Translation in Cascading Crises 1st

Edition Sharon O'Brien

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmeta.com/product/translation-in-cascading-crises-1st-edition-sharon-obri
en/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Retranslation Translation Literature and

Reinterpretation 1st Edition Sharon Deane-Cox

https://ebookmeta.com/product/retranslation-translation-
literature-and-reinterpretation-1st-edition-sharon-deane-cox/

Cowboy Graves Three Novellas 1st Edition Roberto Bolaño

Natasha Wimmer Translation

https://ebookmeta.com/product/cowboy-graves-three-novellas-1st-
edition-roberto-bolano-natasha-wimmer-translation/

Cascading red roses of december 1st Edition Rashmi

Hanna Norman

https://ebookmeta.com/product/cascading-red-roses-of-
december-1st-edition-rashmi-hanna-norman/

Woman Running in the Mountains Yama o hashiru onna 1st

Edition Yuko Tsushima Geraldine Harcourt Translation
Lauren Groff Introduction

https://ebookmeta.com/product/woman-running-in-the-mountains-
yama-o-hashiru-onna-1st-edition-yuko-tsushima-geraldine-harcourt-
translation-lauren-groff-introduction/
Comedy in Crises Weaponising Humour in Contemporary Art
1st Edition Chrisoula Lionis

https://ebookmeta.com/product/comedy-in-crises-weaponising-
humour-in-contemporary-art-1st-edition-chrisoula-lionis/

Criminal Women Gender Matters 1st Edition Sharon Grace

Maggie O Neill Tammi Walker Hannah King Lucy Baldwin
Alison Jobe Orla Lynch Fiona Measham Kate O Brien Vicky
Seaman
https://ebookmeta.com/product/criminal-women-gender-matters-1st-
edition-sharon-grace-maggie-o-neill-tammi-walker-hannah-king-
lucy-baldwin-alison-jobe-orla-lynch-fiona-measham-kate-o-brien-
vicky-seaman/

Writing Measurable Outcomes in Psychotherapy Sharon

Kopyc

https://ebookmeta.com/product/writing-measurable-outcomes-in-
psychotherapy-sharon-kopyc/

Temporary Economic Crises 1st Edition Shahzavar

Karimzadi

https://ebookmeta.com/product/temporary-economic-crises-1st-
edition-shahzavar-karimzadi/

New Perspectives on Corpus Translation Studies (New

Frontiers in Translation Studies)

https://ebookmeta.com/product/new-perspectives-on-corpus-
translation-studies-new-frontiers-in-translation-studies/
Quarto trim size: 174mm × 240mm

Disaster Prevention and Management

Volume 29 Number 2 2020 ISSN 0965-3562
Volume 29 Number 2 2020

Disaster Prevention and Management

An International Journal

Number 2
Translation in cascading crises Disaster Prevention and
Guest Editors: Sharon O’Brien and Federico Marco Federici
129 Crisis translation: considering language needs in multilingual disaster settings
Sharon O’Brien and Federico Marco Federici
Management
144 The role of translators and interpreters in cascading crises and disasters: towards a
An International Journal
framework for confronting the challenges
David E. Alexander and Gianluca Pescaroli Translation in cascading crises
157 Trust, distrust and translation in a disaster
Patrick Cadwell Guest Editors: Sharon O’Brien and
175 Ethics and crisis translation: insights from the work of Paul Ricoeur Federico Marco Federici

Volume 29 Number 2 2020

Dónal P. O’Mathúna and Matthew R. Hunt
187 Ophelia, Emma, and the beast from the east effortful engaging and the provision of
sign language interpreting in emergencies
Lorraine Leeson
200 Transnational crisis translation: social media and forced migration
Jay Marlowe
214 Local capacity building after crisis: the role of languages and translation in the work
of development NGOs in Kyrgyzstan
Wine Tesseur

emeraldpublishing.com

ISBN 978-1-83982-532-3

www.emeraldinsight.com/loi/dpm
 The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

Crisis
Crisis translation: considering translation
language needs in multilingual
disaster settings
Sharon O’Brien 129
School of Applied Language and Intercultural Studies,
Received 27 November 2018
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Revised 3 July 2019
Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland, and Accepted 3 July 2019

Federico Marco Federici

Centre for Translation Studies, University College London, London, UK

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the role that language translation can play in
disaster prevention and management and to make the case for increased attention to language translation in
crisis communication.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on literature relating to disaster management to
suggest that translation is a perennial issue in crisis communication.
Findings – Although communication with multicultural and multilinguistic communities is seen as being
in urgent need of attention, the authors find that the role of translation in enabling this is underestimated, if
not unrecognized.
Originality/value – This paper raises awareness of the need for urgent attention to be given by scholars
and practitioners to the role of translation in crisis communication.
Keywords Crisis communication, Translation studies, Cross-cultural barriers, Emergency responses,
Linguistic vulnerability
Paper type Conceptual paper

Introduction
Much as the world is interconnected and globalized in terms of communication, the breadth of
social and economic impact of communication in multilingual, transborder as well as national
crises remains understudied (Federici, 2016). Long-lasting crises can erupt within multicultural
cities (e.g. the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London), a region (the 2017 earthquake in Mexico), a
nation (the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, or the 2010 Haiti earthquake) or across borders
between multiple countries (the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami across 18 countries in the Indian
Ocean). Triggered by natural hazards, or teleological motivations – human-driven disasters,
including terrorism and conflict (Glade and Alexander, 2016) – happen within multilingual and
multicultural societies (Cadwell, 2014; Cadwell and O’Brien, 2016; O’Brien and Cadwell, 2017).
Increased people displacement and economic migrations across the world causes major
concerns for migrants’ adaptability to disasters in their new contexts. Although displaced
populations can be resilient because of their past experiences (Guadagno et al., 2017; Khan and
McNamara, 2017; MICIC, 2016), at the same time they can be exposed to new vulnerabilities in
their new environments with limited access to information (Puthoopparambil and Parente,
2018). Language plays a role in both cross-boundary and local settings. Local crises in
multilingual societies equally have implications for temporary or long-term residents with
limited proficiency in the local language – an example: translations into 18 languages were
needed after the Grenfell Tower fire. Thus, from indigenous populations to (un)integrated Disaster Prevention and
Management
Vol. 29 No. 2, 2020
The collaboration that led the authors to write this paper was initiated by the INTERACT Crisis pp. 129-143
Translation Network project. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 © Emerald Publishing Limited
0965-3562
research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 734211. DOI 10.1108/DPM-11-2018-0373
DPM migrants, to tourists or business travellers, any crisis can cascade into multiple, diverse and
29,2 interrelated temporal, cultural, linguistic and geographical dimensions (Pescaroli and
Alexander, 2015). Consequently, language translation is required.
Training for internationally coordinated responses to crises (Howe et al., 2013) and
collecting data from disasters (Mulder et al., 2016) also happen in multilingual environments,
where the lingua franca (the English language of international humanitarian institutions) is
130 both a solution and part of the problem. Overreliance on everybody’s (degrees of )
competence in English delays engaging with the “perennial issue” of crisis communication
among international responders (Crowley and Chan, 2011, p. 24) and with crisis-affected
communities (New Zealand Government, 2013).
In this paper, we make the case for increased attention to language translation in crisis
communication. Translation is here intended as linguistic and cultural transfer from one
language into another, be it through oral, signing, written or multimodal channels. We show
how, in spite of some progress, the literature that deals with the multilingual nature of crisis
situations is limited in fields where it should thrive, such as in crisis communication and in
translation studies. Despite the central role attributed to efficient communication in disaster
risk reduction (henceforth DRR), our current ability to plan and deliver multilingual
information in crises is in fact hindered by the focus on language needs that is predominantly
limited to considering, dealing or resolving language issues in the response phase. We propose
a shift of focus towards considering language translation as part of disaster prevention and
management. Embedded in debates on planning, preparedness, training and mitigation,
language translation aligns with the recent call to consider communication of crucial and
timely information in crisis management as a human right (Greenwood et al., 2017). Yet, as the
cursory evidence on how the multilingual communication issues are studied so far shows this
right goes currently unnoticed, or gets very limited attention, at best.

What is crisis translation?

Communication mediated by professional and ad hoc linguists (be they translators or
interpreters) is a complex form of communication. Prior to explaining the proposed
conceptualisation of crisis translation, it is necessary to scope what is meant by
“translation” and “crisis”, as used in this paper. We propose a broad conceptualisation of
crisis translation as a specific form of communication that overlaps with principles of risk
communication (CDC, 2014; Reynolds and Seeger, 2014) as much as with principles of
emergency planning and management (Alexander, 2002, 2016b).
Over the last decades, the recognition that any disruptive event has cascading effects has
become significant. As issues in multilingual communication exist before, during and after
any emergency or disaster, an awareness of cascading effects over the long-term and
beyond the geographical location of the event is a conditio sine qua non to consider
definitions of crisis that account for the interconnectedness of the twenty-first century
world. Pescaroli and Alexander’s (2015) definition of “cascading disasters”, which connects
crisis as a threatening condition with disasters as triggering events of different magnitude
and duration, shapes our definition of crisis. In particular, Pescaroli and Alexander (2015,
p. 62) integrate and sharpen the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction terminology by
emphasizing “that cascades are events that depend, to some extent, on their context, and
thus their diffusion is associated with enduring vulnerabilities”. It is noteworthy, however,
that the UN perceives language translation as a matter of “services”. For instance, the
Disaster Assessment and Coordination Field Handbook (UNDAC, 2018) in the workflow of its
On-Site Operations Coordination Centre for disaster management includes in one of its
checklists for crisis communication “procurement of translation/interpretation services”
(UNDAC, 2018, p. 17). This positive awareness of need clashes with the reality that such
services may exist professionally in very limited scope, translators and interpreters are not
trained in the many language pairs that may be required, and local languages, dialects, Crisis
minority languages and low/no literacy communities are less served than lingua franca or translation
“international” languages. The lack of appropriate linguistic and cultural awareness in crisis
communication may lead to catastrophic consequences, which could be avoidable and for
this reason we position this lack within the “cascading disaster” paradigm. Problems of
translation leading to inappropriate evacuations (e.g. Field, 2017) or cultural presumptions
leading to further infection in displaced and local populations in the 2014 Ebola outbreak 131
(e.g. Bastide, 2018) show that inadequate planning for language translation provision leads
to vulnerability.
The UN defines as vulnerabilities “the conditions determined by physical, social,
economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an
individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards”[1]. Vulnerabilities
also depend on cultural perceptions of risk and whether cultural backgrounds align with
the international (often Anglophone) concepts of preparedness and risk reduction
(see discussions in Blaikie et al., 2004; Krüger et al., 2015). Lack of integration, lack of
participation, lack of access to information represent vulnerabilities for culturally and
linguistically diverse (CALD) communities. Translation would mitigate some of these
pre-existing vulnerabilities, but as Grin (2017, p. 156) puts it “[t]ranslation sometimes evokes
the image of a Cinderella confined to humble domestic chores while her elder sisters, that is,
communication strategies like ‘lingua franca’ and second/foreign language learning, enjoy
all the attention and visibility”. The consequences of these are highlighted in the recent
IFRC (2018) World Disasters Report:
Speakers of minority languages who are not fluent in the official national language(s) are at a
structural disadvantage in many countries. […] However linguistically diverse the affected
population, humanitarian responses are usually coordinated in international lingua francas and
delivered in a narrow range of national languages. (p. 103)

As a result, language translation rarely, if ever, features among plans to increase resilience
but its absence increases the cascading effects of crises. Pescaroli and Alexander’s (2015)
definition of “cascading disasters” (pp. 64-65) underpins a notion of “crisis” that persuades
us that research into translation and its effects on communication in crisis management is
much needed. Poor or culturally inappropriate communication undermines trust in
responders and institutions. Failure to address effective communication for CALD
communities generates further social disruption, one of the cascading effects. This, in turn,
risks affecting and endangering respondents who may deal with crisis-affected populations
because their lack of understanding or their cultural mindset make them appear as
non-collaborative. Thus, crisis translation considers language barriers in the context of
multi-dimensional cascading effects that widen existing vulnerabilities or engender new
ones by means of miscommunication.
As mentioned earlier, “translation” here refers to all modes, oral, written, signed and
multimodal that could be used for communication in preparation and response, as well as
for recovery from a crisis. Hence, “translation” includes the oral task of “interpreting”.
For those outside the academic and professional domain of translation, debates about the
different skills required from translators and interpreters are largely unknown and
“translation” is the term used generally to mean the transfer of meaning and cultural
encodings from one language/cultural system to another regardless of the channel of
communication (e.g. the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative heading “translation: the
perennial hidden issue” concerns in fact a question of interpreting). Moreover, an
individual may act as a translator of written content in one instance and an interpreter
of oral content in another. This is especially the case in crisis situations. The
term “translator” is usually reserved in academia and in the translation professions
DPM (Gouadec, 2007) for those who are “qualified” to act through training and/or experience.
29,2 However, in a crisis situation, a “translator” might be any person who can mediate
between two or more language and culture systems, without specific training or
qualifications (Federici and Cadwell, 2018; O’Brien and Cadwell, 2017). A translator might
even be a young refugee (see Marlowe and Bogen, 2015; Melandri et al., 2014). This loose
definition of a translator is not a comfortable one for those who work in the translation
132 professions or in the related academic discipline. Nonetheless, when people are faced with
a crisis, the luxury of a trained professional is often just that – an unattainable luxury. We
recognize that translation is carried out by many different people in crisis situations; that
it is sometimes oral, sometimes written and sometimes highly multimodal; that the
translator is sometimes a trained professional and sometimes not, sometimes an adult,
sometimes a child, that translators do not just transfer linguistic information, but also act,
very importantly, as cultural mediators. Take this state of affairs and add to it the lack of
trained translators and interpreters who are available to work in a crisis, the lack of
funding for communication, never mind translation, the urgency that is associated with
core phases of crises (response and recovery), and the potential power of volunteers, it is
necessary to adopt a broad definition of “translation” and “translator”.

Growing recognition of the need

We do not wish to give the impression that translation is entirely overlooked in
commentaries or policies on crisis communication. At the Sendai implementation conference
in 2016, translation and interpreting were discussed in the context of capacity building for
disaster risk reduction (Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2016). The Global Disaster Alert Coordination
System[2] guidelines for international exchange in disasters mentions translators once, but
they are listed in the company of the following information exchange responsibilities of the
affected country: transport, fuel/lubricants, translators, warehouses, maps, etc. The Sphere
Project (2018, p. 71), under commitment 6 on information sharing in humanitarian response,
includes two explicit communicative obligations: “Communicate clearly and avoid jargon
and colloquialisms, especially when other participants do not speak the same language.
Provide interpreters and translators if needed”.
Cadwell (2015) and Cadwell and O’Brien (2016) investigate the use and potential of
translation technology in crisis situations. Somewhat surprisingly, it was found that
industry-standard and commercial translation tools such as translation memory,
terminology databases and machine translation (i.e. MT – fully automatic translation)
played an insignificant role for foreign nationals affected by the Great East Japan
Earthquake. Since then, the potential of translation technology to assist in crisis situations
has been growing (see O’Brien, 2019 – for a discussion). Having crisis terminology online is
of course useful, but accessibility in times of crisis for all the potential actors has not been
critically appraised and ways of building and sharing translation databases, for example, by
and for volunteers goes largely unassessed, as does the utility of such databases for the
training of MT engines.
Initial strides for inclusion of translation technologies in response to crisis come from the
NGO Translators without Borders (TWB). It has played a leading role in having translation
recognized and implemented as part of humanitarian aid in the past number of years,
including pioneering work to train crisis translators (O’Brien, 2016). Their Words of Relief
project aims to translate crisis messages into 15 world languages, build a spider network of
diaspora who can translate and create a crowd-sourced application that connects aid
workers and data aggregators in an emergency. In addition, TWB partnered with Microsoft
to push forward crucial work in MT (Crisis MT, see Lewis, 2010; Lewis et al., 2011) and their
operations office in Kenya stimulated a first study on comprehension of translated
information about Ebola among Kenyans.
Yet, translation is mostly ignored Crisis
In spite of these seedling developments, translation as a facilitator of crisis information is translation
mostly overlooked. In 2018, the “Multi-Hazard Early Warning System: A Checklist” (WMO,
2018) shows how awareness about cultural and linguistic differences remains very limited.
Even though the checklist responds to the purpose of the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction 20-15-2030 (UNISDR, 2015) so as to attain “the substantial reduction of
disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, 133
cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities, and countries”, the
checklist remarkably excludes language obstacles to effective communication. Linguistic
diversity is the status quo in most countries world-wide. However, “language” is often
conflated with the concept of “culture” and the implicit assumption seems to be that if
cultural diversity is noted, translation will somehow happen; many international documents,
including influential documents such as this checklist, are redacted in one of the seven
official languages of the UN, whilst 7,111 languages are currently in actual use (Eberhard
et al., 2019)[3]. Yet languages such as Hindi, the fourth largest for native speakers and third
largest for overall number, are not included among the official languages. It is tempting to
argue that considerations about linguistic diversity recede before prestige and power of
lingua francas. Moreover, translation costs money, which may not abound in crisis response.
It also requires forward planning. For example, establishing a database of approved
translators and interpreters for specific language pairs, knowing their expertise, their
availability, etc. As a result of these and possibly other factors, the fact that linguistic
diversity comes with translation needs in cross-boundary crises remains underestimated.
It is unclear who has ownership of provision for effective communication in a language
that is understood by the recipients of crisis information. The document dedicated to early-
warning signals does not suggest that a specific responder (person or institution) should
deal with the logistical difficulties of accommodating language differences when
communicating risks with the purpose of mitigating its impact. CALD communities and
their needs are listed; they are included in checks for assessment of “exposure,
vulnerabilities, capacities, and risks” (p. 10) where the checklist includes a box for
“legislation and cultural norms assessed to identify gaps that may increase vulnerability”.
Though cultural diversity is listed, it does not follow automatically that language needs are
either included or taken care of, as mentioned above. The focus, rather, seems to be on
cultural and behavioural norms, but not on language access.
Further, in the extensive body of literature on crisis or disaster management, with its
intrinsic terminological debates on what disaster management entails (Fischer, 2008; Haddow
et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2013; Wall and Chery, 2011; Waugh, 2007), or in the charter of
humanitarian response of The Sphere Project (2011; as seen some more commitment appears in
the 2018 edition), the common denominator appears to be that multilingual communication
issues are considered sporadically, and only recently have they acquired limited visibility. In
some of this literature, the strategic importance of communication, or information as aid, is
highlighted (Fischer, 2008; Isiolo, 2012; Santos-Hernández and Hearn Morrow, 2013; Seeger,
2006; WHO, 2012). In international and European protocols or roadmaps on crisis or emergency
management, recommendations on clear communication with crisis-affected communities form
a core element yet they do not mention translation (DG-ECHO, 2013; EC, 2014, 2017). A recent
institutional commitment from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has one
formal commitment about access to information – to address migration crises:
Therefore, we need to maintain continuous communication with communities, using languages,
formats, and media that are contextually appropriate and accessible for all groups in a community,
including children and persons with disabilities. (UNHCR, 2018, p. 8)

It is, at best however, a general statement of principle.

DPM The EU’s General Guidelines for Operational Priorities on Humanitarian Aid signalled
29,2 the importance of communicating transparently about disasters (EC, 2014) and recently
introduced an economic argument in favour of risk reduction and prevention that applies to
considering translation as a tool to better inform and educate for prevention: “We know that
investment in prevention saves lives and livelihoods; it needs therefore efficient targeting to
disaster risks” (EC, 2017, Section 2). These goals sit alongside the rights-based notion that
134 whatever the status of one’s spoken language (Mowbray, 2017), information in a crisis is a
fundamental human right (Greenwood et al., 2017; O’Brien et al., 2018).
Some of these commentators have provided evidence of negative consequences when crisis
communication does not work, especially when communication is in a second or third
language for the crisis-affected communities, or in a language they do not understand at all.
The pivotal work, previously mentioned, Disaster Relief 2.0, published by Harvard
Humanitarian Initiative (Crowley and Chan, 2011), using the Haiti Earthquake example,
argues for increased cooperation and dialogue between humanitarian agencies and the
technical and linguistic volunteers spread around the globe who help process the
communication generated by the disaster-affected communities. It also called for deeper
interactions in future disasters between those responding to and those experiencing a disaster;
eight years on and this issue is still relevant as it remains unaddressed (Cook et al., 2016).
Moser-Mercer et al. (2014, p. 141) confirm this point: “Surprisingly, language needs of
large-scale humanitarian actions and deployments are rarely voiced, often downplayed and at
best indirectly stated”. To provide additional concrete examples, Haddow et al. (2011) in their
Introduction to Emergency Management list five critical assumptions for a successful crisis
communications strategy: customer focus; leadership commitment; the inclusion of
communications and planning in operations; situational awareness; and media partnership.
The audience and customers of crisis information are listed as the general public, victims, the
business community, media, elected officials, community officials and volunteer groups (i.e. a
diverse group). It cannot be assumed that all these people share equal competencies in the same
language, so translation is a necessity. Yet, nowhere is translation mentioned in this volume.
The DG-ECHO (2013) Disaster Risk Reduction Policy Document discusses the
importance of inclusive information and communication and mentions in particular that
information should be “accessible for all” (p. 41). This document also mentions
strengthening resilience through timely exchange of information. However, making
information accessible by either simplifying it for those with limited proficiency in a lingua
franca, or translating it is only mentioned very briefly (“briefing of colleagues and
translation in practice”).
In his discussion on lessons learned from previous disasters, Fischer (2008, p. 217) notes that:
[…] instructions for obtaining medical assistance and subsistence supplies as well as instructions
for an evacuation or a quarantine are more likely to be responded to if they are frequently repeated,
articulated clearly and with specificity. All too often emergency personnel assume that because the
information was disseminated, the intended recipients have received it, understood it, and
responded to it in the desired fashion. Nothing could be further from the truth.

This statement reminds us that communicating one way is insufficient, but the author fails to
note that, for communication to be effective, it does not only have to meet the requirements
listed above, but should be delivered in a language that is comprehended by those who need
that communication. Retention, understanding and desire for information in specific modes or
formats by affected populations are excluded from this equation, with the risk of
one-directional forms of communication ( for an illustration, see O’Brien and Cadwell, 2017).
In his 2006 article on best practices in crisis communication, Seeger lists ten best
practices on crisis communication generated from research literature. Due to space
constraints, we do not list them all here, but emphasize practice number (8), given its
significance for ethical crisis communication: communicate with compassion, concern and Crisis
empathy. None of the “best practices”, not even (8), recognize the role of multilingual translation
communication through translation.
Access to compassionate speakers of one’s language represented a powerful resource for
refugees caught in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in New Zealand
(Christchurch and Canterbury), but it was acknowledged that improvements in
communicating with CALD communities was required (New Zealand Government, 2013). 135
As a final example, even Santos-Hernández and Hearn Morrow (2013) who focus on
language and literacy as factors in successful crisis communication, acknowledge the
importance of readability using typical measures such as SMOG and Flesch-Kincaid, but fail
to mention translation or interpreting. In summary, there are ample examples of a
considerable lacuna for the role and need for translation in academic, governmental and
non-governmental discourse on crisis communication.

