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Criminology
W. Morrison
This module guide was prepared for the University of London by:
u Wayne Morrison, LLB, LLM, PHD, LLD, Professor of Law at Queen Mary University of
London and Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand.
This is one of a series of module guides published by the University. We regret that
owing to pressure of work the author is unable to enter into any correspondence
relating to, or arising from, the guide. If you have any comments on this module guide,
favourable or unfavourable, please use the form at the back of this guide.
University of London
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The University of London asserts copyright over all material in this module guide
except where otherwise indicated. All rights reserved. No part of this work may
be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without permission in writing from
the publisher. We make every effort to respect copyright. If you think we have
inadvertently used your copyright material, please let us know.
Criminology page i
Contents
Module descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1 What is your interest in criminology: as a discipline and as a subject?
What are you expecting to study? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Why have criminology? Do we need it? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 The syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Core materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Using the materials and preparing for the assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Module descriptor
GENERAL INFORMATION
Module title
Criminology
Module code
LA3025
Module level
6
Contact email
The Undergraduate Laws Programme courses are run in collaboration with the
University of London. Enquiries may be made via the Student Advice Centre at:
https://sid.london.ac.uk
Credit
30
Module prerequisite
None
The student is asked to think about their own situation, where they are located in the
global order and how they can use criminology to challenge their own ideas and to
better understand the formal and informal sources of knowledge about crime, the
grounds for public policy, labelling of offenders and responses to crime.
MODULE AIM
The module aims to develop a criminological imagination that enables successful
students to engage critically with both their presuppositions and acquired knowledge,
develop a global perspective, separate common sense from scholarly perspectives,
identify information needs and gaps and develop a sense of intellectual integrity that
acknowledges the limits of what we know and the need for further research.
4. Describe the main arguments of the various schools involved in explaining crime
and critically analyses their differences;
5. Describe perspectives on the role of punishment and the different functions that it
might be thought to serve.
7. Engage with definitional and conceptual issues relating to crime, deviance and
control;
8. Analyse popular perceptions of crime and punishment and subject these to critical
analysis;
9. Utilise a range of tools and resources available for the study of crime and its
control.
MODULE SYLLABUS
(a) Objectives and methods of criminology. The idea of a science of criminology. Basic
dichotomies/controversies on nature and scope of criminology, crime as a social
problem verses crime as inevitable and a reflection of social order. Developing a
criminological imagination in conditions of globalism. Defining crime (legal and
sociological conceptions, the role of the nation state and the need for different
focus, social harm and violations of human rights). Historical development of
criminology (in outline only). Classical and positivist schools. Criminology beyond
the nation state and the case of State crime. Sources of data: Official statistics and
alternatives (e.g. self-report studies and victimisation surveys); media images of
crime and offending and ‘moral panics’. Uses, defects and limitations of official data
for purposes of research. Challenges of gender, transnational crime and trafficking.
Module guide
Module guides are the students’ primary learning resource. The module guide covers
the entire syllabus and provides the student with the grounding to complete the
module successfully. The module guide sets out the learning outcomes that must
be achieved as well as providing advice on how to study the subject. The guide also
includes the essential reading and a series of self-test activities together with sample
examination questions, designed to enable students to test their understanding. The
module guide is supplemented each year with ‘Pre-exam updates’, made available on
the VLE.
u a module page with news and updates, provided by legal academics associated
with the Laws Programme;
u pre-exam updates;
u discussion forums where students can debate and interact with other students;
u law reports;
Core text
Students should refer to the following core text and specific reading references are
provided for this text in each chapter of the module guide:
ASSESSMENT
Learning is supported through tasks in the module guide, which include self-
assessment activities with feedback. There are additional online activities in the form
of multiple choice questions. The Formative Assessment will prepare students to reach
the module learning outcomes tested in the Summative Assessment.
Permitted materials
No materials are permitted in the examination.
Please be aware that the format and mode of assessment may need to change in
light of extraordinary events beyond our control, for example, an outbreak such as
the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. In the event of any change, students will be
informed of any new assessment arrangements via the VLE.
1 Introduction
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Learning outcomes
By the end of this introduction you will know more about:
u the style of the course
u the type of materials you will be provided with
u the assessment.
Introduction
The doors are opening. There are our murderers. Dressed in black. On their dirty hands
they wear white gloves. They drive us out of the synagogue in pairs. Dear sisters and
brothers, how difficult it is to take leave of such a beautiful life. You who are still alive,
never forget our innocent little Jewish street. Sisters and brothers, avenge us on our
murderers.
(Message left in blood on the wall of a synagogue in Eastern Europe where the Nazi forces
had herded Jewish inhabitants before taking them out to be shot. (Lawrence Langer, The
age of atrocity. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780807063699] p.40.))
