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“Due to its theoretical perspective and the multiple case studies it addresses, this book
illuminates the historical context of emergence of Latin American conspiracy theories,
and, at the same time, calls us to reflect on the political culture of our time. The work
has global relevance, as it dialogues and questions features of contemporary culture and
the dire challenges we face living in democracy”.
Emilio Crenzel, Professor of Sociology at the National University of Buenos Aires,
Argentina, and author of The Memory of the Argentina Disappearances

“Conspiracy theories in Latin America get little if any coverage in English language
literature. This book remedies that omission with sophisticated analysis and fascinating,
deeply researched narratives”.
Michael Barkun, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Syracuse University,
USA, and author of A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary
America
CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND LATIN
AMERICAN HISTORY

This book is a systematic inquiry of conspiracy theories across Latin

America.
Conspiracy theories project not only an interpretive logic of reality
that leads people to believe in sinister machinations, but also imply a
theory of power that requires mobilizing and taking action. Through
history, many have fallen for the allure of conspiratorial narratives,
even the most unsubstantiated and bizarre. This book traces the
main conspiracy theories developing in Latin America since late
colonial times and into the present, and identifies the geopolitical,
socioeconomic and cultural scenarios of their diffusion and
mobilization.
Students and scholars of Latin American history and politics, as
well as comparatists, will find in this book penetrating analyses of
major conspiratorial designs in this multistate region of the
Americas.

Luis Roniger is Reynolds Professor of Latin American Studies in the

Department of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest
University, USA.

Leonardo Senkman is Research Fellow in the Harry Truman

Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Israel.
CONSPIRACY THEORIES
Series Editors: Peter Knight, University of Manchester, and
Michael Butter, University of Tübingen.

Conspiracy theories have a long history and exist in all modern

societies. However, their visibility and significance are increasing
today. Conspiracy theories can no longer be simply dismissed as the
product of a pathological mind-set located on the political margins.
This series provides a nuanced and scholarly approach to this
most contentious of subjects. It draws on a range of disciplinary
perspectives including political science, sociology, history, media and
cultural studies, area studies and behavioural sciences. Issues
covered include the psychology of conspiracy theories, changes in
conspiratorial thinking over time, the role of the Internet, regional
and political variations and the social and political impact of
conspiracy theories.
The series will include edited collections, single-authored
monographs and short-form books.

Conspiracy Theories and the Nordic Countries

Anastasiya Astapova, Eirikur Bergmann, Asbjørn Dyrendal, Annika
Rabo, Kasper Grotle Rasmussen, Hulda Thórisdóttir, Andreas
Önnerfors

Europe: Continent of Conspiracies

Conspiracy Theories in and about Europe
Edited by Andreas Önnerfors and André Krouwel

Russia Today and Conspiracy Theories

People, Power and Politics on RT
Ilya Yablokov and Precious N Chatterje-Doody

Conspiracy Theories and Latin American History

Lurking in the Shadows
Luis Roniger and Leonardo Senkman
CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND
LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY

Lurking in the Shadows

Luis Roniger and Leonardo Senkman

First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business
© 2022 Luis Roniger and Leonardo Senkman
The right of Luis Roniger and Leonardo Senkman to be identified as
authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with
sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Roniger, Luis, 1949– author. | Senkman, Leonardo, author.
Title: Conspiracy theories and Latin American history: lurking in the
shadows / Luis Roniger and Leonardo Senkman.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2022. |
Series: Conspiracy theories |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021013045 (print) | LCCN 2021013046 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781032052380 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032052373
(paperback) |
ISBN 9781003198048 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Conspiracy theories–Latin America. |
Latin America–Politics and government.
Classification: LCC HV6295.L29 R65 2022 (print) |
LCC HV6295.L29 (ebook) | DDC 001.9/8098–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021013045
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021013046
ISBN: 978-1-032-05238-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-05237-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-19804-8 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198048
Typeset in Bembo
by Newgen Publishing UK
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 The logic of conspiracy thought

2 Conspiratorial thinking and social exorcism

3 Historiography and the political use of conspiracy theories

The alleged conspiracy of the Jesuits justifying their exile
The controversial role of Masonic lodges in Hispanic American
emancipation
Conspiracy theories and the process of secularization in Latin
America

4 Conspiracy theories and the assertion of hidden enemies

The Tragic Week in Argentina: the conspiracy myth of Judeo-
Russian ‘maximalism’
The political use of a conspiratorial gaze in Chile, 1918–1920
An imagined Jewish-Communist threat and Nazi conspiracies in
Vargas’ Brazil
A massacre in the Dominican Republic and the fabled theory of a
Haitian menace
The conspiracy narratives of the Synarchy and the Andinia Plan in
Argentina

5 International wars, imperialist conspiracies and conspiracy

theories
 The Chaco War: the Standard Oil Company and conspiracy
theories
The War of the Pacific: mutual recriminations and the role of
imperialism
Intervention, imperial tutelage and conspiracy plots in Cuba–US
relationships

6 Political polarization, intrigues and conspiracy theories

The Fourth Reich in Argentina: an anti-Peronist conspiracy
narrative
Mexico in the 1990s: political assassinations and conspiracy
theories
Chavismo and its conspiratorial glances
The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in Brazil: a
conspiratorial scenario?

7 Geopolitics, intrigues and conspiracy theories

Dependency theory and conspiratorial figments of victimization
Manichean plots and conspiracy narratives during the era of
global bipolarity
The coup against Allende: intrigues and imperialistic conspiracies
Cuba and the United States: haunting questions around intrigues
evoking the Cold War

8 A quarter century of Argentine intrigues and conspiracies

Conspiracy schemes in the investigation of the terrorist attack
against the AMIA
A suspicious deep state cover-up: the Río Tercero explosion
Wild conjectures to explain the sinking of the submarine ARA San
Juan
Geopolitics, civil mistrust and negligent cover-up: questions and
suspicions
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We completed this book with the support of institutions and the

advice of colleagues and friends. We gratefully acknowledge the
generous financial and logistical support of the Office of Global
Programs of Wake Forest University and that of the Truman
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace of the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. The Office of Global Programs and its
director Vice Provost K. Kline Harrison supported a month-long
research visit by Leonardo Senkman, which allowed us to conclude
research and writing. The rich bibliographic and documentary
repository of the Library of Congress in Washington DC, the Nacional
Library in Buenos Aires and the Bloomfield Library of Social Sciences
and Humanities of the Hebrew University have been also essential
for conducting this research. The analysis of the Chaco War in ‘The
Chaco War: the Standard Oil Company and conspiracy theories’ of
Chapter 5 was first published in the Journal of Politics in Latin
America (“Fuel for Oil: Conspirationism and the War of Chaco in the
Americas”, Hamburg, vol. 11, No. 1, 2019, Sage, Creative Commons
Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 License) and the section on the
Synarchy and the Plan Andinia in Chapter 4 was first published in an
article in the Journal of Modern Jewish Studies (“Conspirationism,
Synarchism and the long shadow of Perón in Argentina”, Oxford, vol.
17, No. 4, 2018, Taylor and Francis). Our theoretical perspective in
Chapter 1 develops insights first presented in the journal
Protosociology (“The Logic of Conspiracy Thought: A Research
Agenda for an Era of Institutional Distrust and Fake News”,
Frankfurt, vol. 36, 2019). The book follows and further elaborates
the work published digitally in the Spanish book América Latina tras
bambalinas: teorías conspirativas, usos y abusos (Latin American
Research Commons, December 2019).
We dedicate the book to the memory of Lito Senkman, who
always suspected a purposeful destiny in the world, to Shuli and
Milly for their love and support in our lives’ journey, and to Hanoch,
whose assistance was essential. Throughout our work, colleagues at
various academic meetings contributed important comments. We
particularly benefited from their suggestions at the congresses of the
Latin American Studies Association, the International Association of
Americanists, the Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies,
the Latin American Jewish Studies Association, at the Politics and
International Affairs Departmental Seminar in Wake Forest University
and at the presentation in Tzavta of Buenos Aires. We are
particularly grateful to Alex Estrada and Henry Parkhurst for their
research assistance; to Dov Winer for his touching initiative
translating and calling attention to our table of contents; and to
María Matilde Ollier (Universidad Nacional San Martín), Angela
Alonso (Universidade de São Paulo/Cebrap), Emilio Crenzel
(Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires), Sergio Kiernan (Página/12)
and the anonymous readers of LARC for their valuable suggestions
and criticisms. Finally, our special thanks go to Peter Knight and
Michael Butter for inviting us to be part of their series at Routledge.
INTRODUCTION

The clinically paranoid person thinks that others are conspiring against him personally,
while the social paranoid thinks that hidden powers are persecuting his class, his nation,
or his religion. I would argue that the latter is more dangerous, since he sees his ordeal
as something shared, perhaps with millions …
Eco, 2014