Crisis translation and emergency planning

We intend to demonstrate that in the context of DRR and crisis management alike,
additional focus on the language barrier would greatly contribute to community-led
initiatives to mitigate risks (Gaillard, 2010; Mercer et al., 2012; Shaw, 2012; Tabatabaei et al.,
2013). Language translation is a significant problem in the response phase of disasters, as
deploying language specialists in combinations that are difficult to predict in advance is an
expensive and logistically challenging task; as we mentioned previously, interpreters and
translators for the needed language combinations may not be available, fully trained, or
even exist. It is likely to remain an impossible task to complete if the focus remains only on
the response phase. In order to deploy interpreters or provide information in languages that
reach the affected communities, translators and interpreters must be available. Professional
translators are rare in many language combinations, so bilingual staff of NGOs double up as
translators and interpreters. This role is frequently imposed on such staff, on top of their
existing workload, and without training or support. Also, translators and interpreters may
even be affected themselves by whatever crisis is ongoing.
Embedding translation into communication strategies within emergency planning is part
of the solution, like any other element that can be considered and included in emergency
plans as part of the “the process of preparing systematically for future contingencies,
including major incidents and disasters” (Alexander, 2016b, p. 2). This could involve pre-
translated, pre-subtitled, pre-audio described materials in the languages understood by the
local communities to be part of early actions. To achieve this, language translation needs to
be part of pre-crisis emergency plans that will include the development of resources to
enable affected-communities to interact with disaster managers and humanitarian
organization. The “so-called ‘disaster cycle’ refers to the phases of resilience building,
preparation, emergency response, recovery, and reconstruction” (Alexander, 2016b, p. 23).
Our contention is that translation can play an important role towards preparedness.
Including translation as a component in emergency planning would have multiple
benefits. With increased access to timely and accurate information in a language that can be
(better) understood, lives and well-being can be protected. Moreover, the considerable
economic costs of dealing with crises could be reduced. The EU H2020 Work Programme
noted that the environmental and socio-economic impact of disasters and crime and
terrorism on the population amounts to average annual losses of roughly 25 per cent of the
global GDP and 5 per cent of the Union’s GDP, respectively. According to the UNISDR, the
2013 central European floods alone resulted in losses of $18bn. In the foreword to the World
Atlas of Natural Disaster Risk (Shi and Kasperson, 2015), the then UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Disaster Risk Reduction, Mrs Margareta
Wahlström, stated that economic losses as a result of disasters continue to rise. It is
DPM estimated that in the past three years, losses due to disasters have exceeded $100bn. In 2005,
29,2 the UK Department for International Development put forward a policy briefing document
arguing that investment in risk reduction is more cost-effective than just response actions
when crises occur (White et al., 2005). To shift from managing disaster to the proactive
prevention of risk, with possible reductions in the cost of disasters, multilingual
communication needs to take its proper place in the list that normally includes supplies,
136 medicine, infrastructure and technology.
Steps can be taken to incorporate translation into emergency planning. A logical starting
point is to ensure that it is a concrete and explicit part of emergency response policy. The
lack of reference to translation in policy or guideline documents is unsurprising, given that
there is not even agreement in policy documents on what core terms such as vulnerability,
capacity and resilience mean. Gaillard (2010) discusses how these core terms in DRR are
often interpreted differently, depending on whether the policy makers are active in the
domain of climate change, development or DRR. He believes that huge efforts are required to
close the gap between these domains as well as between practitioners and scientists. Given
conceptual differences at that level, it is not hard to understand that translation hardly
figures in policies relating to disasters and crises. Expert terminology and the lack of
preparedness in sourcing specialist translators can be a deadly combination. An example of
language needs from the local community is given by Field (2017, p. 340) through her
discussions with local groups. The failure to evacuate appropriate regions before the
landfall of Typhon Yolanda in the Philippines partially rests on a lack of appropriate
translation based on local cultural needs: “while the two are scientifically different
phenomena, it was acknowledged that had the threat of the storm surge been likened to that
of a tsunami ( for a coastal population hit by a wave, the impact would be similar), the
coastal regions would have seen higher evacuation rates, particularly due to familiarity with
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the more recent 2011 tsunami in Japan”.
There is an urgency to identify best practices and to provide new insights for, or indeed
create, recommendations for crisis translation policy for national, European, and
international agencies that regularly work across borders and across languages, with a
view to reversing inequalities across language communities and promoting fairness of
access to information. This approach will be especially important in the context of new
migration patterns and policy requirements for Europe. Crisis communication literature
emphasizes the difficulties when trying to communicate with those who are the most
vulnerable, e.g. the elderly, disabled, children or those with low literacy levels. Dealing
adequately with these challenges must be within the scope of crisis translation into the
future, when, in many societies with migrant populations, first generation migrants will
represent large communities in the care homes and their linguistic skills may not meet their
communicative needs.
There is some evidence that high level, national policies (e.g. FEMA, 2016; NHS England,
2015; Cabinet Office, 2012) provide for language provision for limited-proficiency speakers,
but more empirical data on the ways in which translation is understood in these policies is
required (O’Brien et al., 2018), not to mention how policies are implemented.
Contending that crisis translation must be considered in relation to cascading disasters, we
opt for an activist approach. Viewing the definition from the point of view of emergency
planning, research into crisis translation needs to explore the roles of language in all the
phases of a disaster, including during the “normal” phase in which resilience is built up.
Alexander (2016a, p. 14), discussing emergency planning, reminds the reader that “[a] crisis is
a sudden, intrusive interruption of normal conditions with potentially adverse consequences.
‘Normality’ is defined here as the average of conditions over a protracted period in which
things function acceptably”. If CALD communities are being supported by intercultural
mediators (Belpiede, 1999; Casadei and Franceschetti, 2009), interpreters or community
translators (Taibi, 2011; Taibi and Ozolins, 2016) to access information in normal conditions, Crisis
surely this confirms that such needs will persist, in fact be exacerbated, in crisis situations. We translation
suggest inverting the research priorities, so that by building up data, resources and
technology, these can be better deployed in the response and recovery phases. Just as other
specialist skills receive training to operate in emergencies, linguists ought to receive training
to provide support in crises and to create valuable expertise in handling language needs by
being embedded in crisis management practices. Translation, interpreting, cultural mediation 137
and relationships between different language communities that enhance effective
communication in crisis connecting linguistic sub-groups to the broader society need to be
considered as part of the preventive measures that prepare residents for emergency response
(Federici, 2016). A good example is the initiative described by Clerveaux et al. (2010) where a
Disaster Awareness Game (DAG) is developed to help increase hazard awareness among
school children in the Caribbean Community and Common Market area. This multicultural
area demands a multilinguistic approach to risk communication. Clerveaux et al. (2010) argue
that children are an appropriate target for the DAG because it is an investment in future
disaster preparedness, but also because children of immigrant families are a conduit of
information between school and home. They show awareness of the need for accessibility of
the game, mentioning simple language and the potential for translation. Nevertheless, the
game itself, as represented in the paper, is in English, which still falls short of truly serving
multilinguistic needs. Another good example is discussed in the study of Shackleton (2018);
New Zealand Red Cross worked with members of CALD offering them translation training in
order to contribute to a project to increase awareness of emergencies affecting the Wellington
region. In this project, under-resourced language combinations saw CALD members develop a
basic understanding of translation and linguistic resources to describe natural hazards in the
local area through languages other than New Zealand’s main languages (English and Te Reo
Maori). These are good illustrations of how translation can be embedded in practices of
risk reduction; the CALD members involved in the project would not be professional
interpreters in case of a response, but they could contribute to circulating information in
translations (written texts, texts written to be read, radio or TV broadcasts) to allow CALD
communities to attain information in a language they understand and in a format accessible to
them. The example has limitations, however, as it does not entail a feedback loop seeking to
find out from the CALD communities what information they would like to have and which
formats are most appropriate.
Written, oral and multimodal communication channels are used at different stages of a
crisis, with different audiences. Only early phases of crises automatically call for oral
interpreting; preparedness activities and reconstruction phases after a crisis are more likely
to call for translation, if there is an awareness of language needs. These are broad
differentiations: empirical data to identify how municipal, regional or national-level policies
connect CALD needs with emergency planning is required. The data need to have a
cross-border as well as a local dimension to make sense of the needs of CALD communities;
often the data on ethnographic and linguistic background may be collected for other reasons
(census, electoral rolls) and these data could help identify existing needs and create the
premises (databases, leaflets, technological resources) to develop language support for the
time when it is needed. Data accuracy, assessment of real language competences, distance
between rural and urban needs and budget are among the obvious obstacles to developing
crisis translation resources. However, this complexity can no longer be a sufficient
justification for a reactive mode to deal with the language barrier, because cross-referencing
such data with other well-known data sets on hazards capes, risks and models derived from
statistical data can be done as part of disaster prevention measures. Interpolating these
existing data would create more valuable resources than what can be put together in the
middle of a response.
DPM The role of translation in recovery, reconstruction and preparation phases (intended as
29,2 learning from activities just completed during the response phase) has not been studied
much either. This point begins to be appreciated also in the crisis communication literature:
In other words, to date, transnational corporations, political institutions, disaster relief
organizations, and other actors involved in cross-cultural crises and communication have almost
no evidence-based and well-established guidelines they can use to organize or coordinate
138 international crisis communication or to develop culture-sensitive crisis communication strategies
or messages (instruction, adjusting information, etc.). (Schwarz et al., 2016, p. 6)
Taking the most cynical of arguments, even if all the preparations are never going to be
needed, the benefits of involving CALD communities in preparedness strategies would at
the very least lead to more inclusive societies.

Conclusions
Crisis translation should be viewed from the point of view of reducing vulnerabilities and
providing efficient communication that would reduce costs if/when a crisis erupts. Feeble
yet slowly growing is the voice of cost-effectiveness of investing in preparedness, as in the
Communication of the European Commission of 23 November 2017:
A fully integrated approach to prevention, preparedness, and response to disasters in the Union
and its Member States is urgently needed. We know that investment in prevention saves lives and
livelihoods; it needs therefore efficient targeting to disaster risks. (EC, 2017)
Evidence of failings in crisis communication is plentiful and usually categorized under
“issues of communication”; reasons for avoiding these failings are compelling (Greenwood
et al., 2017), translation is considered as a “perennial hidden issue” (Crowley and Chan, 2011,
p. 24; IFRC, 2018, p. 103), yet its inclusion in emergency planning (and studies thereof )
remain minimal and alternatives of plain or clear language are still offered as adequate
solutions, but are blind to the needs of those who have very limited or no competence in the
“language” in question in the first instance (see Strayhorn et al., 2012, for example), who
cannot read, see or hear.
In this context, we highlight the rationale for demanding evidence-based investigations
into the impact of the language barrier on communication in crisis situations. We need to
understand authentic training needs to support linguists (intended here as anybody with
some knowledge of more than one language) who may need, want or be co-opted to operate
as translators in rare-language combinations when they are not professionally trained. We
need to identify beforehand the needs of local populations in relation to existing capabilities
to deal with multilingual contexts and to identify ways of developing additional capabilities.
We need to seek a better use for the skills, technologies and existing data on translation to
be used in planned and sophisticated ways rather than as afterthoughts at the moment of
dire need. Crisis Translation, as we propose in this paper, is a catalyst research area to
develop a holistic, multidisciplinary and comprehensive understanding of the role of
communication in multilingual crisis situations, so as to better address the necessity for
accommodating language needs in crisis situations, thus lessening the impact of the
language barrier in cascading crises.

Notes
1. See UNISDR, www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology (accessed 21 November 2018).
2. See www.gdacs.org (accessed 21 November 2018).
3. Source: www.ethnologue.com/guides/how-many-languages (accessed 26 June 2019).
References Crisis
Aitsi-Selmi, A., Murray, V., Wannous, C., Dickinson, C., Johnston, D., Kawasaki, A., Stevance, A.S. and translation
Yeung, T. (2016), “Reflections on a science and technology agenda for 21st century disaster risk
reduction”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1-29.
Alexander, D.E. (2002), Principles of Emergency Planning and Management, Oxford University Press,
Oxford; New York, NY.
Alexander, D.E. (2016a), How to Write an Emergency Plan, Dunedin Academic Press, Edinburgh. 139
Alexander, D.E. (2016b), “Disaster and emergency planning for preparedness, response, and recovery”,
in Cutter, S.L. (Ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia Natural Hazard Science, Oxford University
Press, Oxford; New York, NY, pp. 1-20.
Bastide, L. (2018), “Crisis communication during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa: the paradoxes of
decontextualized contextualization”, in Bourrier, M. and Bieder, C. (Eds), Risk Communication
for the Future, Springer, Cham, pp. 95-108.
Belpiede, A. (1999), “La professione di mediatore culturale in ambito sociale”, Prospettive Sociali e
Sanitarie, Vol. 2 No. 99, pp. 11-14.
Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I. and Wisner, B. (2004), At Risk. Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability
and Disasters, 2nd ed., Routledge, London; New York, NY.
Cabinet Office (2012), Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004,
Its Associated Regulations and Non-Statutory Arrangements, Crown, London, available at: www.
gov.uk/governmen t/publications/emergency-preparedness (accessed 21 November 2018).
Cadwell, P. (2014), “Translation and interpreting needs in the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011”,
paper presented at the Man versus Machine Conference, Proceedings of the XXth FIT World
Congress (Vol. II), pp. 752-760.
Cadwell, P. (2015), “A place for translation technologies in disaster settings: the case of the 2011 Great
East Japan Earthquake”, in O’Hagan, M. and Zhang, Q. (Eds), Conflict and Communication: A
Changing Asia in a Globalising World, EHV Academic Press, Bremen, pp. 248-282.
Cadwell, P. and O’Brien, S. (2016), “Language, culture, and translation in disaster ICT: an ecosystemic model
of understanding”, Perspectives: Studies in Translation Theory and Practice, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 557-575.
Casadei, S. and Franceschetti, M. (2009), Il mediatore culturale in sei Paesi europei, ISFOL, Rome,
available at: http://archivio.isfol.it/DocEditor/test/File/2009/Strumenti_Isfol/Il_Mediatore_
culturale_in_sei_Paesi_europei.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
CDC (2014), Crisis, Emergency and Risk Communication, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, GA, available at: https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/resources/pdf/cerc_20
14edition.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Clerveaux, V., Spence, B. and Katada, T. (2010), “Promoting disaster awareness in multicultural
societies: the DAG approach”, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal,
Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 199-218.
Cook, A.D., Shrestha, M. and Htet, Z.B. (2016), “International response to 2015 Nepal earthquake:
lessons and observations”, available at: www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NTS_
Report_5_Nepal_final_revised_Oct.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Crowley, J. and Chan, J. (2011), Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian
Emergencies, Vodafone Foundation, Washington, DC and Berkshire.
DG-ECHO (2013), “Disaster risk reduction. Increasing resilience by reducing disaster risk in
humanitarian action”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention_
preparedness/DRR_thematic_policy_doc.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Eberhard, D.M., Simons, G.F. and Fennig, C.D. (2019), Ethnologue: Languages of the World,
SIL International, Dallas, TX.
EC (2014), “General guidelines for operational priorities on humanitarian aid in 2015”, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&coteId=10102&year=2014&number=345&
language=EN (accessed 21 November 2018).
DPM EC (2017), “Strengthening EU disaster management: rescEU solidarity with responsibility”, available at:
29,2 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&n=10&adv=0&coteId=1&year=20
17&number=773&version=F&dateFrom=&dateTo=&serviceId=&documentType=&title=&
titleLanguage=&titleSearch=EXACT&sortBy=NUMBER&sortOrder=DESC2017 (accessed:
21 November 2018).
Federici, F.M. (2016), “Introduction: a state of emergency for crisis communication”, in Federici, F.M.
(Ed.), Mediating Emergencies and Conflicts. Frontline Translating and Interpreting, Palgrave
140 Macmillan, New York, NY, pp. 1-29.
Federici, F.M. and Cadwell, P. (2018), “Training citizen translators: Red Cross translation needs and the
delivery of a bespoke training on the fundamentals of translation”, in Tesseur, W. (Ed.),
Translation in Non-Governmental Organisations. Special Issue of Translation Spaces, John
Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 20-43.
FEMA (2016), “Language access plan”, available at: www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
FEMA%20Language%20Access%20Plan.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Field, J. (2017), “What is appropriate and relevant assistance after a disaster? Accounting for culture(s)
in the response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,
Vol. 22, pp. 335-344, available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.02.010
Fischer, H.W. (2008), Response to Disaster: Fact Versus Fiction and its Perpetuation: The Sociology of
Disaster, 3rd ed., University Press of America, Lanham, MD.
Gaillard, J.-C. (2010), “Vulnerability, capacity and resilience: perspectives for climate and development
policy”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 218-232.
Glade, T. and Alexander, D.E. (2016), “Classification of natural disasters”, in Bobrowsky, P.T. (Ed.),
Encyclopedia of Natural Hazards, Springer, Berlin, pp. 78-82.
Gouadec, D. (2007), Translation as a Profession, John Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam and
Philadelphia, PA.
Greenwood, F., Howarth, C., Poole, D.E., Raymond, N.R. and Scarnecchia, D.P. (2017), The Signal Code:
A Human Rights Approach to Information During Crisis, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative,
Cambridge, MA, available at: https://hhi.harvard.edu/publications/signal-code-ethical-
obligations-humanitarian-information-activities (accessed 21 November 2018).
Grin, F. (2017), “Translation and language policy in the dynamics of multilingualism”, International
Journal of the Sociology of Language, Vol. 243, pp. 155-181.
Guadagno, L., Fuhrer, M. and Twigg, J. (2017), Migrants in Disaster Risk Reduction: Practices for
Inclusion, IOM, Geneva and Strasbourg, available at: https://publications.iom.int/books/
migrants-disaster-risk-reduction-practices-inclusion (accessed 21 November 2018).
Haddow, G.D., Bullock, J.A. and Coppola, D.P. (2011), Introduction to Emergency Management, 4th ed.,
Butterworth Heinemann, Burlington, MA.
Howe, A.W., Jennex, M.E., Bressler, G.H. and Frost, E.G. (2013), “Exercise24: using social media for
crisis response”, in Jennex, M.E. (Ed.), Using Social and Information Technologies for Disaster
and Crisis Management, IGI Global, Hershey PA, pp. 232-250.
IFRC (2018), “World Disasters Report 2018. Leaving no one behind”, International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, available at: https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/
uploads/sites/5/2018/10/B-WDR-2018-EN-LR.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Isiolo, I.A. (2012), “A learning review of the pilot communications project”, available at: http://reliefweb.
int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/infoasaid-actionaid_isiolo-learningreview032012_2.pdf
(accessed 21 November 2018).
Khan, K. and McNamara, T. (2017), “Citizenship, immigration laws, and language”, in Canagarajah, S.
(Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Migration and Language, Routledge, London and New York,
NY, pp. 451-467.
Krüger, F., Bankoff, G., Cannon, T., Orlowski, B. and Schipper, E.L.F. (2015), Cultures and Disasters:
Understanding Cultural Framings in Disaster Risk Reduction, Routledge, New York, NY.
Lewis, W.D. (2010), “Haitian creole: how to build and ship an MT engine from scratch in 4 days, 17 Crisis
hours, & 30 minutes”, Proceedings of the 14th Annual Conference of the European Association translation
for Machine Translation (EAMT 2010), available at: www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/EAMT-05.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Lewis, W.D., Munro, R. and Vogel, S. (2011), “Crisis MT: developing a cookbook for MT in
crisis situations”, Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Statistical Machine Translation,
Edinburgh, 30-31 July, available at: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2132960.2133030 (accessed
21 November 2018). 141
Marlowe, J. and Bogen, R. (2015), “Young people from refugee backgrounds as a resource for
disaster risk reduction”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Vol. 14, pp. 125-131,
available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.06.013
Melandri, E., Carbonari, L. and Ricci, A. (2014), La qualifica del mediatore interculturale. Contributi per il
suo inserimento nel futuro sistema nazione di certificazione delle competenze, ISFOL, Rome.
Mercer, J., Gaillard, J.-C., Crowley, K., Shannon, R., Alexander, B., Day, S. and Becker, J. (2012), “Culture
and disaster risk reduction: lessons and opportunities”, Environmental Hazards, Vol. 11 No. 2,
pp. 74-95.
MICIC (2016), Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster,
MICIC, Geneva, available at: https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/default/files/document/micic_
guidelines_english_web_13_09_2016.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Moser-Mercer, B., Kherbiche, L. and Class, B. (2014), “Interpreting conflict: training challenges in
humanitarian field interpreting”, Journal of Human Rights Practice, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 140-158.
Mowbray, J. (2017), “Translation as marginalisation? International law, translation and the status of
linguistic minorities”, in González Núñez, G. and Meylaerts, R. (Eds), Translation and Public
Policy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Case Studies, Routledge, New York, NY, pp. 32-57.
Mulder, F., Ferguson, J., Groenewegen, P., Boersma, K. and Wolbers, J. (2016), “Questioning big data:
crowdsourcing crisis data towards an inclusive humanitarian response”, Big Data and Society,
Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 1-13.
New Zealand Government (2013), “Including culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD)
communities”, available at: www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/is-12-13-
including-cald-communities.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
NHS England (2015), “Emergency preparedness, resilience and response framework”, available at:
www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/eprr/ (accessed 21 November 2018).
O’Brien, S. (2016), “Training translators for crisis communication: translators without borders as an
example”, in Federici, F.M. (Ed.), Mediating Emergencies and Conflicts. Frontline Translating and
Interpreting, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, pp. 85-111.
O’Brien, S. (2019), “Translation technology and disaster management”, in O’Hagan, M. (Ed.), The
Routledge Handbook of Translation Technology, Routledge, New York, NY, pp. 304-318.
O’Brien, S. and Cadwell, P. (2017), “Translation facilitates comprehension of health-related crisis
information: Kenya as an example”, Journal of Specialised Translation, Vol. 28, pp. 23-51,
available at: www.jostrans.org/issue28/art_obrien.pdf (accessed 29 June 2019).
O’Brien, S., Federici, F.M., Cadwell, P., Marlowe, J. and Gerber, B. (2018), “Language translation during
disaster: a comparative analysis of five national approaches”, International Journal of Disaster
Risk Reduction, Vol. 31, pp. 627-636, available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.07.006
Pescaroli, G. and Alexander, D.E. (2015), “A definition of cascading disasters and cascading effects:
going beyond the ‘toppling dominos’ metaphor”, Planet @ Risk, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 58-67,
available at: https://planet-risk.org/index.php/pr/article/view/208
Puthoopparambil, S.J. and Parente, P. (2018), “Report on the health of refugees and migrants in the
WHO European region: no public health without refugee and migrant health (2018)”, WHO
Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen and Geneva, available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/handle/10665/311347/9789289053846-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&ua=1
(accessed 26 June 2019).
DPM Reynolds, B. and Seeger, M.W. (2014), Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication, Centers for Disease
29,2 Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, available at: https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/resources/pdf/
cerc_2014edition.pdf (accessed 26 June 2019).
Santos-Hernández, J.M. and Hearn Morrow, B. (2013), “Language and literacy”, in Thomas, D.S.K.,
Phillips, B.D., Lovekamp, W.E. and Fothergill, A. (Eds), Social Vulnerability to Disasters, 2nd ed.,
CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL and New York, NY, pp. 265-280.
142 Schwarz, A., Seeger, M.W. and Auer, C. (2016), “Significance and structure of international risk and
crisis communication research – toward an integrative approach”, in Schwarz, A., Seeger, M.W.
and Auer, C. (Eds), The Handbook of International Crisis Communication Research, John Wiley
and Sons, Oxford and Malden, MA, pp. 1-10.
Seeger, M.W. (2006), “Best practices in crisis communication: an expert panel process”, Journal of
Applied Communication Research, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 232-244.
Shackleton, J. (2018), “Preparedness in diverse communities: citizen translation for community
engagement”, paper presented at the Understanding Risk, Risk Reduction, Consequences and
Forecasting Track. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Wellington, available at:
http://idl.iscram.or g/files/jamieshackleton/2018/1655_JamieShackleton2018.pdf (accessed
26 June 2019).
Shaw, R. (Ed.) (2012), Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction, Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley.
Shi, P. and Kasperson, R. (Eds) (2015), World Atlas of Natural Disaster Risk, Springer, Heidelberg.
Strayhorn, T., Dasmohapatra, S., Tilotta, D. and Mitchell, P. (2012), “Effectiveness of educational tools
for hurricane resilience in homes”, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International
Journal, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 433-444, available at: https://doi.org/10.1108/09653561211256143
Tabatabaei, F., Nasserzadeh, S.M.R., Yates, S., Akhgar, B., Lockley, E. and Fortune, D. (2013), “From
local to global: community-based policing and national security”, in Akhgar, B. and Yates, S.
(Eds), Strategic Intelligence Management, Butterworth-Heinemann, Amsterdam, pp. 85-92.
Taibi, M. (2011), “Public service translation”, in Malmkjær, K. and Windle, K. (Eds), The Oxford Handbook
of Translation Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, NY, pp. 214-227.
Taibi, M. and Ozolins, U. (2016), “Community translation: definitions, characteristics and status quo”,
in Taibi, M. and Ozolins, U. (Eds), Community Translation, Bloomsbury Academic, London,
pp. 7-28.
The Sphere Project (2011), Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response,
2nd ed., The Sphere Project, London and Washington, DC.
The Sphere Project (2018), The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards
Disaster Response, 3rd ed., The Sphere Project, London and Washington, DC.
Thomas, D.S.K., Phillips, B.D., Lovekamp, W.E. and Fothergill, A. (Eds) (2013), Social Vulnerability to
Disasters, 2nd ed., CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
UNDAC (2018), United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Field Handbook, 7th ed.,
UNOCHA, Geneva, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/un-disaster-assessment-and-
coordination-undac-field-handbook-7th-edition-2018 (accessed 26 June 2019).
UNHCR (2018), “Policy on age, gender, and diversity”, UNHCRlHCP/2018/1, available at: www.unhcr.
org/5aa13c0c7.pdf#zoom=95 (accessed 21 November 2018).
UNISDR (2015), “Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction 2015–2030”, available at: www.unisdr.
org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
Wall, I. and Chery, Y.G. (2011), “Ann Kite Yo Pale: let them speak: best practice and lessons
learned in communication with disaster affected communities: Haiti 2010”, available at:
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IAA_Haiti_2010_0.pdf (accessed
21 November 2018).
Waugh, W. (2007), “Local emergency management in the post-9/11 world”, in Waugh, W. and Tierney, K.
(Eds), Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government, ICMA Press,
Washington, DC, pp. 11-23.
White, P., Pelling, M., Sen, K., Seddon, D., Russell, S. and Few, R. (2005), Disaster Risk Reduction: A Crisis
Development Concern, DfID, London, available at: www.preventionweb.net/files/1070_ translation
drrscopingstudy.pdf (accessed 21 November 2018).
WHO (2012), “Toolkit for assessing health-system capacity for crisis management – part 1. User
manual”, available at: www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/157886/e96187.pdf
(accessed 21 November 2018).
WMO (2018), Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems: A Checklist, UN World Meteorological
Organization, Geneva.
143