I would like to say ‘Welcome!’ with full gaiety… but of course there is our subject
matter…
In terms of material: there is a vast range, including, but not limited to, the deliberate
infliction of pain; unnatural death such as homicide, murder and manslaughter; sexual
offences (such as rape – and in some countries the mere fact of sexual orientation);
fraud, burglary; ‘mugging’; drug taking; police corruption; torture; terrorism; drug and
human trafficking; responding to crime via social measures, target hardening and/or
punishment, which seem ‘natural’ but which may have resulted in creating a prison
business; atrocity; ‘industrial accidents’… and institutional selectivity by governments
and the media with regard to what are relevant ‘facts’ and perspectives are presented,
and – finally, but often overlooked – ourselves…
As an academic subject:
It is part of the social or human ‘sciences’ which raises complex questions about
objectivity and subjectivity because, unlike the ‘natural’ sciences in which humans
study inanimate (or ‘soulless’) processes, in the social sciences humans study other
humans and their social and cultural institutions. The social sciences are said to be
morally charged or reflexive, normative and unavoidably political. As opposed to the
study of physical and biological processes, social science studies are more historical
and morally orientated. While adhering to notions of scientific integrity and seeking
factually based arguments, the social sciences are more sciences of persuasion; they
may be ‘researching’ a particular policy – such as reactions by police and social services
to youth offending – but the findings have an effect. They either confirm, according
to a set of criteria, the efficacy of the current policy or they seek to change the overall
policy or particular aspects.
As a practical task:
You are encountering it as part of your LLB or perhaps BSc studies as a single, stand-
alone module.
However, you are undertaking a stand-alone module and you will be asked to read
a selection of material from a wide and often conflicting array. There is a very large
amount of material that could (and often does) go into criminology courses. At its
Criminology 1 Introduction page 3
simplest the word ‘criminology’ denotes the ‘logos’, the rational discourse, associated
with crime: crimin-o-logos. As seen by many of the late 19th and early 20th century
writers who are credited with forming it as a discipline, it connects with criminal law
and with penal policy (early texts were often entitled ‘Criminology and Penology’).
Thus it connected to ‘common-sense’ arguments about the need for social control and
punishment.
But there are those – like Angela Davis (first activity: research who she is) who say we
must break the seemingly common-sense link between crime and punishment (which
in many, many, cases means being sent to prison).
2. You, as the important and subjective element who is to interact with this
discipline and ultimately undergo assessment activities (primarily the summative
examinations); and
3. The world. The world is of course inescapable; it is the context of both the
discipline which seeks to be ‘truthful’ to it and you. The world always escapes being
captured fully and always surprises.
With criminology, for example, there are a number of basic distinctions in the
material, such as between seeing it as an applied science in which the aim is to
acquire secure knowledge that overcomes the need for political debate or choice, or
a critical imagination that reveals contingence and choice running through all human
activity; another is between ‘mainstream’ or ‘administrative’ and ‘critical’ criminology.
Mainstream criminology works with the status quo, the existing social structure and
cultural values; even if some of the individuals working as mainstream criminologists
may seek to reform it, they largely work on research agendas as set by the government
(the state) and accept the common-sense definition of a crime and an act or omission
which is subject to punishment (by the state). ‘Critical’ criminology finds the status
quo itself problematic and does not accept the state as the definer or arbiter of what
we should be concerned about as ‘crime’ or social harm.
In the USA, criminology is often taught in schools of Criminal Justice studies, and
students go on to employment in the ‘correctional service’ (such as in prisons), as
police officers and the like. In the UK, it is more commonly taught in departments
of general sociology or social policy or as a sub-set or as part of law courses and the
outlook is more generally critical.
Given that this is an individual module, it reflects choices made as to material and style
of teaching; it is also reflective. In other words it asks you to consider your taken-for-
granted assumptions, to ask you to consider your position in society and how much
do you know or analyse about the world. Do the criminal laws of your society reflect
the views of the whole population, or, in the case of at least some of them, a particular
portion? Are there circumstances in which you consider it right to break the law? More
broadly, consider the simple but also complex question: what were the real sources of
harm to humans in the 20th century? And has humanity progressed in terms of social
ordering? Are ‘we’, for example, more humane, more caring; has violence decreased or
increased and so forth. And what are our frames of reference?
page 4 University of London
As noted before, social sciences adopt an historical and morally orientated reading or
positioning of people, societies and places. Traditionally, the writers who contributed
to building up criminology seemed to assume that we were getting more civilised,
that the future would always be better (or that we could make it better). It is a product
of the Enlightenment attempt to replace the claims of tradition, the rhetorical appeals
to passion or the privileges of the aristocracy with a commitment to ‘reason’. That
meant, in practical terms, subjecting human arrangements to rational ordering and
making social changes in light of social statistics, of evidence of what worked and of a
rational appreciation of the issues that needed to be addressed.