This book explores Latin American conspiracy theories thematically

and not chronologically. It seeks to identify the historical and
geopolitical configurations that could explain why many in Latin
American societies have often fallen for the allure of conspiracy
narratives, even for those supported by misinformation and
disinformation and, as such, unsubstantiated. At the same time, the
region has provided a fertile ground for multiple plots and intrigues,
adding credence to those believing that even the most bizarre
conspiratorial suggestions might be truthful and as such, require
their decisive action and mobilization.
We recognize that conspiracy theorizing is universal and not
peculiar to any single society or set of societies. Accordingly, we start
the book with a discussion of theoretical perspectives that looked to
decipher the logic of conspiratorial thought in rather universal terms.
That logic pertains to multiple cases but may fail to explain the
specifics of each situation. We thus shift gears thereafter to delve in-
depth with Latin American cases. The cases that we selected for
analysis in each chapter represent clusters of the various contexts
that we identified as key to the emergence of conspiracy theories –
some of them being mass delusions, completely offbeat and fabled –
that permeated sometimes the imaginaries of Latin American
societies.
 Those believing in conspiracy theories interpret the world as the
object of sinister machinations, rife with opaque plots and covert
social forces with nefarious motivations. They consider that internal
and external enemies, including foreign powers and economic
interests, secretly plot plans of domination or destruction. As ‘truth
seekers’, they consider it a moral duty to unmask those plots, defy
the malevolent forces and thus safeguard the integrity of their
collectivity, its spirit and material resources. Others may follow suit,
spread misguided revelations and act upon them, convinced that
they are doing the right thing and making the world a better place.
One may see in their recurrence the product of long-term
geopolitical and institutional tendencies. As Latin American societies
have been at the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system,
they have been subject to the impact of geopolitical or economic
forces beyond their control. It is not surprising, then, to realize that
major strata gave credence to narratives about their victimization by
abusive politicians and bureaucrats, by financial interests and
hegemonic powers. Moreover, these societies have experienced
multiple internal conflicts and plots, bringing political actors to
develop a special flair for suspecting intrigues and finding out ahead
of time who could be plotting, yet also imagining plots when there
none existed.
Such general background is plausible, yet we opted to go beyond
it. We think that research should identify the specific conditions
under which various conspiracy narratives turned believable
sometimes somewhere, that is, the specific circumstances of their
emergence, resonance and implications. In the book, we attempt to
provide such thick reading by analyzing several constellations of
events and forces that turned specific conspiracy theories into more
than just ancillary and ephemeral phenomena in some historical
occasions. Such narratives have involved theories of power, and
social mobilization premised on the suspected presence of enemies
plotting in covert ways to amass political gain, rebel or attain
financial aggrandizement. We identify some of the most notorious
such theories and explain their genesis, rise and dissemination,
adoption and fall, disentangling as much as possible fabled and
offbeat theories from sinister plots that proved correct, like the
coups d'état that brought down democratic institutions during the
Cold War. Not an easy task indeed, as those boundaries are often
ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations.
Approaching this research domain, observers may be tempted to
pose an either/or question: are these fabled conspiracy theories or
real intrigues? If one formulates the question that way, inquiry may
lead to false dichotomies, falling also for the false premise that
conspiratorial thinking is an anomaly. With an acute sense for
historical plots and contingency, the renowned Argentine writer
Jorge Luis Borges disputed the existence of such a dilemma. In
order to unveil the fabric of existence, Borges believed it necessary
to invent “a plot against the plot”, as Ricardo Piglia recalled years
later in a short essay on the theory of the plot (2007). Anyone
assessing historical developments must face the challenge of
complex angles of interpretation when addressing the blurred lines
between planned intrigues and fabled conspiracy narratives.
In this work, we move at the edge of this challenge, paying
particular attention to conspiracy theories, their claims and
controversies, and the contextual circumstances of their rise,
development, decline or mutation. We investigate the collective
scenarios that explain why specific conspiracy narratives profoundly
influenced the way in which sectors of Latin American societies
interpreted reality in terms of hidden intrigues, deep state
hypothesis and conspiratorial narratives. Integrating perspectives
from the social sciences, social history and the history of ideas, we
seek to understand the circumstances that, at certain historical
junctures, brought many to believe that forces conspiring behind the
scenes hurled plans of disruption and domination that could affect
the course of their history.
 Let us make our use of the terms explicit. We have adopted the
terms intrigues and conspiracies to refer to the ample yet ambiguous
semantic field of actual plots. The spectrum of phenomena denoted
by the action of conspiring is vast, as can be seen from the terms
that this semantic field encompasses in Spanish: complot, conjura,
intriga, maquinación, confabulación and trama siniestra (i.e. plot,
conspiracy, intrigue, machination, collusion and sinister plot).
According to certain jurists, a conspiracy is an act “consisting of the
resolution between two people or more to act decisively in concert
(complot) to commit a crime of treason” (Ramírez Gronda 2003),
with the “conspiracy (conspiración) being referred to the crimes of
rebellion or sedition” (Ossorio 1974).
Thus, the terms conspiracy, complot – or rather intrigue, which
we use to avoid confusion – are suggestive of the political
machinations that in fact play out. In parallel, we use the concept of
conspiracy theories or conspiracism to allude to the ideational
constructions that warn about the existence of diabolical forces
thriving clandestinely and seemingly operating with the purpose of
affecting politics, society or the economy. Conspiracy theories
suggest the need to take action to confront the agenda of hidden
internal or external enemies, geared to harm the social fabric, which
they dared to uncover. In their efforts to sustain this kind of
interpretive logic, political forces and movements can end up
fabricating antagonistic myths designed to mobilize society and
thwart the dominating intentions of those they suspect of plotting.
The aforementioned epigraph by Umberto Eco let us perceive how
the conspiratorial logic attempts to explain both historical and
current events as if they were the result of a clash of wills between
opposing forces, pitting supposed good against supposed evil.
Throughout the history of humanity there have been countless
intrigues, conspiracies, plots and coups d'état whose development
and the outcome often depended on the secrecy with which they
were planned, and Latin America is no exception. However, as
Thomas Milan Konda indicates in his book Conspiracies of
Conspiracies. How Delusions have Overrun America,

The mere existence of conspiracies does not, however,

automatically give rise to conspiracy theories or conspiracism.
Conspiracies, in the sense of the plots that pepper history,
have been integral to politics from the beginning and, thus,
unremarkable. [When conspiracies were taken for granted as
normal means of deposing elites] there was no need for theory
beyond the all-encompassing one that elites are constantly
conspiring against each other. […] By the eighteenth century, a
somewhat wider array of participants was making politics more
complex. Conspiracy explanations became broader and more
subtle: “Accounts of plots … were no longer descriptions of
actual events but interpretations of otherwise puzzling
concatenations of events”.
2019, 13–14

In itself, the long existence of intrigues is not a predictor of

conspiracy theories. It is only when life experience becomes
confusing, or change accelerates, and reality develops a complexity
that seems to be beyond comprehension, that people start looking
for coherent explanations, and may imagine that some hidden and
sinister forces manipulate the course of events. Thus, the appeal of
conspiracy narratives, even those outlandish and bizarre, grows from
an innate human search for order, as people try to make sense of
confusing situations and chaotic chains of events they experience,
looking to interpret them in terms of some comprehensive
underlying logic.
We equally claim that it would be erroneous to assume that all
conspiracy theories about collusions and intrigues are irrational in
nature. On the contrary, even the most bizarre conspiracy theories
operate with a logic that is no less coherent than scientific discourse,
although it differs from the latter in two major respects, namely

a. in their verification and discard methodology

b. in their role as mobilizing role

We thus claim that the political, mobilizing aspect of conspiracy

theories is as fundamental as the epistemological one. Conspiracy
theories project not only an interpretive logic of reality that leads
people to feel that their beliefs are justified, but also imply a theory
of power that weighs the world as the object of sinister
machinations, which requires taking action. Sustaining the call for
action is a vision of reality in which two wills confront each other in a
titanic struggle in which only a single will can prevail. Those who
think this way imagine reality as operating through an omnipotent
voluntarist logic, and they often set out to unmask and punish those
who, according to them, threaten the well-being of society, the
integrity of the nation or the destinies of humanity. When people
adopt such vision, research should follow the realm of mentalities,
narratives and conspiracy theories, tracing also their political
implications, from exposing those lurking in the shadows to
confronting and defeating their malevolent designs.
Making use of the analytical categories and theoretical
frameworks of political sociology, social history and the history of
ideas, while contextualizing specific conspiratorial narratives and
their contexts and implications, we propose to deconstruct their
constitutive elements to understand why some of these theories
have had great popular receptivity and repercussion, while others
have remained secondary.
The road map to the book reflects these concerns. In Chapter 1,
we approach the logic of conspiracy theories that often assumes
argumentative certainty, presumably based on ‘true believers’
commitment to unmask a hidden plan or plot and act accordingly.
We offer a sociopolitical interpretation of such demands to confront
whoever seemingly intrigues, seeking to undermine the material and
moral strength of the nation, or even of humanity as a whole, as
some of the ‘true believers’ claim. To this end, our analysis reviews
and integrates different classical and contemporary theories,
anchored in sociology, political science, the history of ideas, social
psychology and the humanities.
Chapter 2 deepens the analysis of how different conspiracy
theories have emerged in modern times with the express design of
averting perceived threats resulting from socioeconomic and political
transformations. We refer to accelerated processes of change in
modernity, the breakdown of political hegemony typical of traditional
society and the onset of moral panics in the face of popular uprisings
provided the breeding ground for generating conspiracy theories
during the liberal revolutions, especially after the French Revolution.
The assault on Enlightenment reason and the rejection of the
insurrectional ideology were simultaneously and concomitantly useful
to produce plots of conspiracies that did not yield to simple evidence
of verisimilitude. Even in the 20th century and the early 21st
century, various sectors validated false positive theories, that is, they
affirmed false conspiracies. Moreover, when it was revealed that the
claim of an alleged intrigue was unfounded, its mentors refused to
accept that the theory was flawed, preferring to continue to uphold
it by admitting as validated only those data that corroborated their
conspiratorial hypothesis.
Chapters 3–8 approach Latin American historical and
contemporary cases of conspiratorial theorizing. Throughout these
chapters, we identify four major scenarios for the development of
such conspiracy logics. One has been that of war scenes, which
carry the risk of defeat and loss of human life and territory. Wars
generate collective sensitivity and accumulate emotional charges,
constituting a breeding ground for suspicions about conspiracies led
by foreign enemies and underground fifth columns of traitors, so to
explain war defeats as resulting from their uncanny maneuvers. A
second scenario has been political polarization, typical of some
populist experiences and revolutionary change. Due to their
mobilizing capacity, contexts of political antagonism and polarization
have proven fertile grounds for the reception and dissemination of
conspiracist discourses. A third scenario relates to the geopolitical
position of Latin America at different historical moments. Particularly,
the era of the Cold War and post-Soviet era witnessed virulent
polemics among politicians, intellectuals, students, trade unionists
and the military, generating suspicions of internal and external
intrigues around contrasting ideological projects. Conspiratorial
glances and fabrications bolstered in the context of clashes between
radical movements and violent counterinsurgency in different
countries. The fourth scenario we identified as favoring the
emergence and persistence of conspiracy theories is one in which
citizens deeply distrust republican institutions, being skeptical of the
political class and the security forces and justice. In such a scenario,
institutional distrust provides a fertile ground for conspiratorial
theorizing about presumed enemies corrupting institutions and
affecting society.
These chapters analyze in a thematic progression these
institutional, political, socioeconomic and cultural scenarios that
provided functionality to those who explained in a conspiratorial key
the ineffectiveness and impotence of republican institutions to
protect society, promote well-being and ensure the livelihood of
major sectors of the population. In Chapter 3, we report on
conspiratorial aspects of early Latin American history and the
historiographical essay. Indeed, modernity in Latin America was no
exception to the push to avert accelerated changes through
conspiracy theories. Some theories defamed the social protest of
popular sectors, political movements, union insurrections and
revolutionary ferments. We then investigate the relationship between
historiographic analysis and the political uses of conspiratorial
interpretations in the historical development of Latin American states
and nations. In particular, we inquire what were some of the
interpretations and political beneficiaries of those conspiracy
theories. Likewise, we analyze how such interpretative perspectives
have affected the historiographical essay until recently, and in
particular, the sociohistorical and political analysis of key events in
the Latin American nations. The selected cases include the alleged
conspiracy of the Jesuits used to justify their expulsion and
banishment from Spain and Latin America; the role of the Masonic
lodges during the Spanish American emancipation; and certain
conspiratorial myths around the secularization of civil society in Latin
American states, with special attention to the cases of Colombia and
Uruguay.
Chapter 4 focuses on suspected internal enemies, an image used
and abused in the construction of conspiracy theories. Since the
19th century and especially in the course of the 20th, Latin American
elites tried to modernize their nations, modeling them according to
certain visions of progress, although at the same time fearing the
demise of hierarchical social structures and the privileges they
enjoyed. Thus, they embodied an ambiguous agenda combining a
modernizing drive and their desire to preserve power structures in
the face of change. The result was the emergence of a biased model
of modernization, intolerant of autonomous voices, built on exclusion
of major sectors and relying on repressive mechanisms of control. In
its attempt to forge a homogeneous nation based on “misplaced
ideas” – to use the term coined by Roberto Schwarz, their
developmental model oppressed, marginalized and stigmatized
indigenous minorities, subaltern racial groups and immigrants.
Focusing on suspected internal enemies, this chapter thus refers to
the analysis of how these societies interpreted, structured and
managed collective mentalities in the context of power structures,
with elites positioning themselves and calibrating the pressures for
change. In particular, we address the use and abuse of the
presumption of internal enemies who were supposedly seeking to
undermine the integrity of society, a suspicion widely present in the
vision of numerous conspiratorial glances. What is distinctive in
those cases is the construction of a narrative of conspiratorial
intentions plotted within society with the expressed design of
undermining collective integrity by their actions. The chapter
analyzes five case studies, three of which – Argentina in 1919, Chile
during 1918–1920 and Brazil in the years 1920–1930 – demonstrate
how conspiratorial glances were generated in situations of
accelerated modernization, social and structural transformations, and
elites’ fear of revolutionary change. Under those circumstances,
those in power made use of conspiracy theories against presumed
internal enemies as they tried to prevent social and political
pressures and the threat they perceived to their lifestyle and
domination. A fourth case, the Dominican Republic under the
government of Rafael Trujillo constitutes a counterpoint, since the
rhetoric of targeting an internal enemy was used post factum to
justify a massive massacre of thousands of Dominican citizens of
Haitian ethnicity. The conspiratorial narrative declined to recognize
the genocide carried out according to racist conceptions and
sanctioned from the peak of state power. Instead, it claimed that the
massive loss of life had been the product of anger and popular
outcry of those who defended themselves from the threat of the
“Haitians”.
The chapter closes with a fifth case, that of conspiracy narratives
warning of the existence of an international secret network, the so-
called Synarchy that supposedly was plotting to achieve its design of
domination over the nation. The deposed Argentine president Juan
Domingo Perón spread such theory when he interpreted his loss of
power as the result of cloudy global geopolitical interests. Being
rather phantasmagoric in its identification of internal and external
enemies, it still found a fertile ground in the conflictive environment
of Argentina during the turbulent years of the 1960s and 1970s.
Under the influence of Peronism, the idea of Synarchy fed for
decades both anti-Semitic plots and later on, evolved into
denunciations of an imaginary Andinia Plan concocted by supposed
internal and external enemies – among them, Mapuche native
activists, British interests, Israeli backpackers and eco-millionaires –
all of them suspected at one point or another to plan a takeover of
Patagonia.
Chapter 5 focuses analysis on the interface between imperialist
intrigues and conspiratorial interpretations designed in light and
shadows of imperial and hegemonic domination. In the historical
investigation of Latin American geopolitics and the continent’s
international relations, the interventions of hegemonic powers,
especially Great Britain and the United States, had a great impact.
Yet, claims of intervention were also projected as explanatory factors
onto cases where the presence of external powers and foreign
interests was merely secondary to the role played by internal forces.
The chapter begins by analyzing certain narratives about the Chaco
War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932–1935), interpreted by
many as a ‘War of the Standard Oil’. Next, we go back to the War of
the Pacific (1879–1883), whose conspiratorial interpretations have
been more marginal in the face of parallel narratives projected in the
academic literature and popular memory. We approach and explain
this counterpoint case from both a historiographical perspective and
the persisting territorial demands of Bolivia and Peru, countries
defeated by Chile. Closing the chapter is an analysis of the
relationships between Cuba and the United States, in which we try
to distinguish real conspiracies and conspiratorial views. In this case,
we approach conspiracy plots of the 19th century, leaving 20th-
century cases for Chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter 6 analyzes how political polarization can stimulate the
development of conspiratorial glances. In that direction, the chapter
covers the study of conspiracy plots of a different tenor, one united
by the common denominator of political polarization. We address the
myth of a Fourth Reich concomitant with the emergence of Peronism
in Argentina in 1945–1946, elaborated with the design of removing
legitimacy and discrediting the first Justicialismo. In addition, we
analyze the case of Chavismo and its confrontation with the
opposition, whom it accused of complicity with the CIA, the US
government and the Colombian government, all supposedly plotting
against the Bolivarian Revolution. We also examine the conspiracy
narratives emerging in Mexico in the 1990s to interpret the
assassinations of key political figures of the ruling PRI party like Luis
Donaldo Colosio. Finally, we review the suspected plot behind the
political process that culminated in the impeachment and premature
removal of President Dilma Rousseff in Brazil in 2016.
Chapter 7 focuses on the conspiratorial logics that proliferated
during the Cold War, an era marked by bipolarity in international
relations, and its persistence in recent decades. Thus, we analyze
dependency theory, which in some popular variants tilted the
imagination of major sectors toward Manichean conspiratorial
theses, reducing the complexity of regional geopolitics in the final
stages of the Cold War. Then we inquire into the different readings
of Pinochet’s 9 September 1973 coup against the Chilean
government of Salvador Allende. In addition, we examine a series of
conspiracies and conspiratorial narratives that characterized the
relations between Cuba and the United States during the Cold War
and the subsequent post-Soviet era.
Chapter 8 reviews the proliferation of conspiracy narratives in
Argentina during the last quarter of a century. Devoting an entire
chapter to Argentina may seem excessive to some readers, yet it is
justified since conspiracism has become a second nature for many in
that country, due to the recurrent background of political conflict and
loss of public trust generating widespread suspicion of authorities
among the population. We have chosen several emblematic cases of
intrigue and generation of conspiracy theories. These include first,
the plots, cover-ups and dead ends prompting conspiratorial theses
in the investigation of the terrorist blast of the Jewish Community
Center’s headquarters in 1994. Second, the explosion of the military
arsenal of Río Tercero in the province of Córdoba in 1995, following
disclosures of Argentine sale arms to countries at war, ignoring a
sale embargo by the international community. Third, the suspicious
signing of a memorandum of understanding between Argentina and
Iran, denounced by Alberto Nisman, in charge of prosecuting the
Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina case who, after claiming to
have incriminating evidence against the President Fernández de
Kirchner, was found dead under mysterious circumstances in January
2015. Fourth, we address the sinking of the submarine ARA San
Juan in 2017, which immediately raised unfounded narratives of
international conspiracies behind what turned to be a major faulting
procedure of repair. Our analyses elaborate on the intersection
between emerging conspiracy plots and suspected corruption under
changing geopolitical contexts. In our opinion, the extreme political
polarization and institutional distrust of modern Argentina seem to
have projected conspiratorial glances to the center of the media and
public agenda in recent decades. The book closes with brief
conclusions and prospective views.
1
THE LOGIC OF CONSPIRACY THOUGHT

