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Partnerships between the European
Union and its Neighbours
This edited volume provides a timely analysis of the European Union’s ‘privi-
leged’ partnerships with neighbouring countries, identifying key points of
comparison.
It analyses which policy areas are covered and why, the reasons why a spe-
cific institutional arrangement has been chosen, the major advantages and short-
comings for both sides and how effectively the privileged partnerships have
worked in practice. Drawing on a number of case studies, the book highlights
critical junctures and path dependence in the EU’s external relations and exam-
ines what general lessons can be drawn regarding privileged partnerships, in par-
ticular with a view to the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU.
This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in EU
affairs, European politics, diplomacy studies, and more broadly to international
relations and law.
Sieglinde Gstöhl is Director of the Department of EU International Relations

and Diplomacy Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges.
David Phinnemore is Professor of European Politics and Dean of Education in

the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Queen’s University
Belfast in Northern Ireland. He is also Visiting Professor at the College of
Europe in Bruges.
Routledge Studies in European Foreign Policy
Series Editors:
Richard Whitman
University of Kent, UK
and
Richard Youngs
University of Warwick, UK.
This series addresses the standard range of conceptual and theoretical questions
related to European foreign policy. At the same time, in response to the intensity
of new policy developments, it endeavours to ensure that it also has a topical
flavour, addressing the most important and evolving challenges to European
foreign policy, in a way that will be relevant to the policy-making and think-tank
communities.
The EU and Russia in Their ‘Contested Neighbourhood’

Multiple External Influences, Policy Transfer and Domestic Change
Laure Delcour
Europe and Iran

The Nuclear Deal and Beyond
Cornelius Adebahr
EU–Russia Relations in Crisis

Understanding Diverging Perceptions
Edited by Tom Casier and Joan DeBardeleben
The European Union’s Evolving External Engagement

Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies?
Edited by Chad Damro, Sieglinde Gstöhl and Simon Schunz
EU Induced Institutional Change in Post-Soviet Space

Promoting Reforms in Moldova and Ukraine
Ryhor Nizhnikau
The European Union’s Approach to Conflict Resolution

Transformation or Regulation in the Western Balkans?
Laurence Cooley
The Proliferation of Privileged Partnerships between the European Union

and its Neighbours
Edited by Sieglinde Gstöhl and David Phinnemore
Partnerships between the
European Union and its
Neighbours
Edited by Sieglinde Gstöhl and

David Phinnemore
First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2019 selection and editorial matter, Sieglinde Gstöhl and David
Phinnemore; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Sieglinde Gstöhl and David Phinnemore to be identified as the
authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
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without intent to infringe.
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
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ISBN: 978-1-138-35070-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-43574-4 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
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Contents
List of contributors vii

Preface and acknowledgements xi
List of abbreviations xiii
1 Introduction: privileged partnerships between the

European Union and third states 1
S ieglinde G st ö hl and D avid P hinnem o re
2 Privileged partnerships: the partner countries’

(institutional) perspective 23
G e o rges B aur
3 The European Economic Area: a flexible but highly complex

two-pillar system 46
C hristian F r o mmelt
4 Switzerland and the EU: current issues and new challenges

under the Draft Institutional Framework Agreement 68
C hristine K add o us
5 Unique, yet archetypal: relations between the European

Union and Andorra, Monaco and San Marino 84
F rancesc o M aiani
6 The institutional framework of the Eastern Partnership

Association Agreements and the Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Areas 102
G uillaume V an der L o o
vi Contents
7 The EU–Turkey customs union: shortcomings and prospects
for modernization 121
Ö z lem T er z i
8 The EU’s sectoral communities with neighbours: the case of

the Energy Community 139
D irk B uschle and R o z eta K ar o va
9 UK withdrawal from EU membership: the quest for cake 157

D avid P hinnem o re
10 Conclusion: the EU and its privileged

partnerships – Governance Power Europe? 175
S ieglinde G st ö hl and D avid P hinnem o re
Index 203
Contributors
Georges Baur is a research fellow at the Liechtenstein Institute in Bendern,

Liechtenstein. From 2012 to 2018 he was Assistant Secretary-General at the
Secretariat of the European Free Trade Association in Brussels. He previously
held the post of Deputy Head of Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein
to the EU in Brussels from 2003 to 2012. From 2000 to 2003 he served as
Senior Advisor to the Government of Liechtenstein in the context of the
reform of the financial centre, after working as a lawyer both in a law firm
and in the legal department of a bank. He holds a PhD in Law from the
University of Zürich. From 1996 to 2003 he was also a member of the Scient-
ific Board of the Liechtenstein Institute. He has published on various issues
regarding the European Economic Area, international law and
Liechtenstein law.
Dirk Buschle is Deputy Director of the Energy Community Secretariat since
2011 and has led its legal unit since 2007. As Chairman of the Energy Com-
munity Dispute Resolution and Negotiation Center, he is also responsible for
dispute resolution and negotiations and has acted as mediator in high-profile
investor-state conflicts in the energy sector. He is a certified negotiation facil-
itator. Prior to his current position, Dirk Buschle was Head of Cabinet of the
President of the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association in
Luxembourg. He is also Professor and holder of the Iberdrola Manuel Marin
Chair for European Energy Policy at the College of Europe in Bruges. He
graduated in Law from the University of Konstanz and obtained his PhD at
the University of St. Gallen. He has widely published in different areas of
European policy and law.
Christian Frommelt is, since 2018, Director of the Liechtenstein Institute in
Bendern, Liechtenstein. He has been a research fellow in Political Science at
the Institute since 2010. He holds a PhD from the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH) in Zürich as well as a Master’s degree from the University
of Innsbruck. His research focuses on the European Economic Area and on
the integration policies of the member states of the European Free Trade
Association. He has also been Director for Brexit Studies at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Justice and Culture of Liechtenstein (2017–2018).
viii Contributors
Sieglinde Gstöhl is Director of the Department of EU International Relations
and Diplomacy Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges. She has been Pro-
fessor at the College since 2005. From 1999–2005 she was Assistant Pro-
fessor of International Relations at Humboldt University of Berlin. She holds
a PhD and an MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies in Geneva as well as a degree in
Public Affairs from the University of St. Gallen. She was, inter alia, a
research fellow at the Liechtenstein Institute in Bendern, Liechtenstein, and at
the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, Cambridge/MA.
Her recent books include The European Union’s Evolving External Engage-
ment: Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies? (ed. with S. Schunz and C.
Damro, Routledge, 2018); The Trade Policy of the European Union (with D.
De Bièvre, Palgrave, 2018); Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ed. with S. Schunz, Routledge, 2017); The European Neighbourhood Policy
in a Comparative Perspective: Models, Challenges, Lessons (ed., Routledge,
2016); The European Union’s Broader Neighbourhood: Challenges and
Opportunities for Cooperation beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ed. with E. Lannon, Routledge, 2015); The Neighbours of the EU’s Neigh-
bours: Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ed. with E. Lannon, Ashgate, 2014).
Christine Kaddous is Professor of European Law at the University of Geneva and
Director of the Centre d’études juridiques européennes, Jean Monnet Centre of
Excellence, and Co-Director of the Master of Advanced Studies in European and
International Governance. Her research interests cover EU external relations,
internal market, in particular free movement of persons and services, judicial
protection and relations between the EU and Switzerland. She holds a PhD in
Law from the University of Neuchâtel, an MA in Law (LLM) from the Univer-
sity of Cambridge and an MA in European Studies from the Université Libre de
Bruxelles. She is the author and editor of many books on EU law. Among her
recent publications are: ‘Les accords mixtes’ (forthcoming in Commentaire
Mégret); Services financiers: Suisse-Union européenne (ed. with S. Matthey,
Schulthess, 2016); The European Union in International Organisations and
Global Governance (ed., Hart Publishing, 2015).
Rozeta Karova is Senior Energy Lawyer at the Energy Community Secretar-
iat, which she joined in 2011. Her main expertise is the liberalization of
energy markets, market design as well as development and implementation
of public service obligations. She is the author of Liberalization of the Elec-
tricity Markets and Public Service Obligation in the Energy Community
(Kluwer Law International, 2012) as well as of numerous articles in the
field of energy law, competition and state aid law as well as on approxima-
tion and implementation of the EU acquis in the Energy Community con-
tracting parties. She is a regular speaker at academic and policy international
conferences and is a certified negotiator facilitator. She holds a PhD degree
from the Law Department of the European University Institute in Florence
Contributors ix
and an LLM in European Business Law from the Faculty of Law at the
University of Leiden.
Francesco Maiani is Associate Professor of Law at the Centre de droit

comparé, européen et international at the University of Lausanne, and
member of the Commission for Democracy through Law (‘Venice Commis-
sion’) for San Marino. In 2007–2008 he was a Max Weber Fellow at the
European University Institute in Florence. He holds a Law degree from the
University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, an LLM in European Law and Inter-
national Economic Law from the Universities of Lausanne and Geneva and a
PhD in Law from the Universities of Lausanne and Milan. His research inter-
ests include EU institutional and constitutional law, EU–Switzerland rela-
tions, European and international migration and asylum law and human
rights.
David Phinnemore is Professor of European Politics, Jean Monnet Chair in

European Political Science and Dean of Education in the Faculty of Arts,
Humanities and Social Sciences at Queen’s University Belfast in Northern
Ireland. He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. He
holds a BA in European Studies and was awarded his PhD in European
Studies by the University of Kent at Canterbury in 1998. His teaching focuses
on the institutions, decision-making procedures, external relations and
enlargement of the European Union. Inevitably much of his current work
deals with the process and potential implications of Brexit, the form that a
new UK‒EU relationship might take, and the consequences of Brexit for the
EU and for Northern Ireland. His recent publications include: UK Withdrawal
(‘Brexit’) and the Good Friday Agreement (with K. Hayward, European Par-
liament, 2017); The Treaty of Lisbon: Origins and Negotiation (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013); The European Union’s 2007 Enlargement (ed. with C.
Chiva, Routledge, 2012); as well as chapters in The European Union in Crisis
(ed. by N. Nugent et al., 2017); and European Union Politics (ed. by M. Cini
and N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, Oxford University Press, 2016).
Özlem Terzi is Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Public

Administration at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. She was previously Associ-
ate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Rela-
tions at Istanbul University. In 2017–2018, she was a visiting scholar at the
College of Europe in Bruges. Among others, she is the author of The Influ-
ence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy (Ashgate, 2010). She
received her PhD in International Relations from the Middle East Technical
University (METU) in Ankara. She was a DAAD Research Scholarship
holder and junior fellow at the Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforsc-
hung (ZEI), University of Bonn. She received her MSc in European Studies
from the London School of Economics as a Jean Monnet Scholarship holder.
She also obtained an MSc degree in International Relations from METU,
Ankara, and a BSc in International Relations from Ankara University. Her
x Contributors
research interests include EU foreign policy and diplomacy, global govern-
ance, diplomacy and negotiation, EU‒Turkey relations and Turkish foreign
policy.
Guillaume Van der Loo is a postdoctoral researcher at the Leuven Centre for
Global Governance Studies (GGS), University of Leuven, and in the ‘Europe
in the World’ unit of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brus-
sels. His research and publications focus on EU external relations law and
policy, in particular the EU’s trade policy, neighbourhood relations, external
competences and international agreements. He is also involved in several
training and technical assistance projects in European Neighbourhood Policy
and pre-accession countries. He obtained a PhD in Law from Ghent Univer-
sity on the EU’s new generation of Association Agreements and Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas signed with the Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia. His recent publications include the monograph The EU–Ukraine
Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: A
New Legal Instrument for EU Integration without Membership (Brill Nijhoff,
2016) and an edited volume on 10 years Common Commercial Policy After
the Treaty of Lisbon (co-edited with M. Hahn, forthcoming).
Preface and acknowledgements
This book on the proliferation of ‘privileged partnerships’ between the Euro-

pean Union (EU) and its neighbours is very timely. On 23 June 2016 voters in
the United Kingdom (UK) decided in a referendum that the UK should with-
draw from the EU after more than 40 years of membership and instead search
for a new type of partnership. Difficult negotiations led to a Withdrawal
Agreement being concluded in December 2018. The UK was set to leave the
EU on 29 March 2019.
In parallel to this ‘Brexit’ process, other neighbouring countries have been
negotiating new important agreements with the EU. Switzerland’s negotiations
on an institutional framework agreement for those bilateral agreements con-
cerning internal market access were concluded in November 2018. This
umbrella agreement foresees rules on how Swiss law will keep up with the rel-
evant EU law, monitoring implementation, ensuring consistent interpretation
and dispute settlement. In light of political controversy over the new agree-
ment, the Swiss Federal Council launched a domestic consultation to be
concluded in spring 2019.
This is also when the EU’s negotiations with the three small-sized European
countries Andorra, Monaco and San Marino on an association agreement are
expected to come to an end. Turkey’s accession negotiations remain stalled
while a modernization of its customs union with the EU has gained support. The
countries of the EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ have entered Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Areas as part of bilateral association agreements with the
EU. Finally, the EU has, in anticipation of further enlargements to include
Western Balkan countries, created sectoral communities such as the Energy
Community, which have been open to other neighbours as well. All these ‘privi-
leged partnerships’ are to varying degrees based on the EU’s acquis and bi- or
multilateral institutionalized arrangements which grant the neighbours a degree
of access to the internal market. Analysing them allows for many lessons to be
drawn regarding the potential ‘bespoke-ness’ of the future partnership between
the EU and the UK.
We would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss Mission to
the EU for the conference ‘The EU’s “Privileged Partnerships” with its Neigh-
bours: An Institutional Perspective’ which took place on 25 January 2018 at the
xii Preface and acknowledgements
College of Europe in Bruges and which allowed a first discussion of papers on
which the majority of chapters presented here are based. We also thank the
College of Europe’s Research Support Fund for its financial support for the
indexing.
Bruges and Belfast, January 2019
Abbreviations
AA association agreement
AAT Agreement on Air Transport
ACER Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators
AEI Automatic Exchange of Information
AFMP Agreement on Free Movement of Persons
AMS Andorra, Monaco, San Marino
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHF Swiss francs
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
COMIX Mixed Committee (Comité mixte) for Schengen matters
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CUJC Customs Union Joint Committee
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DIFA Draft Institutional Framework Agreement
DSM dispute settlement mechanism
DSR Dispute Settlement Rules
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EC European Community/Communities
ECAA European Common Aviation Area
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECRB Energy Community Regulatory Board
EDA European Defence Agency
EDPB European Data Protection Board
EEA European Economic Area
EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
EMAA Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement
EnCT Energy Community Treaty
xiv Abbreviations
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENTSO-E
European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity
ESA EFTA Surveillance Authority
EU European Union
FTA free trade agreement
GPA Government Procurement Agreement
HLRG High Level Reflection Group
JCD Joint Committee Decision
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OJ Official Journal of the European Union
PHLG Permanent High Level Group
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
REACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals
SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement
SEE South Eastern Europe
SPS sanitary and phytosanitary measures
TBT technical barriers to trade
TCT Transport Community Treaty
TEU Treaty on European Union
TF 50 Task Force on Article 50
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TSO transmission system operator
UK United Kingdom
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
WEAAs West European Association Agreements
WTO World Trade Organization
1 Introduction
Privileged partnerships between the
European Union and third states
Sieglinde Gstöhl and David Phinnemore
Introduction: the proliferation of privileged partnerships