What does that mean for our moral picture of humans? Langer describes a lesson:
One of the most sinister and melancholy discoveries of our era is that men and nations can
kill under certain circumstances without having to face effective censure from civilisation.
The desolate heritage of Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Stalinism, fascist Spain, Algeria, Vietnam
– the length of the list grows frightening – is that torture and or atrocities have failed to
offend the sensibilities of men as one might have expected. (Langer, 1978, p.46)
He wrote that in 1978 – what of today? The message rings even more true today after
the deliberate looking the other way and withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops in
Rwanda that allowed some 800,000-plus Tutsi to be killed, the abuses at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq and the USA’s use of torture under President George W. Bush in the
so-called War on Terror and the massacres carried out by the so-called Islamic State in
Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.
Consider language:
Academic criminology has been (and still is) largely language: it is a form of
rational representation. As a discipline it is organised in particular ways and in
your examination you will be expected to write coherently and use references and
arguments drawn from the ‘academic discipline’.
But is the subject matter capable of rational representation and do we, as consumers
or citizens of the world, deal in rational terms? Or do we distort things when we
package social reality into such a language and system of representation; are we really
wanting something other than dry reason, statistics and so forth?
Consider the issue of trust: should we trust ‘experts’, our instincts, our ‘moral
reactions’? And what of non-academic accounts of crime and motivation?
Many, many people read what could be termed ‘popular criminology’ daily, in
newspapers, in novels, and watch a form of criminology on TV and in cinema (whereas
people once thought of Sherlock Holmes as a criminologist, today many would look to
participants in one of the versions of CSI). Larry Lamb, once Editorial Director of
The Sun and News of the World (‘tabloid’ or mass circulation newspapers in the UK)
believed that ‘The basic interests of the human race are not in music, politics and
philosophy, but in things like food and football, money, sex and crime – especially
crime.’ (As quoted in Steve Chibnall, Law-and-order news an analysis of the crime
reporting in the British press. (London: Routledge, 2001; first published 1977)
[ISBN 9780415264082].)
Criminology 1 Introduction page 5
In the literary and popular media world we encounter psychopaths, mass murderers,
detectives with heavy drinking problems, politicians who arrange homicides and
make people disappear, societies losing their moral backbone, crooked deals and
heroic deeds; sometimes (as with for example the early 20th century detective stories
of Dashiell Hammett) we encounter implicit large-scale social theories – Hammett
depicted the American dream as a jungle with human predators, yet we see great
contrasts and collisions: personal honour entangled in corruption, opportunity and
the plays of fate. In the Sweden evoked by the author Henning Mankell, his character
Inspector Kurt Wallander lives in the small town of Ystad, but this is a location that is in
the midst of global flows of trafficked women, drugs and terrorists.
Crime fiction excites and sells: much of academic criminology – particularly that of
positivist criminology in the grip of quantitative analysis – is likely to appear boring in
contrast.
So context is important:
In light of this, as an introduction to thinking about crime, the power of the state,
punishment, and social suffering, this module is necessarily reflexive; we will not only
read about, sometimes watch (i.e. videos on the internet), human activity but try to
think about the status of the ‘secondary’ activity of writing, watching, prioritising,
relating, defining, using power. Certainly, we should not take ‘crime’ for granted as a
settled concept but also ask how it is conceptualised, what are the harms associated
with it and how we understand the social responses to it.
The specific orientation of this module is on criminological theory but this is not
context-free nor is it without links to other projects. Criminology has, for example,
a close – some say too close – relationship with criminal justice. Critics may ask
‘Why criminal justice’? Why not make the link to social justice? Criminology has
often seemed like a servant of the state, a form of discourse which gives a veneer
of legitimacy to the state’s systems of control, of repression, of classification (and
punishment).
Today – for better and for worse – the criminal justice system mediates between
the individual and the state. It can be abused, for example, in some countries forms
of policing work to ‘disappear’ political opponents. The nation state has been (and
continues to be, although losing considerable control under globalisation) the
central organising feature of modernity: it is, however, bureaucratic, hierarchical and
formalised. In earlier times, less complex social units treated occasions which we now
regard as crimes (that is, as offences that under the criminal law are specifically liable
to punishment by the agents of the state) as either normal features of life, or sins,
nuisances, or as wrongs against the victim entitling them – or the relatives if they were
murdered – to compensation. The development of the present situation (where such
wrongs are the concern of the state and where suspected offenders are processed by
police and the criminal courts and, if found guilty, are liable to a range of sanctions
ranging from discharges through to measures like probation and community service
to imprisonment, and even death [capital punishment] in some states) has a history
linked to the rise of the modern state and the various agencies of the state.