A major research challenge is to carry out analysis at the edge of

effective plots and fantasized conspiracy theories. Using the
analytical categories and theoretical frameworks of political sociology
and the history of ideas, in addition to contextualizing the specific
narratives of each case, we propose to deconstruct narratives and
constitutive elements to understand why some of these theories
have had great popular repercussions, while others remained
ancillary. A first step is to understand the logic of conspiracy
thought, and particularly, how it magnifies the nature of an
anticipated or imagined threat, denouncing it as part of a coherent
plan by forces that allegedly conspire backstage against social
structures and institutions, threatening society.
Conspiracists project not only an interpretative logic of reality, but
also a theory of power that ponders the world as the object of
sinister machinations and aims to mobilize against them. Those who
follow a conspiratorial worldview imagine reality as resulting from
omnipotent voluntarist wills, as if two colossal wills confront each
other in a titanic struggle in which only one of them can prevail.
‘Truthers’ feel an urgent need to unmask and punish those who,
according to them, conspire to threaten the welfare of society, the
integrity of the nation or the destinies of humanity.
When people adopt a vision of that character, the inquiry moves
into the realm of collective mentalities, of credible and less credible
narratives and theories, and their political implications. Conspiracists
assume the existence of a unique historical causality, operated by
sinister social forces and underground powers whose motives are
dire. Believing in conspiracy theories, people merge actual
information with fragmentary data and false clues, and refuse to
question their truthfulness, arguing that doubting their veracity is
precisely proof of their truth, since those doubting that a covert plot
exists are merely trying to preclude ‘true believers’ from unmasking
the truth ‘out there’, keeping it hidden from public scrutiny. With
such a worldview, they are critical of others who prefer to ignore the
threat and accept candidly appearances at the risk of doom. Above
all, such ‘truthers’ believe that while the naive rely on existing
routines and institutions, internal and external enemies covertly
conceal projects of domination or destruction. Under such
circumstances, those who claim being aware of hidden intrigues
assume the supreme duty of alerting the naive, unmasking the
conspiracy plot, and acting with proper urgency to save the integrity
of the nation, its collective spirit, or even humanity as a whole.
Conspiracy theorists propose to approach the political and
historical reality by distrusting appearances. They affirm a worldview
about the existence of parallel powers and sustain a series of
premises, namely:

Malevolent forces operate underground; they stalk, seduce,

penetrate and control the thinking of the masses, undermining the
social, psychic or biological integrity of society, while hiding their
plans of domination or destruction

Nothing happens randomly; history has an inner meaning, and that

meaning is not given by structural forces but by a confrontation of
individual wills and designs, and the central question is which will
and design will take precedence over the other(s)

Institutions are ineffective because they are pervaded by malignant

forces or they are unaware of the danger; either way, they should
 not be trusted

Moreover, various social sectors collaborate, naively or maliciously

with those seeking to affect the social and moral fabric of society

Alternative and good-intentioned social forces must mobilize to

confront the hidden nefarious powers, defeat their vicious plan of
domination and thus defend the nation or humankind

This confrontation is not a mere competition for power; even if

focusing on politics and power, the struggle is waged in terms of a
moral confrontation, which tends to acquire an almost apocalyptic
symbolism

Such worldview supports a narrative mode that aims to be a

mobilizing myth. Although it operates – in Max Weber’s terms (1974)
– in terms of functional–instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität)
aimed at achieving specific goals, conspiracy plots integrate value
rationality (Vertrationalität), in this case, as a substantive rationality
that professes to be defending core, vital values. Conspiracist
rationality leads believers to position themselves and adopt lines of
action conceived in dichotomous moral terms, imagining themselves
as waging a confrontation of possible imposing consequences.
Conspiracy theories can flourish at any end of the political
spectrum. Both conservative right-wing forces resisting social change
and left-wing forces advancing radical transformations can uphold
them. Likewise, such theories have been launched by both
individuals holding power and looking to delegitimize opposition
forces, as well as by those who challenged established elites and
used them to convince public opinion of the backstage machinations
of elites and of the existence of what today is called a ‘deep state’.
Social scientists and historians, experts in the humanities and
cultural critics have suggested various analytical approaches to the
study of conspiracism and conspiracy theories. In his book
Philosophy of conspiracy, Horacio González suggested a typology of
conspiracies to characterize a rather broad and somehow confusing
semantic field:

In conspiracies, all these movements – which are perhaps their

proper masks – obtain a historical dignity. If the conspiracy
reverts to domestic scenes, it tends to cover an intrigue; if it
gears towards priestly styles, it attracts the label of conspiracy;
if it does so for state motives, the term plot can be invoked;
and if it is for war, perhaps the word conspiracy would be
heard. In any case, we call it conspiracy when it remains
outside the achievement of precise and immediate objectives.
Having immediacy and urgency, conspiracy, plotting or intrigue
seem appropriate terms.
2004, 19–20

Classical sociologist Georg Simmel analyzed the fascination of

networks sharing a secret, as well as the twin fascination of betrayal
on the human psyche. According to the sociologist, while the secret
circle often relies on interpersonal contacts, presupposing internal
cohesion and separation from the external world, treason is inscribed
in the precariousness of competitions for power; by virtue of this, a
conspiratorial image is attached to every secret association. Simmel
concluded that “the secret association is in such bad repute as
enemy of central powers that, conversely, every politically
disapproved association must be accused of such hostility” (Simmel
1906, 498; Wolff 1950, 376).
The episteme of conspiracy theories is well characterized by
historian Ernesto Bohoslavsky, following Geoffrey Cubitt (1993, 1–2),
as “the propensity to consider that politics is dominated by malicious
and secret machinations of a group with interests and values
opposed to the bulk of society”. This implies that the conspiracy
myth denotes that the true meaning of things hides behind
appearances, and that what is relevant in politics actually occurs
behind the scenes. In the logic of the plot, there is no place for
chance and involuntary results, but the events are rather presented
as the looked-for result of a secret intention (Bohoslavsky 2009, 17).
Those who think this way and imagine reality try to unmask,
expose and punish those who behind the scenes plot to affect the
integrity of a nation, a society or the whole of humanity. Given the
perception of living an existential threat, the fight against the hidden
and exposed danger has a substantial symbolic value, which often
transforms its confrontation into a moral crusade. Let us quote
Horacio González again:

Conspiratorial thinking starts from a doctrine of mutations, by

which what must be known is an unveiling that, in the very act
of giving itself as discovery always fights against what it brings
out: Evil. Act of emerging and act of fight merge into a single
political gesture. […] Conspiracy mentalities postulate that
power necessarily makes its true purposes invisible,
“unspeakable”. Legitimate institutions are eternal, but in front
of them, the conspiracy of the blind powers that cannot stop
their drive for absolute domination arises.
2004, 297

