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China’s Global Reach

China’s Global Reach looks at internal and external dynamics of

China’s new initiatives to reform the world order as a global power in
Xi’s era.
Moving beyond Volume I, this new volume empirically examines
the most recent development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the two most
important initiatives launched by President Xi Jinping as China tries
to emerge as a global power. The first part of the book presents an
overview of geo- strategic development of the two initiatives. The
second part examines domestic political dynamics, particularly
Xinjiang as the core of BRI, in these two initiatives. The third part
investigates the responses from the major foreign partners involved
in the two initiatives, with a focus on the responses from India,
African, and Middle East countries.
The chapters in this book were originally published in various
issues of the Journal of Contemporary China.

Suisheng Zhao is a Professor and the Director of the Center for

China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International
Studies, University of Denver, US, and a founding editor of the
Journal of Contemporary China.
China’s Global Reach
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Volume II

Edited by
Suisheng Zhao
First published 2020
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2020 Taylor & Francis

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
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trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

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Publisher’s Note
The publisher accepts responsibility for any inconsistencies that may have arisen during the
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Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint
material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder
who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in
future editions of this book.
Contents

Citation Information
Notes on Contributors
PART I
The BRI/AIIB and China’s Global Reach

1 China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping

Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done
Suisheng Zhao

2 In the Shadow of Strategic Rivalry: China, America, and the Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank
Tao Xie and Donglin Han
PART II
The BRI/AIIB and China’s Domestic Politics

3 Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and

Road in China
Min Ye

4 Rhetorical Legitimation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank: Evidence from Chinese State Media
Hai Yang and Stephan Keukeleire

5 Beijing’s Pivot West: The Convergence of Innenpolitik and

Aussenpolitik on China’s ‘Belt and Road’?
Michael Clarke
6 From “Lamb Kebabs” to “Shared Joy”: Cultural Appropriation,
Ignorance and the Constrained Connectivity within the “One Belt,
One Road” Initiative
Yangbin Chen

7 Interwoven ‘Destinies’: The Significance of Xinjiang to the China

Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Xi Jinping Legacy
Anna Hayes
PART III
International Responses to the BRI/AIIB

8 Problematic Prognostications about China’s Maritime Silk Road

Initiative (MSRI): Lessons from Africa and the Middle East
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard

9 Beijing’s ‘Going Out’ Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative in the
Sahel: The Case of China’s Growing Presence in Niger
Jean-Pierre Cabestan

10 Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear
Mohsen Shariatinia and Hamidreza Azizi

11 Domestic Politics as Fuel for China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative:

The Case of the Gulf Monarchies
Jonathan Fulton

12 China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the
Case of Djibouti
David Styan

13 India’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy toward China’s BRI and AIIB:

Struggling for Relative and Absolute Gains
Fuzuo Wu

Index
Citation Information

The chapters in this book were originally published in different issues

of the Journal of Contemporary China. When citing this material,
please use the original page numbering for each article, as follows:
Chapter 1

China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping

Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done
Suisheng Zhao
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 123 (May 2020)
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645483
Chapter 2

In the Shadow of Strategic Rivalry: China, America, and the Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank
Tao Xie and Donglin Han
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 28, issue 120 (November
2019) pp. 916–931
Chapter 3

Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and

Road in China
Min Ye
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 28, issue 119 (September
2019) pp. 696–711
Chapter 4

Rhetorical Legitimation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank: Evidence from Chinese State Media
Hai Yang and Stephan Keukeleire
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 28, issue 120 (November
2019) pp. 932–947
Chapter 5

Beijing’s Pivot West: The Convergence of Innenpolitik and

Aussenpolitik on China’s ‘Belt and Road’?
Michael Clarke
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 123 (May 2020)
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645485
Chapter 6

From “Lamb Kebabs” to “Shared Joy”: Cultural Appropriation,

Ignorance and the Constrained Connectivity within the “One
Belt, One Road” Initiative
Yangbin Chen
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 121 (January
2020) https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1621526
Chapter 7

Interwoven ‘Destinies’: The Significance of Xinjiang to the China

Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Xi Jinping Legacy
Anna Hayes
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 121 (January
2020) https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1621528
Chapter 8

Problematic Prognostications about China’s Maritime Silk Road

Initiative (MSRI): Lessons from Africa and the Middle East
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 122 (March
2020) https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1637565
Chapter 9

Beijing’s ‘Going Out’ Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative in the
Sahel: The Case of China’s Growing Presence in Niger
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 28, issue 118 (July 2019)
pp. 592–613
Chapter 10

Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear
Mohsen Shariatinia and Hamidreza Azizi
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 28, issue 120 (November
2019) pp. 984–994
Chapter 11

Domestic Politics as Fuel for China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative:

The Case of the Gulf Monarchies
Jonathan Fulton
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 122 (March
2020) https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1637566
Chapter 12

China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the
Case of Djibouti
David Styan
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 122 (March
2020) https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1637567
Chapter 13

India’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy toward China’s BRI and AIIB:

Struggling for Relative and Absolute Gains
Fuzuo Wu
Journal of Contemporary China, volume 29, issue 123 (May 2020)
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645486

For any permission-related enquiries please visit:

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/help/permissions
Contributors

Hamidreza Azizi is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for

Regional Studies, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

Jean-Marc F. Blanchard is a Distinguished Professor, School of

Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal
University, China, and an Executive Director of the Mr. & Mrs.
S.H. Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations,
US.

Jean-Pierre Cabestan is a Professor and Head of the Department

of Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist
University, Hong Kong.

Yangbin Chen is a Senior Lecturer at Chinese Program,

Department of Languages and Linguistics, School of Humanities
and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia.

Michael Clarke is an Associate Professor at the National Security

College, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

Jonathan Fulton is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the

College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Zayed University,
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and is a senior nonresident
fellow at The Atlantic Council.

Donglin Han is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the

School of International Studies, Renmin University, Haidian,
China.
Anna Hayes is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science and
International Relations in the College of Arts, Society and
Education at James Cook University, Douglas, Australia.

Stephan Keukeleire is a Professor at the Leuven International and

European Studies Institute of the University of Leuven (KU
Leuven), Belgium.

Mohsen Shariatinia is an of International Relations at the School

of Economics and Political Science in Shahid Beheshti University,
Tehran, Iran.

David Styan teaches international relations at the Department of

Politics, Birkbeck College, University of London, UK.

Fuzuo Wu is a Lecturer in International Relations, University of

Salford.

Tao Xie is a Professor of political science at the School of English

and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University,
China.

Hai Yang is a Doctoral Researcher at the Leuven International and

European Studies Institute in KU Leuven, Belgium.

Min Ye is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston

University, US.

Suisheng Zhao is a Professor and the Director of the Center for

China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International
Studies, University of Denver, US.
China’s Belt-Road Initiative as
the Signature of President Xi
Jinping Diplomacy: Easier Said
than Done

Suisheng Zhao

ABSTRACT

This article examines the design, objectives, and

implementation of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) six years after
its inception. It argues that although the BRI as a top-level
design on which President Xi has staked his personal legacy is
to serve China’s ambitious geostrategic and geo-economic
interests, many developing countries have welcomed the BRI
because of their desperate need in infrastructure construction.
But the BRI’s popularity has exceeded the substance as China
has yet to bridge many fault lines on the ground.

Arguably the largest and most ambitious project to enhance global

connectivity, the BRI has been heavily controversial since its
inception. On the one side, idealists present the BRI as a bold and
visionary win-win cooperation between China and its partners.
Establishing China as an engine of global development and providing
China great access to natural resources and markets for sustained
economic growth, the BRI is designed to win diplomatic allies and
produce great prosperity across the developing world.1 As one
survey of six yearsprogress of the BRI projects argued, ‘the BRI has
become the world most welcomed international public goods and
international cooperation initiative.’2 Shrugging at the BRI, the US is
making a grave mistake because, creating transport infrastructure
across the world, China ‘has revived the global dream of Abraham
Lincoln’s allies when they planned and constructed the American
transcontinental railway.’3

1 Wang Yiwei, ‘China’s one belt, one road initiative: a grand vision or a play for power’,
Global Asia 12(2), (2017), pp. 56–59; Wang Wen, ‘Belt and Road Initiative: Creating a
Smoother Path’, China Daily, May 21, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201805/21/WS5b02689da3103f6866ee9a4a.html; Tian
Wenlin, ‘The belt and road initiative: a chinese concept for global development’,
Contemporary International Relations 27(4), (2017), pp. 1–20; Wang Xiaolong, ‘The belt
and road initiative: a new chapter for fruitful and Win-Win cooperation’, Foreign Affairs
Journal 130, (2018), pp. 7–16; Weifeng Zhou and Mario Esteban, ‘Beyond balancing:
China’s approach towards the belt and road initiative’, Journal of Contemporary China
27(112), (2018), pp. 487–501.
2 徐刚 (Xu Gang)，司文 (Si Wen)，陈璐 (Chen Lu)，”一带一路海外项目建设回顾与展望,
[the retrospect and outlooks of the BRI overseas project construction], 国 际 研 究 参 考
[International Studies References]，no. 5, 2019, p.27.
3 Parag Khanna, ‘Washington Is Dismissing China’s Belt and Road’, Washington Post, April
30, 2019, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/30/washington-is-dismissing-chinas-
belt-and-road-thats-a-huge-strategic-mistake-226759; Matthew Ehret-Kump, ‘The
American Spirit behind China’s New Silk Road’, Los Angles Review of Books, February 28,
2019, accessed June 22, 2019, https://chinachannel.org/2019/02/28/railway-links/.