The nation state continues to be the most important entity, even in the face of
globalism and transnational law. Domestically, it provides the context for your home
page 6 University of London
(it is your homeland!) and provides a degree of physical, economic, cultural and social
borders; internationally, it is the chief agent in systems of global interdependence
(even the European Union is a union of nation states). But ease of travel, international
commerce and new forms of communication mean that not only are many of our
problems ‘global’ in reach but we are confronted by evidence of our dependency
and engagement with ‘others’ in faraway places. Some of those concerns are
acknowledged and indicated herein but this course is necessarily introductory and
more questions may be raised than answers given!
Activity 1.1
To see the idea of ‘social harm’ verses ‘criminology’ go to John Moore’s blog,
beginning Wednesday, 27 October 2010: Drug policy harm part one: social harm
theory v criminology at
http://whose-law.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/drug-policy-harm-part-one-social-harm.
html
Read all four parts. What do you think of his assertion that taking a social harm
perspective allows us to look at all drugs, both legal and illegal, within the same
paradigm?
On the other hand, crime has become a political and media event. While before the
1970s crime was seen more as something that ‘experts’ could deal with, during the
1970s politicians discovered that waging ‘war’ on crime, or drugs, allowed them
to take the moral high ground, identify an enemy and mobilise resources. The
consequences are often irrational, putting many people in prison who do not deserve
Criminology 1 Introduction page 7
to be there, and wastes resources and human lives on fighting imaginary enemies
while a more rational approach to the (real) social problems is made difficult because
of the labels used such as ‘war on crime’ (note the concept of ‘moral panics’ that
will be looked at later). The media have found in crime and associated social harms
sources of fascination, titillation and money making.
Politicians play on crime as a serious social problem as well as media and social anxiety
that our modern societies are ‘out of control’ in certain key respects.
Activity 1.2
Over five days collect a variety of newspapers.
Perhaps you can easily distinguish newspapers in terms of popular or serious (in the
UK this distinction used to be made between tabloids and broadsheets (the second
being the more ‘serious’).
Go through each and count up the number of stories that have to do with ‘crime’.
Then look at them with the following questions in mind:
a. What are the headlines?
b. What style of language is used? Can you see any contrasts between informal or
colloquial and more formal and sophisticated?
d. Are there any basic terms which are used and reused?
Feedback
I have just picked up a copy of a UK daily newspaper I have kept, the Guardian for
early August 2015; there is a two-page story analysing how immigrants are being
presented in many of the newspapers as potential criminals. Another looks at how
other newspapers seem to portray homelessness, that is sleeping in the streets, as a
crime. These are both examples of reflexive media practice where the newspaper is
commenting on other newspaper stories.
1.4.1 Texts
Core text
You are expected to purchase:
¢ Hopkins Burke, R. An introduction to criminological theory. (Routledge: London,
2018) fifth edition [ISBN 9781138700215] (hereafter Hopkins Burke).
Further reading
¢ Walklate, S. Understanding criminology: current theoretical debates. (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 2007) third edition [ISBN 9780335221233].
It is our intention to upload materials from time to time: these may include
PowerPoint presentations and podcasts.
In the UK the Office of National Statistics produces official statistics and commentaries
on the official ‘state of crime’.
There are a range of NGOs that work in related areas, for example:
This examination is by essay questions only: criminology is an option in the LLB and BSc
programmes and draws upon material that has either a sociological, psychological or legal
basis.
• Adopt a stance towards the questions, which are often a quote followed by ‘discuss’;
• Structure their answer so that the introduction shows the examiner that they have
read the actual question and that the material that follows is organised to address
that;
• Articulate a response to the question using appropriate material and set out an
argument.
Candidates can express themselves in the subject and reflect issues debated in their own
jurisdiction. The main problem displayed in the answers is an overreliance upon common
sense and almost journalistic perspectives rather than the more considered approach that
criminological discourse hopes to achieve.
In many areas of law subjects candidates are used to answering examination questions
by recalling the names of cases by reference to which legal rules and principles are
introduced into law and into their answers. Criminology is not a case law subject; instead
of cases, there are standard key figures whose work is referred to. Names such as Emile
Durkheim, Karl Marx, Cesare Beccaria, Cesare Lombroso, David Matza, Howard Becker, Stan
Cohen, Jock Young, Travis Hirschi, John Braithwaite, or schools (or general approaches
with shared assumptions), such as classicism, Chicago school, left realism, critical
criminology and so forth provide focal points for the presentation of theories, hypotheses,
and perspectives on crime, social control, social reaction and punishment. In common
with case law subjects, however, good marks are obtained through the articulate and
persuasive use of language; the ability to communicate to the examiner essential points in
the voice of the student.
There were a range of good answers to this paper and features of these will be examined
in the sections on questions as follows. I hope that you can see in the extracts how
page 10 University of London
important the way the answers are expressed is and what I mean by communicating in
the voice of the student.
