from the standing and the role of victims. In the author’s view, these are
the problems that either attract conflicting standpoints among academics and

16 Based in The Hague, The Netherlands, constituted by way of Kosovan legislation through
an amendment to Kosovo’s Constitution and Law No. 05/L-05 of the Asssembly of the
Republic of Kosovo.
17 The Permanent Court of International Justice functioned from 1922 until 1946 upon its
establishment in 1920 in conformity with article 14 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations.
6 Introduction

practitioners or remain insufficiently explored. The attentively selected issues

and their focused discussion are intended to unveil and blueprint the essential
characteristics that delimit the sui generis standing of victims, their position as
autonomous protagonists on the icc’s arena, distinct from that of the parties
and of other non-party participants. They are consecutively canvassed in five
chapters of the monographic paper.
The first fundamental question that the victim-related context brings to the
surface concerns the eligibility as a victim pursuant to rule 85 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (‘the Rules’),18 which is the starting point for any in-
volvement of victims in proceedings. At the beginning of Chapter 1, the discus-
sion of rule 85 sketches the interrelation between the victim definition and the
presumption of innocence as one of the ‘backbones’19 of criminal procedure in
general. In response to contentions of some commentators,20 this part of the
analysis outlines the reasons and expounds why the recognition of victim sta-
tus has no inimical bearing on the presumption of innocence. Subsequently,
the study focuses on the various matters emanating from the application and
interpretation of rule 85 as a whole, as well as of each of the eligibility criteria
which it delineates.
Thus, Chapter 1 addresses consecutively the identification requirements
for victim-applicants, the complicated question concerning the recognition
of deceased persons as victims, the problem of disappeared individuals, the
implications of the introduction of certain legal entities as victims, the no-
tion, substance and compass of the relevant harm depending on the group of
victims (natural or legal persons), and, ultimately, the interpretation and ap-
plication of the requirement for a causal link between the harm suffered and
the alleged crime(s).

18 See supra note 9.

19 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’, Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice vol. 8 (2010), pp. 137–164, p. 140.
20 E.g. Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 11, p. 1403; Scott T. Johnson, ‘Neither Victims nor
Executioners: the Dilemma of Victim Participation and the Defendant’s Right to a Fair
Trial at the International Criminal Court’, ilsa Journal of International and Comparative
Law, vol. 16:2 (2009–2010), pp. 489–496; Margaret Burnham, ‘Fragmentation in Inter-
national Criminal Law and the Rights of Victims’ in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten
Stahn (eds.), The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law, Leiden
Studies on the Frontiers of International Law, vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff (2012), pp. 657–679,
p. 675; Mugambi Jouet, ‘Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at
the International Criminal Court’, Saint Louis University Public Law Review, vol. 26 (2007),
pp. 249–308, p. 271. For further detail see the relevant part of Chapter 1.
Introduction 7

Following the analysis of rule 85, an equally important highlight into the
autonomous yet non-party standing of victims in the icc’s system is provided
in Chapter 2 by way of a comprehensive categorization of the rights afforded
to persons who meet the victim eligibility criteria. The classification of the
array of rights that victims may employ, outlined herewith, provides an in-
novative perspective that goes beyond the commonplace division of victims’
rights between the right to participation, the right to reparations and the right
to protection advanced in legal literature. The review of victims’ rights dem-
onstrates that the involvement of victims is neither indispensable at the in-
ception of the criminal process, i.e. for the initiation of an investigation, nor
subsequently, for the further development and conduct of proceedings. The
essence and the scope of the rights of victims reveal that their participation at
the icc ‘is not strictu sensu essential’, since the criminal process can take place
without them.21 Moreover, as attested by the present classification, victims’ en-
titlement is more limited in ambit and substance than the rights accorded to
the Prosecutor and the defence. By contrast to the parties, victims are neither
vested with an automatic nor with an untrammeled right of participation.22
Next to be addressed in detail is the quintessence and the contours of the
right of victims to take part in proceedings pursuant to the general participa-
tion scheme built up by the Court’s engineers. Chapter 3 suggests a thorough
dissection of the nature and the confines of the fundamental, principled right
of victims to participate under article 68(3) and the multitude of issues which
it entails. The proper interpretation of each of the prerequisites for victims’
involvement set forth in article 68(3), such as the correct connotation of the
notion ‘personal interests’, ‘appropriateness’ of the proceedings and of the in-
tervention, the expression ‘are affected’, as well as ‘views and concerns’, has a di-
rect bearing on the manner and the extent to which victims may participate. As
the discourse on the prerequisites of article 68(3) underscores, victims, unlike
the Prosecutor and the defence, can neither intervene as of right nor without

21 David Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 68: Protection of victims and witnesses and their participa-
tion in the proceedings’ in Otto Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes Article by Article, 2nd edition, Beck/Hart,
pp. 1275–1300, p. 1280 and footnote 17; David Donat-Cattin, ‘The Role of Victims in the icc
Proceedings’ in F. Lattanzi (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Comments on the Draft
Statute, Teramo: University of Teramo (1998), pp. 251–272, p. 266. However, in the view of
the present author the suggested distinction between ‘necessary’ parties to the proceed-
ings (the Prosecutor and the defence) and ‘potential’ or optional parties (the victims)
should be avoided. The term ‘parties’ should be construed strictly and used in tune with
the icc’s legal framework, i.e. as comprising only the Prosecutor and the defence.
22 E.g. Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 11, p. 1406; Donat-Cattin, ibid.
8 Introduction

limitations at the expense of other equally essential criminal justice values,

such as due process, fairness, impartiality and expeditiousness of proceedings.
This logic likewise resonates in the way and the degree to which victims
may engage in the evidence gathering on the merits of the criminal case. In
addition to shedding further light on victims’ position in the icc’s structure,
this topic requires particular and thorough consideration due to the central
importance and direct impact of fact finding on the development and out-
come of proceedings in general. Given that it is the evidence that forms the
basis of the judicial determination in the case, the evidentiary procedure
epitomizes the nucleus, i.e. the core constituent of any criminal justice system,
including the icc’s. Consequently, the proper discernment of the exact role of
victims in the evidence-gathering process not only has a significant bearing
on their interests, but may likewise affect the quality and the quantity of the
evidence on the basis of which the Chamber adjudicates on the merits of the
case pursuant to article 74(2).
The Court’s proof-gathering style accommodates concurrently the par-
ties’ active and autonomous position in the submission and examination
of evidence and the Chamber’s truth-finding responsibility. However, the
­constitutive instruments do not contain a unanimous answer as to the exact
position of victim-participants in this equation, apart from granting the condi-
tional possibility to question witnesses, experts and the accused via their legal
representative.23
The engagement of victims in the evidentiary process has, however, further
essential manifestations. Accordingly, Chapter 4 provides a thorough insight
into the possibility of victims to contribute to the collection of evidence by
way of appearing simultaneously as witnesses in the case, i.e. as dual status
individuals. The procedural phenomenon of duality of status is analyzed from
a comparative perspective against the backdrop of universal principles regard-
ing relevance, admissibility, probative value of evidence and other related
­evidentiary matters. Meticulous consideration is also given to the repercus-
sions on the conduct and the outcome of the case ensuing from the collection
of insufficient and, accordingly, of superfluous evidence. Furthermore, the
analysis suggests a detailed juxtaposition between the nature and substance of
victims’ applications for participation and written witness statements, as well
as between victims’ views and concerns and witness testimony. The examina-
tion of duality of victim-witness status scrutinizes the impact of a testimony
of dual status individuals on their victim standing and explicates how infor-
mation provided in an application for participation may affect that person’s

23 Rule 91(3)(a) and (b).

Introduction 9

­trustworthiness as a witness. The discussion of duality of status also contrib-

utes to casting further light on the parallel between the standing of victims
before the icc and the legal condition of other non-party participants.24
Subsequently, Chapter 5 gives due consideration to the possibility of victims
to enhance the fact-finding process in a proactive way. It becomes apparent
that the involvement of victims in the evidentiary procedure is considerably
restricted in comparison to the Prosecutor and the defence. The limited inten-
sity and degree of engagement of victims in evidence gathering on the merits
of the criminal case is another vital and unequivocal indication of the distinct
standing accorded to victim-participants as compared to the parties. However,
as illustrated in the course of the discussion, this inference is without prejudice
to the key role played by victims in the context of reparations and, accordingly,
in the collection and examination of evidence concerning reparation claims.
Akin to duality of status, victims’ proactive involvement in the evidentiary
process on the merits and their role in reparation proceedings are contem-
plated against the backdrop of the overall rationale of the icc’s fact-finding
procedure. The discourse likewise touches upon the respective roles of the par-
ties and the Chamber, core evidentiary concepts and overarching principles in
the area of evidence law.
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the rights of victims and their
involvement in the various proceedings taking place at the icc, first to be ad-
dressed is the issue concerning the origins of the notion ‘victim’ and of the
logic underpinning the criteria for victim status enshrined in rule 85.

24 For instance, witnesses. Unlike victims, witnesses appear in proceedings not upon their
personal initiative, but only if they are called to testify and thus their participation serves
the interests of justice rather than their own personal interests (see article 64(6)(b) and
rule 65). Consequently, by contrast to persons with victim standing, the participation of
witnesses is confined to their appearance as information-providers to the extent to which
their testimony is deemed necessary by the criminal justice authorities for the elucidation
of the subject-matter at hand. Furthermore, the participation of witnesses is exhausted
once they provide their account of relevant facts. Hence, the procedural engagement of
witnesses is incidental and short-lived.
 chapter 1

Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 851

A thorough discussion of any involvement of victims in the icc’s process is nec-

essarily preceded by the question of who qualifies as a victim. This issue is the
starting point for the recognition of an individual qua victim and represents,
as such, the first step in the assessment of any right of victims’ engagement in
proceedings.2 Consequently, the provisions envisaging victims’ rights or par-
ticipation throughout the criminal justice process3 come into consideration
only after the fulfillment of the eligibility requirements fleshed out in rule 85.4
The possibility for enjoyment of the ‘benefits associated with victimhood’5 is
thus contingent on the recognition of victim status pursuant to said legal text.6
The centrality of rule 85 lies within its design to identify the ambit of the
term ‘victim’ for the purposes of the icc’s constitutive documents. According