In the domain of individual and mass psychology, there is today a

vast literature that attempts to explain the tendency of many
normative individuals to confer credibility on conspiracy theories
whose grip on factual reality is, at best, tenuous or partial. To a large
extent, as analyzed for example by psychologist Rob Brotherton on
the basis of empirical studies, conspiratorial suspicion should not
surprise us when we understand our brain tries to find order in
chaos (Brotherton 2015).
Since the plots imagined by those who have a conspiratorial view
of the world often exaggerate and distort reality, research has
highlighted their resemblance to delusional or paranoid psychological
states. Analyzing American political culture, historian Richard
Hoftstadter identified paranoid streams of thought, using the term
metaphorically to characterize a phenomenon of a collective nature:

Paranoid writing begins with certain defensible judgments (…)

and with a careful accumulation of facts, or at least of what
appear to be facts, and to marshal these facts toward an
overwhelming “proof” of the particular conspiracy that is to be
established. (…) It is, if not wholly rational, at least intensely
rationalistic; it believes that it is up against an enemy who is
infallibly rational as he is totally evil, and it seeks to match his
imputed total competence with its own, leaving nothing
unexplained and comprehending all of reality in one
overreaching, consistent theory. (…) What distinguishes the
paranoid style is not the absence of verifiable facts (though it
is occasionally true that in his extravagant passion for facts the
paranoid occasionally manufactures them), but rather the
curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical
point in the recital of events.
1963, 36–37

Likewise, criminologist Jorge Contreras Ríos stressed the threatening

character as well as the political functionality of conspiracy theories.
Such theories

warn of a danger whose nature is unknown, for which we are

unprepared biologically or psychologically. They always
describe a villain. They seek to accentuate a feeling of
helplessness. … Always [or rather] usually somebody is about
to be their main political beneficiary.
2015
 Our approach aims to identify the contextual scenarios that lead
to the emergence and adoption of conspiracy theories at specific
historical circumstances and locations. In doing so, we search to
assess the impact of conspiracy theories by ascertaining those
collective scenarios rather than postulate a psychosocial dysfunction.
Similarly, Michael Butter and Peter Knight (2016) have criticized the
way that much research in psychology and, to a lesser extent,
political science have tended to consider conspiracy theorizing as
dysfunctional. Probably following on otherwise path-breaking
analyses such as Hofstadter’s on the paranoid style present in US
history or Poliakov’s analysis of demonization in European history,
indeed much research searched for universal traits and stressed
delusional aspects in conspiracy theories, attributing them to
cognitive biases or aberrational epistemological modes of thinking.
Such approaches failed to escape the assumption of a social
dysfunction similar to an individual psychosis. In their critical review
of previous studies, Butter and Knight also indicate that the
conspiracists’ propensity to look “for big causes to explain big
effects” is not peculiar to them. Rather, in their view,

what makes a conspiracy theory distinguishable from other

interpretations of current events is not solely an effect of the
individual psychology of the believer or the structure of the
belief, but a product of the particular content and social
function of the story that is told in opposition to received
wisdom.
2016, 7

In other words, the appeal of conspiracy theories as heuristic

interpretations derives from their ability to make contextual sense of
social, political, economic and cultural processes, while their
endorsers question established truths. For multiple reasons, the so-
called ‘truthers’ may distrust accepted explanations seeing them as
misrepresenting reality, and as products of indoctrination or
brainwashing.
Truthers may be inclined to distrust such truisms for multiple
reasons. Political institutions may have deceived them, authority
figures and scientists may have ignored their qualms, perhaps they
fear minorities or another social category and network, or maybe
they face complex developments and changes beyond their control,
which nonetheless affect their lives. When people distrust official
explanations, which they see as deceiving, they may trust that there
is a greater truth ‘out there’, and that by following conspiratorial
assumptions, they will be able to uncover the truth against those
willing to silence it, assuming a protagonist role in history. It is in
this collective interface between the personal, interpersonal and the
broader social and institutional context where conspiracy theories
thrive. Conspiracy theories find fertile ground for their development
under certain conditions. Above all, when a deep sense of crisis
exists, fueled by socioeconomic problems, political instability, and a
sense of cultural fracture and institutional weakness. In the face of
collective anxiety, those who share a conspiratorial outlook contrast
the certainty that, once the forces of evil are unmasked and their
evil designs revealed, it will be possible to challenge and defeat the
internal and/or external enemies that, according to their
interpretation, are behind the crisis. When there is distrust of
institutions, the authorities, the media and even science, this adds
functionality to those who seek to explain in conspiratorial terms the
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the institutional frameworks to
protect society.
Not by chance, texts that expressed and propagated the view
that, for different reasons and motivating interests, appearances
deceive and hide deeper realities, including the existence of secret
societies, were widely disseminated in the United States. Likewise, in
Latin America, the reception of Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier’s
works was exponential in the 1960s and 1970s. Their books and
essays, translated from French, had tens of thousands of copies
printed. People read them with great interest during the Cold War,
coinciding with the fascination of the literary boom and the popular
curiosity geared at recognizing the existence of alternative plots,
secret societies and ultra-planetary civilizations, which official
institutions would prefer to ignore and perhaps hide. Pauwels and
Bergier opened the prologue of La rebelión de los brujos (The
Warlocks’ Rebellion) with the following antinomic statement:

Our civilization, like every civilization, is a plot. Numerous tiny

divinities, whose power comes only from our consent not to
discuss them, divert our gaze from the fantastic face of reality.
The plot tends to hide from us that there is another world in
the world we live in, and another person is the person we are.
It would be necessary to break the pact and become barbaric,
and, above all, be realistic. That is, starting from the principle
that reality is unknown. If we would freely use the knowledge
we have; if we’d establish unexpected relationships between
facts; if we’d embrace the facts without old or modern
prejudices …
Preface, 1972

The existence of alternative realities constitutes a theme of deep

anchorage in Western societies, reflected in the arts and letters, with
a wide appeal in novels and films such as “Sliding Doors” (1998), a
film directed by Peter Howitt and starring Gwyneth Paltrow and John
Hannah. Some of these may envision intrigues, as in the novel “The
Plot against America” by Philip Roth (2004). In Latin America, the
credibility of alternative realities has usually merged with the
hypothesis of the clandestine. For example, constructing or
suspecting a plot has been widely recorded in Argentine letters, as in
the work of Roberto Arlt, Jorge Luis Borges and Macedonio
Fernández (see, e.g. Arlt 1968 [c.1930]; Piglia 2007).
 The second novel of renowned writer Ernesto Sábato, On Heroes
and Tombs, is an outstanding example suggesting a deep-seated
conspiracy. Popularly considered “the best Argentine novel of the
twentieth century and one of the best Spanish-speaking works ever”,
a quote from Wikipedia based on a widely disseminated opinion, On
Heroes and Tombs (1961) contained a brief and scary ‘Report on the
Blind’.
That Report, mesmerizing to readers, was a supposed allegory of
the existence of underground networks that disguise their
conspiratorial intentions, while they manipulate and cheat their naive
peers who ignore the nefarious plot of the blind. Recall: the fictional
author of the ‘Report’ was obsessed and dismayed by the existence
of an underground organization of the blind who, like other lodges
and secret societies, allegedly maneuvered society clandestinely with
the intention of controlling and dominating it:

Those lodges and sects that are invisibly spread among men
and that, without one knowing and not even suspecting it,
constantly monitor us, persecute us, decide our destiny, our
failure and even our death. To a great extent, this happens
with the sect of the blind, which, to the greater misfortune of
the unnoticing, have normal men and women at their service:
partly, these are deceived by the Organization; partly, [they
serve] as a consequence of sensitive and demagogic
propaganda; and, finally, to a large extent, for fear of the
physical and metaphysical punishments that seemingly receive
those who dare to inquire into their secrets.
Sábato 1998 [c. 1961], 3

The rapporteur in the novel highlighted the connection between the

underground character of that organization and the morally ominous
purpose that motivated its members,
 [t]hose usurpers, kind of moral blackmailers who, naturally,
abound in the underground, because of that condition that
relates them to cold-blooded animals of slippery skin that
inhabit caves, caverns, basements, old passages, drainpipes,
sewers, blind wells, deep cracks, abandoned mines with silent
water leaks; and some, the most powerful, in huge
underground caves, sometimes hundreds of meters deep, as
can be deduced from equivocal and reluctant reports of
speleologists and treasure hunters; clear enough, however, for
those who know the threats that weigh on those who try to
violate the great secret.
Sábato 1998 [c. 1961], 3–4

The alleged author of the Report claimed to be aware of a danger

that he could not ignore, so as to avoid falling victim to those who
try to keep society in its ignorance. Accordingly, he stated, it was
undeniable for him to “wake up from my foolish dream, to notice
that my previous existence had ended up as a stupid preparatory
stage, and that now I had to face reality” (Sábato 1998 [c. 1961],
2).
In popular culture, such logic of thought has been widely found
among broad sectors of the population. Those who have supported
conspiracy theories often assumed that experts hide evidence; that
the media spreads lies and fake news; that insiders mine
institutions; and that malicious plans operate unnoticed. Not
surprisingly, then, those who promote ‘alternative truths’ can
proclaim the imperative need to fight against the hidden enemies
and regain control over current events and the path of history (on
anxiety generated by conspiracy thoughts and their relationship with
the distrust of experts and institutions see Giddens 1990; Beck 1992;
Parish 2001). Whenever traditional ideologies erode, without
diminishing the search for macro-historical explanations and broad
mobilizing myths, that tendency deepens, based on the moral
outrage of those who are convinced of the credibility and
authenticity of a conspiracy theory.
Conspiracy theories conceive reality as based on a simplistic and
binary explanatory argument they articulate. By nature, they are
grandiloquent and often apocalyptic. They systematize and tie
unconnected details and build a meta-analysis of reality that can
seem credible and that, once shared by many, it is almost impossible
to deconstruct for verification of its objective elements. Sadik J. Al-
Azm defines such invulnerability of conspiratorial mentality vis-à-vis
the empirical evidence in the following terms:

… the hard-core conspiracy theory believers can never be

convinced otherwise no matter how high the evidence piles up,
because such theories and explanations are driven by the turns
of their own dialectical momentum – no matter how
phantasmagoric it gets – rather than by anything relating to
evidence and the like.
2011, 77–78

Moreover, the conspiracy theories phagocyte all adverse, contrary

evidence, metamorphosing it into arguments that supposedly
confirm the validity of the theory. In Al-Azm’s terms:

Conspiracy theories and explanations are in their nature

unassailable and irrefutable, because all seemingly contrary
instances, arguments, pieces of evidence, etc. are immediately
absorbed into the theory itself and turned into confirming
instances of its claims.
2011, 80

In a book on US conspiracy theories, Michael Barkun (2003)

indicates that conspiracy theories tend to prevail in the context of
what he defines as “stigmatized knowledge”. This concept refers to
arguments whose veracity is proclaimed by those who express them
despite the condemnation or stigmatization that such arguments
deserve from experts responsible for certifying the difference
between true and false knowledge, be they universities, centers of
research or scientific communities. Under the broad concept of
‘stigmatized knowledge’, Barkun (2003, 27) includes the following
subcategories:

Forgotten knowledge, for example, the knowledge of antiquity that

has been lost, not reaching our times as a result of a cataclysm or
other circumstances.

Superseded knowledge, that is, the knowledge that was once

considered authoritatively recognized, such as astrology and
alchemy, but became less valid or lost its appeal as new advances
and scientific discoveries changed their status.

Ignored knowledge, that is, the knowledge that persists in certain

social groups yet is not considered serious enough by those who
dominate the domain, for example, folk medicine.

Knowledge explicitly rejected for its falsehood, such as the

existence of kidnappings of people by extraterrestrial beings
invading our planet.

Suppressed knowledge – the knowledge that scientific institutions

supposedly recognize as true but deny it due to selfish interests or
due to their fear of the consequences of its revelation, for
example, suppressed cancer cures.