What of poor material? The main weakness in the scripts was a tendency (of some)
to use common sense categories or local media reports as if they were self-evident
or in no need of reinforcement or further explanation. Claims made from appeals to
common sense assumptions and media reports are, undoubtedly, part of the everyday
processes criminology relates to since many of the images and assumptions that people
and policymakers are concerned with come from the media and politicians respond to
popular sentiment. However this must be reflected upon and not uncritically accepted.’
2 Crime, globalisation and the/your criminological
imagination
Contents
2.1 Developing a criminological imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Core text
¢ Hopkins Burke, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction: crime and modernity’.
Essential reading
¢ Morrison, Wayne ‘What is crime? Contrasting definitions and perspectives’
(from Criminology third edition, Oxford University Press, 2013), available on the
VLE (specifically used in Activity 2.7).
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter and the relevant readings, you should be able to:
u question your own assumptions about crime and the world
u appreciate some of the contexts in which criminology has been produced
u debate central issues around the definition of ‘crime’
u understand the difficulty in creating a ‘science of crime’
u recognise the need to think globally.
Criminology 2 Crime, globalisation and the/your criminological imagination page 13
For Hall Williams, events such as the Holocaust were to be studied in history, or
politics but not criminology. Thus it disappeared, making it in Baudrillard’s terms ‘the
perfect crime’ (as if it had never occurred). Why did he have such a narrow view of
criminology? In part because of the impact of ‘positivism’ and its link to mainstream
or administrative criminology, so criminology was the study of those things which in
everyday life the state deemed crimes. Today many criminologists refuse such narrow
boundaries!
What are the core concepts and how do they limit or extend a criminological
imagination? Should criminology study ‘crime’ or ‘deviance’ or ‘social harm’ or
‘breaches of human rights’? Or should it study not harm but ‘social solidarity (basically
how social orders hang together)? How should writers conceive of themselves?
Should they see themselves as a detached and impartial scientist or an engaged
critical social commentator? In the words of David Matza (2010), should one take a
‘correctional’ perspective (in which one assumes that the reason for studying to be to
ultimately rid ourselves of the object or phenomena) or an ‘appreciative’ perspective
(in which one wants to get close to the object in order to understand it on its own
terms). And what of the role of the state?
As an academic enterprise, criminology has been called a ‘basket’ into which is placed
writings and data from a multitude of disciplines and perspectives, framed with
different assumptions in mind, offering different images. Moreover, criminology is a
subject with a mixed reputation and a strangely ambivalent self image. Some writers
may be defined as ‘law and order’ proponents who argue for a strict defence of the
rules of law and identify any rise in recorded crime as the result of societies ‘going
soft’ on responding to deviance or failing to discipline their children and lacking moral
fibre. Others blame crime on the failure of modern societies to achieve social justice
and see crime as a consequence in failings in social solidarity. Some stay at the level
of individual interactions – interpersonal violence, for example – while others use
criminology as an entry into wider social criticism, the latter clearly adopting ‘morally
charged’ positions rather than attempting ‘value-free’ social science.
Even within any one grouping individuals differ. Some writers espouse ‘value-free’
science, for example, and see themselves as doing detached social science, while
others may see themselves as applied social engineers aiming to fix the ‘social
problem’ of crime. While they may then seek a criminology of numbers and equations,
others seem to want to provide accounts of offenders that make them out to be
exciting, humane, desperate and totally alive.
interactionism, or bringing out the diverse cultural meanings of action or even basing
themselves upon existentialism, appears at times politically suspect or scientifically
over-romantic to the first.
But this is also a history of absences. What of slavery, what of war, what of imperialism,
what of colonialism…
Most criminology texts are silent on these big, big historical realities: but to appreciate
it and whether you can learn to ask questions that really matter about the world,
we need to at least consider their absence when thinking about the subject’s formal
history, its socio-political context, and its cultural context.
The classicists (whose heyday was the 18th century and who are represented by names
such as the Italian Cesare Baccaria and the Englishman Jeremy Bentham) are labelled
as accepting the notions of the free will of the individual, of rational choice and, most
importantly, of the social contract ideal or metaphor for the structuring of the social
bond. †
Classical determinism: the
The positivists, arising in the late 19th century and represented by figures such as the theory that every event,
Italians Cesare Lombroso and Enrico Ferri, are seen as accepting human behaviour including every human action,
as being determined by causal conditions;† they interpreted the social bond as is governed by natural laws.
something to be understood ‘naturally’, as if there were natural processes that created Technically, determinism is the
social orders and forms of government. For the positivists, the government of society belief that a determinate set of
becomes akin to a technical enterprise, while for the classicists it is a moral–political conditions can only produce
activity. The classicist sees breaches of the criminal law largely as offences against one possible outcome given
fixed laws of nature.
