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Alexander of Aphrodisias
Commentary on Aristotle, Metaphysics (Books I–III)
Berlin‑Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften

Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca et Byzantina
(CAGB)

|
Series academica

Herausgegeben von
Dieter Harlfinger, Christof Rapp, Marwan Rashed,
Diether R. Reinsch

Volume 3/1
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Commentary on
Aristotle, Metaphysics
(Books I–III)

|
Critical edition with Introduction and Notes

Edited by
Pantelis Golitsis
Herausgegeben durch die Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Dieser Band wurde im Rahmen der gemeinsamen Forschungsförderung von Bund und Ländern im
Akademienprogramm mit Mitteln des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung und mit
Mitteln des Regierenden Bürgermeisters von Berlin, Senatskanzlei – Wissenschaft und Forschung
erarbeitet.

ISBN 978-3-11-073244-3
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-073132-3
ISSN 2700-6417

Library of Congress Control Number: 2021934667

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar.

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Satz: le-tex publishing services GmbH, Leipzig
Druck und Bindung: CPI books GmbH, Leck

www.degruyter.com
Prologue
The present edition of Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is the out-
come of a project (GO 2467/1-1) which was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (DFG) from January 2015 to August 2017. I am extremely grateful to Oliver Pri-
mavesi (Munich) and the anonymous referees for supporting my project. Because of
the generous funding from the DFG, I was able to travel through Italy for seven months
and to inspect in situ thirteen out of twenty-three manuscripts that contain Alexan-
der’s commentary on the Metaphysics, then to spend almost two years in Paris, work-
ing at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, in which a further seven manuscripts of
the commentary reside, and at the Centre Léon Robin (CNRS), where I fruitfully dis-
cussed problematic aspects of the textual tradition of the commentary. The edition
was brought to completion in the framework of the project Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca et Byzantina under the auspices of the Berlin–Brandenburgische Akademie
der Wissenschaften during the years 2018–2021.
I would like to express my warmest thanks to the colleagues and friends who
helped me with my research, through discussion and practical support, in Italy and
France: Stefano Martinelli-Tempesta (Milan), Stefano Serventi (Milan), Daniele Bian-
coni (Rome), David Speranzi (Florence), Eleonora Gamba (Bergamo), Marwan Rashed
(Paris), Jean-Baptiste Gourinat (Paris), Christian Förstel (Paris), Leone Gazziero (Lille)
and Michel Crubellier (Lille). I am also grateful to the personnel of the libraries where
my research was conducted: the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, the Biblioteca Apostolica Vat-
icana, the Biblioteca Angelica, the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, the Biblioteca Es-
tense, the Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli, the Biblioteca Marciana, the Bibliothèque
nationale de France, the Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de la Sorbonne, the Biblio-
thèque Léon Robin.
This book has been accepted as a Habilitationsschrift at the Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität München. I wish to thank my ‘Fachmentor’ Oliver Primavesi for our fruitful
and vivid discussions on what a critical edition should look like, as well as Christof
Rapp and Stephen Menn for their helpful comments on Chapters One and Two. Oliver
Primavesi, Marwan Rashed and Carlos Steel made several critical comments on Chap-
ter Two, which helped me improve it significantly. I warmly thank Dieter Harlfinger for
his goodwill (as always) and his scrupulous reading of Chapters Two and Three, which
saved me from many errors. I also thank Lutz Koch and Nikos Agiotis of the Berlin-
Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften for their critical spirit and their valu-
able advice on editorial matters, as well as my lifelong friend Georgios Bolierakis for
his suggestions and his very careful reading of the Introduction. I am also grateful to
Paraskevi Naka for her help in preparing the indices and to Carson Bay for copy editing
the English text. I alone am responsible for any shortcomings.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110731323-201
VI | Prologue

Finally, I wish to express my love and gratitude to Tatiana, who gave birth to our
second daughter Phoebe not far from the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, when her sister Helle
was not yet two years old and their father had just stopped thinking about philoso-
phers, scholars and scribes.

Pantelis Golitsis
Contents
Prologue | V

Abbreviations | IX

Bibliography | XI

Part I: Introduction

1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics | XXIII

1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXIII
1.1.1 A unitary reading of the Metaphysics | XXIV
1.1.2 The significance of Aristotelian noetics for a unified reading
of the Metaphysics | XXXI
1.1.3 The general structure of the Metaphysics and its culmination | XXXIV
1.2 Alexander’s commenting method | XXXIX

2 The textual tradition of Alexander’s commentary

on the Metaphysics | XLVII
2.1 The transmission of the genuine text in Late antiquity, Byzantium,
and beyond | XLVII
2.1.1 Further genuine readings in one branch of the manuscript
tradition | LV
2.1.2 Stemma codicum of the manuscripts and the indirect sources that
should be used in a critical edition | LXXXIII
2.2 Textual interpolations by John Chortasmenos and Andronicus
Callistus | LXXXIII

3 The manuscripts of Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics | XCII

3.1 Alexandrea | XCIV
3.2 Pseudo-Alexandrea | CXXII
3.2.1 ‘Recensio altera’ | CXXII
3.2.2 Michael of Ephesus | CXXVII
3.3 Pseudo-Philoponea | CXXXII
3.4 Excerpta | CXXXIV

4 Eliminatio codicum | CXXXVII

4.1 The three families | CXXXVII
4.1.1 The descent of A | CXXXVII
4.1.2 The descent of O | CXXXIX
VIII | Contents

4.1.3 The descent of P | CXL

4.1.4 ‘Contaminations’ | CXLII
4.2 Stemma codicum | CXLII

5 The present edition and its relation to previous editions | CXLIV

5.1 The previous editions and Sepúlveda’s translation | CXLIV
5.2 The present edition | CLII
5.2.1 Apparatus fontium et locorum aristotelicorum | CLIII
5.2.2 Apparatus criticus et historicus | CLIII
5.2.3 Apparatus lectionum aristotelicarum | CLIV
5.2.4 Conventions | CLVI

Part II: Editio critica

Conspectus siglorum | CLIX

Auctores et editiones | CLX

ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΕΩΣ ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΑ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ | 1

ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΕΩΣ ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑ ΕΙΣ ΤO ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ Α ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ | 109

ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΕΩΣ ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ Β ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ | 138

Part III: Appendices

A Ioannis Chortasmeni interpolationes | 231*

B Andronici Callisti interpolationes | 237*
C Parisini gr. 1878 variae lectiones | 247*
D Parisini gr. 1878 lectiones in hac editione approbatae | 260*
E Index correctionum traditionis manu scriptae et coniecturarum | 270*

Part IV: Plates

Part V: Indices nominum et locorum

Index nominum | 293*

Index locorum | 297*
Abbreviations
An. On the Soul
Anal. Post. Posterior Analytics
Anal. Pr. Prior Analytics
Cat. Categories
Cael. On the Heavens
Eth. Nic. Nicomachean Ethics
Gener. Corr. On Generation and Corruption
Mem. On Memory and Recollection
Metaph. Metaphysics
Meteor. Meteorology
Mot. An. On the Motion of Animals
Part. An. On the Parts of Animals
Phys. Physics
Sens. On Sense and What Is Sensed
Top. Topics

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110731323-202
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|
Part I: Introduction
1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics
1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary

Editing Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (fl. 200 AD) commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics

is a complicated task for both historical and scholarly reasons. To begin with, there
is some doubt whether Alexander, whose full name was Τίτος Αὐρήλιος Ἀλέξανδρος,¹
commented on the entire treatise or only on some of its books. At any rate, the direct
Greek tradition of the text delivers no commentary beyond book Delta. Nevertheless,
Averroes has preserved some thirty fragments of Alexander’s commentary on book
Lambda² and Syrianus refers to some of Alexander’s comments in his own commen-
tary on books Mu and Nu.³ Taken together with three mentions of Alexander in Ascle-
pius’ commentary on book Zeta,⁴ these references suggest that Alexander composed
a commentary on the entire Metaphysics.
This, of course, is hardly surprising. Quite in opposition to modern and contem-
porary interpreters,⁵ Alexander adopted a unitarian approach to the Metaphysics,⁶
which, of course, in his time was already a single treatise and had already been the ob-
ject of commentaries. As a ‘diadoch’ and holder of the Peripatetic chair, rivalling the
chair-holders of the other Schools (Platonic, Stoic and Epicurean) founded in Athens
by Marcus Aurelius in 176 AD,⁷ Alexander naturally had to present his auditors and
readers with a coherent doctrine of the Peripatetic School on the basis of Aristotle’s
own writings but also to defend the Peripatetic tradition, renewed some two hundred

1 According to the epigraphic evidence from Aphrodisias discussed by Chaniotis 2004: 388–389.
Alexander had a homonymous father, who was awarded Roman citizenship by the governor of Asia
(135/136 AD) Titus Aurelius Fulvus Antoninus (the later emperor Antoninus Pius), as the pronomina
Titus Aurelius imply.
2 See Freudenthal 1885; Genequand 1986. Di Giovanni – Primavesi 2016 raise some issues as to
whether Averroes had access to Alexander’s genuine commentary.
3 Syrianus, In Metaph. [= Kroll 1902] 96.18, 111.34, 122.12 and 18, 160.8, 166.27, 186.16, 195.12. In 186.16,
Alexander is quoted by Syrianus as an authority for the traditional division between books Mu and Nu.
Alexander’s commentary on Nu is mentioned in the Kitāb al-Fihrist of the tenth century; see below,
p. xlviii, n. 3.
4 Asclepius, In Metaph. [= Hayduck 1888] 408.5 and 20, 428.13.
5 The only exception is Menn (forthcoming), who proposes, to my mind magisterially and convinc-
ingly, a unitary approach to the treatise.
6 On this see lately Guyomarc’h 2015; see, characteristically, p. 12: “L’Exégète travaille à faire de la
Métaphysique un livre, et de la métaphysique une science une”.
7 See Toulouse 2008. Alexander was appointed as an imperial teacher of Peripatetic philosophy at
some time between 198 and 209 AD, given that he addresses his De fato to Septimius Severus and
Caracalla, who were joint emperors from 198 to 209; see Todd 1976: 1 n. 3. In the inscription discovered
in Aphrodisias (see n. 1), Alexander styles himself as τῶν Ἀθήνησιν διαδόχων.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110731323-204
XXIV | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

years earlier through the publication of Aristotle’s so-called esoteric treatises.⁸ The
very structure and unity of Aristotle’s single books (συγγράμματα), larger wholes or
treatises (πραγματεῖαι)⁹ and philosophical system (φιλοσοφία)¹⁰ was part and parcel
of that tradition.

1.1.1 A unitary reading of the Metaphysics

Alexander lays out his unitary approach to the Metaphysics in his commentary on the
beginning of A 2 (982a 4 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν…):

From the present treatise we must therefore demand knowledge of the first principles and causes.
These would be the principles of being qua being,¹¹ in virtue of which [principles] each being is,¹²
[each being, that is] each thing of which we predicate being. The first substances, those that are

8 On this renewal see lately Primavesi 2007.

9 The division of Aristotle’s newly discovered treatises into larger wholes related by content is, in
my opinion, what Porphyry credits to Andronicus of Rhodes (fl. 60 BC) with regard to Aristotle’s newly
discovered treatises; cf. Porphyry, Vita Plotini, 24.9–11: ὁ δὲ [sc. Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ῥόδιος] τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους
καὶ τὰ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών.
10 This is, in my view, what the work Περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους συγγραμμάτων by Adrastus
of Aphrodisias (cf. Simplicius, In Cat. [= Kalbfleisch 1907] 18.16–17 and In Phys. [= Diels 1882] 4.11–12
[alternatively reported, in In Cat. 16.1–2, as Περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας]) undertook
to establish (next to quantitative matters as, e.g., the number of lines of a given treatise). His work was
surely influential. Adrastus may have been the first holder of the Peripatetic chair in Athens. Sim-
plicius, In Cat. 16.1–2, calls him ἀνὴρ τῶν γνησίων Περιπατητικῶν γεγονώς (“a man who has come
to belong to the genuine Peripatetics”); γνήσιος (‘genuine’, ‘legitimate’) seems related to an official
function and γεγονώς to a promotion.
11 Reading with Bonitz τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ἀρχαί instead of τοῦ ὄντος οἷον ἀρχαί, which is what Hayduck
prints (in accordance with the manuscripts) and Donini 2011: 109, Bonelli 2012: 260 n. 3, Guyomarc’h
2015: 102 and others adopt. It is remarkable that Bonitz’s conjecture is not even discussed, whereas not
one of these scholars explains why the principles of being (qua being), which are principles par excel-
lence, would be “quasi-principles”. Bonitz’s conjecture is confirmed by the anonymous prolegomena
to the Metaphysics (published by Moraux 1980); see n. 100 (αὗται δ᾽ ἂν εἶεν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ἀρχαί…) and
my note ad locum. Cf. also 106.31–107.1: εἰσὶν αἱ ζητούμεναι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (sc. Ἀριστοτέλους) τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν
ἀρχαὶ κοιναὶ πάντων αὗται, and 239,13–15 Η.: τοῦτο δὲ δείκνυσι διὰ τοῦ δεῖξαι τὰς ἀκροτάτας ἀρχάς τε
καὶ αἰτίας, περὶ ἃς ὁ σοφὸς καταγίνεται, πρῶτον μὲν οὔσας φύσεώς τινος ἀρχὰς καθ᾽ αὑτάς, ἔπειτα ὅτι
ταύτης τῆς φύσεως· τοῦ γὰρ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν αἱ τοιαῦται ἀρχαί. This passage, as reconstructed by Bonitz, is
sufficient to discredit Merlan 1957, who thinks that for Alexander being qua being is identical with the
first substance. The first substances are the principles of being qua being and, of course, the principle
itself is not identical with that of which it is the principle.
12 Genequand 1979, Dooley 1989, Donini 2011 and Movia et al. 2014 take ἐστιν as existential, which is
fine if by ‘𝑠 exists’ they mean ‘𝑠 is ὄν’ in virtue of its having a form regardless of the particular form (τὶ
ὄν) it has (cf. Alexander, In Anal. Pr. [= Wallies 1883] 366.22–27: νῦν λέγει ποσαχῶς ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν
ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν· ὁσαχῶς γὰρ αἱ κατηγορίαι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὄντων γένη διῄρηται. ἢ γὰρ ὡς οὐσίαν τὸ
κατηγορούμενον τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὂν αὐτοῦ ληπτέον ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν, ὡς ἐν τῇ
‘ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν’, ἢ ὡς ποσότητα αὐτοῦ δηλοῦν, ὡς ἐν τῇ ‘ὁ ἄνθρωπος τρίπηχύ ἐστιν’, ἢ ὡς
 1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXV

substances in the most proper sense (αἱ πρῶται καὶ κυριώταται οὐσίαι), are such principles, for (as
[Aristotle] will show) they are the principles of substances, and these latter are the principles of all
other things. It is therefore the knowledge of these first substances that we must demand from the
present treatise, and further of whatever contributes to the knowledge of them; [Aristotle] indeed
devotes the greater part of his discussion to these accessory questions, for it is impossible to
acquire knowledge of the first substances in any other way than by having first established [some
other points] and removed any obstacles beforehand (μὴ προκαταστήσαντα καὶ προεκκαθάραντα
τὰ ἐμποδών).¹³