1 A previous draft of this chapter has been published as ‘Victims’ Eligibility before the Inter-
national Criminal Court in Historical and Comparative Context’, International Criminal Law
Review, vol. 11:4 (2011), pp. 665–706.
2 Elisabeth Baumgartner, ‘Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the Inter-
national Criminal Court’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 90:870 (June 2008),
pp. 409–440, p. 417; Miriam Cohen, ‘Victims’ Participation Rights Within the International
Criminal Court: A Critical Overview’, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 37:3
(Summer 2009), pp. 351–377, p. 366.
3 Such as, inter alia, article 15(3) read together with rule 50(3); article 19(3) read together with
rule 59(1); article 68(3) read together with rules 89–91.
4 See Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘Victims’ Participation in the Investigations of
the International Criminal Court’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 17:73
(2008), pp. 74–105, p. 88. Along the same lines is the observation that ‘[t]he application pro-
cess [for the recognition of victim status] is but the entry point of actual participation in
proceedings’ in ‘Five Myths about Victim Participation in icc Proceedings’, International
Federation for Human Rights (fidh), vol. 649a (December 2014) p. 7.
5 Joris van Wijk, ‘Who is the ‘little old lady’ of international crimes? Nils Christie’s con-
cept of the ideal victim reinterpreted’, International Review of Victimology, vol. 19:2 (2013),
pp. 159–179, p. 160.
6 Although the victim-related provisions in the Statute may seem conditioned upon the ap-
plication of one of the Rules, in the hierarchy of the icc’s constitutive documents the latter
are subordinate towards the Statute. The Rules complement the Statute and serve as an in-
strument for the application of its provisions by elucidating the substance of certain notions
used, but not defined in the Statute. See articles 21(1)(a) and 51(4) and (5), as well as the
explanatory note to the Rules.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004338616_003

Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 11

to this provision ‘victims’ means: (a) ‘natural persons who have suffered harm
as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’;
and may include (b) ‘organizations or institutions that have sustained direct
harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or
science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and
other places and objects of humanitarian purposes.’
Thus, rule 85 enshrines several distinct eligibility requirements, namely: the
victim must be a natural person or a legal entity – an organization or institu-
tion; the victim must have sustained harm; the crime from which the harm en-
sued must fall within the jurisdiction of the Court; there must be a causal link
between the crime and the harm. As this chapter will reveal, although bearing
certain nuances depending on the group of victims, the eligibility criteria ad-
here to the same universal principles and thus overlap to a great extent. The
majority of the requirements raise concerns as to their interpretation in the
conflicting jurisprudence of the icc’s Chambers in that respect, especially at
its inception.

The Victim Definition and the Presumption of Innocence

Bearing in mind the importance of the victim definition, it is somewhat sur-

prising that the eligibility criteria for the recognition of victim status have not
attracted particular attention in the literature on the icc. Still, among the com-
mentators who address the victim definition some regard it as problematic7
with respect to the presumption of innocence.8 While certain authors aver
that the concept of victim as formulated by the Rules appears to presuppose
that a crime has been committed,9 others directly challenge the victim defini-
tion as eroding the presumption of innocence.10 The positive determination

7 Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and Role of the Victim’ in Antonio
Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary,
vol. ii, Oxford University Press (2002), pp. 1387–1419, p. 1403. See in the same vein, Scott
T. Johnson, ‘Neither Victims nor Executioners: the Dilemma of Victim Participation and
the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court’, ilsa Journal of
International and Comparative Law, vol. 16:2 (2009–2010), pp. 489–496.
8 The presumption of innocence is spelled out in article 66.
9 Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 7.
10 Johnson, supra note 7. As a further reiteration of this view see Margaret Burnham, ‘Frag-
mentation in International Criminal Law and the Rights of Victims’ in Larissa van den
Herik and Carsten Stahn (eds.), The Diversification and Fragmentation of International
12 chapter 1

of victim status has thus been equated to a premature judicial conclusion that
the alleged crime has occurred. Accordingly, it has been contended that the ac-
knowledgment of victim status de facto preestablishes two key elements that
the Prosecutor must prove beyond reasonable doubt, namely, that a crime oc-
curred and that there are victims.11 Following this line of reasoning it has been
suggested that a successful victim’s application or, put differently, the recogni-
tion of victim status is the functional equivalent of a preliminary verdict.12
Such contentions prove untenable in light of a number of considerations.
The assumption that the victim definition of rule 85 infringes the presumption
of innocence falls short of discerning the substance and purpose of the rec-
ognition of a person as a victim, on the one hand, and the essence of the
presumption of innocence, on the other. Indubitably, the presumption of
innocence is a central criminal justice postulate dictating that the proceedings
should be conducted with respect to the defendant as if innocent.13 Hence, the
alleged perpetrator has the legal status of innocence prior to conviction.14 As
such, the presumption of innocence represents an instruction to officials on
how they should proceed in respect to the alleged perpetrator, not a prediction
of the outcome of the proceedings at hand.15 Consequently, the presumption
of innocence safeguards the integrity of the criminal justice process through
the duty on public authorities to refrain from ‘prejudging of the outcome of
a trial’.16 In view of that, the reasonable conclusion to be advanced is that by
virtue of the presumption of innocence, until there has been an adjudication
of guilt, the issue concerning the guilt of the alleged perpetrator remains an
open question.17

Criminal Law, Leiden Studies on the Frontiers of International Law, vol. 1, Martinus Ni-
jhoff (2012), pp. 657–679, p. 675.
11 In this regard it has been observed that ‘[o]ne is […] left to conclude that by finding that
applicants are victims of the alleged crime for which the defendant is prosecuted, judges
also necessarily find that the alleged crime has occurred’– see Mugambi Jouet, ‘Reconcil-
ing the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the International Criminal Court’,
Saint Louis University Public Law Review, vol. 26 (2007), pp. 249–308, p. 271.
12 See ibid. Jouet, as well as Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 7.
13 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’, International Journal
of Evidence and Proof, vol. 10:4 (2006), pp. 241–279, p. 250.
14 Ibid., p. 244.
15 See Herbert L. Packer, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’, University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, vol. 113:1 (1964–1965), pp. 1–68, p. 12.
16 Thomas Margueritte, ‘International Criminal Law and Human Rights’ in William A.
Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law,
Routledge (2010), pp. 435–452, p. 441.
17 See Packer, supra note 15, who aptly notes that ‘until there has been an adjudication of
guilt by an authority legally competent to make such an adjudication, the suspect is to be
Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 13

Along these lines it is to be noted that the recognition of victim status

pursuant to rule 85 solely entails that the events as described in the victim’s
application fall within the compass of the charges brought against the alleged
offender(s). In other words, as long as the events described in the application
for participation correspond with the scope of the charges delimiting the
­subject-matter of the proceedings (temporal, territorial and material), this war-
rants the admission of victims in the process. The victim definition, therefore,
serves to differentiate between persons who are entitled to a legal standing
in proceedings (thus, may be admitted as victim-participants in the criminal
justice process) from persons who are not. Notwithstanding arguments in the
opposite vein,18 the recognition of victim status neither predetermines that
the crimes as described have actually been committed, nor that the alleged
events are attributable to the individual criminal responsibility of the alleged
offender(s). In the course of the icc’s fact-finding process it could, for instance,
be established that the alleged harmful events have either not taken place as
described in the charges or do not represent a crime pursuant to article 5 for
different reasons (due to the lack of objective and/or subjective elements of
the crime as enunciated in the relevant provision or due to the existence of
grounds excluding the criminal responsibility of the alleged perpetrator(s)).
Similarly, on the basis of the evidence gathered in the course of the pro-
ceedings it could be established that, even though the alleged events rep-
resent a crime within the icc’s jurisdiction, they are not attributable to the
individual(s) standing trial. Accordingly, the recognition as a victim pursuant
to rule 85 does not in itself entail a pre-determination of any element com-
prised by the subject-matter under consideration. More importantly, the rule
85 definition focuses on the harm suffered,19 as alleged by the victim, rather

treated, for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the probable outcome of the
case, as if his guilt is an open question.’
18 See e.g. Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’, Journal
of International Criminal Justice vol. 8 (2010), pp. 137–164, at pp. 146–147, who contends
that the recognition as victim entails ‘a preliminary finding that a crime was committed
against [the victim]’, which, on its part presupposes ‘a presumption as to the unfolding
of events.’ The author further avers that ‘[t]his implies the establishment (at least prima
facie) of the fact that a crime occurred and that the persons claiming the status of victims
were somehow affected by this crime’ and subsequently observes that the Court should
‘not take the factual basis of the crimes for granted.’
19 Hence, as far as the recognition of victim status acknowledges the harm suffered, it is
considered to affirm as such the victims’ dignity – Luke Moffett, ‘Elaborating Justice for
Victims at the International Criminal Court’, Journal of International Criminal Justice
vol. 13 (2015), pp. 281–311, p. 287.
14 chapter 1

than on the purported crime itself20 or the identity of the perpetrator. Lastly,
icc’s jurisprudence does not consider the identification of the alleged perpe-
trator to be among the prerequisites for a complete application for participa-
tion.21 As also acknowledged in legal literature, victims are not victims of the
accused, but victims of ‘a crime’ which the defendant may or may not have
committed – a fact that is to be determined at trial.22 Furthermore, by way of
reference to the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
(‘un Basic Principles and Guidelines’) commentators duly note that a victim
is a victim regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended,
prosecuted or convicted.23 Given all the above, it is to be concluded that the
victim definition as provided under rule 85 and, respectively, the recognition of
a person as a victim has no inimical bearing on the presumption of innocence.