Further reading
Coombs, W.T. (2004), “Impact of past crises on current crisis communication: insights from
situational crisis communication theory”, The Journal of Business Communication, Vol. 41 No. 3,
pp. 265-289.
Crouse Quinn, S. (2008), “Crisis and emergency risk communication in a pandemic: a model for
building capacity and resilience of minority communities”, Health Promotion Practice, Vol. 9
No. 4, pp. 18S-25S.
Reynolds, B. and Seeger, M.W. (2005), “Crisis and emergency risk communication as an integrative
model”, Journal of Health Communication, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 43-55.
Steelman, T.A. and McCaffrey, S. (2013), “Best practices in risk and crisis communication: implications
for natural hazards management”, Natural Hazards, Vol. 65 No. 1, pp. 683-705.

Corresponding author
Sharon O’Brien can be contacted at: sharon.obrien@dcu.ie

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
 The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

DPM
29,2 The role of translators and
interpreters in cascading
crises and disasters
144 Towards a framework for
Received 9 December 2018 confronting the challenges
Revised 2 May 2019
9 July 2019
Accepted 9 July 2019
David E. Alexander and Gianluca Pescaroli
Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London, London, UK

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explain the significance of cascading crises for translators and
interpreters, and how their work may be affected by such events. It provides a theoretical basis for analysis
and field practice.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors define cascades and explain how they influence the
development of preparedness, mitigation and response. The authors identify key drivers of cascading
crises and discuss how they challenge conventional approaches to emergency management. The authors
discuss ways in which use of language could be a key factor in crisis escalation. The authors define
priorities and operational challenges of cascading crises for translators and interpreters. In terms of
methodology, this paper develops a conceptual framework that can be used for future enquiry and case
history analysis.
Findings – The authors provide a qualitative description and synthesis of the key instructions to be used in
the field. The authors offer a short list of key questions that can be referred to by linguists and scholars. The
authors identify situations in which translation and interpretation are important ingredients in the success of
emergency preparedness and response efforts. These include multilingual populations, migrant crises,
international humanitarian deployment and emergency communication during infrastructure failures.
Research limitations/implications – This work has academic value for the process of understanding
cascades and practical relevance in terms of how to deal with them.
Practical implications – Translators and interpreters need to understand cascading crises in order to be
prepared for the challenges that such events will present.
Social implications – Society has become more complex and interconnected, with non-linear cascading
escalation of secondary emergencies. Emergency planners and responders need to address this in new ways.
Effective communication and information strategies are essential to the mitigation of cascading disaster risk.
Originality/value – The study of cascading crises from a socio-economic point of view is relatively new, but
it is important because society is increasingly dependent on networks that can propagate failure of
information supply.
Keywords Information, Communication, Disasters, Interpretation, Translation, Cascading crises
Paper type Conceptual paper

Disaster Prevention and
Management
Vol. 29 No. 2, 2020
pp. 144-156
© Emerald Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/DPM-12-2018-0382
Introduction
On 27 March 1977, two fully-laden Boeing 747 aircraft collided on the runway at Tenerife
North Airport. In this, the deadliest accident in civil aviation history, 583 people were killed
and only 61 survived (Weick, 1990). At Milan’s Linate Airport on 8 October 2001, a light
aircraft strayed onto the active runway and was struck by a departing flight. All 114 people
on board the aircraft died, as did 4 people on the ground (Catino, 2010). Both of these
disasters were caused by verbal misunderstandings. At Tenerife, the captain of KLM flight
4805 wrongly believed that he had clearance for take-off. At Milan, the pilot of the light
aircraft mistook his position and communicated it wrongly to the control tower. In each case,
there were issues with safety mechanisms: at Tenerife, lax procedures for the use of the
active runway; at Milan, absence of ground radar. Nevertheless, these two disasters
graphically illustrate the essential role of language in risk and safety.
 In the so-called information age, much effort has been devoted to the physical The role of
mechanisms of communication but, remarkably, much less attention has been given to the translators and
use of language and issues of comprehension in crisis situations. In a world in which more interpreters
than 5,000 languages are spoken, there is an obvious need to ensure that emergency
messages are understood so that they can be acted upon (Netten and van Someren, 2011).
This is particularly true with regard to the high complexity of networked organisations and
societal functions that are the backbone of the global interconnected systems. 145
It is not only necessary to consider the physical functions needed to maintain and
develop operational capacity, but in order to facilitate adaptation and recovery processes
the resilience of the system as a whole must be taken into account (Linkov et al., 2014). The
information, cognitive and social domains are essential components of this process,
including the practical matters of learning, sharing knowledge, finding the locus of meaning
and making sense of information. This will help people to take action in response to stimuli
from early warning sensors and other sources (Linkov et al., 2013). Despite a prevailing lack
of concern for language and translation in emergency planning, they are an essential part of
the core of the human determinants of impact and remedy (Alexander, 2000).
The ideas held by people and groups evolve in their developing social and environmental
contexts. Evolution embraces the construction of the self, the socialisation of knowledge in
the family, and the ways in which people make sense of information (Bateson, 1972). Social
models and contexts are dynamic over time. They incorporate individual and collective
forms of symbolism that people endow with meaning. Thus, linguistic and functional
representations are key means of understanding events (Alexander, 2005). Cannon (2008)
noted that the social construction of disasters takes different forms. These are associated
with power relations, but they also stem from psychological phenomena that motivate the
beliefs and behaviours of groups. Here, language is a crucial means of understanding the
perspectives of the members of social groups.
This paper explores the potential or actual role of translation in cascading disasters and
crises. First, we describe the nature of cascades. Second, we highlight the role of culture,
language and interpretation as cross-cutting elements in the escalation of crises. Third, we
suggest how translation can act as a possible driver of cascades. Finally, we provide a
summary and checklist that could be used by researchers and practitioners to resolve
problems associated with the use of language in disasters.

Cascading disasters
In the modern, networked world, most disasters will to a greater or lesser extent be
cascading crises (Helbing, 2013). In high-risk technological systems, a certain degree of
multiple and non-linear failure must be anticipated because of their great complexity, the
tight coupling of their components, and intricacy of the chain of causes and effects. Strong
interdependencies in technological systems imply that disturbances may spread rapidly
between the elements that cause cascading impacts. They may scale up to the point at which
they are unstoppable (Perrow, 1999). Cascades have several distinguishing elements.
A cascading disaster or crisis is an event in which an initial physical trigger sets off a series
of linked consequences, perhaps through a network. Rather than simple linear progress, a
“top event” arises from a series of connected errors or failures that, through a variety of
possible paths, creates the conditions for a greater malfunction with more devastating
consequences (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2015).
During the propagation of the cascading impact, interactions among different forms of
vulnerability can give rise to escalation points, in which consequences are amplified,
conceivably to the point at which the escalation has a more profound impact than the
original trigger event. Figure 1 shows that cascades are the manifestations of vulnerabilities
accumulated at different scales (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). In the top part,
DPM
Long/Slow
29,2 Environmental triggers (if any)

y
ilit Socio-Technological systems
rab
lne ps (macro level: e.g. globalization,
Vu loo
technologies, development)

146
Socio-Technological systems
y
ilit (local/regional level: e.g.
rab
lne ops
Time

u
V lo
culture, institutions, policies)

h CAS and Critical Infrastructure

Hig

re
su
po
Ex
Short/Fast

w
Figure 1. Lo Impact and feedback
Vulnerability paths of
cascading disasters, Limited
scale interactions and Space

escalations in time Diffused

and space
Source: Pescaroli and Alexander (2016, p. 183; reprinted with permission)

environmental triggers are associated with compounding and interacting risks, such as
concurrent extreme climatic events (e.g. storms and floods). Below are the different levels of
socio-technological systems, from globalisation to local culture, with the incorporation of
information and communication. The base of the diagram is distinguished by two elements:
(1) Critical infrastructure involves “the physical structures, facilities, networks and
other assets which provide services that are essential to the social and economic
functioning of a community or society” (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 12).
(2) Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are intricate, interconnected phenomena, such as
social networks, that interact dynamically and evolve in mutual ways (Lansing,
2003). In all processes, information flow and communication must be maintained
across the interconnected systems. Some elements of CAS are associated with
linguistics, such as understanding how people learn, employ and teach languages
(Cameron and Larsen-Freeman, 2007). Intergovernmental crisis management can be
framed in terms of CAS (Comfort, 2007).
The increasing sophistication of modern life has induced an ever stronger dependency upon
critical infrastructure. This has naturally generated a corresponding need to understand
complex systems better. Different methods are used in this, including linear and networked
multi-hazard risk assessment (Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2018). Cascading disasters are often
propagated through inefficiencies and failures, which have knock-on effects in terms of risks
to human safety, interruptions to normal routines, and challenges in emergency
management. The more interconnections there are, the more rapidly and substantially
cascading risk builds up. This emphasises the need to understand vulnerability, which is the
central element of the root causes of disaster. It shows how dangerous it is to assess and
manage impacts on the basis of weak background knowledge (Pescaroli and Alexander,
2018). Vulnerability is defined here as “those conditions determined by physical, social,
economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an
individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards” (UN General
Assembly, 2016, p. 24).
 In order to plan for and anticipate emergencies, there is a pressing need to develop The role of
scenarios for cascading failures and complex events. For example, using a scenario-building translators and
process that involves local stakeholders, the cascading effects of hydrological droughts interpreters
have been explored in the social, economic and environmental domains, including, for
example, the effects of groundwater depletion and salinization of aquifers (Parisi et al., 2018).
The managers and engineers who run critical infrastructure and their academic
counterparts have long studied such conditions in terms of how to prevent or limit the 147
propagation of failure. The disruption of critical infrastructure could propagate cascading
effects across different scales. This should stimulate us to map and make local assessments
of both vulnerability and resilience (Serre and Heinzlef, 2018). Hence, in the conclusions to
this paper, we pose some questions about language that we have developed as suggestions
for an agenda to extend, improve and clarify our understanding of cascading phenomena.
However, much more needs to be done to study the social and economic consequences of
cascading failures. Escalation also deserves more attention in the organisational dimensions
of management (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018). Such is the complexity of modern society
that all disasters of any significant size are likely to have cascading consequences.
The practice of emergency management often assumes a simple cause-and-effect
relationship between an extreme event and its consequences. Instead, there will be a chain of
potential outcomes with factors that directly compromise safety, systems, assets and activities.
This can allow further consequences to proliferate in society. For example, prolonged, wide-
area power failure is one of the most serious risks in the field of cascading disasters. Electrical
power drives almost all mass communication. It is also vital to all other sectors of critical
infrastructure, from water and sewerage (electrically pumped) to food supply (refrigeration)
and banking (electronic transactions). The possible consequences of power failure include
traffic chaos and a surge in accidents, food toxicity and gastric illnesses, entrapment (in
elevators and tunnels), inability to make essential purchases via electronic transactions, and
dependency upon diesel generators that may fail through overloading or shortage of fuel.
Without the benefit of an electricity supply, mass communication in any language with any
person or group is rendered very difficult. The practical and psychosocial effects of a
prolonged blackout would be experienced at the local scale by individuals, households and
communities. Like other changes in the availability of resources there would inevitably be
changes in behaviour, and perhaps these would be radical (Miller and Pescaroli, 2018).

Translation, culture and interpretation

Communication is the primary means of stimulating action in disaster and crisis
management. Timely and effective conveyance of information between stakeholders is
essential to mitigation, preparedness and response (Lindell et al., 2007). The increased
diversity that characterises global society has strong implications for this process. In fact,
there is a pressing need to increase access to information by people from diverse cultures
who use different languages (O’Brien et al., 2018). Linguistic challenges include issues of
translation and interpretation. They also involve cultural drivers that must be understood in
order to reduce vulnerability to disaster risk (Kelman, 2018). For example, given that
language and vocabulary are constructs that are continuously developed, adjusted and
interpreted, definitions and instruction are interpreted through cultural lenses. In situations
of conflict, language is the main vehicle of communication and mediation. This highlights
the need for trained interpreters who understand organisational structures and particular
cultures (Moser-Mercer et al., 2014; Salama-Carr, 2018). The need for linguistic mediation has
developed strongly in recent decades, but in the scholarly literature the study of translation
and interpretation for emergencies is only now beginning to receive significant attention
(Federici, 2016; Cadwell and O’Brien, 2016). Nevertheless, it is possible to find examples of
the most critical challenges that arise in complex crises.
DPM Despite the dearth of research, the relevance of translation to disaster studies has been
29,2 recognised for a long time. For example, in Cameroon in 1986, the Lake Nyos volcanic gas
disaster, which killed approximately 1,700 people, highlighted how important it is to make
risk assessments by taking into account local culture and knowledge. In reporting the event
it emerged that local languages used the same word for smell and taste. They also used a
word which translates into English as “red” for all colours except black and white.
148 Communication between risk managers (plus disaster researchers) and the local population
took place in Pidgin English, which initially failed to uncover such details, yet they were
vital to the identification of a lethal hazard (Freeth, 1993). Moreover, on a practical level, it is
clear that if first responders do not share the same language or culture as the affected
population, they are liable to miss out on indigenous knowledge and experience (Bolton and
Weiss, 2001). Problems that could arise in complex situations include the existence of words
that are not directly translatable, incompatibility of concepts, and existence of social
barriers. This is particularly true when giving training and assistance to local populations
in, for instance, psychosocial support. Experience after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in
Sri Lanka showed that translation is an essential means of conveying ideas and concepts.
In this disaster, at the local level translators required context-specific training, ideally with
the aid of complementary tools such as role-playing and simulation (Miller, 2006).
The importance of translation is particularly clear in the health sector. O’Brien and
Cadwell (2017) analysed health-related crisis communication in urban Kenya and
highlighted the importance of translating information from English into Kiswahili.
Similarly, in the USA, it has been demonstrated that limited language proficiency is directly
associated with increased vulnerability, highlighting the need for both communication and a
relational strategy in order to service the full range of the population (Kreisberg et al., 2016).
During patient assessment and the communication of diagnoses, translation can involve
technical challenges (Solet et al., 2005). As research is evolving, local authorities are now
more aware of the importance of translation in crisis situations. For example, after the
Canterbury earthquakes of 2010–2011 in New Zealand, Christchurch City Council learned
that resources and information need to be translated in ways that target specific
communities, both in terms of content (including cultural and religious elements) and the
practical aspects of where to distribute material in order to convey it to the right users. If
information needs constantly to be renewed, the translated version should be amended
along with the original source. Homepages and websites need to be updated and endowed
with fully searchable keywords in all relevant languages. Finally, when key information is
distributed to individuals, translated print material is preferable to monolingual telephone
or online services (Christchurch City Council, 2012).
Approaches to disaster response at the national level still tend to be fragmented. They
seldom formally address the question of how best to translate and disseminate information
(O’Brien et al., 2018). This presents multiple challenges. It highlights the need to produce
dynamic policies and guidelines. In this context, some key principles have been suggested
as a common baseline for progress. For instance, protocols and services should be available.
They should be accessible on multiple platforms and in different languages. Messages
should be culturally acceptable to their audiences. Services and platforms should be
adaptable to multiple and complex scenarios (O’Brien et al., 2018). This last principle may
be particularly important in addressing the escalation of cascading crises, as explained in
the next section.

