Running Head: Critical Essay 1

De-constructing the response of Law Enforcement on 26/11 Mumbai Attacks

An Essay

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University
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Introduction:
Terrorism has been a long-standing issue which even the most developed and
powerful nations have not been able to prevent. As defined by the United Nations,
terrorism is a criminal act that is intended to cause terror in public for the furtherance
of some particular personal or political purpose (Perera, 1994). Such criminal
activities have been devastating several countries for several decades now and are
expected to do so in future as well. However, the law enforcement strategies and
responses of the attacked countries have been getting stronger with recommendations
from various agencies and government forces. It plays a vital role in planning and
preventing future terror attacks and give a lesson to the terrorist organisations that
operate with the ill intention of killing and destroying humanity based on their false
religious beliefs. However, law enforcement has experienced both success and failure
in this regard as the terrorist organisations have been quite successful till now in
spreading terror in public. Considering these the primary intention of this essay is to
critically analyse the response of the law enforcement after the famous 26/11 Mumbai
attacks when 10 members of Lashkar-e-Taiba entered the city of Mumbai, India and
were killed 174 people while injuring more than 300 people. The essay identifies the
failures of law enforcement and provides a brief overview of how these failures can
be remedied. Further, the essay analyses the challenges for law enforcement in
preventing and responding to the terror attacks and lastly the essay discusses the
viable strategies that can be implemented for preventing failures of law enforcement
in the future.
Running Head: Critical Essay 3

Police as First Responders:

The terrorist attack that happened on 26/11 in Mumbai is considered as a test for
the conventional anti-terrorism response strategies of the law enforcement agencies.
However, as reported by Chakraborty, Agrawal & Rao (2014) the Mumbai police
department was the first group that responded to the terrorist attacks. In a crucial
emergency, such as the 26/11 attacks, the police officer, either in the controlling area
or on the ground, takes several choices. Each of these choices is driven by an
incentive generally derived from knowledge about the circumstance. As per the initial
report of the Mumbai Police, the incident at the first instance was considered a gang
shootout from their past experience. A Control Room officer may not have played a
role in monitoring the events at the scene based simply on the history of Mumbai,
which is frequently controlled by field officers on the basis of gun assaults. However,
this attitude would amount to a non-protective response, particularly in the setting of a
major tragedy in real fact. In such instances, news and social media play an essential
part in the information collection and dissemination of the ongoing scenario and it is
quite likely that critical information will be avoided if media reports are not reliable
(Oh et al, 2011).
Further, as analysed from the first responder Mumbai police, it can be said that at
the moment of the attack, the police officials were not equipped with the required
arms as compared to the advanced arms carried by the terrorists. Therefore it was hard
for the police officials as law enforcement agencies to react to the situation soon
enough to prevent the incident. Moreover, the approach of the terrorists did not allow
the law enforcement agencies to react fast enough to save lives because the terrorists
open fire on the general public inside a restaurant. As stated by Machold (2017) that
the 26/11 attack made the government respond furiously as the senior officials were
forced to go out of the office to control the situation and called for major institutional
and policy changes in relation to handling terrorist activities.

Failures of Law Enforcement and Remedies:

Even with all the latest technologies, arms and army, the Indian government
failed to respond to the situation immediately because of a lack of intelligence reports.
This does not mean that the intelligence bureau did not have any information,
however, did not have the notion of such an immediate attack. As stated by Narayan
(2014) the initial assertions that 26/11 was a shift in paradigm in the approach to
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safety governance by the Indian State have been overestimated. However, the attacks
have led to major improvements in policy. Several government-level union-level
programmes were in place, such as the Police Modernization Scheme and the Mega-
City Police, aimed especially at providing Mumbai police with modern weaponry and
security equipment. While the newest version of the MFG scheme was launched
in2000, the procurement process of Maharashtra was going slowly, stalling due to the
very bureaucratic and poorly defined procurement procedure and the absence of
accredited test laboratories. Further, as reported by Pant & Mirchandani (2018) the
lack of effective institutional capacity is the reason why Indian failed to prevent and
manage terrorist attacks like 26/11. This is also the reason why the Uri army base
attack took place took the life of several army officers in 2016. Similarly, the report of
Mahadevan (2019) clarified that the institutional capability of the Indian state and the
overall situation is far from adequate and the changes are not far-reaching. In the way
the Indian authorities addressed the Mumbai tragedy, India's deplorable condition of
internal security infrastructure became clear. During three days, while terrorists raged,
Indian security personnel failed to even get to grips with the situation and react
properly. Primarily because of political squabbling, major projects such as the
National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the National Intelligence Grid are
striving to get out.
As far as the remedies to such failures are concerned, it comes down to the
implementation of policies for countering terrorism by the Indian government. Rabasa
et al. (2009) reported that intelligence failure, gaps in coastal surveillance, inadequate
metal detectors, slow response timing and inadequate counter-terrorism training were
some of the major reasons why such a devastating terrorist incident took place.
Addressing all the above-mentioned gaps can suffice as remedies provided that the
government takes the report into consideration and acts accordingly.

