Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209

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Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

The complementary relationship between illegal fishing and maritime

piracy: A case study of the Gulf of Guinea☆
Anup Phayal a, *, Aaron Gold b, Curie Maharani c, Brandon Prins d, Sayed Fauzan Riyadi e
a
University of North Carolina at Wilmington, USA
b
Sewanee: The University of the South, USA
c
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia
d
University of Tennessee, USA
e
Raja Ali Haji Maritime University, Indonesia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This research paper investigates the interrelationship between maritime crime, specifically sea piracy, and illegal
Maritime piracy fishing. Existing studies primarily focus on the link between piracy and illegal fishing activities carried out by
IUU fishing foreign trawlers, drawing evidence from Somali piracy cases. A causal narrative in past works highlights the
West Africa
detrimental effects of foreign trawlers on local marine resources, ecosystems, and livelihoods, thereby driving
State capacity
local fishers to turn toward piracy and prompting coastal states to address the key issue of illegal fishing by
foreign vessels.
However, this emphasis on external perpetrators can lead states to pay less attention to local actors involved in
illegal fishing and maritime piracy. Therefore, this study redirects our attention to local perpetrators who engage
in illegal fishing and maritime piracy. It explores the complementary relationship between these two types of
crimes. Our findings indicate that reducing illegal fishing activities in a local area enhances the likelihood of
maritime piracy occurrence. By shedding light on the complementarity between illegal fishing and maritime
piracy, this research provides valuable insights for policymakers and law enforcement agencies involved in
combating maritime crime. It underscores the importance of locally addressing illegal fishing and piracy using a
more holistic approach.

Interviews with West African artisanal fishers support the claim that
industrial foreign fishing vessels exploit weak governments in the region
to plunder scarce marine resources in the Gulf of Guinea waters [18].
Local fishers themselves often resort to illegal fishing, as well, since the
overall decline in fish stock prevents them from catching enough fish to
feed their families. Maritime criminal networks develop in this envi­
ronment that governments subsequently find difficult to eliminate.
These criminal organizations then prey upon artisanal fishers, com­
pounding the problems these local workers confront.
Researchers have mostly assumed a linear relationship between
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and maritime piracy.
The causal narrative employed to explain the observed data describes
the over-exploitation of local marine resources, the damage inflicted on
sensitive ecosystems, and the destruction of local economies and
livelihoods all by industrial foreign fishing fleets. Another consequence
of this illegal foreign fishing is that artisanal fishers migrate elsewhere or
turn to maritime crime. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence collected
to date does not conclusively support a causal story that sees foreign
fishing singularly driving maritime piracy. In fact, in some spaces, in­
creases in IUU fishing may produce declines in sea-piracy [15]. More­
over, embedded within the argument, attributing piracy to local
retaliation against foreign fishers, lies a resource conflict narrative that
some consider overly simplistic [35]. Interactions between IUU fishing
and government capacity, vessel traffic, and poverty can also help
explain commercial ship attacks.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between illegal fishing and
piracy. But instead of focusing on the involvement of foreign trawlers,
we examine the dynamics between these events at a local level.

Funding for this project was provided by the U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Naval Research, through the Minerva Initiative. The opinions and in­
☆