Aristotle will explicitly say that the substances (οὐσίαι) are “the principles of all other
things”, i.e. the things said in the categories other than the category of substance,
in book Gamma but also in book Lambda,¹⁴ in which he will precisely show what
are the first substances, mentioned by Alexander, which are principles of all other
substances, namely perpetual heavenly substances and perishable sublunary sub-
stances.¹⁵ Indeed, for Alexander at least, the first οὐσίαι, of which the Metaphysics will
yield knowledge in its culmination in book Lambda, are the immaterial forms (ἄυλα
εἴδη) or νόες in the proper sense;¹⁶ these are the (forty-eight?) unmoved movers¹⁷ of
the heavenly spheres, which account for their eternal and regular celestial motions,¹⁸
which in their turn are responsible for the perpetual generation and corruption (and
the periodic growth and decay) of all sublunary substances. Following Aristotle’s us-
age in Λ 8, in the passage quoted above Alexander specifically employs the word

ποιότητα, ἂν λευκὸς εἶναι ῥηθῇ…). Alexander’s explicative sentence promptly explains τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν,
which is mentioned immediately before without τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό. See also n. 20.
13 9.6–13: χρὴ οὖν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας ἀπαιτεῖν τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτίων· αὗται
δ᾽ ἂν εἶεν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ἀρχαί, δι᾽ ἃς τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν τὸ εἶναι κατηγοροῦμεν. τοιαῦται δὲ
αἱ πρῶται καὶ κυριώταται οὐσίαι· αὗται μὲν γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀρχαί, αἱ δὲ οὐσίαι τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων,
ὡς δείξει. τήν τε οὖν τούτων γνῶσιν ἀπαιτεῖν χρὴ ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας καὶ ἔτι ὅσα εἰς τὴν τούτων
γνῶσιν συντελεῖ, εἰς ἃ καὶ ὁ πλεῖστος αὐτῷ λόγος ἀναλίσκεται· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐκείνων γνῶσιν ἄλλως
λαβεῖν, μὴ προκαταστήσαντα καὶ προεκκαθάραντα τὰ ἐμποδών. Transl. Dooley 1989, modified.
14 Cf. Γ 2, 1003b 16–19: πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, καὶ δι’
ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.
Λ 1, 1069a 18–21: περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ
ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος· καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ οὕτως πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιὸν ἢ
τὸ ποσόν.
15 On the three different kinds of substances, discussed by Aristotle in Λ 2–5, see Rapp 2016.
16 See n. 47. It has to be stressed, though, that whereas pseudo-Alexander, i.e. Michael of Ephesus,
does use the plural form νοῖ in his commentary on the posterior books, Alexander never does (the
form νόες is first attested in Plotinus). I take it, however, that his speaking of first οὐσίαι in the plural
legitimizes this light anachronism.
17 Only one of them, however, i.e. the First Principle, is unmoved both per se and per accidens; cf. Λ 8,
1073a 23–25. The rest of the νόες are unmoved per se but “are moved accidentally by another” insofar
as they are, in a way, in the higher celestial sphere; cf. Phys. VIII 6, 259b 28–31 and see Menn 2012:
440–442.
18 Cf. Λ 8, 1074a 14–16: τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς
ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους καὶ <παρὰ> [addidi] τὰς αἰσθητὰς τοσαύτας εὔλογον ὑπολαβεῖν.
XXVI | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

οὐσίαι to refer to the unmoved movers of the celestial spheres.¹⁹ The First and the other
unmoved movers are the immediate causes of the particular eternal motions of the ce-
lestial substances and, through them, they are also causes of being (τὸ εἶναι) to all
sublunary substances; in other words, the immaterial forms, which are the unmoved
movers, ultimately account for the fact that everything in the universe has and retains,
eternally or for a longer or shorter span of time, its form,²⁰ which is what is best for it.
It is in this comprehensive sense that the first substances are said by Alexander to be
the principles and causes of being qua being.
Being qua being (ὂν ᾗ ὄν) is meant to denote being in its most indeterminate sense
(μηδενὶ ἀφωρισμένως τῶν ὄντων),²¹ that is, being simpliciter, along with the per se
attributes of being²² which are common in (and true of) all heavenly and sublunary

19 Cf. also Alexander, Quaestio I 25 [= Bruns 1892], 40.23–27: πλειόνων δὲ σφαιρῶν οὐσῶν τῶν τοῦ
θείου σώματος ἡ μὲν πρώτη τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω ἁπλῆν τε καὶ μίαν κινεῖται κίνησιν ἐκείνης ἐφέσει τῆς
οὐσίας, αἱ δὲ μετὰ ταύτ<ην τεσσαράκοντ>α [scripsi : ταῦτα codd. Bruns] ἑπτὰ κινοῦνται μὲν καὶ τούτων
ἑκάστη ἐφέσει τε καὶ ὀρέξει τινὸς [codd. : τῆς Bruns] οὐσίας, ὁποίας καὶ ἡ πρὸ αὐτῶν. “There are several
spheres in the divine body, and the first and outermost is moved in a simple and single motion by
desire for that substance [i.e. the First unmoved mover]; and of the <forty->seven after it, each one too
is moved by desire and appetite for some substance [i.e. the other separate unmoved movers] of the
sort by which the sphere before them [i.e. the outermost sphere] is also moved”. It would be a gross
error on Alexander’s part to identify the number of the heavenly spheres, which explain the orbits of
the planets (a single orbit corresponding to a single desire) with the number (ἑπτά) of the planets;
hence my emendation of the transmitted text. Aristotle concludes, albeit tentatively, to the existence
of forty-seven (or, alternatively, fifty-five) heavenly spheres (without counting the outermost sphere) in
Λ 8, 1074a 13–14, in a notorious passage that has caused many difficulties to his interpreters. I defend
the reading of the manuscripts (47, emended to 49 by Sosigenes) in a forthcoming publication.
20 That the being (τὸ εἶναι) of each thing is dependent on its form is not clear in this context. Com-
pare, however, what I suggest should be considered as Alexander’s prolegomena to the Metaphysics
(2.7–8: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ τοῦτο, <τὸ> ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος εἶναι τὸ εἶναι.
“Everyone agrees on that too, namely that to einai belongs to each being according to its form”) and,
at any rate, with Alexander, De anima [= Bruns 1887] 88.26–87.1: ἐν πᾶσιν γὰρ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ κυρίως
τι ὂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι τοιούτοις. “For all things, whatever is in the highest degree and
properly 𝑥 is also the cause of other things’ being 𝑥”, where ‘properly 𝑥’ is a form per se, e.g. light,
and ‘being 𝑥’ is a property of some other thing, e.g. being visible. Speaking of τὸ εἶναι τοιούτοις in
the context of the Metaphysics would be misplaced, since in the Metaphysics there is no question of
a particular being but of being qua being.
21 Cf. 258,20–22 H.: ἐπεὶ δὲ μηδενὶ ἀφωρισμένως τῶν ὄντων, τῷ ὄντι ἂν ᾗ ὂν ὑπάρχοι καθ’ αὑτό,
ὥστε τῆς περὶ τὸ ὂν πραγματευομένης ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἡ τούτων γνῶσις οἰκεία καὶ τῶν τούτοις
συμβεβηκότων. “Since [sameness and otherness and whatever things are objects of inquiry concern-
ing contraries] do not belong to any [particular] kind of being determinately, they would belong per
se to being qua being, so that the knowledge of these things and of their accidents would be proper to
the science which treats of being [qua being]”; transl. Madigan 1993, modified.
22 Cf. 144.10–11: … τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν θεωρητικῆς τὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν
κοινῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπαρχόντων τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖσθαι (relating to Γ 1, 1003a 21–22: ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ
θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό). “It belongs to first philosophy, which contem-
 1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXVII

substances,²³ regardless of their qualified or particular being (e.g. their being sepa-
rate and eternally moved, which belongs to the heavenly sensible substance, or their
being separate and generated and corrupted, which belongs to the sublunary sensible
substance, or their being unmoved and inseparate, which belongs to the intelligible,
i.e. mathematical, substance); particular being is not studied by the Metaphysics or
“first philosophy” but by the particular sciences:

Universal philosophy (ἡ φιλοσοφία ἡ καθόλου) differs from other sciences in that each of those
sciences is concerned with particular being (τὶ ὄν), while universal philosophy is concerned not
with particular being but with being qua being.²⁴

As in the passage just quoted, Alexander often renames “first philosophy” (πρώτη
φιλοσοφία), which is an expression repeatedly used by Aristotle to refer to the sci-
ence of the things that exist separately from matter,²⁵ to “universal philosophy” (ἡ
φιλοσοφία ἡ καθόλου),²⁶ which is not used by Aristotle, so that the focus of this
science falls on the study of being qua being (τὸ καθόλου, τὸ κοινόν), as opposed
to particular being, and its per se attributes (unity and plurality and connected at-
tributes). Nonetheless, on Alexander’s view, who naturally wishes to be faithful to
Aristotle,²⁷ “first philosophy” is also specifically related to the study of the first sub-
stances (πρῶται οὐσίαι):

So it is concerning substances: the ungenerated and imperishable, incorporeal and unmoved

substances are first, and first philosophy would be concerned with these; the philosophy con-
cerned with substances that are eternal but in motion would be second; the philosophy con-

plates being qua being, to carry out a contemplation of those things, too, which commonly belong to
being”.
23 I.e. unity, the things that fall under unity (sameness, equality, likeness etc.) and the things op-
posed to unity, i.e. plurality and what falls under it (otherness, contrariety); cf. 238,5–14 H. The per se
attributes of being will also include axioms, that is, truths that hold for all things such as the principle
of non-contradiction; cf. 238,14–17 H.: περὶ πάντα ἄρα τὰ καθ’ αὑτά καὶ κοινῶς τῷ ὄντι ᾗ ὂν ὑπάρχοντα·
τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀξιώματα. ἐφ’ οἷς δείκνυσιν ὅτι κοινότατον καὶ γνωριμώτατων τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἐστὶ
τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνυπάρχειν τὴν ἀντίφασιν.
24 244,26–28 H.: … ἡ φιλοσοφία ἡ καθόλου ταύτῃ διαφέρουσα τῶν ἄλλων, ᾗ ἐκείνων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
περὶ τὶ ὂν ἑκάστη, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἡ καθόλου περὶ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ τὶ ὄν.
25 See Metaph. E 1, 1026a 24 and K 4, 1061b 19; Phys. I 9, 192a 34–36 and II 2, 194b 14–15; Cael. I 8, 277b
10; An. I 1, 403b 16; Mot. An. 6, 700b 9.
26 Cf. also 258,23–24 H.: ἡ καθόλου τε καὶ κοινὴ φιλοσοφία.
27 Cf. Aristotle’s characteristic reference to the “formal principle” in Phys., I 9, 192a 34–36: περὶ δὲ τῆς
κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀρχῆς, πότερον μία ἢ πολλαὶ καὶ τίς ἢ τίνες εἰσίν, δι’ ἀκριβείας τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας
ἔργον ἐστὶν διορίσαι. “Whether there is one formal principle or more, and what it is or they are, it
belongs to First Philosophy to determinate it with accuracy”. This passage looks forward to book
Lambda, and specifically to chapters 7–9, in which it will be shown that there is a number of sepa-
rate substances that intelligize themselves.
XXVIII | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

cerned with substances involved in coming-to-be and perishing would be third, since these are
the last among substances.²⁸