Drivers of cascading disasters: translation as a mediator of vulnerability

through information flows
The root causes of disasters reside in the negative characteristics of society, such as
poverty, lack of equity, marginalisation and corruption (Alexander, 2000). They also lie in
political decisions that direct resources to matters other than disaster risk reduction. The role of
According to the “pressure and release” model of Wisner et al. (2004), the root causes translators and
combine with dynamic pressures, such as rapid urbanisation and crippling debt, to act upon interpreters
unsafe conditions, which include vulnerability, to produce disasters when they are triggered
by hazard impacts. In cascades, the specific vulnerabilities and pressures that need to be
identified are those that could lead to the rapid escalation of a crisis by generating
secondary emergencies. These will have physical, socio-economic and information-related 149
dimensions, including the ways in which information and disinformation influence decision
making (Helbing, 2013). In the absence of adequate planning and preparedness for disaster,
cascading events are likely to concentrate their effects in three parallel ways, as follows
(Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016, 2018):
(1) The weakest members of society (those who are least able to defend themselves) are
at greatest risk, as they suffer disproportionately from the amplification of
vulnerability. By and large, the most robust societies are those that are most
cohesive, least divisive, most equal, most participatory, most democratic and least
troubled by conflict and corruption (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). In such
societies, language is not used as an instrument of separatism, protest and conflict.
(2) When assets are forced out of service by disaster impact and concomitant lack of
preparedness, information flows and mitigation capacities are reduced (Kachali et al.,
2018). For example, an increasing number of requests for intervention by the
emergency services could be limited by critical infrastructure losses, such as
electricity blackouts, which will affect both communication among crisis managers
and communication with the population (Hempel et al., 2018).
(3) Physical interaction between elements of the built environment determines
physical losses that affect vital services (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2015; Serre and
Heinzlef, 2018).
At first reading, it seems unlikely that physical interactions between assets could be
influenced by translation issues. However, by influencing vulnerability and information
flows, the latter could have a critical impact on the resolution or amplification of emergency
situations. Although hazards can be the triggers of disasters, root causes are generally
found in the human domain, in which elements such local culture and environment interact
and mutually reinforce each other (Hewitt, 1983). Vulnerability is a social construct. It is
associated with political, cultural and historical processes, and it implies that individuals
and groups of people have different degrees of access to power, resources and expertise
(Wisner et al., 2004). One way to reduce vulnerability is to stimulate those capacities that are
used to cope with crises and disasters. Many of these are traditional or indigenous coping
mechanisms (Wisner et al., 2012). Before they are officially promoted, they need to be
evaluated in terms of their efficacy.
For localities at risk, the pattern of vulnerability reflects a mixture of historical factors
and present-day realities. It reflects the propensity of people, businesses and assets to
suffer harm and the degree to which people are able to mobilise resources to buffer
impacts and recover from them. Diversity in community groups increases the complexity
of communication. It requires a communication strategy that takes account of the beliefs,
needs and goals of particular social groups (Paton and Johnston, 2001). In this context,
translation can convey precise messages that address the needs of marginalised
individuals or communities, such as ethnic minorities or non-native elderly people
(Alexander, 2000). Thus, translation and interpretation are essential means of ensuring
that appropriate risk communication takes place with such communities. A population
that lacks proficiency in the dominant language is particularly vulnerable if it fails to
DPM understand directives and warnings (Shiu-Thornton et al., 2007; Vihalemm et al., 2012).
29,2 Lindell et al. (2007) suggested that there are cases in which the fragmentation of local
communities is so great that it requires the translation of emergency information into all
the languages that are spoken in the affected area. In addition, elderly people may have
physical or mental limitations that restrict their ability to absorb information. Indeed,
vulnerabilities are easily reflected in people’s state of health (Thomas et al., 2013), but not
150 so easily in their ability to express their needs to others. Unless it is presented to people in
a manner that they can readily absorb, the ability to communicate safety measures,
evacuation protocols or other matters of public security is likely to vary with the cognitive
capacity of the people who receive the information.
For information to flow, constant communication must be maintained between the various
parts of CAS. This may also stimulate capacity to adapt and be resilient (Lansing, 2003;
Cameron and Larsen-Freeman, 2007; Linkov et al., 2013). Paradoxically, in modern society,
information and communication are important root causes of instability, as decisions are derived
from flows that are increasingly complex, ambiguous and uncertain (Helbing, 2013). Information
flows control aspects of all phases of the “disaster cycle”: prevention, mitigation, emergency
response, recovery and reconstruction. First, at the operational level, developing adequate
communication and information sharing is an essential means of maintaining the capacity to
organise response, deliver relief and train responders (Lindell et al., 2007). Second, by influencing
positively the behaviour of groups and families who depend on local resources, effective
information supply fosters resilience in individuals and communities (Miller and Pescaroli, 2018).
Recognition of emerging risks and use the flux of information to take action are essential
and dynamic means of understanding and managing crises (Comfort, 2007). They influence
all catastrophe-related activities, including strategic policy making and diplomacy (Kelman,
2016). Preparedness for cascading effects triggered by critical infrastructure failures
requires the development of scenarios in which different stakeholders understand their roles
and share information outside their particular spheres of action (Kachali et al., 2018).
Limiting the exchange of information, or conversely suffering information overload, can
negatively affect crisis managers, who may then be unable to identify the path of an
escalation process (Hempel et al., 2018). Here, translation is an essential means of developing
timely and coordinated actions in cross-border crises, both between different agencies (e.g.
international deployment in affected areas) and between agencies and citizens (e.g. delivery
of international relief in these places). The failure to maintain a functioning information
supply could cause operational failure and escalation to a secondary emergency, in which,
due to shortage of emergency resources, collaboration would be needed even more.
These drivers are particularly evident in some phenomena associated with the network
of interdependencies that is the global interconnected system. Here, by addressing
vulnerabilities and maintaining an effective flow of information, translators and interpreters
can be seen as agents of mitigation.
One field that requires translators and interpreters with increasing urgency is human
mobility. Migration can be voluntary, induced or forced. It can be temporary,
semi-permanent or permanent, although the long-term outcome is often not known in
advance. It can lead to permanent residency abroad, the acquisition of a new nationality, or
to statelessness. Human mobility is thus an extremely complex phenomenon that is
intimately bound up with such contentious issues as welfare, entitlement, sovereignty and
identity (IoM, 2018). The largest migrations are the desperate result of proxy wars fought
between the dominant powers in third-country locations such as Syria and Yemen. Conflicts
of this kind can be very long drawn out, as shown by the 27-year civil war in Angola and
half a century of low-level asymmetric warfare in Colombia.
Given the tendency of migrants to establish themselves where there are economic and
social opportunities, modern cities thus become polyglot agglomerations. For example, in
London, England, 300 languages are spoken daily. In the London Borough of Lambeth, 142 The role of
mother tongues have been identified among the resident population (Demie and Strand, translators and
2006). One consequence of this is that the flow of remittances to countries such as Haiti, the interpreters
Philippines and Nepal intensifies when there are disasters. Working in Los Angeles County,
USA, Lindell et al. (2007) observed that about 100 major languages or dialects were in daily
use in the urban areas, which resulted in increased diversity of culture and languages
associated with particular communities such as the Hispanic ones. Nepal et al. (2012) found 151
that linguistically isolated populations in the USA need information that is culturally and
linguistically appropriate. It must reflect the context of their knowledge and awareness.
Because awareness of such needs is inadequate among emergency planners and managers,
word of mouth is the preferred source of information for these populations, and it tends to be
inadequate. The problem is somewhat mitigated by bilingualism and language brokering
from family members and peer groups. Those in the community who are fluent in English
tend to be leaders. However, linguistic isolation remains a problem that is not being tackled
adequately in terms of a fair sharing of emergency preparedness.
The presence of populations that have limited access to the messages of emergency
response increases the barriers to effective first response, for example, by increasing health
disparities (Shiu-Thornton et al., 2007). Migrants may have limited reading skills, which
highlights the need for simple and accessible translation in line with their cultural and
religious backgrounds (Herrick and Morrison, 2010). A relationship of involvement and trust
with the vulnerable and marginalised communities becomes an essential asset to the
planning process (Herrick and Morrison, 2010; Christchurch City Council, 2012).
Another example refers to the failure of international networks and the need for crisis
managers to deal with vulnerabilities that suddenly emerge. In April 2010, ash emissions from
the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull led to six and a half days in which civil
aviation was grounded at 70 per cent of Europe’s airports. The resulting cost to the airlines was
$1.7bn. If the “ground-stop” had continued much longer, faced with unsustainable losses, many
of Europe’s airlines would have been threatened with becoming unviable as commercial
undertakings (Alexander, 2013). The chain of disruption had complex negative effects upon
business travel, the movement of perishable goods and a variety of cultural enterprises
(Pescaroli and Alexander, 2015). In this case, translation acquired an important role in the
cross-coordination of governmental agencies. It becomes an essential means of assisting
vulnerable categories such as stranded tourists and providing them with the information they
need in order to plan alternative actions. Translation also saved lives among indigenous people
when threatened with the eruption of Nevado del Huila in Mexico (García and Mendez-Fajury,
2018, p. 342). Moreover, translation crosses the boundary between the public and private sectors.
It is also essential for companies that have to find a new strategy to deliver products and
services during a wide-area emergency ( Jensen, 2011, p. 69; Martin, 2011, p. 91).
One of the greatest demonstrations that we live in a networked society lies in the fact that
portable computing by tablet, telephone and laptop computer has brought social media and
instantaneous communication to the mass of the population. As used in disasters, social media
have a positive and a negative side (Vultee et al., 2014). They can help crowd-source information
and resources. They can disseminate warnings and safety information. They provide citizen
journalism and instant awareness, and they can bring people together in solidarity. Yet they
have a dark side. In any particular crisis situation, the spread of rumour, defamation, false
information and unchecked speculation could conceivably outweigh the benefits of instant mass
communication. This is a duality that was first recognised decades ago:
Close inspection of technological development reveals that technology leads a double life, one which
conforms to the intentions of designers and interests of power and another which contradicts
them – proceeding behind the backs of their architects to yield unintended consequences and
unanticipated possibilities. (Noble, 1984, p. 325, quoted by Quarantelli, 1997, p. 96)
DPM In managing emergencies, precision and clarity of language are essential if
29,2 misunderstandings are to be avoided, and that is as true in translation as it is in
mono-linguistic situations. The precarious and dynamic nature of disasters means that
uncertainty is inevitable, but it should not be compounded by ambiguous orders and unclear
instructions. In planning for resilience, it is necessary to work out the level of dependency on
services that might fail, assets that might stop functioning and goods that might become
152 unobtainable. For the most part, losses will be a direct function of the duration of the “down
time”, taking account of any actions designed to mitigate, prevent or offset the losses during
the crisis phase. Although not all losses are preventable, failure to anticipate the need for
action and plan accordingly greatly increases the chance of high magnitude losses.
Communication is a vital means of reducing down time.

Conclusions
Our globalised society’s networks and their interdependencies rely heavily on
communication and languages. In a complex adaptive socio-technical system, disruptions
can easily escalate to become cascading crises. During attempts to remedy such situations,
translation can constitute a serious bottleneck. Indeed, if misunderstandings result and they
have serious consequences, it contributes to the escalation of secondary emergencies.
Lack of adequate translation may amplify the impact of crises on marginalised
communities, non-native speakers and international tourists. For example, a primary
trigger, such as flooding, could become more lethal by causing contamination due to the
disruption of sewer systems or chemical facilities. This may be limited in its extent, but it
could require the adoption of safety measures or access to specialised services. In an area
with a concentration of marginalised people, such as an urban area full of recent
immigrants, lack of adequate translation and cultural mediation could result in failing
adequately to explain the characteristics of the risk, its seriousness and the measures
required, with possible long-lasting effects upon population health (Hernandez et al., 2015).
Disruption of information flows could hamper the delivery of effective emergency services.
For example, translation could be critical to the management of cross-border crises, where
differences in the local operational culture and language could cause early warnings or logistics
to fail. This could be particularly important for areas that are not used to international
cooperation, and those in which civil protection lacks adequate collaboration (Coppola, 2015).
As explained in previous sections, due to the complexity of phenomena such as
migration or infrastructure operation, the drivers of cascading failures can recombine.
Figure 2 syntheses this process and visualises the possible role of translation, including
cultural mediation, in addressing cascading drivers and the escalation of secondary crises
(the yellow boxes).

Trigger event

Figure 2. Information
Vulnerability
Cascading drivers that flow
mediate translation,
and possible
escalations of
secondary Translation
emergencies (yellow
boxes)
The following short list of key questions about the practice of translation in cascading The role of
events is derived from the work of Herrick and Morrison (2010), to which we have applied translators and
the four principles suggested by O’Brien et al. (2018). Most of the questions should be interpreters
addressed during the planning phase. In order to derive a list that is suitable for action at the
local level, the questions should be addressed in scenarios created with the assistance of
local authorities:
• What key information should be available and accessible for the most common 153
disaster risks in the area of action (e.g. through local risk registers)?
• What is the principal terminology that needs to be used in information and messages
(e.g. for warnings) and how can it be expressed neutrally, economically and clearly?
• How is the local context of language unique and how can it be used to improve the
quality of explanations?
• In defining messages, are the categories of vulnerable citizens considered, such as the
elderly and people with disabilities?
• Given the nature of the target population, what are the key dissemination tools that
need to be considered? Are they equally effective in both natural hazard impacts and
technological failures such as electricity blackouts?
• How good are local emergency services at communicating with communities that
are less proficient in local languages and is there a risk that the information flow will
be compromised?
This paper cannot provide an exhaustive review and this list of questions must therefore
be considered preliminary. Further research is needed in order better to understand how
cascading drivers can be mediated by translation. Quantitative and qualitative evidence
on the subject need to be developed further. Moreover, our work is limited by the lack of
literature, in particular on the role and function of language in complex crises and on how
to apply knowledge about translation to different kinds of cascading crisis. We propose a
first application of different concepts in a common framework, which needs to be
developed further and tested. Hopefully, as awareness of the role of translation in disaster
management increases, this research will expand and, during its application, more
questions will be answered.

References
Alexander, D. (2000), Confronting Catastrophe, Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Alexander, D. (2005), “An interpretation of disaster in terms of changes in culture, society and
international relations”, in Perry, R.W. and Quarantelli, E.L. (Eds), What is a Disaster?,
Routledge, New York, NY, pp. 89-108.
Alexander, D. (2013), “Volcanic ash in the atmosphere and risks for civil aviation: a study in European
crisis management”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 9-19.
Bateson, G. (1972), Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution,
and Epistemology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Bolton, P.A. and Weiss, W.M. (2001), “Communicating across cultures: improving translation to
improve complex emergency program effectiveness”, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 16
No. 4, pp. 252-256.
Cadwell, P. and O’Brien, S. (2016), “Language, culture and translation in disaster ICT: an ecosystemic
model of understanding”, Perspectives, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 557-575.
Cameron, L. and Larsen-Freeman, D. (2007), “Complex systems and applied linguistics”, International
Journal of Applied Linguistics, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 226-239.
DPM Cannon, T. (2008), “Vulnerability, ‘innocent’ disasters and the imperative of cultural understanding”,
29,2 Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 350-357.
Catino, M. (2010), “A multilevel model of accident analysis: the Linate disaster”, in Alvintzi, P. and
Eder, H. (Eds), Crisis Management, Nova Science, New York, NY, pp. 187-210.
Christchurch City Council (2012), “Best practice guidelines: engaging with culturally and linguistically
diverse (CALD) communities in times of disaster”, Final Report, Community Language
154 Information Network Group, Community Language Information Network Group, Christchurch.
Clark-Ginsberg, A., Abolhassani, L. and Rahmati, E.A. (2018), “Comparing networked and linear risk
assessments: from theory to evidence”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,
Vol. 30B, pp. 216-224.
Comfort, L.K. (2007), “Crisis management in hindsight: cognition, communication, coordination, and
control”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 67 No. S1, pp. 189-197.
Coppola, D. (2015), Introduction to International Disaster Management, 3rd ed., Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Demie, F. and Strand, S. (2006), “English language acquisition and educational attainment at the end of
secondary school”, Educational Studies, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 215-231.
Federici, F.M. (2016), “Introduction: a state of emergency for crisis communication”, in Federici, F.M.
(Ed.), Mediating Emergencies and Conflicts: Frontline Translating and Interpreting, Palgrave
Macmillan, London, pp. 1-29.
Freeth, S.J. (1993), “On the problems of translation in the investigation of the Lake Nyos disaster”,
Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, Vol. 54 Nos 3-4, pp. 353-356.
García, C. and Mendez-Fajury, R. (2018), “I understand, I am understood: experiences of volcanic risk
communication in Colombia”, in Fearnley, C.J., Bird, D.K., Haynes, K., McGuire, W.J. and Jolly, G.
(Eds), Observing the Volcano World: Volcano Crisis Communication, Springer, Cham,
pp. 335-352.
Helbing, D. (2013), “Globally networked risks and how to respond”, Nature, Vol. 497, pp. 51-59.
Hempel, L., Kraff, B.D. and Pelzer, R. (2018), “Dynamic interdependencies: problematising criticality
assessment in the light of cascading effects”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,
Vol. 30B, pp. 257-268.
Hernandez, M., Collins, T.W. and Grineski, S.E. (2015), “Immigration, mobility, and environmental
injustice: a comparative study of Hispanic people’s residential decision-making and exposure to
hazardous air pollutants in Greater Houston, Texas”, Geoforum, Vol. 60, pp. 83-94.
Herrick, R. and Morrison, A. (2010), Providing Information Services to Migrants: A Literature Review,
Department of Labour, Wellington.
Hewitt, K. (1983), Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology, Allen and
Unwin, London.
IoM (2018), “World migration report 2018”, International Organisation for Migration, Geneva.
Jensen, O.B. (2011), “Emotional eruptions, volcanic activity and global mobilities: a field account
from a European in the US during the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull”, Mobilities, Vol. 6 No. 1,
pp. 67-75.
Kachali, H., Storsjö, I., Haavisto, I. and Kovács, G. (2018), “Inter-sectoral preparedness and mitigation
for networked risks and cascading effects”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,
Vol. 30B, pp. 281-291.
Kelman, I. (2016), “Catastrophe and conflict: disaster diplomacy and its foreign policy implications”,
Brill Research Perspectives in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 1-76.
Kelman, I. (2018), “Lost for words amongst disaster risk science vocabulary?”, International Journal of
Disaster Risk Science, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 281-291.
Kreisberg, D., Thomas, D.S., Valley, M., Newell, S., Janes, E. and Little, C. (2016), “Vulnerable
populations in hospital and health care emergency preparedness planning: a comprehensive
framework for inclusion”, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 211-219.
Lansing, J.S. (2003), “Complex adaptive systems”, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 32 No. 1, The role of
pp. 183-204. translators and
Lindell, M.K., Prater, C. and Perry, R.W. (2007), Introduction to Emergency Management, interpreters
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ.
Linkov, I., Eisenberg, D.A., Bates, M.E., Chang, D., Convertino, M., Allen, J.H., Flynn, S.E. and Seager, T.P.
(2013), “Measurable resilience for actionable policy”, Environmental Science and Technology,
Vol. 47 No. 18, pp. 10108-10110. 155
Linkov, I., Bridges, T., Creutzig, F., Decker, J., Fox-lent, C., Kröger, W., Lambert, J.H., Levermann, A.,
Montreuil, B., Nathwani, J., Nyer, E., Renn, O., Scharte, B., Scheffler, A., Schreurs, M. and
Thiel-Clemen, T. (2014), “Changing the resilience paradigm”, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 4
No. 5, pp. 407-409.
Martin, D. (2011), “Eyjafjallajökull 4 33: a stillness in three parts”, Mobilities, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 86-94.
Miller, J. (2006), “Waves amidst war: intercultural challenges while training volunteers to respond to
the psychosocial needs of Sri Lankan tsunami survivors”, Brief Treatment and Crisis
Intervention, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 349-365.
Miller, J. and Pescaroli, G. (2018), “Psychosocial capacity building in response to cascading disasters:
a culturally informed approach”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Vol. 30B,
pp. 164-171.
Moser-Mercer, B., Kherbiche, L. and Class, B. (2014), “Interpreting conflict: training challenges in
humanitarian field interpreting”, Journal of Human Rights Practice, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 140-158.
Nepal, V., Banerjee, D. and Perry, M. (2012), “Disaster preparedness of linguistically isolated
populations: practical issues for planners”, Health Promotion Practice, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 265-271.
Netten, N. and van Someren, M. (2011), “Improving communication in crisis management by evaluating
the relevance of messages”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 19 No. 2,
pp. 75-85.
Noble, D. (1984), Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation, Knopf, New York, NY.
O’Brien, S. and Cadwell, P. (2017), “Translation facilitates comprehension of health-related crisis
information: Kenya as an example”, Journal of Specialised Translation, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 23-51.
O’Brien, S., Federici, F., Cadwell, P., Marlowe, J. and Gerber, B. (2018), “Language translation during
disaster: a comparative analysis of five national approaches”, International Journal of Disaster
Risk Reduction, Vol. 31, pp. 627-636.
Parisi, A., Monno, V. and Fidelibus, M.D. (2018), “Cascading vulnerability scenarios in the management
of groundwater depletion and salinization in semi-arid areas”, International Journal of Disaster
Risk Reduction, Vol. 30B, pp. 292-305.
Paton, D. and Johnston, D. (2001), “Disasters and communities: vulnerability, resilience and
preparedness”, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 270-277.
Perrow, C. (1999), Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technology, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
Pescaroli, G. and Alexander, D. (2015), “A definition of cascading disasters and cascading effects: going
beyond the ‘toppling dominos’ metaphor”, Planet@ Risk, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 58-67.
Pescaroli, G. and Alexander, D. (2016), “Critical infrastructure, panarchies and the vulnerability paths
of cascading disasters”, Natural Hazards, Vol. 82 No. 1, pp. 175-192.
Pescaroli, G. and Alexander, D. (2018), “Understanding compound, interconnected, interacting, and
cascading risks: a holistic framework”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 38 No. 11, pp. 2245-2257.
Quarantelli, E.L. (1997), “Problematical aspects of the information/communication revolution for
disaster planning and research: ten non-technical issues and questions”, Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 94-106.
Salama-Carr, M. (2018), “Mediating emergencies and conflicts: frontline translating and interpreting”,
Translation Studies, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 217-219.
DPM Serre, D. and Heinzlef, C. (2018), “Assessing and mapping urban resilience to floods with respect to
29,2 cascading effects through critical infrastructure networks”, International Journal of Disaster
Risk Reduction, Vol. 30B, pp. 235-243.
Shiu-Thornton, S., Balabis, J., Senturia, K., Tamayo, A. and Oberle, M. (2007), “Disaster preparedness
for limited English proficient communities: medical interpreters as cultural brokers and
gatekeepers”, Public Health Reports, Vol. 122 No. 4, pp. 466-471.
Solet, D.J., Norvell, J.M., Rutan, G.H. and Frankel, R.M. (2005), “Lost in translation: challenges and
156 opportunities in physician to physician communication during patient hand-offs”, Academic
Medicine, Vol. 80 No. 12, pp. 1094-1099.
Thomas, D., Shannon Newell, M. and Kreisberg, D. (2013), “Health”, in Thomas, D., Phillips, B.D.,
Lovekamp, W.E. and Fothergill, A. (Eds), Social Vulnerability to Disasters, CRC Press, Baton
Rouge, LA, pp. 235-264.
UN General Assembly (2016), “Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on
indicators and terminology relating to disaster risk reduction, A/71/644”, United Nations,
Geneva, 41pp.
Vihalemm, T., Kiisel, M. and Harro-Loit, H. (2012), “Citizens’ response patterns to warning messages”,
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 13-25.
Vultee, F., Ali, S.R., Stover, C.M. and Vultee, D.M. (2014), “Searching, sharing, acting: how audiences
assess and respond to social media messages about hazards”, International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 297-316.
Weick, K.E. (1990), “The vulnerable system: an analysis of the Tenerife air disaster”, Journal of
Management, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 571-593.
Wisner, B., Gaillard, J.-C. and Kelman, I. (2012), “Framing disaster: theories and stories seeking to
understand hazards, vulnerability and risk”, in Wisner, B., Gaillard, J.-C. and Kelman, I. (Eds),
Handbook of Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction, Routledge, London, pp. 47-62.
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. (2004), At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability
and Disasters, 2nd ed., Routledge, New York, NY.

Corresponding author
David E. Alexander can be contacted at: david.alexander@ucl.ac.uk

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
 The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

Trust, distrust
Trust, distrust and and translation
translation in a disaster in a disaster
Patrick Cadwell
SALIS, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
157
Received 28 November 2018
Abstract Revised 29 March 2019
18 June 2019
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to describe, explain and provide context for relationships between 24 June 2019
translation, trust and distrust using accounts of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake given by foreign Accepted 24 June 2019
residents who experienced the disaster.
Design/methodology/approach – This research provides a qualitative analysis of ethnographic interview
data drawn from a broader study of communication in the 2011 disaster using the cases of 28 foreign
residents of the disaster zone from 12 different countries of origin.
Findings – The study confirms the general importance, the linguistic challenges and the context dependency
of trust in disaster-related communication at the response phase. It found that translation was involved in
some trust reasoning carried out by foreign residents and that translation was an ad hoc act undertaken by
linguistically and culturally proficient acquaintances and friends.
Research limitations/implications – The research examines a limited range of trust phenomena and
research participants: only reason-based, social trust described by documented foreign residents of the 2011
disaster zone in Japan was considered. Furthermore, generalisations from the case study data should be
approached with caution.
Originality/value – This paper adds to the literature on trust and disaster response as opposed to trust and
disaster preparedness, which has already been comprehensively studied. It responds to calls for more studies
of the role of context in the understanding of trust and for greater attention to be paid in research to
relationships between trust and other phenomena.
Keywords Culture, Trust, Disaster response and recovery, Context, Distrust, Information need,
One to one interviews, Translation studies
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
This paper examines trust, distrust and translation in the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Disaster. It uses accounts of communication relating to
vulnerability, risk and uncertainty gathered from foreign residents who were in the
disaster zone in 2011 to describe, explain and provide context for relationships between
translation and trust in their experiences of responding to the disaster. Preparedness and
hazard awareness have been comprehensively studied in the literature on translation and
disaster (see, e.g. Arlikatti et al., 2007a, b, 2014; Paton, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2013; Paton et al.,
2005). Trust phenomena observed in response settings have also been examined, yet to a
lesser degree (see, e.g. Henry et al., 2011; Hyvärinen and Vos, 2016; Steelman et al., 2015).
This paper adds to the literature on trust and disaster response. Moreover, scholars have
expressed a need for more studies of the role of context – in particular, high-stakes and
safety-critical contexts – in our understanding of trust (Lyon et al., 2016; Paton, 2007) and
for greater attention to be paid in research to relationships between trust and other
phenomena (Searle et al., 2018). The research presented here offers a novel examination of

This work was supported by Dublin City University and the National Development Plan under a Daniel Disaster Prevention and
O’Hare PhD Scholarship. Fieldwork for this research was also part-funded by DCU’s School of Applied Management
Vol. 29 No. 2, 2020
Language and Intercultural Studies and Centre for Translation and Textual Studies. The author would also pp. 157-174
like to thank Prof. Richard L. Priem and Prof. Dr Antoinette Weibel for advice given at a conference in 2016 © Emerald Publishing Limited
0965-3562
to put context and participant voices at the centre of his study of trust, distrust and translation. DOI 10.1108/DPM-11-2018-0374
DPM relationships between trust, distrust and translation and embeds the relationships
29,2 observed in their social contexts.
Three questions were posed in this research:
RQ1. What accounts of trust and distrust were described by foreign residents as part of
their communicative interactions in the 2011 disaster?
RQ2. How were translational processes involved in these trust or distrust accounts, if at all?
158
RQ3. If translation processes were involved, what are the implications for crisis translation?
Before answers to these questions are presented, the objects of enquiry in this research will
be clarified, a relevant context for the 2011 disaster will be provided and the way in which
participant accounts were gathered and analysed will be described.