In contrast, the realists describe the BRI as a power grab by

Beijing for global hegemony, fueled by its vast wealth that draws
developing nations into Beijing’s grip.4 According to one observer,
‘Instead of gunboat diplomacy and coercive military power, the PRC
intends to use BRI to access new markets, get a hold on to critical
infrastructure assets, and influence regional countries’ strategic
decisions.’5 Another observer warns that due to the long-term effects
of the BRI, the RMB would replace the dollar, customers would use
Alipay instead of VISA, authoritarian rule would be consolidated,
families would watch Chinese TV programs and read the news
provided by Xinhua, students, professionals, and political elites
would be educated and trained in Chinese universities, internet
censorship technology and applications from China’s great firewall
would cover the region and filter public cyberspace, the spread of
universal rights would yield to development rights, and Western
influence, especially that of the United States, would be relegated to
the margins.6
4 William A. Callahan, ‘China’s belt and road initiative and the new Eurasian order’,
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Policy Brief 22, (2016), accessed June 22,
2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07951?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents;
Christopher K. Johnson, ‘President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative: A Practical
Assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Road Map for China’s Global Resurgence’,
US-China Business Council, March 2016, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/President; Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road
Initiative.pdf; Ely Ratner, ‘Geostrategic and Military Drivers and Implications of the Belt
and Road Initiative’, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 25,
2018, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ratner_USCCTestimonyCORRECTED.pdf.
5 Nadège Rolland, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission Hearing on: ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later’, National
Bureau of Asian Research, January 25, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=837.
6 Roy D. Kamphausen, ‘Development Finance in Asia: U.S. Economic Strategy amid China’s
Belt and Road’, National Bureau of Asian Research, November 15, 2017, accessed June
22, 2019, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=820.

Related to the realist view is the pessimist position that

characterizes BRI as ‘One Belt and One Trap,’ a ‘bridge to nowhere,’
and ‘a grandiose and abstract wish list.’7 Such an ambitious,
expensive, and risky initiative is doomed to collapse and ultimately
exhaust China. The BRI is China’s way ‘to overplay its hand,
encouraged by its sudden wealth.’8 The massive and costly projects
of BRI could create ‘the risk of strategic overdraft’ (战略透支).9
 7 Harry G. Broadman, ‘Will China’s “One Belt, One Road” Become a “Bridge to Nowhere”?’,
Forbes, January 6, 2016, accessed June 22, 2019, http://onforb.es/1PL9o3J; Guy de
Jonquiere, ‘Beijing’s Belt and Road summit invites caution in the West’, Nikkei Asian
Review, April 27, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Guy-
de-Jonquieres/Beijing-s-Belt-and-Road-summit-invites-caution-in-the-West; ‘The
Challenges Facing China’s Belt And Road Initiative’, DIIS Policy Brief, February 2016,
accessed June 22, 2019,
http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/409521/PB_Belt_and_Road_WEB.pdf.
8 Philip Bowring, ‘China’s Silk Road Illusions’, New York Books, October 25, 2017, accessed
June 22, 2019, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/10/25/chinas-silk-road-illusions/.
9 Shi Yinhong, ‘Amid Western uncertainties, China mustn’t spread too thin’, Global Times,
October 26, 2016, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1013884.shtml.

Advocates of the three views tend to present what they want to

see. Examining BRI’s design, objectives, and implementation six
years after its inception, this article argues that, focusing rightfully
on infrastructure construction, BRI has provided opportunities not
only for China but also for its partners to reach their respective
goals. However, Beijing has yet to develop practical programs based
on scrupulous economic planning and formidable diplomatic actions
to realize these ambitious goals. While BRI has become an
organizing concept of Chinese diplomacy, it faces challenges to be
commercially sustainable, balance China’s interests with the interests
of partners, and create shared values. Without overcoming colossal
economic obstacles, navigating fragile political barriers, and
placating apprehension surrounding its ambitions, BRI could become
a huge white elephant, leaving an enormous amount of wasted
resources strewn along its path.

A Top-Level Design

President Xi announced the Silk Road Economic Belt to connect

China with Eurasia continent in his September 2013 visit to
Kazakhstan and announced the Maritime Silk Road linking China with
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe the next month
in his visit to Indonesia. Known later as the Belt and Road Initiative,
Beijing extended it to the Arctic in January 2018, forming a Polar Silk
Road. With Xinjiang as the core area of the Belt and Fujian as the
core of the Road, BRI is to cover two-thirds of the world’s population
by building six economic corridors: the New Eurasian Land Bridge,
the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the China-Central
Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula
Economic Corridor, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
The Third Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Congress in November 2013
endorsed BRI as a component of China’s long-term economic reform
strategy. The Central Economic Work Conference at the end of 2014
launched BRI as one of China’s national grant strategies. In March
2015, the Chinese government issued The Visions and Actions on
Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road, which laid out principles, framework, priorities,
coordination, mechanism, and Chinese government actions, with the
intent to allocate more than US $1 trillion to the initiative. In March
2016, BRI was morphed into an entire chapter in the 13th Five-Year
Plan running through 2020. At the CCP’s 19th Congress in October
2017, BRI was enshrined into the party constitution.
A government hierarchy has been established to help design and
implement BRI. At the top is the Central Small Leadership Group for
BRI Development. Its leadership lineup that was publicized for first
time in February 2015 included a CCP Standing Committee member
as the chair (Zhang Gaoli) and two politburo members (Wang
Huning and Wang Yang). After the 19th Party Congress in 2017, a
new politburo Standing Committee Member (Han Zheng) became
the chair. Its members include three Politburo members (Yang Jiechi,
Hu Chunhua, and Wang Yi).10 The National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) is in charge of the coordination of BRI
projects, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the
Ministry of Commerce (MOC). The State International Development
Cooperation Administration (SIDCA) was established in 2018 as a
one-stop shop for disseminating important decisions on BRI.
10 ‘韩正主持召开推进“一带一路”建设工作领导小组会议’ [Han Zheng calls for the meeting
of the Central Small Leadership Group for the BRI Development], Xinhua, January 31,
 2019, accessed June 22, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2019-
01/31/content_5362888.htm.

Meeting the enormous funding demands, China established the

US$40 billion Silk Road Fund (SRF) in December 2014. President Xi
in May 2017 pledged additional 100 billion yuan (about US $14.5
billion) to the SRF and 380 billion yuan (about US $55.1 billion)
special lending schemes through China Development Bank (CDB)
and Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China. In addition, the Chinese
government has launched six international institutions to facilitate
BRI funding opportunities. The best known is the US $100 billion
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The others include
China-Central European Cooperation Fund, China-Eurasia Economic
Cooperation Fund, Asian Regional Cooperation Transfer Fund, China-
ASEAN Maritime Fund, and the Coalition of China-Central-Eastern
European Banks.
The Xi leadership has gone into overdrive to generate enthusiasm
for BRI in a forceful and occasionally bizarre propaganda campaign,
which reached a peak when President Xi hosted the First Belt and
Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRFIC) in Beijing in May
2017, attended by 29 heads of states and representatives from
about 100 governments and international organizations. As a vivid
display of the power of Chinese propaganda, one video released in
the run-up to the lavish Forum showed a father reading his rapt
daughter a bedtime story about BRI. Two videos showed children
singing to express gratitude for the initiative. Two Western reporters
found that ‘The videos are so cringe-inducing, so ridiculously
saccharine, that they are almost funny.’11 Although the propaganda
for the second BRFIC in 2019 was more restrained than the over-
the-top campaign for the first BRFIC, Beijing still produced a music
video prior to the forum, ‘I’d Like to Build the World a Road,’ adapted
from a popular English song in the 1970s, ‘I’d Like to Teach the
World to Sing,’ to show BRI helped promote common development
and prosperity and was taken root in the minds of people from all
around the world.12 Another propaganda video, ‘about a durian
called Little Thai,’ thanked BRI for helping its ‘durian brothers and
sisters’ get a smoother ride to China to be eaten in ‘durian hot pot.’13

11 Emily Rauhala and Simon Denyer, ‘Silk Road forum showcases China’s power—and the
power of its propaganda’, Washington Post, May 15, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/15/silk-road-forum-
showcases-chinas-power-and-the-power-of-its-propaganda/?utm_term=.625bbf0cff3a.
12 ‘Let’s sing a song called I’d Like to Build the World a Road’, People’s Daily, September
10, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0910/c90000-
9499003.html.
13 ‘Durian “Little Thai” takes us on a journey along the Belt and Road’, The Second Belt
and Road Forum official website, April 19, 2019, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2019/0419/c40-1121.html.

BRI is framed by the Chinese government as a product of China’s

benevolence to offer other countries to jump aboard the Chinese
development express train. Portraying itself as the magnanimous
provider of public goods, China is to extend friendship, economic
development, and trade without any of the US-style political strings
attached. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the much
ballyhooed 2017 Forum, President Xi presented BRI as ‘the project
of the century,’ creating new opportunities for global development.
Invoking the potent historical imagery of China as the center of
regional commerce, prosperity and stability, Xi hailed the spirit of the
ancient silk roads, a network of trade routes crisscrossing Eurasia to
the eastern frontiers of the Roman Empire, underpinning China’s
golden age more than a thousand years ago, as ‘peace and
cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and
mutual benefit.’ Proclaiming the Silk Road spirit as a great heritage
of human civilization, Xi claimed that BRI would be the road of
peace, prosperity, opening up, innovation, and connecting different
civilizations, adding splendor to human civilization and helping build
a new era of harmony.14
14 ‘President Xi’s speech at opening of Belt and Road forum’, Xinhuanet, May 14, 2017,
accessed June 22, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
05/14/c_136282982.htm.