Moreover, and seemingly more problematically, in one passage Alexander enumer-

ates first philosophy, along with physics and ethics, as one of the species of sophia or
universal philosophy, which itself deals with being qua being:

The genus, i.e. the common nature of being, is the object of science for common and generic
philosophy, and so the parts of being are objects of science for the parts of philosophy. Thus each
of the sciences which are ranged under philosophy as a sort of generic science would be a science
of each species of being […]. And the species of generic philosophy match the species of being. For
its species are: (i) first philosophy (ἥ τε πρώτη φιλοσοφία), which is called wisdom in the proper
sense (κυρίως), being the science of things eternal, unmoved, and divine [[it is wisdom that is
both universal (καθόλου) and first (πρώτη), given that it is concerned with being qua being and
not with a particular being; and, under wisdom, there is a particular first philosophy concerned
with the first substances]],²⁹ and (ii) physics (ἥ τε φυσική) is concerned with natural things, in
which there is already motion and change. There is also a particular [philosophy, i.e. ethics,]
which considers matters of action (for there are also beings that are of this sort).³⁰

28 251,34–38 H.: οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν πρῶται μὲν αἱ ἀγένητοί τε καὶ ἄφθαρτοι, ἀσώματοί τε καὶ
ἀκίνητοι, περὶ ἃς ἂν εἴη ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία· ἡ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἀιδίους μὲν ἐν κινήσει δὲ δευτέρα, τρίτη δὲ
ἡ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας τὰς ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὗται τῶν οὐσιῶν τελευταῖαι. Transl. Madigan
1993, modified.
29 I take this to be a marginal scholium by a reader objecting to or, rather, confused by Alexander;
otherwise we are led to a paradox: κυρίως σοφία and πρώτη σοφία will be two different things, which
is against the standard usage of κυρίως and πρώτως as equivalent (so the problem is not only, as most
scholars justly remark, that Alexander speaks of two first philosophies, the one being general and
the other particular, as that the κυρίως σοφία is said to be other than the “πρώτη σοφία”). Moreover,
Alexander says explicitly that it is first philosophy, i.e. “the science of things eternal, unmoved and
divine”, which is “wisdom in the proper sense”, so that it is hard to see how wisdom as universal
science could be first, that is, prior to wisdom in the proper sense. Rather, universal science is wisdom
because, by studying being qua being, it studies the effect of the first substances, the knowledge of
which constitutes wisdom in the proper sense. Donini 2011 argues that Alexander uses ‘first’ in two
different meanings, referring to the science of (axiologically) first substances and to the (generically)
first science. But using the same word in two different meanings in quite a short passage like this would
not be appropriate of a good commentator, all the more so because Alexander could have conveyed
the exact same meaning by simply saying ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία ἐστὶν ἡ καθόλου (without adding τε καὶ
πρώτη). The fact that generic wisdom is also qualified as πρώτη rather points to a kind of objection
against Alexander’s explanation. Bonelli 2012 suggests deleting the passage εἴδη δὲ αὐτῆς … θείων.
But her suggestion fails to see that εἴδη is correlative to φιλοσοφία ὡς γενική τις ἐπιστήμη and that
what comes in between (245,33–37 H.) is parenthetical; see also below, p. xliv–xlv. Besides, if this
were a gloss, it would be a very elliptical one.
30 245,29–246,6 H.: Ἔστι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος κοινὴ φύσις ἐπιστητὴ τῇ κοινῇ τε καὶ γενικῇ
φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τὰ μέρη ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιστητὰ τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρεσιν. ὥστε ἑκάστου τῶν τοῦ
ὄντος εἰδῶν ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη ἑκάστη τούτων, ὅσαι ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίαν ὡς γενικήν τινα ἐπιστήμην τεταγ-
μέναι εἰσὶν ἐπιστῆμαι (…)· εἴδη δὲ αὐτῆς ὅσα τὰ τοῦ ὄντος. εἴδη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἥ τε πρώτη φιλοσοφία, ἥτις
καὶ κυρίως σοφία καλεῖται, οὖσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἀιδίων τε καὶ ἀκινήτων καὶ θείων [ἡ μὲν σοφία ἐστὶν
 1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXIX

The construction ἥ τε … ἥ τε … aptly reflects the Aristotelian distinction between first

philosophy [= metaphysics] and second philosophy [= physics], which are considered
as the chief theoretical sciences by both Alexander and Aristotle.³¹ Ethics comes only
afterwards as a further particular philosophy, so that the traditional division of phi-
losophy in Alexander’s time, of Stoic origin, is satisfied.³²
Despite appearances, the passage quoted above does not imply that, for Alexan-
der, first philosophy is different from universal philosophy and that first philosophy
is subordinate to universal philosophy, or that Alexander separates the Metaphysics
into two blocs or different objectives, the one dealing with theology and the other with
“ontology”, as in the late scholastic distinction between metaphysica specialis and
metaphysica generalis³³ or in modern interpretations of the Metaphysics.³⁴ Alexander
adheres to a unitary reading of the Metaphysics and explains a bit later in the commen-
tary that “universal philosophy” and “first philosophy” are one and the same science,
which is “first” in two ways:

First [philosophy] would be both (i) the philosophy which is concerned with the first substances
and (ii) the philosophy which is concerned universally with all substance and the things which
are themselves beings by virtue of belonging to substance. The same [philosophy] turns out to be
first in both ways: both (i) the philosophy which contemplates the first substances also contem-
plates all other things whose being depends on these, and (ii) the philosophy which commonly
contemplates being qua being, since being is among the things spoken of as derived from one
thing and with reference to one thing, will mostly consider this [first] nature, to which the other
things which it discusses are referred, and from which they derive their being.³⁵

ἡ καθόλου τε καὶ πρώτη, εἴ γε αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν ἀλλ’ οὐ τὶ ὄν· ἔστι δὲ ὑπὸ ταύτην ἡ μέν
τις πρώτη φιλοσοφία ἡ περὶ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας ut scholium delevi : habent codd. edd.], ἥ τε [scripsi
cum P : δὲ codd. edd.] φυσικὴ οὖσα περὶ τὰ φυσικά, ἐν οἷς ἤδη κίνησις καὶ μεταβολή· ἡ δέ τίς ἐστι
τῶν πρακτῶν θεωρητική (τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τῶν ὄντων τινά). Transl. Madigan 1993, modified. This pas-
sage was perceived as problematic by Andronicus Callistus (one of the scribes of Parisinus gr. 1878;
see Chapter 2), who emended it as follows: εἴδη δὲ αὐτῆς ὅσα τὰ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ δέ ἐστιν ἡ σοφία ἡ
καθόλου τε καὶ πρώτη, εἴ γε αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν ἀλλ’ οὐ τὶ ὄν, εἶεν ἂν ὑπὸ ταύτην ἥ τε πρώτη
φιλοσοφία, ἥτις καὶ κυρίως σοφία καλεῖται, οὖσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἀιδίων τε καὶ ἀκινήτων καὶ θείων καὶ
πρώτων οὐσιῶν, ἥ τε φυσική…
31 Cf. Γ 3, 1005b 1–2: ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρώτη.
32 See Guyomarc’h 2015: 179.
33 Genequand 1979.
34 See, eminently, Jaeger 1912.
35 266,6–14 H.: Πρώτη δ’ ἂν εἴη ἥ τε περὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν [θεωροῦσα add. edd.] καὶ ἡ καθόλου
περὶ πάσης οὐσίας καὶ τῶν τῷ αὐτῆς τι εἶναι ὄντων καὶ αὐτῶν. ἀμφοτέρως δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ γίνεται πρώτη·
ἥ τε γὰρ περὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν θεωροῦσα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων θεωρεῖ, οἷς ἐκ τούτων
ἤρτηται τὸ εἶναι, ἥ τε κοινῶς περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν θεωροῦσα, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὂν τῶν ἀφ’ ἑνός τε καὶ πρὸς
ἓν λεγομένων, μάλιστα ἂν περὶ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως θεωροίη, πρὸς ἣν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα περὶ ὧν ποιεῖται τὸν
λόγον ἀναφέρεται, καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. Transl. Madigan 1993, modified.
XXX | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

First philosophy and universal philosophy are two aspects of the same science. By
studying the immaterial divine substances, which are “first” because all other sub-
stances (and, in virtue of the latter, all beings said in the categories other than the
category of substance) derive their being from them (or acquire their form for the sake
of them), first philosophy studies all other things in that it studies the first principles
and causes to everything else; and, on this account, first philosophy is also universal
philosophy. For knowledge of the first principles as immaterial forms that function as
final causes to everything else yields to the first philosopher the universal knowledge
that the form of each thing, regardless of what each thing is, is what is best for each
thing to be and that according to which each thing has unity and being, sameness and
otherness etc. By studying being universally, that is, being qua being, universal phi-
losophy studies the widest effect of, and discovers as its cause, the eminent being, i.e.
the divine and first substance, from which all other being derives and with reference
to which it is (and is said) being; and, on this account, universal philosophy is also
first philosophy. For knowledge that to be, to be one, to be one-and-many, to be the
same as and other than, to be similar to and dissimilar to etc. in a universal sense (i.e.
regardless of what each thing is), is to have a form yields to the universal philosopher
knowledge of a First Form or Substance, from which each form (or being) is derived.
Being, Alexander says, is said ab uno and ad unum (ἀφ’ ἑνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἕν). To put
it simply, this means that there are beings which are more beings than other beings
and that there is a being which is being in an absolute sense, that is, it is being in such
a way that no other being is. These beings are indeed the first principles and causes,
i.e. the divine εἴδη (or νόες), which, as Alexander says using an expression similar to
the πρῶται καὶ κυριώταται οὐσίαι quoted earlier,³⁶ are “beings in the highest degree”
(μάλιστα ὄντα).³⁷ Among them there is an eminent being, the Good (τὸ ἄριστον),³⁸ the
knowledge of which constitutes wisdom; this is what the Metaphysics strives for:

The knowledge of that which is being in the most proper sense, and the best of beings, and being
in the highest degree, is the greatest good [for man] and the end of wisdom.³⁹

In order to understand what is absolute being and how one being is more being than
another, we now have to turn to Alexander’s noetics and its relation to cosmology.

36 See 9.8–9 (quoted above, p. xxv).

37 237,9–10 H.: ταῦτα [sc. αἱ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἴτια] γὰρ μάλιστα ὄντα.
38 Cf. Λ 10, 1075a 11–12: τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.
39 151.5–6: ἡ γὰρ τοῦ κυριωτάτου τέ καὶ ἀρίστου τῶν ὄντων καὶ μάλιστα ὄντος γνῶσις, μέγιστον οὖσα
ἀγαθόν, ἐκείνῃ [sc. τῇ σοφίᾳ] τέλος.
 1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXXI

1.1.2 The significance of Aristotelian noetics for a unified reading

of the Metaphysics

In his treatise On the soul Alexander says that “for all things, whatever is in the highest
degree and properly 𝑥 (τὸ μάλιστα καὶ κυρίως τι ὄν) is also the cause of other things’
being 𝑥”.⁴⁰ For instance, what is visible in the highest degree, i.e. light, is the cause of
the greater or lesser visibility of all other things.⁴¹ This principle being valid overall,⁴²
and since all things have forms, there must be a Form that is the cause, to a greater or
a lesser degree, of the form of all other things, a “Form of forms”, as Aristotle says,⁴³
or, in Alexander’s words, a “First Form”:

Now, the First Form would be cause also qua efficient cause. For [Aristotle] says in the Metaphysics
that that which is moved by it, “that” being the fifth body, “moves the other things”, i.e. those
that come to be and perish. It is in this way that [the First Form] moves qua efficient cause. On the
other hand, insofar as everything achieves its perfection through its desire for [the First Form], as
we said a little earlier, and insofar as, as Aristotle himself says again in the Metaphysics, “it moves
qua being loved”, it would be cause qua end and that for the sake of which; for this is “what is
desired”.⁴⁴

Since each thing is what it is according to its form, the First Form will be the cause of
being or essence of all other things; indeed, the Form of forms will be the First cause,
since it will be the immediate or mediate cause of all forms or essences and, through
them, of all secondary beings (i.e. beings which depend on essences or substances).⁴⁵

40 See above n. 20.

41 Cf. Alexander, De anima 89.1–2. Compare with Aristotle, α 1, 993b 24–26: ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ
τῶν ἄλλων καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον (οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις
τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο τῆς θερμότητος).
42 Gyuomarc’h (2015: 21) calls it “principle of maximum causality” (principe de causalité du maxi-
mum) and rightly describes it as “one of the cardinal schemes of Alexander’s thought”.
43 Cf. Aristotle, An. III 8, 432a 2: ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν. It should be noted, however, that Alexander is
more liberal than Aristotle with the use of the word εἶδος.
44 Alexander apud Simplicium, In Phys. 258.17–24: τὸ δὲ πρῶτον εἶδος καὶ ὡς ποιητικὸν ἂν εἴη αἴτιον.
λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ κινούμενον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, «τοῦτο» δέ ἐστι τὸ πέμπτον σῶμα,
«τὰ ἄλλα κινεῖ» [Metaph. Λ 7, 1072b 4] τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ποιητικόν· καθόσον δὲ
πάντα τῇ τούτου ἐφέσει τῆς οἰκείας τελειότητος τυγχάνει, ὡς καὶ μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, καὶ καθόσον,
ὡς αὐτὸς εἴρηκε πάλιν ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, «κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον» [1072b 3], εἴη ἂν ὡς τὸ τέλος
καὶ τὸ οὗ χάριν αἴτιον· τοιοῦτον γὰρ «τὸ ὀρεκτόν» [1072a 26]. I discuss this passage and how it relates
to Alexander’s contention that God (or First Form) is solely the final cause of the universe in Golitsis
2017.
45 Cf. the parallel in In Metaph. 9.9 (αἱ δὲ οὐσίαι τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων [sc. ἀρχαί]) and in Quaestio Ι 1,
5.23–24: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο [sc. τὸ ἐν οὐσίᾳ] καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔστιν.
XXXII | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