2. Defining and delimiting trust, distrust and translation

Trust, distrust and translation are elusive concepts. The plethora of definitions of trust that
exists has been noted (Arlikatti et al., 2007a) and the difficulty of formulating an all-
encompassing definition of translation has been asserted (Colina, 2016).
For the purposes of this study, trust and distrust have been taken to be reason-based
and context-dependent social phenomena (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010) pertaining to a
willingness or unwillingness to be vulnerable to another (see Rousseau et al., 1998 for a
widely-cited definition of trust and Sitkin and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2018 for an
understanding of distrust). Trust in people and trust in institutions are also considered
in this research. The idea that trust can be based on the “rules, roles and routines”
that constitute institutions, as well as on individual relationships between people has been
widely accepted in the literature (Möllering, 2006a, pp. 355-357). Comprehensive
definitions of trust and distrust should, therefore, recognise both institutional and
interpersonal dimensions (Khodyakov, 2007). Trust in an institution depends on
perceptions of its reliable functioning and legitimacy (Möllering, 2006a). Trust in people
depends on more symmetrical mutual interactions (Khodyakov, 2007). While institutional
and interpersonal trust are understood differently, it is frequently observed that people
are trusted or distrusted as performers or representatives of the rules, roles and routines of
an institution (Möllering, 2006a). Similarly, institutional trust can also enable or be a
barrier to the development of interpersonal trust (Khodyakov, 2007). It is also useful in
this research to subdivide interpersonal trust into thick interpersonal trust, which is based
on strong bonds of kinship, friendship, or similarity between people and thin interpersonal
trust, which is based on weaker ties with members of out-groups on whose reputation one
depends (Khodyakov, 2007).
Translation, in this research, has been understood to be a form of communication
across phases (House, 2018) in which a new text is constructed from an anterior text
through the interpretation and application of interlingual and intercultural knowledge
(Halverson, 2016). Translation mostly involves written texts (Colina, 2016). Nevertheless, a
text can be understood to be a coherent stretch of written or spoken language (see, e.g.
Carter and McCarthy, 2008) and this view of translation as something written or spoken is
adopted here.
Despite multiple perspectives being taken on trust, distrust and translation in the
literature, there is wide agreement on the importance of these concepts to disaster settings,
the challenge that language places on disaster-related communication and behaviours and
the need to pay particular attention to sources of information in a disaster.
Trust provides a vital way for social beings to deal with risk, uncertainty and
complexity (Möllering, 2006b; Nooteboom, 2002; Sztompka, 1999). Trust built through
sustained contact prior to a disaster’s onset is required for stakeholders to carry out their
roles (Auf Der Heide, 1989; Stephenson, 2005). Trust is also central to crisis Trust, distrust
communication as a management tool when people must deal with complex hazards, and translation
both among affected people and between affected people and those tasked with response in a disaster
and recovery (Curnin et al., 2015; Drabek, 2003; Eadie and Su, 2018; Wray et al., 2006;
Paton, 2008, 2013; Steelman et al., 2015).
Clear, timely, accurate and reliable information is essential for the success of
disaster-related communication (Coyle and Meier, 2009). Increasing cultural and linguistic 159
diversity across the globe intensifies the complexity of the communicative situation
and communicating appropriately is recognised as a complex process fraught with
challenges that results in significant negative impacts if not addressed (Arlikatti et al.,
2014; Henry et al., 2011; Nepal et al., 2012). Ground-breaking scholarship focusing on
interpreting in crises (Bulut and Kurultay, 2001; Moser-Mercer et al., 2014; Tipton, 2011)
and translation in crises (Federici, 2016; Federici and Cadwell, 2018; O’Brien et al.,
2018) has begun to address some of these challenges. Nevertheless, many more
questions remain to be answered. It is also worth noting that trust has been made a central
concern for scholars working to define and delimit translation as a profession (see, e.g.
Pym, 2012), to create ethical frameworks of practice for translators and interpreters
(see, e.g. Mulayim and Lai, 2017) and has been found to motivate people’s decisions
to use informal networks of family, friends and acquaintances as interpreters
(Edwards et al., 2005).
The trust and distrust in different sources of information prior to and in a disaster have
been widely examined (Arlikatti et al., 2007a, b; Paton 2008, 2013; Paton et al., 2005; Steelman
et al., 2015). It has been argued that the source of information plays a role independent of the
content of the information itself (Paton, 2007, 2008, 2013) and that the higher the trust, the
more intimate the relation between the source and the receiver of the information (Arlikatti
et al., 2007a). Empirical findings on trusted sources of disaster-related information can be
contradictory; surveys of disaster-affected populations sometimes present one source as
being both trusted and distrusted by the same cohort of research participants in the same
setting (see, e.g. Henry et al., 2011; Hyvärinen and Vos, 2016; Nepal et al., 2012; Steelman
et al., 2015). Theories of trust emphasising its context dependency help to explain such
findings; a source trusted under one set of contextual factors could be distrusted under
another (Henry et al., 2011; Paton, 2007; Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). It is helpful,
therefore, to embed trust and distrust in their contexts. To this end, the next section
summarises details of the 2011 disaster in Japan that will be relevant to the accounts of
trust, distrust and translation analysed later on.

3. Context of the 2011 disaster

A long-running, complex and cascading Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Disaster began
in Japan on March 11, 2011. The officially-designated disaster zone to which the 1947
Disaster Relief Act was applied encompassed ten prefectures over much of the eastern half
of Japan’s main island (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, 2011).
Approximately 670,000 foreign nationals from more than 190 different countries resided in
this disaster zone (E-Stat, 2011). The numbers of foreign residents registered in Japan
dropped dramatically during the disaster and 41,207 fewer foreign nationals were resident
in Japan by the end of March 2011 than had been there at the start of the year (Ministry of
Justice of Japan, 2012). Massive amounts of communication were generated during the
events of 2011: press conferences and meetings were held; announcements and instructions
were issued; news was broadcast over television, radio, the internet and in print; and
affected people consumed this news, talked to each other about it and telephoned, mailed
and used social media to connect with others affected and those in the outside world.
Foreign residents were involved in this communication.
DPM It should be remembered that the context of this communication was Japan, a highly
29,2 hazard-prone country that, nonetheless, possesses an elevated capacity to cope and a
sophisticated legislative and policy framework to guide disaster prevention and management.
Policy on disaster in Japan finds its legislative mandate in the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Act and is formulated through the Basic Disaster Management Plan (Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan, 2015). Stakeholders of the plan include national, prefectural, municipal
160 and local governments, designated public institutions and corporations (such as the Bank of
Japan, the national broadcasting corporation, NHK, or the Japanese Red Cross Society) and
even residents and all stakeholders are responsible for formulating and implementing their
own Disaster Management Operation Plans, Local Disaster Management Plans or Community
Disaster Management Plans based on this policy (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015).
The first Basic Disaster Management Plan was formulated in 1963 and had been through
some ten revisions based on lessons learned by the time the several-hundred-page document
in force at the onset of the 2011 disaster was created (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office
of Japan, 2017).
Despite such a formalised, dynamic and well-resourced context, the scale and complexity
of the devastation in 2011 managed to overwhelm some of these sophisticated legislative
and policy structures, including in relation to communication with foreign nationals.
Therefore, a case study was carried out to interrogate issues of language, culture and
translation in the communicative context of this disaster.

4. Case study of the 2011 disaster

Participant accounts analysed in this paper were drawn from this broader case study.
The study used the cases of 28 foreign residents of the disaster zone who held diverse
perspectives on the disaster: they came from 12 different countries of origin (Ireland, the
Netherlands, France, Germany, Sudan, Tunisia, China, Bangladesh, the USA, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand) and varied in age, occupation, length of residence and Japanese
proficiency. Individual, face to face ethnographic interviews lasting approximately 1 hour
each were conducted by the researcher with participants during a two-month visit to the
disaster zone in 2013. (Ethical approval for this research project was received from the
Research Ethics Committee of Dublin City University under reference DCUREC/2013/146.)
Ethnographic interviews create relatively free-form dialogues between the researcher and
the participant (Blommaert and Jie, 2010; Josephiddes, 2012) and the audio of these dialogues
was digitally recorded and later transcribed by the researcher. An outline sent to
participants prior to meeting to indicate potential interview topics can be seen in the
Appendix. While most topics in this outline were covered in each interview, spontaneously
discussed issues and the free-form nature of the dialogue are not captured in the
pre-interview outline. A full record of all the dialogue contained in each interview is available
in anonymised and participant-checked transcriptions (see Cadwell, 2015). Interview
transcripts were analysed along with relevant secondary data using a form of thematic
analysis operationalised from Braun and Clarke (2006). One of the themes developed during
the analysis of the interviews related to trust. Based on the operational definitions for trust,
distrust and translation adopted for this study and explained above, these passages were then
recoded to: isolate instances in which a foreign national was willing or unwilling to be
vulnerable to another; categorise these accounts by vulnerability; specify the channels of
communication involved; search for evidence of translational processes in these accounts of
trust and distrust; and clarify the sources of information involved.
Tables I and II summarise the results of this analysis of participant accounts of trust
and distrust in the interview data. They will be used in the discussion that follows, along
with direct quotes from the transcript data, to begin to answer the research questions
posed at the start of the paper. The tables are presented here to support qualitative claims
 Vulnerability to Communication Translational Source of original Source of
Trust, distrust
Participant another channel processes text translated text and translation
in a disaster
08 Emergency Face to face Present Residents’ Japanese building
procedure decision association receptionist
19 Emergency Face to face Present Train station Japanese co-
procedure decision announcer worker
28 Emergency Face to face Present School principal Japanese co- 161
procedure decision workers
08 Emergency Face to face Present Building Japanese co-
procedure decision management workers
21 Radiation danger E-mail Present Japanese Japanese friend
decision broadcaster
24 Evacuation/return Face to face Present Emergency Japanese hotel
decision responders staff
03 Evacuation/return Emergency Present Japanese language Japanese local
decision radio broadcasts and news Embassy staff
15 Evacuation/return Face to face Present Municipal Japanese
decision authorities university
professor
13 Evacuation/return Telephone call Present Railway operators Japanese-speaking
decision foreign national
16 Emergency Face to face Present Evacuation centre Japanese-speaking
procedure decision staff foreign national
friends
20 Radiation danger Internet and Present Japanese Japanese-speaking
decision face to face government and foreign national
power plant operator friends
20 Evacuation/return Twitter Present Japanese Japanese-speaking
decision government and foreign nationals
power plant operator
27 Radiation danger TV news Present Japanese Journalists
decision broadcaster
27 Radiation danger News wires Present Japanese news Journalists and
decision agencies translators
28 Radiation danger News website Absent BBC News Website n/a
decision
23 Emergency News website Absent BBC, CNN, Al n/a
procedure decision Jazeera
08 Evacuation/return E-mail Absent Embassy n/a
decision
26 Evacuation/return E-mail Absent Embassy n/a
decision
08 Radiation danger Letter Absent Embassy n/a
decision
28 Evacuation/return E-mail Absent Family and friends n/a
decision overseas
23 Evacuation/return Telephone call Absent Home university n/a
decision
01 Emergency Face to face Absent Japanese building n/a
procedure decision receptionist
10 Evacuation/return Face to face Absent Japanese customers n/a
decision employed at nuclear
plant
05 Evacuation/return Face to face Absent Japanese employer n/a
decision Table I.
Summary of
accounts of trust in
(continued ) interview data
DPM Vulnerability to Communication Translational Source of original Source of
29,2 Participant another channel processes text translated text

09 Radiation danger E-mail Absent Japanese inlaws and n/a

decision friends
04 Evacuation/return News Absent Japanese language n/a
decision programmes broadcasts and news
162 27 Radiation danger News website Absent Journalists at New n/a
decision York Times
27 Radiation danger News website Absent New York Times n/a
decision
06 Evacuation/return Face to face Absent Foreign national n/a
decision friends
09 (Outlier) Request Telephone call Absent Foreign national n/a
Table I. to run business employer

Vulnerability to Communication Translational Source of original Source of translated

Participant another channel processes text text

02 Evacuation/ Face to face Present Japanese Japanese girlfriend

return decision government of participant
22 Evacuation/ Telephone call Present Municipal Japanese-speaking
return decision authorities foreign nationals
17 Emergency Social media Absent Chinese social n/a
procedure media sites
decision
12 Radiation danger TV news Absent Japanese news n/a
decision media
04 Evacuation/ TV news Absent Japanese news n/a
return decision media
27 Radiation danger Newspapers Absent Japanese news n/a
decision media
07 Radiation danger TV news Absent Japanese and n/a
decision overseas news
media
03 Evacuation/ TV, radio, Absent Overseas news n/a
Table II. return decision website media
Summary of accounts 25 Emergency E-mail Present Other foreign n/a
of distrust in procedure national in Japan
interview data decision

made about the breadth and depth of patterns elaborated through analysis of the
interview data and are not an attempt to claim quantitative or statistical significance from
the data.

5. Accounts of trust and distrust related by foreign residents

Findings from the process of analysis described can be related to the three significant
themes identified earlier in the literature on disaster and trust: the general importance of
trust to disaster-related communication, the challenges that language brings and the need to
examine sources of information carefully.
5.1 Importance of trust Trust, distrust
Trust was a significant phenomenon for many participants in this research. A broad spread of and translation
participants – 25 out of a total of 28 – chose to recount instances of vulnerability to another in in a disaster
their descriptions of their communicative experiences and comparing Tables I and II illustrates
that more participants spent more time talking about trust than distrust in their interviews.
Almost all accounts of trust and distrust could be divided into three categories (see
Tables I and II, vulnerability to another) and no one category predominated. Participants 163
related trust and distrust equally to decisions about evacuation, radiation threats and
emergency procedures.
Face to face communication was also important for participants and was often
associated by them in their interviews with trust, while it was rarely associated by them
with distrust (see Tables I and II, communication channel). Electronic communication
channels – such as e-mail, the internet and telephone calls – were also valorised by
participants. One participant related a stressful account of realising her vulnerability and
need to depend on others when watching a television news broadcast of an explosion that
occurred at the early stages of the disaster at the damaged nuclear power plant. E-mail
communication from a Japanese friend helped the participant make an immediate decision
about the radiation danger she faced, but also highlighted problems she faced trying to
respond to the disaster alone:
I plugged in my TV and was watching it, and then the reactor exploded. That’s when I
realised – this is probably where the translation stuff comes in – that’s when I realised I was
completely alone and listening to Japanese news and had no idea what was going on; none at all […]
And then I get an email from [my Japanese friend] that’s like, “Everything is okay. It exploded, but
that was a good thing. Like, it released the pressure”. (Participant 21: low-level Japanese
proficiency; from the USA; age 30–39; in Japan for 5 years at onset; Recruitment Consultant)
These findings support other research, which has shown that word of mouth – in the form of
direct, face-to-face communication or facilitated through telephone and other technology –
appears to be the preferred channel for culturally and linguistically diverse communities
(Arlikatti et al., 2014; Nepal et al., 2012). It also offers an indication of the presence of thick
interpersonal trust in the data; personal familiarity and a strong emotional commitment
were features of this trust encounter. This account also introduces other features of the
interview data: the challenges that language presented in the participants’ communicative
experiences and the presence of translational processes in their accounts of the disaster.

5.2 Challenges of language

It was found that about half of the participants who talked about trust and about a fifth of the
participants who talked about distrust involved translational processes in their accounts (see
Tables I and II, translational processes). We can say, therefore, that more participants spent
more time talking about translation being involved in trust instances than distrust instances;
nevertheless, this should not diminish the qualitative significance of translation in the distrust
accounts and translational processes were significant to both trust and distrust. Several
participants in this research moved into community evacuation centres after the onset of the
disaster. The language of communication in these centres was predominantly Japanese.
Luckily, many communities of foreign nationals contained people with Japanese proficiency
and these key community members were relied on by others to carry out ad hoc translation:
[The language in the centre was] mainly Japanese, but one or two people could comment in English.
To use Japanese, it was not difficult for us, because all people [from the Bangladeshi community] were
in the same place, and many of them know Japanese. In our community, three or four people know
Japanese. If there is an announcement, instantly he translated, “Oh, this is like this”. (Participant 16:
low-level Japanese proficiency; from Bangladesh; age 30–39; in Japan for 2 years at onset; Student)
DPM These findings should not be interpreted as a claim that foreign residents trusted other
29,2 friends and acquaintances because they were on the ground with them, or because they
were foreign; i.e. while thick interpersonal trust depends on strong bonds of familiarity, it is
not caused by them alone. Indeed, though acquaintance and proximity were sometimes
factors that were taken into account in trust reasoning, there were examples in the data
where communication from another foreign or Japanese resident on the ground was
164 distrusted. Take, for instance, one participant’s distrust in the ability of other foreign
residents to coordinate response and recovery efforts:
A lot of the foreigners who organised these volunteer things were just people trying to help, but not
Japanese speakers, so that’s where I thought, you know, how much of this is completely true or do
you have a complete grasp of the situation? (Participant 25: high-level Japanese proficiency; from
Australia; age 30–39; in Japan for 11 years at onset; Sales Manager)
Where translational processes were involved in these accounts, participants were
vulnerable because of their lack of linguistic and cultural knowledge. Having a third party
supplement this knowledge was often helpful and participants were frequently willing to
take the “leap of faith” that Möllering (2006b, p. 191) sees at the heart of trust. Nevertheless,
participants still recognised that they could not be sure that taking this leap was a
reasonable decision to make and their vulnerability still remained, as can be seen in the
following encounter. We also see from this encounter that institutions as well as people were
the objects of trust and distrust reasoning in the interview data; participants queried
whether they could take a leap of faith in their social interactions with organisations such as
broadcasters and news agencies and not just their interactions with people:
I can’t read Japanese very well. So I started listening to NHK [Note: the Japanese national broadcaster] in
English, because I think they built a lot of credibility during the crisis and I knew some of the people
who worked there. But that’s just a translation, and I don’t know if it’s a good translation. I think the
story for what you are talking about is the fact that I am not doing Japanese media except the English
version of it. I’m doing Jiji and Kyodo [Note: Japanese news agencies] and NHK, you know, I’m going off
the wires every day, but that’s just a translation and I don’t know if it’s a good translation. (Participant
27: mid-level Japanese proficiency; from the USA; age 50–59; in Japan for 25 years at onset; Consultant)
At the same time, other participants thought that being vulnerable to a linguistically and
culturally proficient other – be it a person or an institution – would be a leap too far. For instance,
one participant with low Japanese ability was due to move to Fukushima Prefecture where the
damaged nuclear reactor was located to take up a job following the disaster. He recognised that
information in the disaster zone would probably not be provided in a language he could
understand and was unwilling to have to depend on others to contact him with translations:
That was partly why I decided not to go up to Fukushima because I thought, “If something
happens, even if they drive with an announcement, those are not going to be in English”. And there,
language would have been an issue. I would be totally reliant on others ringing me, thinking of me:
“Oh, he’s ringing because something has happened”. I wasn’t in a very vulnerable situation, at least
not in every respect, but I also chose not to put myself in a situation where I would have been worse,
at least that was my reasoning. (Participant 22: low-level Japanese proficiency; from Germany; age
30–39; in Japan for 6 months at onset; Language Teacher)
Thus, while we can argue from these interviews that translation was a factor in participants’
trust and distrust accounts at times, the presence or absence of translational processes in an
account did not correlate with a presence or absence of trust.

5.3 Sources of information

The most notable pattern that could be perceived by using translation as a lens through which
to view the interview data related to the sources of information in these communicative acts.
The information summarised in Tables I and II indicates that participants considered more Trust, distrust
than one source of information in their trust reasoning when translation was involved: the and translation
source of the original text and the source of the translated text. Such layered sources are not in a disaster
unique to situations of translation; any situation involving intermediaries conveying trusted
or distrusted information should take the issue into account. Nevertheless, the issue of layered
sources of information is fundamental to translation because an original and translated text
will always coexist and these will frequently come from different sources. 165
We can see from Table I that in half of the accounts relating to trust, an acquaintance, friend
or work colleague on the ground in the disaster zone was the source on whom participants
relied for translation. One participant described the importance of these pre-existing social links
to trust and claimed that they were, at times, even more important than expertise. This aligns
with findings on thin interpersonal trust in the literature discussed above (see, e.g. Khodyakov,
2007) concerning the importance of developing weak social ties that can be called on when
needed to access otherwise unavailable resources or information:
You just wanted as much information as you could get, and then you start to parse it for yourself
and figure out what’s going on. You rely on the people that you trust for, you know, who might not
frankly be really great arbiters of nuclear radiation and understanding what’s going on with that.
But at least you rely on them in a social context. (Participant 20: mid-level Japanese proficiency;
from Canada; age 30–39; in Japan for 5 years at onset; Advertising Executive)
Indeed, it appears strongly from the data that personal, more than the cultural, bonds were
significant in the relationships between translators and participants in accounts of both
trust and distrust. While the beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviours that are common to
certain populations can contribute to their perceptions of disaster risk and their
vulnerability to hazards (Cannon, 2015), the data provided by participants in this research
did not indicate a need for cultural similarity in the establishment of trust or distrust
through translation. Indeed, we should understand that the crisis translators in the 2011
disaster were not only other foreign nationals but also local Japanese with particular
pre-existing bonds to the foreign resident communities.
The interview data also confirm the common contradiction in studies of disaster-related trust
that one source of information can be both trusted and distrusted by the same cohort of research
participants in the same setting. Take, for instance, news media. We cannot say from these data
whether news media were a trusted or a distrusted source of information; it depended on whom
you asked and on the news media involved. Some participants were unwilling to rely on foreign
news accounts of the disaster – especially the Nuclear Disaster – because they felt it was
sensational coverage not based in fact. The same participants also distrusted Japanese news
accounts because they felt that these sources were biased and withheld facts. Japan is often
described as a high-context culture in which significant interpretation of the communicative
context is required to achieve understanding (Hall, 1976) and a hierarchical society in which
individual expression is frequently constrained (Hofstede, 2001). These features meant that the
cultural imperative to maintain calm and avoid overt expression may have been stronger than a
need to communicate risk effectively in the Japanese media in the 2011 disaster, in stark contrast
to the sensational coverage present in the overseas media:
I felt like the foreign media covered it [Note: the nuclear disaster] a lot, but there was too much
opinion. There were a lot of loud opinions going around about how bad that was. Then, the
Japanese penchant for understatement just left me with, like, where the hell do you draw the middle
line? You don’t know how far to one side or the other it should have been. I didn’t trust it.
(Participant 12: low-level Japanese proficiency; from Ireland; age 20–29; in Japan for 5 months at
onset; Company Employee)
Nonetheless, other participants talked in their interviews about how they placed
institutional trust in information from both overseas and Japanese news media – such as the
DPM BBC or NHK – in order to make decisions about their own safety and whether to evacuate
29,2 out of the disaster zone:
I think the BBC seemed like a trusted resource to us. We probably did check several other ones but
we kept going back to the BBC one because they seemed to be the most up-to-date and non-
sensational, I guess. (Participant 28: low-level Japanese proficiency; from New Zealand; age 30-39; in
Japan for 18 months at onset; Teacher)
166 Trust reasoning is complex and context-dependent (Henry et al., 2011; Paton, 2007;
Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010), so we cannot argue that one group of sources, whether
people or institutions, will routinely be trusted over another group of sources. This calls
into question the value of presenting lists of trusted or distrusted sources of information in
disaster-related research without also presenting the sources’ contextual embedding.