Officially using ‘initiative’ ( 倡 议 ) rather than strategy ( 战 略 ) to

show its intention of inclusiveness, President Xi said that the vast
and amorphous project is ‘open to all like-minded friends … not a
member’s club, but a circle of friends with extensive participation. It
does not exclude or target any party.’ He stated that ‘The initiative is
neither the Marshall Plan after World War II nor an intrigue of China.
The initiative is aimed at achieving policy, infrastructure, trade,
finance, and people-to-people connectivity, building a new platform
for international cooperation, and creating new drivers of shared
development to benefit more countries and people.’15
15 ‘Highlights of Xi’s keynote speech at Boao Forum’, China Daily, April 10, 2014, accessed
June 22, 2019,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201804/10/WS5acc15a6a3105cdcf6517259.html.

Serving China's National Interests

In spite of the altruistic rhetoric, BRI is similar to the Marshall Plan

that the US implemented to rejuvenate Europe through imports from
American companies across the Atlantic on American merchant
ships. ‘Only the naïve would believe it was all altruistic. An open
Europe provided a market for US exports. Free flows of goods and
capital played to America’s core strength: the dynamism of its
private sector. The mighty dollar anchored the system. Finally, in the
thinking of US planners like Mr. Acheson, a prosperous “Free World”
provided a bulwark against the Soviet Union in the Cold War.’16
Similarly, BRI serves China’s national interests in many ways.
16 Andrew Browne, ‘China Builds Bridges and Highways While the U.S. Mouths Slogans’,
Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-bridges-and-highways-while-the-u-s-mouths-
slogans-1517308205?
mod=cx_picks&cx_navSource=cx_picks&cx_tag=contextual&cx_artPos=2#cxrecs.

First, BRI is to serve China’s geostrategic interests by making

China the dominant power in Asia and beyond. With investments
and infrastructure projects both as incentives to garner support and
as means to punish recalcitrant countries, China could enmesh a
large number of countries within a web of the BRI projects, making
them hesitate to align with the US to challenge China’s core
interests. China’s success in building connectivity to Africa has
helped China gain geostrategic leverage over countries far beyond
its neighborhood. China has been successful to such an extent that
Taiwan has been left with diplomatic ties to only one small country in
Africa. The appeals of BRI with easy finance are the primary reasons
for the steady switch of allegiance by African states.
As a rising power demanding greater voices in the global
governance, BRI is one of China’s major initiatives to provide ‘new
thinking of global governance and new concepts of globalization.’17
Co-founding the BRICS Bank with Brazil, Russia, India, and South
Africa in 2014 and launching the AIIB in 2015 in this regard, China
has pushed for internationalization of its currency, RMB. One
explicitly stated goal of BRI is to promote the use of RMB. While
RMB is used as a transaction currency less than 2% globally, RMB
usage among BRI economies is about 5%.18 China made big
progress when Pakistan decided to use RMB in replacement for the
US dollar to pay for the surge of capital goods import from China in
January 2018.19

17 何亚非 (He Yafei), ‘一带一路’给世界经济和全球治理带来新思路” [One Belt and One

Road brings new thinking for the world economy and global governance], 财 新 会
[Caixin], September 15, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://conferences.caixin.com/2017-09-15/101147776.html.
18 Cai Xiao andLi Xiang, ‘RMB use to grow in Belt, Road economies’, China Daily, June 7,
2017, accessed June 22, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-
06/07/content_29645681.htm.
19 Editorial, ‘Ending reliance on dollar’, the Pakistan Observer, January 4, 2018, accessed
June 22, 2019, https://pakobserver.net/ending-reliance-dollar/.

Second, BRI is to serve China’s geo-economic interests by

connecting with an expansive geographic scope, particularly
emerging economies in Afroeurasia. While China’s rapid economic
growth in the past decades benefited immensely from the market
opening of the US and other developed countries, China’s economy
has faced increasing competition from these developed countries.
Trump’s trade war has further limited China’s access to the market in
the US and other developed markets. BRI has helped China open
emerging markets and offered a new path for China to participate in
the international division of labor by building ‘an economic network
led by China and connecting producers, resources, and consumers in
East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and
the US to sustain China’s development.’20
20 Fu Mengzi, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative from Three Theoretical Perspective,’
Contemporary International Relations 29(2), (2019), pp. 20–21.
China began advancing westward with pipelines to the oil-rich
Caspian Sea when Persian Gulf countries shifted the majority of their
oil exports towards the fast-growing markets of the Indo-Pacific after
the Cold War. Enhanced trade allowed Asians to capitalize on each
other’s comparative advantages. According to one account, annual
Afroeurasian trade is more than US $2 trillion compared with US
$1.1 trillion in trans-Atlantic trade and growing steadily. Afroeurasia
and its nearly six billion people have become the center of gravity of
the world economy. As a result, countries that once aspired to a
future convergent with the West—Saudi Arabia, Russia and Turkey—
have become significant and enthusiastic players in the new
economic networks, seeing themselves as Eurasian or Indo-Pacific
powers and bridges.21
21 Parag Khanna, ‘Washington Is Dismissing China’s Belt and Road’, Washington Post, April
30, 2019, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/30/washington-is-dismissing-chinas-
belt-and-road-thats-a-huge-strategic-mistake-226759.

China’s economic growth is powered by its massive export-

oriented industries and the import of large amounts of intermediate
components and raw materials. As the transport of these goods
depends on land transportation and maritime shipping, BRI is to
create a network of infrastructure to extend its economic reach
around the Afroeurasian and beyond by investing in strategically vital
transit corridors and seaports. Building trans-border highway and
expressway transportation networks to almost every neighboring
region, China has made progress in the construction of pan-Asia
railway networks such as the China-Laos and China-Thailand
railways. BRI also includes direct rail services cross Eurasia. Freight
express train lines between central China and Europe have linked
four major Chinese cities (Chongqing, Zhengzhou, Yiwu, and
Lianyungang) to the heart of Europe. The rail services are
considerably cheaper than air and faster than sea. With generous
government subsidies and state media promotion, these rail links
have operated as successful stories of BRI.
BRI has also built seaports all over the world to secure reliable
shipping lines. In Southeast Asia, investing in four key ports of
Malaysia (Melaka gateway, Kuala Linggi Port, Penang Port, and
Kuantan Port), China expanded the Tanjung Priok, Indonesia’s
biggest port. In South Asia, China has developed the Seaport of
Hambantota in Sri Lanka and the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan. In the
Middle East, Chinese companies have invested in Abu Dhabi Ports,
taken over management of Israel’s Haifa port and won a contract to
build a port in the Israeli city of Ashdod. In Europe, constructing a
deep port at Arkhangelsk located in Russia’s White Sea, Chinese
companies have built train lines from Budapest to Belgrade, Serbia,
providing another artery for Chinese goods flowing into Europe
through a Chinese-owned port in Greece. Running from China to the
Pacific and Indian Ocean and then on to the Mediterranean, these
projects not only help China control the world’s busiest trade loops
but also have broader strategic significance. Overly relying on its
transit from the Gulf through the Malacca Straits between Indonesia
and Malaysia under the patrol and surveillance of the US Navy,
Beijing has looked for alternative routes to circumvent the ‘Malacca
Strait dilemma.’ The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and
the Chinese-invested Pakistani port of Gwadar, a political bulwark of
BRI, is to circumvent the dilemma.
BRI helps define and export Chinese technical standards across
the full range of infrastructure investments, dictating a broad set of
technological applications and altering the global competitive
landscape. Standards serve as bridges between innovations and the
marketization and industrialization of those innovations. The
companies that own the technology on which the standards are
based benefit by either selling their equipment or licensing their
patents. America’s ability to set international standards has benefited
its economy immensely, giving American companies a strong
advantage in selling goods in other markets. The BRI projects push
participating countries to adopt Chinese standards, circumventing
standards set by Western countries and creating barriers to
competing US technologies. Billions of dollars in equipment sales and
patent royalties are up for grabs in this competition. To the extent
that China’s standards supplant Western ones, it represents a direct
threat to the profitability of non-Chinese companies.22
22 Andrew Polk, ‘China Is Quietly Setting Global Standards,’ Bloomberg News, 6 May 2018,
accessed 22 June 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-06/china-is-
quietly-setting-global-standards.