terpretations are those of the authors and not the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: phayala@uncw.edu (A. Phayal).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106209
Received 1 October 2023; Received in revised form 20 April 2024; Accepted 11 May 2024
Available online 20 May 2024
0308-597X/© 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
A. Phayal et al.
Borrowing insights from the crime displacement and criminal milieu
theories, we propose that these two illicit activities often coincide within
a specific region. Yet, their connection goes beyond mere correlation;
instead, they mutually complement each other due to the displacement
from one criminal activity to the other.
For evidence, we construct longitudinal grid-cell data for the Gulf of
Guinea and meticulously analyze whether illicit fishing leads to
heightened incidents of piracy attacks in each grid cell. We also inves­
tigate whether the evidence aligns with a narrative of localized illicit
fishing and maritime piracy. Information on IUU fishing comes from the
Sea Around Us project [34], while piracy data are drawn from the
Maritime Piracy Event and Location Database (MPELD).
Our findings unveil a significant relationship between these two
events. Specifically, we observe that reductions in IUU fishing at a local
level are associated with increased ship attacks, particularly in regions
with high vessel traffic. Notably, this pattern does not hold true for legal
fishing, implying that local capacity and economic conditions, rather
than environmental factors, predominantly drive piracy attacks. More­
over, we find little evidence of a reverse relationship that piracy drives
IUU fishing. Government countermeasure actions like increased law
enforcement patrols are prominent factors that can lead to a decline in
illegal fishing. Our final investigation using mediation analysis demon­
strates that high-frequency law enforcement patrols within the Gulf of
Guinea grid cells contributed to a reduction in illegal fishing. However,
this reduction subsequently led to an increased likelihood of piracy at­
tacks in the same region. We conclude by offering some insights into
potential directions for future research in this domain.
1. Illegal fishing and maritime piracy
The importance of understanding the causes of maritime piracy
became increasingly evident when Somali pirates operating near the
Gulf of Aden posed a serious threat to international trade in the mid-
2000 s. These incidents marked the peak of sea piracy since its resur­
gence in the late 1980 s, coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the
waning influence of superpowers in the Global South. But even as the
international community managed to bring down the piracy events in
the region [17], piracy incidents have persisted in other areas like
Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Guinea (Prins et al. [36]). The recent
disruptions to supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and
their impact on the global economy have further emphasized the sig­
nificance of comprehending issues that endanger maritime security
[22].
Studies on Somali piracy have explored the structural causes of pi­
racy, such as state failure and poverty along coastal areas. They indicate
that the shift in international politics after the Cold War weakened state
capacities in many littoral countries, making them more susceptible to
maritime piracy [14,26,32]. More recent studies, conducted in the wake
of piracy’s reemergence have focused on identifying the regional and
country-level conditions that facilitate such incidents. Specifically,
institutional factors such as state fragility, military capacity, and regime
type; as well as geographic conditions like coastline length, proximity to
high-traffic shipping lanes, and population size, have all been shown to
impact the incidence of maritime piracy [11,13,15].
But as Denton and Harris [15] note, additional studies have sug­
gested that economic opportunity is a primary motivation for piracy
among individual perpetrators. Specifically, these studies highlight the
conducive environment for piracy created by the growth of global trade
and commerce via sea routes [14,26]. The central contention of these
studies is that individuals who seek to maximize their utility opt to
participate in criminal activities when the expected benefits outweigh
legitimate economic opportunities, taking into account the associated
risk and cost of punishment [6]. From an aggregate perspective, this
implies that regions with weak economies will experience elevated
crime rates as individuals increasingly resort to illegal activities to
generate income to fulfill their financial needs. Within this analytical
2
Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209
framework, economic conditions intersect with the institutional and
geographic factors discussed previously to shape the overall opportunity
structure for piracy and other forms of maritime crime.
The economic model of piracy posits a connection between piracy
and the members of the fishing community. According to this model, an
individual’s available resources and skill sets heavily influence the de­
cision to engage in a particular type of crime. As such, piracy research
has increasingly focused on economic conditions within the maritime
sector, with particular attention given to the fishing industry. Due to
their navigational skills and local knowledge, criminal entrepreneurs
often target local fishers seeking to recruit them into pirate activities
[33]. Indeed, several studies have shown that decreased employment
opportunities within the fishing sector are strongly correlated with pi­
racy incidents. For example, Daxecker and Prins [13] used the state
fragility index and changes in fish values in the market as proxies for
employment opportunities and found a significant relationship between
reduced labor opportunities and pirate attacks. Another empirical study
by Flückiger and Ludwig [21] confirmed this finding, demonstrating
that economic shocks to the fishing sector, as measured by the reduction
in phytoplankton in coastal areas, increased piracy incidents.
While the above studies about fishing and piracy explored the rela­
tionship using reported fish catch, recent studies have acknowledged
that illegal fishing comprises a substantive proportion of the total fish
production. Studies show that more than 20% of the overall fish pro­
duction worldwide is through illegal and unreported channels, and it is
increasing over the years [1,41]. Recently, studies have explored the
relationship between fishing and piracy by considering both legal and
illegal fishing. For instance, Denton and Harris [15] found the associa­
tion between the two was stronger when incorporating IUU estimates
into the fish catch totals, rather than relying solely on reported catches,
and by disaggregating fish catches among the industrial, artisanal, and
subsistence segments of the industry. They found that, while increases in
industrial catch were strongly linked to increases in piracy, increases in