An increasing number of neighbouring states of the European Union (EU) have
in recent years been seeking to deepen their relations with the EU to secure
better access to its internal market. Central to the EU’s response has been a
further institutionalization of relations with neighbours, in particular where the
relationship is based, at least in part, on the acquis communautaire. Such a
response is not new. In the early 1990s, as part of the completion of the internal
market, the EU set up the multilateral European Economic Area (EEA) with the
countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Subsequent to its
rejection of the EEA in a referendum, Switzerland negotiated bilateral sectoral
agreements with the EU. More than two decades later, the EU’s approach to its
‘Western neighbourhood’ includes efforts to conclude one or several association
agreements with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, which have been part of its
customs union for a long time already, as well as negotiations with the United
Kingdom (UK) about its withdrawal from the EU and a post-Brexit relationship.
The EU’s neighbourhood to the East and South has since 2003 benefitted from a
dedicated and rapidly developing policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP). There are also the candidate and potential candidate countries of the
Western Balkans with their Stabilization and Association Agreements and firm
focus on EU membership. Finally, as a candidate country in a customs union
with the EU, Turkey occupies its own special position in the EU’s external
relations.
The ability and willingness of these neighbouring countries to join the EU
varies considerably. While the EFTA countries are generally considered able but
not willing to become members,1 some of the Western Balkan and European
ENP countries might be willing but not (yet) able. Other countries might lack
both the political will and the capacity. This has contributed to increasing
demands for closer relations with the EU and a need for the EU to exploit
options for external differentiated integration to develop the alternatives to EU
membership. With the development of relationships, each country tends to per-
ceive itself as a ‘special case’ either already in or deserving of a new ‘privileged
partnership’. Much academic analysis arguably reinforces the special case of
2 Sieglinde Gstöhl and David Phinnemore
each state or group of states by focussing on single types of relationship rather
than considering the evolving relationships collectively. There is therefore
considerable scope to move beyond a ‘snapshot view’ of individual relationships
with the EU and consider these relationships comparatively and temporally.
There are a few exceptions to this gap in the literature. Their emergence in
the past decade or so has been triggered by the EU’s 2004 enlargement, the sub-
sequently developed ENP and, since 2016, Brexit. First, EU external relations
lawyers have provided comparative analyses of the legal and institutional aspects
of the EU’s relationships with its neighbours. In this context, two books need to
be mentioned.2 Rapoport (2011) studies in detail how the EU’s ‘partnerships’
with European third countries – i.e. states that could apply for EU membership –
affect the structuring of the international public legal order in Europe. She argues
that by spreading its norms and policies, the EU contributes to legal homogen-
eity either by the neighbours’ full alignment or limited approximation to the
acquis.3 Petrov (2011) traces the external dimension of the acquis communau-
taire by comparing the international agreements concluded by the EU. He argues
that the scope of the exported acquis depends on the explicit objectives of these
agreements and on the wider framework of relations and the general political
climate between the parties. In a more recent article, Tobler (2016) argues in
light of the experience of the EFTA states, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino
that should the UK seek a market access agreement based on EU rules, it will
face strict institutional demands from the EU that go far beyond having to accept
the relevant acquis in a dynamic manner.
Second, political scientists have developed concepts and typologies to
compare the various partnerships between the EU and its neighbours. Drawing
on the notion of external governance, Lavenex (2011) offers a typology of exter-
nal ‘circles’ of EU rule export: while the ‘quasi-member states’ of Western
Europe combine far-reaching regulatory alignment with limited opportunities for
inclusion in EU structures, the Eastern and Southern neighbours face less legal-
ized forms of rule transfer along with the establishment of parallel regional
structures. She concludes that the comparative assessment of the EEA, Swiss–
EU bilateralism and the association with the EU of the Western Balkans or ENP
countries ‘illustrates the diminution of regulatory and organizational ties with
the greater geographic distance of the partner countries’ from the EU (ibid.:
387). Gstöhl (2015) examines different neighbourhood models of deep economic
integration with the internal market and conceptualizes the EU as an expanding
economic community. She argues that the available options range from narrow,
bilateral, static models to broad, bi- or multilateral, dynamic models and that the
EU’s neighbourhood relations have over time been shifting in the latter direc-
tion.4 The UK’s withdrawal from the EU and search for a new partnership has
fuelled the debate on the advantages and shortcomings of current relationships.
These options range from the EEA, the Swiss approach and a customs union, to
an association agreement or a Canada-style free trade agreement and mere reli-
ance on membership in the World Trade Organization (see, for instance,
Emerson 2016; Phinnemore and McGowan 2016: 19–28).
Introduction 3
While these comparative legal and political studies – in addition to single
case studies – have contributed to understanding the EU’s relations with its
neighbours, they generally lack a temporal dimension and a stronger, more sys-
tematic focus on the institutional bodies and mechanisms governing the relation-
ships. In this regard, the concept of privileged partnerships will help to provide a
more complete picture by considering questions around the EU’s evolving
approach to its neighbours, notably as regards the inter-relationships between the
principles, benchmarks and precedents underpinning the relationships and their
operation. When compared with the relationships that most of the EU’s non-
European partners have with the EU, the relationships that are under discussion
here all generally involve more intense forms of cooperation and integration as
well as institutionalized governance arrangements. They are comparatively
speaking more substantively ‘privileged’ partnerships.
This volume seeks to understand and explain why privileged partnerships
between the EU and certain neighbouring countries have been established, and/
or are currently being revisited or negotiated, and how they have developed over
time. Privileged partnerships have been created as forms of external differenti-
ated integration because of the varying abilities and willingness of the EU’s
neighbouring countries to join as full members. The focus on the scope of and
the institutional structures and processes within these relationships raises ques-
tions such as the extent to which the EU’s neighbours are facing similar chal-
lenges regarding their privileged partnerships, whether a benchmark model
exists, how institutional choices can be explained, to what extent the EU is not
only exporting political and economic norms to its neighbourhood but also insti-
tutional rules, and what lessons can be drawn. A comparative approach yields
interesting insights and helps fill the research gap in this area of EU external
relations.
Historical institutionalism, which originates from Comparative Politics, helps
explain the reasons why specific privileged partnerships have been created and
how they have developed over time. Scholars working in this school of thought
have generally focused on the EU’s internal policies, not on the EU’s external
relations, and in International Relations ‘historical institutionalism has remained
at the sidelines’ (Fioretos 2011: 368). Nevertheless, the approach offers useful
concepts for studying the evolution of the governance of privileged partnerships.
These are introduced below. The main insights are summarized in the conclud-
ing Chapter 10. Overall, the EU’s own institutional set-up and legal order plays
a defining role by providing a template for privileged partnerships, the shape of
which also reflects path dependence, the neighbours’ ambitions and relative bar-
gaining power, as well as unintended consequences. By exporting its institu-
tional norms and principles to the neighbourhood, the EU can be characterized
as a ‘Governance Power Europe’.
This introductory chapter proceeds as follows: the next section clarifies the
notion of privileged partnership before the third part sets out the volume’s broad
analytical framework based on historical institutionalism. The fourth part briefly
presents the neighbouring countries’ demands for differentiated integration from
a historical perspective, drawing on insights from historical institutionalism.
Finally, an overview of the chapters of the book is provided.
What are privileged partnerships?

The European Union has used the term ‘partnership’ in a somewhat inflationary
manner in its external relations, creating various ‘strategic partnerships’ and
‘accession partnerships’, and referring to relationships with countries in its
neighbourhood as well as far away as ‘special partnerships’, ‘strengthened part-
nerships’ or ‘privileged partnerships’. The term ‘partnership’ is therefore used
quite freely and without reference to a shared understanding of its meaning. The
same can be said for ‘privileged’. Moreover, there has been no formal attempt to
establish what either term means. Unlike with ‘association’, the EU’s treaties are
silent on what these concepts might or should entail.5
The term privileged partnership has most often been used with reference to
Turkey. Former French President Giscard d’Estaing argued in 2000 that the
EU’s relations with Turkey should, as an alternative to membership, take the
form of a privileged relationship. The notion of establishing a ‘privileged part-
nership’ for Turkey was subsequently supported by various politicians and
scholars (Hürsoy 2017). It would entail a ‘special status’ for Turkey that goes
beyond association with the EU institutions and policies through differentiated
participation in the four freedoms of the internal market, cooperation in other
areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and enhanced
institutional structures (zu Guttenberg 2004). However, Turkey has constantly
rejected privileged partnership, referring to it as a ‘second-class status’ (Hürriyet
Daily News 2018). Moreover, İçener (2007: 425) argues that the debate about
privileged partnership has focused on why Turkey should be offered an altern-
ative to EU membership rather than on the content of the concept, which remains
‘surprisingly underdeveloped’.
The idea of establishing privileged partnerships has also featured in the
framework of the ENP as an option for countries without an EU membership
perspective. In 2012 post-Arab Spring Tunisia officially obtained a ‘privileged
partnership’ status which was to cover stronger political cooperation, a progres-
sive integration in the internal market and various forms of EU support (Euro-
pean Commission 2012a; Cohen-Hadria 2018).6 Already in 2008 Morocco had
been granted an ‘advanced status’ (EU–Morocco Association Council 2008).
This foresaw closer cooperation, including a gradual integration of Morocco into
the internal market and its legal convergence to the acquis. In 2010 Jordan was
also given an ‘advanced status’ albeit with a weaker reference to legislative
approximation (Council of the EU 2010b). Kaddouri (2014: 135) argues that the
‘advanced status’ is a step on the way to a ‘privileged partnership’; even though
it has no legal meaning, it opens the way to much closer association with the EU
and reflects Morocco’s aspirations in terms of rapprochement.
The content of these relationships provides little sense of what makes them
‘privileged’ or indeed a ‘partnership’. In fact, other ‘partnership’ arrangements
Introduction 5
suggest a more privileged – or at least intense and wide-ranging – relationship.
Whereas the EU’s accession partnerships – such as the European Partnerships in
the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process with the Western
Balkan countries – aim at the integral adoption of the EU’s acquis, other agree-
ments specify an evolving relevant acquis (such as the EEA) or list specific legal
acts to be implemented, as in Ukraine’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area (DCFTA) with the EU. Moreover, some relationships require an adoption
of (relevant or pre-selected) acquis and others merely an adaptation to parts of it
by way of a one-sided legislative approximation, or combinations thereof.
Although there is no formal, legal definition of the term ‘partnership’ in EU
external relations law, Rapoport (2011: 45) offers the following definition: a
partnership is a sustainable and balanced relationship, based on shared values or
principles, aiming at the realization of a common project. Furthermore, in a
‘privileged’ partnership a third country that effectively applies the acquis would
in return enjoy a certain degree of participation in the EU’s legislative process
(Rapoport 2011: 628). Although Rapoport’s study includes the EU’s relation-
ships with Switzerland and Turkey, her definition arguably limits the EU’s privi-
leged partners to the EEA EFTA countries and is too narrow.
The concept of privileged partnerships is understood in this volume as follows.
First, the relationship that the EU has in place – or is intent on establishing – with
a third country is by definition privileged in that through formal, legally binding
agreements it provides for an institutionalized relationship involving extensive
reciprocal rights and obligations, selective acquis adoption, policy cooperation and
integration. Second, the privileged partnership involves extensive institutional
arrangements for governing the relationship. These may include bilateral institu-
tions (e.g. a council, a committee, subcommittees and a joint parliamentary com-
mittee), surveillance and possibly even judicial enforcement arrangements, dispute
settlement mechanisms and in certain instances privileged ‘decision-shaping’
access to EU institutions, bodies and agencies. These deep, acquis-based relation-
ships may cover substantial parts of the internal market (such as the European Eco-
nomic Area) or just an important sector thereof (as in the case of the Energy
Community or the European Common Aviation Area).
In adopting this understanding of privileged partnership, the volume is not
being overly prescriptive. Nor is it explicitly challenging other attempts to cat-
egorize different relationships with the EU. Maresceau (2013: 153), for
example, defines agreements in which parts of EU acquis are identified and
listed in order to become part of the partner country’s domestic legal order as
‘integration agreements’.7 Drawing on this concept, Van der Loo (2016: 28)
further specifies that an ‘integration agreement’ contains the obligation for the
partner country to apply, implement or incorporate in its domestic legal order a
predetermined selection of EU acquis. In addition to this defining character-
istic, the uniform interpretation and application of incorporated law may in
cases of more far-reaching agreements include a procedure to amend or update
the incorporated acquis, an obligation to interpret it in conformity with the
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and judicial mechanisms to
ensure its uniform interpretation and application (ibid.: 49). Examples include
the EEA, some of the current Swiss bilateral agreements (e.g. those on civil
aviation and the free movement of persons), the Schengen and Dublin associ-
ations of the EFTA countries, the customs union agreements with Andorra,
San Marino and Turkey,8 the monetary conventions on the use of the Euro as
official currency (with Andorra, San Marino, Vatican City and Monaco) and
the DCFTAs with some ENP countries (currently Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia). Those partnerships (or ‘integration agreements’) that aim at legal
homogeneity may come with indirect participation in the decision-shaping part
of the EU’s legislative process as a means to compensate for the alignment
(Rapoport 2011: 561–581). The participation of third countries in the CFSP is
different in that it is not based on a legal obligation but a political choice. The
EU can invite a partner to participate in a CFSP common position, joint action
or mission.
Hence, privileged partnerships are forms of external differentiated integration
where outsiders – non-member states – adopt EU rules, mainly because, in
almost all cases, they lack the capacity and/or willingness to fully integrate
(Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2013: 17–18). Privileged partnerships
do not include therefore the most obvious case of external differentiation: pre-
accession. This is because accession is – notionally – temporally limited and
does not allow for any differentiated integration beyond transitional periods and
the very occasional permanent derogation from the acquis; candidate countries
are expected to take on the entire acquis in full. A special case covered in this
volume is the sector-specific Energy Community which was initially conceived
as a step towards EU enlargement in South Eastern Europe but now comprises
also a few other neighbouring countries as contracting parties or observers.
Institutional dimensions to external differentiated integration have often been
discussed under the label of ‘EU external governance’. Lavenex and Schim-
melfennig (2009: 796) conceive of EU external governance as an extension of
the EU’s regulatory and organizational boundaries beyond its borders. In other
words, parts of the acquis are extended to non-member states, possibly in
exchange for participatory elements in EU policy-shaping. The institutional
arrangements established to manage the implementation of a privileged partner-
ship therefore differ from the modes of internal EU governance in different
policy areas. Lavenex, Lehmkuhl and Wichmann (2009: 829) explain this disso-
ciation with reference to ‘the pre-eminence of institutional continuities between
the ways in which the EU governs internally and its external modes of govern-
ance’ (ibid.: 829). In other words, it matters for the institutional arrangements
which areas of cooperation are included in a third country’s relationship with
the EU.
As a result of increasing internal and external differentiation, the status of
‘member’ state of the EU compared to that of third countries in the EU’s neigh-
bourhood has become somewhat blurred. The EU’s external relations have
become more diversified and neighbouring countries increasingly participate in
EU programmes, agencies, missions and policies as well as align themselves to
Introduction 7
EU rules (see Bosse-Platière and Rapoport 2014a). Moreover, the international
and the European legal orders have become more intertwined. The EFTA Court
has even qualified the EEA Agreement as a public international law treaty sui
generis which created a distinct legal order of its own (Baudenbacher
2016: 160).
Analyses of the evolution of the EU’s external relations – especially with
regard to its neighbours – demonstrate quite clearly the development of a range
of institutionalized relationships. These continue to evolve, often expanding their
scope and activities. In some instances (e.g. EU–Switzerland relations) they are
also the focus of proposals for significant further institutionalization. The level
of engagement between the EU and the states concerned is high with a focus on
integration and, in many instances, adoption of at least elements of the acquis.
This is accompanied – notionally at least – by intense forms of either bilateral or
multilateral institutional engagement. These are likely to expand further to
include the UK once its post-Brexit relationship with the EU is established. As a
consequence, the EU finds itself with neighbours that have privileged access to
its integration activities and in particular the internal market.
Framework of analysis: a historical institutionalist