Application of Rule 85

The in-depth analysis of the victim notion fleshed out in rule 85 is essential
not only for the accurate elucidation of the eligibility criteria, but proves also
critical for the operation of the victims’ participation scheme and may have an
impact on the expeditiousness of proceedings.24

20 Unlike, for instance, the victim definitions enunciated in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribu-
nals and of the Residual Mechanism.
21 E.g. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Bemba), Trial Chamber (tc) iii, Decision
on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications by victims to participate
in the proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-807, 30 June 2010, and the Corrigendum, ICC-01/05-
01/08-807-Corr, 12 July 2010 (Bemba, tc iii, Decision of 12 July 2010), para. 94; The Pros-
ecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (Ruto et al.),
ptc ii, First Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Case, ICC-01/09-01/11-17, 30 March
2011 (Ruto et al., ptc ii, Decision on victims’ participation of 30 March 2011), para. 19; Ruto
et al.., ptc ii, Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing
and in the Related Proceedings, ICC-01/09-01/11-249, 5 August 2011 (Ruto et al., ptc ii, De-
cision of 5 August 2011), para. 22 and footnote 26 for additional relevant case law.
22 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Victims before the International Criminal Court: A New Model of
Criminal Justice?’, Victims of Crime Research Digest, Issue 5 (2013).
23 Mariana Pena, ‘Victim Participation in the International Criminal Court: Achievements
Made and Challenges Lying Ahead’, ilsa Journal of International and Comparative Law
vol. 16 (2010), pp. 497–516, p. 511.
24 Arguably, ‘a broad interpretation of the notion of victim risks creating a backlog in the
proceedings, undermining the ability of the Court to efficiently implement its mandate
Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 15

The broad nature of the victim definition has been reflected in the icc’s
initial jurisprudence, according to which ‘[t]he location of rule 85 in the Rules
is indicative of a general provision relating to victims, applicable to various
stages of the proceedings’.25 Heedful of the ‘catch-all’ character of the victims’
eligibility provision,26 it is beyond doubt that the legal condition of victim can-
not be determined in the abstract, but should be examined in the context of
concrete proceedings in light of their nature, purpose, scope and stage.27
Admittedly, the opposite proposition in favour of a uniform application of
the rule 85 criteria irrespective of the particularities of the procedural phases
would prove untenable. Such a viewpoint would fail to heed the distinctive-
ness of the various proceedings28 and stages at which the assessment of eli-
gibility is to be performed. Each subsequent procedural stage is marked by
higher specificity and concreteness than the preceding one. With the develop-
ment of the criminal justice process the events and facts under consideration
also crystallize and narrow in scope. Similarly, the victims’ eligibility criteria
become more specific and precise. Hence, the more advanced the stage of the
proceedings, the higher the threshold of the victims’ eligibility requirements
which must be met.
Likewise, the temporal, geographic and personal parameters of a situation
are considerably wider and subsume the parameters of all cases which may
arise from it. The investigation of a situation takes place at an earlier procedur-
al stage and covers much broader scale of events. Consequently, as potential
cases originate from situations, they have a significantly narrower ambit. Cases
focus on particular crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction individualized in

[footnote omitted]’ – see Valentina Spiga, ‘Indirect Victims’ Participation in the Lubanga
Trial’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 8:1 (2010), pp. 183–198, p. 186.
25 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence
against Trial Chamber i’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432, 11 July 2008 (Lubanga, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 11 July 2008), paras.
57–58.
26 Håkan Friman, ‘The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third
Party to the Proceedings?’, Leiden Journal of International Law vol. 22 (2009), pp. 485–500,
p. 490.
27 Note, however, the existence of an understanding in the opposite vein in the initial juris-
prudence of Pre-Trial Chamber (ptc) i, according to which a ‘victim procedural status’
was to be assessed and, respectively, granted outside concrete judicial proceedings.
28 Such as proceedings on the merits of the criminal case, proceedings pursuant to articles
15(3) and 19(3), reparation proceedings pursuant to article 75.
16 chapter 1

terms of the identity of the alleged perpetrators and the alleged harm inflicted
through their commission. Logically, the victims’ eligibility criteria should be
applied and construed more flexibly within the context of a situation as they
bear less specificity and concreteness than they do in a case.
An illustration of an early procedural stage where the threshold of the rule
85 criteria is considerably lower and lacks much specificity are the proceedings
pursuant to article 15(3). This procedure takes place prior to the commence-
ment of the actual criminal process and is based on the preliminary examina-
tion of the Prosecutor of the information provided to him or her. The purpose
of victims’ representations within this particular proceeding is to express the
prevailing stance of the community of individuals affected as a whole by an
alleged criminal conduct with regard to the Prosecutor’s request to the Pre-
Trial Chamber for authorization of an investigation. Victims’ representations
are confined to providing the Chamber with a general idea of the prevalent
disposition of the respective population towards the initiation of an investiga-
tion by the Prosecutor in order to make a useful contribution to the final de-
termination to be made by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Hence, as noted by Pre-Trial
­Chamber (‘ptc’) ii29 victims’ representations within the article 15(3) proceed-
ings serve exclusively the purpose of ‘express[ing] their position on a possible
investigation [to be undertaken by the Prosecutor] or not’.30 E ­ vidently, at this
early stage a thorough, strict and detailed assessment of the rule 85 require-
ments to each person within the affected community or group of ­individuals
would be unwarranted.31
The jurisprudence of ptc ii just mentioned is a manifestation of a flexible
approach in the application of rule 85 whereby the eligibility criteria were
applied creatively with an emphasis on the particular nature and the nar-
row scope of article 15 proceedings, as well as on the limited involvement of
victims therein. The rule 85 requirements were outlined in very broad and
general terms and were applied to groups of victims and even to a wider cat-
egory of ‘affected groups’. The same principled approach was endorsed in the

29 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ptc ii, Order to the Victims Participation and Repara-
tions Section Concerning Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Stat-
ute, ICC-01/09-4, 10 December 2009, para. 10.
30 Ibid.
31 Recently, in the Situation in Georgia, 6335 representations by or on behalf of victims were
collected under article 15(3) – see Situation in Georgia, ptc i, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
request for authorization of an investigation, ICC-01/15-12, 27 January 2016, para. 2.
Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 17

s­ ubsequent jurisprudence of the Court. Noting the specific and limited purpose
of representations within the context of article 15 proceedings ptc iii applied
the rule 85 criteria not only to individual victims, but also to the victimized
community represented by the respective community leader(s).32
The need for a varied approach in the assessment of rule 85 adapted to the
stage of the proceedings has been acknowledged also on other occasions, al-
beit in a different context. Both in its initial, as well as more recent jurispru-
dence ptc i has advanced the view that during an investigation of a situation
the status of victim will be accorded to applicants who fall within the victim
definition in relation to the situation,33 whereas, at the case stage, victim status
will be accorded to applicants who meet the eligibility criteria in the context
of the case.34
Besides the specific stage of the icc’s process, at which victim status is to
be evaluated, it is likewise pertinent that the eligibility criteria are considered
in light of the nature and object of the concrete proceedings – whether on the
merits of the criminal case or on reparations – as well as in view of the pur-
pose of victims’ intervention – presentation of views and concerns or claiming
reparations. This proves of particular importance in the context of the first
criterion – the ‘natural persons’ requirement – and, more specifically, for the
proper resolution of the question whether deceased individuals are eligible
pursuant to rule 85(a).

The First Criterion: Natural Persons

The first eligibility criterion under rule 85 comprises two groups of persons –
natural and legal persons. Natural persons are set out in rule 85(a) as the first
group of eligible victims. The initial jurisprudence of the Court interpreted this
criterion in ‘the ordinary meaning of the term “natural person” as “a human

32 Situation in Cote d’Ivoire, ptc iii, Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Sec-
tion Concerning Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3), 6 July 2011, para. 10.
33 Situation in drc, ptc i, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Pro-
ceedings, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006 (Situation in drc, ptc i, Decision of 17
January 2006), para. 66. See along the same lines Situation on the Registered Vessels of the
Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia (Comoros Situ-
ation), ptc i, Decision on the Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/13-18, 24 April 2015, para. 12.
34 Situation in drc, ptc i, Decision of 17 January 2006, para. 66.
18 chapter 1

being”’.35 This entails ‘the rather banal conclusion’36 that ‘[a] natural person
is any person who is not a legal person.’37 A more comprehensive consider-
ation is suggested in legal literature, according to which ‘natural persons’ are
‘legal subjects (sujet[s] de droit) with full juridical capacity since such a juridi-
cal relevance stems from the natural capability of exercising inherent rights
and duties.’38
Consequently, at first glance the ‘natural persons’ eligibility requirement
may appear straightforward and thus may be regarded as the ‘most clear-cut
and unproblematic’,39 and of little complexity.40 However, to infer that the ‘nat-
ural persons’ requirement does not cause any ambiguity or complexity would
be impetuous. A thorough scrutiny of the first criterion detects a number of
contentious issues, some of which have been brought to light in the Court’s
initial jurisprudence. Among the most pressing ones are the identification of
natural persons, as well as the highly debatable question of deceased persons.
In light of the icc’s case law both issues prove to be far from unproblematic.

Identification Requirements
The need that the identity of applicants before the icc be duly established
is undoubtedly essential, so that the victim status be accorded to actual indi-
viduals. At the same time, the scope and nature of the identification require-
ments must be tailored to the available means for proof of identity. Hence, the
application of the identification criteria must reconcile two major concerns.
First, the identification materials should not be clouded with any doubt as to
the applicants’ actual identities and, secondly, the applicants should not be
deprived of the possibility to be recognized as victims due to impediments be-
yond their control. In order for the two concurrent objectives to be achieved, a
well-­balanced, realistic and flexible approach must be adopted when elaborat-
ing and applying the identification requirements.

35 Situation in drc, ptc i, Decision of 17 January 2006. Recourse to the notion of ‘human
being’ is also made in the definition of the term ‘person’ in article 1(2) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, according to which ‘person’ ‘means every human being’.
36 Baumgartner, supra note 2, p. 418.
37 Situation in drc, ptc i, Decision of 17 January 2006, para. 80; see also Black’s Law Diction-
ary, Eighth Edition (2004), according to which ‘[a] ‘natural person’ is a human being, as
distinguished from an artificial person created by law.’
38 Gioia Greco, ‘Victims’ Rights Overview under the icc Legal Framework: A Jurisprudential
Analysis’, International Criminal Law Review vol. 7 (2007), pp. 531–547, p. 535.
39 Yvonne McDermott, ‘Some Are More Equal than Others: Victim Participation in the icc’,
Eyes on the icc, vol. 5:1 (2008–2009), pp. 23–48, p. 30.
40 Baumgartner, supra note 2, p. 419.
Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 19

This view finds support in the practice of international adjudicative bodies

and in literature. Commentators agree upon the creative application of the
identification prerequisites acknowledging that in conflict zones and areas
lacking operational registration systems individuals are very likely to lose their
identification documents and are often deprived of access to public records.41
Thereby, victim-applicants from volatile corners of the world encounter nu-
merous obstacles in proving their identity ensuing from the difficult conditions
surrounding them. Destruction of documents and lack of documentation are
widely acknowledged as a common and frequent problem in the aftermath
of mass atrocities.42 Given the frustration of victim-applicants who run the
risk of being rejected admission because of inability to generate proof of their
alleged victimization, it is critical that adjudicative institutions modify their
standards of proof of applicants’ identities depending on the circumstances
of the case.43
Observers point to the relaxed evidentiary standards with respect to claim-
ants’ eligibility and the determination of claims in the context of mass claims
processes, such as the Claims Resolution Tribunals for Dormant Accounts in
Switzerland (‘Claims Resolution Tribunals’) and the German Forced Labour
Programme. Notably, the Rules of Procedure of the First Claims Resolution
Tribunal have introduced the explicit stipulation that, when assessing the in-
formation submitted to them, the arbitrators or the Claims Panel shall at all
times bear in mind difficulties in proving a claim after the destruction of World
War ii and the Holocaust, and the long time elapsed since the opening of the
dormant accounts.44 This approach has been endorsed by the Second Claims
Resolution Tribunal, which in its determination on the claims applied rather