artisanal and subsistence catches were associated with reduced pirate
activity. Their findings suggest that competition and conflict between
industrial and small-scale fishers is a critical piracy driver. Overall, these
findings indicate that a scarcity of resources due to overfishing, partic­
ularly those done using industrial techniques, drives fishers into poverty
and piracy.
Overfishing results from increased demand and the availability of
technological tools that facilitate large catches (Srinivasan, Watson, and
Sumaila [40]). The need for fish has increased production in legal
fishing and aquaculture [27]. However, while most countries regulate
fishing in their waters to manage sustainable fisheries and prevent the
depletion of fish stocks, the growing demand for fish has also increased
the market for illegal fishing in defiance of these regulations. The rise in
illegal fishing obviously undermines effective fisheries management and
greatly increases the risk of overfishing. It also emphasizes the signifi­
cant role that IUU fishing may play in triggering sea-pirate attacks.
However, the precise relationship between IUU fishing and maritime
piracy is not entirely clear. Many theorize that IUU fishing results in
greater scarcity and declining yields for local fishers, prompting
increased piracy as local fishers attempt to replace revenue stolen by
foreign trawlers. This relationship largely stems from the popular
narrative that emerged out of Somalia in the mid-2000 s that presented
Somali piracy as a defensive response to the collapse of the local fishing
industry under pressure from increased competition and destructive
tactics by foreign trawlers [45]. For example, Schmidt and Mitchell
(2021) argue that IUU fishing may increase the willingness to engage in
piracy by increasing economic competition and depleting the total
available fish stock. In addition to economic incentives, piracy may act
as a form of conflict behavior, allowing fishermen to “punish” the
foreign illegal fishers they blame for harming their livelihoods. Schmidt
and Mitchell (2021) also note that IUU fishing increases the chance of
piracy by both expanding the pool of potential pirates––individuals with
the necessary skills and knowledge to successfully attack at sea––and
A. Phayal et al.
increasing the number of potential targets in the region, namely the IUU
fishing vessels themselves, which may present as attractive targets due
to their illegal nature and lack of state protection. The authors present a
cross-national study where the results show that increased IUU fishing is
associated with increased piracy events. Desai and Shambaugh [16]
confirmed this correlation through a spatially disaggregated analysis
using 1◦ X 1◦ grid cells. Often infused with nationalism, the narrative
that foreign trawlers are responsible for resource depletion, has been the
basis of state policies of many littoral countries and an essential ingre­
dient for resource conflict [28,39].
However, while overfishing leads to the depletion of fishing re­
sources, the empirical evidence is not conclusive in support of the
narrative that piracy and armed robberies on ships are byproducts of
illegal foreign fishing. For instance, researchers have challenged the
narrative that Somali pirates were acting as coast guards against foreign
fishing vessels. According to Hansen [25], most piracy attack targets in
2010 were profitable oil tankers despite the higher success rate in
attacking fishing vessels. Similarly, other studies have also highlighted
individual economic incentives as the key motivation for pirates in So­
malia (Kraska [30,38]), a claim that strongly undermines the legiti­
mizing pirate narrative of protecting local fishing resources.1 Even if
Weldemichael’s [45] account is accurate, and while it is noteworthy that
the Somalis Weldemichael interviewed invariably complained about
foreign industrial trawlers, what began in the early 2000 s as “defensive
piracy” later evolved into the predatory model identified by Hansen in
2011.
It is also plausible that IUU fishing and piracy are two distinct and
otherwise unconnected forms of maritime crime prevalent in poorly
governed waters, the maritime equivalent of high-crime neighborhoods
on land. Moreover, the assumption in some of the past studies that IUU
fishers are foreigners and are separate from local sea pirates, ignores the
possibility that the same local individuals could transition between IUU
fishing and piracy. But, others who have qualitatively combed through
local piracy patterns have found that the switch between local fishing
and opportunistic piracy is common. For instance, in her study about
piracy events in Southeast Asia, Liss [9] states that “opportunistic pirates
and those hired by syndicates to conduct pirate attacks often came from
areas where poverty was rife and alternative income hard to find.” Ac­
cording to the author, perpetrators of these attacks are mainly impov­
erished fishers who took ‘employment’ as pirates or conducted
opportunistic attacks to supplement their income. In this paper, we
examine the link between piracy and local illegal fishing by analyzing
the proximity of pirate attacks to IUU fishing sites.
2. Crime displacement, target availability, and maritime piracy
The existing body of literature on crime and terrorism has estab­
lished that these events tend to occur in specific geographical hotspots,
with clustering present in some regions but not others. Eck [19] has
developed a theory to explain these patterns, suggesting that they may
be linked to the location of both offenders and victims. However, such
clustering patterns have also increased the attention of law enforcement
agencies, who have shifted their focus to intelligence-led policing stra­
tegies [37]. As a consequence of such policing tactics, criminal and
terrorist offenders have been forced to either relocate to new nearby
areas [7] or adapt by evolving and innovating [2,44]. More specifically,
control of one form of crime often leads to crime displacement in
different locations or forms (Guerette and Bowers [23]). This evolu­
tionary theory of crime, borrowed from the literature on criminal
behavior, can also be applied to explain the link between piracy and
illegal fishing.
1
Even if piracy initially started to ward off foreign trawlers, Schubert and
Lades (2014) suggest that the “business” model of piracy soon took over since
they found it so much more lucrative than fishing.
3
Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209
Curbing illegal fishing can often have unforeseen consequences.
Some scholars have also noted that the government’s curtailing illegal
fishing can have unintended consequences. In Indonesia, for instance,
Bailey [3] states that the government decided to ban trawlers in 1980
mainly to reallocate resources to small-scale fishers. However, this step,
combined with government loan programs to encourage small-scale
fishers, only worsened resource competition at the local level as the
unemployed fishers from the trawlers entered the local market.