Challenges for Law Enforcement:

It is obvious that terrorist activities are difficult to prevent with an immediate effect
even if a country has all the necessary resources for the same. As stated by Rourke
(2010) that the attack presents substantial problems for authorities to react to and
manage the event to the capacity to obtain real-time media intelligence during a
terrorist occurrence. This extends to the physical access to the media with more
resources than the police on the scene of the event and information supplied to the
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media. In combination with the difficulties of monitoring various crime scenes and
tackling unknown criminals, training and preparation are also needed. Just like the US
failed to prevent the 9/11 attack even it had enough intelligence reports signifies that
it is not completely the fault of the law enforcement agencies. It can also be analysed
that while traditional military operations require time to build up and deploy
equipment that provides clear signs, terrorist activity is more subtle and difficult to
predict. Contemporary intelligence agency's main duty is to provide decision-makers
with excellent analytical reports. However, to act upon the intelligence report is not as
easy as it seems because the standard of protocols implemented by the government
lacks a constructive mechanism using which first-hand reaction can be imposed to
stop such terrorist incidents.

Recommended strategies to prevent failures

The Indian law enforcement agencies like the police and other security agencies
are highly fragmented and often found to have poor coordination. The federal system
of India makes the individual states responsible for policymaking in relation to
counter-terrorism. The individual responsibility makes the local police being deployed
for countering such incidents who do not possess adequate training and equipment to
handle the terrorists. Staniland (2009) with evidence noted that the investigation
agencies like the Central Reserve Police Force, National Investigation Agency and the
Research and Analysis Wing along with the Central Bureau of Investigation should
start focusing on the pattern of terrorist attacks and implement military protection in
certain areas that are more prone to such attacks. The areas that are highly vulnerable
to such attacks must be controlled by the National Security Guard who are the highly
trained special forces only deployed at the time of emergency. These are the guards
who came to the rescue and neutralised the terrorists and therefore signifies that
deployment of such forces should be an immediate action whenever the country faces
such terrorist incidents.
Human Rights Watch (2010) provides several recommendations for the
prevention of such terror incidents in future and to strengthen the political and
legislative scenario in India. First, Indian has to ensure that the definition of terrorism
as per the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 must be in accordance with the
UN and human rights fundamental concepts. Ensure a rapid court review and bail for
those arrested and detained on alleged membership of a terrorist group or gang.
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Revoke the provisions of section 43 of the UAPA on too wide search, seizure and
arrest. Amend the NIAA, in particular by guaranteeing that court rulings on
jurisdictional problems are not restricted, to ensure the independence of special
tribunals from the executive.
Running Head: Critical Essay 7

Alternate Response for non-law enforcement subject participants:

Introduction:
Counterterrorism has been the basis of law and policymaking for the Indian
government for decades now because of the fact that the country has been facing
tensions with several terrorist organisations and the alleged involvement of Pakistan.
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 is the main legislation in India for counter-
terrorism. Several legislations are enforced but lapsed due to changes in government
and changes in government policies. It has to be noted that apart from the law
enforcement agencies like Police and military, there are several other participants
responsible for preventing terrorist activities. In this regard, the purpose of this part of
the essay is to analyse the response of the non-law enforcement agencies or parties in
relation to the attacks that took place in Mumbai on 26/11 of 2008. It also discusses
the failures and how these failures can be prevented. Lastly, the essay also discusses
the challenges and strategies to prevent terrorism.

Initial Response:
The government, police and military have the highest authority with regard to the
prevention of terrorist activities, however, as reported by Human Rights Watch (2010)
that the legislations are never sufficient in preventing terrorism and this is what
exactly happened to India. As terrorism violates human rights, laws must take into
account the definitions of terrorism in such a sense that it allows the members of
public and international agencies to take control of some situations whenever
required. Further, Das (2019) reported that the maritime security strategy of India has
been inadequate in this regard. It might be the lack of capable officials in the position
or the unawareness or corrupted fishermen working in the sea. As the Indian Coast
Guards are entrusted with such high levels of responsibilities, it is inevitable that the
adherence to such high levels of responsibilities requires help from non-law
enforcement parties. Elkus & Sullivan (2009) said that police have limited time and
space to act and operate. As the intention of the terrorist was to create mass casualties
in the furtherance of the strategic goals and mission of the terrorist organisations,
police officials and other law enforcement agencies cannot dominate the urban spaces
in a city.
Running Head: Critical Essay 8