41 See Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 7, p. 1411; Heike Niebergall, ‘Overcoming Eviden-
tiary Weaknesses in Reparation Claims Programmes’ in C. Ferstman et al. (eds.), Repara-
tions for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Systems in Place
and Systems in the Making, Martinus Nijhoff (2009), pp. 145–166, p. 149; Lutz Oette, ‘Bring-
ing Justice to Victims? Responses of Regional and International Human Rights Courts and
Treaty Bodies to Mass Violations’ in C. Ferstman et al. (eds.) (in ibid.), pp. 217–242, p. 226.
42 Ibid.
43 Eric Stover, Mychelle Balthazard and K. Alexa Koenig, ‘Confronting Duch: civil party par-
ticipation in Case 001 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, Interna-
tional Review of the Red Cross vol. 93:882 (June 2011), pp. 503–546, p. 542.
44 The tribunal was established in 1997 to adjudicate claims concerning the entitlement of
non-Swiss nationals and/or residents to dormant bank accounts held in Swiss banks set
out in published lists. See in more detail on this issue Jacomijn van Haersolte-van Hof, ‘In-
novations to Speed Mass Claims: New Standards of Proof’ in Redressing Injustices Through
Mass Claims Processes: Innovative Responses to Unique Challenges, The ­International
20 chapter 1

flexible criteria.45 In the same vein, the German Forced Labour Programme46
has introduced relaxed standard of proof of a claimant’s eligibility. To the same
effect, as far as the determination of claims is concerned, the Programme’s
Supplemental Principles and Rules of Procedure provide that ‘[a] claim cannot
be rejected on the sole ground that it is not supported by official documentary
evidence.’
The impediments in meeting the required standard of proof for victims
in conflict zones are acknowledged also by other adjudicative bodies at the
international level. The United Nations Compensation Commission (‘the un
­Compensation Commission’),47 for instance, took into account the difficult cir-
cumstances of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait and ruled that ‘many
claimants cannot, and cannot be expected to, document all aspects of a claim.
In many cases, relevant documents do not exist, have been destroyed, or were
left behind’.48 This finding portrays the general stance of the un Compensa-
tion Commission about victims’ lack of access to documentation relevant to all
aspects of a claim, the identity of the claimant(s) being one of them. Similarly,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘the IACtHR’, ‘the Inter-American
Court’) has recognized alternative methods for the proof of victims’ identity
depending on the peculiarities and accessibility of the respective registration
systems.49

Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Oxford University Press (2006),
pp. 13–23, p. 15 et seq.
45 See ibid., pp. 18–19. The tribunal was established in 2001 on the basis of newly discovered
additional dormant accounts. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the tribunal ap-
plied presumptions as to the entitlement of the claimants.
46 See ibid., pp. 20–21. This programme was established by virtue of the German Law on the
Establishment of a Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’.
47 The un Compensation Commission was established as a subsidiary organ of the United
Nations Security Council pursuant to para. 18 of un Security Council (unsc) Resolution
687/1991 of 3 April 1991 and unsc Resolution 692/1991 of 20 May 1991 to process claims
and to pay compensation for any direct loss, damage and injury resulting from Iraq’s in-
vasion and occupation of Kuwait and to administer the fund created for the payment of
such compensation.
48 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part
One of the First Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages above usd 100 000 (Cat-
egory ‘D’ Claims) (S/AC.26/1998/1 of 3 February 1998).
49 See e.g. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment on the Merits and Reparations of 15
June 2005, Series C No. 124, para. 178; Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 Sep-
tember 1993 on Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 15, para. 64; Plan de Sánchez Massacre
v. Guatemala, Judgment on Reparations of 19 November 2004, Series C No. 116, para. 63;
Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 21

Along these lines it bears mentioning that the lack of access to evidentiary
material regarding identity is merely one among the numerous problems for
victims in conflict zones. Therefore, in addition to considerably lowering and
adapting the identification criteria to the factual circumstances, human rights
bodies tend to adopt flexible requirements concerning the filing of applica-
tions on behalf of victims. An illustration of this approach contains the legal
framework of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the
African Commission’). The relevant provisions envisage the possibility for
petitions or communications claiming human rights violations to be filed on
behalf of third persons, whom the petitioner neither knows nor has any rela-
tionship with (kinship, representation) – also known as actio popularis.50 This
approach of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (‘the African
Charter’) may be explained by the fact that in conflict areas it is difficult if
not even impossible for victims themselves to pursue national or international
channels of remedy.51
The initial jurisprudence of the icc reveals a propensity towards a strict ap-
proach concerning applicants’ identities. The requisites were applied uniform-
ly, regardless of applicants’ personal circumstances.52 This standpoint failed
to consider the specificities surrounding individuals and, eventually, proved

Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment of 1 July 2006, Preliminary Objections, Merits,

Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 148, para. 94.
50 Articles 55 and 56 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and rule 104 of the
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.
51 Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), para. 78.
Actio popularis is also envisaged in article 44 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, as well as in article 87(d) of the Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 (Institution-
building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 18 June 2007). On the contrary, the
legal framework of the ECtHR does not envisage such form of public interest litigation
(see article 34 echr). For further reference on actio popularis see Lutz Oette, ‘Bringing
Justice to Victims? Responses of Regional and International Human Rights Courts and
Treaty Bodies to Mass Violations’ in C. Ferstman et al. (eds.), Reparations for Victims of
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Systems in Place and Systems in the
Making, Martinus Nijhoff (2009), pp. 217–242, at pp. 221–222.
52 Situation in Uganda, ptc ii, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-
02/04-101, 10 August 2007 (Situation in Uganda, ptc ii, Decision of 10 August 2007) and
The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen (Kony
et al.), ptc ii, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-01/05-252, 10
August 2007 (Kony et al., ptc ii, Decision of 10 August 2007). A number of strict require-
ments were set with regard to the nature and form of the identification documents, which
significantly narrowed the range of the admissible identification material.
22 chapter 1

unsustainable. Furthermore, the Court itself recognized the likelihood that in

some areas the available proofs of identity may not be of the same type as they
would be in other less tumultuous areas.53
Hence, it comes as no surprise that the subsequent jurisprudence of the Court
embraced a less stringent approach as regards establishment of applicants’
identities. By virtue of the latter, the identification requirements were adapted
to the particular factual circumstances, thus, the threshold for the proofs of
identity was lowered.54 Gradually, the reasonable stance was advanced that a
balance was needed between ascertaining applicants’ identities with certainty
and their personal circumstances. The Court acknowledged the need to ensure
that victims must not be unfairly deprived of an opportunity to participate for
reasons beyond their control.55 This positive development in icc’s jurispru-
dence is a lucid illustration of the unsustainability of the initial uniform and
strict application of the identification criteria. An inference along the same
lines is premised on the fact that at present the Chambers unanimously fol-
low creative and moderate approach in the assessment of applicants’ proofs of
identity.56 Moreover, even in cases of incongruity between application forms

53 Ibid. Nevertheless, the strict approach was retained: a simple statement by an individual
belonging to a local authority that a given applicant ‘is a victim’ of a specific incident was
regarded as falling short of the requirements for an adequate proof of identity. By con-
trast, in the Situation in drc on the basis of similar findings ptc i applied a more flexible
evidentiary threshold. See ptc i, Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of
the Applicants on the application process for victims’ participation and legal representa-
tion, ICC-01/04-374, 17 August 2007 (Situation in drc, ptc i, Decision of 17 August 2007).
54 Situation in Uganda, ptc ii, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-
02/04-125, 14 March 2008 (Situation in Uganda, ptc ii, Decision of 14 March 2008), and
Kony et al., ptc ii, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-01/05-
282, 14 March 2008. The Single Judge embraced the idea of a moderate threshold of the
identification criteria and their application in light of the specific conditions in the region
following the findings in the report of the vprs. See in the same vein Ruto et al., ptc ii,
Decision on victims’ participation of 30 March 2011, paras. 7–8, where the Single Judge
acknowledged the ‘difficulties victim applicants […] may encounter in obtaining or pro-
ducing copies of official identity documents, such as a passport’ and thus regarded as
acceptable other substitute forms of identification to official documentation, in case the
latter would not be available.
55 Lubanga, tc i, Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 18 January
2008 (Lubanga, tc i, Decision of 18 January 2008), para. 87; The Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Katanga and Ngudjolo), tc ii, Decision on the
Treatment of Applications for Participation, ICC-01/04-01/07-933-tENG, 26 February 2009
(Katanga and Ngudjolo, tc ii, Decision of 26 February 2009).
56 See e.g. Situation in drc, ptc i, Decision of 17 August 2007; The Prosecutor v. Bahar Id-
riss Abu Garda (Abu Garda), ptc i, Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at
Victims’ Eligibility under Rule 85 23

and supporting identification documents, the Court has consistently regarded

the identities as duly established as long as the applicants would clearly and
satisfactorily explain such incoherences.57 Consequently, victim status could
be acknowledged on the basis of the intrinsic coherence of the application,
notwithstanding discrepancies between the application and the documents in
support or lack thereof.58