Our argument proposes that a decrease in illegal fishing activities
results in an upsurge in incidents of sea piracy. Illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing involves a range of activities, such as
capturing prohibited species, overfishing, falsifying catch weights,
fishing without a permit or outside the fishing season, and employing
prohibited gear [31,5]. Fishers participating in IUU fishing are inclined
to engage in opportunistic piracy attacks as the latter offers high returns.
When there is external pressure to curb illegal fishing, the risk of piracy
events increases as those previously involved in IUU fishing are more
prone to engage in pirate attacks. In a recent study on illegal fishing,
Couper et al. [12] elaborate on how fishers commit piracy. They observe
that the perpetrators are mainly disgruntled young fishers from disad­
vantaged villages, including recruits below the age of 18. They launch
piracy attacks from small skiffs, sometimes operating from mother ships
about 35 kilometers off the coast. Skiffs and larger fishing vessels were
often obtained through coercion from legitimate fishers ([12]: 197).
But even for the locals who are ‘employed’ in illegal fishing as a part
of organized crime, a constraint on illegal fishing can lead to losing such
a source of income, thus adding them to the pool of potential pirates.2 In
a recent study, Jaleel and Smith [29] illustrate the plight of fishers, who
often face dubious contracting arrangements by fishing companies that
frequently engage in illegal fishing. The authors note that these migrant
fishers often end up as forced labor once they are at sea and risk arrests
by coastal state authorities when on land and abandonment by fishing
vessel owners. These individuals have a high chance of engaging in pi­
racy activities, either by launching opportunistic attacks individually or
as a part of organized crime groups. Constraints on illegal fishing can
arise from legal enforcement or other factors, including the depletion of
fish stocks due to foreign trawlers or other climatic conditions. The
above discussions lead to the following hypotheses:
H1: Piracy incidents are more likely to occur in areas where illegal
fishing has declined
Piracy attacks are also a function of target availability. Ships become
more vulnerable to such attacks in geographical features such as narrow
shipping channels or chokepoints as they slow their speeds due to heavy
traffic. In fact, past studies have shown that piracy attacks are much
more likely near chokepoints like the Malacca Straits, Bab el-Mandeb
Strait, or the Gulf of Aden ([10]; Daxecker and Prin, [43]). We should
also see this increase in vulnerability in any high vessel traffic areas.
Moreover, constraints on illegal fishing and an apparent decline in such
activity should also motivate individuals to pursue more profitable
pirate activities, particularly in target-rich areas, such as marine areas
with high vessel traffic.
H2: Piracy incidents are more likely to occur in areas with high
commercial vessel traffic
H3: Piracy incidents are more likely to occur in areas with high vessel
traffic and a decline in illegal fishing
2.1. Empirical approach
This study aims to investigate the relationship between illegal fishing
2
According to a report by UN Monitoring Group (UN Doc S/2013/413),
perpetrators of maritime crime often diversify criminal activities into more than
one specific form. It aligns with our criminal milieu assertion that when illicit
maritime actors encounter constraints in one area, they are likely to shift and
diversify their activities into another form.
A. Phayal et al.
and piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea region. Specifically, we focus
on the waters within the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of 10 countries
in the region, spanning the years 1990–2018. While piracy incidents
increased dramatically in the Indo-Pacific region in the late 1990 s and
in East Africa after 2007, recent years have seen a rise in piracy in the
West African Gulf of Guinea (Prins et al. [36]). However, it is important
to note that there is a high level of geographical variation within the
region, highlighting the need for a more nuanced examination of the
underlying factors driving piracy.
The Gulf of Guinea region is a significant contributor to marine fish
production, accounting for nearly 2 percent of worldwide production in
2018, with countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast play­
ing a significant role. Fig. 1 presents the trend in fish production in the
region from 2010 to 2018, including demersal, pelagic, and other ma­
rine fish, in thousands of tonnes. As seen in the figure, fish production
has been on an upward trajectory, increasing from 772 thousand tonnes
in 2010 to nearly 1.1 million tonnes in 2018. This increase also marks a
rise in the region’s share of world fishery production.
This increase in fish production may have implications for piracy in
the region. Prior research has suggested that declining employment
opportunities in the fishing sector, often due to overfishing, can be a
driving force behind piracy incidents [13]. As such, the rise in fish
production in the Gulf of Guinea may act as a mitigating factor against
piracy incidents in the region. On the other hand, factors such as changes
in fish values in the market or the level of state fragility may still
contribute to piracy incidents. Our study will examine the potential
relationship between illegal fish production and piracy incidents in the
Gulf of Guinea, while accounting for other potential factors to provide a
more nuanced understanding of the underlying factors driving piracy in
the region.
3. Research design
This study aims to investigate the association between IUU fishing
and maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea at the local level. The study
region is delimited by the coordinates 7 W to 12E and 8 S to 9 N,
encompassing the waters of ten countries in the area. To examine the
relationship, we utilize a spatial disaggregation approach, dividing the
region into grid cells measuring 55 km x 55 km, and use the grid-cell
year as the unit of analysis. The study period spans from 1990 to
2018, resulting in a dataset of 35,351 grid-cell years. Of these, there are
27,318 coastal or water grid-cell years, and maritime piracy is reported
in 1.15% of these grid-cell years.
The dependent variable, piracy onset, is measured by the presence of
maritime piracy incidents in a grid-cell year, coded as 1 if any piracy
attacks occurred in that year and 0 otherwise. The piracy onset variable is
only coded for actual attacks and does not include attempted but ulti­
mately failed pirate attacks. Although the frequency of such attacks in
grid-cell years ranges from 0 to 22,3 the variable is binary since our
theoretical expectations focus on transitioning from a space without
piracy to one where an attack occurs.
To test our hypotheses, we use two main explanatory variables in the