Third, BRI is a stimulus package to sustain China’s economic

growth by supporting Chinese companies to explore international
markets. When President Xi announced BRI in 2013, China’s growth
started to sputter partially because the state-led investment drive
that turned China into an economic powerhouse produced an
overheated infrastructure sector. As a platform to address its excess
capacity and look for a new engine of economic growth, BRI is to
channel investment-led growth beyond China’s border by offering an
‘upgraded’ version of the Going Global strategy that China launched
in the 1990s.
BRI is a smart branding to provide new vision and direction for the
SOEs to expand overseas. Taking a centralized approach as an all-
encompassing initiative, BRI folded old projects into the new
narrative. A number of the BRI projects actually began operations
before BRI was announced in September 2013. For example, one of
the listed projects on the official website of BRI Portal, the Sino-
Myanmar natural gas pipeline, began operations in July 2013. The
building of the first oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China in 1997
was also wrapped into BRI. Using its political might, BRI could help
grease the wheels to get deals through faster. Collectively dubbed
BRI, these existing and new projects leverage China’s vast reserves
of capital, business savvy, engineering expertise, and production and
construction capacity to help sustain domestic growth.
Fourth, BRI is to help China contain security threats by stabilizing
the troublesome Western hinterland through economic development
to narrow the prosperity gap. In particular, the land-locked Xinjiang
has been threatened by Islamic jihadists and separatist activities
partially because the region is under-developed. As the hub of the
trade routes towards the Indian Ocean and the Middle East through
the port facilities in Pakistan, Xinjiang could attract more investment
and trade to create jobs and discourage radicalization and terrorist
recruitment within China’s borders.
Fifth, as an expression of newly-found pride in the nation’s power
and wealth for Xi to sell his nationalist ideology wrapped in globalist
terminology, BRI demonstrates to a domestic audience that China is
a global leader and all roads go to Beijing. The blanket coverage of
the BRFICs showed that all world leaders came to Beijing and
praised how China’s investments were welcomed in other countries,
stirring national pride and Solidifying Xi’s doctrine of ‘four
confidences’ in the path, political system, theories, and culture of
Chinese socialism. In a set piece of imperial pomp, power and
benevolence for which the Chinese capital seems designed,
President Xi stood in front of a giant landscape painting titled This
Land is So Rich in Beauty and shook hands with the heads of state
lining up in the Great Hall of the People. Broadcast live on national
television and repeated numerous times in prime-time newscasts,
these images encapsulated China’s growing political and economic
influence and President Xi’s leadership on the world stage. China
was positioned as a benign master, receiving tribute from neighbors.
BRI reminds the Chinese people of the glory days when the imperial
reach was at its peak. As one Chinese scholar wrote, ‘every time
foreign leaders walk down that 50-meter stretch of red carpet and
shake hands with Chinese leaders, many of us are overcome with
excitement.’23 As a result, ‘BRI helps to mobilize public support for
Xi’s diplomacy in a way few other initiatives could accomplish.’24

23 罗 建 波 (Luo Jianbo), 中 国 的 救 世 主 心 态 要 不 得 [China needs to check its inflated

national ego], Financial Times [Chinese Edition], May 25, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://www.yinhucms.com/story/001072733.html.
24 Zhimin Lin, ‘Xi Jinping’s “Major country diplomacy”: the impacts of China’s growing
capacity’, Journal of Contemporary China 28(115), (2019), pp. 35–37.
Attractions to Developing Countries

Serving China’s interests, BRI is welcomed in many developing

countries primarily because their enormous infrastructure deficit and
funding gap are major impediments to economic development,
poverty reduction, and market access. The costs of mega
infrastructures are vast and inaccessible to many developing
countries. Western developmental aid and investment have failed to
meet these needs. The major international financial institutions have
not provided sufficient infrastructure loans. A widely quoted ADB
study finds that in Asia alone, US $26 trillion infrastructure
investments or US $1.7 trillion per year are needed over 2016–2030
to maintain 3–7% economic growth. The report covered 45
countries where a substantial infrastructure gap remained, with over
400 million people lacking electricity, 300 million without access to
safe drinking water, and about 1.5 billion lacking access to basic
sanitation. Many economies lacked adequate ports, railways, and
roads that could connect them efficiently to larger domestic and
global markets.25
25 ‘Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $1.7 Trillion Per Year’, Asian Development Bank,
February 28, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.adb.org/news/asia-
infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-trillion-year-double-previous-estimates.

Massive infrastructure investment has been an engine of China’s

growth. With technologies practical and relatively affordable, China
has accumulated a significant amount of wealth to provide capital,
technology, and equipment to a wide-range of infrastructure
construction in developing countries. No country builds infrastructure
as speedily as China or has comparable means to fund it. BRI
investments increase competition for development projects, allowing
developing countries to bargain more effectively for better economic
returns with Western countries.
The BRI has, in fact, sparked an infrastructure race in which other
countries have actively competed with China to finance infrastructure
projects. For example Australia, India, the US and Japan met at the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in November 2017 ‘to expand
cooperation between democracies in the region for economic
openness and give opportunities to other nations who are looking for
infrastructure development.’26 The Quad first came together in
response to the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in relief
operations and held their first summit and participated in a large
naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. But the Quad
suffered demise when the Rudd government in Australia pulled out
under Chinese pressure. Although it remains unclear what the
resurrected Quad can accomplish, it is one response to BRI from the
four democracies.
26 Primrose Riordan, ‘Brits call for united front of involvement to loosen China Belt fears’,
The Australia, February 21, 2018, accessed July 11, 2019,
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/brits-call-for-united-
front-of-involvement-to-loosen-china-belt-fears/news-
story/33d87b93b8bb4f68cf7e347208322cf3.
The EU also launched its Europe-Asia connectivity strategy to
provide funding for the construction of transport links, which
emphasizes ‘sustainability’ through investments that respect labor
rights, do not create political or financial dependencies, and
guarantee a level playing field for businesses. Ioana Kraft, general
manager of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, notes that the
market-based European approach to cross-border connectivity
contrasts significantly from Beijing’s state-led approach. The EU
approach puts transparent public procurement processes in place to
allow European and Chinese companies, and especially private
companies, to compete on an even playing field.27
27 Emanuele Scimia, ‘Europe prefers market driven connectivity over Belt and Road’,
AsiaTimes, September 29, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://www.atimes.com/article/europe-prefers-market-driven-connectivity-over-belt-and-
road/.
The US established a new agency in 2018, the International
Development Finance Corporation, to offer financing assistance to
US companies involved in development projects abroad. The US
Agency for International Development also announced a new
initiative to provide capacity building to countries interested in
understanding the financial as well as social impacts of proposed
infrastructure projects. Both Japan and India have launched their
Connectivity Corridors to finance and build infrastructure in
developing countries. They joined Sri Lanka in 2019 to develop the
Port of Colombo to prevent cargo from being transferred to China
controlled port of Hambantota. Japanese Official Development
Assistance is to finance a portion of the project.28
28 ‘Japan and India to develop Colombo port, countering Belt and Road With Sri Lanka,
partners take on China’s expanding Indian Ocean presence’, Nikkei Asian Review, May
20, 2019, accessed June 22, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-
relations/Japan-and-India-to-develop-Colombo-port-countering-Belt-and-Road.
Quoting the Chinese proverb, ‘to become rich, one must first build
roads,’ IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde praised BRI for
helping close the developing country infrastructure gap, lift potential
global growth, and raise the incomes of millions of people.29 Asian
Development Bank President Takehiko Nakao concurred that BRI
was instrumental in boosting inter-connectivity and regional
development.30 A World Bank Report suggested that the BRI
transport corridors ‘will help in two critical ways- lowering travel
times and increasing trade and investment’ to substantially improve
trade, foreign investment, and living conditions for citizens in its
participating countries that ‘are ill-served by existing infrastructure.’
It estimated that ‘BRI transport projects could help lift 7.6 million
people from extreme poverty (those earning less than $1.90 a day)
and 32 million people from moderate poverty (those earning less
than $3.20 a day)’31

29 Christine Lagarde, ‘Belt and Road Initiative: Proven Policies and New Economic Links’,
International Monetary Fund, May 14, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/05/14/sp051417-belt-and-road-initiative-
proven-policies-and-new-economic-links.
30 ‘ADB president willing to engage in BRI projects, sees AIIB as partner’, Xinhua, May 29,
2019, accessed June 22, 2019, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2019-
05/29/content_74834692.htm.
31 World Bank Group, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport
Corridors (Washington DC, 2019), accessed June 22, 2019,
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31878/9781464813924.
pdf.
 Many developing countries have welcomed BRI also because the
China Model of state capitalism characterized by the authoritarian
state making use of markets to create wealth lifted hundreds of
million people out of poverty. Only three decades ago, China was as
poor as some of the poorest third world countries. While most of
them remain poor, China has developed as the second largest
economy in the world. Many political leaders of developing countries
have seen the paramount task as the eradication of poverty. For
them, the secret of China’s success is that the powerful Chinese
state is effective in marshalling extraordinary resources for economic
development, creating world-class infrastructure and majestic cities,
building thousands of miles high speed railways, a massive feat
requiring colossal human sacrifice quite unthinkable in the West.32
32 Suisheng Zhao, ‘Whither the China model: revisiting the debate’, Journal of
Contemporary China 26(103), (2017), pp. 1–17.
The appeal of the China model is supported by China’s value-free
diplomacy in contrast to Western countries that sets democracy,
transparency, rule of law, and human rights as conditions. Guiding
mostly by economic and strategic interests, China has invested
heavily in countries off limits to the Western investors. Increasingly
fed up with the doctrinaire Western democratic promotion, many
developing countries have turned to the China model and Chinese
investment. A recipe for stability and prosperity, the China model has
become a unique and refreshing brand at a time the Western brand
has been much tarnished and lost a big chunk of its allure. Political
leaders in many developing countries have welcomed the BRI
investment and the China model as alternatives to the Western
versions of both.