Now, that which is form in the highest degree is the form which has no matter at
all, i.e. either in knowledge or in the thing itself.⁴⁶ This form is “the intelligence in the
proper sense” (ὁ κυρίως νοῦς),⁴⁷ i.e. the Form that is intelligible in the proper sense
and in the highest degree (τὸ κυρίως τε καὶ μάλιστα νοητὸν εἶδος), which Aristotle
in his On the Soul calls “efficient intelligence” (ποιητικὸς νοῦς).⁴⁸ This Intelligence is
efficient both in that it causes the “material intelligence” (ὑλικὸς νοῦς) of souls to ac-
quire a form (ἕξις ἡ τοῦ ὑλικοῦ νοῦ), that is, to exercise in themselves an intellectual
activity,⁴⁹ and in that it is the cause of being of all intelligences (τὰ νοούμενα), in other
words the immaterial νόες which are responsible for the motions of the ensouled bod-
ies of the heavens.⁵⁰ This means that the κυρίως νοῦς is responsible for all intelligibles,

46 Composite things, such as horse and tree for instance, are enmattered forms but are without matter
in knowledge. Cf. Alexander, Quaestio I 1, 4.15–16: καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις τότε νοητά, ὅταν ὁ νοῦς
αὐτὰ χωρίσῃ τῶν ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ ὥσπερ ἁπλᾶ αὐτὰ θεωρῇ, which relates to Metaph. Λ 9, 1075a 1–2.
47 Cf. Alexander, De anima 89.17–19: τοιοῦτον δὲ ὂν δέδεικται ὑπ’ Ἀριστοτέλους τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ
καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοῦς· τὸ γὰρ ἄυλον εἶδος ὁ κυρίως νοῦς.
48 Cf. Alexander, De anima 88.23–25: ἐπεί ἐστιν ὑλικός τις νοῦς, εἶναί τινα δεῖ καὶ ποιητικὸν νοῦν, ὃς
αἴτιος τῆς ἕξεως τῆς τοῦ ὑλικοῦ νοῦ γίνεται. εἴη δ’ ἂν οὗτος τὸ κυρίως τε καὶ μάλιστα νοητὸν εἶδος.
“Since there is some sort of material intelligence, there must also be some sort of efficient intelligence,
which is the cause of the content that is present in the material intelligence. This [Intelligence] would
be the form that is intelligible both in the proper sense and in the highest degree”. Cf. Aristotle, An.
III 5, 430a 10–15; Aristotle speaks rather of παθητικὸς νοῦς (430a 24) but he relates this kind of νοῦς to
what is potentially all things, i.e. matter (ὕλη), at the beginning of the chapter. The expression μάλιστα
νοητὸν εἶδος echoes Metaph. Λ 7, 1072b 18–19: ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ
μάλιστα (sc. νόησις) τοῦ μάλιστα (sc. νοητοῦ). See also n. 57.
49 Cf. Alexander, De anima 89.4–7: καὶ τὸ μάλιστα δὴ καὶ τῇ αὑτοῦ φύσει νοητὸν εὐλόγως αἴτιον καὶ
τῆς τῶν ἄλλων νοήσεως· τοιοῦτον δὲ ὂν εἴη ἂν ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν τι νοητὸν φύσει, οὐδ’
ἂν τῶν ἄλλων τι νοητὸν ἐγίνετο. “What is intelligible in the highest degree and by its proper nature
would reasonably be the cause of the intellection that other things have; this sort of thing would be the
efficient intelligence. For if there were not something intelligible by [its own] nature, no other thing
would become intelligible”. The cause of the forms of all things is also the cause of the intellection of
these forms by other intellects.
50 Cf. Alexander, De anima 89.9–11: ἔτι, εἰ ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ
εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, εἴη ἂν καὶ ταύτῃ ποιητικός, ᾗ αὐτὸς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς νοουμένοις. Most
scholars (see lately Guyomarc’h 2015: 274–275) think that νοούμενα are equivalent to the ἄλλα that
become νοητά (see preceding note). But, if this is the case, one cannot explain why Alexander intro-
duces the variation between νοητά and νοούμενα in such a short passage and, moreover, one cannot
understand why this particular passage is supposed to introduce a further aspect (ἔτι, καὶ ταύτῃ) of
the efficiency of νοῦς. In my opinion, Alexander here uses νοούμενα as Aristotle uses it in Λ 9, where
he says that “for things that have no matter”, i.e. pure forms, “νοῦς and νοούμενον are the one and
same thing, and νόησις is one with the νοούμενον” (1075a 3–5), where νόησις describes the pure activ-
ity that God is (or Gods are). Thus, Alexander means that the First cause or ποιητικὸς νοῦς is ποιητικός
not only in that it produces the intelligible form that resides in the soul of the heaven but also in that it
gives being to other pure νόες which, by being present in the souls of the heavenly bodies, produce the
rest of the heavenly motions. That the First cause is a cause of being for the other νόες (and not merely
a cause of motion for the outermost heavenly sphere) is an important idea, in itself absent in Aristotle,
 1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXXIII

existing either per se or in intelligizing souls, which as objects of perpetually actual

intellection are responsible for the formation of matter.⁵¹
In Quaestio I 1 (Διὰ τίνων ἄν τις συστήσαι τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη
[Through what arguments one might establish the first cause according to Aristotle]),⁵²
Alexander follows a different procedure. He argues that the best body, that is, the
heavenly body, which, as best, is of course ensouled, is moving eternally and con-
tinuously in accordance with the impulse (καθ’ ὁρμήν) of its soul towards an eternal
object that it intelligizes and desires.⁵³ This object is “the οὐσία that causes motion in
the universe”,⁵⁴ which is unmoved (for if it were moved, it would itself require a cause
of motion) and has no potentiality but is eternally actual (for if it had potentiality, it
would potentially be the object of intellection and desire and the motion of the heav-
enly bodies would eventually cease).⁵⁵ Being unmoved, this οὐσία will be incorpo-
real,⁵⁶ i.e. Form, and being by its own nature intelligible and eternally actual, this pure
Form or pure Intelligible (ἁπλοῦν νοητόν) will be “intelligible in the highest degree”
(μάλιστα νοητόν).⁵⁷ By being intelligized, this pure Form (εἶδος) causes the eternal
circular motion of the outer sphere of the fixed stars,⁵⁸ which encompasses all other
motions. Other such οὐσίαι, we may add, are responsible for the rest of the heavenly
motions.
By being intelligized, these οὐσίαι are νοητά and νόες or, as Alexander would
put it, immaterial forms (εἴδη), and by being most intelligible, they are more forms

which we later encounter in the Metaphysics of the Book of Cure of Avicenna and in the subsequent
Arabic tradition.
51 Matter is local in the case of heavenly bodies and substantial in the case of sublunary ones.
52 See Sharples 1992; Rashed 2007: 291–293.
53 Cf. Alexander, Quaestio I 1, 3.17–19: ὥστε εἴη ἂν καὶ τὸ ἀίδιον σῶμα καθ’ ὁρμὴν καὶ κατ’ ἔφεσίν τινος
κινούμενον· τοῦ δὲ καθ’ ὁρμὴν καὶ κατ’ ἔφεσιν κινουμένου δεῖ εἶναί τι, οὗ ἐφιέμενον τοῦτο κινεῖται τὴν
ἀίδιον κίνησιν, ἀίδιον καὶ αὐτὸ ὄν.
54 Alexander, Quaestio I 1, 4.16–17: ἡ κινητικὴ τοῦ παντὸς οὐσία.
55 Cf. Alexander, Quaestio I 1, 3.20–24: καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς κινοῦν ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ,
ἄμοιρον παντάπασιν δυνάμεως· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται δυνάμει, οἷόν τε ἔσται καὶ τὴν κίνησιν φθαρῆναι, μὴ ὄντος
ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ κινήσοντος αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο κινήσει κινούμενον, δεήσει
καὶ τούτῳ πάλιν ἄλλου κινοῦντός τινος.
56 Cf. Alexander, Quaestio I 1, 3.25: ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀκίνητον, ἀσώματον.
57 Cf. Alexander, Quaestio I 1, 4.13–15: μάλιστα γὰρ νοητὸν τοῦτο τῷ τε μάλιστα εἶναι ἀεὶ ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ
καὶ τῷ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει τὸ ἁπλοῦν νοητόν. For ἁπλοῦν cf. Metaph. Λ 7, 1072a 30–32: νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ
νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ᾽ αὑτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ
καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν.
58 Cf. Alexander, Quaestio Ι 1, 4.7–8: καὶ πρῶτον νοητὸν καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν καὶ μάλιστα
τὸ κινητικὸν τῆς κύκλῳ κινήσεως εἶδος. As pure form, this οὐσία is “object of appetition in the highest
degree” (μάλιστα ὀρεκτή), since it is “what is good in the highest degree by its own nature” (τὸ τῇ
αὑτοῦ φύσει καλὸν μάλιστα); cf. Quaestio I 1, 4.17–19 with Metaph. Λ 7, 1072a 28: βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον
τὸ ὂν καλόν.
XXXIV | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

than other forms, i.e. enmattered forms. These are the πρῶται καὶ κυριώταται οὐσίαι,⁵⁹
which Alexander mentions in his commentary on Metaph. A 2 as causes of being in its
widest sense, namely being qua being. (Strictly speaking, it is only the First Form that
is the cause of being qua being absolutely, since it gives being to the other immaterial
forms too.) Indeed, whatever is, that is, “each thing of which we predicate being” (or
each thing that has a form),⁶⁰ is for the sake of — that is, it achieves its proper perfec-
tion thanks to — the First cause (τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον), which qua ultimate final cause is
the Good:

All beings desire the supreme of the goods, that is, the Good, and the Good is the first cause.⁶¹

The rest of the πρῶται οὐσίαι, the νοούμενα, are subordinate to this First cause. They
are the per se unmoved movers, the final causes of the eternal heavenly locomotions
and thereby of the perpetual generations and corruptions that take place in the sub-
lunary world, through which all material things preserve their form (which is what is
best for each one of them) for a period of time. If the eternal heavenly bodies, Alexan-
der says, are “beings in the highest degree” (μάλιστα ὄντα), the causes of their eternal
being — which, for Alexander, means the causes of their eternal motion⁶² — will be
“more beings” (μᾶλλον ὄντα) than the heavenly bodies and will themselves be “be-
ings in the highest degree”.⁶³ The cause of being 𝑥 is “more being” than 𝑥 itself,⁶⁴ and
since being is to have a form, the Form which is the cause of all forms, i.e. the κυρίως
or ποιητικὸς νοῦς, will be the absolute being and the First cause.

1.1.3 The general structure of the Metaphysics and its culmination

With this in mind, let us return to Alexander’s unitary reading of the Metaphysics.
When Alexander says, in his On the soul, that “Aristotle has shown that [a form sepa-
rate from potentiality and matter] is the First cause, which is Intelligence in the proper
sense”,⁶⁵ he must think of the Metaphysics and, in particular, of book Lambda. In the

59 Remember that Aristotle speaks precisely of οὐσίαι in Metaph. Λ 8, where he discusses the number
of the unmoved movers of the heavenly spheres; see n. 18.
60 9.8: ὧν τὸ εἶναι κατηγοροῦμεν.
61 13.28–29: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα τοῦ κυριωτάτου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐφίεται καὶ τἀγαθοῦ, τἀγαθὸν δὲ τὸ
πρῶτον αἴτιον. For “proper perfection” (οἰκεία τελειότης) see the passage quoted in n. 44.
62 See Golitsis 2017.
63 Cf. 117.14–16: εἰ δὲ τὰ ἀίδια μάλιστα ὄντα, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὄντα τὰ τούτοις αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι ἀεί· διὰ γὰρ τὸ
εἶναι αἴτια τούτοις ἐκεῖνα τούτων μᾶλλον ὄντα καὶ μάλιστα ὄντα.
64 Thus, by transitivity, the heavenly beings, which are the causes of the eternity of the sublunary
beings in species (κατ’ εἶδος), will be more beings than the sublunary beings.
65 Alexander, De anima 89.17–19: τοιοῦτον [sc. εἶδος χωρὶς δυνάμεώς τε καὶ ὕλης] δὲ ὂν δέδεικται ὑπ’
Ἀριστοτέλους τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοῦς.
 1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXXV

commentary on the Metaphysics, while commenting on the starting phrase of book

Beta,⁶⁶ he gives a pertinent description of the science with which the Metaphysics is
concerned:

The science which is the object of the present inquiry and lies before [Aristotle] is both wisdom
and the theological science, [contained in a treatise] which he also entitles ‘Metaphysics’ because
it comes after the [treatise of]⁶⁷ physics in the order relative to us. He also calls it [i.e. both the
science and the treatise which contains this science] ‘First philosophy’, because it contemplates
the things which are first and of highest dignity [i.e. the πρῶται καὶ κυριώταται οὐσίαι or Gods].⁶⁸
For this same reason it is also ‘theological’. For Aristotle’s discussion in the Metaphysics is chiefly
(προηγουμένως) concerned with the cause, that is, the Form, which is on his view in every way
an immaterial substance, which he calls both ‘first god’ and ‘intelligence’.⁶⁹

As a matter of fact, Aristotle does not speak of a ‘first god’ (πρῶτος θεός) but he does
speak of “the principle, that is, the first among beings, which is immobile both per se
and per accidens” in book Lambda (Chapter 8),⁷⁰ where he also discusses God as νοῦς
and as νοήσεως νόησις (in chapters 7 and 9). In the subsequent commentary on book
Beta, Alexander makes clear that Aristotle will discuss “whether there exists a cause
that is separate and immaterial, and whether this cause is one or many in number
in book Lambda of the present treatise”.⁷¹ Therefore, προηγουμένως in Alexander’s
passage refers to the governing goal of the Metaphysics, which is the path leading to
the possession of the divine science or knowledge of divine things,⁷² especially of the

66 B 1, 995a 24–25: Ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς περὶ ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ
πρῶτον.
67 I take it that, had Alexander wished to designate not the treatise but the science of physics, i.e.
its objects, he would have said μετ’ ἐκεῖνα (sc. τὰ φυσικά) and not μετ’ ἐκείνην. In what I take to be
Alexander’s prolegomena to the Metaphysics (see 1.8–11), Alexander says that Aristotle conceived of
the Metaphysics as coming after the teaching of the Meteorology and the treatise On the Heavens, which
thus belong to the general treatise of physics. This ordering reflects a bottom-to-top conception in the
ordo cognoscendi of Aristotle’s system.
68 I refer to ‘Gods’, with a capital ‘G’, in order to distinguish the πρῶται καὶ κυριώταται οὐσίαι from
the lesser gods, i.e. the heavenly substances.
69 138.4–10: Ἡ μὲν ἐπιζητουμένη ἐπιστήμη καὶ προκειμένη νῦν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἡ σοφία τε καὶ ἡ θεολογική,
ἣν καὶ ‘Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά’ ἐπιγράφει τῷ τῇ τάξει μετ’ ἐκείνην εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. λέγει δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ πρώτην
φιλοσοφίαν, ὅτι τῶν πρώτων καὶ τιμιωτάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητική· διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ θεολογική· περὶ
γὰρ τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ εἴδους ὃ πάντῃ ἄυλός ἐστιν οὐσία κατ’ αὐτόν, ἣν καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καλεῖ, ὁ
λόγος ἐν τούτοις προηγουμένως αὐτῷ γίνεται.
70 Λ 8, 1073a 23–25: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός.
71 Cf. 145.20–22: εἰ ἔστι τι αἴτιον χωριστὸν καὶ ἄυλον, πότερον τοῦτο κατ’ ἀριθμόν ἓν ἐστιν ἢ πλείω,
περὶ ὧν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Λ τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας λέγει.
72 Cf. (in what I take to be, although possibly not in his very own words, Alexander’s prolegomena to
the Metaphysics) 2.17–19: εἰ τοίνυν διὰ τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας ὁ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς ἐνεργεῖ περὶ τὰ
θεῖα καὶ μάλιστα ὄντα, δῆλον ὅτι πάνυ χρησιμωτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία. “If then, through
the present treatise, the theoretical intelligence [in us] becomes active with regard to the divine things
XXXVI | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

“first god”, which is νοῦς (or νοήσεως νόησις); and this first god or νοῦς, together with
the rest of the νόες, are explored by Aristotle in book Lambda.
It is, thus, unfortunate that Alexander’s commentary on Lambda and the pre-
ceding books did not survive, since it was in all probability through them that the
Peripatetic exegete achieved his unitary reading of the Metaphysics.⁷³ Nevertheless,
thanks to some anticipating passages and to other works, as we have seen, we may
safely surmise that Lambda, in which the first substances are made known and
explored, represented for Alexander the culmination of the Metaphysics. Besides,
Averroes testifies that Alexander rendered this approach clear in his prolegomena to
Lambda:

Alexander begins by saying that those who say that this book Lām [= Lambda] is the last of this
science are right because some of the other books [Aristotle] wrote concerning this science con-
tain the difficulties that must be solved in it after they have been critically examined and others
[contain] the solutions of these difficulties; this is what he did in the books which come before
[scripsi : after codd. Genequand] this book.⁷⁴ In some books, he talks about the properties of be-
ing qua being; but in this book, he talks about the principles of being qua being and about the
principle [(i.e. the First Principle) scripsi : principles codd. Genequand] of the first [domain of]
substance [i.e. the intelligible substances], which is absolutely real.⁷⁵ He does it by showing that
there is a substance which is in this state and what this substance is; the elucidation of this sub-
stance is the final aim of this discipline.⁷⁶

The intermediate books of the Metaphysics are accessory books, in which predom-
inantly false paths⁷⁷ towards the quest of the first substances are progressively done
away with in accordance with the aporiae brought forth by Aristotle in book Beta. This
is precisely the meaning of προεκκαθάραντα τὰ ἐμποδών (9.13), which we saw in the

and beings in the highest degree, it is clear that the present treatise is extremely useful”. Cf. Α 2, 983a
21–23: τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς οὗ δεῖ τυγχάνειν
τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον, where the nature of the researched science is to be the most divine
(θειοτάτη) among the theoretical sciences and the skopos its possession by human beings (983a 11–12:
τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς).
73 This point is also made by Movia et al. 2014: vi.
74 Aristotle, of course, raises and solves the difficulties that pertain to the science of the first prin-
ciples in the books that precede book Lambda. That he should do so in the books following Lambda
contradicts what Averroes says immediately afterwards about Mu and Nu (“In the two books which
come after it, he does not explain anything pertaining to his primary aim”). Besides, as Stephen Menn
tells me, the Arabic text employs the plural and not the dual, as one would expect from Averroes, had
he in mind books Mu and Nu. Notice that Averroes’ comment may have influenced John Argyropoulos
(1415–1487), who did not include books Mu and Nu in his Latin translation of the Metaphysics; see
Argyropoulos 1515.
75 I take it that “absolutely real” renders Alexander’s τὰ μάλιστα ὄντα, said of the separate εἴδη or
νόες, causes of the eternal heavenly substances; “absolutely real” cannot qualify the first sensible
substance, i.e. the heavenly substances.
76 Bouyges 1948: 1394; transl. Genequand 1986, modified.
77 I borrow the expression from Menn (forthcoming).
 1.1 Scope and contents of the commentary | XXXVII

beginning of this chapter, and to which Averroes’ testimony also refers (“some of the
other books [Aristotle] wrote concerning this science contain the difficulties that must
be solved…”).⁷⁸ The expression denotes a discourse that contributes, albeit in a nega-
tive way, to the knowledge of the issues related to the researched science, which has
a single aim, i.e. the knowledge of the First substances. This is made clear also in the
beginning of the commentary on Beta, where Alexander explains that, according to
some interpreters, Beta could be seen as the first book of the treatise, since it is from
this book onwards that Aristotle’s main discourse is developed; by contrast, Alpha
meizon and alpha elatton are not proper parts of the “προεκκάθαρσις” but belong to
the προκατάστασις, which means that they merely have a preparatory value:

For Aristotle this is the starting point of the present treatise; for here he begins to speak of matters
which have a necessary bearing on the issues proposed. The matters discussed in books alpha [i.e.
Alpha meizon and alpha elatton] would be preliminary to this treatise and contribute to making
some preparatory points (εἰς τὴν προκατάστασιν συντελοῦντα). This is why some have thought
that the present book is the first of the treatise Metaphysics.⁷⁹

Thus, the καί that we saw earlier in the commentary on A 2 (9.12–13 προκαταστήσαντα
καὶ προεκκαθάραντα)⁸⁰ is not an explicative καί but serves to distinguish between two

78 Di Giovanni – Primavesi 2016 have reservations as to the reliability of Averroes’ testimony, consid-
ering that the book-by-book analysis (presented as part III) of Averroes’ proem to book Lambda comes
from the same source as Averroes’ quotations from “Alexander”’s commentary on Lambda (including
the passage quoted above, presented as part II), which would be the work of an unknown Greek reviser
of Alexander’s original work (hence “Alexander”). Here I cannot go into the details of their analysis,
which is full of useful observations. I remain skeptical, however, as to their claim (against Freudenthal
1885) that the expression “we say” (Bouyges 1948: 1395.11), with which the book-by-book analysis is
introduced, marks the beginning of Alexander’s (or “Alexander’s”) quotation, granted that such a de-
vice would lead to confusion, whereas Averroes systematically introduces his quotations of Alexander
with the expression “Alexander says”. After quoting Alexander’s passage which I quoted above, Aver-
roes says (Bouyges 1948: 1395.9–10) “Yet what [Alexander] says with regard to understanding the con-
tents of the other books [my italics] written on this discipline is open to interpretation [Stephen Menn
suggests “is an overall survey”], and the passage best suited for being expounded [i.e. within the two
thirds of Alexander’s commentary on Lambda, which was all that was known to Averroes; see below,
p. xlviii, n. 3] is perhaps this passage” (transl. Di Giovanni – Primavesi 2016: 23). In my interpretation,
Averroes refers to the passage that he has just quoted, in which the content of book Lambda is ex-
plicitly specified by Alexander, whereas the contents of the other books are only alluded to. Averroes,
therefore, uses Alexander’s passage not only as an introduction to Lambda but also as a transition to
his book-by-book analysis, which is based, of course, on sources other than Alexander’s commentary
(though some of them may somehow relate to Alexander’s commentary).
79 139.8–12: Ἔστι δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς προκειμένης πραγματείας ἐντεῦθεν ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίως
συντεινόντων εἰς τὰ προκείμενα ἐνταῦθα λέγειν ἄρχεται. ὅσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἄλφα εἴρηται, προλεγόμενα ἂν
εἴη αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς τὴν προκατάστασιν συντελοῦντα. διό τισιν ἔδοξε τῆς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματείας
τοῦτο εἶναι πρῶτον. Transl. Madigan 1992, modified.
80 See above, p. xxv.
XXXVIII | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

different operations, say the προκατάστασις and the προεκκάθαρσις, within the same
treatise, before the culmination arrived at in book Lambda.
Alexander’s prolegomena to book Gamma enable us further to see how he con-
ceives of the sequence of the first four books of the Metaphysics:

Having proposed to consider being qua being in the treatise Metaphysics, a treatise which he also
calls ‘wisdom’ and ‘first philosophy’, and which he is accustomed at times to call ‘theological
[science]’ as well; and having shown [in A 1] that the proposed treatise is not one of those arts
or sciences concerned with the knowledge of the necessaries of life, nor of those concerned with
the useful, but rather will pursue the things which it pursues for the sake of knowledge and of
science as such; and having shown [in A 2] that it contemplates the first principles and causes
(for these are beings in the highest degree); and having, before inquiring which principles are
the first principles, set in motion in general terms [in A 3] the discussion of the causes; having
presented [in A 4–6] the views of his predecessors concerning the principles, having related them
and replied to them [in A 7–10]; having shown that there are certain first principles and [in α] that
the ascent to principles does not go to infinity; and further, having raised [in B] certain aporiae
concerning being and the principles, as well as related matters (this being useful and necessary
for the discovery of the objects proposed to wisdom), after the aporiae he henceforth begins the
present book [Γ], hereafter telling and establishing his own doctrines and solving the points of
aporia from this book onwards. In this book he shows what things wisdom, which [in this book]
he also calls ‘philosophy’ and ‘first philosophy’, is concerned with.⁸¹

Further, Alexander claims that book Delta rightly comes after book Gamma, since in
it Aristotle discusses those plurivocal terms which are not peculiar to any particular
science but to all sciences, as is to be expected from the universal science of being qua
being, whose content has been clarified in Gamma:

That this is also the proper place for the book [= Delta] is obvious, on the one hand, from the
fact that [in it] Aristotle distinguishes those things expressed in various ways that [all] the sci-
ences employ and that are the common concomitants of being. He said in book Beta, too, that
the philosopher must treat of these things, distinguishing the number of ways in which each of