perspective
A key purpose of this volume is to explore and compare: how these different
forms of privileged partnership have emerged and evolved; what they involve in
terms of rights and obligations; and how they are structured and operate in terms
of institutional arrangements. To do so, the contributions to the volume draw on
historical institutionalism, an approach that ‘examines how temporal processes
and events influence the origin and transformation of institutions that govern
political and economic relations’ (Fioretos, Falletti and Sheingate 2016: 3).
Taking a longer-term perspective on why certain privileged partnerships have
been chosen enables the study of EU neighbourhood policies as a process that
unfolds over time. Among the most important historical institutionalist concepts
are unintended consequences, critical junctures, path dependence and the role of
power asymmetry.
Regarding the first of these, Pierson (1996: 126) argues that ‘actors may be in a
strong initial position, seek to maximize their interests, and nevertheless carry out
institutional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their own positions
(or those of their successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or undesired’.
Institutional choices may over time lead to societal adaptations and other
consequences which may create constraints that change available options or
generate states’ loss of control. Gaps may thus emerge between the initial intentions
of the EU and/or the third countries and the actual functioning of institutions they
establish. Factors that are likely to create such gaps include autonomous actions of
EU institutions, political decision-makers’ restricted time horizons (including the
discounting of long-term consequences), the potential for unintended consequences
and actors’ changing preferences over time (ibid.: 131–132).
Second, critical junctures are periods of significant change which enable freer
agency and produce distinct legacies. They often mark the beginning of path-
dependent processes. Critical junctures are thus moments when substantial insti-
tutional change takes place and creates a ‘branching point’ from which historical
development moves onto a new path (Hall and Taylor 1996: 942). At least two
kinds can be distinguished: at the systemic level, such as the end of the Cold
War; and at the level of a country’s bilateral relations with the EU, such as Swit-
zerland’s 1992 rejection of the EEA Agreement or the UK’s decision to with-
draw from the EU.
Third, path dependence generally means that ‘the entrenchment of certain insti-
tutional arrangements obstruct[s] an easy reversal of the initial choice’, unless
policy-makers face a critical juncture (Levi 1997: 28). Preceding steps in a certain
policy direction may induce further movement in the same direction. This is even
more likely when over time the relative benefits compared to other options and the
costs of exit and policy change increase. Depending on the particular sequence in
which events unfold or steps are taken, different possible outcomes may be gener-
ated and certain choices may become irreversible. The concept of path dependence
‘recognizes the importance of existing institutional templates to processes of insti-
tutional creation and reform’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 954).
Fourth, historical institutionalists emphasize the asymmetries of power asso-
ciated with the development of institutions. As argued by Hall and Taylor (1996:
954), ‘the power relations present in existing institutions give some actors or
interests more power than others over the creation of new institutions’. In addi-
tion, historical institutionalists posit that the structure of actors’ institutional
preferences is shaped heavily by their investments in existing and past designs,
especially when these are the source of increasing returns and positive externali-
ties (Fioretos 2011: 384). On the one hand, the EU may have an interest in repro-
ducing established practice, especially if it is linked to vested interests and
specialized investments. On the other hand, third countries may accept institu-
tional choices because of power asymmetry with the EU, for example based on
market size or relative preference intensity (i.e. their comparatively much
stronger desire to conclude an agreement).
In order to understand more fully why specific institutionalized relationships
and institutional arrangements have been established, or are currently being
negotiated, between the EU and its privileged partners, the volume’s chapters
address in particular the following questions:
• which policy areas are covered in the relationship and why?

• which institutional arrangements have been chosen?
• what are the major advantages and shortcomings of these arrangements
for both the EU and the third country/countries?
• what general lessons can be drawn?
While Chapters 3 to 9 focus on specific actual or emerging privileged partnerships,

Chapter 2 takes a comparative approach and addresses horizontal questions from
Introduction 9
the perspective of the third countries, notably regarding legislative and judicial
homogeneity.
The demand for external differentiated integration: a

historical perspective
In order to provide an overview of the historical context in which the privileged
partnerships under discussion have been established and have been implemented,
it is worth recalling the key phases in the development of the EU’s relations with
its neighbourhood. For most of the EU’s European ‘partners’, the demand for
some form of new or enhanced privileged partnership has been triggered by the
deepening and the widening of the European integration process since the later
1980s. For the EU’s West European neighbours, both the completion of the
internal market by 31 December 1992 and the end of the Cold War with which it
coincided can be considered as critical junctures regarding their integration
policy. The prospect of a competitive disadvantage in the EU market and the
challenge to longstanding national security strategies (including neutrality)
created major new policy demands and opened up new paths for addressing
them. Later on, the Kosovo crisis of 1998–1999 provided a turning point for the
countries of the Western Balkans in terms of the EU’s engagement with them
(Friis and Murphy 2000). For the countries of the wider European neighbour-
hood, the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004–2007 served as a trigger for the
ENP and, in turn, reactions that then led to policy reviews.
Each wave of establishing new partnerships was accompanied by debates on
forms of flexible and differentiated integration. Originally, the focus was on
internal differentiation within the EU. Hence from the 1970s onwards concepts
such as ‘multi-speed Europe’, ‘variable geometry’ or ‘core Europe’ entered the
lexicon of terms associated with European integration. In the 1990s this debate
shifted from internal to external differentiation with concepts such as a Europe
of ‘concentric circles’, graduated membership and even partial membership (see
e.g. Stubb 1996). Neither of the latter were taken up. The same applies to ideas
of ‘affiliate’ membership (Andriessen 1991). Instead, the EU proceeded to
develop a range of institutionalized relationships that formally maintained a dis-
tinction between member states and non-member states, yet involved levels of
integration and cooperation that have increasingly blurred that distinction across
each of the relationships that the EU has with its European neighbours.
The EFTA states and the EU – the EEA option … for most
When the European Communities (EC) in 1970 opened accession negotiations
with the UK, Denmark, Norway and Ireland (the only one which was not a
member of EFTA), the remaining EFTA countries (joined by Norway after its
1972 referendum on EC membership) sought to conclude bilateral free trade
agreements on industrial goods to compensate for the expected trade deflection.
These agreements – with the exception of the agreements with Switzerland and
Finland – contained an evolutionary clause on the basis of which the scope of
cooperation could be expanded to new fields. In the mid-1980s, the Commis-
sion’s plan to complete the internal market, the Single European Act which
introduced qualified majority decisions in most of the related areas, and the
accession of Spain and Portugal (another EFTA country) pushed the EFTA
countries to intensify their cooperation with the European Communities (see
Gstöhl 2002). The new neoliberal economic climate coincided with the end of
the Cold War and the negotiation of the TEU (Maastricht).
In 1989 Commission President Delors (1989: 17–18) invited the EFTA
countries to look for ‘a new, more structured partnership with common
decision-making and administrative institutions’ on the basis of ‘two pillars’,
the EC and a strengthened EFTA. The result was the creation of the EEA
which largely extended the internal market – the free movement of goods, ser-
vices, capital and persons, competition rules as well as horizontal and flanking
policies – to the EFTA countries. Excluded are the EU’s external relations, the
common agricultural and fisheries policies, EU budget contributions and
regional policy, taxation as well as economic and monetary policy. Nonethe-
less, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and Norway followed Austria’s lead and
applied for EU membership well before the EEA Agreement entered into
force. However, only Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. The
Norwegian people rejected EU membership (for the second time), and Swiss
voters refused to ratify the EEA Agreement, thus putting the country’s mem-
bership bid on ice.
Whereas the EEA was envisaged primarily as an alternative to EU member-
ship, it had the unintended consequence of sparking – or at least contributing to
– membership applications. The EEA Agreement more or less fulfilled the EFTA
states’ hopes regarding its contents, but not in respect of the institutional set-up
(Gstöhl 1994). Instead of a ‘one-pillar’ EEA structure with a joint surveillance
body and an independent EEA Court, the EFTA countries had – after the CJEU’s
negative Opinion 1/91 on the EEA Agreement – to create their own EFTA Court
and EFTA Surveillance Authority. The attempt to reconcile the principles of
internal market homogeneity and decision-making autonomy resulted in the
EFTA states renouncing any requests for permanent exceptions from the acquis
and lacking a real right of co-decision (Van Stiphout 2007). This should not have
surprised. In 1987, the European Commission had established what became
known as the ‘Interlaken principles’ (De Clercq 1987): preserving (1) the ‘Com-
munity first’, (2) the autonomy of its decision-making, and (3) a balance of bene-
fits and obligations.
The EEA Agreement soon became a benchmark model for other countries in
search of privileged partnerships (Gstöhl 2016b). Although the power asym-
metry increasingly shifted over time in the EU’s favour, no significant reforms
were implemented in the EEA despite comprehensive reviews carried out in
2010–2013.
Introduction 11
Switzerland’s piecemeal approach
The 1992 referendum on the EEA can be seen as a critical juncture in EU–Swiss
relations.9 The EEA also led to a certain path dependence in that the Swiss
approach largely sought to replicate bilaterally with the EU the market access
and cooperation offered by the EEA. In two major package deals in 1999 and
2004 the Swiss government concluded 16 new sectoral agreements with the EU
based on the principle of ‘appropriate parallelism’ – the negotiation in parallel of
separate agreements reflecting both sides’ interests. The first package also
contained a ‘guillotine clause’ which linked several agreements. If one of the
agreements were not to be ratified or if it were terminated, the others would also
cease to have effect (Swiss Federal Council 1999: 6156).
Over time, Switzerland has accumulated around 20 main agreements and
more than 100 secondary agreements with the EU. In substance the agreements
collectively approach the contents of the EEA Agreement, while lacking an
overarching institutional structure, which the EU soon came to view as a loss of
control. Therefore, the Council insisted on the limits of such a static, sectoral
approach and on finding a solution for the horizontal, institutional issues. In
2010, it noted:
Due to a lack of efficient arrangements for the take-over of new EU acquis

including ECJ [European Court of Justice] case-law, and for ensuring the
supervision and enforcement of the existing agreements, this approach does
not ensure the necessary homogeneity in the parts of the internal market and
of the EU policies in which Switzerland participates.
(Council of the EU 2010a: para 42)
Between 2014 and 2018 the EU and Switzerland negotiated an institutional

framework agreement for the five existing as well as future sectoral market
access agreements. The EU had repeatedly made clear that solving the horizontal
institutional issues is a precondition for further developing market access. Swit-
zerland formally withdrew its EU membership application only in July 2016,
shortly after the EU referendum in the UK. Although the EU has clearly stated
that it is not willing to reopen negotiations, the Swiss government launched in
December 2018 domestic consultations on the agreement with a view ‘to seek
further dialogue with the EU if necessary’ (Swiss Federal Council 2018).
The ‘trap’ of the EU–Turkey customs union

Turkey has been an ‘associate’ of the EU since 1964 and in 1987 applied for
membership. It obtained candidate status in 1999, and in 2005 accession negoti-
ations were opened. Very limited progress has been made in the negotiations
which are currently stalled. This lengthy process of more than 50 years of associ-
ation illustrates path dependence and rhetorical entrapment: once Turkey suffi-
ciently demonstrated its commitment to the political and economic reforms
required by the EU, ‘member states opposed to Turkish membership for economic
or cultural reasons could not legitimately block the path to accession but were rhe-
torically entrapped’ (Schimmelfennig 2011: 113). The 1963 Ankara Agreement
already mentioned the possibility of membership and foresaw the progressive cre-
ation of a customs union. In 1996 the customs union covering industrial and pro-
cessed agricultural goods came into force based on a decision of the Association
Council. Its persistence over two decades and the growing perception that it is an
alternative to membership rather than a stepping stone on Turkey’s way to full
membership can thus be seen as an unintended consequence.
Institutional relations between Turkey and the EU have their privileges. The
Commission informally consults Turkish experts when drafting a new legal act
of relevance for the partnership (such as technical barriers to trade). The
Customs Union Joint Committee monitors the implementation and thus legal
homogeneity of the customs union. As argued by Rapoport (2012: 163), the roles
of both sides are necessarily unequal and the Joint Committee is supposed to
ensure Turkey’s alignment with the relevant acquis. To an extent, the informal
consultation mechanism in the customs union regarding new relevant acquis has
been taken from the EEA, but ‘the flaws in the EEA provisions have been com-
pounded by the failure to adjust them to reflect Turkey’s involvement in the
EC’s trade policy’ (Peers 1996: 423). Compared to the EEA, the informal
cooperation is constrained by the enlargement context. The power asymmetry is
also more pronounced due to the lack of a two-pillar structure: Turkish courts
are supposed to follow the CJEU’s case law (yet without a communication
mechanism between the judges) and disputes between the contracting parties are
settled diplomatically in the Association Council, which may decide to refer the
issue to the CJEU or – even more unrealistically – to another court. The institu-
tional shortcomings of the EU–Turkish customs union as well as the need to
update its contents in light of the changing nature of the international trade
agenda have been increasingly felt since the 2000s, leading to calls for a mod-
ernization as the accession talks have stalled.
Sectoral communities and the internal market

The EU has also created privileged sectoral communities with its neighbours
and with a particular focus on the countries of the Western Balkans. In 2005 the
Energy Community Treaty was signed. It extends the EU’s internal market for
electricity and gas to South Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
(with Armenia, Norway and Turkey as observers). The EU has also signed in
2006 an agreement establishing the European Common Aviation Area. This
includes the countries of the Western Balkans, Iceland and Norway, with the
possibility of other neighbouring countries joining. And in 2017 agreement was
reached on the Transport Community Treaty with the countries of South Eastern
Europe. Like the EEA, such sectoral integration is based on multilateral agree-
ments (Maresceau 2013: 164–171). Besides the partial extension of the internal
market, the communities established by these agreements also aim at closer
Introduction 13
cooperation between the participating countries themselves. Blockmans and Van
Vooren (2012) therefore refer to this form of privileged partnership as ‘legally
binding sectoral multilateralism’ aiming at treaty-based legal integration in
selected areas between the EU and (able and willing) neighbours and between
the latter themselves. Buschle (2014: 194) refers to the Energy Community as an
‘energy EEA’.
Eastern enlargement as a trigger for the ENP