Deceased Persons
Another complex issue within the scope of the first eligibility criterion con-
cerns deceased persons. The jurisprudence of the Court, especially at the be-
ginning, is marked by the dilemma of whether individuals who are no longer
alive are encompassed by rule 85(a). Various Chambers have pondered on
the question if deceased persons are ‘natural persons’ within the meaning of
the victim definition and, accordingly, if they are entitled to the standing of

the Pre-Trial Stage, ICC-02/05-02/09-121, 25 September 2009 (Abu Garda, ptc i, Decision
of 25 September 2009), and Bemba, ptc iii, Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation,
ICC-01/05-01/08-320, 12 December 2008 (Bemba, ptc iii, Decision of 12 December 2008);
The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo (Gbagbo), ptc i, Corrigendum to the Second decision
on victims’ participation at the confirmation of charges hearing and in the related pro-
ceedings, ICC-02/11-01/11-384-Corr, 8 February 2013, para. 27; Gbagbo, Appeals Chamber,
Reasons for the ‘Decision on the “Request for the recognition of the right of victims au-
thorized to participate in the case to automatically participate in any interlocutory appeal
arising from the case and, in the alternative, application to participate in the interlocutory
appeal against the ninth decision on Mr Gbagbo’s detention (ICC-02/1 1-01/15-134-Red3)”’,
ICC-02/11-01/15-172, 31 July 2015, para. 17.
57 E.g. The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (Ntaganda), ptc ii, Decision on Victims’
Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, ICC-
01/04-02/06-211, 15 January 2014, para. 23; Gbagbo, tc i, Decision on victim participation,
ICC-02/11-01/11-800, 6 March 2015 (Gbagbo, tc i, Decision of 6 March 2015), para. 32. See
in the same strain in the case of The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (Ongwen), the observa-
tions by the Registry submitted to tc ix in the First Report on Applications to Participate
in the Proceedings, ICC-02/04-01/15-530, 2 September 2016.
58 E.g. Gbagbo, tc i, Decision of 6 March 2015, para. 32 and The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo
and Charles Blé Goudé (Gbagbo and Blé Goudé), Decision on victims’ participation status,
ICC-02/11-01/15-379, 7 January 2016, para. 46. Note as well the observation in the preceding
paragraph of the decision (para. 45), according to which ‘pursuant to Regulation 86(2) of
the Regulations [of the Court], applications for victims’ participation shall contain infor-
mation and supporting documentation to the extent possible [emphasis in the decision]’;
Ntaganda, tc vi, Decision on victims’ participation in trial proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, 6 February 2015 (Ntaganda, tc vi, Decision of 6 February 2015), para. 46.
Another random document with
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Megverekedett és pedig nem is egy, hanem mindjárt két úrral,
Törökváry Stefivel, meg –
– Oszkár bátyámmal! – kaczagott a gonosz Rádern Gida – tudod,
beszélgettek a tegnapelőtti estélyen és rossz viczczeket mondtak a
hölgyekre…
Elmondták neki a részleteket. Guszti majd sóbálványnyá
változott.
– Megverekedett?… – makogta – de hát hogy jut hozzá, hogy az
én feleségemért megverekedjék? Ki ez a Dombrády Gyuri?
– Ismételten kijelentette, hogy nem is ismeri a feleségedet.
– Gavallérságból tette – nevetett Gida – hinni kell a keresztes
lovagnak!…
– No, köszönöm! – tört ki Guszti selypítve – ez igazán szamár
egy eset!… A feleségeért csak a férjnek van joga megverekedni –
mit tegyek? Mivel tartozom ennek az embernek,… izé… micsoda
kötelezettségbe kerülök én egy olyan úrral, a ki a feleségemért
mindjárt két párbajt vív?
– Köszönd meg neki szépen! – kaczagott még hangosabban
Rádern Gida.
Balsay Guszti nem felelt, csak elsápadt. A legellentétesebb
érzések dulakodása közben felszállt benne a gyanakvás ördöge.
– Megyek haza – mondta határozottan – majd tudom én, mit kell
tennem! – A barátok szolgálatkészen kísérték el.

II.

Akkorra már a jukker-asszonyok teljes pletykatanácsban ülték

körül a Guszti feleségét. Lili asszony nem is jutott szóhoz tőlük –
kanapéja száz párnájába temetkezve, pongyolában ott pihent
közöttük, mint egy áldozatra szánt bárányka, vagy helyesebben,
mint egy kényeztetett angoramacska, melynek lusta ösztöneit
kellemesen czirógatja az a tudat, hogy mindenki vele foglalkozik.
Divatos életpályája kezdetén eddig két erény védte meg Lili asszonyt
a szerelmes flirt-ek ellen: hiusága és lustasága; még mindig
gyermekesen örült a szép ruháknak önmagukért, s jólesően kerülte
az ábrándokba való mélyedést, mert attól félt, hogy a töprengés árt
az arczszínének. Kerülte a szerelmet, mert mindenekfelett
kényelmetlennek tartotta… A túlhamar jövő sikerek, s a küzdelem
nélküli hódolatok bizonyos fokig blazirttá is tették, únta a
vallomásokat, sőt annyira elbizakodottá lett, hogy már olykor
szépsége dicséretét is unta. Mikor meghallotta, hogy egy merőben
idegen fiatal ember megverekedett érte, pillanatra gyöngén
elmosolyodott, s leánykori regényes érzések támadtak fel benne. De
a fontoskodó jukker-asszonyoknak gondjuk volt rá, hogy
kiábrándítsák ebből a regényességből: tegnapelőtt a «külföld»
szemeláttára lefőzte valamennyiőjüket ez az ujoncz menyecske, ma
még ez a siker hozzá, sok volt ez egyszerre, nem lehetett ezt szó
nélkül hagyni.
– De hát ki ez a Dombrády Gyuri? – kérdezte Lili asszony naiv
mosolylyal, még kényelmesebben belefeküdve párnáiba.
– Még kérded, kedvesem? – felelt csipősen a vöröshajú,
férfigalléros Sztalevszkyné – csak nem akarod elhitetni velünk, hogy
nem ismered?
– De ha mondom, hogy nem ismerem!
– Ugyan, Lili – folytatá Benczédyné – nekünk a jóbarátnőknek
mondhatsz ilyet, de idegeneknek, az Istenért, ne említsd!
– De mondom, sose láttam életemben!
– Ez már igazán nevetséges! – sziszegte a babaarczú Dághy
Bercziné – mondd legalább, hogy gyermekkorod óta nem láttad!
Erre már feltápászkodott párnái közűl Lili asszony.
 – De hisz a Dombrádyak a hetedik vármegyében laknak tőlünk!
Mondom, se gyerekkoromban, se azelőtt, se azóta sose láttam –
no!…
Mérges lett, könyek szöktek a szemébe. A jukker asszonyok csak
ezt akarták: ne essék a diadal olyan könnyen az elkényeztetett
babának! Odaültek mellé, czirógatták, s addig vigasztalták, míg
végre keservesen elsírta magát. Akkor aztán méltatlankodva kezdték
el nyilatkozataikat.
– No, ha igazán nem ismered – mondotta Sztalevszkyné – akkor
a legnagyobb szemtelenség ilyen tüntető módon hívni fel egy
asszony figyelmét. Valósággal kompromitál, édesem! Hát jó,
szerelmes beléd, elismerem, de az ilyen imádókat ne vedd
lajstromba…
– Dehogy veszem! – siránkozott Lili asszony.
– Ez nem uriember – folytatta Benczédyné – valami modortalan
ripők!
– Persze hogy az…
– Ez nem siker, hanem inkább szégyen – fejezte be az
elmefuttatást Dághyné.
– Jó, jó – csak hagyjatok már békét vele! Látjátok, hogy unom…
Lili asszony befogta a fülét és türelmetlenül nézett szét. A jóbarátnők
a legérzékenyebb pontján érintették: teljességgel kizavarták a
kényelméből. Ebben a válságos pillanatban rontott be a boudoirba a
férj. Gusztáv úr, alkalomadtán igen pathetikus, sőt szinpadias tudott
lenni, a megfélemlítés rhetorikájával akart vallomást csikarni a
feleségéből.
– Asszony – kiáltotta tragikusan selypítve – számadást nekem
erről a szemtelen fráterről…
– No, most meg ez jön – méltatlankodott Lili asszony felkelve
(valósággal felkelve!) a kanapéról. – Ünnepélyesen kijelentem, hogy
nem ismerem Dombrády Gyurit – no!
 – Hah, hisz kimondtad a nevét!
– Igen, mert a barátnőim már egy óra óta nyaggatnak vele.
– Vallj meg mindent – szereted!
– Ugyan, hagyj már békét…
– Vérére szomjazom! – selypített tovább Balsay Guszti.
– Megőrültél?
– Hah – véded? Felelj – én nem vagyok olyan mint a többi férj,
én nem azért házasodtam, hogy engem a feleségem megcsaljon! Én
azért házasodtam, hogy… hogy…
Szegény Guszti egyszerre kiesett a rhetorikájából. Ott állt és
csak bámult az asszonyokra, a kik helyeslő mosolylyal viszont
bámultak rá. A barátok, kik elkisérték volt, a szomszéd szobában
várakoztak, csak Rádern Gida dugta be a fejét az ajtón. Lili asszony,
ki a sarokban állva sírt, daczosan épp akkor vetette oda a férjének:
– Mit tehetek én róla? Te csak szavalni tudsz, de sohse vagy ott,
mikor a feleségedet bántják.
– Engedjen meg, nagyságos asszonyom – szólt közbe Gida – de
hisz a férjeket csak nem hívják oda az ilyen ostoba
viczczelődésekhez!
– Engem még sohse hívtak – jelentette ki Guszti
meggyőződéssel. – Hisz csak ott lettem volna!…
Rádern Gida mérsékletre intette a kedélyeket, s a hölgyek
segélyével aztán csakugyan ki is békítette a házasfeleket. Guszti
bocsánatot kért a feleségétől, s hivatalosan elfogadták mindannyian
tárgyalási alapul, hogy Lili asszony csakugyan nem ismeri azt az
idegen urat, a ki érette megverekedett. Behívták a gyűlésre a
szomszédban várakozó két barátot is. Lili asszony unottan űlt vissza
párnái közé, s szívemélyén a poklok legfenekére kivánta azt az
ismeretlen Rittert, a ki ilyen kellemetlenül megvédte a becsületét. A
szabóhoz kellett volna mennie, jaj, már csak vége volna ennek az
ostoba gyűlésnek!
– Abban, azt hiszem, mind megegyezünk – kezdte Gida – hogy
itt tenni kell valamit.
– Meg, meg! – erősítették valamennyien.
– De mit? Mit tegyünk ezzel a Dombrády Gyurival? Erre nézve
már el fognak térni a vélemények.
– Emberileg véve a dolgot – mondotta az egyik barát, egy
mérsékelt filozóf – az ügy tiszta: egy ismeretlen, lovagias férfi a férj
háta mögött, mikor annak nincs módjában föllépni – helyt áll a
felesége becsületéért. Szavára kijelenti, hogy nem is ismeri azt a
hölgyet… itt hát nincs alap a gyanusításra. Nos, egy gentlemannal
szemben, ki ilyen gavallérosan jár el, a férjnek csak egy kötelessége
lehet: menjen el hozzá és köszönje meg neki! Emberileg véve
egyedül ez helyes…
– Hohó! – tiltakoztak többen – de a gentleman még se járt el
egészen korrektül! Neki azt kellett volna mondania az érdeklődő
uraknak, hogy: «majd tudomására hozom a férjnek!»
– Igen – jegyezte meg Guszti – ez lett volna helyes!
– De – vágott közbe a filozóf barát – addig, míg ezt megtehette
volna, már személyesen úgy összeveszett azokkal az urakkal, hogy
szükségképpen neki kellett vállalnia mindent.
Zajos vita lett. Gida gonoszúl csóválta a fejét.
– Bolond egy eset! Itt vagy meg kell köszönni a szivességet, vagy
pofon kell vágni érte a gentlemant…
Végre Sztalevszkyné kért szót:
– Akárhogy veszszük az esetet «emberileg», egy dolog tény: egy
idegen fiatal ember, a ki a férj helyett megverekszik a feleségért,
súlyosan kompromittálja az asszonyt! Esküdözhetnek a világnak,
hogy sohse ismerték egymást, senkise fogja elhinni nekik! A férj még
hegyében meg is köszönje a szívességet?… no ez kicsit sok, ez nyilt
bevallása annak, hogy maga gyönge arra, hogy a feleségeért helyt
álljon! Igen, menjen el ahhoz a gentlemanhoz, vagy helyesebben,
küldjön el hozzá s vonja felelősségre azért a merényletért, hogy meg
mert verekedni a feleségeért!…
A vita egyre hevesebbé fejlődött. A vége az lett, hogy utoljára is
az asszonyok harcziasabb felfogása kerekedett felül. Guszti fölkelt s
ünnepélyesen kijelentette, hogy tudja, mi a kötelessége. Köszönet
helyett segédeket fog küldeni Dombrády Gyurihoz: ezek majd
felvilágosítást, aztán elégtételt kérnek tőle. Megkérdezte a feleségét
is.
Lili asszony duzzogva ült párnái közt. Nem bocsátja meg soha
sem a férjének, sem annak a gyalázatos Dombrády Gyurinak, hogy
miattuk a szabóját elmulasztotta.
– Bánom is én – mondotta mérgesen – csináljatok vele, a mit
akartok! Csak én nekem nem említsétek többet még a nevét se…

III.