Economic Sustainability

But BRI still faces serious challenges. The first challenge is economic
sustainability. Looming on a scope and scale with little precedent in
modern history, BRI has been driven more by China’s strategic
ambitions than economic rationale. As a political campaign that
takes political diktat in command over market force, BRI is not
intellectually coherent and carefully orchestrated. Mobilizing all
segments of the bureaucracy and state-owned and private
companies, it is fragmented and patchy. Everyone has pitched in
with frenzied enthusiasm but little coordination. The negative effects
are generally disregarded until they grow too serious to ignore. The
widely publicized Chinese government document of Visions and
Actions is only seven pages long, ‘hardly a blueprint for how to
invest $1 trillion, by when, for what priorities and by whom. Top
officials still haven’t defined what constitutes a BRI project or who
qualifies as a participant in the initiative. As a result, every
investment project, whether public or private, profit-making or
money-losing, honest or dishonest, claims to be part of the
bandwagon.’33
33 Yuen Yuen Ang, ‘China’s Belt and Road Is a Campaign, Not a Conspiracy’, Bloomberg
News, September‎ ‎27‎, ‎2018, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-27/china-s-belt-and-road-
initiative-is-a-campaign-not-a-conspiracy.
The MAF and the MOC as two supporting agencies are often in a
tug of war, with MFA’s long-term political agenda clashing with MOC’s
emphasis on short-term commercial interests. The SIDCA was
established to cut through the overlap and discord of the agencies
and institutionalizes a concept of ‘development coordination’ to
which Beijing’s strategic goals are vital, but its commercial interests
cannot be ignored. The SIDCA is not an aid agency as the word ‘aid’
is nowhere in the agency’s title. Instead, its emphasis is
‘international development cooperation’, which consists less of grants
and volunteerism, more of bank loans and the construction expertise
of Chinese companies.
Below the central level, every province has its own BRI office.
Scrambling to get hold of and justify the use of funding and ensuring
their projects being chosen with a generous budgetary support, local
governments have collaborated with the infrastructure building
complex, the nexus between SOEs and state banks formed in the
domestic infrastructure building spree but has faced diminishing
returns domestically, to sneak through their side projects. Turning
into Xi’s signature diplomacy effectively gave local governments
carte blanche to pursue whatever projects they can get away with.34
This opaqueness makes it difficult to balance economic rationality
and political motivations, fostering a politically-driven rush for SOEs
to take on projects hastily and the state banks to give out loans
whether or not they are financially viable.
34 Baogang He, ‘The domestic politics of the belt and road initiative and its implications’,
Journal of Contemporary China 28(116), (2019), pp. 180–195.
Although Chinese SOEs’ risk awareness has grown, they still lack
the ability to manage overseas risks effectively. Becoming
overexposed abroad while struggling to shed costs and slash soaring
debt loads at home, they lack local knowledge, adding that they
sometimes assume money can solve all problems. BRI passes
through volatile countries suffering from unstable governments,
brittle authoritarian regimes, unstable economies, terrorism, ethnic
conflict, and other security threats and geopolitical risks. Their lack
of a fair and transparent mechanism and supervision inevitably
results in corruption and rent-seeking. It is difficult for Chinese
companies to ensure their money is well-spent because they are
contending with a myriad of complex political and social situations.
Without sufficient risk-control procedures, they often only see a bevy
of opportunities, but not the pitfalls underfoot.
Chinese banks also do not have a track record of allocating
resources effectively. In the early days of BRI, it was easy to get
loans if they were going to do some sort of BRI projects, especially if
the projects were in the countries with significant natural resources.
The assumption was that if a resource-rich country had trouble
repaying loans, it could offer resources instead. No one, not even
the Chinese government, had a comprehensive picture of the
lending. The state banking system poured money into projects as
various government agencies issued extensive export and loan
guarantees and other financial arrangements as part of the initiative
without sufficient risk or cost-benefit analysis, helping get many
projects up and running faster than might have happened otherwise.
In unstable, high-risk markets, loans could turn sour and projects
could fail easily, creating a strain of bad debts. Many BRI countries
are off the World Bank’s ease-of-doing-business league, with
sovereign debt ratings that are either junk or not grade, meaning
their capacity to repay the loans is in doubt. As a result, thousands
of financially dubious ‘white elephants’ projects that never took off,
or were abandoned or useless, or faced long delays, got the
imprimatur of BRI projects. China’s politically directed investments
resulted in vanity projects and tens of billions in bad loans.
Critics of BRI have claimed that the failures are intentional as a
result of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ to ensnare some countries in
debt by unsustainable loans to seize strategic assets from them.35
While the debt trap could make the nations in debt beholden to the
Chinese government, China fell victim of its own snare and lending
missteps. One example is the US $60 billion of China’s loans-for-oil in
Venezuela, which helped China secure energy supplies while
bolstering an anti-US ally in Latin America for a decade. The loan
went south after the collapse of oil prices in 2014. As inflation ran in
the four digits and the country was in real peril of defaulting on debt
repayments, Chinese-funded infrastructure projects turned into ‘red
elephants’ as they were called by locals. ‘Venezuela has changed
from the closest thing China had as an ally in Latin America and the
Caribbean to a clear liability. China’s own interests are therefore
undercut through such unsustainable deals.’36
35 Brahma Chellaney, ‘China’s debt-trap diplomacy’, Project Syndicate, January 23, 2017,
accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-
one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog.
36 Matt Ferchen, ‘China, Venezuela, and the Illusion of Debt-Trap Diplomacy’, AsiaGlobal
Online, August 16, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019,
https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/china-venezuela-debt-trap-diplomacy/.

Clearly, the unsustainable debt is negative for everyone. One

study tracked over 3000 Chinese financed projects and found scant
evidence that Chinese banks, acting at the government’s behest,
were deliberately over-lending or funding loss-making projects to
secure strategic advantages.37 A study of 38 Chinese debt
renegotiations with 24 countries supports the finding. Borrowers in
14 cases were able to get China to write off the debt and in most
other cases renegotiated their loans. The problems point to a lack of
competency among Chinese lending institutions, combined with their
eagerness to support broader political goals despite low potential
returns and weak project planning capacity.38

37 Deborah Brautigam, ‘Is China the World’s Loan Shark?’, New York Times, April 26, 2019,
accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/opinion/china-belt-road-
initiative.html.
38 Agatha Kratz, Allen Feng, and Logan Wright, ‘New Data on the “Debt Trap” Question’,
Rhodium Group, April 29, 2019, accessed June 22, 2019, https://rhg.com/research/new-
data-on-the-debt-trap-question/.

The CPEC as a flagship project of BRI is one example. In a straight

line on the map, it is only about 1100 miles from Kashgar in Xinjiang
to Karachi and the Indian Ocean. But the road twists and turns up to
more than 15,000 feet above sea level and down through almost
uninhabited country until it reaches the Indus Valley. While the great
knot of mountain ranges and deserts that separate China from the
Indian Ocean makes land transport difficult, Kashgar itself is 2500
miles from Shanghai, half of that distance through the very sparsely
populated country.
Additionally, the CPEC has faced security troubles from the
Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups. Separatist militants in
Baluchistan province that forms the southern hub of the CPEC have
waged campaigns against the central government for decades,
demanding a greater share of the gas-rich region’s resources and
trying to disrupt construction of the corridor. Pakistan’s military
created an army division of more than 10,000 troops in 2015 to
protect CPEC projects and Chinese workers, increasing the costs of
CPEC.
Global transportation and trade network making has been
intertwined with the rise of hegemonic powers. The connectivity of
the global sea lanes in post-1945 was warranted by US hegemony.
Rising but still far from the hegemonic position, China could be over-
extended by the costs of BRI. A Chinese scholar warned that
although BRI may help promote China’s rejuvenation and global
development, there have been substantial concerns such as
‘premature advance’ (战略冒进), ‘rejoicing in grandiose deeds’ (好大
喜 功 ) and ‘having too great an appetite’ ( 贪 大 求 全 ) in the actual
implementation. Criticizing BRI in a political campaign style, he was
particularly concerned about the repeated declarations to see an
‘early harvest of results’ (早期收获)” in the full-fledged rush into the
CPEC without consideration of costs.39
39 罗 建 波 (Luo Jianbo), 中 国 的 救 世 主 心 态 要 不 得 [China needs to check its inflated
national ego], Financial Times [Chinese Edition], May 25, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019,
http://www.yinhucms.com/story/001072733.html.
These events are all occurring as China’s economic growth slows,
the debt-to-GDP ratio has skyrocketed, and their fragile financial
system is increasingly under strain. Stacking China’s losses and
obligations on top of slowing growth, Beijing has tried to curb capital
outflow. BRI has complicated Beijing’s effort. Chinese companies
have used BRI as an excuse to evade capital controls, smuggling
money out of the country. The initiative has provided cover for the
acquisition of less productive and often trophy assets, such as
European football clubs, of which Chinese tycoons acquired about
100.40 When BRI outlays are snowballing, many huge ventures with
dubious returns take ever-bigger bites of China’s finances. BRI is a
stiff test of China’s ability to weather a slowing economy.
40 Jörg Wuttke, ‘Xi Jinping’s Silk Road is under threat from one-way traffic Trade must flow
both ways to make the route economically and politically viable’, Financial Times, May 9,
2017, accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/61c08c22-3403-11e7-99bd-
13beb0903fa3.