The ENP emerged in 2002 in response to calls for a new ‘proximity policy’ that
would mitigate the effects of the EU’s imminent Eastern enlargement – a critical
juncture – on the future neighbours to the East. Initially focused on Belarus,
Moldova and Ukraine as well as Russia, which then opted out, the ENP was
quickly expanded to the countries of the Southern Mediterranean as well as the
South Caucasus. It aimed to avoid drawing new ‘dividing lines’ in Europe and to
promote security, stability and prosperity beyond the new borders of the EU by
offering these neighbours ‘the prospect of a stake in the EU Internal Market
based on legislative and regulatory approximation, the participation in a number
of EU programmes and improved interconnection and physical links with the
EU’ (European Commission 2004: 14).
The ENP’s design clearly followed the EU’s experiences with enlargement,
yet Commission President Prodi (2002: 6) was much more cautious than his pre-
decessor Delors had been in 1989 with the EFTA countries, and he only pro-
posed a framework for the ENP in which both sides ‘could ultimately share
everything but institutions’. However, he suggested that it was ‘worth seeing
what we could learn from the way the EEA was set up and then using this
experience as a model for integrated relations with our neighbours’ (ibid.: 7).
Based on the two core principles of conditionality and differentiation, ‘[t]he
ambition and the pace of development of the EU’s relationship with each partner
country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as
its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities’ (European Commission
2004: 8). The ENP instruments were to a large extent modelled on the EU’s
accession policy, such as benchmarking, regulatory and legislative approxima-
tion, monitoring and reporting, political conditionality, technical and financial
assistance, and dialogues. In 2008 the ENP was complemented by two regional
dimensions: the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership.
Critical junctures leading to policy reviews followed. The first was the Arab
Spring which erupted at the end of 2010 in Tunisia with rapid, unexpected spill-
over effects in the region. The EU responded with the launch of the Partnership
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean which
called for a differentiated, ‘more for more’ approach under which increased
support in terms of financial assistance especially for civil society and emerging
political actors, enhanced mobility and better market access was made available
to those partner countries most advanced in the consolidation of reforms (Euro-
pean Commission and High Representative 2011). Nevertheless, Noutcheva
(2015) argues that there was little substantive change in the EU’s approach
before and after the Arab Spring due to the institutional governance of the ENP,
a composite policy with multiple objectives, competences and institutional
arrangements.
Second, there was the Vilnius Summit with the Eastern Partnership countries
in November 2013. Here, only Georgia and Moldova initialled their Association
Agreements including DCFTAs with the EU. Under Russian pressure the Arme-
nian government announced instead that it would be joining the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union, while the Ukrainian President suspended the signature of his
country’s Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU, a decision that trig-
gered the ‘Euro-Maidan’ protests in Kiev, which in turn led to a new govern-
ment. In March 2014 Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and
intervened in the violent conflict in eastern Ukraine. In response to this destabili-
zation of Ukraine, the EU imposed restrictive measures against Russia. Azerbai-
jan has shown no interest in moving too close towards either the EU or Russia.
A 2015 review of the ENP called for a strong focus on stabilization and for
further differentiation among the partner countries (European Commission and
High Representative 2015).
The Association Agreements concluded with the eastern ENP neighbours aim
at a gradual rapprochement between the parties based on common values and
close, privileged links. As with the ENP more generally, they draw on the EU’s
experiences with enlargement and so provide evidence of the EU’s ‘effort to
emulate the influence mechanisms template employed by the EU in the pre-
accession process’ and ‘displays heavy path dependency, but also a degree of
adaptation to the absence of a membership perspective for the ENP countries’
(Magen 2006: 410). The DCFTAs therefore cover substantially all trade in goods
and certain services as well as many ‘behind-the-border’ issues, such as stand-
ards, competition policy, intellectual property rights or public procurement. They
require the partners to have or develop the capacity to approximate to and take
over elements of the EU acquis. They do not per se aim at the creation of a
homogeneous and dynamic legal space. They nevertheless involve far-reaching
market access conditionality, which links additional access to the EU’s internal
market to the progress in implementation.
The emancipation of the small-sized countries

The small-sized European states other than Liechtenstein – Andorra, San
Marino and Monaco – also maintain close relations with the EU. These rela-
tions have developed from indirect integration based on historical relations
with the states’ respective neighbouring EU member states to direct agree-
ments with the EU (see Friese 2011). Close relations with bigger neighbours
not only opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for the three small-sized states to
develop direct relations with the EU, but also created strong path-dependencies
in terms of the three states being treated in a similar way when entering agree-
ments with the EU.
Introduction 15
Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986 made it necessary to find a solution for
Andorra which was now located between two EU member states. It was also an
occasion for the ‘co-principality’ to adopt a modern constitution and gain inter-
national recognition. The Andorran government signed a bilateral customs union
agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1990 and a
cooperation agreement with the EU in 2004. San Marino, surrounded by Italy,
signed a bilateral agreement on cooperation and customs union with the EEC in
1991 to facilitate its participation in the internal market. Only Monaco still relies
on an indirect inclusion in the EU’s customs territory via its agreements with
neighbouring France. For the same reasons it also became part of the Schengen
area. The principality signed its first bilateral agreement – on the application of
certain Community acts on Monegasque territory – with the EU in 2003. Finally,
all three small-sized states adopted the Euro when it was introduced in 2002. By
granting far-reaching competences to the European Commission and the CJEU,
their asymmetric power relations with the EU come close to an ‘absorption
model’ (Gstöhl 2015: 862).
Article 8 TEU, as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, stipulates that
the EU shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, ‘aiming
to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the
values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on
cooperation’. In a declaration related to the article, the EU promises to ‘take into
account the particular situation of small-sized countries which maintain specific
relations of proximity with it’. Andorra, San Marino and Monaco have all in
recent years expressed the wish to enhance their relations with the EU since they
still face obstacles to internal market access (Maresceau 2015: 423–430). In
2012 the European Commission (2012b) suggested exploring a multilateral
framework association agreement with the three states or their accession to the
EEA, but it did not retain alternative options such as bilateral sectoral agree-
ments or EU membership. Negotiations with a view to concluding one or several
association agreements opened in 2015 and it is anticipated that they will be con-
cluded in spring 2019. These are expected to entail special governance arrange-
ments for the small-sized states’ consultation (decision-shaping) and for the
monitoring and enforcement of the acquis (ibid.: 17). The envisaged scope
includes ‘the four freedoms of the internal market and related horizontal and
flanking policies’ as well as ‘a coherent, efficient and effective institutional
framework’ (Council of the EU 2018).
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU

The UK referendum on continued EU membership in June 2016 led to an unex-
pected outcome: the decision to withdraw. On 29 March 2017, the UK govern-
ment duly triggered Article 50 TEU, starting the first withdrawal of a member
state from the EU. At this critical juncture in the bilateral relationship, the UK
decided to pursue ‘a deep and special partnership’ with the EU. In theory at
least, opportunities exist to develop some novel form of relationship. Within
a cademic circles, the novelty of Brexit and the challenges it poses in terms of
establishing a privileged partnership has helped revive the debate on external
differentiated integration (see e.g. Leruth, Gänzle and Trondal 2017). However,
the EU’s response to the UK’s quest has been marked by path dependence in so
far as the EU has insisted on existing models of privileged partnership, such as
the EEA or the EU–Turkish customs union, as benchmarks and has limited
opportunities to consider a bespoke model. It has also been reluctant to offer any
concessions to the UK given that the withdrawal negotiations took place as the
EU and other neighbouring countries were seeking to develop their relations.
Indeed, the negotiations on the UK’s Withdrawal Agreement were concluded at
the same time as the EU’s negotiations with Switzerland on its institutional
framework agreement, with the parallel negotiation processes clearly having a
bearing on each other.
Although the EU fears setting a precedent in negotiations with the UK, the
UK’s situation differs from that of other states with respect to its starting point
as a full-fledged member. This raises questions about whether, to what extent
and how the UK seeks or avoids regulatory divergence in its future relationship
with the EU and how this will be managed in a future agreement and in the insti-
tutional structures it creates to govern the relationship. For the EU, the guide-
lines of the European Council (2017, 2018) show that the 30-year-old ‘Interlaken
principles’ still hold: any agreement with the UK will have to be based on a
balance of rights and obligations, ensure a level playing field, preserve the inte-
grity of the internal market (which excludes participation based on a sector-by-
sector approach) and preserve the EU’s autonomy as regards its decision-making
as well as the role of the CJEU.
Outline of the volume

In Chapter 2, Georges Baur analyses the major privileged partnerships that the
EU has concluded with neighbouring countries. The chapter takes a horizontal
perspective and asks to what extent the EU pursues a standardized approach to
institutional arrangements. It also considers the specific issue of legal homogen-
eity as an important principle safeguarding a coherent application of law in both
the EU and the partner countries. He finds that the EU can only partially impose
its institutional ‘programme’ with implications for the quality of access to and
integration into the internal market.
In Chapter 3 Christian Frommelt focuses on the institutions and processes
present in the EEA, the most far-reaching model for the integration of non-
member states with the EU. The chapter discusses the EEA’s complex institu-
tional two-pillar structure and uses this complexity to explain why the
incorporation of many new EU acts into the EEA Agreement is often delayed,
thus compromising the EEA’s homogeneity. He shows that a multitude of ad
hoc rules for EEA decision-making and surveillance has been added and high-
lights the policy-specific modes of governance that range from strictly intergov-
ernmental cooperation to subordination to supranational EU bodies.
Introduction 17
The volume then turns to the case of Switzerland with Christine Kaddous,
exploring EU–Swiss relations from a political and legal point of view. Chapter 4
therefore, in considering the sets of bilateral agreements of 1999 and 2004,
presents a very dense relationship similar in substantive terms to participation in
the EEA. However, in terms of institutional arrangements, the two forms of
institutionalized relations differ significantly, or at least have done to date. The
chapter proceeds to consider the draft institutional framework agreement cur-
rently under consideration in exchange for increased Swiss access to the EU
market. Some aspects of the proposal resemble the institutional arrangements in
privileged partnerships that the EU has concluded with other neighbouring
countries.
Chapter 5 considers the EU’s ‘extended but fragmented’ relations with
Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, the so-called ‘AMS states’. Francesco
Maiani analyses the existing
��
patchwork of customs, monetary and other agree-
ments and the essentially pragmatic, ad hoc approach that has served all parties
well in the past. However, this approach sits less and less well with the integra-
tion needs of the AMS states and the EU’s aspiration to establish a coherent set
of relations with its small-sized neighbours. The chapter therefore examines the
options being considered for new association agreements, shedding light on their
linkages to the broader context for the EU’s relations with its AMS neighbours.
In Chapter 6 Guillaume Van der Loo switches attention to the ENP and ana-
lyses how and to what extent the new generation of Association Agreements
with a DCFTA that the EU recently concluded with Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia integrate these countries into its internal market. In particular, the
chapter explores the innovative dimension of the institutional arrangements
related to the numerous legislative approximation commitments into which the
EU’s eastern European partners have entered. The chapter shows that the agree-
ments are indeed innovative, but not revolutionary. Whereas the objective to
‘gradually integrate’ the partners into the EU’s internal market seems unique, the
complex web of institutional arrangements is largely shaped by path-dependent
processes and mainly replicate existing arrangements.
The focus of Chapter 7 is Turkey and the institutional and structural short-
comings of the country’s customs union with the EU and options for its modern-
ization. Özlem Terzi places these shortcomings in historical context before
reflecting on the challenges that the EU’s new generation of free trade agree-
ments as well as current institutional inadequacies of the EU–Turkey customs
union and how these might be addressed. She argues that the customs union was
never intended as a goal in itself and that in its current form it does not constitute
a sustainable form of privileged partnership. However, political challenges cur-
rently stand in the way of modernizing the customs union.
Chapter 8 by Dirk Buschle and Rozeta Karova introduces the Energy Com-
munity as the prime example of an EU sectoral community with neighbours. The
authors argue that EU sectoral communities, which mainly target the Western
Balkan countries and thus (potential) candidates for EU membership, constitute
privileged partnerships with solid institutional structures and decision-making
processes. Like the EEA, they are based on multilateral agreements and partially
extend the internal market to neighbouring countries based on the relevant
acquis. Unlike the EEA Agreement, however, the Energy Community Treaty
provides for common institutions rather than a two-pillar institutional set-up and
also aims at closer cooperation between the participating countries themselves.
The chapter also reveals important shortcomings with the Energy Community
and considers how it is seeking to adapt to changing realities.
The penultimate Chapter 9 by David Phinnemore considers the case of the
UK and the aspirations and options for a future post-Brexit UK–EU relationship.
It therefore explores not only the preferences of the UK and the EU, but also the
extent to which the EU’s position is being determined by established principles,
practice and precedent. The chapter explores the significant challenges the UK
government has faced in reconciling its aspirations for a wide-ranging, bold and
ambitious free trade agreement with not only its own red lines on leaving the
customs union, the single market and the jurisdiction of the CJEU, but also how
these fit awkwardly with the EU’s general insistence in the development of priv-
ileged partnerships with its European neighbours on a balance of rights and
obligations, ensuring the integrity of the internal market and upholding its
decision-making autonomy. A key question is whether the UK is seeking to
‘have its cake and eat it’?
Chapter 10 then concludes the volume by discussing the findings of the other
chapters and considering the lessons to be learned regarding privileged partner-
ships between the EU and third states. Sieglinde Gstöhl and David Phinnemore
draw on historical institutionalism in an attempt to explain the institutional
choices made from a longer-term, comparative perspective. The chapter shows
that the EU’s own institutional set-up has played a defining role by providing a
template for privileged partnerships, the shape of which also reflects path
dependence and the neighbours’ own ambitions and relative bargaining power.
The precedent of existing relationships is now also affecting the options for the
UK’s post-Brexit partnership with the EU. By exporting its institutional norms
and principles to its neighbourhood, the EU has indeed turned into a ‘Govern-
ance Power Europe’.
Notes
1 Norway has negotiated EU membership twice but has failed to ratify the resulting
Treaty of Accession each time owing to negative referendums in 1972 and 1994.
Iceland applied in 2009, yet in 2015 its government requested that the country should
no longer be regarded as a candidate. Switzerland submitted an application in 1992,
suspended it after the EEA referendum later that year, and formally withdrew it
in 2016.
2 See also Maiani, Petrov and Multiarea (2009) who compare models of integration
without EU membership (Ukraine, Russia, Norway and Switzerland).
3 A volume edited by Bosse-Platière and Rapoport (2014b) examines more generally the
position of third states in EU law. It also provides a comparative analysis of the sub-
stantive and institutional dimensions of third states’ participation in EU policies and
processes.
Introduction 19
4 In addition, a volume edited by Gstöhl (2016a) maps the EU’s neighbourhood relations
in a comparative perspective and explores key challenges and lessons from the various
policy frameworks for the ENP.
5 Article 217 TFEU defines ‘association’ with the EU as involving ‘reciprocal rights and
obligations, common action and special procedure’. For an early comparison of associ-
ation agreements concluded by the EU with European non-member states, see Phinne-
more (1999).
6 As an incentive for a negotiated two-state solution, the EU also offered Israel and Pal-
estine ‘a Special Privileged Partnership, which will ensure unprecedented economic,
political and security support for both parties in the event of a final status agreement’,
yet without specifying what this would mean in practice (Council of the EU 2014).
7 In its 1999 bill to Parliament regarding the ratification of the first package of bilateral
agreements, the Swiss Federal Council (1999: 6157) classified the civil aviation agree-
ment with the EU as a ‘partial integration agreement’ because Switzerland agreed to
take over relevant acquis whose application and interpretation would to some extent be
controlled by the EU institutions.
8 Monaco is part of the EU customs territory because of its customs union with France
and not as a result of a direct agreement with the EU. The Vatican is not part of the
EU’s customs union.
9 According to Article 128 EEA Agreement, the Swiss Confederation may at any time
still apply to become a contracting party.
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2 Privileged partnerships
The partner countries’ (institutional)
perspectives
Georges Baur
Introduction: principles of privileged partnerships1