According to Barkun, two characteristics stand out in stigmatized

knowledge: the outstanding role of suppressed sub-knowledge and
the empirical basis on which its defenders based it. Such knowledge
tends to phagocyte all others. Because when a conspiracist perceives
that the suggested interpretation and orthodox knowledge contradict
each other, he will argue that institutional forces have done
everything possible to silence ‘the truth’ for the sake of their petty
benefit or for another ominous reason. The persons who embrace a
conspiracy theory maintain that those conspiring against its
revelation are trying to suppress, ignore, marginalize it or bring ‘the
truth’ into oblivion. Since those who believe in the existence of
conspiracies trust that the conspiratorial forces maneuver the
population into disbelief and ignorance, it is very difficult to dismiss
even the most delusional theories. In Barkun’s assessment,
conspiracy theories

explain why all forms of stigmatized knowledge claims have

been marginalized – allegedly the conspiracy has utilized its
power to keep the truth from being known (…) Stigmatization
itself is taken to be evidence of truth – for why else would a
belief be stigmatized if not to suppress the truth?
2003, 27–29

Karl Popper, in his book Conjectures and Refutations (1963), already

indicated how difficult it is to dismiss the claim of veracity of any
conspiracy theory. Foremost, as there is an assumption that the
truth has been maliciously suppressed. Popper stressed that people
often do not distinguish between two basic ways to verify the validity
of all information: one, based on the critical examination of
information errors and the other, based on the origin of the
information. Assuming that the veracity of the information depends
then on who issues and enunciates the information, its interests and
projects, which according to Popper leads many to fall victim to
authoritarianism, whether in its liberal, fascist or communist
versions. Contrastingly, the author of The Open Society and its
Enemies (1992 [c. 1950]) indicated that every theory must be
verified based on observations and must be based on the
assumption that knowledge is the modification of previous
knowledge. Furthermore, although important, neither observation
nor reason should be accepted a priori as a source of undeniable
authority. All knowledge opens space for new unknowns and doubts;
and all knowledge is human and consequently, is not infallible and is
not free from possible errors and prejudices. Finally, all knowledge
must be subjected to criticism and be seen as a conjecture, thus
discarding explanatory certainties (Popper 1992 [c. 1950], 94;
Popper 1963, 24–29). This is exactly the opposite of conspiracy
theories, which Popper defines as a kind of ‘superstition’, which
attributes with a sense of certainty all social ills to the design of
certain powerful groups or individuals.
The problem becomes even harder as the remarkable
interpretative openness and uncertainty of modern societies
deepens. Together with the significant rise in personal autonomy,
growing structural and psychological differentiation, social
fragmentation and the increasing variability of life choices, there is
also an increase in uncertainty, paralleled by the indeterminacy of
lifestyles and the relativism of postmodernism. This, in particular,
operates by opening spaces that support the legitimacy of any
interpretation, however far-fetched and even remote from the
original intention of a text. Since ancient Greek and Roman times,
rationality was used to identify the discursive logic, for example, the
principle of identity (A = A), the principle of noncontradiction (that it
is impossible for something to be A and No-A at the same time) and
the principle of exclusion from the middle place (A is true or false
and tertium non datur).
The rationality of Western thought based on such principles did
not go unchallenged in modernity, but with the advent of
postmodernism, its predominance resulted in multiple readings of
reality, some of them bordering on the irrational, the chimerical and
the conspiratorial.
Not by chance, even when hermeneutics drove his professional
work, semiologist and writer Umberto Eco reacted to such
tendencies by stating: “I recognize that a text can have many
senses, but I reject the claim that a text can make any sense” (Eco
1990, 141; Eco 1991; and see Villalba 2016).
Precisely in his second novel, Foucault’s pendulum, Eco leads us,
in often playful and dark metaphorical form, to measure the dangers
of accepting conspiratorial visions of reality. Combining literary
genres, the plot develops how, when trying to develop a ‘Plan’ from
intriguing documents, three friends create a parody of the
interpretive paranoia of diabolical groups, with irreparable
consequences. They will have to find their death at the hands of
conspiracy groups that have persisted for centuries trying to reunite
and recover a lost diabolical plan, which they assume that the three
friends have deciphered and pretended to hide (Bondanella 1997).
Likewise, in a posthumously published book of essays, Umberto Eco
establishes a very lucid differentiation between the plot syndrome
and the idea of conspiracy that, according to Popper, rarely manages
to be consummated:

There have been always conspiracies. Some failed without

people noticing, others were successful, yet in general, what
characterizes them is that their aims and scope of efficacy are
limited. Contrastingly, when talking of the plot syndrome, we
refer to the idea of a universal conspiracy (in some theologies,
even of cosmic dimensions), by which all or most historical
events are the work of one single and mysterious power that
operates in the shadows. This is the syndrome of the plot that
Popper was talking about …
2016, translated into English

Criminologist Erich Goode and sociologist Nachman Ben-Yehuda have

analyzed from a contextualized constructivist position the
characteristics of a phenomenon linked to conspiracy, namely, ‘moral
panic’. Moral panic is a concept coined by Stanley Cohen that is
closely related to situations in which conspiracy theories flourish
(Cohen 1972, 9; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1996). The phenomenon is
characterized by the feeling, widely disseminated under certain
circumstances, that those who harbor diabolical intentions constitute
a threat to society and its moral order and that, therefore,
‘something’ must be done against those evil elements. In a situation
of moral panic, a very serious danger is identified for the interests
and values of society or certain social segments, a cataclysm is
predicted to occur in the event that society does not react in time
and the danger is confronted with determination and effective
actions. Let us detail what indicators operate in the development of
such syndrome:

a serious concern about what is perceived as a palpable threat

the widely shared sense that the threat is serious enough, and may
affect the deep structure of society, so to propel an assertive
reaction against the threat

the imperative obligation to face such nefarious threat

When instilling a conspiracy theory, the fight against the threat

becomes a principled struggle, a kind of moral confrontation of
quasi-apocalyptic consequences, the result of which will be positive
or harmful for the future of society or humanity. The conspiratorial
mentality postulates a confrontation between two opposing
antagonistic universes: a universe of forces operating in the
shadows, behind the scenes, urging a nefarious plot and hiding its
evil project from the public eye; and another universe, of moral
strength, which seeks to unmask the secret designs of its
antagonist. Thus, a confrontation ‘of titans’ is promoted. That is to
say, the ‘true believers’ think that the ordinary mechanisms of social
life have failed and, consequently, an apocalyptic scenario opens that
requires exceptional measures since the future of society or
humanity depends on that.
 In the event that such a vision generates a state of collective
hysteria, conspiracy theories can lead to mass action and legislation.
However, this does not happen in many cases, as not all conspiracy
theories are equally convincing and manage to unify social sectors
divided by class, ethnic or other cleavages. However, there are also
conspiracy theories that have persisted for decades and even
centuries, and that also managed to project from society to society.
What are some of the general conditions that favor the
emergence and diffusion of conspiracy theories? As indicated,
diverse contexts favor the diffusion of distinct conspiracy theories. In
some cases, these theories emerge from within marginalized social
sectors that challenge elites and official narratives. In other cases,
such theories are conceived by elites and dominant classes who feel
threatened and who, in order to maintain their control, resort to
conspiracy myths as a mechanism of popular mobilization, so to
divert tensions toward a supposed internal or external enemy.
Such theories rely on real, factual components, which they
extrapolate until they reach fantastic and illusory dimensions, which
then lose their factual grounding. An example of a bottom-up theory
was the reaction to the water fluoridation campaign in the mid-20th-
century United States. Many resisted the water fluoridation
campaign, believing they were protecting public health against
federal agencies trying to introduce Socialism through fluoride water.
Specifically, many imagined the existence of a conspiracy plan.
According to their interpretation, the fluoride added to the waters
would lower people’s mental reserves, making them vulnerable to
Socialist preaching. In other words, in the context of confrontation
between the Western world and the communist bloc during the Cold
War, broad sectors in the United States distrusted the integrity and
capacity of their country’s institutions. In a society that prided itself
on professing individualism at all costs, many Americans were
convinced that the fluoridation campaign would have a dire result.
Either because federal agencies concealed the real objective of their
actions or because of their inefficiency and penetration by
conspirators, citizens feared that their vitality, mental health and
lifestyles would be affected. There is no doubt, historian Hofstadter
wrote, that scientists could in the future change their consensus on
the advantages of introducing fluoride into the waters; yet, the
conspiracy theory went further, coming to suspect a ruse of elites
trying to subjugate the resistance of the citizens. Thus, in that view,
fluoride was nothing more than a mechanism designed to break the
free will of the American population. According to Hofstadter, it was
yet another example among many conspiracy theories emerging
‘from the bottom up’ in society. This was part of what he defined as
a “paranoid political style”, a worldview resurfacing intermittently in
the United States, typical of a society prone to extreme individualism
(Hofstadter 1963; see also Hsu 1983).
On the other hand, conspiracy theories can arise from within the
circles of the powerful, as these try to divert social tensions and
conflicts toward internal or external enemies, in order to stay in
power and overcome social protests. A classic example is the
fraudulent ‘Protocols of the Sages of Zion’, a mythical story
transformed into a plot theory. As thoroughly analyzed by British
historian Norman Cohn in his book The Myth of the World Jewish
Conspiracy, during the decline of the Tsarist Empire in Russia in the
19th century, counter-revolutionary circles of power adapted a
demonic libel of medieval origin, fabricating a fictitious story about
an underground Jewish network conspiring to dominate the world.
This myth would bear catastrophic consequences once the Nazis
adopted it as the basis of their mass terrorizing mobilization and
state policies:

According to that myth, there is a Jewish secret government

that – through a world network of disguised organizations –
controls political parties and governments, the press and public
opinion, the banks and the economy. It claims that the secret
Another random document with
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Manlius Volso in 189 made war upon the Gallograeci without an
order of the people or a decree of the senate, and was on that
ground accused in the senate by two of his legati.[1377] We
conclude, however, that the charge was fruitless from the
circumstance that the senate finally decreed him a triumph.[1378] For
beginning war against the Histrians on his own responsibility the
consul A. Manlius, 178, was threatened with a prosecution, which
was quashed by a tribunician veto.[1379] Licinius Lucullus was not
even brought to trial for the war he waged without an order of the
people against the Vaccaei in 151.[1380] Hence it appears that
though a magistrate could not legally begin war on his own initiative,
there was no real danger of condemnation for so doing. The reason
is that those in authority attached little importance to the right of the
comitia in the matter. Only once is mentioned a fear lest the people
may not give their consent to a war.[1381] One case of rejection is
recorded, and even here the centuries at a second session
obediently accepted the consul’s proposition.[1382] The control of
diplomacy and of the revenues by the senate and magistrates
assured these powers the practical decision of questions of war and
peace to such an extent that ratification by the assembly could
ordinarily be counted on as certain; and its influence decreased with
the expansion of the empire. Meantime, however, the idea of popular
sovereignty, which was expressing itself in other spheres of
government, effectually demanded, if only in form, some concession
to the assembly in this field as well; and accordingly in the formula of
declaration “populus” wholly takes the place of the once all-important
“senatus.”[1383] By such empty concessions the nobility rendered the
people more docile. Thus to the end of the republic the centuriate
assembly retained the constitutional right to decide questions of
aggressive war, although in practice the magistrates nearly regained
the place which they and the senate had held during the century
following the overthrow of kingship.[1384]
The nature of our sources does not allow a precise judgment
regarding the importance of the comitia curiata in the early republic.
To the time of the Gallic invasion it may occasionally have passed
resolutions affecting the status of citizens.[1385] But as legislation
never became an acknowledged function of the curiae, we are in a
position to assert that through the comitia centuriata the people were
first introduced into this sphere of public life.[1386]
The earliest legislation of this assembly, in fact the earliest
recorded legislative act of the Roman people, was the lex de
provocatione attributed to Valerius Publicola, consul in the first year
of the republic, 509.[1387] It was also through the centuriate
assembly that the consuls Valerius and Horatius in 449 passed a law
which forbade the election of a magistrate without appeal, and
affixed as a penalty the outlawing of the trespasser.[1388] The third
Valerian law of appeal in 300[1389] was an act of the same assembly,
whereas all three Porcian laws on the same subject seem to have
been tribal.[1390] The legislative function of the centuriate assembly,
resting in the pre-decemviral period simply on precedent, brought
into being the statute of 471 to establish a tribal assembly for the
transaction of plebeian business, improperly known as the Publilian
law,[1391] the lex sacrata for the division of the Aventine among the
plebeians, erroneously termed Icilian, 456,[1392] the lex Aternia
Tarpeia de multae dictione, 454,[1393] the lex Menenia Sextia on the
same subjects in 452,[1394] the laws ratifying the Twelve Tables in
451, 449[1395]—all excepting the second having reference to the
limitation of the magisterial power. Regarding the creation of offices,
no mention is made of a law for the institution of the consulate itself;
but the centuries passed a law for the creation of the dictatorship,
501,[1396] and of the decemviri legibus scribundis, which should be
named Sestian after the consul who undoubtedly proposed it, 452.
[1397] Thus far popular legislation had no basis excepting precedent,
but a law of the Twelve Tables now provided that there should be
resolutions and votes of the people, and whatever the people voted
last should be law and valid—the first clear enunciation of the
principle that the will of the people, whenever expressed, prevailed
over every other authority.[1398] It was far from establishing popular
sovereignty, however, for the initiative remained with the magistrates.
 The activity of the comitia centuriata, thus authoritatively
established, manifested itself in the passing of the Valerian-Horatian
laws of 449,[1399] the lex Iulia Papiria de multarum aestimatione,
430,[1400] the law for the election of six military tribunes by the
comitia tributa, 362,[1401] the law of the dictator Publilius Philo, 339,
[1402] the third Valerian law concerning appeal, 300,[1403] and finally