Conflict of Interests

The second challenge is the conflict of interests between China and

its BRI partners in a complex and vulnerable geo-economic and geo-
political environment. Beijing may assume that economic
development coupled with good will would be enough to make BRI a
success. But the implementation of BRI ‘depends on the response of
China’s neighbors, large and small, and will require much more than
simply rhetoric and good will.’41 Cross-border infrastructure projects
require complex and often protracted negotiations over proposed
routes, development rights, financing and investment returns, and
local employment. China cannot assume that the growth through
gigantic infrastructure investments, which drove China’s economic
success in the past, is a panacea and embraced by other countries.
With shared and conflicting interests, other countries’ reactions to
BRI are inevitably mixed, both longing for and dreading Chinese
investment.
41 Hong Yu, ‘Motivation behind China’s “One belt, one road initiatives and establishment of
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”’, Journal of Contemporary China 26(105),
(2017), p. 367.
The conflict of interests has come firstly due to the concerns of
BRI countries over China’s geostrategic ambitions. China’s smaller
neighbors are concerned about being overwhelmed by an over-
mighty China. In particular, China’s heavy-handedness in the
maritime territorial disputes has conspired to breed fear, mistrust
and misgivings among China’s neighbors. Expanding land
reclamation in the South China Sea while promoting maritime Silk
Road, China has difficulties in convincing Southeast Asian countries
that the benefits of BRI outweigh their apprehensions.
Regional powers such as Japan and India are also concerned over
China’s strategic intentions. Despite projects on its turf, Japan
remains leery of throwing its support behind BRI as Sino-Japan
relations have been soured by various issues deriving from
unresolved historical legacies, strategic rivalry, and territorial
disputes. Fearing Beijing will create a sphere of influence that could
erode its own power, Japan has taken the lead to revive the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the US withdrawal, creating
competition with BRI. A group of 11 nations signed the CPTPP (the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership) in March 2018, which became effective on 30 December
2018. In addition, Japan has competed with China to boost outward
investment. Japan owned US $1.667 trillion in foreign assets, while
China owned US $1.542 trillion in 2018. Promoting the overseas use
of its currency, the yen is the third most popular currency for
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upon. The charge entered his hand and breast, and he fell dead.
Capt. Reid at the head of 50 men, went after the murderers, and
soon returned with six of them. They are to be kept in close
confinement.
2nd.—Our officers were in an unpleasant dilemma. They did not
know how to dispose of the prisoners, and after some debate, they
concluded to turn them loose. A file of soldiers was detailed for that
purpose. They took them some miles off, and soon returned,
announcing that they had turned them loose. At 4 o’clock we left,
and travelled all night through a thick forest of muskeet trees and
brushwood. About sunrise we arrived at Columbus, where we found
several steamers ready for us. Many of us were miserably
disordered from our weary midnight march. We encamped on the
Rio Grande. This evening our cannon was sent down the river two
miles to be shipped.
3d.—Orders were received at an early hour for the troops to bring
forward their saddles, rigging, &c., to be valued. A most unsightly
mass was soon presented, the dilapidated articles were gathered in
a heap. Our Sergeant gave notice he should value them as
condemned property, it being impossible to transport them. A large
fire was then made, and all were consumed. Our horses were placed
in charge of a Mr. Van Bibber, who for a stipulated sum engaged to
drive them through Texas to Missouri, and leave them at any point
we might designate. We walked a mile to the beach, where several
steamers awaited us. The sick went immediately on board. Two or
three companies started, while the rest of us were detained till very
late to assist in shipping the cannon. Orders were given that we
should remain all night, so we went again on shore, spread our
blankets on the beach, and spent the night rather uncomfortably.
4th.—It commenced raining at 3 o’clock this morning. After eating a
breakfast of coffee and a few hard crackers, we hurried on board the
steamer. Here we found both cabin and deck crowded with men. Our
little steamer started in the midst of a heavy rain, rendering every
thing exceedingly unpleasant. Night came on and no cooking could
be done, so we went on shore, erected our tents, ate our suppers
and rested quietly through the night.
5th.—The bell rang at 3 o’clock for us to come on board which we
accomplished in the course of an hour. One fellow being rather slow,
was left behind, but he regained the boat before she had gone two
miles. Fortunately for him an accident happened to the wheel, which
was found to be broken, thus detaining us for repairs several hours.
We did not reach Matamoras till two o’clock. Here we stopped but a
very few minutes, and proceeded on till sunset. The boat now
stopped to take in wood, and the Captain informed us that he should
leave at moonrise. We laid down on deck on our blankets.
Sunday, 6th.—I was awakened at one o’clock by the deck hands to
make room to haul in the foot plank. I found myself drenched with
filthy water, which had run under me as I slept. Quietly folding up my
blanket I thought I would make no complaint, as I was near my
journey’s end. About sunrise we reached the Balize, when all hands
landed and erected the tents. After breakfast, with a number of
others, I went to bathe in the sea. We let the breakers pass over our
heads. They came with such force, that in my present reduced state,
I found it difficult to stand up under them. Nor could I remain long in
the water.
7th.—We are encamped on the banks of the Rio Grande, eight miles
from the shipping, which is on the opposite side of this narrow neck
of land.
8th.—A regiment of regulars landed to-day, on their way to the seat
of war. No ship has appeared as yet to take us off.
9th.—This morning we had orders to start for Brazos Santiago, nine
miles from this place. We had not proceeded far through the deep
sand, when it became necessary for those who had the remnant of
shoes, to pull them off, on account of the sand gathering in them, it
being above the ankle at every step. Our feet became badly blistered
by the heat and friction. Most gladly did I spread my blanket on the
sand and enjoy a night of rest, after the fatigues of the day. We are
not yet at the end of this uncomfortable journey. The shipping is in
sight, and a short march in the morning will relieve the weary teams
of their burdens.
10th.—We are all on board—artillery, baggage, and a motley crew of
250 men, with unshaved faces, ragged and dirty, but all in fine
spirits, save a few poor fellows, whose thin visages show the
ravages of disease and suffering.
11th.—The past has been a memorable night. For suffering I have
not experienced its equal in all my peregrinations through life. In the
brig, on board of which we took passage, there were 100 bunks (a
slight elevation made of plank) for the soldiers to sleep on. When I
got in mine, the crowd was so great and the air so oppressive, that I
thought I would get out, and take a few pulls at the fresh
atmosphere. Groping along in the dark, I endeavored to find some
place of egress, but the whole gangway was strewed with men, and I
was forced to return, amid a shower of blessings from the poor
fellows, on whom I had the misfortune to tread. I laid the rest of the
night in this hot place, more dead than alive. There was not the
slightest air, and I was covered with a profuse perspiration.
12th.—An inspection of this brig, which was beautiful in its exterior,
convinced me that it was a filthy place indeed; especially between
decks. It was certainly worse than a hog-pen, for just above our
bunks, there was a sty, in which were several of the real material.
Two small fires were built for the soldiers to cook with, and so many
crowded around them, all anxious to be served, that a long time
elapsed before I could get my coffee. As a matter of convenience we
were supplied with hard crackers and molasses. This diet only
increased my disease, and I turned a longing eye on a large turtle
which had been killed and was being served up for our officers, and
the inmates of the cabin.
13th.—Our allowance of water was a coffee pot full twice a day for
coffee, and a pint apiece for each man to drink; a hogshead had
been drawn upon deck for our use. There is a guard kept throughout
each day, over this hogshead of miserable water, not fit for horses to
drink. It was with mingled feelings of admiration and sorrow that I
saw our brave fellows, who had borne the fatigues of the march, and
the strong blows of the battle, come humbly around the hogshead,
which was a central point of attraction, and ask for a little cup of
water, when they were almost famished, and could drink several
pints were it allowed them. It is a gloomy Sabbath evening—nearly
calm.
14th.—We are running S. E. by E., though the boat scarcely glides
along, there being a calm. It seems that the water is becoming
scarcer to-day. The Captain has directed that a quart only shall be
given to each man for all purposes. And it is to last 24 hours. When
this was announced one of the men muttered something which I did
not hear, but which the Captain disliked; for he told us all, that if any
one made another threat, he would blow his brains out as quick as
he would shoot a rattlesnake. When this threat was heard the men
all roared out in a hearty laugh. The Captain was of middle size,
somewhat corpulent, swarthy in complexion, and blind in his right
eye. He was rough in his manners, but talked very little, especially to
us, privates. He is master of the brig and is employed by government
to convey troops across the gulf. His name is Woodsides. This
morning about a pint of water was issued to each man. Of course, no
coffee is made. We mixed a little vinegar with some water, and with
crackers and molasses, made out our supper. Two dolphins were
caught by the sailors, and one of our men caught a young shark.
Another turtle is served up for the cabin. It was so warm that I could
not sleep in my bunk, but lay in the gangway, on my blanket. At
midnight a steamer came alongside, and the Captain took on board
several barrels of water. It was truly a blessing for us.
15th.—Coffee and fried shark for breakfast, but a dreadful sore
mouth (which I fear is the scurvy) makes the eating a painful
performance. Every indication of land was near. At 12 o’clock the
Captain said we were 80 miles from the Balize. In anticipation of a
storm, the sails were furled, but a little sprinkle of rain was all, and
we again spread our canvass to the breeze. A sailor was sent aloft to
see if the light house was in sight, and after remaining in the cross
trees two hours, he came down and said he saw it. A short time after
the cry was heard, “the pilot boat is coming.” Sails were furled, and