This chapter looks at a series of ‘privileged partnership’ agreements concluded
by the European Union (EU), mainly at the institutional aspects including the
homogeneity principle. In doing so, it adopts the understanding of privileged
partnership presented in Chapter 1, namely that the partnerships are, first, by def-
inition privileged in that through formal, legally binding agreements they provide
for an institutionalized relationship involving extensive reciprocal rights and
obligations, acquis adoption, policy cooperation and integration. Second, privi-
leged partnerships involve extensive institutional arrangements for governing the
relationship. Moreover, they may also be understood as forms of external differ-
entiated integration where outsiders adopt EU rules, mainly because they lack
the capacity and/or the willingness to fully integrate.2
Given this understanding of privileged partnerships as forms of external
differentiated integration, this chapter excludes two groups of agreements from
its analysis: free trade agreements (FTAs) and pre-accession or Stabilization and
Association Agreements (SAAs). The former are part of the EU’s Common
Commercial Policy and therefore – a priori – do not necessarily aim at EU inte-
gration understood here as ‘the obligation for the partner country to apply,
implement or incorporate in its domestic legal order a predetermined selection of
EU acquis’ (Van der Loo 2016: 28). Of course, FTAs have increasingly been
used by the EU in its neighbourhood policy with a view to exporting EU rules
and fostering market integration, for instance in the Association Agreements
(including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas [DCFTAs]) with Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia. Here, however, the reference is to ‘normal’ FTAs outside
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), such as with South Korea,
Mexico or Canada. In some cases, and under certain conditions, they may grant
access to the EU’s internal market. Under no circumstances, however, is parti-
cipation in the internal market obtained through a free trade agreement.
Put simply, participation in the EU’s internal market grants partner countries
treatment as if they were EU member states (Emerson 2016: 3). The legal basis
generally is an association agreement according to Article 217 TFEU, and it
typically covers the four freedoms as well as competition and other relevant
24 Georges Baur
p olicies. A level playing field is guaranteed by applying the internal market
acquis. A conditio sine qua non is an institutional set-up of an at least partly
‘quasi-supranational’ character, as will be shown later in this chapter.
By contrast, access to the EU’s internal market only provides the EU’s FTA
partner countries with an improved market access under what is commonly
known in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as ‘WTO+’ terms, like no or
lower tariffs, as well as a reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade or the recogni-
tion of professional qualifications etc. Here the legal basis normally is Article
207 TFEU. Enterprises from such FTA partner countries can only expect equi-
valent treatment compared to enterprises from within the internal market as far
as there is no contradicting internal market legislation. They can, for instance,
invest freely as ‘all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member
States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited’
(Article 63(1) TFEU). They have, however, no possibility to obtain financial ser-
vices passports for the whole of the internal market or the right to cabotage in
transport between states within the internal market. And, normally, in such FTAs
there is no elaborate institutional framework.
Switzerland is a case in between, as it only participates in the internal market to
a limited extent. It has obtained that participation through a number of sectoral
agreements of relevance to the internal market, e.g. on free movement of persons.
In the other areas, it only has access to the internal market under FTA or WTO
conditions (see also Höltschi 2017). And, again, there is, to date, no compre-
hensive institutional set-up (Oesch 2018: 27). This is the main reason why, until
now, the EU only grants Switzerland access, but no participation in the internal
market in those areas which are not covered by a specific market access
agreement.
Pre-accession agreements and SAAs, which both aim at eventual EU mem-
bership of the associated country, can be excluded from the analysis. Such agree-
ments are ‘notionally temporally limited’ and accession to the EU does not allow
for any differentiated integration.
This all fits with Maresceau’s (2013: 152–153) and Van der Loo’s (2016: 28)
understanding of ‘integration agreements’. Such agreements are association
agreements based on Article 217 TFEU.3 Although there is no agreed typology
of association agreements, various types can be identified. Four groups of associ-
ation agreements are considered here: first, those covering the non-EU Western
European countries; second, those having developed from the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy as with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; third, the special case
of Turkey; and fourth, and as far as it will not be covered under the first cat-
egory, the future agreement between the EU and the UK.
The first group includes countries which are, in principle, capable of joining
the EU, but which, for different reasons, do not wish to do so. They are all
democratic Western European states with developed economies. While having
no interest in joining the EU, they are, however, interested in the closest possible
trade relations and in obtaining (partial or sectoral) access to or (fully) participat-
ing in the EU’s internal market.
Privileged partnerships 25
Although the EU does not pay particular interest to such terminological
differences, there is a clear distinction to be made between ‘access to’ the
internal market and ‘participating in’ it. Switzerland only participates in the
internal market with regard to free movement of persons and air transport.
However, Switzerland does not participate in the internal market with regard to
free movement of goods (except for those which are covered by the mutual
recognition agreement), nor in the internal market for capital or services, except
for those covered by the Agreement on Free Movement of Persons (AFMP). In
these areas it does, however, have access to the internal market according to
FTA or WTO terms. Furthermore, Switzerland only has (partial) access where
the EU grants such access. For example, through equivalence decisions in the
field of financial services.
Also, EU–Switzerland relations lack a comprehensive institutional frame-
work. This leads to an overall different treatment by the EU than Switzerland’s
fellow EFTA members – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The latter are,
through membership of the EEA, for example, exempt from EU safeguard meas-
ures regarding steel products, whereas Switzerland is not (European Commis-
sion 2018a). The EU terms its EFTA partners ‘non-EU Western European’
(Council of the EU 2018: 1) and includes alongside them the small-sized states
of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino (the so-called AMS states). Both Switzer-
land and the AMS states are in the process of rearranging their relations with the
EU.4 In late 2018 the EU and Switzerland concluded negotiations on a draft
institutional framework agreement covering existing and future bilateral market
access agreements (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2018). The
EU’s negotiations with the AMS states on ‘one or several association agree-
ments’ are still ongoing (Council of the EU 2018: para 34).
The second group of agreements are the association agreements, mainly
developed from Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with ENP countries,
especially those with the EU’s Eastern Partnership neighbours. Essentially, rela-
tions with these countries are being developed without a membership per-
spective. EU membership at a later stage cannot be excluded and will mostly
depend on geopolitical developments and fulfilment of membership criteria. The
focus is on the countries with which the EU has currently concluded an associ-
ation agreement: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Of these the EU–Ukraine
Association Agreement shall be taken as an example. It is the most prominent
because of the sheer size of Ukraine and the current geopolitical situation.5
Third, there is the EU–Turkey Association Agreement. While Turkey may be
a candidate country and to some extent also participates in some EU pro-
grammes, its Association Agreement essentially entails a (partial) customs union
with the EU and involves some elements of market access through free move-
ment of goods and – although quite limited – free movement of workers (see e.g.
Article 6(1) of Association Council Decision 1/80; Groenendijk, Hoffmann and
Luiten 2013: 11, 49–112). The Ankara Agreement also contains institutions to
oversee and manage its functioning. Furthermore, Turkey aims at negotiating
better access to the EU’s internal market by modernizing its customs union.6
26 Georges Baur
Fourth, the chapter also considers the future UK–EU relationship. Comparing
the already existing partnerships provides valuable insights into possible future
UK–EU arrangements. Assuming path dependence, any agreement should follow
known models. It seems, at this point in time, rather unlikely that negotiations
will lead to a ‘bespoke agreement’ (Guardian 2017), at least not in the sense that
something absolutely different from existing agreements will result. It is much
more realistic to assume that a future UK–EU agreement will follow the scope,
structure, general content and the institutional set-up of one or other agreements
in force or being negotiated (Emerson 2016: 1). This is also suggested by the
EU’s chief negotiator’s comparison of the UK negotiating ‘red lines’ with avail-
able models (European Commission, 2017). For the sake of grouping, the agree-
ments between the EU and the non-EU Western European countries shall be
called West European Association Agreements (WEAAs). If the future UK–EU
agreement is going to be an association agreement at all, it is most likely to be
part of this group as well. None of these countries is seeking to join the EU.
What is to be understood by institutions? Here, the meaning is broader than the
EU’s institutions, such as the Commission or the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU).
It suffices, however, to define institutions as ‘the more enduring features of social
life’ (Giddens 1984: 24). They can be either structures or practices (see Miller
2014). Hence, it is not only formal or embodied structures, such as courts and com-
mittees and so on that can be regarded as institutions, but also institutionalized prac-
tices, mechanisms and principles as, for example, methods of interpretation.
As any initial review of the EU’s privileged partnerships already shows, there
is certainly not one model for the institutional elements of an association agree-
ment. Essentially, institutions can be found in any international agreement, and
the most basic ones in FTAs. These mostly contain a body that, once the agree-
ment is in force, agrees on amendments, supervises its functioning and tries to
resolve disputes if the need arises. Such ‘joint committees’ are political bodies
where the contracting parties meet as equals. Solutions are subject to the mere
willingness of the parties (e.g. Article 31 of the 1960 EFTA Convention).
In newer generation agreements, dispute resolution is sometimes handed to an
arbitration body which is the first step to a judicial solution out of the parties’
hands. This is about how far states, in a bilateral or even multilateral arrange-
ment, are willing to go without compromising their sovereignty (e.g. Article 48
of the 2002 EFTA Convention).The more sophisticated an agreement, the more
sophisticated the institutional set-up tends to be.7 Hence, at the other end of the
spectrum of agreements, the EEA is certainly the most sophisticated agreement
as it provides for the respective associated countries’ participation in the EU’s
internal market, essentially with the same conditions, rights and duties as if they
were EU member states (Emerson 2016: 3) and with a similar set of institutions.
In exploring the institutional dimension of the EU’s privileged partnerships,
this chapter deals first with the question of whether there is an ‘institutional
standard’, i.e. whether the EU in its privileged partnerships insists on the same
institutional arrangements in order to safeguard the functioning of the different
agreements. Second, the standard – as far as there is one – is compared with the
respective content of the various privileged partnerships being considered here.
Finally, there is a short analysis of the result of this comparison. The chapter
finds that the EU appears to be pursuing a standardized approach, yet it can only
partially impose its institutional ‘programme’ on the neighbouring countries,
which has various implications for the quality of access to and integration into
the EU’s internal market.
A common EU approach under institutional aspects

The institutional benchmark8 for the WEAAs is the EEA Agreement. This is the
view of commentators (see Chapter 1; Baur 2016: 46) and the official view of
the EU (Council of the EU 2012: para 33). It was also very clear when the EU’s
Brexit chief negotiator presented the possible agreements the UK could seek in
light of its government’s ‘red lines’ (TF 50 2017): the slide presented by Michel
Barnier showed a descending staircase whereby the different agreements are
shown in relation to the EU. Each step down symbolizes the degree to which the
(institutional) link with the EU becomes looser. The EU is followed by the EEA,
Switzerland, Ukraine and Turkey. With regard to every agreement the slide men-
tions the UK government’s ‘red lines’, and the conclusion is that – short of ‘no
deal’ – only an FTA, such as the one between the EU and South Korea or
between the EU and Canada, is available. The question now is to what extent
there is also a range or spectrum available with regard to institutions.
The EEA Agreement is, until now, the only association agreement that provides
for an ‘economically integrated entity with a single market [sic], based on common
rules between its members’ (Court of Justice of the EU 2013: para 78). This, of
course, refers to the substantial areas covered, but also to the institutions.9 In this
respect, the EEA Agreement is a legally binding agreement establishing an institu-
tionalized relationship involving extensive institutional arrangements for govern-
ing the relationship between the EU and the EEA EFTA states. The two main
features of the Agreement are the so-called two-pillar structure and the homogen-
eity principle. The EU’s institutions are to some extent replicated on the EFTA
side by the two-pillar structure to safeguard parallel decision-making among the
EEA EFTA states before they meet at different levels with the EU in the joint
bodies such as the EEA Joint Committee to decide on new legal acts to be incorp-
orated into the EEA Agreement. The EFTA Surveillance Authority mirrors the
Commission and the EFTA Court mirrors the CJEU. The homogeneity principle –
in essence – is the principle that both the incorporation of new law into the EEA
Agreement needs to happen ‘as closely as possible to the adoption by the Com-
munity [sic]’ (Article 102(1) EEA) and that its interpretation should be ‘as uniform
… as possible’ (Article 105(1) EEA).
The EEA Agreement is the only association agreement that is multilateral, cov-
ering two groups of countries.10 They meet in the joint bodies with each group
having one voice. The EU member states coordinate their positions in their institu-
tions (Working Groups, the Committee of Permanent Representatives
[COREPER], Council). In the joint bodies of the EEA, the EU is then represented
28 Georges Baur
by the European External Action Service (EEAS). Such ‘discipline’ for the
purpose of decision-making in the EEA Agreement had to be introduced on the
EFTA side as well. Hence, the EEA EFTA states must ‘speak with one voice’
(Article 93(2) EEA). The process is, however, of an intergovernmental rather than
a supranational nature. This requirement that the EEA EFTA states speak with one
voice is the precondition for the functioning of the two-pillar structure. From this
also follows that membership in the EEA can only be through membership of
either the EU or EFTA.
The EU’s theoretical benchmark …

In the late 1980s, when EU non-members sought to participate in the internal
market, the classical approach between sovereign states had to change in several
respects. This was not, as in the case of FTAs, any more about mutually granting
rights and privileges. The EU allowed for the participation of non-members in
‘its’ market based on the 1987 ‘Interlaken principles’. These state that: (1) Com-
munity (Union) integration comes first; (2) the autonomy of Community (Union)
decision-making must be preserved; and (3) there needs to be a balance between
benefits and obligations (De Clercq 1987: 6). Hence, there is no room for shared
decision-making and/or external control of the internal market. Interested third
countries need to not only commit to abide by EU rules, but also follow regu-
latory developments within the market, for instance by adopting new legislation
so as to ensure that they are bound by generally the same substantial rules as EU
member states. Relations thus become unbalanced with, essentially, a rule-
making and a rule-taking party. If it were left to a political body like a joint com-
mittee alone to decide on the adoption of legal acts, supervising their application
as well as the resolution of disputes, such an agreement might easily become
unworkable. It would only need one party to delay or block discussions. More
recently, the EU has reinforced its Interlaken principles by committing to ‘a con-
sistent approach towards non-EU partners that participate in the extended
Internal Market and are equated with EU member states for the purposes of this
participation’ (Council of the EU 2014: para 14).
Therefore, in the context of the negotiations on a framework agreement with
Switzerland and the association agreement(s) with the AMS states, the EU has
insisted on certain conditions (European Commission 2012: 18) and essentially
taken the EEA Agreement as its benchmark (Council of the EU 2012: 6). Impor-
tantly, the EU has repeatedly made clear that it expects the following four hori-
zontal conditions as well as the homogeneity principle to be included in any
framework agreement in order to ensure ‘legal certainty for authorities, operators
and individual citizens’ (Council of the EU 2010: para 42).
The first condition is that there has to be a ‘dynamic’ approach to the relation-
ship, i.e. the adoption of new legislation occurs at regular intervals, which leads
to a huge increase of joint committee meetings. Due to their frequency and the
need to act at a much quicker pace than in classical agreements and because
these decisions have a direct impact on national legislation, conflicts may arise
with the democratic process in some of the states, especially if the national con-
stitutional requirement includes referendums. This can cause delays in decision-
making.
Second, independent surveillance and, third, judicial enforcement should
ensure that the associated country or countries effectively abide by the rules.
These institutions should also be international (Council of the EU 2012: 6).
Hence, a national supervisory body and a national legal institution for enforce-
ment will not suffice. Fourth, dispute settlement is the tool to settle disputes
between the contracting parties to an agreement, but it does not give individuals
and economic operators access to supranational justice.
Finally, if non-members participate in the internal market, there needs to be a
‘homogeneous interpretation of the agreements’ (ibid.). This is closely linked to
the first horizontal condition, namely the dynamic adaptation of the agreement.
The homogeneity principle does not, however, only encompass the incorporated
acquis, but also the future acquis to be incorporated. Furthermore, it also applies
to the jurisprudence of the CJEU.
… checked against practice