the Hortensian law, 287.[1404] All have reference to the regulation of

magistracies or of assemblies. Meantime the centuriate comitia
passed the law for instituting tribunes of the soldiers with consular
power, 445,[1405] and censors, 443[1406] (or 435?), for increasing the
number of quaestors, 421,[1407] for instituting the praetorship, 367,
[1408] and the curule aedileship in the same year.[1409] All the laws
thus far mentioned, excepting that for the division of the Aventine,
effected important modifications of the constitution, the most of them
forced upon the senate and magistrates in the struggle for equal
rights in which the commons were engaged with the nobility. In like
manner two provisions of the Valerian law of 342, (1) that the name
of no soldier should be erased from the muster roll without his
consent. (2) that no military tribune should be degraded to the rank
of centurion,[1410] established under the sanction of an oath certain
fundamental rights on which the soldiers and their officers
respectively insisted. Another provision, the total abolition of debts,
[1411] if indeed it is historical, was administrative, and is considered

therefore in another connection.[1412] Of the same nature, though

less sweeping, was the Hortensian provision for the relief of debtors.
As soon as there came to be plebeian senators (about 400), the
patricians reserved to themselves the right to decide on the legality
of legislative and elective acts of the people under patrician
presidency—a right designated by the phrase patrum auctoritas,
which signified originally the authorization of the senators, thereafter
of the patrician senators. Till 339 the patres were at liberty to give or
withhold the auctoritas; but in that year an article of the Publilian law
required them to grant it to legislative acts of the centuries before the
voting began and while the issue was still in doubt, reducing it in this
way to a mere formality.[1413] The effect was to free centuriate
legislation from the constitutional control hitherto exercised by
patrician senators.[1414] Henceforth the resolutions of this assembly
could be declared illegal by no less than a majority of the entire
senate. The Publilian statute, accordingly, deprived the patricians of
an important power, whereas the senate as a whole continued
through its consulta to exercise an increasing influence over the
comitia centuriata. Polybius rightly ascribes to the consuls, therefore,
the function of bringing the resolutions of the senate before the
assembly. It could not have been the intention of Publilius Philo to
energize the comitia centuriata by this provision; for another article of
the same statute, confirming the validity of the tribunician assembly
of tribes, as then actually constituted exclusively of plebeians, paved
the way for the Hortensian law, which by making the acts of the
tribunician assembly in every respect equal to those of the centuries,
deprived the latter of their great importance as a factor in
constitutional progress. From the time of Hortensius to the time of
Sulla no constitutional statute is known to have been enacted by the
centuriate assembly; though our sources do not give us clear
information on the point, it is highly probable that the consuls and
dictators of this period preferred to bring their measures however
important before the tribes.[1415] In Sulla’s time the lex Valeria, 82,
[1416] clothing him with his extraordinary dictatorship rei publicae
constituendae, must have been passed by the centuries, which
alone in addition to the politically obsolete comitia curiata could be
summoned by an interrex, as was the author of the law. This act,
Lange remarks, cannot well be considered a revival of the legislative
power of the centuries, as it was not only passed through
intimidation and under a magistrate who had no constitutional right to
initiate legislation, but it also created a legalized tyranny destructive
of popular freedom.[1417] In the words of Cicero it was the most
iniquitous of all laws and most unlike a law.[1418] Only one of Sulla’s
statutes, the lex de civitate Volaterranis adimenda, 81, which,
depriving the Volaterrani of their civitas cum suffragio, placed them in
the condition of the Latins of Ariminum, is known to have been an act
of the centuries.[1419] Probably all his other laws were ratified by the
tribes.[1420] C. Julius Caesar preferably used the tribes, although it is
possible that his lex de provinciis and his lex iudiciaria came before
the comitia centuriata.[1421]
Sulla’s constitutional legislation curtailed the powers of the
plebeian tribunes and of their assembly, proportionally increasing the
importance of the centuries; and although his form of government
was of short duration, the optimates thereafter naturally preferred the
comitia centuriata for the ratification of senatorial resolutions.[1422]
To this assembly accordingly belong the leges Vibiae of the consul
C. Vibius Pansa, 43, which confirmed the acts of Caesar, and took
the place of Antony’s leges de coloniis deducendis and of his lex de
dictatura tollenda.[1423]
On the institution of the censorship, and by the law which called
the office into being, it was enacted that elections of censors should
be ratified, not by the curiae as in the case of other magistrates, but
by the centuries themselves.[1424] Before this date the principle was
already established that the people should vote twice in the election
of every magistrate in order that if they repented of their choice, they
might recall it by a second vote.[1425] As the primary function of the
censors was the periodical reconstitution of the comitia centuriata, it
was doubtless thought appropriate that this assembly alone should
be concerned with the election. The lex centuriata de potestate
censoria, evidently passed under consular presidency, remained, like
the curiate law in confirmation of elections to other offices, a mere
form. It was of too little practical significance ever to be noticed by
the historians; in fact no individual instance of the passing of this act
is mentioned by any extant writer. Characteristically the lex Aemilia,
433, which is alleged to have cut down the term of censorship to
eighteen months,[1426] and the lex Publilia Philonis, 339, which
provided that at least one censor must be a plebeian,[1427] were
centuriate, whereas the Licinian-Sextian law, 367, which provided
that one consul must be a plebeian,[1428] and the Genucian law, 342,
permitting both to be,[1429] were plebiscites.
An occasional attempt was made by a magistrate to usurp for the
comitia centuriata a share in the administration. The first which is
worthy of notice,[1430] even though it may be mythical, is the
agrarian proposal of Sp. Cassius, 486. According to the sources it
was opposed by the senate and the colleague of the mover. Far from
enacting it into a law, the author, on the expiration of his consulship,
was himself accused of attempting to usurp the royal power, and
was, in one version of the story, condemned to death by the
assembly to which he had offered the bill.[1431] The senate must
have taken very seriously this first attempt of a magistrate to transfer
some of its administrative power to the comitia. The law for the
division of the Aventine Hill among the people, 456, was actually
passed, most probably by the centuries.[1432] It was forced upon the
government by the plebeians, and did not serve as a precedent for
the future. The Valerian law of 342,[1433] which abolished debts, was
an extraordinary administrative measure similar in character, but far
more sweeping, to the clause for the relief of debtors in the Licinian-
Sextian plebiscite.
If then the centuriate assembly was excluded from the field of
administration, it must certainly in pre-decemviral times have had no
part in religious legislation. The law which regulated the intercalary
month inscribed on a bronze column by Pinarius and Furius, consuls
in 472,[1434] and the ancient law composed in archaic letters,
mentioned in connection with the year 363,[1435] requiring the
praetor maximus to drive the nail on the ides of September, must
accordingly have been acts, not of the centuriate assembly, but of
the pontifical college. By the ratification of the Twelve Tables,
composed chiefly of private laws and of closely connected religious
regulations, an example was set for the invasion of both of these
legal spheres by the centuriate assembly. But the precedent
remained unproductive; for at this time the tribal assembly under
plebeian or patrician magistrates was recognized as competent for
legislation, and naturally took to itself the function of enacting the
less weighty, for a time generally the non-constitutional, laws.[1436]
We are not to imagine the field of legislation clearly divided into
constitutional, private, religious, and other departments; aside from
the question of declaring an offensive war, which remained strictly
the province of the comitia centuriata, the distinction in legislation
was simply between the more and the less important; the dignified
assembly of centuries, organized on an aristocratic-timocratic basis,
was entrusted with the weightier business, whereas the simpler tribal
assembly, which was easier to summon and more expeditious in
action, served well enough for the despatch of lighter business. The
question of the assembly to be employed was largely one of inertia;
it required a far greater force of circumstances to set in motion for
legislative purposes the cumbrous centuriate assembly than the
relatively mobile gathering of the tribes.