Failures and Remedies:

Intelligence reports and inter-agency coordination is the answer to such terrorist
activities. Even though complete prevention is not possible and never potentially the
approach of any government, however, people reporting to the intelligence bureau are
often found to be privately working spies and reporters for the government officials.
As reported by the US Department of Justice (2006) the lack of research in the hands
of state police has been a major reason why both law and non-law enforcement
agencies fail to understand the pattern of terrorist attacks. State police forces, as the
topics of study and policy activity, were traditionally disregarded always. State
enforcement agencies are typically included in broader studies on state and local
police communities. Sadly, local law enforcement organisations, particularly major
municipal police departments, often have a subsidiary role to play. It is vital for
various reasons today to better understand the non-law enforcement agencies as they
play an important role in providing information. For example, the local police
officials are dependent on local and private informers and research agencies whose
failure cannot be reported directly on government reports.

Desai & Bhatt (2019) reported that the intelligence agencies of India contain both
public and private informers. However, this involves a three-fold problem that has
always existed. The first is that there are absolutely no intelligence reports that are
constructive, secondly, the intelligence supplied is too generic, ambiguous in nature
and cannot be implemented. Globally, the failure of effective intelligence is a big
barrier to prevent terrorist attacks by law enforcement authorities. The third problem
is that many agencies fail to efficiently transmit to the proper law enforcement agency
the information they receive. Terrorism is moving into the digital world beyond the
physical realm. In this environment, intelligence collection must also take on several
facets. Human intelligence is no longer better than technical intelligence which means
that technology must be used to ensure authentic intelligence. Desai and Bhatt (2009)
also reported that social media being a non-law enforcement party also failed to
provide and report constructive data. For example, communications between the
terrorist organisations happen over daily used social media platforms however during
the incident of 26/11 the terrorists were in constant communication through satellite
phones which are easy to track down.
Running Head: Critical Essay 9

As far as the remedies are concerned, the Indian Council on Global Relations
(2014) stated that self-defence is a legitimate action granted by article 51 of the UN
Charter. The prerequisite to utilise this privilege rests in the fact that the State of the
victim was subject to an armed attack, which might be attributed to a different state.
The use of force ought to be reasonable and required. The same has been utilised by
US citizens whenever they feared an armed attack on civilians.

Challenges to Law Enforcement for Terrorism:

Terrorism is such a criminal act that cannot be prevented or countered by one
country alone because of the nature of the criminals and their approach. It requires the
cooperation of several developed countries and adherence to international treaties and
customary laws. The absence of a global consensus on what constitutes terrorism is a
key issue in combating terrorism, and the differences between nations in order to help
each other in the wake of terrorism also represent a difficulty (Mirchandani, 2018).
An additional hurdle against terrorism in international law is the strict rule of state
accountability. If used appropriately, international law is one of the strongest
instruments for restore world order and stability for the international community.
Nayak & Krepon (2012) stated that the political tension between India and Pakistan is
another challenge for law enforcement agencies. Terrorist acts will nonetheless
happen in India and Pakistan, whether or not domestic authorities are trying to
improve bilateral relations.

Conclusion:
Terrorism has been treated as a serious crime and the criminals deserve death
penalties as per general norms because terrorism involves the killing of other people.
This notion has been considered by the law enforcement agencies in India however,
the terrorist Ajmal Kasab, who was caught and was one of the 10 terrorists
responsible for the 26/11 attack saw how incapable and slow the judicial system the
country has. The judgement of AJMAL MOHAMMAD AMIR KASAB @ ABU
MUJAHID v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [2012] 8 SCR 295, took 4 years to
grant a death sentence to a criminal who killed hundreds of innocent people. It shows
the incapabilities of not only the law enforcement agencies but also the judicial
system as a whole. India did not respond quickly enough as found from the evidence
cited in this essay and this has been a major problem why India faced not one rather
Running Head: Critical Essay 10

several terrorist attacks in the past decades. Law enforcement agencies lack not only
institutional support but also international support in this regard because even the
terrorist live in the society and communicate with the daily used technologies. The
intelligence bureau agencies need to secure information every time there is some form
of enemy movement. The capacity for the police in response to and management of
the event to obtain real-time media intelligence during a terrorist attack offers major
problems. This includes physical access to the media which can benefit more from the
policing of the event site and the media's information. In conjunction with the
difficulties of handling several crime scenes and facing unknown criminals, training
and preparation are also necessary.
Running Head: Critical Essay 11

References:

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Das, H. (2019). India’s maritime security governance challenges: A decade after

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