The chapter now turns to the question of how the four horizontal conditions and
the homogeneity principle have been applied by the EU by considering the exist-
ing and planned WEAAs as well as the EU–Ukraine and the EU–Turkey Associ-
ation Agreements.
As a general remark with regard to Switzerland, it needs to be said that cur-
rently there is ‘no institutional framework applicable across the board’ (Oesch
2018: 27). Only a few of the Bilateral Agreements contain institutional provi-
sions. The EU has been criticizing this for over ten years. From 2014 to 2018
Switzerland and the EU negotiated an ‘umbrella agreement’ with a view to
establishing an institutional framework to oversee their relations. It also needs to
be noted that the institutional conditions are of a much higher importance in the
WEAAs compared to the EU’s agreements with Ukraine and Turkey. This is due
to their different aims. While the WEAAs should ultimately involve participa-
tion in the internal market, this is less obviously the case for the agreements with
Ukraine and Turkey. Their aim is more political and arguably directed at ulti-
mately joining the EU.
The five elements of the EU’s theoretical benchmark will now be looked at
with regard to their incorporation (or not) in the different agreements.
Dynamic approach
The ‘benchmark’ of the EEA Agreement involves a sophisticated institutional
arrangement to achieve the dynamic incorporation of new EU law. Unique
among international agreements, the EEA Agreement foresees the preparation of
so-called Joint Committee Decisions (JCDs) which serve as the legal basis on
which EU legal acts are transposed into EEA law. The dynamic element is the
30 Georges Baur
regular and – compared to ‘old style’ international agreements – much better
structured and more intense calendar of meetings that allows for amending the
Agreement as closely as possible to the adoption of corresponding EU legis-
lation ‘with a view to permitting a simultaneous application’ (Article 102(1)
EEA). This has, over the last 25 years, worked well. However, there is a certain
‘backlog’, i.e. a delay in adopting new legislation in the EEA that has built up
(Baur 2016: 60).11
With regard to Switzerland, however, it is only the Schengen and Dublin
agreements with the EU as well as the Agreement on Customs Facilitation and
Security that contain provisions on their own adaptation (Oesch 2018: 42–43).
These adaptations are discussed in the respective joint committees. From the
Swiss point of view, this has the advantage that changes cannot be imposed by
the EU. Furthermore, Switzerland is – for now – in a position where it can delay,
and de facto block, unwanted amendments. A prominent example is the so-called
Union Citizenship Directive 2004/38 that Switzerland – despite the EU’s
insistence – has refused to incorporate into the AFMP.
The EU’s current customs union agreements with Andorra and San Marino
are governed by a joint committee and therefore ‘static’. The more recent EU
monetary agreements with the AMS states, introducing the Euro as a legal tender
and allowing them to mint Euro coins, are, in short, fully integrating the three
states, albeit without any participation rights in decision-making processes.
These agreements are automatically updated whenever there is an update by the
EU of the relevant acquis. The sole EU concession to the AMS states is that
appropriate delays to the implementation of new measures may be agreed in the
joint committee. From the AMS states’ point of view, given the asymmetry of
power, this was the price to pay if they wanted to adopt the Euro. The draft
association agreement(s) with the AMS states, however, foresee dynamic
amendments of the agreements.12
Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU also contains provisions to
ensure its correct implementation. A key provision in the DCFTA sets out the
concept of gradual approximation of Ukraine’s legislation to EU norms and
standards. Specific timelines are included and vary between two and ten years
from the entry into force of the agreement. Another guiding provision sets out
the concept of dynamic approximation for additions to the acquis.13 This ‘double
step approach’ for adopting new acquis and for the updating of acquis already
adopted reflects Ukraine’s still very basic approximation to the internal market.
From Ukraine’s perspective, this allows it to keep pace with the EU, but in a
proportionate way, taking account of Ukraine’s capacity to carry out the approx-
imation. However, whether this meets the understanding of ‘dynamism’ as in the
EEA is questionable (Van der Loo 2016: 302).
Then there is the case of Turkey. According to Article 53(3) of the Ankara
Agreement, the Joint Committee meets ‘as a general rule’ at least once a month.
This frequency as well as the consultation and decision-making procedures
agreed in 1995 suggest a dynamic adaptation process comparable to the EEA
Agreement, even if this is not expressly mentioned. Indeed, according to Article
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Size Number Size Number Size Number
Inches of Pieces Inches of Pieces Inches of Pieces
6 × 12 533 9 × 16 246 14 × 20 121
7 × 12 457 10 × 16 221 11 × 22 138
8 × 12 400 9 × 18 213 12 × 22 126
9 × 12 355 10 × 18 192 13 × 22 116
7 × 14 374 11 × 18 174 14 × 22 108
8 × 14 327 12 × 18 160 12 × 24 114
9 × 14 291 10 × 20 169 13 × 24 105
10 × 14 261 11 × 20 154 14 × 24 98
8 × 16 277 12 × 20 141 16 × 24 86
In Table XII is given a list of the different colors of slate used in the Eastern and Middle
States, the quarries from which they are obtained, and the cost of slate, labor, etc. per
square, pertaining to each variety. The prices in the table are based on the 8 in. × 12 in. or 9
in. × 18 in. sizes, thickness five to 1 inch, and for quantities of not less than 50 squares. The
cost of labor, etc. being based on current prices in the aforementioned territory.
Slate ¼ inch thick cost about 20 per cent. more than the five to 1 inch for the material,
and about 5 per cent. more for laying and freight.
Slate ⅜ inch thick cost about 45 per cent. more than the five to 1 inch for the material,
and about 15 per cent. more for laying and freight.
When copper nails are specified obtain current prices.
TABLE XII
APPROXIMATE COST OF SLATING,
PER SQUARE
Cost of Laying,
Cost of Slate Total Cost,
Including
Classification F. O. B. Exclusive of
Roofing Felt,
Quarries Builder’s Profit
and Freight
Black Slate
Brownville, Maine $8.00 $5.00 $13.00
Monson, Maine 7.00 5.00 12.00
Peach Bottom, Pennsylvania 5.50 4.00 9.50
Chapman (Hard Vein), Pennsylvania 4.50 3.50 8.00
Bangor, Pennsylvania 4.50 3.50 8.00
Lehigh, Pennsylvania 4.00 3.50 7.50
Buckingham, Virginia 3.75 4.00 7.75
Red Slate
Vermont 12.00 4.25 16.25
Green Slate
Vermont 5.50 4.25 9.75
Purple Slate
Vermont 5.00 4.25 9.25
Mottled Slate
Vermont (Purple and Green) 4.00 4.25 8.25
59. Sheet-Metal Roofs.—In estimating sheet-metal roofs, the hips and valleys are
measured extra their entire length by 1 foot in width, to compensate for increased labor and
waste of material in cutting and laying. Gutters and conductor pipes, or leaders, are
measured by the linear foot, 1 foot extra being added for each angle. All flashings and
crestings are measured by the linear foot. No deductions are made for openings (chimneys,
skylights, ventilators, or dormer-windows) if they are less than 50 square feet in area; if
between 50 and 100 square feet, one-half the area is deducted; if over 100 square feet, the
whole opening is deducted. An extra charge is made for labor and waste of material to flash
around openings.
60. There are two regular sizes of roofing plates, namely, 20 in. × 28 in. and 14 in. × 20
in. The larger size is generally used on common work, owing to the fact that it requires fewer
seams on the roof and consequently cheapens the cost of laying. A third size, namely, 10 in.
× 20 in., is also supplied, and is used generally for gutters and leader pipes. Sheets 10 in. X
14 in. are sometimes used for laying roofs, as they can be cleated better than the larger
sizes. Such small sheets, however, cost more to lay.
Two thicknesses of roofing plates are commonly recognized. One is the IC, or No. 29
gauge, and weighs 8 ounces to the square foot; the other is the IX, or No. 27 gauge, and
weighs 10 ounces to the square foot. Sometimes, a still heavier plate is called for, and it is
therefore kept in stock by the best manufacturers. This plate is known as IXX, or No. 26
gauge, and is used for especially heavy work.
Formerly, the standard net weight per box of IC, 14" × 20" roofing tin was 112 pounds, or
1 pound per sheet, making 112 sheets to the box; but now this weight is reduced to 108
pounds. The old standard for IX plates was 140 pounds, but very few brands now weigh
more than 135 pounds per box. The most reliable manufacturers guarantee the weights for
the different boxes of tin, and if the material does not come up to the guaranteed weight, it
can be returned. The best sheets in the market today are stamped with the mark of the
brand and the designation IC or IX of the thickness.
61. Using standing joints, a 14" × 20" sheet of roofing tin will cover about 235 square
inches of surface, or one box of such tin will cover about 182 square feet. With a flat, lock
seam, a sheet will cover 255 square inches, allowing ⅜ inch all around for joints; or a box
will lay 198 square feet. These figures make no allowance for waste.
Two good workmen can put on from 250 to 300 square feet of tin roofing per day of 8
hours; this also includes painting the outside of the tin. Tin roofing will cost from 8 to 10
cents per square foot, depending on the quality of material and workmanship.
62. Tile Roofs.—Since tile roofs are constructed of so many styles of tile, no general
rules of measurement can be given. Every piece of work must be estimated according to the
particular kind of tile used and the number of sizes and patterns. Information on all these
points is to be found in the catalogs of tile manufacturers.
TABLE XIII
APPROXIMATE COST OF ROOF TILING,
PER SQUARE
Cost of Laying, Total Cost,
Cost of Tile
Classification Including Exclusive of
Delivered
Ashphalt Felt Builder’s Profit
Shingle tile (rectangular), 6" × 12" $13.00 $ 7.50 $20.50
Cost of Laying, Total Cost,
Cost of Tile
Classification Including Exclusive of
Delivered
Ashphalt Felt Builder’s Profit
Shingle tile (rectangular), 8" × 12" 14.00 6.50 20.50
Shingle tile (geometric shapes) 12.00 7.00 19.00
Conosera (interlocking), 8" × 12" 14.00 5.50 19.50
Conosera (interlocking), 10" × 15" 12.00 5.00 17.00
Conosera, combination 8" × 12" and 2" × 12" 16.50 8.00 24.50
French A (interlocking), size 10" × 15" 12.00 5.00 17.00
Spanish, 8" × 12" 13.00 6.50 19.50
Old Spanish, semicircular, channels 22.50 10.00 32.50
laid alternately, concave and convex
Roman, pan and semicircular roll, 17.00 8.00 25.00
laid 7½ in. center to center of rolls
Greek, pan and semihexagonal cap, 17.00 8.00 25.00
laid 7½ in. center to center of caps
Promenade for flat roofs, laid on 5 layers 7.00 13.00 20.00
of asphalt felt in asphalt pitch
In Table XIII is given a list of the prevailing styles of roof tiling, the cost of tiling, labor, etc.
per square, pertaining to each variety. The prices in the table are based on the natural red
color of the clay when burnt; extra prices are asked for glazed-surface finish which can be
obtained in different colors. The prices in the table are based on quantities of not less than
30 squares, as less than a minimum carload means increased freight rates. The prices given
cover railroad delivery to points in the Eastern and Middle States. Labor, etc. being based on
current prices.
The above prices are figured on the tile being laid on wooden sheathing; if laid on book
tile or cement add 20 per cent.
If copper nails are used, care must be taken in figuring the number of nails, as well as
their length and gauge, for the special forms of tile specified. Fluctuating values of copper
make this an item of much importance.
Ridges, hip rolls, barge tile, and finials are charged as extras and due allowance must be
made for cutting at valleys and hips.
63. Gravel Roofs.—In gravel roofing, the cost per square depends on the number of
thicknesses of tarred felt and the quantity of pitch used per square. A value of 4 cents per
square foot for four thicknesses may be considered an average.
ROOF MENSURATION
64. While a knowledge of how to apply the ordinary principles of mensuration is all that is
necessary to calculate any roof area, yet the modern house, with its numerous gables and
irregular surfaces, introduces complications that render some further explanation of roof
measurement desirable. The most common error made in figuring roofs—and one that
should be carefully guarded against—is that of using the apparent length of slopes, as
shown by the plan or side elevations, instead of the true length, as obtained from the end
elevations.
Fig. 6
65. The area of a plain gable roof, as shown in end and side elevations in Fig. 6, is found
by multiplying the length g j by the slope length b d, and further multiplying by 2, for both
sides. The area of each gable is found by multiplying the width of the gable a d by the
altitude c b, and dividing by 2.
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9
66. In Fig. 7 is shown the plan and elevation of a hip roof, having a deck z. The pitch of
the roof being the same on each side, the line c d shows the true length of the common
rafter l m.
In Fig. 8 is shown the method of developing the true lengths of the hips and the true size
of one side of the roof. Let a b c d represent the same lines as the corresponding ones in
Fig. 7. From the line a d, Fig. 8, through b and c, draw perpendiculars, as g h and e f; lay off
from g and e on these lines, the length of the common rafter c d, Fig. 7, and draw the lines a
h and d f, Fig. 8; then the figure a h f d will represent the true shape and size of the side of
the roof shown in the elevation in Fig. 7. The area of the triangle d e f is equal to the area of
the triangle a g h or a similar triangle a i h. Hence, the portion of the roof a h f d is equal in
area to the rectangle a i f e, the length of which is half the sum of the eave and deck lengths,
while its breadth is the length of a common rafter.
67. A method of obtaining the lengths of valley rafters, applicable also to hip rafters, is
shown in Fig. 9, which is the plan of a hip-and-gable roof. To ascertain the length of the
valley rafter a b, draw the line a c perpendicular to a b and equal in length to the altitude of
the gable; then draw the line c b, which will represent the true length of the valley rafter a b.
68. As an example of roof mensuration, the number of square feet of surface on the roof
shown in Fig. 10 will be calculated.
Fig. 10
The area of the triangular portion a c b is equal to the slope length of d c (found by laying
off c′ c equal to the height of the ridge above the eaves and drawing c′ d) multiplied by the
length of the eaves line a b and divided by 2. Multiplying the dimensions 13.5 feet and 23
feet, respectively, and dividing by 2, the area is found to be 155.3 square feet.
The area of the trapezoid g f i h is half the sum of f i and g h (shown in their true length
on the plan) multiplied by the true length of h i. The latter is found by marking the height of
the gable i i′ on the ridge line, and drawing the line i′ h, which measures 10.6 feet.
Performing these operations, there results
5 + 14
× 10.6 = 100.7 square feet
2
for each side, or 201.4 square feet for both. As each of the side gables is the same size, the
area of the two roofs is 201.4 × 2 = 402.8 square feet.
The area of the polygon q p n k is equal to the triangle q p w minus the triangle k n w, the
area covered by the intersecting gable roof. The former is equal to the triangle a c b, the
area of which is 155.3 square feet. The area of k n w is equal to half of n w, or 6.5 feet,
multiplied by the true length of k s or the altitude of the triangle; the latter is obtained by
laying off k k′ equal to the height of the gable, 5.5 feet, at right angles to k s, and drawing s
k′, which is the required altitude and which measures almost 7.4 feet. Then k n w = 6.5 × 7.4
= 48.1 square feet; whence q p n k equals 155.3 - 48.1 = 107.2 square feet.
The area of a p q c is
ap+qc
2
multiplied by the true slope length of t v, or t v′, which measures 15.2 feet. Substituting
dimensions, the area is found to be
6 + 24
× 15.2 = 228 square feet.
2
From this deduct the area of y z u, which is the portion covered by the intersecting gable
roof. The true length of t u along the slope is t u′, measuring 12 feet; hence, the area of y z u
is
14 × 12
= 84 square feet.
2
The net area of a p q c is therefore 228 - 84 = 144 square feet; b c q w being equal to a p
q c, its area is the same, making the area of both sides 288 square feet.
The area of k n m l is
mn+lk
× m l′,
2
the slope length of m l. Substituting dimensions, the area is
11 + 16
× 8.5 = 114.8 square feet.
2
As k l x w is equal to k n m l, the area of both is 229.6 square feet.
Adding the partial areas thus obtained, the sum is 155.3 + 402.8 + 107.2 + 288 + 229.6 =
1,182.9 square feet, or approximately 11.9 squares.
PLASTERING
69. Plastering on plain surfaces, such as walls and ceilings, is always measured by the
square yard. In determining the cost of plastering walls and ceilings, measure the surface
actually plastered, making no deduction for grounds or for openings less than 7 superficial
yards. For surfaces of domes or groined ceilings, beams, coves, paneling, etc., a unit price
is fixed by the linear or the superficial foot, according to the character and disposition of the
work. Round corners and arrises should be measured by the linear foot.
On interior work, increase the price 5 per cent. for each 12 feet above the floor after the
first. For outside work, add 1 per cent. for each foot above the lower 20 feet. All repairing
and patching should be done at agreed prices.
70. Stucco Work.—In estimating stucco work, cornices composed of plain members
and panel work are measured by the square foot. Enriched cornices with carved moldings
are measured by the linear foot. When moldings are less than 12 inches in circumference,
measurement is taken by the linear foot; when over 12 inches, superficial measurement is
used. For internal angles or miters, add 1 foot to the length of cornice, and for exterior
angles add 2 feet to the length. Sections of cornice less than 12 inches measure as 12
inches. Add one-half for raking cornices.
For cornices or moldings abutted against a wall or plain surface, add 1 foot to the length
of cornice; if against the soffit of stairs or other inclined or covered surface, add 2 feet to the
length of cornice. Octagonal, hexagonal, and similar cornices, less than 10 feet in single
stretches, take one and one-half times the length.
For circular or elliptical work, charge double price; for domes and groins, three prices.
Enrichments of all kinds should be estimated at an agreed price.
71. Cost of Plastering.—The following analysis of the cost of plastering for 100 square
yards, for both three-coat and two-coat work, will be of assistance in making estimates.
These costs are exclusive of the lathing, which will be taken up later.
Cost of 100 Square Yards of