6. Implications for crisis translation

Having established the ways in which trust and distrust were described by participants in
this study and the role of translation in these descriptions, a final question remains to be
answered in this paper: what are the implications of these findings for crisis translation
beyond the 2011 disaster? Before proceeding to answer this question, it should be
remembered that the findings in this paper are based on case study data and that making
generalised claims from case study data is open to question (see, e.g. Gomm et al., 2000).
Some authors argue that making claims about significant categories and relationships in
case study data to guide further enquiry can be supported once rigour and transparency
have been demonstrated (e.g. Mitchell, 2000). Implications beyond the 2011 disaster are
presented here in this light.
Crisis translation was not a matter of prepared, coordinated, professional translation
for participants in this research. Instead, when participants lacked linguistic and cultural
proficiencies to interpret information about risks and vulnerabilities, they turned to those
nearby with the skills they lacked and on whom they already relied socially. The first
implication, therefore, is that pre-existing personal bonds may be important
considerations for generating trusted information through crisis translation.

6.1 Consider personal common ground

How can we systematically explain the observation that personal acquaintance seemed
significant to trust, distrust and translation in this context? Priem and Nystrom (2014)
suggest the use of Clark’s (1996) concepts of “communal common ground”, suppositions
made about the cultural communities to which a person is perceived to belong and “personal
common ground”, assumptions based on shared experiences gained over a period of
acquaintance. Looking at the Sources of Translated Information in Tables I and II, we see
that many of the sources of translated information were Japanese and did not share the
participant’s country of origin: we might speculate that communal common ground between
them was low. More significant in the relationships were the shared experiences of the
participant and translator, through work, friendship or exposure to the same hazards. Thus,
regardless of cultural background, a crisis translator may want to consider strategically
emphasising shared common experiences as a way to build trust with the person for whom
they are translating.

6.2 Link crisis translation with disaster preparedness

Emphasising shared personal common ground will be a more realistic proposition if
opportunities to build the necessary acquaintance are available to local responders and
foreign resident communities prior to the onset of a disaster. In short, while crisis
translation was examined in this research in the response phase, there may be benefits to
linking crisis translation to disaster preparedness. Scholars who have studied trust in Trust, distrust
other crisis contexts argue for forging links between key potential local responders and and translation
culturally and linguistically diverse communities and providing these groups with in a disaster
community-based training (Arlikatti et al., 2014; Hyvärinen and Vos, 2016; Nepal et al.,
2012). Conducting translation projects together in advance of a disaster could be one way
in which to build personal common ground and foster trust between locally based
responders and diverse communities. Japan’s 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act 167
introduced in Section 3 recognises local residents and businesses as key stakeholders with
responsibility for local level disaster planning – albeit in a voluntary capacity – and sets
down in law that residents should have responsibility for self-preparedness, storage of
basic necessities and voluntary participation in disaster preparedness activities (Cabinet
Office, Government of Japan, 2015). Foreign nationals have begun to be involved in
citizen-centred disaster preparedness initiatives, with volunteering as translators and
interpreters being one prominent activity. For instance, Tokyo Metropolitan Government
has created a network of “Disaster Language Volunteers” that are being recruited and
trained in preparation to carry out translation and interpreting activities in future
disasters (Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs, 2015). It has also been running
annual disaster preparedness training drills for foreign residents since 2016 to improve
capacity for self-help among residents and to increase cooperation between official
responders and foreign communities (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Bureau of
General Affairs, 2019). These efforts are valuable, but participation by foreign nationals
has been limited: about 129 foreign residents – with more than half linked to embassies –
took part in the 2019 drill (Takahashi, 2019), out of a foreign resident population of 550,000
in Tokyo.
Low participation rates and lack of preparedness could be culturally bound. Evidence
from the 2011 disaster suggested that foreign residents coming from hazard-prone countries
to Japan were more sensitised to disaster preparedness. For example, participants from
New Zealand and hazard-prone parts of the USA spoke of experiences in their home
countries preparing them to some extent for the events of 2011. At the same time,
participants from countries with a lower risk hazardscape, such as Ireland or the
Netherlands, declared a relative lack of preparedness. A stronger pattern in the interview
data, though, attested to a lack of integration into local communities and a lack of weak
social ties with close neighbours as a barrier to participation in disaster preparedness
efforts, even for participants who had already lived in Japan for some time:
I live in a danchi complex [Note: means a housing estate]. It’s reclaimed land. The buildings are old,
they are from the seventies. It’s not safe if a big earthquake hits. But I am not aware of any disaster
preparation measures they have in place in the community. I have lived there four years now.
I don’t know any of my neighbours. I know some people, I’ll nod at them when I walk down the
street, but at the same time, I’m not really interested in taking part in community activities […]
maybe it is unfriendly on my part, but we come from different worlds. A lot of them are retirees,
sixty, seventy to eighties – very Japanese domestic culture. They are nice people, but we have
nothing in common. (Participant 6: mid-level Japanese proficiency; from Canada; age 30-39; in Japan
for 5 years at onset; PR Consultant)
How can these barriers to disaster preparedness be overcome? Preparedness activities
should be taken as opportunities to exchange cultural information to mitigate the
cultural mismatch evident in Participant 6’s comments. They could also be opportunities
to build the thin trust, the weak social ties, that might not exist yet between foreign
residents and their local neighbours. An example of using translation training for the
purposes of community development and the generation of intercultural awareness in the
context of disaster preparedness is described in Federici and Cadwell (2018) and
Shackleton (2018).
DPM 6.3 Train crisis translators to empower others
29,2 This begs the question: what form should crisis translation training programmes take?
There are many possibilities. Based on the findings of this research focussed on trust,
distrust and translation, crisis translators need to be trained to translate as much about the
sources and contexts of production of disaster-related information as about the content of
the information itself. We have seen in this study’s findings that trust reasoning is complex
168 and context-dependent. To be denied access to relevant information about a source of
information or the context of some information’s production is to be denied the articulation
and empowerment required by people to truly understand the uncertainty or risk that they
face (see Paton, 2007, pp. 375-377). Crisis translators can conceptualise part of their mission
as one to empower the people for whom they translate to make informed decisions regarding
a disaster. A key part of this decision making will be trust reasoning and such reasoning
requires context-rich translation. In practice, context-rich translation could be achieved
through training in the framing techniques used in news production and translation (see,
e.g. Reese, 2018; Valdeón, 2015). Framing involves combining the content of information
with pre-existing end-user knowledge and associated context in order to achieve a specific
outcome (Reese, 2018). The process of framing, while being used to empower others, would
nonetheless be an expression of the crisis translator’s power: to choose content, to make
assumptions about the end-user, to interpret context, etc. For this reason, such training in
framing techniques would need to be accompanied by a foundation of ethical principles and
frameworks around disaster-related translation that would help the trainee to navigate such
challenging decisions.

6.4 Lobby for further policy change

The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act introduced in Section 3 calls for the Japanese
Government to produce an annual White Paper on Disaster Management in Japan in which
an overview of the hazards faced, significant crises or disasters experienced and
countermeasures taken over the preceding year are provided (Cabinet Office, Government of
Japan, 2015). Lessons learned through this dynamic annual reporting system inform
revisions to the Basic Disaster Management Plan. In recent years, the plan has been revised
as much as twice annually (Director General for Disaster Management, 2017) and the plan
has been updated to take into account issues of language, culture and communication with
foreign nationals at various stages since the 2011 disaster.
The most recent version of the plan at the time of writing is the 2018 version. It
acknowledges the need for those managing and those affected by a disaster in Japan to
engage with languages other than Japanese in ways that were not present in 2011. The
development of these revisions can be traced through the White Papers on Disaster
published in the intervening years[1]. The plan now proceeds from the basis that the
behaviour and informational needs of foreign residents and foreign visitors may be
different, but that a system for timely and accurate information transmission needs to be put
in place to support both groups (Central Disaster Management Council, 2018, p. 5). Another
salient guiding principle set down at the very outset of the document is that foreign
nationals can be grouped together with the elderly and disabled (Central Disaster
Management Council, 2018, p. 5), as well as with infants and pregnant women (Central
Disaster Management Council, 2018, p. 15) as “people requiring special assistance” (要援護
者). The principle here states that there is a need to adopt specific, detailed policies to
support these categories of individuals. Communication with foreign nationals is
acknowledged in the document in terms of disaster training and education (Central
Disaster Management Council, 2018, p. 15), evacuation procedures (Central Disaster
Management Council, 2018, pp. 31-32), communicating disaster-related information to
evacuees (Central Disaster Management Council, 2018, p. 71) and communicating with
foreign counterparts and governments overseas (Central Disaster Management Council, Trust, distrust
2018, pp. 18, 37, 43), especially with respect to nuclear-related issues (Central Disaster and translation
Management Council, 2018, pp. 249, 261, 271, 272, 278). The plan also states that local in a disaster
governments shall devise an accessible information communication system that takes into
account “people requiring special consideration” including foreign nationals (Central
Disaster Management Council, 2018, p. 144). In short, many issues of concern in crisis
translation have been incorporated into disaster policy in Japan since 2011 through dialogue 169
from local to national level via the White Paper reporting system.
At the same time, trust has not yet been related in an explicit way to communication with
foreign nationals in the plan. The importance of fostering trust between stakeholders
through relationship building in advance of disasters is recognised in the plan (Central
Disaster Management Council, 2018, p. 13) and there are multiple mentions of the
importance of ensuring reliable physical infrastructure for telecommunications, transport
and power supply (Central Disaster Management Council, 2018, pp. 90, 112, 134, 163, 221,
231, 232). More can be done through knowledge dissemination and lobbying to argue for the
fact that those who do not speak dominant local languages in a disaster setting will make
different decisions about their safety based on the trust or distrust they hold in the sources
and content of the information involved, especially when translation is involved, as has been
shown in this research.

7. Conclusions and future work

The research presented in this paper used in-depth case study data to examine relationships
between trust, distrust and translation embedded in the context of the 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake. It found that participant accounts of trust and distrust confirmed the
general importance, the linguistic challenges and the context dependency of trust in
disaster-related communication. It found, too, that translational processes were involved in
some of these accounts. The crisis translation involved was an ad hoc act undertaken by
linguistically and culturally proficient acquaintances of participants on the ground in the
disaster zone. Had this ad hoc translation not been available, a significant proportion of
decisions made about emergency response, personal safety and evacuation and return
would have been reasoned differently by participants. For this reason alone, further work on
relationships between trust, distrust and translation seems warranted. It was also argued
that findings from this case study could have implications for crisis translation more
broadly. It was suggested that shared personal common ground could be used by crisis
translators to build trust, that crisis translation could be linked usefully with disaster
preparedness, that crisis translators should be trained to empower those for whom they
translate to carry out more effective trust reasoning and that lobbying for further inclusion
of trust in disaster management policy should be undertaken.
The research presented here should be seen in the context of its limitations. First,
generalisations from case study data should be approached with caution, though they can
be used to suggest avenues for future research. Second, only a limited range of reason-based
social trust phenomena were considered; other forms of trust that can be irrational, implicit,
culture-based or derived in part from someone’s personality (Castelfranchi and Falcone,
2010) were not dealt with. Finally, only documented foreign residents in the disaster zone in
2011 were interviewed for this research; the perspectives of other foreign nationals in Japan
for the disaster – such as foreign emergency responders, short-term foreign business
visitors or tourists, or undocumented migrants – were not analysed due to the difficulty of
gaining access to these groups.
Despite these limitations, there is scope for further work arising out of this research. As
translation was observed to be a factor taken into account in participants’ trust reasoning,
studies could be developed to hypothesise and test this relationship further. In particular, it
DPM would be useful to examine ways in which the layered sources of information characteristic
29,2 of translation moderate trust phenomena. In addition, it could be beneficial to study whether
shared personal or perceptual experiences can be factors in building trust during an act of
crisis translation. Finally, in relation to a broader project of establishing crisis translation as
a systematic practice, it would be worthwhile to develop and evaluate training on the
concept of trust and its relation to translation in existing crisis translation courses.
170
Note
1. A record of the White Papers on Disaster Management in Japan (防災白書) can be consulted in
Japanese here www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/ and English translations of recent White
Papers are available here www.bousai.go.jp/en/documentation/white_paper/index.html (accessed
26 March 2019).

References
Arlikatti, S., Lindell, M. and Prater, C. (2007a), “Perceived stakeholder role relationships and adoption
of seismic hazard adjustments”, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters,
Vol. 25 No. 3, pp. 218-256.
Arlikatti, S., Lindell, M. and Prater, C. (2007b), “Building trust among community stakeholders”, in
Durmaz, H., Sevinc, B., Sait Yayla, A. and Ekici, S. (Eds), Understanding and Responding to
Terrorism, IOS Press, Washington, DC, pp. 383-392.
Arlikatti, S., Taibah, H.A. and Andrew, S.A. (2014), “How do you warn them if they speak only
Spanish? Challenges for organizations in communicating risk to Colonias residents in Texas,
USA”, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 533-550.
Auf Der Heide, E. (1989), Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination, Mosby,
St. Louis, MO.
Blommaert, J. and Jie, D. (2010), Ethnographic Fieldwork: A Beginner’s Guide, Multilingual Matters,
Bristol.
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006), “Using thematic analysis in psychology”, Qualitative Research in
Psychology, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 77-101.
Bulut, A. and Kurultay, T. (2001), “Interpreters-in-Aid at disasters: community interpreting in the
process of disaster management”, The Translator, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 249-263.
Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs (2015), “Tōkyōto bōsai (gogaku) borantia”, available at: www.
seikatubunka.metro.tokyo.jp/chiiki_tabunka/tabunka/tabunkasuishin/0000000145.html
(accessed 20 March 2019).
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2015), “Disaster management in Japan”, available at: www.
bousai.go.jp/1info/pdf/saigaipamphlet_je.pdf (accessed 20 March 2019).
Cadwell, P. (2015), “Translation and trust: a case study of how translation was experienced by foreign
nationals resident in Japan for the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake”, PhD thesis, Dublin City
University, Dublin, available at: http://doras.dcu.ie/20839/1/PHD_Thesis_Patrick_Cadwell_20
15.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
Cannon, T. (2015), “Disasters, climate change and the significance of ‘culture’ ”, in Krüger, F., Bankoff, G.,
Cannon, T., Orlowski, B. and Schipper, L.F. (Eds), Cultures and Disasters: Understanding Cultural
Framings in Disaster Risk Reduction, Routledge, London, pp. 88-106.
Carter, R. and McCarthy, M. (2008), Cambridge Grammar of English, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Castelfranchi, C. and Falcone, R. (2010), Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model,
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Central Disaster Management Council (2018), “Bōsai kihon keikaku”, available at: www.bousai.go.jp/
taisaku/keikaku/pdf/kihon_basic_plan180629.pdf (accessed 27 March 2019).
Clark, H.H. (1996), Using Language, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Trust, distrust
Colina, S. (2016), Fundamentals of Translation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. and translation
Coyle, D. and Meier, P. (2009), New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of Information in a disaster
and Social Networks, UN Foundation-Vodafone Foundation Partnership, Washington, DC
and London.
Curnin, S., Owen, C., Paton, D., Trist, C. and Parsons, D. (2015), “Role clarity, swift trust and multi-agency
coordination”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 29-35. 171
Director General for Disaster Management (2017), “Bōsai kihon keikaku no sakusei shūsei no rireki”,
available at: www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/keikaku/kihon.html (accessed 25 March 2019).
Disaster Management, Cabinet Office of Japan (2017), “Tōhoku chihō Taiheiyō oki jishin o kyōkun to
shita jishin tsunami taisaku ni kansuru senmon chōsa-kai”, available at: www.bousai.go.jp/
kaigirep/chousakai/tohokukyokun/10/pdf/sub1.pdf (accessed 25 March 2019).
Drabek, T.E. (2003), Strategies for Coordinating Disaster Responses, Institute of Behavior Sciences,
Boulder, CO.
Eadie, P. and Su, Y. (2018), “Post-disaster social capital: trust, equity, bayanihan and Typhoon
Yolanda”, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 334-345.
Edwards, R., Temple, B. and Alexander, C. (2005), “Users’ experiences of interpreters: the critical role of
trust”, Interpreting, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 77-95.
E-Stat (2011), “Tōroku gaikokujin tōkei (nenji)”, available at: www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL08020102.
do?_toGL080201].02_&tclassID=000001048666&cycleCode=7&requestSender=estat&
tstatCode=000001018034 (accessed 27 November 2018).
Federici, F.M. (2016), Mediating Emergencies and Conflicts, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills.
Federici, F.M. and Cadwell, P. (2018), “Training citizen translators: design and delivery of bespoke
training on the fundamentals of translation for New Zealand Red Cross”, Translation Spaces,
Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 23-43.
Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. (2000), Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts, Sage,
London.
Hall, E.T. (1976), Beyond Culture, Anchor Press, Garden City, NY.
Halverson, S.L. (2016), “Implications of cognitive linguistics for translation studies”, in Rojo Loṕ ez, A.M.
and Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuñano, B. (Eds), Cognitive Linguistics and Translation: Advances in Some
Theoretical Models and Applications, De Gruyter Mouton, Berlin, pp. 33-73.
Henry, M., Kawasaki, A. and Meguro, K. (2011), “Disaster information gathering behaviour after the
Tohoku Earthquake Part 2: results of foreign respondents”, paper presented at 10th
International Symposium on New Technologies for Urban Safety in Mega Cities in Asia,
Chiang Mai, 12-14 October, available at: www.researchgate.net/publication/266868138 (accessed
27 November 2018).
Hofstede, G. (2001), Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and
Organizations across Nations, 2nd ed., Sage Publications, London.
House, J. (2018), Translation: The Basics, Routledge, London.
Hyvärinen, J. and Vos, M. (2016), “Communication concerning disasters and pandemics”, in Schwarz, A.,
Seeger, M.W. and Auer, C. (Eds), The Handbook of International Crisis Communication Research,
Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, pp. 96-107.
Josephiddes, L. (2012), “Finding and mining the talk: negotiating knowledge and knowledge transfer in
the field”, in Skinner, J. (Ed.), The Interview: An Ethnographic Approach, Berg, London, pp. 89-104.
Khodyakov, D. (2007), “Trust as a process: a three-dimensional approach”, Sociology, Vol. 41 No. 1,
pp. 115-132.
Lyon, F., Möllering, G. and Saunders, M.N.K. (2016), “Introduction. Researching trust: the ongoing
challenge of matching objectives and methods”, in Lyon, F., Möllering, G. and Saunders, M.N.K.
(Eds), Handbook of Research Methods on Trust, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp. 1-22.
DPM Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan (2011), “Tōhokuchihōtaiheiyōokijishin ni kakaru
29,2 saigaikyūjohō no tekiyō ni tsuite”, available at: www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000014j2y-
.

img/2r985200000167hm.pdf (accessed 27 November 2018).