A segédek csakugyan eljártak az ügyben, voltak Dombrády

Gyurinál, de némileg megszégyenülve, hosszú orral jöttek vissza.
Voltaképp csak most sült ki, hogy a gavallérgyerek is megsebesült,
sőt, hogy váll-lövése aggasztó lázakkal fenyegetett. Gyurit nem is
láthatták, helyette nagynénje fogadta őket, özv. Zenthy Istvánné,
kinél szállva volt…
– Özv. Zenthy Istvánné? – kiáltott Guszti meglepetve – hisz Máli
nénit mi jól ismerjük! Mit szólt?
Hát – folytaták a segédek – nagyon szivesen fogadta őket, de
mindjárt az ötödik szavuknál tisztában volt a szándékukkal.
Boszankodva komolyodott el, feltette pápaszemét, leült az
íróasztalhoz és levelet írt. Itt az irás…
 Balsay Guszti sietve tépte fel a borítékot:
«Kedves Balsay! Én magát sohse tartottam nagy hősnek,
de hogy maga egy seblázban fekvő emberhez, ki – nem a
maga feleségeért – hanem, hangsúlyozom, a női becsületért
két párbajt vivott, segédeket küldjön: az mégis kicsit túlsok a
hősieskedésből! Különben hisz igaza van – kár manapság
gavallérnak lenni, a mai asszonyok cseppet sem érdemlik
meg. Nos tehát – én beteg unokaöcsém helyett elfogadom az
ön kihivását és biztosíthatom magát, hogy mihelyt meg tud
állni a lábán, minden elégtételt meg fog adni, a mit maga, a
helyett, hogy lovagiasságát megköszönte volna, botorul kivánt
tőle. Üdvözli
Zenthy István ezredes
özvegye.»
– De hát én nem is tudtam, hogy ez a Dombrády Gyuri
megsebesült! – tanakodott Balsay Guszti – mintha bolondot tettünk
volna! Ennek a Máli néniek igaza van: botorság volt egy seblázban
szenvedő emberhez segédeket küldeni, kivált, ha az az ember
ismeretlenül a mi feleségünkért verekedett meg – kétszer! Mit
tegyünk most?
Guszti gyűlésezni akart volna megint, de aztán mégis a józanabb
meggyőződésére hallgatott. Alig várta, hogy a felesége
hazaérkezzék a szabótól. Előadta neki az egész kihivási kudarczot s
felolvasta a Zenthyné levelét.
– Édesem – fejezte be – hogy Dombrády Gyurival mi lesz, az
egyelőre mellékes; hogy azonban ezek után Máli nénihez el kell
mennünk látogatóba, az előttem világos. El kell hozzá menni, nekem
is, neked is…
– Már megint ez a Dombrády Gyuri? – kiáltotta Lili asszony
őszinte haraggal – hát micsoda férfi vagy te, hogy még most se
tudtad ezt az affairet befejezni? Bolondot csináltál s most megint
engem rántasz elő? Én menjek el egy Máli nénihez vizitbe, azért,
mert a párbajozó unokaöcscse szerelmes belém!…
 – Honnan gondolod?
– Hát bizonyosan szerelmes belém – hisz már oly unalmas, hogy
minden ember utánam bolondul! Nincs más asszony a világon?
– De édesem, belátod, illenék elmenni…
– Eh, a nyakamba vegyek megint egy sóhajtozó imádót? Neked
könnyű, neked nem vallanak szerelmet, nekem magamnak kell
mindazt a szóáradatot elviselnem. Oh, hogy unom már az
efféléket!…
Guszti látta, hogy a felesége haragszik, hát nem mert szólni. De
titokban napokon át tudakozódott a sebesült állapotáról. Végre egy
napon, mikor a felesége meg volt elégedve az új ruhájával, szóba
hozta, hogy tán most mehetnének.
– Jó hát menjünk – mondotta Lili asszony – nem bánom!…
Essünk túl a dolgon mentől hamarább. Csak aztán, ha azt a beteg
hőst látjuk, ne hagyj magamra véle, mert még ott nyomban
szerelmet talál vallani nekem…

IV.

Máli tant lábbujjhegyen jött be az ósdi szalonba, szigorúnak

látszott, de mikor végig hallgatta a Guszti hebegő mondókáját,
lassankint földerült az arcza. Kezet adott a szónoknak s vontatottan
Lili asszonynak is. A régi világból való módis öreg asszony volt, ki
nem engedett a negyvennyolczból.
– No jó, jó – a többit aztán csináld ki Gyurival, hej, mások voltak
a férfiak az én időmben, de az asszonyok is! – tette hozzá kicsit
mérgesen pillantva Lili asszonyra. Köszönöm a kérdésteket, most
már jobban van az öcsém. Már bizony attól féltünk, a tüdejét érte a
lövés és nagy baj lesz, de hát megsegít az Isten, ha ti modern
emberek nem is hisztek benne!… Hm, hm… no, jertek be,
bejöhettek Gyurihoz…
 Lili asszony muffjába fojtotta ásítását, de azért szófogadóan kelt
fel. Átmentek néhány ósdi szobán s aztán benyitottak egy kissé
melegebb, de derüs nappali helyiségbe. Angol plaidbe burkoltan egy
erőteljes, szép fiatal ember pihent ott a középső karosszékben; bal
válla be volt kötve, borogatás volt a homlokán is, de a lázokozta
sápadtság azért mitsem vett el tekintetének a határozottságából. A
hogy a nevet hallotta, legénykedve akart föltápászkodni, de Máli néni
gyöngéden letartotta.
– Eh, katona-dolog! – mondotta – köszönöm, hogy meglátogatsz,
kedves barátom. Hallom, ki akarsz hívni, – szívesen, öregem,
mihelyt birom a karomat! Ha az ember egy ismeretlen hölgyért két
úrral megvív, csak annál korrektebb, ha utána a férjjel is
megverekszik.
– De kérlek… – mormogta Guszti. Nevettek.
– Különben – folytatta Gyuri, udvarias nyugalommal nézve végig
Lili asszonyon – nagyon örülök, hogy nagyságos asszonyom is
megtisztelt látogatásával legalább megláthatom azt a szép hölgyet, a
kiért a nagy csata folyt… Valóban, be kell vallanom…
Közönyös bókot mondott, egykedvű, még inkább tán gunyoros
hangon. Lili asszony kissé elcsodálkozott. Tetteti magát ez az
ember? A tant és Guszti felkeltek, hogy a szomszéd szobában Alt-
Wien csészéket nézzenek meg s ők magukra maradtak. Lili asszony
már nem félt a vallomástól, ellenkezőleg ő hajolt érdeklődően előre.
– Hát maga igazán sohse látott engem azelőtt? – kérdezte – én
nem ismertem magát, az természetes, de azt hittem…
Gyuri felkaczagott.
– Nem én, most látom nagyságos asszonyomat először… Nincs
az én eljárásomban semmi érdem, nem tartozik maga nekem
semmivel. Akármelyik gavallér ember megtette volna… Nem is
nagyságos asszonyomért történt, hanem egyáltalában… a női
becsületért…
– Ah!… Én azt hittem…
 – Azt hitte, hogy szerelmes vagyok magába? – kaczagott Gyuri –
ah, dehogy…
Lili asszony elhallgatott. Egyszerre nagyot fordult valami az ő
hivalkodó és lusta lelkében – s egyre szorgalmasabb ámulattal
nézett arra a hideg mosolylyal tekintő fiatal emberre. Olyan furcsa
nyughatatlanság fogta el, a milyet eddig még nem ismert.
Csengettek. Pillanat múlva selymes suhogás hallatszott, s
lábujjhegyen egy szép fiatal leány suhant be a szobába. Mintha
észre se vette volna Lili asszonyt, kedveskedőleg hajolt a beteg fölé
s gyöngéden a Gyuri fejére tette keztyűs kezét.
– Jobban van, édes Gyuri?
– A huga?… – kérdé Balsayné zavartan.
– Nem, a menyasszonyom – felelt a beteg, megcsókolva a
keztyüs kezecskét – az én hű kis ápolónőm… Ilonka, hadd
mutassam be magát.
– Hát magának menyasszonya is van? – kérdezte Lili asszony
egészen elhűlve.
– Van bizony! – felelt Ilonka örömmel – és most még kétszerte
jobban szeretem Gyurit, a miért olyan vitézűl megvédte az asszonyi
becsületet!…
*
Mikor lejöttek a lépcsőn, Guszti félénken szólalt meg:
– Nagyon derék, kedves ember!… Bocsáss meg, édesem, de
meg kellett hivnom őket magunkhoz ebédre. Haragszol rá még?
– Persze, hogy haragszom! – felelt Lili asszony – most még
jobban! Nem értem, egy vőlegény minek verekszik meg a más
feleségéért…
– Mit mondasz?
 – Oh, semmit… Csak jőjjön el hozzánk! Megmondom én neki
szemébe az igazat. Ha te nem tudtál vele leszámolni, majd
leszámolok vele én!…
 IKAROS.