regression analysis: the annual decline in IUU fishing and the yearly mean
vessel traffic in a grid cell. We hypothesize that a decrease in IUU fishing
will lead to an increase in maritime piracy incidents, while an increase in
vessel traffic will lead to a similar increase in piracy incidents. Below, we
describe how we operationalized these two explanatory variables. Fig. 2.
The time frame for this study spans from 1990 to 2018, during which
the average yearly unreported fishing in the grad-cells was 776 tonnes,
with values ranging from 0 to 47,634 tonnes. To measure the change or
decline in the amount of illegal fishing in grid-cell years, which consti­
tutes one of the two explanatory variables in this study, we create a
3 5
There are 229 grid-cell years with one incident, 63 with two, 29 with three,
13 with 4, 13 with five and 20 with more than five.
4
Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209
binary variable decrease in IUU fishing. If a grid-cell year exhibited a
decline of 10% or more in unreported catch compared to the previous
year, the variable decrease in IUU fishing for that grid-cell year was coded
as 1; otherwise, it was coded as 0. Of the total 27,318 grid-cell years in
the dataset (excluding land), approximately 30% of these grid-cell years
experienced a decline of 10% or more in illegal fishing as compared to
the preceding year.
The expectation in the hypotheses posits that piracy is more likely to
take place in grid-cell years characterized by higher vessel traffic and a
reduction in IUU fishing compared to the previous year. However, a
minor decrease in IUU fishing may not result in a noticeable impact on
pirate activity. To put it differently, reductions in IUU fishing may not
have a linear effect on piracy. Consequently, we selected an arbitrary
threshold of a 10% decline in IUU fish catch compared to the preceding
year, as it is a substantive decline, and the results from this operation­
alization are cleaner. In the supplementary information, we include
results with a logged form of the decline, which produces similar results.
3.1. Vessel traffic
We create a binary variable high vessel traffic, to proxy the presence of
opportunity targets for piracy. Past studies used broader geographical
choke points like the Malacca Straits or the Bab el Mandab waterway to
operationalize piracy-opportune areas [14,24]. In contrast, our study
uses more granular vessel traffic data of ship location every two hours,
generated by the Automatic Identification System (AIS) installed on
vessels and captured by both satellite and terrestrial systems, to create a
more reliable and universal measure of opportunity. But we are also
constrained since a reliable AIS data is available only from the year
2014. Using this two-hourly ship traffic data from the AIS, we first
aggregate it to the monthly vessel traffic for each grid cell and then
further take the average for each year to create grid-cell level yearly
mean ship traffic data from 2014 to 2018.4 The right panel in Fig. 3
visualizes the vessel density data in log scale, where darker shade grid
cells represent higher traffic areas. As expected, it correctly represents
the scale of traffic density when compared with the raw two-hourly AIS
data shown in the figure’s left panel. Using this grid-cell level vessel
traffic data, we create a binary variable High traffic, coded as 1 if the
grid-cell has higher than 75th percentile ship movement and
0 otherwise.
In this study, we consider two additional control variables that are
linked to the onset of piracy at the local level, namely, the location of
ports and nearby coastal economy. Previous research has established a
positive association between the location of ports or anchorage and the
likelihood of piracy attacks. For example, Daxecker and Prins [43] re­
ported that almost 40% of piracy attacks that occurred worldwide be­
tween 1995 and 2020 targeted ships that were anchored near coastal
ports. To account for the potential influence of port locations on piracy
onset, we introduce a measure of port counts in a grid-cell, variable port
counts, the data for which is obtained from the UN Economic Commis­
sion for Europe (UNECE) for the year 2020. 5 Specifically, our dataset
includes a static count of international ports in each grid cell. There are
29 grid-cell years with three coastal ports, 29 with two, and 406 with
only one.
Lastly, we control the coastal economy and market using satellite
nightlight data. Previous research has shown that these factors signifi­
cantly impact the onset of piracy incidents in nearby waters. Desai and
Shambaugh [16] argue that piracy requires a functional market and
population center where pirates can recruit members, sell stolen goods,
and obtain financing, weapons, and other equipment needed to initiate
attacks.
4
Data obtained from Fleetmon https://www.fleetmon.com/
Available https://service.unece.org/trade/locode/ca.htm [Accessed
February 14, 2023]
A. Phayal et al.
Fig. 1. Fish produce in the Gulf of Guinea, according to FAO data. Note: Bars in the figure indicate the region’s share of global fishery production.
Fig. 2. : Gulf of Guinea: Land, coastline, and water grid cells used in the study.
The Decline in Illegal Fishing.
To assess the impact of adjacent land activity on water grid cell
events, we use night-time light emissions as a proxy for economic ac­
tivity in the land areas. However, we employ a slightly different method.
5
Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209
Firstly, we identify all nearby land masses falling within the 3-degree
radius of a water grid cell. Next, we calculate these land masses’
average night light emission and use it as the variable near nightlights for
the grid-cell year. We believe this approach better captures the influence
of adjacent land activity on water grid cell events.
We illustrate our approach using Fig. 4, which shows Gulf of Guinea
grid cells for 2009. In the figure, water grid cells with lighter shades
represent their closer proximity to population centers that have higher
average night light values. It is worth noting that we use standardized
calibrated nightlight data, ranging from 0 to 1, in accordance with
Elvidge et al. [20] and Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug [42]. We repeat
this procedure for all Guinea Gulf grid-cell years spanning from 1990 to
2017.
4. Results
Table 1 depicts the main results, and they support our hypotheses
that a decline in illegal fishing increases the likelihood of piracy onset.
Of the three models in the table, data for the model (1) starts from 1990
until 2018, while the data for the other two are from 2014 until 2018
since these models include variable high traffic from the AIS data for ship
movement, which was available only from 2014. However, the result in
(1) does not differ substantively from model (2), which is our main
model. The results in model (2) indicate that a 10% or more decline in
IUU fishing and high traffic in a grid cell are both strong predictors of
A. Phayal et al. Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209