Three-Coat Plastering
Scratch Coat
6 bushels of lime, at 25 cents per bushel $ 1.50
9 pounds of hair, at 4 cents per pound .36
¾ cubic yard of sand, at $1.50 per cubic yard 1.13
5 hours, plasterer’s time, at 50 cents per hour 2.50
5 hours, laborer’s time, at 25 cents per hour 1.25
Total $ 6.74
Brown Coat
1 cubic yard of sand, at $1.50 per cubic yard 1.50
6½ hours, laborer’s time, at 25 cents per hour 1.63
Total $11.25
Finishing Coat
3½ bushels of finishing lime, at 35 cents per bushel $ 1.23
½ barrel of plaster of Paris, at $1.75 per barrel .88
⅜ bushel of white sand, at 27 cents per bushel .10
4½ hours, laborer’s time, at 25 cents per hour 1.13
Total $12.34
The total cost of 100 square yards of three-coat plaster, then, is $30.33, or about 31
cents per yard.
Cost of 100 Square Yards of

Two-Coat Plastering
Brown Coat
1¼ cubic yards of sand, at $1.50 per cubic yard 1.88
8 hours, laborer’s time, at 25 cents per hour 2.00
Total $10.52
Finishing Coat
Same as given for three-coat work $12.34
The total cost of 100 square yards of two-coat plaster is therefore $22.86, or about 23
cents per square yard.
LATHING
72. Lathing is measured by the superficial, or square, yard, no openings under 7

superficial yards being deducted.
Plastering laths are about 1¾ inches wide, ¼ inch thick, and usually 4 feet long, the
studding being generally placed 12 or 16 inches on centers, so that the ends of the laths
may be nailed to them. The laths are usually set from ¼ to ⅜ inch apart, requiring about 1½,
1⁷/₁₆, or 1⅜ four-foot laths, respectively, to cover 1 square foot.
For a fair grade of work, a man will lay on an average about 15 bundles, or 1,500 laths,
per day. The price usually paid for laying laths is 25 cents a bundle.
In the following analysis is given the cost of lathing 100 square yards of surface:
Cost of Lathing 100 Square Yards

14⁴/₁₀ bundles of laths, at 55 cents per bundle $ 7.92
9 pounds of threepenny nails, at $3.65 per hundred pounds .33
Putting on 14⁴/₁₀ bundles, at 25 cents per bundle 3.60
Total $11.85
The total cost of lathing 100 square yards is therefore $11.85, or about 12 cents per
square yard.
JOINERY
73. Joinery includes all the interior and exterior finish put in place after the framing and
covering are completed; as, for example, door and window frames, doors, baseboards,
paneling, wainscoting, stairs, etc. Most of these materials are worked at the mill and are
brought to the building ready to set in place.
74. Frames.—In taking off door and window frames, describe and state sizes. Measure
architraves by the running foot, giving width and thickness, whether molded or plain, and
state the number of plinth and corner blocks.
75. Sash.—For sash, state dimensions (giving the width first); thickness of the material,
molded or plain; style of check-rail and sill finish; thickness of sash bar; whether plain, single
or double-hung; and sizes (giving dimensions in inches) and number of lights. Use standard
sizes as much as possible.
76. Doors.—In taking off doors, describe and state the sizes and thicknesses, whether
the framing is stuck-molded, raised-molded, or plain; and number of panels, whether plain or
raised. Use stock sizes wherever possible and suitable. For special work, where doors are to
be veneered, state thickness of veneer, how cores are to be built, and the kind of wood to be
used.
77. Blinds.—Describe size and thickness of blinds; whether paneled or slatted (fixed or
movable), and whether molded or plain.
78. Baseboard and Beam Casings.—Measure the baseboard and beam casings by
the running foot, stating width and thickness of stuff, and whether molded or plain. When a
shoe is used for the base, so state; also, if a surbase is required, give particulars.
79. Wainscoting.—Measure wainscoting by the superficial foot. State kind of finish,
whether paneled or plain, and style of molding and panels. Wainscoting cap and base,
measure by the running foot.
80. Stairways.—Often stairways are taken by the contractor at so much per step,
complete according to specifications. In measuring stairways, take off the amount of rough
material in carriage timbers, and the planed lumber in treads, etc. Measure balustrades by
the linear foot. Give description of newels. Measure spandrel and stairway paneling the
same as wainscoting.
81. Inside Fixtures.—Kitchen dressers may be taken at a fixed price complete; or at a
fixed rate per square foot; or as dressed lumber, drawers and doors being taken separately.
Wardrobes, bookcases, mantels, and china closets should be treated separately, and a fixed
price stated.
82. Porches, Etc.—Porches, exterior balustrades, balconies, porte cochèrs, etc. may be
taken at a price per linear foot, or the actual quantity of material may be measured.
JOINERY DATA AND EXAMPLES
OF ESTIMATING COSTS
83. Molding.—Molded work that goes through the mill is usually charged for by the
square inch of section per foot in length. Thus, if the price is 1 cent per square inch of
section per foot in length, a molding ⅞ in. × 4¾ in. and 12 feet long will cost 60 cents,
because the section in the rough is 1 in. × 5 in., or 5 square inches. Therefore, 1 foot of this
molding will cost 5 cents, and 12 feet will cost 60 cents. This method of charging for molding,
however, is not altogether satisfactory, because it requires as much time to put a narrow
piece of molding through the molding machine as it does a wide piece, and a wide piece,
since it will have a larger sectional area, will bring a higher price.
A molding machine operates at different speeds, being run at a slow speed when cutting
hard woods and at a high speed when cutting soft woods. A machine will turn out from 900
to 4,800 linear feet of molding of any width per hour, the 900 feet representing the amount of
very hard wood run through the machine, and the 4,800 feet the amount of soft wood run
through when the machine is speeded up to its full capacity. The average output of a
machine, however, is about 3,000 feet per hour.
The cost of the machine with a man to operate it may be considered as 70 cents an hour
on an average, the man getting 30 cents per hour and the machine being charged for at the
rate of 40 cents per hour. Therefore, according to these figures, the cost of machining per
linear foot is only ⁷⁰₃3₀₀₀, or .023 of 1 cent. It will thus be seen that the actual cost of putting
molding through the machine, especially in large quantities, does not amount to much.
For this reason, especially in the eastern cities, it is cheaper to buy molding direct from
the lumber mill than to buy the rough material and then run it through the mill at its
destination. In nearly every instance the saving effected in putting the rough material through
the machine at its destination is more than counterbalanced by the extra cost of freight rates
due to the extra weight. For the same reason, in the eastern market today planed boards are
really as cheap as rough ones, because the planed boards are lighter and thus cost less
freight.
The cost of molding is governed almost entirely by the cost of the raw material, and is
always reckoned from a base price of 1 cent per square inch of section 1 foot long. On this
price a discount is given, depending on the kind of wood and the finish desired. At present
an average discount for soft woods, such as white pine, spruce, cypress, etc., is about 35
per cent. Thus, the actual cost of pine molding 1 foot long and 1 square inch in cross-section
is
35 65
1- = of 1 cent.
100 100
No discount is given on hard woods in many of the large eastern cities at present—oak,
birch, and the like being figured net. For walnut, mahogany, and other high-priced woods, a
special price is set, depending on the market and the local prices.
84. Cost of Window Frames and Windows.—The following is approximately the cost of
a window frame with two 28" × 28" lights, where all mill work is priced at ₆₅/₁₀₀ cent per
square inch per foot:
Cost of Window Frame

Jambs at head, ⁵/₄" × 5" × 16' $ .65
Sill, 2" × 5" × 4' 0" .26
Sub-sill, ⁵/₄" × 6" × 2' 9" .14
Blind stop, 1" × 2" × 16' 0" .21
Parting stop, ½" × 1" × 16' 0" .11
Outside casing, ⁵/₄" × 5" × 12' 0" .49
Head casing, ⁵/₄" × 7" × 4' 0" .23
Rabbeted cap, ⁵/₄" × 4" × 4' 0" .13
Molding under cap, 1" × 3½" × 4' 6" .11
Sill nosing, ⁵/₄" × 4" × 4' 0" .13
Inside casing, including apron, 1" × 5" × 20' 0" .65
Back band, ⁵/₄" × ⁵/₄" × 16' 0" .17
Inside stops, ½" × 2" × 14' 0" .10
Four sash pulleys, at 3 cents per pulley .12
Making frame, 1 hour, at 40 cents per hour .40
Total $3.90
The cost of setting and casing such a window frame is about 70 cents. The total cost of
the frame set in place is therefore $3.90 + .70 = $4.60.
The cost of the frame per square foot of light is therefore
$4.60 × 144
= 43 cents
2 × 28 × 28
85. The cost of an ordinary window with two 28" × 28" lights may be estimated as follows:
Cost of Sash in Place

Cost of two sash, ⁶/₄, double-hung, glazed
with single-thick American glass $2.10
Sash weights, 30 pounds, at 2 cents per pound .60
Cord, 22½ feet, at 1 cent per foot .23
Two sash lifts, at 5 cents each .10
Sash lock .15
Setting and hanging sash .35
Total $3.53
If double American instead of single American glass is used, the cost just given should
be increased by $1.
If the sash is glazed with single American glass, the cost per square foot of light will be
$3.53 × 144
= 33 cents.
2 × 28 × 28
Therefore, the total cost of window and frame in place is 43 + 33 = 76 cents per square
foot. If the sash is glazed with double American glass, the cost per square foot of light will be
$4.53 × 144 = 42 cents.
2 × 28 × 28
Therefore, in this case the total cost of window and frame will be 43 + 42 = 85 cents per
square foot.
For curved sash in curved walls, the cost is about twice as much as that of straight work.
86. Cost of Door Frames and Doors.—The following estimate represents the cost of an
ordinary door frame. All molded work is put in the estimate at 1 cent per square inch of
section per foot of length less 35-per-cent. discount, which is the same thing as ⁶⁵/₁₀₀ cent
per square inch of section per foot.
Cost of a 2' 8" × 6' 8" Door Frame in Place

17 linear feet of ⁵/₄" × 6" rabbeted jambs $ .83
36 linear feet of 1" × 5" casing 1.17
36 linear feet of 1" × 2" back band .47
Dadoing and smoothing jambs and casing,
1 hour, at 40 cents per hour .40
Nails .05
Setting up jambs and casing,,
3 hours at 40 cents per hour 1.20
Total $4.12
The area of the door is 2 ft. 8 in. × 6 ft. 8 in. = 17.78 square feet. Therefore, the cost of
the preceding door frame per square foot of door is $4.12 ÷ 17.78 = 23 cents.
87. The following estimate gives the cost of a door of moderate price. The size of this
door is 2 ft. 8 in. × 6 ft. 8 in. × ⁶/₄ in. It has four panels, is made of No. 1 pine, and is finished
with solid ogee molding.
Cost of Door in Place