81 237,3–238,4 H.: Προθέμενος ἐν τῇ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματείᾳ, ἣν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ πρώτην φιλο-
σοφίαν, ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ θεολογικὴν ἔθος αὐτῷ καλεῖν, περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν θεωρῆσαι, καὶ δείξας ὅτι ἡ
προκειμένη πραγματεία μήτε τῶν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων γνῶσιν καταγινομένων ἐστὶ τεχνῶν ἢ ἐπι-
στημῶν μήτε τῶν περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτῆς χάριν τῆς γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης μετιοῦσα
ταῦτα ἃ [scripsi : αὐτὰ ἃ Bonitz : αὐτὰ ἐπ’ αὐτὰ codd., † Hayduck] μέτεισι, δείξας δὲ αὐτὴν θεωρητι-
κὴν οὖσαν τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν τε καὶ αἰτίων (ταῦτα γὰρ μάλιστα ὄντα), πρὸ τοῦ ζητεῖν τίνες αἱ πρῶται
ἀρχαί, κινήσας καθόλου τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων λόγον καὶ τὰς δόξας τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὰς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν
ἐκθέμενός τε καὶ ἱστορήσας καὶ ἀντειπὼν πρὸς αὐτάς, δείξας δὲ ὅτι εἰσί τινες ἀρχαὶ πρῶται καὶ οὐκ ἐπ’
ἄπειρον ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄνοδος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν τῶν τῇ σοφί-
ᾳ προκειμένων ἀπορήσας τινὰς ἀπορίας περὶ τοῦ ὄντος τε [scripsi cum O : περί τε τοῦ ὄντος Hayduck
cum Ascl.] καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παρακειμένων, μετὰ τὰς ἀπορίας ἄρχεται λοιπὸν [codd. :
ἄρχεται Hayduck cum A3 ] τοῦ προκειμένου [τοῦ Γ A O edd. : om. P, ut glossema delendum] βιβλίου,
λοιπὸν ἐν τούτῳ λέγων τε καὶ κατασκευάζων τὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα καὶ λύων τὰ ἠπορημένα. δείκνυσι δὲ ἐν
τῷδε τῷ βιβλίῳ περὶ τίνα ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία, ἣν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὀνομάζει καὶ πρώτην φιλοσοφίαν. Transl.
Madigan 1993, modified.
 1.2 Alexander’s commenting method | XXXIX

them is said. On the other hand, book Gamma showed what things first philosophy contemplates;
and the immediate sequel to this last point is to examine those first [items] that must be used in
order to investigate and prove the other things that are going to be proved. Hence [Aristotle] spoke
first about the axiom which [says] that in every case either the affirmation or the denial must [be
true], since this axiom is useful for formulating proofs. After that inquiry, he distinguishes, in
this book, the things that are thus expressed in various ways.⁸²

According to Alexander’s unitarian reading, the four books that follow Delta (the com-
mentary on which unfortunately does not survive) will precisely treat the most impor-
tant of those plurivocal items, namely being, the principles of which are investigated
throughout the Metaphysics: Epsilon will treat being per accidens and veridical being,
Zeta and Eta will treat being per se, and Theta will treat actual and potential being.⁸³
All this preliminary study of being contributes to the knowledge of the first principles,
which will be shown (in Lambda) to be eternally actual immaterial substances, causes
of being per se.

1.2 Alexander’s commenting method

Alexander taught Aristotle because he philosophised with Aristotle.⁸⁴ Several repeti-

tions and asyndeta in the course of the commentary betray its oral origin.⁸⁵ (By con-

82 344,20–345,4 H.: ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡ τάξις τοῦ βιβλίου αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ποιεῖσθαι μὲν αὐτὸν τὴν διαίρε-
σιν τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων τούτων, οἷς αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι χρῶνται, ἃ κοινῶς τῷ ὄντι παρακολουθεῖ· περὶ
ὧν εἶπε καὶ ἐν τῷ B [codd. : δευτέρῳ edd.] δεῖν τὸν φιλόσοφον πραγματεύεσθαι διελόμενον ποσαχῶς
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν λέγεται· ἀκόλουθον δέ ἐστι μετὰ τὸ δειχθῆναι περὶ τίνων ἐστὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας
ἡ θεωρία, ὃ ἐν τῷ Γ [scripsi cum A3 : τρίτῳ codd. edd.] δέδεικται, ἐφεξῆς περὶ τούτων πρώτων θεωρεῖν
οἷς ἀναγκαῖον χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μελλόντων δείκνυσθαι θεωρίαν τε καὶ δεῖξιν. διὸ καὶ
πρῶτον περὶ ἀξιώματος εἶπε τοῦ ἐπὶ παντὸς δεῖν τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὄντος πρὸς τὰς δεί-
ξεις χρησίμου· μεθ’ ἃ ἐν τούτῳ τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιεῖται τῶν οὕτως πολλαχῶς λεγομένων. Transl. Dooley
1993, modified.
83 Cf. 372,34–37 H.: ποιήσεται δὲ τὸν λόγον περὶ μὲν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς
ἀληθοῦς ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὄντος ἐν τῷ Ζ καὶ Η, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει τε καὶ
ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐν τῷ Θ. Rashed 2007 offers a reconstruction of how Alexander would interpret the central
books of the Metaphysics.
84 In this respect, his approach is different from that of the Neoplatonists (for instance, Plotinus, Syr-
ianus, Proclus, Ammonius and Simplicius) who taught Aristotle but stricto sensu did not philosophize
with him but with Plato.
85 Compare, for instance, 11.6–7 and 13: ὡς ἐν τοῖς Ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς εἴρηται… δέδεικται μέν, ὡς
ἔφην, καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς; 12.21–23: ἡ τῶν μᾶλλον αἰτίων θεωρητικὴ καὶ διδασκαλικὴ
μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ διὰ τῶν αἰτίων ἡ διδασκαλία· αὕτη δὲ ἡ τῶν μᾶλλον αἰτίων θεωρητικὴ καὶ διδασκαλικὴ
μᾶλλον; 17.25 and 18.30–31: κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστῳ τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν… κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος
ἑκάστου τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; 31.18–19 and 23–25: ἐδόκουν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιώματα πολλὰ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα ὁρᾶν
καὶ πρὸς τὰ γιγνόμενα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασιν… ὁμοιώματα δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς
τὰ ὄντα καὶ γινόμενα ἡγοῦντο ἐν τούτοις εἶναι, τουτέστι τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἢ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς σώμασιν ἃ
XL | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

trast, Alexander’s monographs (μονόβιβλα), such as the De anima, the De fato and
the De mixtione, were conceived right from the start as written works.) While lecturing
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the Peripatetic ‘diadoch’ would apparently use all exeget-
ical works that were available to him.⁸⁶ These certainly included Aspasius’ commen-
tary,⁸⁷ as well as anonymous scholia of various origins probably mentioned by As-
pasius himself or transmitted in the margins of papyrus rolls next to Aristotle’s text.
Indeed, some vague references to τινές (ὑπομνηματισταί or ἐξηγηταί) may allude to
such marginal scholia,⁸⁸ which, together with Aspasius’ commentary and the mem-
ory of (his) Aristotle’s oral teaching,⁸⁹ must have been his sources also for the variae
lectiones that he reports. At 85.5, Alexander refers to a passage of Aristotle’s text that

στοιχεῖά φαμεν; 61.27–28, 62.1–2 and 24: οὕτως δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αἴτιον λέγοιεν
ἂν… αὐτοὺς δὲ αὑτῶν ἔλεγον εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους… ὡς αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον…; 82.13–15
and 26–28: ὅτι δὲ κενολογοῦσιν οἱ τὰς ἰδέας παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἔδειξε διὰ τοῦ «τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ
ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον»… ὅτι δὲ κενολογοῦσι βραχέως ἔδειξε διὰ τοῦ «τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ
ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον»; 95.14, 15 and 17: βουλόμενοι γὰρ τὰ ὄντα…, ταῦτα δὴ τὰ ὄντα
βουλόμενοι ἀνάγειν…, εἰς δὴ ταύτην θέλοντες πάντα ἀναγαγεῖν…; 128.3–5: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον… οὕτως
οὖν ἔχοντος…; 157.9 and 11: τὸ δὲ «περὶ πάντων γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι» εἶπεν ὡς ἀκόλουθον
τῷ…· τούτῳ γὰρ ἀκόλουθον τὸ «περὶ πάντων γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι»; 157.18–21 and 158.11–14:
καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν «ἔκ τινων» τῶν ἀξιωμάτων δι’ ὧν ἡ δεῖξις δηλωτικόν, τὸ δὲ «περί τι» τοῦ ὑποκειμένου
γένους, ᾧ δείκνυταί τι ὑπάρχον ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχον, τὸ δὲ «τινῶν» τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ
ὑπάρχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ… ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ τὰ εἰρημένα ὑπάρχειν ἐν πάσῃ ἀποδείξει, ἐδήλωσε καὶ διὰ
τοῦ ἐπενεγκεῖν «ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἔκ τινων εἶναι», δι’ ὧν δείκνυται, «καὶ περί τι εἶναι», οὗ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, «καὶ
τινῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν», αὐτῶν τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων; 184.2–5: οἷον εἰ ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται, δεῖ εἶναι καὶ
δύνασθαι εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ὃ γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος (ἀνυπάρκτου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐδ’ ἂν γένοιτο
ἄνθρωπος), δεῖ οὖν εἶναί τι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃ λέγεται γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται οὗτος. Note
also the asyndeton at 41.13–16, the absolute nominative at 59.22 (οὐδὲ ὄντα χρήσιμα) and the anho-
moioptoton at 24.3–4: «Ἀναξαγόρας» Ἐμπεδοκλέους «πρότερος» γενόμενος, τοῖς ἔργοις φησὶ καὶ περὶ
τῶν φυσικῶν δόξῃ ὕστερον εἶναι, as well as the loose syntax at 53.5–6: τοῦ γὰρ εἴδους τοῦτο [sc. τὸ ἓν
καὶ ἡ ἰδέα] αἴτιον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τούτων [sc. τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῆς ἰδεάς] χάριν ἐκεῖνα γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἔστι.
86 On Aristotelian commentators before Alexander see Sharples 1987 and Gottschalk 1990.
87 Alexander refers explicitly to Aspasius only three times, twice (34.27, 379,3 H.) with regard to an al-
ternative interpretation that, although it is not endorsed by Alexander, is deemed worthy to be quoted,
and once (48.28) with regard to the origin of an interpolation in Aristotle’s text, towards which Alexan-
der seems to be skeptical. Nevertheless, Alexander’s tacit borrowings from Aspasius, each time the
latter explained Aristotle’s text well, must have been much more. The minutiae, with which Aspa-
sius deals in these three known cases, suggest that Aspasius composed a proper commentary on the
Metaphysics (such as the commentary he also composed on the Nicomachean Ethics).
88 Cf. 81.29–30: ἢ λέγοι ἄν, ὥς τινες ἤκουσαν, τὸ «κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι» ὑ-
πὸ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας τιθεμένων…; 112.7–8: ὃ φεύγοντές τινες ἐνηλλάχθαι φασὶ τὴν λέξιν; 130.9–10: τινὲς
ἤκουσαν τοῦ «πλεονάζοντα τῷ λόγῳ» ὡς λέγοντος αὐτοῦ…; 131.1: τινὲς δὲ «ἄτομα» ἤκουσαν τὰ καθ᾽
ἕκαστα καί φασι…; 132.10: τινὲς δὲ «κινουμένην» γράφουσι, καὶ ἐξηγοῦνται τὴν λέξιν…; 139.11–12: διό
τισιν ἔδοξε τῆς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματείας τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον; 141.15–16: τινὲς μέντοι διὰ τὸ νῦν
εἰρημένον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ τῶν ἄλφα ἐλάττονος ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν προσγράφουσι; 144.8–9:
οὐ γὰρ λογικὴ ἡ πραγματεία, ὥς τισιν ἔδοξε διὰ τὸ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ζητεῖσθαι ἐν αὐτῇ.
89 Aristotle (of Mytilene?) was one of Alexander’s teachers in aristotelicis — his other teachers were
Sosigenes (cf. Alexander, In Meteor. [= Hayduck 1899] 143.13) and Herminos (cf. Simplicius, In Cael. [=
 1.2 Alexander’s commenting method | XLI

is not transmitted in all manuscripts and, hence, did not receive a commentary (διὸ
οὐδὲ ὑπεμνηματίσαντο αὐτήν [sc. τὴν λέξιν]); the plural, of course, cannot solely refer
to Aspasius. It is possible that passages preceding an alternative explanation, which
are introduced by Alexander with an ἤ, are actually bits of Aspasius’ commentary.⁹⁰
Alexander uses a form of commentary which is less sophisticated and less
“scholastic” than the Aristotelian commentaries of later centuries.⁹¹ Indeed, Alexan-
der’s exegetical activity predates important technical works of late antiquity, such as
the treatise Τὰ πρὸ τῆς συναναγνώσεως τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀκροαματικῶν συνταγμά-
των [What comes before the reading in class of Aristotle’s acroamatic writings] by Pro-
clus,⁹² which must have had quite an impact on the systematization of the form of the
Aristotelian commentary. Still, one finds in Alexander’s commentaries a discussion,
which was later made compulsory, of introductory points to a treatise (the so-called
κεφάλαια in the later tradition), although this is not made in a straightforward and
systematic way. In his prolegomena to the Prior Analytics, Alexander explains, among
other considerations, the aim (ὁ σκοπός or ἡ πρόθεσις),⁹³ the usefulness (τὸ χρήσιμον)
and the title (ἡ επιγραφή) of the treatise. He explains the same introductory points in
his commentary on the Topics, but this time as part of the commentary on the opening
sentence of the treatise, which specifically calls for such explanations.⁹⁴ In his com-
mentary on On the Sense and What Is Sensed, Alexander only briefly discusses the aim
of the treatise (since this is immediately made clear by its title) and its arrangement
after the treatise On the Soul (pertaining to the point called ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως
by later commentators). His commentary on the Meteorology does not contain any
prolegomena at all; nonetheless, as with the Topics, this is only apparently so, since
Alexander’s commentary on the opening lines of the Meteorology, in which Aristotle
resumes his investigation on nature,⁹⁵ makes by itself a sort of prolegomena, in which
the ordering (ἡ τάξις) of the treatises belonging to the second branch of Aristotle’s
theoretical philosophy, i.e. physics, is thoroughly articulated.
Our manuscripts of the commentary on the Metaphysics lack its beginning, so we
cannot be certain whether Alexander wrote prolegomena to the Metaphysics or not.