… Ismét itt ülök ebben a gazdátlan műteremben s csak bámulok

ki az őszi délután sorvadó világába. Egy év óta, a mióta festő
barátom eltűnt, magam se tudom, mért, ide szoktam. Ez a műterem
lett magányos elmélkedésem tanyájává; hogy nálam maradtak a
kulcsok, mindegyre gyakrabban ide bujtam el, ha a hétköznapi élet
elől menekülve, a művészi khimairák világába vágyódtam…
Esteledik, odakint álomra hunyja a szemét November. A halott kert
fái fekete gallykarjaikkal szinte könyörgőleg nyúlnak fel a
naplemente sötétvörös csíkjába; mintha csak kérlelni akarnának
valakit, hogy ne hagyja őket még elpusztulni. Az elapadó fényben
azonban rejtelmessé válik ez a műterem. Ilyenkor szeretek én itt
lenni, ilyenkor lassankint elvesztem az idő és a tér fogalmát s a hogy
álmaim szárnyra kelve szállnak tova mesés Ultima Thulék felé, úgy
tetszik nekem, hogy ennek a műteremnek a falai egész a Végtelen
küszöbéig tágulnak. A kis bohém zúg az elérhetetlen ideálok
világegyetemévé válik… Csak mi tudjuk, micsoda gyönyör az a
Képzelet szárnyai alatt egyszerre élni minden elmult és jövendő
századokban s egyszerre ott lenni a Tér minden sarkában… Csak
mi tudjuk azt, hogy mi az, midőn a vergődő gondolat olykor túl
merészkedik a Véges határán is s aztán lankadt szárnyakkal áll meg
a Végtelen oszlopainál… De viszont csak mi tudjuk azt is, hogy
micsoda kín e szédületből ismét felocsudni…
Körülnézek: minden a régiben van e csudálatos műteremben. Az
elapadó fényben még látszanak a keleties pompájú persa és indus
díszletek, a fal mellett sorakozó gipsz Vénuszok, Parthenon-
domborművek és renaissance-madonnák, a kirivó párisi
impresszionista képek s végül szegény barátom temérdek
olajtanulmánya, melyeket ahhoz a nagy képéhez csinált. Az a
végzetes kép! Azóta megnyerte a világtárlat nagy díját, vajjon
legalább tudja-e ő ezt?… S ha él valahol, hol lehet, mit csinál? Élhet-
e az, a kit a végtelen utáni vágy lesújtott, a kit az Ideál
kikaczagott?… A sarokba nézek: valami eltévedt visszfény ép arra a
bájos antik domborműre esik, melyen Daidalos szárnyakat csinál
boldogtalan fiának, Ikarosnak, ki a mithosz szerint a felhős magasból
a samosi tengerbe bukott le s ott lelte halálát, a mért
viaszszerkezetű szárnyaival túlságosan magasra merészkedett, fel
egész az Apolló napszekeréig. Szomorúan gondolom el: az én
barátom ez az Ikaros…

I.

Nem is tudom már, hol találkoztam Olivérral először. De azt

hiszem, egy régibb spanyol utam alkalmával a madridi Prado
múzeumban ösmerkedtem meg vele. Igen, emlékszem, egy napon a
Velasquez-féle vörös szoknyájú infánsnő előtt egy sápadt, magas,
szőke fiatal embert pillantottam meg. Meglepett az egész lénye: a
hogy azt az infánsnőt nézte, finom rajzolatú arczában s
mindenekfelett csodálkozó nagy kék szemeiben annyi mélységes
rajongás volt, hogy figyelmem a képről lassankint egészen reá
terelődött. Egymásra néztünk. Hanyag bársonykabátjáról, óriási
Boul-Miche nyakkendőjéről s szinte még pelyhedző kis művész-
szakálláról sejtettem, hogy festő. Amerikainak néztem, ő meg a hogy
első pár szava után kivettem, orosznak tartott engem. Ő francziául
beszélt, én angolul feleltem neki, így aztán csakhamar tisztába
jöttünk, hogy mind a ketten magyarok vagyunk… Kisült, hogy jól
ismerem magyarországi rokonait és ösmerőseit, a Dombrádyakat,
Szentinczeyket, Pándyakat, Domokosokat.
Sohse felejtem el azt a napot, melyet a madridi Buen Retiro
magnoliái alatt sétálva együtt töltöttünk. Csupa eszeveszett rajongás
volt az egész ember, egy délibábos poéta, kinek csak egy gondolata
volt a földön: a művészet. Elmondta, hogy már pár év óta él
külföldön, Münchenben végezte az akadémiát s Párisban Julient,
most huszonnégy éves s ha arra gondol, hogy végre hát szabadon
megfestheti gondolatait, szinte beleszédül boldogságába. Túláradó,
egymást kergető gondolataitól szinte alig tudta mondatait befejezni.
Óriási tervei voltak… Olykor szinte vallásosan ejtett ki egy szót, alig
hallhatóan: a Nő… Csodálkozva néztem rá, s hogy pillanatra
megrögzitsem tovaszáguldó gondolatait, szinte brutálisan kérdém
tőle:
– Szereti-e az asszonyokat?
Zavartan, csalódottan, utóbb szinte szemrehányólag nézett rám.
Láttam rajta, hogy e pillanatban megvet, talán gyűlöl is engemet…
De szemei csakhamar ismét felvették rajongó kifejezésüket. Aztán
szinte szégyenkezve vallotta be, hogy nem úgy szereti ő a nőket, a
hogy én gondolom. Sohse tudna ő élő, eleven asszonyhoz
hozzányúlni… A ki a Nőt, a teremtésnek ezt a legszebb géniuszát,
az Ideált szereti, hogy nyúlhatna az élő nőhöz?
– Szentségtörés volna az… – szólt, – olyan, mint a bibliai
eredendő bűnbe esés… Hát nem érti ön, hogy a valóság érintése
örökre beszennyezné az eszményt?
Álmélkodva néztem rá. De ő lelkesedetten folytatta:
– A Nő! A Nő!… Nem szabad az igaz művésznek az «amor
profanot» ismerni, csak az «amor divino»-t! Az isteni szerelem a
művészetben az eszmény szeretete. A ki földi, egyéni szerelemben
adja ki lelkesedését, a ki egy nőt tud szeretni, hogy tudná az a nőt,
az összességnek a jelképét, az eszmét átérezni, azt az összideált, a
mely felette áll az egyéni asszonynak? Hisz az csak egy miriádnyi
megnyilatkozása, alkatrésze annak az egésznek, hogy lehetne annál
megállapodni annak, a ki az Egész felé törekszik?…
– De nem gondolja, hogy esetleg igazuk van azoknak, a kik azt
tartják, hogy nagy szerelemmel épp egy egyéni nőben lehet feltalálni
az egészet, a Nőt?
– Nem, ezerszer nem! – válaszolt ő hevesen, – ha egy millió
emberélet alatt minden létezett és létező nőt végig lehetne szeretni,
akkor esetleg igen, de a mi emberi véges életünkben: nem! A
szerelem eddigi nagy héroszai, a Rómeok, Wertherek, Petrarcak
csak részletösmerői voltak annak az erőnek, a mely nemcsak csókra
vonzza ajkainkat, hanem a csillagok járását, az egész
világegyetemet is igazgatja. Elárulom most önnek az én eszelős
tervemet. Ön nem olyan bolond, mint én, hát ne nevessen ki…
Lássa, az eddigi összes művészek mind csak az egyéni nőnek a
mását tudták megteremteni, az egyéni Aphroditét, az egyéni
Madonnát, az egyéni Magdolnát: én azt a Nőt akarom megfesteni, a
kiben minden faj, minden temperamentum, minden egyéni nő benne
van… Ez az én életem czélja…
– Értem… ön azt mondja, hogy idáig csak a prizma egyes szineit
vették külön-külön. Ön összegezni akarja ezeket a szineket. De
tudja-e, micsoda szin jön ki akkor belőle? Az, a minek nincsen többé
szine, a fehér, a fehér napfény…
– Jó, – felelt ő rajongva, – hát olyan vakító glóriában akarom én
megálmodni a Nőt, mint a milyen a nap orczája, azt akarom, hogy
olyan fényes legyen az, hogy elkáprázzék tőle az alacsony földi
emberek tekintete…
Sajnos, nem tudtuk a vitánkat befejezni. Ő, ki, a mint mondta,
csak azért rándult le Madridba, hogy a Velasquez szineitől
«megrészegedjék», másnap visszautazott Párisba, én meg tovább
hatoltam lefelé Andaluziába s Afrikába. Azonban barátságot
fogadva, megigértük egymásnak, hogy Párisban tovább folytatjuk az
eszmecserét.
Pár hónap mulva aztán csakugyan ismét találkoztunk Párisban
és pedig abban a bizarr művész-kompániában, melynek éjjeli
összejöveteleit és lelkes vitatkozásait sohasem fogom elfelejteni.
Mesés kis csapat volt az: igazi rajongó művészek, a kiknek első és
utolsó gondolatuk a Szép volt… Tán bolondok, őrültek voltunk, de
fiatalok s szent a fiatalság őrülete. A jövendő művészetének a
formuláját akartuk megtalálni… Nem volt nemzetiségi vagy
művészeti ágbeli különbség közöttünk. Ép úgy voltak magyarok,
amerikaiak és francziák közöttünk, mint festők, szobrászok és írók:
hisz az Ember és a Szép úgy is Egy és ép úgy, a mint az örök
emberi tulajdonokat illetőleg gyermekes kishitűség nemzetiségi
különbségeket tenni az emberek közt, akként kicsinyes dolog
válaszfalakat akarni emelni az egyes művészeti ágak közé, melyek
csak egyugyanazon eszmének a külön-külön kisugárzásai. A
természet az előrehaladó emberi elme előtt egyre egyszerűbb
tényezőkre vezetődik vissza… S a mi egyik fő vitatárgyunk az volt,
hogy hogymint lehetne a négy fő művészeti ágat, a költészetet,
festészetet, zenét és szobrászatot egy közös megnyilatkozási
formára egyszerűsíteni. Az lesz a huszadik század formulája, ha
nem a huszadiké, hát a harminczadiké!…
És csodálatos guerillacsapat voltunk mi, mikor éjente kivonultunk
a Montmartre művészi lebujaiba, «Chat-Noir»-jaiba és «Ane-rouge»-
jaiba, melyekben a művészet olyan különösen ölelkezik a ledér
félvilággal, a zseni a maquereau-val s a pierreuse-el… Lelkesen
hallgattuk, a «sör-Napoleon», Salis, XVI-dik századbeli nyelvezetű
prológjait, a troubadour Montoya halkan elsuttogott költői dalait s a
botticelli-hajú sápadt leányok bús románczait a tiszta, nagy
szerelemről, ép arról, a mit itt hiába keresett az ember. Érdekes
profilok voltak ott. Mindenekelőtt a mi szelíd magyar védnökünk, «az
öreg Diogenes», az az őszbecsavarodott szakállú filozofus, kinek
koldus egyszerűségű ruházata alatt korunk egyik legnagyobb
tájképfestője rejtezett. Ott volt Bunny, a festő, az az ausztráliai angol
baronet, a kinek derűs, gyöngéd zsenijében olyan harmónikusan
tudott egyesülni az antik mithologikus világ a shakespearei
költészettel. Ott volt a franczia szimbolista Riom, kinek érdekes
bohém fejét olyan hosszú haj övezte, mint a milyet a merovingi
királyok viseltek, mellette ült a mi magyar Ivánunk, kinek «Szirén» és
«Nyomok a hóban» czímű képeit olyan drágán vették meg
Amerikában. Odább a híres Harrison és a mi saját külön orosz
szobrászunk közt huzta meg magát a krisztusfejű, bizarr Everard
Dismal. Az a csodálatos amerikai festő volt ő, ki miután volt
prerafaelista, Baudelaire-illusztrátor, «szerelemcziklus»-festő, miután
mint megtért buzgó katholikus szentképeket s egy csodatevővé vált
«Beata Virgo»-t festett, harmadszorra is renegáttá vált, hogy
kétségbeesésében «halál-cziklusát» tegye vászonra. Hogy azután
mi lett vele s az emberi gondolatok nagy vargabetűje után mint tért
meg ismét – tán utolszor – a szerelem által, azt egy fiatal magyar író
barátunk irta meg…
Ott volt végül e csodálatos társaságban az én madridi
ösmerősöm is. Sokat beszélgettem vele az utóbbi időben. Everard
Dismalnál lakott a neuillyi góthikus ház egyik szobájában s a téli
estéken, mialatt a «menazseria» a szomszédos nagy műteremben
tombolt, csakugyan folytattam vele a kettőnk közt abbanmaradt
művészi vitát.
Hát elcsodálkoztam: sem Páris illuzio-hervasztó lehellete, sem a
bohémvilág gunyoros léhasága nem tudta elkoptatni az ő lelkesedő
természetét. Az a rajongó maradt, a ki volt. Észrevettem, hogy ha
mind együtt voltunk, ritkán elegyedett bele a nagy vitákba, az
elméleti, tisztán filozófiai thézisek megvitatásába. Egy darabig szelíd
mosolylyal hallgatta a heves fejtegetéseket, de aztán a szemein
láttam, hogy visszamerül ábrándjaiba s tovább álmodja művészi
álmait. Nevetett ő a theóriákon… érezte, hogy mankók azok,
melyeken csak olyanok járnak, a kik nem tudnak az eszmény után a
fellegekbe szállni. Ő odafent volt mindig képzelmének kiterjesztett
szárnyaival ott lebegett az eszmények azurjában s nem értette meg
azokat a földön vitatkozó embereket, a kik logikából és analizisból
akarnak létrát csinálni az égbe.
– Hát még mindig az az ideálista, a ki volt? – kérdeztem
mosolyogva. – Még mindig csak az eszményt, a Nőt szereti s nem a
földi szép asszonyokat?
– Az vagyok, a ki voltam, az is maradok. Tűz az bennem, – ki ne
nevessen: oltártűz, s nem lehet azt a gúnynak a hideg zuhanyaival
eloltani. Lássa, hogy még Párisnak a czinizmusa se fog ki rajtam…
Csak hadd nevessenek a fiúk, a balgák! Tudom én mit csinálok.
Közelébb hajolt hozzám.
– Lássa, mindent megpróbáltak már velem. Elvittek könnyelmű
nők közé, rám uszították őket, hogy elveszítsenek, de minden
kisérletük hiába való maradt. Megbocsátok nekik, bár csunya volt
tőlük. Egy évek óta igazán tiszta, nemes ihlettel épített eszményt
akartak bennem lerombolni… Ön nem hiszi, hogy a földi nő érintése
örökre elhervasztaná bennem az ideált?… Hát nem érti ön meg, –
nézze végig kérem a nagy emberek, a nagy művészek életét, – nem
az egyéni földi nő beleavatkozása tette azokat tönkre, vonta el őket
az ideáltól, a munkától s rántotta le géniuszukat a köznapi
boldogtalanság, vagy – boldogság… sarába? A ki az eszménynek
akar élni, az először is függetlenítse magát a földi dolgoktól, mert
azok az ideálhoz képest mindig piszkosak, mindig… S a földi nőtől
való függetlenség az első feltétele annak, hogy az ember az
eszmény felé elindulhasson. Lássa, az élet rövid, oh istenem
túlságosan rövid, s az a szent kor, melyben a képzelem még elég
ruganyos arra, hogy magasra szálljon: az ifjúság, az szinte
lehelletnyi rövid… Kérdezze meg a keresztyén misztikusokat,
minden korok és vallások aszkéta rajongóit, szóval azokat, a kik nem
múló földi érdekek, hanem örök ideálok felé törekedtek, hogy nem
óva intenek-e a földi asszonyoktól, az «amor profano»-tól? Nem
vagyok én nőgyűlölő, hogy is volnék? Hisz a nő esszencziáját tartom
a legmagasabbnak a teremtésben, csak nem akarom annak egyéni,
tehát tökéletlen megnyilatkozása miatt az egészet elveszíteni. Tán
félek tőle… jó, de nem bánom. Független vagyok, megszabadultam
már tőle, – tette hozzá büszkén.
– De hát ha minden ember úgy gondolkodnék mint ön, mi lenne a
világból?
Mosolygott.
– Ne féltse a világot! Arra, a mit én elmulasztok, mindig fog
akadni elég ember. De azok aztán nincsenek az eszmény
keresésére hivatva…
Tetszettek nekem ezek a bizarr elméletek s megvallom, mulattam
kissé rajtuk. Sok minden badar tréfát megpróbáltak Olivérral, de
bizony csak nem lehetett kifogni rajta. Mondják, különös volt, hogy
milyen rajongással festette női modelljeit, leste testük körvonalainak
a titkát és hogy irtózott tőlük, mihelyt a műterem emelvényéről
leszálltak… Denique az az ember, a ki annyira ösmerte a női
szépséget, a kinek a Nő volt élete czélja, az földi nővel életében
úgyszólván még csak sohasem is beszélt…
– Nos és terve, az a nagy kép, mely a Nő esszencziáját lesz
hivatva ábrázolni, mi van azzal?
Szeme felcsillant.
– Meglesz, de nem olyan hamar, mint ön gondolná. Évek
munkája lesz az. Egész lelkemet akarom én abba beletenni,
ifjúságom főmunkája lesz az. Most egyelőre csak tanulmányokat
csinálok, átveszem az összes földi fajok női tipusait… Még egyideig
itt maradok Párisban, itt végzem el előtanulmányaim alapvető részét,
aztán hazamegyek Magyarországba. Ott nagy visszavonultságban
akarom megálmodni azt az eszményi Arczot, a mely egyesíteni fogja
minden tipusnak, minden temperamentumnak az egyéniségét. Az
lesz a Nő, az Ösmeretlen, a Világideál, az, a kit még nem ismerek s
a kit én fogok megteremteni… Ah, az az arcz! Bárcsak látnám már…
Nem látom még, de vonásai mint valami aranyos ködben, olykor már
felderengenek előttem…
Ajkai körül szinte túlvilági boldog mosoly játszadozott. Sajnáltam
és irigyeltem rajongó, tiszta hiteért.