Fig. 3. : Comparison of vessel traffic data (left) and grid-cell aggregate for June 2014. Control Variables.

Fig. 4. Port locations and near night lights in the Gulf of Guinea. Note: Above figure shows the location of ports in the Gulf of Guinea, represented by the red dots. It also
depicts the 2009 yearly average night lights in land and coastal grid cells and the mean near night lights in water grid cells, an average of night lights within its 3-degree radius.

piracy onset in the cell.6 The positive coefficient of the variable IUU
fishing decline suggests that a grid cell with a 10% or more decline has an
increased probability of piracy onset. When all other variables are
6
Table 1 A in the supplementary information includes results with a logged
form of the decline, instead of 10% binary variable, and it produces similar
results.
constant, model (2) result suggests that a grid cell that experienced 10%
or more decline in IUU fish catch than the previous year has a 53%
higher probability of a piracy incident occurring than grid cells without
such a decline.7 This marginal probability is even higher in model (2),
our main model, where IUU fishing decline grid cells are, on average,
7
Based on Table 2, model (1), piracy onset probability for grid-cell with no
IUU decline is 0.0096, and it is 0.015 for grid-cell with 10% or more decline in
IUU catch. This result is based on the margins command in Stata 16 at values
0 and 1 for the variables.

6
A. Phayal et al. Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209

Table 1
Main results on the onset of piracy events at the local level.
(1) (2) (3)
** ***
IUUF decline 0.492 0.865 -0.312
(0.192) (0.243) (1.039)
Near nightlight dummy 4.888*** 3.310*** 3.191***
(0.474) (0.794) (0.786)
Port count 1.842*** 1.406*** 1.417***
(0.266) (0.351) (0.354)
High Traffic 1.860*** 1.527***
(0.454) (0.477)
IUUF decline X Traffic 1.276
(1.079)
Constant -8.429*** -8.182*** -7.760***
(0.455) (0.762) (0.817)
Observation 26377 4685 4685

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Model (1) includes data from 1990–2018, whereas models (2) & (3)
include AIS data from 2014 to 2018
Fig. 5. : IUU fishing decline, vessel traffic & piracy. Note: The figure above shows
*p < 0.1,
** that piracy probability is distinctly higher for grid-cells years with a 10% or more
p < 0.05,
*** IUU fishing decline and high vessel traffic. The figure shows results at 95% confi­
p < 0.01
dence interval.

twice as likely to witness piracy events after including ship traffic.8

holistic consideration, such measures can only lead to crime displace­
Similarly, piracy onset in grid-cell with high traffic is nearly four times as
ment, enticing them to launch high-risk, high-reward maritime piracy
likely as in other grid cells.
attacks. If this is indeed the case, can we link the security patrols to the
Results for the control variables are also consistent with past
decline in illegal fishing to increased piracy onset probability? The
research. Like past studies [16,26], we find that grid-cells closer to land
availability of the AIS data allows us to isolate and pinpoint the move­
economic activities, as depicted by variable near nightlight dummy, are
ment of security vessels and explore the effects of higher frequency
more likely to experience piracy onset compared to other areas. Simi­
patrols in an area on a decline in IUU fishing and increased piracy
larly, piracy onset is also more likely in grid-cells with higher number of
incidents.
ports (Daxecker and Prins [43]). The effects of both control variables are
We begin the analysis by isolating the law enforcement government
statistically significant at p<0.01 in all three models in Table 1. But most
vessels in the AIS vessel traffic data. Since our analysis is at the yearly
important, the significant results for our key explanatory variables, IUUF
level, we isolate and aggregate the frequency of visits by law enforce­
decline, and high ship traffic, hold with or without including the control
ment government vessels in a grid cell. We add all grid-cell level patrol
variables.9
events occurring within a year. To account for the timing accurately, we
An expectation in our hypothesis (H3) is that the interaction of the
lag the patrol variable to explore whether higher patrol frequency last
two factors, decline in illegal fishing and high-traffic areas, should also
year affected the IUU fishing decline this year. In other words, if a grid cell
lead to increased chances of piracy onset. Model (3) in the table includes
had a higher patrol frequency in the preceding year, we expect a more
an interaction term to test this expectation. The term itself is not sta­
significant decline in IUU fishing than in other grid cells. Fig. 6 shows
tistically significant, but to understand the effect, we must examine the
interaction using a graphical representation [8]. Fig. 5 depicts the
interaction term in model (3), Table 1. The y-axis in the figure shows the
piracy onset probability as an effect of the interaction when all other
factors in model (3) are constant. As expected, the figure indicates that
piracy onset probability is higher in a grid cell when it has a decline in
IUU fishing and high vessel traffic.10 More specifically, the marginal
piracy onset probability is nearly twice in a grid cell year with illegal
fishing decline and high vessel traffic, compared to others. In sum, not
only do these two variables increase the chances of piracy onset inde­
pendently, they also have an interactive effect.