III. Judicial

The jurisdiction of the people in whatever assembly was confined

to cases of crime and of serious disobedience to magistrates.[1437] It
was not exercised by them in the first instance but only by way of
appeal. In the opinion of the Romans Tullus Hostilius was the first to
grant an appeal,[1438] necessarily to the comitia curiata, which under
the kings remained the only formally voting assembly.[1439] During
the regal period, the well attested appellate function of the
comitia[1440] was simply precarious, depending wholly on the
pleasure of the king.[1441] The Romans represented the advance in
liberty brought by the republic as consisting partly in the
establishment of the right of appeal for every citizen through the lex
de provocatione of Valerius,[1442] a consul of the first year of the
republic—according to Cicero the first law carried through the
comitia centuriata—providing that no magistrate should scourge or
put to death a citizen without granting him an appeal to the people.
[1443] Although the historical existence of this Valerius has been
questioned, and though his law has the appearance of being an
anticipation of the Valerian law of 449, or more closely of that of 300,
[1444] we must admit in favor of its reality that the decemvirs were
themselves exceptionally above appeal and that their laws
guaranteed to the citizens an extensive use of the right.[1445] The
appellant, however, had no legal means of enforcing his right against
the magistrate; he could do no more than “throw himself on the
mercy of the crowd, and trust that their shouts or murmurs would
bend the magistrate to respect the law.”[1446] The first lex Valeria,
accordingly, brought little real benefit to the citizens.[1447] The right
was recognized and its application extended, as intimated above, by
the Twelve Tables, in which various laws relating not only to capital
crimes but to some of less importance granted an appeal to the
people.[1448] It was provided also by a special statute of the code
that judgments as well as laws involving life or citizenship could be
passed only by the comitiatus maximus, which is evidently the
comitia centuriata.[1449]
The Valerian-Horatian law of appeal, 449, was directed against the
recurrence of the decemvirate or any similar magistracy with
absolute jurisdiction, and hence resembled neither the laws of the
Twelve Tables referring to the subject nor the Valerian law of 509. It
provided that any one who brought about the election of such a
magistracy might be put to death with impunity,[1450] and is alleged
to have been reinforced by a Duillian plebiscite of the same year,
which set the penalty of scourging and death for the same offence.
[1451] These regulations could not refer to the dictatorship, which
was appointive not elective, and which continued to possess
absolute jurisdiction for more than a century after the decemviral
legislation.[1452]
But legal rights by no means imply actual enjoyment; and the
decemviral laws of appeal must have long remained substantially
inoperative through lack of a power sufficiently interested in their
enforcement; “the might of the few was stronger than the liberty of
the commons.”[1453] The right was limited, too, by the first milestone,
[1454] and hence did not affect the imperium militiae.[1455] The only
punishment of a magistrate for refusal to grant an appeal even by
the Valerian law of 300, was to be deemed wicked.[1456] Furthermore
the oft-recurring dictatorship was unrestricted by the law, being in
this respect a temporary restoration of the regal office.[1457] Not till
after the enactment of the last Valerian statute did the people begin
to enjoy in fact the privilege which had long been constitutionally
theirs. The enforcement of the law, as in general of the rights of the
citizens, was chiefly due to the plebeian tribunate, “the only sure
protection even of oppressed patricians,”[1458] but itself a limitation
on the jurisdiction of the assembly.[1459] At some unknown date after
325[1460] the dictator’s authority within the city was subjected to
appeal; and it has accordingly been suggested that this limitation
was due to the Valerian law of 300.[1461]
The practical establishment of the right of appeal ordinarily led the
magistrate in the exercise of his disciplinary power to substitute light
fines and imprisonment, which he had full power to enforce, for the
heavier penalty of scourging.[1462] But in case of crimes, especially
perduellio and parricidium, public sentiment compelled him to
prosecute the accused to the full extent of the law. In the former
accusation the consul of the early republic appointed duumviri
perduellioni iudicandae for each case as it arose.[1463] This office is
obscure because, without being formally abolished, it fell early into
disuse, its function passing to the tribunate of the plebs. Of the three
cases attributed by the sources to these duumviri, that of
Horatius[1464] belongs to the regal period, and is a mythical
prototype of the republican procedure. The offence has the
appearance of parricidium. Only by the broadest interpretation could
perduellio be made to cover the murder of a sister.[1465] The second
case is that of M. Manlius, 384, according to the more credible
account,[1466] whereas Livy[1467] himself is of the opinion that the
prosecutors were the plebeian tribunes. We may conclude, then, that
the duumviri were still employed at this date.[1468] The third case is
an unsuccessful attempt in 63 to revive the office for the trial of C.
Rabirius.[1469] The first republican law of appeal must have
empowered the comitia to order the appointment of these officials by
the magistrate;[1470] and it seems probable that at a later date
unknown to us they began to be elected by the people.[1471] The
function of the duumviri was to try the case and pronounce sentence,
from which if condemnatory the accused had a right to appeal to the
comitia centuriata.[1472] From the analogy offered by the questorian
procedure we may infer that the duumviri requested from a higher
magistrate permission to take auspices for that assembly, over which
they presided in the final trial.[1473]
All capital crimes committed by a citizen against another were in a
similar way referred by the consuls to the quaestores parricidii as
their deputies.[1474] The activity of these officials is first mentioned by
the annalists in connection with the trial of Sp. Cassius, not for
murder but for perduellio.[1475] Lange’s[1476] explanation that the
quaestors were appointed duumviri for the trial would satisfy all
requirements; yet in myths of this kind we need not expect absolute
legal consistency.[1477] According to another, perhaps even earlier,
version he was tried and condemned at home by his father.[1478] The
second instance is the trial of M. Volscius, 459, for false testimony,
[1479] which was likewise a capital crime. Their judicial competence

was recognized by the Twelve Tables;[1480] and two capital cases

are assigned to their jurisdiction after the decemvirate, (1) that of
Camillus on an accusation variously stated by the ancient
authorities;[1481] he avoided capital prosecution before the centuries
by retiring into exile, and in his absence was condemned by the
tribes to a fine of 15,000 or perhaps 100,000 asses: (2) that of T.
Quinctius Trogus brought by the quaestor M. Sergius,[1482] which
must have taken place after 242.[1483] The reason for the fewness of
the known cases is to be sought in the circumstance that their
jurisdiction was substantially limited to common crimes, whereas
political crimes came at first before the duumviri and afterward
before the tribunes of the plebs.[1484] The criminal jurisdiction of the
quaestors must have continued till the institution of standing
quaestiones.[1485]
While the importance of the comitia centuriata as a criminal court
was enhanced by the lex Valeria Horatia and the Duillian plebiscite
of 449, which prohibited the election of a magistrate with absolute
jurisdiction, the number of officials competent to bring capital actions
before this assembly was increased as a result of that law of the
Twelve Tables which enacted that all resolutions concerning the
caput of a Roman citizen should be offered to the centuries only.
[1486] Thereafter the tribunes were required to prefer their capital
accusations before this assembly, for the summoning of which they,
like the quaestors and the duumviri perduellioni iudicandae,
requested the auspices of a higher magistrate, ordinarily after 367 of
a praetor.[1487] For a time, probably till the Hortensian legislation,
they were dependent upon the patrician magistrates for this
privilege.[1488] According to our sources the tribunes, with the
approval of the consuls,[1489] entered upon their new sphere of
judicial activity by bringing a capital charge against Appius Claudius
and Sp. Oppius, past decemvirs, for misconduct in office, the specific
charge being the abuse of justice in the interest of a person or of a
party.[1490] The suicide of the accused prevented the trial. On the
eight remaining decemvirs they passed in the same assembly a
sentence of exile.[1491] M. Claudius, too, condemned for false
testimony, was exiled, the death penalty being mitigated also in his
case.[1492] The tribunes of 439 are said to have accused L. Minucius
and C. Servilius Ahala for the part they had taken in the death of Sp.
Maelius, and two years afterward Servilius was sentenced to exile by
the comitia centuriata, to be recalled later by the same body. The
charge against the former was false testimony, against the latter the
putting to death of a citizen who had not been legally sentenced.
[1493] Livy next mentions a charge, probably of perduellio, brought by
the tribunes against Q. Fabius, 390, for having, in violation of the ius
gentium, fought against the Gauls while he was an ambassador to
them. He, too, is said to have died before the trial.[1494] All these
cases are uncertain. If historical, they may represent the beginnings
of capital jurisdiction of the tribunes, in rivalry with the duumviri; or
they may in reality, like the case of M. Manlius, 384, already
mentioned, have been duumviral. On either alternative they came
before the centuriate comitia.
As we approach firmer historical ground, we hear of three
accusations of unnatural lust alleged to have been brought by the
tribunes of the plebs before the same comitia: (1) that against L.
Papirius, 326,[1495] (2) that against L. or M. Laetorius Mergus, a
military tribune, quod cornicularium suum stupri causa appellasset,
[1496] (3) the case mentioned by Pliny and others against a person of

unknown name, which probably belongs to this period.[1497] The

second case seems to be a trial of official accountability, which fell
within tribunician jurisdiction according to the usage of historical
time; the others are too little known to be legally formulated.
In this period falls the attempted prosecution of Appius Claudius
Caecus, 310, on the ground that he had not laid down the
censorship at the end of the limit of eighteen months.[1498] The
accusing tribune ordered him to be seized and imprisoned, but three
colleagues interceded.[1499] About the same time M. Atilius Calatinus
was unsuccessfully prosecuted on a charge of having betrayed Sora,
[1500] probably in connection with the defection of that town to the

Samnites in 315.[1501]
In reviewing the cases said to have been brought by tribunes
before the comitia centuriata it is surprising to find the period from
the institution of the office to the trial of Q. Fabius, 390, swarming
with such prosecutions, whereas for the century intervening between
that date and the Hortensian legislation comparatively few cases are
recorded and those of little significance.[1502] These circumstances
tend to prove that the cases assigned to the earlier and less known
period either belong mostly to the jurisdiction of the duumviri or of
the quaestors rather than of the tribunes, or are in great part
mythical, and that the tribunes, therefore, exercised no extensive
capital jurisdiction before the enactment of the Hortensian law.[1503]
We are led thence to the conclusion that either by an article of the
statute of Hortensius or at least as a recognized consequence of the
high place in the government assured the tribunes by it, the
jurisdiction of these magistrates in political cases was freed from
every restraint. At this time they succeeded wholly to the place of the
duumviri. The cases of which the tribunes had cognizance were
thereafter exclusively political, whereas the questorian jurisdiction
was confined to murder and other common crimes. This distinction
was not a limitation upon the power of the tribunes, who if they
chose might have superseded the quaestors as easily as they had
superseded the duumviri. It was rather a division of functions
adopted by the tribunes themselves in view of their own political
character and on the basis of the relative dignity of the two offices.
The chief judicial function of the tribunes, accordingly, was to hold
officials responsible for their administration, though occasionally they
called private persons to account for their conduct as citizens. All
grades of officials were within their jurisdiction, but most of the cases
were against the higher magistrates.
The first tribunician case of the kind after the Hortensian
legislation, and the first which is absolutely free from historical doubt,
is that brought against P. Claudius Pulcher on the ground that as
consul, 249, he fought the naval battle off Drepana contrary to
auspices, thereby losing his fleet. After the comitia had been
interrupted by a storm, the intercession of colleagues against the
resumption of the trial saved him from the death penalty. As the
result of a new trial before the tribes, however, he was fined 120,000
asses, 1000 for each ship lost.[1504] His colleague, L. Junius, by
suicide escaped condemnation on a charge of perduellio.[1505] In
212 two tribunes of the plebs prosecuted M. Postumius Pyrgensis, a
publican, before the tribes for fraud, setting the penalty at 200,000
asses; but the accused with his friends violently broke up the
assembly, whereupon the tribunes, dropping the original charge,
prosecuted him for perduellio,[1506] we should suppose before the
centuries.[1507] Among the complaints urged against him by the
consuls in the senate were that “he had wrested from the Roman
people the right of suffrage, had broken up a concilium plebis, had
reduced the tribunes to the rank of private persons, had marshalled
an army against the Roman people, seized a position, and cut the
tribunes off from the plebs, and had prevented the tribes from being
called to vote.” Specifically the crime must have been perduellio.
[1508] Before the day of trial he withdrew into exile. In his absence
the plebs on the motion of Sp. and L. Carvilius decreed that he was
legally in banishment, that his property should be confiscated, and
that he should be interdicted from fire and water. In this connection it
should be noticed that whereas the banishment of a citizen by lex or
iudicium was the exclusive right of the centuries,[1509] the tribes
were competent to decree him an exile after his voluntary retirement.
[1510] Some of the coadjutors in the violence of the publican above
mentioned left their bail and followed him into exile; others were
imprisoned to await capital trial, with what result the historian does
not inform us.[1511]
In the same year Cn. Fulvius, a praetor, met with military reverses
through gross cowardice,[1512] and in the following was prosecuted
in a finable action by a tribune of the plebs for having corrupted his
army by the example of his unsoldierly habits. Finding in the course
of the trial that the fault of the magistrate was far more serious than
had been imagined, and that the people were in a temper to vote the
extreme penalty, the prosecutor changed the form of accusation to
perduellio on the ground that such cowardly conduct in a
commander threatened the existence of the state. In this instance,
too, the accused avoided trial by withdrawing into exile.[1513] In 204
by a decree of the senate a special commission, consisting of the
praetor for Sicily with a council of ten senators,[1514] was appointed
for the trial of a legate of Scipio, Q. Pleminius, on the charge that he
had robbed the temple of Persephone in Locri and had violently
oppressed the Locrians.[1515] The commission brought him and his
accomplices in chains to Rome and cast them in prison to await their
trial for life before the centuries.[1516] The day of trial was continually
deferred, till finally Pleminius, now charged with the instigation of a
plot to burn the city, was put to death in prison.[1517] The fate of his
accomplices is unknown.[1518] Livy[1519] remarks that while
Pleminius was languishing in jail the wrath of the populace gradually
changed to sympathy, to such an extent doubtless as to convince the
authorities of their inability to secure a popular verdict in favor of the
death penalty. In fact since the death of M. Manlius Capitolinus, 384,
no example of the execution of a death sentence pronounced by the
assembly is recorded in history.[1520] But the magistrate probably
often inflicted corporal punishment in violation of the third Valerian
law. To put an end to this abuse, and at the same time to embody in
legal form the popular feeling against the application of the death
penalty to citizens, a Porcian law absolutely forbade the scourging or
slaying of a citizen under the imperium domi, the article prohibiting
the sentence of death being afterward reënforced by other
enactments.[1521] There has been much discussion as to the
authorship of this law; probably it was the work of M. Porcius Cato
the Elder in his praetorship, 198.[1522] Another Porcian law, probably
of P. Porcius Laeca, praetor in 195, extended the right of appeal to
Roman citizens who were engaged in the affairs of peace outside
the city, in Italy and the provinces, and were therefore under the
military imperium.[1523] According to this law the citizen who
appealed was sent to Rome for trial by the appropriate civil
authorities. Still later the third Porcian law, which Lange[1524]
conjecturally assigns to L. Porcius Licinus, consul in the year of the
elder Cato’s censorship, 184, seems to have been passed for the
benefit of Roman soldiers. We learn from Polybius,[1525] who wrote
later than the date last mentioned, that the military tribunes were
accustomed in court-martial to condemn common soldiers for
neglect of sentinel duty and that the condemned were cudgeled and
stoned, often to death, by their fellow-soldiers. He also speaks of the
punishment of entire maniples by decimation. Under Scipio
Aemilianus, 133, the Roman who neglected duty was flogged with
vine stocks, the foreigner with cudgels.[1526] Cicero[1527] intimates
that in his own time there was no appeal from the judgment of
commanders; and in fact it is impossible to understand how
discipline could otherwise be maintained. Evidence to the contrary is
scant and uncertain. The person against whom an accusation of
desertion was brought before the tribunes of the plebs in 138 seems
to have claimed to be a civilian, and on that ground appealed to the
tribunes. When proved guilty he was flogged and sold as a slave,
probably by a judgment of the military authorities.[1528] In 122 Livius
Drusus proposed to exempt Latin soldiers from flogging.[1529] While
informing us that in 108 a commander had a right to scourge and put
to death a Latin official, Sallust[1530] intimates that he had less
authority over a Roman. In the time of the emperors, on the other
hand, soldiers were subject to the death penalty as in the time of
Polybius.[1531] All these circumstances may be best explained by
supposing that the third Porcian law permitted the infliction of
flogging and death on Roman soldiers by the judgment only of a
court-martial.[1532] This difficult subject is further complicated by the
statement of Cicero[1533] that the three Porcian statutes introduced
nothing new excepting by way of penalty. Interpreted in the light of
other information given by various authors, including Cicero himself,
these statutes simply extended the right of appeal by adapting the
Valerian principle to new conditions, and substituted exile in place of
scourging and death. In the relation between the accused and the
civil court the cry “civis Romanus sum” was thereafter a sufficient
protection from bodily injury.[1534]
In the period to which the Porcian laws belong falls the accusation
of perduellio brought by the tribune P. Rutilius Rufus against the
censors C. Claudius and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, while they were
in office, 169. The charge against Gracchus was disregard of the
tribunician auxilium, against his colleague the interruption of a
concilium plebis (quod contionem ab se avocasset). The accused,
foregoing the privilege of their magistracy, consented to a trial, which
came before the comitia centuriata. Claudius narrowly escaped
condemnation, whereupon the case against Gracchus was dropped.
[1535]