II.

Aztán hosszú ideig nem láttam viszont Olivért. Én sokat utaztam

a külföldön, ő is és a sors sohasem hozott bennünket össze. Mikor
legközelebb ismét találkoztunk, az Pesten volt, itt ebben a
műteremben. Hej, sok rajongó, boldog órát töltöttünk mi itt együtt!
Nagyon megbarátkoztunk… Szerfölött pozitivista hazánkban, múló
divatok s praktikusabb ideálok után járó művészkoloniánk közepette
nem volt rajtunk kívül más ilyen bolond rajongó, hát igazán szomjas
lélekkel menekültünk egymáshoz.
 Olivér azalatt a másfél év alatt keveset változott. Csak még
kevesebbet beszélt. Mint benső, lelki életet élő barátok közt gyakran
megesik, utóbb már naphosszat el voltunk egymás mellett, a nélkül,
hogy beszélgettünk volna: nem volt többet szükségünk a szóra,
egymáshoz és együvé szokott gondolataink már párhuzamosan
fejlődtek tova, úgy, hogy csak «eredményeinket» közöltük
egymással. S azok többnyire megegyeztek…
Azt mondtam, keveset változott Olivér azalatt a másfél év alatt.
Nem egész helyes ez: arczban határozottan megöregedett, a soká
fiatalon maradt arczok hirtelen hervadása látszott meg rajta. Kissé
pergamentszerűvé vált ábrázatját pár csodálatos szenvedő, szinte
fájdalmas vonás élesítette ki: a mint azelőtt fiatalabbnak tetszett a
koránál, akként most idősebbnek tartotta volna az ember, mint a
milyen valósággal volt. Csak szemei lettek nagyobbak s ha lehet,
lázasabbak. Néha még felcsillant bennük a régi gyermekes,
csodálkozó kifejezés, de különben rendesen inkább szórakozott és
álmatag volt a pillantása. Teljesen belső álomvilágába húzódott
vissza. Már arra se volt többé szüksége, hogy túláradó rajongását
időről-időre szavakban ontsa ki más előtt: sok visszafojtott indulata
még csak megkettőztette a néma benső életet benne. S az a
rajongás, a mely nem talál természetes szelepet a
«megnyilatkozásban», az természetesen csak annál
veszedelmesebben erősödik meg a magába zárkózott lélekben.
Nem mondom, hogy rögeszmévé, de mégis bizonyos fokú
fanatizmussá válik…
Mikor először meglátogattam, elcsodálkoztam a műtermén.
Valóságos múzeum volt az, egy a maga nemében egyetlen
múzeuma a női szépségnek. Szobor- és domborművekben,
fényképekben s metszetekben megvoltak ott az antik világ, a
byzantin kultura, az olasz és spanyol renaissance és a kölni iskola
minden női szépségei. Bizarr fenséggel sorakoztak ott egymás
mellett a teremtés női princzipiumának a képviselői: a démoni
mosolyú ninivei Lilithek, a rejtelmes, mintegy túlvilági kéjbe
belemerevedett babyloni Astarté-k, aztán ennek az Astarténak a
bűbájosan megtisztult leányai, a görög Aphroditék és római
Vénuszok. Ott volt mindenek királynője, a szinte madonnaarczú,