the social contract and the rights of other members of the pact. But is a government
Many believe this rules out
really to be understood as based on a social contract? When one says this is a moral
human freedom.
approach perhaps it is better to say it is a normative approach, meaning that one is
However, there are at least
putting a particular interpretation upon the social order in which it is possible to say
three different positions:
that some things are right and some things are wrong as they conform or move away
i. Human beings have free will
from the main points of that interpretation.
because determinism is false
The positivist claims to have no direct normative interpretation but simply says how (‘libertarianism’).
things are value free! So, for example, some may say that offending against the laws of ii. Human beings do not
the society is part of social processes and may be functional in that it either created an have free will because
opportunity for a ceremonial reaffirmation of the social bond or displayed itself as a determinism is true (‘hard
‘symptom’ of social pathology. determinism’).
iii.Even though determinism is
In many criminological texts the student is presented with a progressive picture of true, human beings do have
criminological history as if criminology were gaining a closer and closer approximation free will (‘soft determinism’).
Criminology 2 Crime, globalisation and the/your criminological imagination page 15
to the ‘truth’ of crime and criminality over time. As Vold, for example, put it in his
second edition:
Thus the victory of positivism was presented as a ‘rational advance’ over the
abstractions and politics of classicism. However, the image of criminology gradually
but solidly progressing as a discipline becoming more sure of its knowledge and with
an enhanced ability to make policy recommendations, become problematic in the
1960s and 1970s. In this period, criminology was first criticised by writers such as the
American David Matza for an uncritical belief in ‘determinism’, and then splintered
into a whole series of competing ‘paradigms’ and ‘perspectives’; nevertheless,
positivism remained (and remains) a dominant theme.
The problem with the progressive picture of criminological history is that it seemed
to make criminology self-developmental – as if there was a steady objective world out
there, a set range of things to be investigated, and criminology was slowly refining its
tactics and methodologies in understanding it and coming to understand what to do
to eliminate crime. In other words, that there was an autonomous development of
the knowledges of crime and deviance, a growth which was progressive and that the
changes in fashion or degree of concentration were as a result of the correcting of false
perspectives and slowly ‘getting the correct picture’. This downplays the essentially
pragmatic link between knowledge production and socio-historical location.
In broad outline it is possible to see that classicism was a doctrine necessarily linked
to the development of ‘rule of law states’ over feudal society, of the rights of the
bourgeoisie over aristocratic privileges, and of the creation of a more free social space
for the abstract ‘market’ to function as opposed to the settled hierarchies and status
interactions of late feudal society. Positivism, likewise, can be seen as responsive to a
different set of demands linked to the spread of political influence into lower social
classes in society. The restoring of neo-classical or ‘new right’ themes in the mid-1970s,
1980s and 1990s can also be seen, in some countries at least, as responsive to the cost
of the welfare state and the apparent paradox that crime rates were increasing at the
same time as the West appeared to be more prosperous than any time in history. Yet,
we also realise that this prosperity masked a growing gap between the richest sections
of Western societies and the poorest.
The contemporary movement beyond the nation state can be linked to post-colonial
realities and globalisation. Many feel the need to rethink crime and criminal justice but
the grip of the established systems of thought and social control – what, following Jock
Young (2011), we may call the criminological imagination – remains strong.
The institutions and organisational motifs that make up the systems of crime and
deviance control in the modern West originated in the grand transformations that
page 16 University of London
occurred from the 18th century. Thus these systems are basically the product of
‘modernity’, a term which is difficult to define concisely but which designates what is
essentially new and particular about Western societies since the Enlightenment. In the
field of criminology, these changes are both the context of criminal justice and have
also shaped the institutional form of criminal justice. We can hint at several that have
shaped criminal justice:
u first, the development of the modern nation state with its centralised state
apparatus for the formal control of crime, gathering of statistics and the provision
of ‘care’ and ‘welfare’ for its population;
u second, the typologising and differentiation of the deviant and dependent into
separate types, each with particular sets of ‘scientific’ knowledge, expertise, and
group of ‘experts’;
There is merit in the ‘modernity’ of a society, apart from any other virtues it may have.
Being modern is being ‘advanced’ and being advanced means being rich, free of the
encumbrances of familial authority, religious authority, and deferentiality. It means being
rational and being ‘rationalised’... If such rationalisations were achieved, all traditions
except the traditions of secularity, scientism, and hedonism would be overpowered.
(Shils, 1981, pp.288–90.)
The concept of ‘modernity’ is troublesome (see Morrison, 1995, and Hopkins Burke).