the pilot was soon on board. In the meantime some one cried “three
cheers for Capt. Woodsides!” The cry was echoed by the crowd, and
Capt. Woodsides looked bullets. A flag was placed on the bow, a
steamer came alongside and towed us over the bar, where our
Captain anchored. We now draw water up the sides of the ship, for
we are in the Mississippi river, 100 miles from New Orleans. The
water is good and there is plenty of it, as the river is full. Every man
has just as much as he can use, and we use it freely enough. After
supper I went to my bunk, but found it too warm to rest in, so I took
my blanket, and laid down, as usual, in the gangway—but not being
able to stretch my feet out, in consequence of a sack of bacon in the
way, I got up and searched about, and at length found an empty
bunk of some one who had gone on deck to spend the night. I felt
weak and sick from the heat.
16th.—We drew our water from the river to get some breakfast, the
sailors are washing off the deck, and if any man happens in the way,
he is sure of having a bucket full thrown on him; of course several of
our boys have had a good drenching. At 8 o’clock a steamer took us
in tow. As we proceeded up the Mississippi, we beheld on its banks
large plantations of the sugar cane which present a lovely contrast
with some countries over which I have marched. On the left side of
the river is Fort Jackson, now nearly in ruins, but still a beautiful
place. With several of our men I slept on the deck of the steamer.
We were all in good spirits at the prospect of getting home, though
the want of a change of clothes at this particular juncture is keenly
felt. Some are covered with filth, and vermin, which have kept their
hiding places within our garments, for many a long day.
17th.—We are now among the thick settlements, and sugar
plantations which line the river as we approach the city. I remained
most of the night on deck, and ate an early breakfast of the usual
diet. Afterwards Capt. Hudson had one of the big guns taken up, and
fired a salute as we passed a pretty little village. We are now on the
site of the battle ground, where General Jackson fought the English
in 1814—continued our course up the river, and fired several times.
At last, we were safely landed on the wharf in New Orleans. Upon
my head there was no hat, having lost my last remnant overboard in
the gulf. My pants, I had thrown away three days before, because
(being composed of deerskin worn into tatters,) I despaired of
making them look decent. A pair of drawers, rather the worse for
wear, and an old overcoat, constituted my dress. If, to this
description of my person I add that my hair, beard, and mustachios,
had been left to vegetate undisturbed ever since I left Fort
Leavenworth, then some idea may be formed of the accomplished
soldiers of Col. Doniphan’s command.
18th.—In company with twelve others I got in an omnibus to search
for some clothes and quarters; came three miles to a large clothing
establishment, where our wants as to garments were soon supplied.
The barber next exercised his skill, and it was with many an amusing
jest and laugh that we regarded each others altered and improved
appearance. Comfortable quarters were secured, and to-night I am
reposing in a quiet boarding house. Here I feel that no homage of my
soul is profound enough to render due adoration to that gracious
Providence Who has protected and guided me, while marching over
the wild plains, and through the mountain passes of Mexico.
“Deserts in vain opposed our onward course;
O’er hostile lands and wild untravelled wastes,
Our journey we pursued, nor feared the floods,
Through deep ravines that flow; dire banked with death;
Nor mountains in whose jaws destruction grinned.
Though floods rapacious roaring as they rolled,
And mountains huge and rough were circled round
By roving bands of restless savage foes.”
22nd.—On Sunday last I went to the M. E. Church and listened to an
excellent sermon. I was kindly invited by a stranger, who introduced
himself to me, to dine and spend the evening with him. I complied
with his request and was pleasantly entertained. After tea I returned
to my boarding house, which is kept by a Mr. Wren, and whose
charge is moderate, viz. $4 per week. On my first introduction here I
committed a blunder, the thought of which has frequently caused me
to smile. It shows the contrast between a camp life and the more
polished proceedings of life in the city. When I was called to the first
meal, I seated myself at the table in the presence of my hostess, and
commenced operations as I supposed in a manner the most polite
and refined. Casting a glance at the lady I observed that she was
eyeing me with a curious interest. The smile that played upon her lip
told me that she was amused at some awkwardness of mine or
some oddity in my appearance. And what was my surprise when I
found that I had jerked my old knife from my pocket and was cutting
my meat placed upon my bread in my usual way. The habit had been
fixed upon me, and notwithstanding the neat arrangements of the
table I could not resist the propensity to indulge in my camp
customs.
26th.—On board the steamer Louisville bound for Cincinnati. The
boat is crowded, but a mattress on which to lie is a luxury. A few
hours ago, I parted with many of my fellow soldiers and friends, with
feelings which it is impossible for me to describe. I am not in a
situation to continue with the regiment until it reaches its final
destination. My mouth is so sore that the least effort to masticate my
food is very painful, and I cannot eat, now that I have before me all
the luxuries of life; and even if I could it would be improper for me to
do so, on account of a long continued diarrhœa and pain in my
breast and side. I feel that I am greatly changed when I compare the
present with the time when I last glided over this beautiful stream.
Then so full of health and anticipations of pleasures and happiness,
now, a sick soldier—a mere skeleton of a man, bronzed by the
burning rays of a Mexican sun, and worn down by the prolonged
fatigue of travelling, watching and toil. I regret very much that I
cannot go to St. Louis, as requested by Col. Doniphan, where an
enthusiastic reception is awaiting him. To express myself in
measured terms about our Commander, would not be expressive of
my feelings, and I feel how utterly incompetent I am to utter his
eulogy. The man who can familiarise himself with the poorest private,
by some kind word, or ride among the troops, and make us forget
that we were hungry or thirsty by some pleasant converse, in our
long and toilsome march;—the man who can forget his own personal
safety in the hour of danger, and rise superior to every
embarrassment—who can be prepared for every emergency, by
superior skill in the tactics of war—as well as a refined sense of
honor, and an open suavity of manner, not only leading captive the
hearts of his entire command, but thousands of the hostile foe—such
a man is a treasure to society, an honor to his country. And, such a
man, is the brave Doniphan. It was with the feelings of a brother or a
friend to whom I owed many obligations, that I grasped the hand of
this great man, who kindly wished me a safe return to my family.
27th.—Our noble steamer has made good headway up the river,
passed Baton Rouge, and at nine o’clock at night came in sight of
Natchez.
28th.—Passed the Grand Gulf at 10, and at 2 got to Vicksburg. The
pleasure of feasting my eyes on scenes so lovely, and which are
presented by a trip to the “Father of Waters,” compensates for any
little inconvenience arising from our crowded state.
30th.—At this time we are near Memphis. There is some excitement
on board. A man laboring under the effects of mania potu is quite
crazy, and has attempted several times to jump overboard. Just now
he entered the ladies’ cabin and struck his wife; one of our officers
interfered, and soon placed him on his back. But a further attempt to
kill his child made it necessary to secure him. With several others I
entered the ladies’ cabin, and helped to tie this gentleman. He made
much useless resistance.
July 1st.—Slept but little—the surrounding bustle and noises mingled
strangely with dreamy anticipations of soon receiving the cordial
welcome of friends, that I fondly think that are eagerly awaiting me in
my native home.
West River, July 10th.—Let no brave soldier say he cannot shed
tears of joy, when clasped in the arms of his aged, widowed mother,
after an absence of nearly two years, in which he has encountered
the perils of both land and sea—travelling nearly 6000 miles, 2200
being through the heart of an enemy’s country, and witnessing death
in every shape and feature.
It were an endless task to attempt any thing like a minute description
of that part of Mexico through which we travelled. Our route lay for
the most part, on the Rio Grande del Norte, whose head waters rise
in the Green Mountains, several hundred miles above Santa Fe. It
forms the western boundary of Texas, and can be easily forded at
almost any point above El Paso. In the dry season it is extremely
low, and can be of very little importance for navigation, except near
its mouth, which flows into the Gulf of Mexico. It is thought this river
has a course of from 15 to 1800 miles. The country is elevated:
being traversed by a range of mountains extending far to the
northward. Among the inhabitants, I saw every shade of complexion,
from a dark swarthy, or yellow, to the palest white. But few are
handsome among the ladies; and this is principally to be attributed to
their great love of coloring the skin with red paint. The mountaineers
are mostly poor, and almost universally destitute of every thing
beyond the bare necessaries of life. Their flocks and herds constitute
their principal riches, and their implements of husbandry are all of
the most simple character. Their ploughing such as it is—is effected
by a wooden plough, to which is attached two or four oxen, and the
wheat is slightly covered over, having been previously sown on the
hard ground. There are some fertile valleys in this mountainous
range, but the poor simple inhabitants have very little idea of taking
advantage of the natural resources of their country. After we left
Chihuahua, fields of cotton and corn, interspersed at intervals with
the sugar cane, presented themselves. The ranchos are always
about a day’s journey apart, and the whole aspect of nature in these
delightful spots, is one of the most inviting that can be imagined, as a
field of operation, for the industry and art of man. The soil here is
fertile, and what is generally termed bottom land; and with proper
culture would be made as productive as any of our western lands, as
the climate is more genial. They grow only a few vegetables, of
which the red pepper appears to be a favorite, these they string and
hang on the outsides of their houses so thick that on approaching I
frequently thought I should see a painted dwelling, but was to see
only a miserable dirty hut. The mines of Mexico afford her principal
wealth, but of this the poorer classes obtain but little, they are kept in
ignorance and degradation by a government which has borne the
name of Republican, but which every one who sojourns in that
country must soon discover to be a mockery, for the mass of the
people are subject alone to the will of the Roman clergy, and are not
free to act. There is no slave in any of our Southern States whose