Heiberg 1894] 430.32–33); on these Peripatetics see lately Kupreeva 2016. Alexander mentions, albeit
with some slight criticism, (his) Aristotle’s proof of the causes not being infinite in the context of α 2,
994b 27–31 (see 134.6–20).
90 E.g. 23.3–5, 23.23–27, 26.6, 27.30–32, 31.3–4 etc.
91 On the form and content of late antique philosophical commentaries see Hoffmann 2006.
92 Proclus also composed a work entitled Τὰ πρὸ τῆς (συν)αναγνώσεως τῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος διαλόγων.
On these two works see Mansfeld 1994: 7 and 22.
93 The term σκοπός becomes prevalent in the later tradition.
94 Top. I 1, 100a 18–20: Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν ἀφ’ ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογί-
ζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐξ ἐνδόξων. Cf. Alexander, In Top. [= Wallies 1891] 1.3–5: Τὴν μὲν
πρόθεσιν τὴν κατὰ τὴν τοπικὴν πραγματείαν, καὶ πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμός ἐστι τῷ φιλοσοφοῦντι
ἥδε ἡ μέθοδος, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς, αὐτὸς [sc. ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης] λέγει.
95 Cf. Meteor. I 1, 338a 20–339a 9.
XLII | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

Nevertheless, as this lack of beginning was probably due to the loss of the first fo-
lio of the archetype, i.e. a late antique codex written in uncial letters,⁹⁶ and since the
equally missing beginning of the commentary proper is approximately only half a CAG
page (as we can deduce from a comparison with the so-called “recensio altera”),⁹⁷ we
are compelled to posit that Alexander wrote some prolegomena to the Metaphysics;
for half a CAG page would correspond only to the verso of the lost first folio of the
archetype. A possible counter-argument would be that the “recensio altera” itself,
which closely follows Alexander’s commentary, delivers the beginning of the com-
mentary proper but no prolegomena; so Alexander’s commentary should have like-
wise omitted any prolegomena. This argument, however, is weak. For it is quite prob-
able that the anonymous late antique prolegomena to the Metaphysics contained in
codex Parisinus Coislin 161 [C], published by Paul Moraux,⁹⁸ are the prolegomena to
the equally anonymous “recensio altera”, which was copied without prolegomena on
the model of the extant manuscripts, probably because there was a need of strict cor-
respondence between Aristotle’s text and the surrounding commentary (as it indeed
happens in manuscripts Laurentianus plut. 87,12 [L] and Ambrosianus F 113 sup. [F],
which contain the “recensio altera”).⁹⁹ Moraux showed that these prolegomena are
to be dated to the 6th/7th century, just like the “recensio altera”. Not surprisingly,
these anonymous prolegomena incorporate elements drawn from the commentaries
of both Alexander and Asclepius, as generally happens in the “recensio altera”.¹⁰⁰
Most importantly, it seems that there is a back reference to these prolegomena in the

96 See below, Section 2.1.

97 On this anonymous late antique commentary on the Metaphysics, misleadingly known since Hay-
duck’s edition as the “recensio altera” of Alexander’s commentary, see below, Section 2.1.
98 See Moraux 1980.
99 Given that the monk Malachias, who is the scribe of C, restored some problematic passages in
Alexander’s commentary with the help of a copy of the so-called “recensio altera”, different from the
extant copies which could be known to him, that is, L and F (see the description of C in 3.1), we may sur-
mise that the copy he used also contained the prolegomena. Besides, it is unlikely that these ancient
prolegomena were transmitted from late antiquity separately as part of some mysterious miscellany.
100 Compare Moraux 1980, lin. 1–3: σκοπός ἐστι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐν τῇ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματείᾳ, ἥ-
τις οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἐπιγράφεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφία καὶ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καὶ θεολογία … with Alexander
237,3–4 H.: προθέμενος ἐν τῇ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματείᾳ, ἣν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ πρώτην φιλοσοφίαν, ἔστι
δὲ ὅτε καὶ θεολογικὴν ἔθος αὐτῷ καλεῖν …; Moraux 1980, lin. 26–36: περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεολογικοῦ ἐνταῦθα
τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται, ἐν ᾧ δὴ καὶ τά τε περὶ θεῶν διέρχεται καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτίων
τῶν πρώτων· αὗται δ᾽ ἂν εἶεν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ἀρχαί, δι᾽ ἃς τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν τὸ εἶναι κατη-
γοροῦμεν. τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ πρῶται καὶ κυριώταται οὐσίαι· αὗται μὲν γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀρχαί, αἱ δὲ οὐσίαι
τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ὡς δείξει. τήν τε οὖν τούτων γνῶσιν ἐν τῇδε τῇ πραγματείᾳ πρόκειται εὑρεῖν τε
καὶ διδάξαι καὶ ἔτι ὅσα εἰς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν συντελεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν ἄλλως ἐκείνων γνῶσιν λα-
βεῖν μὴ προκαταστήσαντα with Alexander 9.6–13 (quoted n. 13). For debts to Asclepius’ commentary
see Moraux 1980: 62–63. The slight reformulations and omissions with regard to Alexander’s text are
reminiscent of the method of the anonymous commentator.
 1.2 Alexander’s commenting method | XLIII

prooemion of the anonymous commentary on book Beta.¹⁰¹ In the present edition,

therefore, I have ventured to reconstruct Alexander’s lost prolegomena to the Meta-
physics with the help of Asclepius’ commentary (“from the voice of Ammonius”), not
only because Asclepius’ commentary is largely based on Alexander’s but also because
I have found some strictly parallel ideas between Asclepius’ prolegomena to the Meta-
physics and Alexander’s prolegomena to the Prior Analytics.¹⁰² Alexander’s wording,
however, may have undergone some alterations.
Having laid out the prolegomena, the ancient commentators proceeded by divid-
ing Aristotle’s treatise into lemmata (a lemma was usually called τὸ ῥητόν), which
were successively commented upon and explained. The explanation focuses mainly
on two aspects of Aristotle’s text, namely its sense (ὁ νοῦς) and its wording (ἡ λέξις).
Alexander uses these technical terms in his commentary,¹⁰³ as he also distinguishes
once between θεωρία and λέξις,¹⁰⁴ a distinction conventionally used in the commen-
taries produced in late antique Alexandria. The latter terms, however, are used by
Alexander as merely equivalent to νοῦς and λέξις and do not refer to two different
stages of lecturing on Aristotle (the first delivering en bloc the doctrine contained in
a given portion of text, the second commenting on the same portion of text bit by bit
and focusing on its wording), as in the commentaries of the schools led by Ammonius
and Olympiodorus.¹⁰⁵
Although Alexander rarely makes the distinction between νοῦς and λέξις explic-
itly, he systematically comments on Aristotle’s wording (when needed) at the end of
his comment on a given lemma.¹⁰⁶ Before that, he usually places τὸ ῥητόν within
the larger argument of Aristotle and then paraphrases, selectively quotes (Alexander
calls a portion of the lemma τὸ εἰρημένον) and explains it, occasionally supporting
his paraphrase with developments coming from other works of Aristotle. It is typical

101 Ἐν τῷ μείζονι Α τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας εἰπὼν τίς ἐστιν ὁ σκοπὸς αὐτῆς, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ
ὄν, καθὼς ἐν ἐκείνῳ σαφῶς διείληπται, καὶ τὶς ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ τοῦτο θεωροῦσα, ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία,
ἣν καὶ θεολογίαν καὶ ῾Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά᾽ ἐπιγράφει… Unless it is a gross error, this must refer to the
anonymous prolegomena, especially lin. 26–36 in Moraux 1980 (quoted in the previous note). The
agent complement of διείληπται is not Aristotle but the anonymous commentator himself.
102 See the apparatus fontium ad locum.
103 Cf. 63.17: ὁ νοῦς τῶν λεγομένων γνώριμος; 208.19: ὁ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων νοῦς τοιοῦτος; 276,9–10 H.:
διὸ καὶ ἀσαφεστέρα ἡ λέξις. ἐκλαβόντι δὲ ὁ νοῦς τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως τοιοῦτος; 276,27–28 H.: ὁ μὲν νοῦς
τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως τοιοῦτος, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν οὕτως; 331,9–10 H.: Ἡ ἐπιχείρησις βραχέως μὲν εἴρη-
ται καὶ αὕτη, ἔστι δὲ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς τοιοῦτος.
104 Cf. 109.2–3: Τὸ ἔλαττον ἄλφα τῶν Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ἔστι μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους ὅσα καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τῇ
θεωρία τεκμήρασθαι.
105 See Golitsis 2008: 55–57. Évrard 1957 (an unfortunately unpublished doctoral dissertation) still
provides the best discussion of what he thoughtfully labelled “la pratique de la double exégèse”.
106 These particular comments on lexis are printed in the present edition in separate paragraphs.
Exceptionally, and when this is required in order for the text to be intelligible, the lexis is dealt with
by Alexander in the beginning; see 17.11, 58.6 and 153.19.
XLIV | 1 Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics

of Alexander to explore in his comments diverse possibilities of interpretation with-

out concluding. Seen in a historical perspective, Alexander’s commentaries display
a primitive form of the more systematic form that we later encounter in the Neopla-
tonic commentaries.
The extant manuscripts always record as lemma only the beginning of the pas-
sage to be commented upon. It is clear, however, that in the course of teaching the
passages of the Metaphysics were read out (either by Alexander or, more probably, by
an amanuensis or ὑπογραφεύς) in their entirety; otherwise Alexander’s comments,
which do not always quote but always presuppose Aristotle’s text in its entirety,¹⁰⁷
could not (and cannot) be understood. A clear case is seen under lemma 980b 25–26,
where the past tense ἔδειξεν (5.7) presupposes Aristotle’s text down to 981a 7. Some-
times, however, Alexander’s initial comment (that is, the comment that comes imme-
diately after a lemma) is not a freestanding phrase but depends syntactically on the
lemma (sometimes through a τουτέστι);¹⁰⁸ nonetheless, Alexander goes on as usual
with his comments presupposing much more text than the portion that appears in
the lemma. This suggests the following oral practice: the first time the amanuensis
would read out in class the entire passage to be commented on; then, Alexander would
reread the first sentence (which appears as lemma in the manuscripts) and would di-
rectly proceed to elucidate it. It is interesting to notice in this respect that Averroes
used a manuscript of Alexander’s commentary on Lambda, which contained Aristo-
tle’s text in its entirety.¹⁰⁹ Inasmuch as the separate transmission of Alexander’s com-
mentary on book Lambda, to which Averroes had access,¹¹⁰ may ultimately go back
to an ancient papyrus edition in many volumina (the use of papyrus rolls clearly pre-
vailed over the use of codex in AD 200), it is possible that Averroes’ testimony reflects
the very first edition of Alexander’s commentary, in which full lemmata alternated
with the comments.
It is only natural to think that, throughout his teaching career, Alexander would
return to his commentary in order to improve his comments or to make additional
ones, which he would confine to the margins of his manuscript. We may adduce some
examples. It is evident that, in a passage that we have quoted and discussed before,¹¹¹
εἴδη αὐτῆς (245,37 Η.) is correlative to γενικὴ ἐπιστήμη (245,33 Η.): there is generic phi-

107 This characteristic of Alexander’s exegesis enables the editor to detect a few omissions in the
manuscripts of the Metaphysics used by Alexander, that is, passages that he leaves without comment.
In the present edition, these omissions are signalled in the apparatus lectionum aristotelicarum.
108 Cf. 8.18, 17.29, 21.13, 26.22, 27.5, 28.22, 35.23, 41.7 and 42.29.
109 Cf. Bouyges 1948: 1538: “I found the section which I transcribed first in the manuscript of Alexan-
der blended with the text of Aristotle”, and 1545: “I found that in the rest of this section the text of
Aristotle is lacking in the commentary of Alexander and I completed it from the second translation”;
transl. Genequand 1986.
110 See below, p. xlviii, n. 3.
111 See n. 30.
 1.2 Alexander’s commenting method | XLV

losophy and there are also its species, i.e. first philosophy, physics and ethics. But this
correlation is interrupted by the following passage (which has caused some trouble for
interpreters):

It is shown through the things said [by Aristotle] that the division of being into genera, which he
carried out in the Categories, belongs to first philosophy. At the same time, he has also indicated
to us, through these considerations, how philosophy is one science: by being universal.¹¹²

This is an isolated statement by Alexander, who nowhere else in the commentary as-
cribes the division of the categories to first philosophy. I think that this is best ex-
plained perhaps as an afterthought and a supplementary comment, made by Alexan-
der himself in the margin of his manuscript and copied later into the main text. Simi-
larly, at 13.20–23 there is a second explanation of the same passage (982b 5–6), which
is not an alternative but actually an improved and more complete explanation of what
we read at 13.12–15:

(1) Having said “The science which knows for what end each thing must be done”, [Aristotle]
shows what kind of cause is one for the sake of which each thing must be done, saying: “This is
the good”; for the final cause is of this short […]. (1a) Wishing to make clear how the first cause is
cause of the things that are, namely that it is [their cause] as an end, and that the science capable
of knowing this kind of cause is more architectonic than those that produce the things that are
for its sake, he made the statement that “The science that knows to what end each thing must be
done is more authoritative than the ancillary science”.¹¹³