4.1. What causes the decline in IUU fishing?

Our central argument is that a decline in IUU fishing leads to an

increased likelihood of piracy in the area, even more so if there is high
vessel traffic. However, we do not discuss the cause of such a decline
elaborately but speculate that such a decline could be due to increased
law enforcement patrols in the area. Law enforcement patrols can
constrain perpetrators from illegally fishing in the area. Still, without

8
Based on Table 2, model (2), piracy onset probability for grid-cell with no
IUU decline is 0.014. Whereas, for grid-cells with a 10% or more decline in IUU
catch, the piracy onset probability is 0.031, nearly twice.
9
Results without the control variables are not included in Table 2.
10
For results with a logged form of decline, instead of the 10% binary vari­ Fig. 6. : Patrol frequency (lagged) in grid cells and decline in illegal fishing.
able, see Fig. 1A in the supplementary information. The results are similar. Note: Error bars in the figure depict a 95% confidence interval.

7
A. Phayal et al.
the bivariate analysis using the 2014–2018 dataset after the availability
of the AIS ship movement data. According to the figure, on average, grid
cells that have a decline in illegal fishing compared to the previous year
had a greater number of law enforcement patrols in the preceding year
(22.0). In contrast, lagged patrol frequency is significantly less in grid
cell years where illegal fishing had not declined (8.3).
We proceed to conduct a more comprehensive mediation analysis to
further explore the relationship between patrols, illegal fishing decline,
and their potential impact on piracy onset. We initiate this investigation
by accurately operationalizing the frequency of law enforcement patrols
in the Gulf of Guinea grid-cell years. Currently, this frequency distri­
bution is highly skewed, with a mean of 0.56, a standard deviation of
4.1, and values ranging from 0 to a maximum of 172.3. It is essential to
note that this yearly frequency is derived from monthly averages and
does not represent a cumulative patrol count.11
Given the skewed distribution, we create a binary variable of patrol
frequency, variable high patrol, and lag it in the model to check the effect
of patrol in the past year. This variable is coded as 1 if the grid-cell year
has a patrol frequency equal to or higher than the mean (0.56) and
0 otherwise. In total, there are 1611 grid-cell years with high-frequency
security patrols, which accounts for 5.9% of all water grid-cell years in
the dataset.
Based on our theoretical expectation that a higher frequency of law
enforcement patrols in the preceding year leads to a decline in illegal
fishing and an increased likelihood of piracy onset, we propose a three-
variable recursive model. This model suggests a causal path where the
decline in illegal fishing serves as a mediating variable between
increased security patrols and the outcome of increased piracy onset
probability, as illustrated in Fig. 7. The primary causal paths in this
relationship are denoted as paths b and c. Without the mediating vari­
able, it might seem that high-frequency law enforcement patrols directly
affect maritime piracy (path c’). However, when we include the medi­
ating variable into the equation, the direct effect should vanish.
We assess the mediation in Fig. 7 through a sequence of independent
regression equations that measure the suggested path. First, we exam­
ined path a, the association between the lagged high frequency of law
enforcement patrols, high patrol (lagged), and the decline in IUU fishing
using a generalized estimating equations regression in Table 2. While
model 1 in the table is for comparison, the main model (model 2,
Table 3) shows a strong correlation between high patrol (lagged) and the
presence of IUU fishing decline, with statistical significance at p < 0.01.
As expected, this finding supports path a in Fig. 7, that a high frequency
of law enforcement patrols leads to a decline in IUU fishing.
Secondly, we assess the directionality of causation, whether or not
there is reverse causation, by investigating how the decline in IUU
fishing predicts the occurrence of law enforcement patrols. Our results12
for this analysis do not provide substantial empirical support for the
reverse causality, suggesting a more tenable explanation that the higher
frequency of law enforcement patrols serves as a driving force behind
the decline in IUU fishing rather than the other way around.
Finally, we investigate two key aspects: (1) the direct effect of law
enforcement patrols on the probability of piracy onset, denoted by path
c’ in Figs. 7, and (2) the total effect (path c) when accounting for the
mediation effect of law enforcement patrols on piracy onset through
illegal fishing decline, as indicated by paths a and b. These results are
presented in Table 2.
Model (1) in the table showcases the outcome of the direct effect
(path c’) when the mediator is excluded. It suggests a positive and sig­
nificant impact of high-frequency law enforcement patrols (lagged) on
11
In other words, the yearly law enforcement patrol frequency for each grid
cell is calculated by first counting the unique monthly patrol frequency for each
grid cell, and then taking the average of those monthly values for each year.
12
Result for the reverse causality check is not shown here but is included in
Table 2 A supplementary information document.
8
Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209
the onset of maritime piracy, with significance at p < 0.1. However, as
previously mentioned, we anticipate this direct effect to diminish when
introducing a mediating variable into the model.
Baron and Kinney (1986) [4] propose a fundamental framework for
mediation analysis, where an intervening variable mediates the rela­
tionship between an independent variable (IV) and a dependent vari­
able. This framework comprises three conditions that must be met.
Firstly, the IV, which is the high-frequency patrols in our case, should
significantly impact the dependent variable, piracy onset, as demon­
strated in model (1) Table 2. Secondly, the mediator should significantly
explain the IV, as evidenced in Table 2. Lastly, the effect of the mediator
should become significant when incorporated into the model. These
conditions serve as a guideline to assess the mediating effect of the
intervening variable and establish the causal relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. By satisfying these conditions,
researchers can confirm that the mediator plays a crucial role in con­
necting the IV and the dependent variable.
Using this approach, model (2) in Table 3 examines whether the total
effect of law enforcement patrol remains significant when including the
mediator. It shows that variable high patrol (lagged) is no longer statis­
tically significant at p<0.1 when the mediating variable IUU fishing
decline is included. Consequently, it can be inferred that the total effect
(path c) is not significant and that the mediator fully mediates the effect
of the IV on the dependent variable. This outcome illustrates an indirect
association between high law enforcement patrols and the occurrence of
piracy, where the decrease in IUU fishing, resulting from intensified law
enforcement patrols, plays a pivotal role as the mediating factor. In other
words, our findings provide evidence for a unidirectional causal
pathway, wherein law enforcement patrols contribute to the reduction
of illicit fishing in a grid-cell year, subsequently amplifying the proba­
bility of piracy onset.
To verify the above recursive models and to more formally test the
indirect effect as a product of paths a and b, and the total effect c in
Fig. 7, we conduct additional tests using structural equation modeling
(SEM) by pooling all grid-cell year observations and with bootstrapped
standard errors. The results of the SEM analysis are shown in Table 4,
where we exclude coefficients of the two control variables. As with the
recursive models above, the direct and total effect of high frequency law
enforcement patrol on piracy onset is not statistically significant. The
only way the high frequency patrol increases piracy onset probability is
through the mediator, IUU fishing decline.
5. Conclusion
Efforts to comprehend the intricacies of maritime criminal activities
and bolster international maritime security have led to a growing
emphasis on understanding the impact of illegal, unreported, and un­
regulated fishing on marine ecosystem degradation and its connection to
other forms of maritime crime. In the context of the Somali case, a
prevailing narrative suggests that foreign illicit fishing is a significant
driver of sea piracy. This narrative, often imbued with nationalism, has
shaped the policies of numerous littoral countries and serves as a crucial
element in shaping resource conflicts.
This research presents an alternative perspective on the relationship
between illegal fishing and piracy, one that is more nuanced and local.
We show that the two forms of maritime crime tend to co-occur in an
area, but rather than a linear association, the chances of maritime piracy
increase whenever illegal fishing is constrained.13 Presumably, local
anglers engage in lawful and unlawful fishing activities within the same
waters. When the opportunity for illegal fishing to generate extra in­
come is constrained, some resort to piracy attacks on vessels as an
alternative means to compensate for the loss in revenue. However, we do
13
We acknowledge the caution required when generalizing this finding as our
empirical evidence is region-specific.
A. Phayal et al. Marine Policy 165 (2024) 106209