[You may wish to go to the Wikipedia entry on modernity for some guidance.] Grand
theorists who have been concerned with its themes largely locate modernity in
terms of a spectrum of categorisations differentiating between oppressive and ‘false’
traditions (including religion) and empty, rootless freedom. Within criminological
texts, Durkheim is sometimes used in this way (see Vold Bernard, 1986, Chapter 9
‘Durkheim, anomie, and modernisation’). Interestingly, many social theorists refer to
a social crisis of modernism (using terms such as ontological insecurity) of which two
broad features can be mentioned. First, we can see many current social problems in
terms of a crises of power whereby modern societies find themselves immersed in a
technological ability and knowledge spiral which gives advances in certain powers, but
which outstrip mankind’s ability to assimilate its consequences and link its meanings
(need one mention the present nuclear capability? Or the vast increase in the world’s
population and the possibility of ecological destruction?). Second, the alienating and
nihilistic effects of modern culture on a humanity which has thrust itself free from a
context of traditional positioning and community structures which gave existence
meaning and which allowed people to live in ways that they assumed were natural
and ‘real’. To take a simple example, most people used to live in rural locations, now
cities dominate. Or take Bangladesh where the majority are still living in villages and
many are illiterate. For some of them, modernity means an attack on what they hold to
be natural and, for a great many, an attack on their interpretations of Islam.
The modern Western world, on the other hand, although an urban world where
mankind lives cheek-by-jowl with a multitude of ‘others’, is a place of distance which
Criminology 2 Crime, globalisation and the/your criminological imagination page 17
demands newer and more complicated forms of social control than previously. For
the modern self-image and self-consciousness, the question of personal identity is
not defined by one’s position in the order of things, some embedment in localised
tradition and custom which ultimately seems some integration of self and cosmos, but
by an insulated individualism mediated by concepts such as authenticity, choice, and
the ‘rationality’ of ends–means relations.
Alongside the vast increase in population growth, an inescapable feature is the urban
context of social life – the majority of the world’s population live in cities of 20,000
people or more. As a point of comparison, prior to the 19th century, even in societies
considered urbanised, probably less than 10 per cent of the population lived in towns
or cities. London’s population in the 14th century is estimated at around 30,000, and
when at the turn of the 19th century it reached 900,000 it was not only the largest city
in the world but dominated England.
The routines of this urban life are set within structures responsive to the changing
demands of economic performance. Many of the competing interpretations on social
life can be traced to defining modern society’s economic basis as either industrialisation
or capitalisation. The attitude that a theorist takes to issues such as class and the nature
of social interaction differ depending on whether they adopt a more benign functional
theory of industrial society, or engages with the (not only Marxist!) notion of capitalist
society with its relations of exploitation and domination.
In 19th century France, Comte attempted to develop a positive sociology which would
provide a truly scientific basis for the reorganisation of society. He made positivism
a utopian understanding and shared the optimism of such philosophers as the
Englishman Francis Bacon about the benefits of a positive approach to science for
page 18 University of London
humanity but was not blind to the extent to which this approach clashed with the
traditional hegemony of the ruling class. The very first words he had published make
this clear:
Rulers would gladly have it taken for granted that they alone can see alright in politics, and
consequently are entitled to a monopoly of opinions in such matters. They have doubtless
their own reasons for speaking in this way, while subjects have theirs for refusing assent to
a principle which, under every point of view, is wholly absurd.
(Quoted in Fletcher (ed.), 1974.)
Secure social knowledge was to provide a new basis for developing social structures
and building social relations. The opinions of the rulers would have to give way in a
new form of knowledge–power combination, a position where the organisation of
society would be the responsibility of scientists and the rationality of the knowledge
they produced. Comte proposed a law of three stages through which all human
thinking had to pass: first, the theological or fictive, then the metaphysical or abstract
and finally the scientific or positive. These stages corresponded to the development
of our knowledge of the universe and ourselves, and in the positive stage there is a
clear-cut distinction between science and morals and the operation of all features in
the universe could be gauged by the operation of the positive methodology whereby
science could in time come to control ‘moral’ dilemmas.
Clearly in Comte’s view, Europe was to be the crux of progress and of civilisation, and
the modes of life of Europe were the destiny of the world. The power of the West
has indeed spread throughout the world. But he is confident that the modes of life
which have developed in the West are intrinsically superior to those of other cultures.
Today? Of course the spread of the West has unleashed forces which have corroded
or destroyed many of the features and coherence of the other cultures it has come
in contact with. The metaphysics of progressive evolution has tended to glorify the
dominance of the West as the necessary result of a system of determinate social
evolution; this evolution is judged in terms primarily of technological growth and the
ability to control and change the material environment, and has led to the denial of
the resources of other cultures in favour of the Western solution. Thus Eurocentrism
dominates criminological history – it is almost impossible to find any criminology
from the developing world which can challenge the theories and presuppositions
of that of the West. If you come across examples of such writings, use them to your
advantage to challenge the presuppositions of mainstream criminology.