Ministry of Justice of Japan (2012), “Heisei23nenmatsu genzai ni okeru gaikokujin tōrokushasū ni
tsuite”, available at: www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00021.html
(accessed 15 August 2017).
172 Mitchell, J. (2000), “Case and situation analysis”, in Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. (Eds),
Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts, Sage, London, pp. 165-186.
Möllering, G. (2006a), “Trust, institutions, agency: towards a neoinstitutional theory of trust”, in
Bachmann, R. and Zaheer, A. (Eds), Handbook of Trust Research, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
pp. 355-376.
Möllering, G. (2006b), Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Moser-Mercer, B., Kherbiche, L. and Class, B. (2014), “Interpreting conflict: training challenges in
humanitarian field interpreting”, Journal of Human Rights Practice, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 140-158.
Mulayim, S. and Lai, M. (2017), Ethics for Police Translators and Interpreters, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
Nepal, V., Banerjee, D., Perry, M. and Scott, D. (2012), “Disaster preparedness of linguistically isolated
populations: practical issues for planners”, Health Promotion Practice, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 265-271.
Nooteboom, B. (2002), Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures, and Figures, E. Elgar Pub,
Cheltenham.
O’Brien, S., Federici, F.M., Cadwell, P., Marlowe, J. and Gerber, B. (2018), “Language translation during
disaster: a comparative analysis of five national approaches”, International Journal for Disaster
Risk Reduction, Vol. 31, October, pp. 627-636.
Paton, D. (2003), “Disaster preparedness: a social-cognitive perspective”, Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 210-216.
Paton, D. (2007), “Preparing for natural hazards: the role of community trust”, Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 370-379.
Paton, D. (2008), “Risk communication and natural hazard mitigation: how trust influences its
effectiveness”, International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 2-16.
Paton, D. (2013), “Disaster resilient communities: developing and testing an all-hazards theory”, Journal
of Integrated Disaster Risk Management, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 1-17.
Paton, D., Smith, L.M. and Johnson, D. (2005), “When good intentions turn bad: promoting natural
hazard preparedness”, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 25-30.
Priem, R.L. and Nystrom, P.C. (2014), “Exploring the dynamics of workgroup fracture: common
ground, trust-with-trepidation, and warranted distrust”, Journal of Management, Vol. 40 No. 3,
pp. 764-795.
Pym, A. (2012), On Translator Ethics: Principles for Mediation between Cultures (translated by Walker, H.),
John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam.
Reese, S. (2018), “Foreword”, in D’Angelo, P. (Ed.), Doing News Framing Analysis II: Empirical and
Theoretical Perspectives, Routledge, New York, NY, pp. xiii-xvi.
Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R.S. and Camerer, C. (1998), “Not so different after all:
a cross-discipline view of trust”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 393-404.
Searle, R.H., Nienaber, A.-M.I. and Sitkin, S.B. (2018), “Implications for future directions in trust
research”, in Searle, R.H., Nienaber, A.-M.I. and Sitkin, S.B. (Eds), The Routledge Companion to
Trust, Routledge, London, pp. 536-541.
Shackleton, J. (2018), “Preparedness in diverse communities: citizen translation for community
engagement”, Proceedings of ISCRAM Asia Pacific 2018, Massey University, pp. 400-406.
Sitkin, S. and Bijlsma-Frankema, K. (2018), “Distrust”, in Searle, R.H., Nienaber, A.-M.I. and Sitkin, S.B.
(Eds), The Routledge Companion to Trust, Routledge, London, pp. 109-121.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
ogniqualvolta il re vi tornava, e ben pochi s’attaccarono alla fortuna
del nuovo signore. Mentre la nobiltà ribramava l’antica dominazione,
le persone colte stomacavansi d’un assolutismo non palliato dalla
gloria; la plebe rimpiangeva i tempi in cui non pagava nulla; e a
guarnir la città, non tanto contro i forestieri come contro i cittadini,
bisognava tenere più soldati che non ne desse il Genovesato, ed
erigere fortezze minacciose.
Re Vittorio Emanuele, si dicesse pur raggirato dalla moglie, dal
confessore, dal confidente, palesava però intenzioni benevole;
lasciava poc’a poco sottentrare le nuove idee e nuove persone; e
dopo gli odiati Cerutti e Borgarelli, chiamò al ministero il conte
Prospero Balbo, onorato per mente e per liberalità secondo i tempi e
il ceto, che impacciato da tutto l’organamento burocratico, sperò alle
urgenti riforme supplire con palliativi. Secondando la moda, si diè
voce che stava in lavoro una costituzione, e se non veniva agli
effetti, imputavasene l’Austria, la cui vicinanza impacciava
l’indipendenza del regno; l’Austria, potenza preponderante in Italia,
spauracchio universale, su cui i governanti versavano anche le colpe
proprie. Rimedio unico, infallibile a tutti gli abusi acclamavasi la
costituzione: questa al Piemonte attirerebbe l’attenzione e i voti di
chiunque aspira al meglio nazionale, e d’un soffio diroccherebbe
l’Austria, reggentesi solo sul despotismo: gli impazienti
raddoppiavano d’attività nelle combriccole dei Carbonari, degli
Adelfi, de’ Maestri sublimi; e quando scoppiò la rivoluzione di Napoli,
più sorrise il desiderio d’emancipare il Piemonte dalla tutela
austriaca, e metterlo a capo dell’Italia redenta.
Allora le società secrete abbracciarono moltissimi soldati, più
avvocati e professori, e gl’impiegati fin nelle somme magistrature, e
non pochi del clero, e tutti gli studenti; poi propagate nelle provincie
compresero sindaci e parroci, legarono intelligenze colle lombarde e
romagnole. L’antica lealtà savojarda repugnava dalle congiure; l’onor
militare rifuggiva dal calpestare il giuramento di fedeltà; ma si fece
intendere che non trattavasi di ribellarsi al re, bensì di salvarlo dalla
congiura dei preti e dei nobili e dalla servitù, dell’Austria, che si
spargeva volesse obbligare a ricevere guarnigione tedesca, e
concorrere alla spedizione contro di Napoli; anzi, essa pensasse
trarre in un arciduca il Piemonte, a danno di Carlalberto principe di
Savoja Carignano.
Questo giovane rampollo del ramo cadetto reale, educato
popolarmente a Parigi, erasi mescolato d’amicizie, di studj, di
godimenti, d’intelligenze colla gioventù coeva; e poichè de’ quattro
fratelli della Casa regnante nessuno lasciava figliuoli maschi,
trovossi vicino al trono, e fu messo granmastro d’artiglieria. In
quest’arma molti aderivano a’ Carbonari, ed essi gli posero indosso
la febbre di divenire illiberatore d’Italia. Il conte Santorre Santarosa
spingeva a venire ai fatti, mentre sollevata Napoli, incalorite le menti
dalla rivoluzione greca e dalla spagnuola, imbarazzate le Potenze;
Francia commossa parlava di vessillo tricolore, di costituzione del
1791; la Germania, reciso il nervo austriaco, volea rialzare il
liberalismo; Italia esser matura; leverebbesi come un uomo solo per
acquistare la libertà, l’unità, l’indipendenza. Quando poi gli Austriaci
mossero verso Napoli, certo (diceasi) gli eroi popolari terranno testa
lungamente (1821); i monti sono le barriere della libertà, nè i briganti
furono mai domabili: intanto l’insurrezione in Piemonte si compirà
senza ostacoli, Milano seconderà, Romagna e i piccoli Stati non
tarderanno, e tutta l’Italia superiore si troverà costituita prima che
gl’Imperiali tornino a reprimerla; Francia, se anche non favorisse,
non permetterà mai che l’Austria entri armata in paese che confina
con essa.
Si cominciò al solito dalla stampa clandestina, e girò un reclamo, in
cui pretendeasi strappare al re la benda postagli da’ suoi cortigiani,
rivelandogli esausto l’erario, il denaro stillato dalla fronte del popolo
è prodigato a impinguare le più alte e inutili persone dello Stato; gli
uomini a cui è affidata l’economia pubblica sagrificano all’egoismo
personale gl’interessi della patria. — Maestà, se invece di cumulare i
poteri in una classe sola, aveste chiamato il consiglio di tutta la
nazione, i lumi generali avrebbero riparato a questi mali, nè voi
avreste il rimorso d’aver condotto a rovina lo Stato. Il vostro Governo
avversò sempre la dottrina; l’istruzione primaria è abbandonata
all’ignoranza e all’impotenza dei Comuni; l’educazione media è
tiranneggiata dai Gesuiti; gli studj filosofici involti nella ruggine
monacale; i legali, disordinati per mancanza di legislazione;
l’Università condotta da uomini o inetti o stupidi o maligni, gl’ingegni
migliori vanno a cercare un pane altrove, o vivono sprezzati. I favoriti
hanno il monopolio dei diritti e dei privilegi, pesando sulla classe
industriosa della società. Le provincie dai governatori delle divisioni
sono rette come paese di nemici. Le amministrazioni civiche e
comunali cascano in disordine per l’indolenza, l’incapacità, la
discordia dei capi. La religione, in mano dei Gesuiti, è strumento
d’ambiziose voglie e di tenebrosi raggiri. La legislazione civile ha
l’arbitrio per base, la criminale il carnefice per sostegno. Uno strano
ed informe accozzamento di leggi romane, di statuti locali, di
costituzioni patrie, di editti regj, di sentenze senatorie, di
consuetudini municipali, hanno tolto la bilancia alla giustizia, e
lasciata la strada al despotismo dei tribuni. L’esercito non ha forza
morale, perchè composto di elementi contrarj, di corpi privilegiati, di
brigate varie tra loro di dottrine, di lingua, di diritti, comandati da capi
promossi non per merito ma per favore. Dei militari una parte è
avvilita, perchè si vede preclusa la strada ai gradi maggiori; tutti
indignati ai maneggi del vostro Governo, il quale medita di trafficare
la loro vita col gabinetto d’Austria. No: il nome de’ soldati piemontesi
non si confonderà mai col tedesco; essi sono e saranno italiani».
L’11 gennajo 1821 alquanti studenti dell’Università comparvero al
teatro d’Angennes con berretti rossi alla greca. Arrestati, in onta del
privilegio che li sottoponeva al magistrato degli studj, furono messi in
fortezza: i condiscepoli irritati si asserragliano nell’Università, a gran
voce domandando la scarcerazione de’ colleghi: il reggimento
Guardie mandato a calmarli trova resistenza, e fa sangue. Tali
manifestazioni sogliono chiamarci primizie di martiri; e ne rimase una
cupa irritazione. Se n’incaloriva la faccenda delle società secrete;
ma quale costituzione adottare? la francese, la spagnuola, o
l’inglese? perocchè sempre si stava all’imitare, anzichè fondarsi sulle
basi storiche e nazionali. Per risolvere si mandano tre deputati alla
vendita suprema di Parigi, alla quale faceano centro i Liberali di
Spagna, i Radicali d’Inghilterra, gli Eterj di Grecia, i nostri Carbonari;
e vien data la preferenza alla costituzione spagnuola, come scevra
d’elementi aristocratici e tutta popolare. Ma il Governo, istruitone
forse dalla Polizia francese, intercettate le lettere del principe La
Cisterna e del marchese Priero, conobbe partecipi gl’impiegati e i
militari, cioè quelli che doveano opporsi, onde non sapeva o non
poteva impedire. Il conte Moffa di Lisio e il marchese Sanmarzano,
uffiziali sospetti, invitati a partire da Torino, ricusano, e con Giacinto
Collegno, ajutante di Carlalberto, con Santarosa, Morozzo, Ansaldi,
Bianco, Baronis, Asinari ed altri uffiziali prendono concerto di
rivoltare l’esercito, sorprendere Alessandria, acclamare Vittorio re
costituzionale dell’alta Italia.
I cospiratori non si erano intesi co’ Napoletani, onde non fu nè
contemporaneo il sollevarsi, nè uniforme l’intento; poi i preparativi
erano impacciati dal tentennare del principe di Carignano fra la gloria
e la fedeltà. Ma la rivolta scoppia fra i militari a Fossano ed
Alessandria (9 marzo), costituendo una giunta della Federazione
italiana; fra il restante esercito corre il grido d’Italia, di francare
dall’Austria il re, sicchè possa seguire i moti del suo cuore italiano, di
porre il popolo nell’onesta libertà di manifestare i proprj voti al trono,
come i figli a un padre; e scritto sui vessilli, Regno d’Italia,
Indipendenza italiana; e gridando, Viva la costituzione, Morte agli
Alemanni, i sollevati s’accostano a Torino. Quivi gli studenti e
alquanti militari col capitano Ferrero attruppatisi a San Salvario, che
allora giaceva un pezzo fuor di città, gridano la costituzione; altri
uccidono il colonnello Raimondi che li richiama al dovere; ma non
secondati dal popolo, con disastrosa marcia sfilano come vinti verso
Alessandria, il cui comandante fu ucciso [184].
Il re non osa ricorrere alla forza, ma espone lealmente la
dichiarazione fatta dai re a Troppau contro ogni novità, mostrando
come ne resterebbe pericolata l’indipendenza; e non volendo nè
promettere quel che non è disposto a mantenere, nè autorizzare atti
che agli stranieri diano pretesto d’invadere il suo paese, depone una
corona (13 marzo) ch’egli non potea conservare se non colla guerra
civile.
Il Carignano, da lui nominato reggente, esitava a palesare le sue
intenzioni, sicchè schiamazzi, poi armi. Dalla cittadella sorpresa
gl’insorgenti minacciano far fuoco sulla città: molti soldati lasciano le
bandiere, considerandosi come sciolti dal giuramento dato al re;
l’anarchia sottentra; quando il Carignano proclama la costituzione
spagnuola, gli applausi vanno al cielo, e al nome di Carlalberto si
accoppia quello di re d’Italia.
In Lombardia avea preso piede la setta della Federazione italiana, e
da un pezzo tramava nelle sale del marchese Gattinara di
Breme [185] e del conte Federico Confalonieri, mascherata sotto il
velo d’imprese benefiche o progressive, come una distilleria d’aceto
a Lezzeno, un battello a vapore sul lago di Pusiano e sul Po,
l’illuminazione a gas, il mutuo insegnamento, un bazar, il giornale del
Conciliatore, apostolo del romanticismo. L’Austria, avutone fumo,
arrestò Silvio Pellico, giovane saluzzese educatore in casa Porro, la
cui Francesca da Rimini avea fatto sperare all’Italia un secondo
Alfieri. Allo scoppiar della rivoluzione piemontese si rinserrarono le
file in mano del conte Confalonieri, principale nella sciagurata
insurrezione del 1814, poi nei suoi viaggi legatosi co’ primarj liberali,
e che si mise attorno Demester e Arese antichi uffiziali napoleonici,
Giuseppe Pecchio economista, Pietro Borsieri letterato, i marchesi
Giorgio Parravicini e Arconati, Benigno Bossi, i fratelli Ugoni di
Brescia, il cavaliere Pisani di Pavia, il conte Giovanni Arrivabene di
Mantova, l’avvocato Vismara novarese, Castiglia, altri ed altri. Essi
aveano già disposta sulla carta una guardia nazionale, una giunta di
Governo; neppur l’inno mancava, opera d’un sommo poeta; e
appena l’esercito piemontese varcasse il Ticino, insorgerebbero
Milano, Brescia, le valli, le campagne, occupando le casse e le
fortezze di Peschiera e Rôcca d’Anfo.
I Lombardi spedirono al Sanmarzano, generale degli insorgenti
piemontesi, con numerose firme esortandolo a venire. — Cominciate
ad insorgere voi», ci diceano i ministri piemontesi; e noi
rispondevamo: — Da soli non bastiamo a vincere; ma senza noi, voi
non bastate a difendervi». Il vero è che Sanmarzano contava
appena ducento dragoni e trecento fanti; ma poichè coll’audacia
dominansi le rivoluzioni, risolvea ritentar l’impresa, massime che gli
Austriaci, collo sgomento di chi accampa in terra nemica, aveano
ritirato ogni truppa dal Ticino, e il vicerè lasciavasi vedere a incassar
mobili e vendere vasellame. Ma il ministro piemontese Villamarina
disapprovò quella temerità; e il reggente che, come dice il Santarosa
«voleva e non voleva», mandò quel reggimento ad Alessandria. Così
la rapidità degli avvenimenti, la inconcepibile mancanza di concerti,
la titubanza dei capi, la paura che Torino cessasse d’essere capitale
del Regno, elisero il moto della Lombardia, donde sol pochi giovani
corsero in Piemonte ad aggregarsi al battaglione di Minerva.
Binder ambasciatore austriaco, insultato fin nel suo palazzo, parte
lasciando una nota minacciosa. Il duca del Genevese che, per la
rinunzia del fratello, diventava re col nome di Carlo Felice, da
Modena dichiara ribellione ogni attenuamento della piena autorità
reale, e punibile chi non torni all’ubbidienza; ed ordina le truppe si
concentrino a Novara sotto il generale La Torre. Carlalberto, anche
dopo giurata la costituzione, non si era risoluto a convocare i collegi
elettorali, bandir guerra all’Austria, entrare in Lombardia. Udita poi la
dichiarazione del nuovo re, e che questo avea invocato l’Austria,
dicendo minacciata la propria vita, e sè incapace di padroneggiare la
rivoluzione, fugge all’esercito regio a Novara, e di là pubblica che
«altro ambir non saprebbe che di mostrarsi il primo sulla strada
dell’onore, e dar così l’esempio della più rispettosa obbedienza ai
sovrani voleri».
Era il 23 marzo, il giorno stesso d’un altro proclama ventisette anni
dopo.
Quella fuga toglieva agl’insorgenti ogni apparenza di legalità: ma
risoluti di non cedere, creano una giunta provvisoria [186]; sparigliano
proclami e bugie. Intanto ogni cosa va sossopra; la Savoja si
chiarisce pel re; la brigata che porta quel nome, ricusa disertare,
onde fu dovuta rimandare in patria; i carabinieri in arme si recano
all’esercito regio; a Genova il governatore Des Geneys, che
annunziò la defezione di Carlalberto, è assalito, trascinato per le vie,
e a fatica salvato dai generosi che non voleano contaminare con
violenze la rivoluzione; i Liberali medesimi discordano, quali
caldeggiando la Camera unica, quali la duplice, quali unitarj, quali
federalisti. Santarosa, fatto ministro della guerra, cerca destare il
coraggio colle speranze, e collo spargere che gli Austriaci furono
disfatti dai Napoletani, e le valli Bresciane insorsero furibonde; ma
ecco giungere certezza della disfatta degli Abruzzi, e che centomila
Russi sono in mancia; poi addosso ai Liberali muovono i Realisti col
generale La Torre e gli Austriaci col generale Bubna (9 aprile), che in
Lombardia aveva, se non alle trame, partecipato alle speranze de’
Carbonari; presso Novara succede un’affrontata, e la rivoluzione
piemontese è finita.
Carlalberto ricoveratosi a Milano, è dal generale austriaco
beffardamente presentato come re d’Italia: Carlo Felice a Modena lo
tratta come uno scapato, e la lettera di lui getta in viso al suo
scudiere: egli si ritira a Firenze a digerire l’obbrobrio, confessare i
suoi torti e farne scusa, solo appoggiato dall’ambasciatore francese
per rispetto alla legittimità [187].
La società de’ Maestri Sublimi, raffinamento della Massoneria, e che
professava il regicidio, fu dalla Francia trapiantata a Ginevra dal
fiorentino Michelangelo Buonarroti, antico adepto di Babœuf, che
v’istituì un congresso italiano per diffonderne i dogmi nel nostro
paese. Alessandro Adryane, che n’era diacono straordinario, fu
spedito qui per rannodare le rotte fila; ma a Milano lasciossi cogliere
con tutte le carte, le quali diedero a conoscere la trama, senza
bisogno che la rivelasse Carlalberto, come si ciancia. Da nove mesi
era finito il parapiglia di Piemonte quando si cominciarono i processi
contro i Lombardi, parte a Milano, parte a Venezia [188], da una
commissione speciale, alla cui testa il tirolese Salvotti. In quelli
l’imputato si trovava all’arbitrio d’un giudice, senza difensori,
senz’avere sott’occhio le sue e le altrui deposizioni; durava interi
mesi di solitudine nel carcere fra un esame e l’altro; e qualche volta
l’inquirente, fattosi mansueto, gli diceva: — Ecco, ella è interamente
nelle mie mani. Qui non siamo in paese di pubblicità
compromettente. Confessa ella quel che del resto noi sappiamo?
l’imperatore le fa grazia, ella torna a casa sua onorato. Persiste al
niego? sta in me il diffamarla, e spargere che ha tutto rinvesciato,
che tradì i compagni, e così torle quel ch’ella mostra valutare tanto,
la pubblica opinione».
Ad arti di simil genere, piuttosto che a torture fisiche, non tutti
resistettero; vi fu uno che, per generosità di salvare un amico, corse
a denunciare se stesso, poi accortosi dell’errore si finse pazzo, e per
mesi sostenne la straziante simulazione; altri credette scagionarsi
col provare che aveva dissuaso i Piemontesi dall’invadere la
Lombardia; altri ammise di quelle tenui concessioni che conducono
ad altre; tanto che si potè raccogliere onde condannare
Confalonieri [189], Adryane, Castiglia, Parravicini, Tonelli, Borsieri,
Arese e molt’altri a Milano, dove furono esposti sulla gogna il 24
gennajo 1824. E già a Venezia, la vigilia di Natale, giorno di
gratulazioni e feste ecclesiastiche e civili, erasi letta la sentenza di
Pellico, Maroncelli, Solera, Villa, Oroboni, Foresti, Fortini ed altri e,
cosa insolita in quella stagione, l’accompagnarono tuoni e ruggito del
mare sotto un insistente scirocco, onde al domani la città fu invasa
dall’acqua, e tutto il litorale ne patì fin alla Spezia e a Genova.
Furono portati allo Spielberg, ove alcuni soccombettero, quali il
conte Oroboni, il veterano Morelli, il Villa; Maroncelli perdette una
gamba; altri poterono dopo molti anni uscire ancora a narrare i proprj
patimenti [190]. E mentre alcuni li esagerarono, o posero in evidenza
se stessi, o denigrarono altrui, Silvio Pellico li raccontò senza
rancori, senz’arte; e tutto il mondo lesse le sue Prigioni, e la pietà
per quei sofferenti partorì esecrazione a colui che così facea soffrire:
e che pure non avea mai lasciato che l’applicazione dell’estremo
supplizio gli togliesse di esercitare il diritto più prezioso pei re, il
ripiego più nobile pell’uomo, la grazia e la riparazione.
Gioja, Romagnosi, Trechi, Mompiani, Visconti e altri fur on rilasciati
senza condanna [191]. I quali poi restavano in condizione tristissima,
chè, mentre la Polizia perseverava nell’adocchiarli e vessarli, quasi a
giustificarsi dell’averli perseguitati, il pubblico (troppo solito complice
degli oppressori) dubitava di loro perchè non condannati, e
accogliendo le sinistre insinuazioni sparse d’alto luogo, finiva per
temere e odiare quelli ch’erano temuti e odiati dal Governo.
In Piemonte si fecero 92 sentenze di morte, 432 di lunga o perpetua
prigionia [192], ma tutti in contumacia, essendosi lasciato partire chi
volle; il notajo Garelli e il sottotenente Laneri furono messi a morte, e
in effigie La Cisterna, Caraglio, Collegno, Lisio, Morozzo, Regis,
Santarosa; di seicennovantaquattro uffiziali inquisiti, dugenventi
furono destituiti, e così molti impiegati civili.
Anche negli Stati Pontifizj i cospiratori abbondavano: e il Puccini,
direttore della Polizia toscana, scriveva al Corsini plenipotenziario al
congresso di Lubiana: «Nelle Marche e nelle Legazioni sono assai
numerose le sêtte, e grandi mezzi adoprano per diffondere l’odio
contro i Governi monarchici, e sperano nei torbidi d’Italia, comunque
arrivino. L’odio di questi partiti si sfoga colle maniere dei tempi del
duca Valentino. Molte uccisioni vennero commesse negli anni scorsi
sopra ecclesiastici ed impiegati pubblici a Forlì, Ravenna, Faenza;
altre in maggior numero modernamente, certo per odio di parte».
Istantemente aveano chiesto che le truppe sarde si avvicinassero al
confine, ma non ne fu nulla; e quel Governo, ripigliata forza,
cominciò gli arresti; di quattrocento processati, molti, principalmente
per opera del Rusconi legato di Ravenna e del Sanseverino di Forlì,
condannò alla pena capitale, che il papa commutò nella reclusione. Il
granduca non credette necessarj i processi perchè non ebbe paura.
Maria Luigia li lasciò fare, e vi furono involti Ferdinando Maestri e
Jacopo Sanvitali professori; ma commutò le pene in esiglio. A
Modena nel 1817 erasi formata una società della Spilla nera per
rassicurare i Napoleonidi: e al tempo stesso i Massoni, gli Adelfi, le
Chiese dei sublimi maestri perfetti aveano adepti, e s’erano ascritti i
dottori Carlo e Giuseppe Fattori di Reggio, nella cui casa teneansi le
adunanze, il capitano Farioli di Guida, il dottore Pirondi, Prospero
Rezzio e molti ebrei [193]. Tutte le Società aveano statuti proprj, ed
alcune v’univano l’obbligo di farsi vicendevoli correzioni e di non
vagheggiare la moglie dell’amico: comune era quello di uccidere chi
fosse condannato o avesse rivelato il segreto: pagare una certa
somma, manifestare a tutta la società le operazioni del Governo.
Sconfitti su tutti i punti, i Liberali rifuggono in Ispagna a fiancheggiare
una causa che sentiano dover soccombere, ma che era la loro; e a
mostrare, colle generose morti, che non erano colpevoli delle fughe
di Rieti e di Novara. Altri crociaronsi in ajuto della Grecia, dove a
Sfacteria perì il Santarosa, eroe all’antica.
Gli alleati, all’udire l’inaspettato successo, esclamano «doverlo
attribuire non tanto ad uomini che mal comparvero nel giorno della
battaglia, quanto al terrore onde la Provvidenza colpì le ree
coscienze»; e protestando di lor giustizia e disinteresse, annunziano
all’Europa d’aver occupato il Piemonte e Napoli, e nella lora unione
«una sicurezza contro i tentativi de’ perturbatori». Insieme
partecipano ai loro ministri presso le Corti «essere principio e fine di
loro politica il conservare ciò che fu legalmente costituito, contro una
setta che pretende ridurre tutto a una chimerica eguaglianza»;
annunziano altamente che «i cambiamenti utili o necessarj nelle
leggi o nella amministrazione degli Stati, non devono emanare che
dalla libera volontà di quelli che Dio rese responsali del potere [194].
Così essi erigonsi custodi e dispensieri unici della verità, della
giustizia, delle franchigie: e i Liberali ebbero servito agl’interessi
dell’Austria, dandole occasione di estendere l’alta vigilanza e quasi
l’impero su tutta la penisola, da lei sottratta ai tumulti o al progresso.
Poi a Verona (1822) s’adunarono a congresso i re di tutta Europa
colla grandezza loro e cogli avanzi di loro miserie: e i diplomatici più
vantati dichiararono che «resistere alla rivoluzione, prevenire i
disordini, i delitti, le calamità, assodar l’ordine o la pace, dare ai
Governi legittimi gli ajuti che aveano diritto di chiedere, fu l’unico
oggetto degli sforzi dei sovrani; ottenutolo, ritirano i soccorsi che la
sola necessità avea potuto provocare e giustificare, felici di lasciare
ai principi il vegliare alla sicurezza e tranquillità del popolo: e di
togliere al mal talento fin l’ultimo pretesto di cui possa valersi per
ispargere dubbj sull’indipendenza dei sovrani d’Italia». In fatto
l’Austria si persuase a sgombrare il Piemonte e abbreviare
l’occupazione del Napoletano; della Grecia non si ascoltarono
tampoco i deputati, benchè il papa gli avesse accolti ad Ancona e
raccomandati; si convenne dei casi in cui i re si dovrebbero sussidj
reciproci; si stabilì soffocare la rivoluzione anche in Ispagna, e
l’incarico ne fu commesso all’esercito francese, che tra le grida di
Muoja la costituzione, Viva il re assoluto, procedette senza ostacolo
fino a Siviglia. Carlalberto, combattendo al Trocadero, aveva in
faccia ai re lavato la macchia dell’essersi lasciato salutare re
d’Italia [195].
La facile caduta di rivolte militari o di popolari sommosse, fecero
persuasi i re d’essere sicuri, e che niuna reale efficacia possedesse
lo spirito liberale, che amavano confondere col rivoluzionario;
bastasse affrontarlo per vincerlo; e pesarono sull’Italia con una
taciturna oppressione non ricreata da verun lampo di speranza.
 CAPITOLO CLXXXIV.
La media Italia. Rivoluzioni del 1830.