Fig. 7. : Mediation analysis paths.

Table 2 Table 4
Effect of Law Enforcement Patrols (lagged) on Illegal Fishing Decline (0/1). Effect of law enforcement high frequency patrol on piracy onset.
(1) (2) High patrol (lagged) Coeff. SE p* Bootstrap 95% CI
***
High patrol (lagged) 0.340 Total effect (pact c) 0.0073 0.005 .136 [-.0023,.0169]
(0.082) Direct effect (path c’) 0.0071 0.005 .147 [-.0025,.0166]
***
High Traffic -0.231 -0.359*** Indirect effect (via 0.00023 0.0001 .016 [0.000044;
(0.090) (0.096) mediator) 0.000431]
Near nightlight dummy -1.056*** -1.107***
(0.078) (0.078) Note: In the indirect effect, the mediator is the IUU fishing decline
Port count 0.059 0.022
(0.326) (0.336) foreign perpetrators. Secondly, it underscores the necessity of adopting a
Constant -0.505*** -0.544***
holistic approach when formulating policies to avoid unintended out­
(0.035) (0.037)
Observation 4685 4685 comes. While measures to combat illegal fishing may deter some crim­
inals, there is a potential risk of crime displacement, where illegal
Standard errors in parentheses
fishing activities could shift towards piracy attacks. Therefore, careful
* p < 0.1,
assessment and consideration of such policies are crucial.
** p < 0.05,
***
p < 0.01
CRediT authorship contribution statement

Table 3 Anup Phayal: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft.
Mediation Analysis: Law enforcement patrol, IUUF decline and Maritime Piracy. Brandon Prins: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft.
(1) (2) Sayed Fauzan Riyadi: Writing – review & editing. Aaron Gold: Writing
– review & editing, Writing – original draft. Curie Maharani: Writing –
High patrol (lagged) 0.463* 0.337
(0.246) (0.237) review & editing.
IUU fishing decline 0.781***
(0.226) Declaration of Competing Interest
Hi Traffic 1.622*** 1.732***
(0.444) (0.446)
Near nightlight dummy 3.036*** 3.213*** None.
(0.778) (0.803)
Port count 1.351*** 1.377*** Data Availability
(0.344) (0.352)
Constant -7.814*** -8.165***
(0.712) (0.757)
Data will be made available on request.
Observation 4685 4685
Appendix A. Supporting information
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p < 0.05,
*
p < 0.1, Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
***
p < 0.01 online version at doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106209.

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