The increasing number of special judiciary commissions and the

institution of standing courts limited more and more the judicial
activity of the centuriate assembly; but the tribunes of the plebs kept
alive the feeling of popular sovereignty in this sphere by the
occasional prosecution of some notorious offender.[1536] The
continuance of the centuriate judicial function is proved by the
Cassian plebiscite of 137, which provided for the use of the ballot in
all iudicia populi excepting in perduellio,[1537] and by the lex Caelia,
108, which removed the exception.[1538]
The limitation upon popular jurisdiction by the special court is said
to have begun as early as 414, when, according to Livy,[1539] a
senatus consultum authorized the appointment of a quaestio
extraordinaria to discover and punish the murderers of M.
Postumius, a tribune of the soldiers with consular power. The plebs,
consulted as to the presidency of the court, left it to the consuls. The
instance may be an anticipation of later usage. The case of
wholesale poisoning by Roman matrons, 331, was investigated, and
a hundred and seventy matrons were condemned, by an
extraordinary court, which evidently owed its existence to a senatus
consultum without the coöperation of the people.[1540] The same is
true of the quaestio appointed by the senate under dictatorial
presidency in 314 to inquire into charges of conspiracy of the leading
men in certain allied states. The dictator extended the inquiry to
Rome, and after his resignation the consuls continued the work.
Livy’s account of this affair assumes that the senate had full power to
appoint such commissions.[1541] It did in fact possess the right
without the coöperation of the people to institute quaestiones
extraordinariae for the trial of allies or other aliens in crimes which
menaced the security of Rome. In the period between the Hortensian
legislation and the Gracchi in two recorded instances it dared on its
own responsibility to appoint such courts for the trial of citizens.[1542]
These were usurpations; for as the laws of appeal forbade the
putting to death of a citizen unless condemned by the people, a
special court with capital jurisdiction over citizens could not be
constitutionally established excepting with the consent of the
assembly. This right of the people was considered a legislative
equivalent of their judicial power, which the vast expansion of their
state made it impossible for them directly to exercise.[1543] The court
which tried and condemned the insurgent garrison of Rhegium in
270 was instituted accordingly by a plebiscite authorized by a
senatus consultum.[1544] Most probably the court in this case was
the senate itself, just as in 210, when the plebiscite of L. Atilius gave
it full power to judge and punish the Campanians for revolt.[1545] The
appointment of special courts for the detection and punishment of
aliens for illegal usurpation of the citizenship, which belonged
originally to the senate, began in 177 to be shared by the people.
[1546]
 Similar in character to the special judiciary commission appointed
by the senate, but far more sweeping in effect, was the senatus
consultum ultimum (“videant consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti
capiat”), which in crises armed the consuls with absolute power of
life and death over the citizens.[1547] By these means the senate at
its pleasure circumvented the laws of appeal on the plea that the
accused had ceased to be citizens.[1548] Against this abuse Ti.
Gracchus planned a new law of appeal, which he did not live to see
enacted.[1549] His own followers were ruthlessly condemned without
the privilege of appeal by an extraordinary quaestio under P.
Popillius Laenas, consul in 132.[1550] Probably a similar court was
appointed after the revolt of Fregellae.[1551] To put an end to such
circumvention of a well-established right of the people, C. Gracchus
in his first tribunate, 123, carrying into effect the plan of his brother,
passed the often mentioned lex Sempronia de provocatione, which
absolutely forbade capital sentence upon a citizen without an order
of the people.[1552] The wording indicates that it was intended not to
do away with extraordinary courts and powers, but to allow their
establishment in no other way than by popular vote.[1553] It
reiterated, too, the article of the Porcian statute which absolutely
forbade the infliction of the death penalty on civilians.[1554] Far,
however, from transferring the jurisdiction of the assembly to the
quaestiones, the Sempronian law evidently confirmed the right of the
people by enacting that the tribunes might bring the violator of that
law before the comitia on a charge of perduellio, for which it
mentioned the penalty of interdict from fire and water.[1555] It held
responsible not only the magistrate charged with the extraordinary
commission, but probably also the senator who moved or supported
the measure which called it into being.[1556] The entire Sempronian
law was made retroactive, so as to cover the case of Popillius, who
thereupon fled into exile to avoid trial. The interdict was accordingly
decreed by the tribes on the motion of Gaius.[1557] Rupilius, the
colleague of Popillius, seems to have suffered a similar punishment.
[1558]
 In 120 the tribune Decius prosecuted for perduellio L. Opimius,
who, as consul in 121, armed with the senatus consultum ultimum,
had caused the death of C. Gracchus. The accused was acquitted.
[1559] Ihne[1560] considers this prosecution to have been instigated
by the optimates in order to settle once for all and in their favor the
question as to the legality of special courts which were called into
being by an act of the senate alone. In that case acquittal was a
foregone conclusion. In 119 the popular party met with greater
success in the prosecution of C. Papirius Carbo, whom it hated as a
renegade.[1561] The charge was probably perduellio, though the
details are unknown.[1562]
The jurisdiction of the comitia in criminal cases suffered more
extensive curtailment from the standing courts,—quaestiones
perpetuae,—the first of which was established in 149 for the trial of
Roman officials accused of extortion—repetundae—committed in the
provinces or in Italy.[1563] As the object of the prosecutors was in the
main the recovery of extorted property, the court was essentially civil,
and seemed, therefore, to the Romans no infringement of popular
rights; yet even before Sulla the principle began to apply to distinctly
criminal cases.[1564] Notwithstanding this development several
accusations were brought before the centuriate assembly in the
period between the Gracchi and Sulla.[1565] The latter increased the
number of quaestiones to seven and brought all crimes within their
cognizance. The questorian jurisdiction in cases of murder had
already passed to the quaestio inter sicarios, established between
149 and 141;[1566] and now Sulla transferred cases of perduellio
from the jurisdiction of the tribunes to the quaestio maiestatis.[1567]
Although restored to the tribunes in 70, it was for the remainder of
the republican period exercised by them on special occasions only,
for the quaestio maiestatis still existed. With the establishment of the
principate the jurisdiction of the people finally vanished.[1568]
The revolutionary character of the period after Sulla is illustrated
by the case of perduellio against C. Rabirius[1569] brought in 63 by a
tribune of the plebs, T. Atius Labienus. Rabirius was charged with
complicity in the murder of L. Appuleius Saturninus, the famous
tribune of the year 100. Labienus proposed and carried a plebiscite
requiring the praetor to appoint duumviri for the trial, whereas it was
generally held at the time that these officials should have been
elected by the people. It was also enacted, in violation of the Porcian
and Sempronian laws, that in case of conviction the accused should
be crucified on the Campus Martius. C. and L. Caesar, appointed
duumviri, brought the case before the comitia centuriata, which were
prevented from giving their verdict by the removal of the flag from
Janiculum.[1570] The object of the trial was not to punish the guilty,
but to discredit the senate, to which the accused belonged.[1571] The
decline of the idea of popular sovereignty is further indicated by the
agrarian rogation of the tribune P. Servilius Rullus, 63, an article of
which, in violation of the lex Valeria Horatia de provocatione, ordered
the appointment of decemviri agris adsignandis without appeal.[1572]
The procedure was the same in all finable and capital actions. In a
case subject to appeal the magistrate, after a preliminary inquiry
(quaestio), summoned the people to contio on the third day[1573] for
a thorough examination (anquisitio).[1574] The trumpeter blew his
horn before the door of the accused, and cited him to appear at
daybreak in the place of assembly.[1575] Acting as accuser, the
magistrate addressed the contio and produced his witnesses. Then
came the witnesses for the defence, the statement of the accused,
and the pleading of his counsel. These proceedings filled three
contiones separated from one another by a day’s interval. At the end
of the third day’s session the magistrate acquitted the accused or
condemned him and fixed the penalty. In case of condemnation, the
accused if dissatisfied appealed. The magistrate then put his
sentence in the form of a rogation and set a date for the comitia,
[1576] which could be held only after an interval of a trinum

nundinum,[1577] unless the accused desired an earlier trial.[1578]

Some scholars, however, hold the theory that a magistrate,
recognizing the limitation of his competence, might bring the case
directly to the comitia without the formality of a condemnation and
appeal.[1579] The penalty proposed in the rogation was not