Price of door $2.75
Setting door, putting on hinges and lock,
2 hours, at 40 cents per hour .80
1 pair of 4" × 4" japanned-steel butts .16
1 mortise lock, brass-face knobs and escutcheons .70
Total $4.41
If the door is provided with stuck molding instead of solid molding, it will cost about 50
cents more.
The area of the door is 2 ft. 8 in. × 6 ft. 8 in. = 17.78 square feet. The cost per square foot
is therefore $4.41 ÷ 17.78 = 25 cents. The total cost of door and frame per square foot of
door is therefore 25 + 23 = 48 cents.
88. The door just described has no transom. A transom 2 ft. 8 in. × 16 in., complete, will
cost about $1. The area of such a transom is 2 ft. 8 in. × 16 in. = 3⁵/₉ square feet. The cost
per square foot is therefore $1 ÷ 3⁵/₉ = 28 cents.
The prices just given are for solid pine doors. Veneered hardwood doors are usually
made to order. When the contractor bids on a house, the architect as a rule has not yet
detailed the veneered doors; therefore, the contractor is more or less uncertain as to what
will be required and usually puts in a price that he thinks will cover the cost. In the eastern
part of the United States, for a veneered door, with ¼-inch veneers built of staved-up cores,
a price of from 35 to 50 cents per square foot will be found adequate. This price does not of
course include the frame.
89. There is now on the market a ready-made, veneered birch door known as the
Korelock door. In using these doors, it is always cheaper to make the door frame of the
correct size to take stock-size doors. The price of these doors is quite reasonable. For a 2'
8" × 6' 8" × ⁶/₄" door, with six cross-panels, the price is $2.80 for ⅛-inch veneer; if the door is
⁷/₄ instead of ⁶/₄ inch, the price is $3.25. This price of course includes no hardware or frame.
A 2' 8" × 6' 8" × ⁶/₄" two-panel door costs $3.30, and if ⁷/₄ inch, it costs $3.75. A 2' 8" × 6' 8"
× 1⅜", half-glass door, with plain glass, costs $5.55; with art or lace glass, the price is $6.20.
This price includes the glass. If the door is 1¾ inches thick instead of 1⅜ inches, 65 cents
should be added to the two prices just stated.
A fair workman can hang, trim, and put hardware, including mortise lock, on about four
ordinary doors per day. For veneered doors, or those requiring extra care, not more than two
can be put in place in a day by one man.
90. Cost of Baseboards, Rails, and Moldings.—The cost of material and fitting in place
of baseboards may be estimated at 1³/₁₀ cents per square inch of section per linear foot.
This price is for pine; if hardwood is used, the price will be 2 cents. The same rule also
applies to chair rails, cap rails, and natural-finish picture moldings.
91. Cost of Paneling and Wainscoting.—Paneling may be estimated at 20 cents per
square foot for ⅞-inch pine; if over ⅞ inch, add simply for extra material. If the paneling is of
hardwood and veneered, add 50 per cent. to the price of pine.
Plain wainscoting may be estimated at 9 cents per square foot, the cap being figured
separately by the linear foot.
92. Cost of Stairs.—The cost per step for an ordinary stairway, constructed according to
the following specifications, is about $3.55. For a better class of work, about one-quarter
should be added to this price. Length of steps, 3 feet; tread, Georgia pine; riser, white pine;
open string, white pine; nosing and cove; dovetail balusters, square or turned; rail 2½ in. × 3
in.; 6-inch start newel, cherry; two 4-inch square angle newels, with trimmed caps and
pendants; simple easements, furred underneath for plastering; treads and risers tongued
together, housed into wall strings, wedged, glued, and blocked.
The material of such a stairway will cost about $1.84 per step. This rate includes landing
fascia and balustrade to finish on upper floor. The labor on the same, mill work and setting in
place, is about $1.71 per step. For example, for a stairs having 17 steps and landing
balustrade (including return, about 14 feet), the entire cost will be 17 × $3.55 = $60.35, of
which $31.28 will represent the cost of dressed lumber, including turned balusters and
newels and worked rail, and $29.07 will represent the cost of labor in housing strings,
cutting, mitering, and dovetailing steps, working easements, fitting and bolting rail, and
erecting stairway in building.
93. Cost of Verandas.—For small dwellings, it has been found by experience that a
veranda built according to the following specifications will cost about $3.75 per linear foot:
Width, 5 feet; posts, turned, set 6 or 8 feet on centers; floor timbers, 2 in. × 6 in.; flooring, ⅞-
inch white pine, sound grade; rafters, 2 in. × 4 in., dressed; purlins, 2 in. × 4 in., set 2 feet on
centers; roof sheathing, ⅞-inch white pine; box frieze and angle mold; angle and face
brackets; steps; no balustrade.
To include balustrade with 2-inch turned balusters, add about 60 cents per linear foot.
For a veranda built according to the following specifications, the cost will be about $6.75
per linear foot: Width, 8 feet; columns, 9-inch, turned; box pedestals; box cornice and gutter;
level ceiling; roof timbers, 2 in. × 6 in.; roof covered with matched boards; tin, a good grade;
floor timbers, 2 in. × 8 in.; floor, 1¼-inch white pine, second grade, with white-lead joints; no
balustrade.
Including balustrade, with 2½-inch turned balusters, rail, and base to suit, add 80 cents
per linear foot.
Where a portion of the veranda is segmental or semicircular, a close approximation to the
cost will be had if the circumference of the circular part is measured, and a rate fixed at twice
that for straight work of the same length. This applies to veranda framing, roofing, casing,
and balustrades.
STRUCTURAL STEEL
94. The price of structural steel varies continually as the steel market fluctuates. The
cost of erecting steel also varies continually and depends on the difficulties to be overcome.
Heavy steel work costs less per pound than light roof trusses and domes, because less shop
work is required in proportion to the weight. For average prices in the eastern part of the
United States, heavy steel may be taken at 3³/₁₀ cents per pound. Roof trusses, due to extra
framing, will cost about 3⁸/₁₀ cents per pound, and light, complicated dome work will cost 6½
cents per pound. These prices are for steel delivered and painted. To erect steel costs
anywhere from ½ to 2 cents per pound, depending on local conditions.
HEATING AND VENTILATING SYSTEM

95. Heating and ventilating work should be estimated as indicated in the following
paragraphs:
Estimate all pipes and fittings the same as for
plumbing. Sum up all standard radiators, and the price
per square foot of radiation. Figure special radiators
separately.
Itemize all valves, air vents, hangers, etc.
Estimate on pipe coverings by linear foot.
Estimate sheet-metal, indirect-radiator casings in
pounds.
Estimate sheet-metal flues and smoke pipes by the
linear foot; but estimate elbows and dampers
separately.
Estimate register boxes, registers, and borders
separately.
Make separate items of expansion tanks, hot-water
damper regulators, and furnace regulators.
Figure heaters, steam boilers, and furnaces from
manufacturers’ catalogs.
In estimating on heating by furnace, the average
cost of labor is about one-third that of materials. For
steam and hot-water heating, the ratio is about one-fifth.
The cost of a hot-air installation is approximately 6
per cent. of the cost of the building; for steam heating, 8
per cent.; and for hot-water heating, 10 per cent.
PLUMBING AND GAS-FITTING

PLUMBING
96. An approximate figure for the cost of plumbing is 10 per cent.

of the cost of the building. This figure is for good materials and labor,
and of course is subject to considerable variation. The cost of labor
alone will average about one-fourth the cost of the materials.
97. Drainage System.—In making estimates for the drainage
system, measure all horizontal pipes from the plans and all vertical
pipes from the sectional drawings.
Commence at the sewer outlet and measure the
main-sewer line forwards into the building; then
measure the horizontal branches.
Measure the vertical, soil, waste, and vent stacks to
their terminations above the roof, and waste-pipe
branches to the fixtures on the several floors.
Itemize the several pipes in the different kinds and
classes.
Estimate all earthen pipe by the linear foot, allowing
for Portland cement in the joints.
Estimate all cast-iron pipe by the linear foot, allowing
for each joint ¾ pound of lead for every inch in diameter
of the pipe.
Estimate wrought pipe by the linear foot, inclusive of
couplings.
Estimate brass, copper, and lead pipe by the pound.
Estimate all traps, bends, branches, increasers,
reducers, and other fittings separately, except such
special brass fixtures, traps, and connections as are
included in the cost of the fixtures. Do not figure lead
bends that are smaller than 2 inches.
Estimate on brass ferrule connections at all points
where lead pipe joins iron pipe.
Estimate on all solder joints (wiped), allowing 1
pound of solder for every inch inside diameter of the
pipe.
98. Water-Supply System.—For water supplied from street mains,
allow for permits, corporation tapping, and curb box.
Measure the service pipe from street main to cellar, and allow for a
stop and waste cock inside the cellar wall.
Measure all horizontal distributing pipes from the
plan views of the building and all vertical distributing
pipes from the sectional drawings.
Measure all branches for the several fixtures on the
different floors, to the lawn hydrants, etc.
Itemize the different kinds and classes of pipes.
Estimate lead, brass, and copper water pipes by the
pound, and wrought water pipe by the linear foot.
Itemize all stop-cocks, pipe supports, straps,
hangers, etc. separately.
Estimate all water-pipe fittings less than 1½ inches
by the pound.
Figure on brass solder-nipple connections in all
places where lead pipes join iron pipes.
Estimate on kitchen boiler, sediment cock, and range
connections; also on faucets for all fixtures other than
those which are included in the costs of the fixtures.
Estimate on garden hydrants and lawn sprinklers,
and allow a stop and waste cock in cellar for each.
99. Well Supply.—For water supplied from a well, figure on
double-action force pump in kitchen or laundry if the well is not deeper
than 26 feet below the pump; for a deep well, estimate on a pumping
engine or a windmill.
Measure lead tank linings in square feet, and
estimate by the pound, allowing 1 pound of solder for
every 2 feet of seams.
Allow 2 feet of lead pipe to connect iron pipes to
house tank, and for stop-cocks close to tank.
Provide for telltale and overflow pipes for tank.
Estimate copper tanks in square feet and by the
pound.
If there are iron, slate, glass, or cedar tanks, figure
them separately.
100. Fixtures.—Estimate each fixture separately, and include
traps, faucets, waste, vent, and water connections to walls or floors.
When the sewer is long and has but little fall, figure on using a grease
trap for the kitchen sink.
GAS-FITTING
101. Cost.—The cost of the gas-fitting may be approximately

figured as about 3 per cent. of the cost of the building. The cost of
labor alone varies from about one-fourth to one-seventh of the cost of
materials. The better the grade of fixtures, the lower will be the ratio,
provided there is no excessive ornamentation requiring much time to
put in place, as the cost of the labor is about the same for cheap
fixtures as for more costly ones.
102. Estimate piping the same as for plumbing.
Allow for meter, permits, tapping gas main, etc.
Figure each gas fixture separately set up in place.
The owner usually makes a selection of fixtures from the
manufacturer’s catalog. Allow for shields, fireguards,
etc. in places where there is danger of fire.
Figure gas grates, gas stoves, gas heaters, etc.
separately. Where the gas pressure is very high or
unsteady, allow for a pressure regulator.
PAINTING AND PAPERING
PAINTING
103. Painting is measured by the superficial yard, girting every

part of the work that is covered by paint, and allowing additions to the
actual surface to compensate for the difficulty of covering deep quirks
of moldings, for carved and enriched surfaces, etc. Ordinary door and
window openings are usually measured solid, to compensate for the
extra time taken in working around them, “cutting in” the window sash,
etc. Porch and stair balustrades, iron railings, and work having
numerous thin strips, are also counted solid, for a similar reason.
Allowance is frequently made for the distance from the ground that the
work is to be done, as in cornices, balconies, dormers, etc., and also
for the difficulty of access.
Charges are usually made for each coat of paint put on, at a
certain price per superficial yard and per coat.
Graining and marbling (imitations of wood and stone) and
varnishing are rated at different prices from plain work.
Capitals and columns and other ornamental work that is difficult to
measure should be enumerated, and a clear description of the amount
of work on them should be given.
DATA ON PAINTING
104. Quantities.—One pound of pure lead-and-oil paint will cover

from 2¾ to 3¼ square yards of wood for the first coat, and from 4½ to
6 square yards for each additional coat; on brickwork, it will cover
about 1½ and 2 square yards, respectively. Colored paint will cover
about one-third more surface than white paint.
Using prepared or ready-mixed paint, 1 gallon will cover from 250
to 300 square feet of wooden surface, two coats; for covering metallic
surfaces, 1 gallon will be sufficient for from 300 to 400 square feet,
one coat. The weight per gallon of pure mixed paints varies
considerably, but, on an average, may be taken at about 16 pounds.
Prepared shingle stains will cover about 200 square feet of surface
per gallon if applied with a brush; or, this quantity will be sufficient for
dipping about 500 shingles. Rough-sawed shingles will require about
50 per cent. more stain than smooth ones.
One pound of cold-water paint, for the first coat, will cover from 50
to 75 square feet of wood, according to the surface condition, and
about 40 square feet of brick and stone.
One gallon of liquid pigment filler, hard-oil finish, or varnish will
generally cover from 350 to 450 square feet of surface for the first
coat, according to the nature of the wood and the finish, and from 450
to 550 square feet for the second and subsequent coats. One pound
of paste wooden filler will cover about 40 square feet.
One gallon of varnish weighs from 8 to 9 pounds; turpentine, about
7 pounds; and boiled or raw linseed oil, about 7¾ pounds.
For puttying, about 5 pounds of putty will be sufficient for 100
square yards of interior and exterior work.
For sizing, about ½ pound of glue is used to 1 gallon of water.
For mixing paints, the figures given in Table XIV represent the
average proportions of materials required for each 100 pounds of
lead.
TABLE XIV
QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS
Lead Raw Oil Japan Drier Turpentine
Coat
Pounds Gallons Gallon Gallons
Priming 100 7 ½ —
Second 100 4 — 2
Third 100 6½-7 — ½
The drier is omitted in the second and succeeding coats, unless

the work is to be dried very rapidly, as it is considered to be injurious
to the durability of the paint.
On outside work, boiled oil is generally used in about the
proportion of 1 gallon to 2 gallons of raw oil.
105. Care in Painting.—In painting woodwork, putty should not be
used until after the first coat of paint or varnish has been applied.
There are two reasons for this. In the first place, if putty is used on dry
wood, the wood is liable to absorb the oil from the putty and leave it in
a dry and crumbly condition. Then, also, the oil from the putty soaking
into the wood will stain the wood dark, and this stain may be seen
through varnish. For this latter reason, putty should be put in cracks

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The Proliferation of Privileged Partnerships Between The European Union and Its Neighbours 1st Edition Sieglinde Gstöhl David Phinnemore Eds

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The Proliferation of Privileged

Partnerships between the European

The European Union s Evolving External Engagement

International Relations and the European Union Hill

The European Union And The Technology Shift 1st Edition

Free Movement and the Energy Sector in the European

The Militarization of the European Union 1st Edition

Regulating Risks in the European Union 1st Edition

The Dental Team in the European Union Sondra Z Koff

Competing Interest Groups and Lobbying in the

Sieglinde Gstöhl is Director of the Department of EU International Relations

David Phinnemore is Professor of European Politics and Dean of Education in

The EU and Russia in Their ‘Contested Neighbourhood’

Europe and Iran

EU–Russia Relations in Crisis

The European Union’s Evolving External Engagement

EU Induced Institutional Change in Post-­Soviet Space

The European Union’s Approach to Conflict Resolution

The Proliferation of Privileged Partnerships between the European Union

Edited by Sieglinde Gstöhl and

ISBN: 978-1-138-35070-0 (hbk)

List of contributors vii

1 Introduction: privileged partnerships between the

2 Privileged partnerships: the partner countries’

3 The European Economic Area: a flexible but highly complex

4 Switzerland and the EU: current issues and new challenges

5 Unique, yet archetypal: relations between the European

6 The institutional framework of the Eastern Partnership

8 The EU’s sectoral communities with neighbours: the case of

9 UK withdrawal from EU membership: the quest for cake 157

10 Conclusion: the EU and its privileged

Georges Baur is a research fellow at the Liechtenstein Institute in Bendern,

Francesco Maiani is Associate Professor of Law at the Centre de droit

David Phinnemore is Professor of European Politics, Jean Monnet Chair in

Özlem Terzi is Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Public

This book on the proliferation of ‘privileged partnerships’ between the Euro-

Introduction: the proliferation of privileged partnerships

What are privileged partnerships?

Framework of analysis: a historical institutionalist

• which policy areas are covered in the relationship and why?

While Chapters 3 to 9 focus on specific actual or emerging privileged partnerships,

The demand for external differentiated integration: a

Due to a lack of efficient arrangements for the take-­over of new EU acquis

Between 2014 and 2018 the EU and Switzerland negotiated an institutional

The ‘trap’ of the EU–Turkey customs union

Sectoral communities and the internal market

Eastern enlargement as a trigger for the ENP

The emancipation of the small-­sized countries

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU

Outline of the volume

Introduction: principles of privileged partnerships1

A common EU approach under institutional aspects

The EU’s theoretical benchmark …

… checked against practice

Cost of 100 Square Yards of

Cost of 100 Square Yards of

72. Lathing is measured by the superficial, or square, yard, no openings under 7

Cost of Lathing 100 Square Yards

EU Induced Institutional Change in Post-Soviet Space

List of contributors vii

9 UK withdrawal from EU membership: the quest for cake 157

Due to a lack of efficient arrangements for the take-over of new EU acquis

The emancipation of the small-sized countries