That the second chunk of the passage may be a later addition seems to be supported by
the fact that, whereas in the first chunk Aristotle’s text is quoted according to Metaph.β
(τίνος ἕνεκα πρακτέον ἐστὶν ἕκαστόν), it is quoted in the second chunk according to
Metaph.α (τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον).
There are further passages of this sort that reflect this state of affairs.¹¹⁴ In 113.28–
114.4, for instance, the sentence “at the same time, he establishes through these con-
siderations that the theoretical studies are worthy of our most serious efforts” (113.31–
32 ἅμα δὲ τὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τούτων συνίστησιν ὡς πάσης σπουδῆς ἀξίαν, put in [[…]]

112 245,33–37 H.: διὰ δὲ τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων δέδεικται ὅτι τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ἡ εἰς τὰ γένη τοῦ
ὄντος διαίρεσις, ὃ πεποίηκεν αὐτὸς ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐνεδείξατο ἡμῖν διὰ τούτων καὶ πῶς
ἐστι μία ἐπιστήμη ἡ φιλοσοφία· τῷ γὰρ καθόλου. Transl. Madigan 1993, slightly modified.
113 13.12–23: εἰπὼν δὲ “ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκα πρακτέον ἐστὶν ἕκαστόν”, τὸ τοιοῦτον αἴτιον, οὗ
ἕνεκεν αἰτίου ἕκαστον πρακτέον, ἐδήλωσεν εἰπὼν “τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τἀγαθόν”· τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ τελικὸν
αἴτιον […]. βουληθεὶς δὲ δηλῶσαι πῶς τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον τοῖς οὖσιν αἴτιον, ὅτι ὡς τέλος, καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ
τοιούτου αἰτίου γνωστικὴ ἀρχιτεκτονικωτέρα τῶν ποιουσῶν τὰ ἐκείνου χάριν, εἶπε τὸ “μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ
τῆς ὑπηρετούσης ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον”. Transl. Dooley 1989, slightly
modified.
114 See also 17.30–18.20, where the ἔσχατον (983a 28: ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον) is
explained twice, and 47.17–22 with my note.
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prove this. I have been handling plays now for more years than I care
to remember, and have found in case after case that a little technical
adjustment will turn an unmarketable play into a commercial
proposition.” Among the topics covered are: What the public want;
Things that are essential in a good play; How to choose a plot; How
to select and differentiate the characters; Humour; How to sell a play
when finished; Casting and production. A glossary of stage terms
comes at the end. The author is an English woman writing with
London conditions in mind but most of her discussion is general in
nature.

+ Ath p384 Mr 19 ’20 50w

 “A beginner, provided he were only a beginner with no idea of the
drama, would do well to read this book.”

+ N Y Evening Post p10 D 31 ’20 180w

PLUMB, CHARLES SUMNER. Types and

breeds of farm animals. (Country life educ. ser.) rev
ed il *$3.80 Ginn 636

20–8897

A revision of a work published in 1906. The new edition contains

“a more detailed discussion relative to the great breeds, and
considerable space is devoted to families of importance and to noted
individuals. A large amount of new data has been collected relating
to various phases of production, although it is a hopeless task to
bring such records down to date.... The number of chapters remains
the same, but several obsolete breeds have been omitted and other
new and more important ones have been substituted. Maps and
many illustrations have been added.” (Foreword)

“The book gives probably the best account published of modern

farm animals and there are good illustrations. Another very
interesting feature is the history of the families which the author has
diligently worked out.” E. J. R.

+ Nature 106:659 Ja 20 ’21 210w

 POLLAK, GUSTAV. International minds and the
search for the restful. $1.50 Nation press 814

19–16675

The collection of essays in this book are gathered from articles

contributed to the Evening Post and the Nation before the war. As
the title indicates, they fall into two groups. The first group bears out
the author’s claim “that intellect recognizes no distinctions of
nationality, race, or religion.” He has selected a representative of
each, from the literatures of Germany, Austria, France and America
in the persons of Goethe, Grillparzer, Sainte-Beuve and Lowell and
points out a certain similarity of attitude toward life and literature, of
perception of the dignity of literary achievement, of keen-eyed
observation and of a self-contained repose. The second group of
essays is devoted to Ernst, Baron von Feuchtersleben, and his book
on the “Hygiene of the soul” which of late years has achieved a new
fame. One of the essays gives a resumé of the book. The titles of the
essays are: Literature and patriotism; Goethe’s universal interests;
Grillparzer’s originality; Sainte-Beuve’s unique position; Lowell:
patriot and cosmopolitan; Permanent literary standards;
Feuchtersleben the philosopher; The hygiene of the soul;
Feuchtersleben’s aphorisms; Feuchtersleben’s influence.

POLLARD, ALBERT FREDERICK. Short

history of the great war. *$3.25 Harcourt 940.3

20–26545

“Although several histories of the war have already appeared, only

a few of them have been written by men who had an ante-war
historical reputation. Dr Pollard is one of this small group. For many
years he has held the chair of English history in the University of
London, and is the author of numerous historical works, besides
having served as assistant editor of the ‘Dictionary of national
biography.’ His record of the war is chronologically complete, and
includes the work of the peace conference.”—R of Rs

“Simply as an account of military events the volume leaves

something to be desired, in spite however of what the book does not
contain—and one cannot say everything in four hundred pages—the
volume is well worth reading.” A. P. Scott

+ − Am Hist R 26:331 Ja ’21 470w

“An excellent feature of Professor Pollard’s evenly balanced and

temperately written narrative is that it corrects several popular
misapprehensions.”

+ Ath p431 Mr 26 ’20 260w

Booklist 16:309 Je ’20

“An excellent record of the facts, combined with a true

representation of their relative importance. Some of his opinions will
not be generally accepted, and he has a strong prejudice against the
present prime minister. Original views will not, however, detract
from the great and patriotic interest of the book. The style is vigorous
and sometimes eloquent.” G. B. H.

+ Eng Hist R 35:477 Jl ’20 190w

 “In contrast with some other writers on the subject, he has
succeeded in being more historical than hysterical. Having mastered
the sources, as far as they are available, he presents his conclusions
with admirable impartiality. But his book is conclusive proof that the
true history of the war will not be written in this generation.”
Preserved Smith

+ − Nation 110:804 Je 12 ’20 800w

“It is written from the British rather than from the world’s point of
view.” Walter Littlefield

+ − N Y Times p6 D 19 ’20 380w

“He has vision, he has perspective, and almost more, he has style.
In reading this book, we are clearly conscious that a discriminating
spirit of power and clearness is ever preserving a proper balance, and
so resisting the temptation of overcoloring and undercoloring.
Professor Pollard has written a capital book, packed with common
sense; it will be hard to surpass it.”

+ Review 3:423 N 3 ’20 650w

“His book undoubtedly represents the best that English historical

scholarship can do at this stage by way of outlining the five-years’
struggle.”

+ R of Rs 61:670 Je ’20 120w

“Professor Pollard’s lucid narrative and caustic comments are

highly interesting. His very able and stimulating book deserves
careful reading.”

+ Spec 124:355 Mr 13 ’20 200w

“Professor Pollard’s is a notable achievement; and he who has been

looking for the one small volume which shall tell him what
innumerable more bulky ones have failed to impart may be
confidently recommended to purchase this short history. We cannot,
however, invariably follow Professor Pollard in his military
appreciations.”

+ − The Times [London] Lit Sup p133 F 26

’20 1050w

POLLEN, JOHN HUNGERFORD. English

Catholics in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 1558 to
1580; a study of their politics, civil life and
government. *$7.50 (*21s) Longmans 282

20–7672

“Father Pollen has written a history of the English Catholics under

Elizabeth from the fall of the old church to the advent of the counter-
reformation (1558–1580). He himself gives us the reasons of his
beginning with the reign of Elizabeth; ‘Henry’s revolt is indeed the
proper starting-point for a history of the reformation taken as a
whole; but Elizabeth’s accession is better, if one is primarily
considering the political and civil life of the post-reformation
Catholics. Reform and counter-reform under Henry, Edward and
Mary were transitory. The constructive work of each was
immediately undone by their successor. But the work done by Queen
Elizabeth, whether by Catholic or Protestant, lasted a long time.
There have, of course, been many developments since, but they have
proceeded on the lines then laid down. On the Catholic side the work
of reorganization began almost immediately after the first crash,
though it was only in the middle of the reign that the vitality and
permanence of the new measures became evident.’”—Cath World

“The soundness of his assumptions, the critical value of his

judgments, are certainly for us to consider. An internal history of
Catholic organization such as Father Pollen might write would be
exceptionally valuable, but this book does not contain it.” R. G. Usher

+ − Am Hist R 26:84 O ’20 1250w

+ Cath World 111:534 Jl ’20 1050w

“Father Pollen has written an interesting and scholarly work on a

critical period of our island history. The book is written, on the
whole, with tact and discrimination: the author holds the scales more
evenly than most Catholic historians do between the warring creeds
and factions.”

+ − Sat R 130:55 Ag 17 ’20 1200w

“His present volume is well documented with printed and

unprinted material. He is somewhat sparing in his references to
other scholars who have laboured in the same field.”

+ − The Times [London] Lit Sup p560 S 2

’20 1400w
 POLLOCK, SIR FREDERICK. League of
nations. *$4 (*10s 6d) Macmillan 341.1

20–14891

“The author’s purpose is to give a practical exposition of the

covenant of the League of nations, ‘with so much introduction as
appears proper for enabling the reader to understand the conditions
under which the League was formed and has to commence its work.’
The references to authentic documents and to other publications,
which are given at the heads of some of the chapters, are of material
assistance to the reader.”—Ath

Ath p462 Ap 2 ’20 130w

“A valuable reference and guide to further reading written for the

layman.”

+ Booklist 17:55 N ’20

“The veteran jurist’s exposition of the text of the covenant is

lucidity itself.”

+ Spec 124:215 F 14 ’20 180w

+ The Times [London] Lit Sup p39 Ja 15
’20 330w
 [2]
POLLOCK, JOHN. Bolshevik adventure.
*$2.50 Dutton 914.7

20–1771

“Mr Pollock was in Russia from 1915 to 1919, and his book
pretends to be nothing more than a calm statement of facts as he saw
them.” (Ath) “We gather that until the revolution of November, the
author worked on the Red cross committee: when the others left the
country, however, he stayed on, though he should have left with
them. One day in the summer of 1918, he was told by a friend that
the Red guards were in possession of his rooms at the hotel. From
that date he lived under a disguise and an assumed name. He got
employment as a producer of plays, and to attain membership in the
second food category he joined the ‘Professional union of workers in
theatrical undertakings.’ He worked in this capacity first at Moscow,
and afterwards at Petrograd until January, 1919, when he decided to
risk an attempt at escape into Finland.” (Sat R)

Ath p32 Ja 2 ’20 150w

“‘The entire upper class’ is Mr Pollock’s chief concern throughout

his book. Everything else in Russia is anathema, to be damned in
eternity. Especially the Jews. There are so many Jews in the
‘Bolshevik adventure’ that in reading the book one has the
impression that Mr Pollock uses Russia as a misnomer for Jewry.” S.
K.

− Ath p111 Ja 23 ’20 1250w

 “The like of his book for misstatement, weakness of thought, and
excited imagination is not to be found even among books on Russia.”
Jacob Zeitlin

− Nation 112:20 Ja 5 ’21 240w

“This book should have been written in two parts, the first
containing Chapters I to VI and the second Chapters VII, VIII, and
IX. Then the first part should have been filed with the Minister of
propaganda at London and pigeonholed in an asbestos-lined
receptacle. This treatment would have left us with eighty pages of
rather vivid narrative by an English eye-witness.”

− + N Y Evening Post p4 D 31 ’20 780w

“It is a pity that Mr Pollock’s style of writing is not better: some of

the confusion of Russia appears to have crept into the construction of
his sentences. Apart from such minor defects as these, the book is a
magnificent and crushing indictment of the Bolsheviks by one who
has lived under their misrule for nearly sixteen months. No other
work on the subject has conjured up for us such a vivid picture of the
loathsome misery and degradation to which communism can drag a
country.”

+ Sat R 129:211 F 28 ’20 550w

“Where Mr Pollock tells his own story he does succeed in adding to

the volume of evidence against them. But the other portions of the
book, written in the early days of the bolshevik régime, are too
violent and too superficial to be convincing.”
 − + The Times [London] Lit Sup p2 Ja 1 ’20
1050w

POLLOCK, WALTER. Hot bulb oil engines and

suitable vessels. il *$10 Van Nostrand 621.4

(Eng ed 20–10619)

“The objects of this book are: (1) To popularise the engine, to

explain what it has done and what it is capable of doing; (2) To
enable those interested to appreciate the advantages and
disadvantages of the various designs; (3) To facilitate the study, and
add to the general knowledge of this form of prime mover and its
application to vessels of various types.” (Chapter I) There are 369
illustrations and an index.

“The photographic reproductions and clear and carefully executed

drawings are calculated to give sufficient detail without introducing
unnecessary complexity.”

+ Engineer 129:225 F 27 ’20 380w

+ N Y P L New Tech Bks p32 Ap ’20 160w

POOLE, ERNEST. Blind. *$2.50 (2c) Macmillan

20–18299