Nei Liberali questo momentaneo agitarsi sotto le bajonette de’

padroni lasciò scontentezza, ma non sconforto: e poichè, invece di
studiar le vere cause della ruina, la spiegavano colla plateale
ragione del tradimento, altra lezione non se ne traeva se non
d’esecrare i traditori, e non isperare nei principi.
Tanti profughi ond’erano piene non solo Francia, Inghilterra e
Svizzera, ma Barberia e Turchia, rodendo il pane dell’esiglio
rinnovavano que’ tempi del medioevo quando le trame dei fuorusciti
decideano le sorti della patria, e co’ loro scritti mantenevano
l’irrequietudine, eccitando sdegni che pareano speranze. Giuseppe
Pecchio descrisse i proprj viaggi e la vita di Foscolo e la storia
dell’amministrazione finanziera del regno d’Italia e quella
dell’economia politica nel nostro paese, adulandoci: Giovanni
Arrivabene applicavasi all’economia e alla beneficenza pubblica:
Camillo Ugoni continuava la critica letteraria, come il Salò:
Santarosa ed altri raccontavano la rivoluzione di Piemonte, mentre
Pepe e Carascosa duellavano su quella di Napoli: il capitano Bianco
insegnava la guerra per bande: Giannone ordiva un poema l’Esule: il
conte Alerino Palma sedeva nell’areopago della risorta Grecia, e in
quella lingua scriveva delle viti e del vino: le romanze di Giovanni
Berchet milanese rendevano popolare l’esecrazione contro l’Austria
e contro Carlalberto. I libri che si faceano leggere, erano proscritti o
di proscritto; le opere statistiche del Gioja, le giuridiche del
Romagnosi, le mediche del Rasori, le filologiche del Giordani e del
Foscolo, le storiche del Troya, del Colletta, del Sismondi, le poetiche
del Pellico e del Rossetti, le filosofiche del Borelli, prediligeansi
perchè d’autori perseguitati; voleano vedersi allusioni e condanne
contro l’autorità che le proibiva, e il divieto aguzzava le voglie, e
toglieva il criterio di sceverare il vero dal falso. Così crebbe la
smania del leggere e scrivere, del ragionare e ragionacchiare di
politica e d’economia; e si moltiplicarono i giornali.
Era anche questa un’imitazione di Francia, dove i Carbonari, non
avendo potuto insorgere nel 1821, si erano diretti a preparare
l’opinione sia alla tribuna, sia colle gazzette, lanciandosi in una
politica avventurosa, com’è sempre quella che non ha il riscontro
della realtà, ed esercitando quell’opposizione negativa, ch’è
facilissima perchè ha bisogno solo di collocarsi in un punto di vista
differente da quello del Governo, ed è insufflata dalle passioni
invidiose e malevole. Di là quei giornali arrivavano in Italia: i Governi
che ne capivano la potenza a segno di proibirli, non riuscivano ad
opporvene alcuno, il quale alla savia moderazione che concilia
anzichè irritare unisse la prudente franchezza che fa rispettare la
ragione anche quando contraria, e all’elogio dà valore e dignità col
saper disapprovare. Intanto sui Francesi formavasi quel poco di
spirito pubblico, creando bisogni e affetti che non erano i nostri;
lodando una beneficenza che storpia l’uomo per avere il vanto di
dargli le stampelle; erudendosi a una storia tessuta con luoghi
comuni e paradossi; allucinandosi ad un liberalismo che abbaja
contro ciò che s’ha a distruggere, non ragiona sopra ciò che bisogna
sostituire, e vagheggia una democrazia che sconoscendo le parti più
vitali delle nazioni e degli individui, condanna ad abdicare ogni
valore proprio ed inabissarsi nella così detta opinione pubblica, cioè
volgare.
Quest’indeclinabile imitazione de’ Francesi, della loro scienza
incompleta, della filosofia eclettica, della letteratura improvvisata,
della politica rischiosa fu sempre una delle più funeste endemie
degl’Italiani. Intanto i principi nostri credevano che i mali si
rimediassero col negarli, e se la compressione materiale ristabilì
l’ordine esterno, non si provvide all’interna agitazione, cresciuta anzi
ne’ paesi dove non s’era dianzi sfogata, e dei quali or ci avanza a
parlare.
Il papa era stato rintegrato ne’ suoi possessi, eccetto Avignone e il
contado Venesino che Francia si tenne, e le fortezze di Comacchio e
Ferrara a cavallo del Po, volute dall’Austria ad onta delle proteste
pontifizie.
Roma aveva esultato nel ricuperare il Laocoonte, l’Apollo, la Corte,
le solennità, l’aurifera affluenza dei forestieri. Pio VII, tornando
ingloriato dal martirio, non ricercò alcuno per l’operato durante il
Governo francese o nell’invasione di Murat; anzi il generale
austriaco Stefanini, col fare qualche persecuzione, scemò la
propensione che non piccola v’era per gli Austriaci. Col consiglio del
cardinale Consalvi e del Bartolucci, il papa con motuproprio (1816 6
luglio) sistemò l’amministrazione pubblica in aspetto di legge
generale che tenesse dell’antico senza ripudiare tutto il nuovo,
tenendo all’unità e uniformità collo sbandire quelle amministrazioni
molteplici, e ridurre a un centro le giurisdizioni. Lo Stato fu diviso in
diciannove provincie, oltre la metropoli colla comarca; ogni
delegazione in distretti ch’erano quarantaquattro: questi in
seicenventisei Comuni sotto delegati prelatizj. Le Comunità
regolavansi da un consiglio che deliberava, da una magistratura che
amministrava, scegliendone i membri fra il clero, i possessori, i
letterati, i negozianti, salva la conferma del delegato. Roma ebbe un
senatore e conservatori; e così Bologna.
Ai fidecommessi poteasi rinunziare: abolite le servitù e le riserve;
abolite le giurisdizioni baronali, eccetto quelle del cardinale decano
in Ostia e Velletri, e del maggiordomo papale in Castelgandolfo;
aboliti gli statuti municipali, se non in quanto concerne l’agricoltura.
Si sistemò l’imposta, alleggerendola d’un quarto, e doveasi erigere il
rendiconto annuo, compilare un catasto regolare, un registro di tutto
il debito pubblico fruttante il cinque per cento, con una cassa di
redenzione.
Abolito il codice civile e il criminale francese, le commissioni, i giudizj
privati, si accentravano le giurisdizioni, determinando i tribunali
collegiali e le loro gradazioni, con appelli a Bologna, Macerata e
Roma, e una cassazione detta Segnatura; le cause trattate in
italiano, motivate le sentenze criminali, difeso il reo e confrontato coi
testimonj, abolita ogni guisa di tortura; indipendente l’autorità
giudiziale, responsali i magistrati. Ma regolamenti soggiunti
smentirono i preamboli, nè i codici promessi comparvero mai: i fôri
vescovili impacciavano col trarre a sè ogni lite ove fosse implicato un
ecclesiastico: rinacquero i vecchi tribunali della fabbrica di San
Pietro che conosce di qualunque eredità a suffragio delle anime, e
della congregazione de’ chierici di camera per le cause demaniali: la
Segnatura non giudicava definitivamente, ma rimetteva alla sacra
Rota, la quale cogli opinamenti (del resto opportuni a raggiungere la
verità) poteva eternare le cause, ripetendo l’audiatur invece dello
exequatur.
Alla francese continuarono l’ordinamento delle finanze, le ipoteche, il
bollo, il registro: ma il commercio era incagliato da privative e
protezioni; arbitraria la Polizia, diretta dal governatore di Roma, e
che applicava fino la pena del cavalletto. I soldati raccoglievansi per
ingaggio: privilegio dei chierici la istruzione e la censura, come a soli
prelati la diplomazia, e le supreme magistrature amministrative e
giuridiche, e fino il governo delle armi. Il papa ripristinò le accademie
della Religione cattolica, d’Archeologia, di San Luca; malgrado le
indomabili paure dei re, concesse ospitalità alla famiglia Buonaparte;
rielesse cardinali; colle antiche cerimonie canonizzò molti santi, fra
cui gl’italiani Andrea da Peschiera, Costante da Fabiano, Antonio da
San Germano vercellese, Ranieri da San Sepolcro, Francesco
Caracciolo, e le beate Angela da Desenzano, Caterina da Racconigi,
Giacinta Marescotti, Bartolomea Bagnesi fiorentina.
Alla basilica di San Paolo, fondata da Costantino, arricchita
dagl’imperatori e dai pontefici con quadri, musaici, porte di bronzo,
cimelj, marmi, s’apprese il fuoco accidentalmente, e que’ tesori
d’arte e di devozione e ventiquattro colonne di marmo frigio ne
rimasero distrutte. Parve preludere alla fine del pontefice, il quale
allora appunto cascando in camera, si ruppe l’osso del femore, e
soccombette (1823 20 luglio). Eroe da che la prigionia pose fine alle
sue debolezze, nè gradi nè ricchezze attribuì ai parenti; non
commise crudeltà, ma non impedì le malversazioni; e inetto al
governo, abbandonava il paese più povero, disordinato e bollente di
ire. Gli fu dato successore Annibale Della Genga (28 7bre), col nome
di Leone XII; il quale congedò il Consalvi, che lascerà buon nome fra
i ministri di Stato per lo spirito conciliativo ed opportuna fermezza, e
che poco dopo morendo, i molti donativi diplomatici destinò ad
erigere una statua al pontefice, di cui era stato sostegno.
Leone XII, reputato per moralità non meno che per l’accorgimento
politico mostrato come nunzio in Francia, proseguì le cure pastorali
contro «l’irruente empietà, e contro la meticolosa politica, invasata
dalla paura dei forti ed affettante alterigia coi deboli»; comprò la ricca
biblioteca artistica del Cicognara, che l’imperator d’Austria avea
ricusata; fece da giureconsulti esaminare il motuproprio del suo
predecessore; nominò anche una congregazione di Stato, ma subito
la risolse in mera assemblea consultiva. Parve anzi condiscendere ai
retrivi col lasciar vivere gli arbitrj di ciascun dicastero: vennero estesi
i diritti delle comunità; ma se ne’ consigli entravano tutte le classi,
rimaneva separata la nobiltà, con le primogeniture e fedecommessi,
credendo «influisca al decoro del principato»: volevasi anche
ripristinare le giurisdizioni baronali «come l’unico mezzo di ridonare il
lustro alla nobiltà romana», se il concistoro non si fosse opposto. Le
femmine dotate furono escluse dalla successione; rimessi i giudizj a
singoli, invece de’ collegi; aboliti i tribunali di distretto; introdotto di
nuovo il latino ne’ giudizj, e nelle più grandi Università e nelle cinque
minori; ad ecclesiastici affidato il condurre anche il processo dei laici;
attribuito ai Gesuiti il collegio romano, il museo, e l’osservatorio, con
dodicimila scudi di rendita sul tesoro pontifizio; ripristinato il
Sant’Uffizio; estesi i privilegi della manomorta.
Forza era dunque dar torto al papa di prima o al presente, e
facilmente si dava torto ad entrambi, cioè si perdea la fede
nell’autorità. Commissioni di preti ed uffiziali sgomentarono le
Legazioni, solcate da società segrete, che manifestavansi ad ora ad
ora con assassinj di pretesto politico, e contro avversarj che
denunciavansi per Sanfedisti: e un tentativo d’insurrezione nel 1825
in occasione del giubileo, costò la testa a un Targhini. Il cardinale
Rivarola nella legazione di Ravenna in una sola volta, udito il parere
de’ giudici, condannò (1825) cinquecentotto persone; poi ad un tratto
perdonò a tutte, assegnò pensioni ai loro parenti, e cercò
rappattumare Sanfedisti e Carbonari per via di matrimonj, che
riuscirono come Dio vel dica. Essendosi poi attentato alla vita del
legato, egli istituì una commissione severissima, moltiplicò le spie,
lasciò andare alla forca sette omicidi (1828), che il pubblico
compassionò come vittime politiche. Del resto, allorchè si promise
perdono a chi spontaneo venisse a far dichiarazioni, a centinaja vi
accorsero. Tali erano i governati, tali i governanti.
Leone XII aveva divisato di riformare le regole ed il vestire dei frati,
riducendoli a tre soli Ordini: uno di regolari, poveri, di scienza
discreta e gran cuore, che servissero al popolo sussidiando i parroci
e prestandosi agli spedali. Il secondo, tutto all’educazione e
istruzione della gioventù, e a sostenere gl’interessi della religione e
del buon costume. Il terzo di contemplativi, che salmeggiassero,
predicassero, e cercassero l’evangelica perfezione.
Non mancavano i Barbareschi di molestare le coste; ma peggior
vitupero allo Stato Pontifizio veniva dai briganti. L’antico paese dei
Volsci, fra gli Appennini, le paludi Pontine e i monti d’Albano e
Tuscolo, fino al 1809 appartenne alla famiglia Colonna, che all’armi
addestrava quelle popolazioni per ajutarsene nelle sue emulazioni
cogli Orsini e coi papi. E i papi non vi poteano nulla; se non che, alle
persone probe dando un brevetto di cherico, le sottraevano alla
giurisdizione territoriale. I Francesi abbatterono questa feudalità; ma
gli eccessi della coscrizione del 1813 tornarono in armi la
popolazione, e bande di politici vi si formarono in opposizione di re
Gioachino. Sotto il debole Governo sottentrato crebbero di baldanza:
obbedienti a capi quali De Cesaris e Gasparone nelle provincie
romane, Furia e Vandarelli nelle napoletane confinanti, e carichi
d’armi e di reliquie, a torme fin di cento scorrazzavano la campagna
spopolata, e rendeano pericolosissimo il tragitto da Roma al
Napoletano; assalirono e taglieggiarono un collegio alle porte di
Terracina, i Camaldolesi presso Tuscolo; molte famiglie ridussero sul
lastrico; guastarono i commerci, l’agricoltura, la pastorizia. Chi
avrebbe osato negare ricovero e vitto a questi formidabili? Assai
volte il Governo dovette scendere a patto con essi, pure beato
quando qualcuno tornasse a penitenza, e venisse a sospendere a
una Madonna il coltello insanguinato. Il Consalvi, fisso di sterminarli,
s’accontò col Governo napoletano acciocchè non li ricoverasse nel
suo territorio, arse le capanne e i villaggi ove annidavano, e potè
consacrare una festa a commemorazione d’averli distrutti. Ma non lo
erano così, che molto non restasse a fare. Leone XII spedì il
cardinale Pallotti legato a latere con un editto, ove, cessata ogni
misericordia o transazione, intimavasi morte immediata ai briganti
côlti; pena cinquecento scudi ai Comuni ove succedesse un loro
latroneccio. Di fatto si trovarono ridotti aventi, che a Sonnino
capitolarono: ed essi furono mandati nelle fortezze, il paese distrutto.
Lo Stato romano si estendeva fra il 41 e il 45º parallelo per
centrentadue miglia da Ancona a Civitavecchia e ducenquaranta dal
Po a Terracina, con due milioni e settecensettantaduemila abitanti, e
con fama di sterilità a terreni calcari e vulcanici, che sarebbero
ubertosissimi. Il pendìo dell’Appennino che scende al Mediterreneo
presenta vaste pianure, esercitate colla coltivazione grande; verso
l’Adriatico le varietà della piccola trovansi nelle Legazioni, nelle
Marche, nelle valli dell’Appennino. Le Legazioni partecipano della
fertilità della Lombardia; e una popolazione intelligente e laboriosa
prospera la coltura della seta, del frumento, del riso, del vino, della
canapa. Altrettanta è la fecondità delle Marche, ma i possessori
meno ricchi s’accontentano delle produzioni meno costose, quali il
vino e la seta: il colono è a mezzerìa, non affittajuolo. Lo Stato
guadagna assai dalle saline di Cervia e di Comacchio.
L’inameno Appennino verso settentrione vestesi di foreste; ma di
sotto di Roma restò ignudo, dacchè Sisto V le fece distruggere per
togliere il nido ai masnadieri: da quelle che sopravanzano verso il
lago di Bolsena e le fonti del Tevere si taglia eccellente legname
anche da navi. Le valli interposte si lavorano a piccola coltura, e
bellissime quelle della Nera e del Velino: la scabra dell’Anio è atta
appena all’ulivo: verso il Napoletano si allargano i piani di Sacco. Le
rive del Tevere mostrano la piccola coltivazione fino al monte
Soratte, ove comincia l’Agro romano, vastità di ducencinquantamila
ettari ubertosissimi, ma che accumulati in possessioni non minori di
trecento ettari, e fino di cinquecentomila, spesso con una sola casa
rustica, la più parte rimane soda, o soltanto lavorata a lunghissimi
intervalli.
Nel medioevo le famiglie romane viveano alla campagna e de’
prodotti di questa, e se le guerre private vi recavano guasti,
adoperavasi però ogni cura a farle fruttare come unica ricchezza.
Quando i papi cominciarono a impinguare i nipoti, questi comprarono
i beni de’ piccoli proprietarj, che volentieri li cambiavano contro
luoghi di monte, oggi diremo azioni di banca, molto fruttuosi. Nel
1470 Sisto IV permise a qualunque avventiccio di seminare per
proprio conto un terzo del terreno che fosse rimasto sodo: tale idea
avevasi allora della proprietà! Sisto V nel 1585 con un milione di
scudi stabilì una cassa di credito agricola a favore de’ proprietarj
dell’Agro romano; ma ben poco vantaggiò. Intanto i Borghesi vi
comprarono da ottantamila terre, e Paolo V le decretava immuni da
confisca: i Barberini altrettanto, impiegandovi, si disse, cento milioni
di scudi. Così sparve la proprietà suddivisa, e molte famiglie di
Parma, Firenze, Urbino lasciavano le proprie terre per venire a
Roma a goder le rendite dei Monti; ma non tardarono ad accorgersi
d’aver ceduto il certo per l’incerto. Alessandro VII cominciò le
riduzioni d’interessi: onde il credito ebbe una scossa tanto maggiore
perchè la cosa era inusata, i capitali si ascosero o sparvero, e così la
terra appartenne a proprietarj cui mancavano i capitali da utilizzarla.
Scemata la produzione, si dovette assicurare il vivere alle
popolazioni col proibire l’asportazione; laonde l’agricoltura si
restrinse a produrre soltanto quant’era necessario per l’interno.
Oggimai quell’ampiezza era posseduta da centredici famiglie e
sessantaquattro congregazioni: i Borghesi davano a fitto
ventiduemila ettare, i Chigi cinquemila seicento, i Cesarini Sforza
undicimila, e così via, cavandone da otto a diciotto franchi l’ettare: e i
grandi fittajuoli sopperivano alle spese cui non basterebbero i
proprietarj. Nella stagione che l’aria è men micidiale, si fa ressa ad
ottenere le ricchezze del suolo; centinaja d’aratri, a quattro, a sei, a
otto paja di bufali di fronte lo solcano; quella che credevi una
sodaglia incolta, in pochi giorni trovasi arata e sementata; poi si
dimentica fino all’ora della messe, quando un nugolo di montanari
scende alla mietitura; e dove parea un mare di biade ondeggianti, in
pochi giorni non rimane spiga in piede, e sottentra aspetto di
deserto. La gente degli Abruzzi, compiuta l’opera, riporta a’ suoi
monti pochi denari e le febbri. Il resto si abbandona alla pastorizia
che frutta senza spese nè pericolo, ed offre un cibo sano e nutritivo
alla città: ma neppur le mandre si pensa a moltiplicare, o introdurvi
migliori specie di montoni e di cavalli, in modo da farne lontane
asportazioni. Un pastore sceso dalla montagna, a cavallo addirizza i
numerosissimi armenti, trafiggendo con un lancione il puledro o la
bufala che scompigli il branco; e pochi bastano a migliaja d’animali.
Di cui in tutto lo Stato contansi oggi quattro milioni ducentomila capi,
dove seicentosessantatremila sono bovini, quindicimila muli ed asini,
due milioni e mezzo di pecore, trecentoventimila capre,
settecentomila majali. Ecco perchè delle 4,166,297 ettare dello Stato
Pontifizio, 1,046,861 tengonsi a prati.
Le alture d’Albano che fanno cornice all’Agro romano, nutrono una
popolazione robusta, e d’uva e frutti provvedono la capitale: ma
neppur qui abbastanza si cerca migliorare le produzioni, e il vino e
l’olio.
Di là da Velletri cominciano le paludi Pontine su quarantadue
chilometri di lunghezza per diciotto di larghezza. Pio VI vi sanò
ottomila ettare, che furono distribuite in enfiteusi coll’obbligo di
coltivarle e mantenere i canali secondarj, ma non che adoprarvi tutta
la cura, è assai se s’adempiono i contratti. Principali concessionarj
sono le famiglie Massimo, Fiano, Gaetani, e la fabbrica di San
Pietro, alla quale appartiene il Campo Morto di ottomila cinquecento
ettare, dove, fra gli altri allettativi per attirar gente, i malfattori sono
tenuti immuni dalla giustizia purchè subiscano la disciplina
prescrittavi. Quel podere alla semenza di mille ettolitri di frumento e
quattrocentoventi d’altre granaglie risponde l’annuo ricolto di
quindicimila trecento ettolitri; quattrocento giornalieri lavorando alla