situation they have not reason to envy. The women are more
degraded if possible than the men, and more slovenly in their
appearance, and while this is the case in any country the morals of
the people must remain at a low grade. Since my return, I have
heard of the enthusiastic reception of Col. Doniphan at St. Louis, an
account of which I annex as published in the Baltimore American.
Our business was not, however, to see all that was worth seeing, but
to hurry on to the place we started for and when arrived at that to
make arrangements to hurry on again.
 COL. DONIPHAN’S MARCH.
At the recent reception of the Missouri volunteers under Col.
Doniphan at St. Louis, the address of welcome was delivered by Mr.
Senator Benton. The speech is characteristic—exhibiting that clear
and graphic narrative and those strong and concentrated
expressions for which the Senator is remarkable.
The orator gave an outline of the long march of this gallant regiment
—first, a thousand miles to New Mexico, which became a starting
point of a new departure. Then Chihuahua was aimed at—
Chihuahua, a rich and populous city of nearly thirty thousand souls,
the seat of the government of the state of that name, and formerly
the residence of the Captains General of the Internal Provinces
under the vice-regal government. In advancing towards Chihuahua
the adventurous regiment encountered incredible hardships. They
passed over the desert called el jornada de los muertos—the journey
of the dead—an arid plain of ninety miles strewed with the bones of
animals perished of hunger and thirst and marked by continual
mementos of men who had fallen victims to the perilous way. They
fought the enemy at the Bracito, and gained a decisive victory
although opposed by superior numbers strong in cavalry and
artillery. Again at Sacramento the intrepid band fought and
conquered a vastly superior force. Mr. Benton calls that victory “one
of the military marvels of the age.” At length Chihuahua is reached
and taken; and there the bold adventurers must pause to determine
which way next they shall direct their steps. They had occupied a city
about as far from St. Louis as Moscow is from Paris. Let Col.
Benton’s graphic narrative be heard:
“Chihuahua gained, it became, like Santa Fe, not the terminating
point of a long expedition, but the beginning point of a new one. Gen.
Taylor was somewhere—no one knew exactly where—but some
seven or eight hundred miles towards the other side of Mexico. You
had heard that he had been defeated—that Buena Vista had not
been a good prospect to him. Like good Americans you did not
believe a word of it; but like good soldiers, you thought it best to go
and see. A volunteer party of fourteen, headed by Collins of
Boonville, undertake to penetrate to Saltillo, and to bring you
information of his condition. They set out. Amidst innumerable
dangers they accomplish their purpose; and return. You march. A
vanguard of one hundred men, led by Lieut. Colonel Mitchell, led the
way. Then came the main body, (if the name is not a burlesque on
such a handful,) commanded by Col. Doniphan himself.
“The whole table land of Mexico, in all its breadth, from west to east,
was to be traversed. A numerous and hostile population in towns—
treacherous Cumanches in the mountains—were to be passed.
Every thing was to be self-provided—provisions, transportation, fresh
horses for remounts, and even the means of victory—and all without
a military chest, or even an empty box, in which government gold
had ever reposed. All was accomplished. Mexican towns were
passed, in order and quiet: plundering Cumanches were punished:
means were obtained from traders to liquidate indispensable
contributions: and the wants that could not be supplied, were
endured like soldiers of veteran service.
“I say the Cumanches were punished. And here presents itself an
episode of a novel, extraordinary, and romantic kind—Americans
chastising savages for plundering people who they themselves came
to conquer, and forcing the restitution of captives and of plundered
property. A strange story this to tell in Europe, where back-woods
character, western character, is not yet completely known. But to the
facts. In the muskeet forest of the Bolson de Mapimi, and in the
sierras around the beautiful town and fertile district of Parras, and in
all the open country for hundreds of miles round about, the savage
Cumanches have held dominion ever since the usurper Santa Anna
disarmed the people; and sally forth from their fastnesses to
slaughter men, plunder cattle, and carry off women and children. An
exploit of this kind had just been performed on the line of the
Missourians’ march, not far from Parras, and an advanced party
chanced to be in that town at the time the news of the depredation
arrived there. It was only fifteen strong. Moved by gratitude for the
kind attentions of the people, especially the women, to the sick of
General Wool’s command, necessarily left in Parras, and unwilling to
be outdone by enemies in generosity, the heroic fifteen, upon the
spot, volunteered to go back, hunt out the depredators, and punish
them, without regard to numbers. A grateful Mexican became their
guide. On their way they fell in with fifteen more of their comrades;
and, in short time, seventeen Cumanches killed out of sixty-five,
eighteen captives restored to their families, and three hundred and
fifty head of cattle recovered for their owners, was the fruit of this
sudden and romantic episode.
“Such noble conduct was not without its effect on the minds of the
astonished Mexicans. An official document from the Prefect of the
place to Captain Reid, leader of this detachment, attests the verity of
the fact, and the gratitude of the Mexicans; and constitutes a trophy
of a new kind in the annals of war. Here it is in the original Spanish,
and I will read it off in English.
“It is officially dated from the Prefecture of the Department of Parras,
signed by the Prefect Jose Ignacio Arrabe, and addressed to Capt.
Reid, the 18th of May, and says:
“‘At the first notice that the barbarians, after killing many, and taking
captives, were returning to their haunts, you generously and bravely
offered, with fifteen of your subordinates, to fight them on their
crossing by the Pozo, executing this enterprise with celerity, address
and bravely worthy of all eulogy, and worthy of the brilliant issue
which all celebrate. You recovered many animals and much
plundered property; and eighteen captives were restored to liberty
and to social enjoyments, their souls overflowing with a lively
sentiment of joy and gratitude, which all the inhabitants of this town
equally breathe, in favor of their generous deliverers and their valiant
chief. The half of the Indians killed in the combat, and those which fly
wounded, do not calm the pain which all feel for the wound which
your excellency received defending christians and civilized beings
against the rage and brutality of savages. All desire the speedy re-
establishment of your health; and although they know that in your
own noble soul will be found the best reward of your conduct, they
desire also to address you the expression of their gratitude and high
esteem. I am honored in being the organ of the public sentiment, and
pray you to accept it, with the assurance of my most distinguished
esteem.
“‘God and Liberty!’”
“This is a trophy of a new kind in war, won by thirty Missourians, and
worthy to be held up to the admiration of christendom.”
The regiment arrived at Gen Taylor’s camp at Monterey, and
reported themselves ready for duty. They were prepared to go with
the hero of Buena Vista to San Luis Potosi, or Zacatecas, or the city
of Mexico. They regarded not their fatigues nor the approaching
expiration of their term of service. “But unhappily,” says Mr. Benton,
“the conqueror of Palo Alto Resaca de la Palma, Monterey and
Buena Vista, was not exactly in the condition that the Lieutenant
General, might have been, intended him to be. He was not at the
head of 20,000 men! he was not at the head of any thousands that
would enable him to march! and had to decline the proffered service.
Thus the long marched and well fought volunteers—the rough, the
ready, and the ragged—had to turn their faces towards home, still
more than two thousand miles distant.”
The last nine hundred miles of the land march from Chihuahua to
Matamoras was made in forty-five days with seventeen pieces of
artillery, eleven of which had been taken from the enemy. During all
their long march this regiment of hardy soldiers received from the
Government not a dollar of pay; they furnished for the most part their
own supplies and forage and clothing, and yet brought back nearly
their whole number. “You marched farther than the farthest,” says Mr.
Benton, “you have fought as well as the best, left order and quiet in
your train, and cost less money than any.”
Col. Doniphan made an eloquent address in reply to the oration of
welcome, and towards the close of it, he turned to his men, the
companions of his toils and dangers, and said:
“You have endured much toil and hardship. It is now about to
terminate. You have arrived once more in the land of civilized
society, and again we are citizens mingling with our fellow-citizens.
Your lot has been a hard one in many respects.
“Before reaching New Mexico, by two hundred miles, you were on
half rations, and never afterwards, for a single day, during our long
and arduous march to Saltillo, did you receive full rations. Yet all this
you have borne, and you have borne it with fortitude. The order
which you received to march in Major Gilpin’s command, with a large
column, over the Sierra Madre, covered with perpetual snow—
proceeding on your march on shortened allowance, without tents or
transportation, and many other comforts, because the Government
was unable to furnish them; yet you bore it all, and were ready to
resume your march in two days on the city of Chihuahua. You have
travelled over five states of Mexico, and five very large ones, in point
of territory.
“Perhaps the citizens of St. Louis do not know what a Bonava is, but
I will answer for every man in my command, knowing what they are. I
may assure you, had you crossed them, you too, would have known
what they are. The shortest one that we crossed was fifty miles and
one ninety-five miles, which we crossed in three days in December,
without wood, without water, without tents, at an elevation of 7000
feet above the Atlantic ocean. In sending expresses to the distance
of 600 miles, when I was unable to furnish them with the means of
carrying provision and other comforts with them over immense sand
prairies covered with snow, I have never made a detail, but all were
volunteers, or when I have sent out parties for the purpose of
watching the enemy who have had to starve for days, I never made
a detail in this column, but all were volunteers, and I am proud to say
it.”
 TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:
Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.
Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been
standardized.
Archaic or variant spelling has been retained.
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JOURNAL OF
WILLIAM H. RICHARDSON, A PRIVATE SOLDIER IN THE
CAMPAIGN OF NEW AND OLD MEXICO, UNDER THE COMMAND
OF COLONEL DONIPHAN OF MISSOURI ***

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