The result, conversely, was to demonstrate diversity and difference rather than
uniformity. At the same time, however, the anthropological dimension to modern
thought also illustrates the essential interconnections of the modern world and
the central unity of the human race. It denies the purported ‘irrationality’ of many
primitive practices and demonstrates the richness of non-state institutions, for
example, and there are now no grounds for supposing that those who live in
‘primitive’ societies are genetically inferior to those of the advanced ‘civilisations’.
However, anthropology also demonstrates the complex processes of socialisation
and signification that go to make up the successful ‘normal’ members of any society.
Moreover, the question of ‘social order’ and conformity, of the normal and deviant, is
not placed on some purely ‘natural’ footing by anthropology. Apart from a basic few
measures, such as some protection of life in the ‘in-group’ (the protection of strangers
is certainly not a universal) or of the domain of groups, the ordering of societies differ.
Thus while all societies have ideas concerning what normal and deviant behaviour
is and mechanisms for controlling social interaction, each may have particular
‘functions’ or roles in that particular context. Once we appreciate this diversity,
criminology becomes more complicated. It cannot simply be the accumulation of
knowledge to control troublesome people in society, although some criminological
knowledge may aid this. Nor can it be solely the provision of knowledge about social
processes to enable the members of the society to better understand social processes,
although this is a laudable aim. It can also be a form of inquiry about the consequences
of what is, and the possibility of what is not but could be, for human existence.
In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center in the New York in 2001,
the authorities were faced with a choice: did they call the attacks ‘crimes’ or ‘an act
of war’? Some called it both but it ushered in what was termed a ‘war on terror’. Post
the invasion of Iraq, and after early ‘victory’, drawn out wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
partial interventions in Libya and Syria, the result seems to be the creation of failed
states and the opening of spaces that defy governance providing havens for terrorists
and actions by Western powers that smell of hypocrisy.
Numerous acts have occurred against Western targets and tens of thousands of lives
have been lost in actions by the ‘so-called’ Islamic State (or Isis, Isil or Daesh, each
name having different political and cultural symbolisms) in the Middle East, while
other ‘radical Islamic’ group have engaged in terrorist attacks in Africa, Bangladesh and
even sacred sites in Saudi Arabia (for instance in Medina in July 2016).
Currently, the terrorist is the new figure of ‘evil’, the outlaw whose apparent
irrationality and rejection of modernity and civilisation makes them seem beyond
normal understanding.
If modernity was meant to be about the use of reason, education, scientific progress,
rise of humanism, then when we see the extreme cruelty practised currently by Isis
– beheading of hostages, random killings of civilians, destruction of cultural heritage,
enslaving of woman, excessive bravado – it seems difficult for many to treat this
as anything to do with the expression of valid ideas/beliefs. Some consider them
psychopaths, scum of the earth, enthused with irrational hatred and so forth. But such
labelling is in itself a subject of analysis.
See the following article which has as its central claim that ‘Islamic State is no mere
collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs,
among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means
for its strategy – and for how to stop it.’
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/
See also Hopkins Burke, Chapter 21 ‘Section terrorism and state violence and terrorism
and postmodernism revisited’.
As said before, in many texts criminology was simply assumed to be the ‘scientific
study of crime’ (Hall Williams, 1982, p.1), but why should the only kinds of discourse
considered ‘proper criminology’ be those called ‘scientific’? What are the appropriate
roles of scientific perspectives and ‘lay’ or common-sense claims? What are the limits
of each? Further, is the concept of crime a ‘scientific’ or a ‘common-sense’ category?
Ask yourself what your presuppositions in beginning the study of criminology are/
were? Do you believe that ‘crime is a social problem’? If so, does that give rise to the
question ‘What causes crime?’ And is the reason for asking that question to develop
measures to ‘cure’ society of crime?
Are you assuming that there is some natural thing or sets of characteristics which
constitute(s) the essential element to all crimes? Are you also assuming that there are
‘criminals’ who are different from ‘normal’ people?
Consider what the link is between assuming that ‘crime’ is a natural entity and our
attitude to those adjudged ‘criminals’?
Criminology, in its narrow sense, is concerned with the study of the phenomenon of crime
and of the factors or circumstances ... which may have an influence on or be associated
with criminal behaviour and the state of crime in general. But this does not and should
not exhaust the whole subject matter of criminology. There remains the vitally important
problem of combating crime ... To rob it of this practical function, is to divorce criminology
from reality and render it sterile.
(Radzinowicz, 1962, p.168)
Let us state quite categorically that the major task of radical criminology is to seek a
solution to the problem of crime and that of a socialist policy is to substantially reduce the
crime rate.
(Young, 1986)
Are these statements similar? Perhaps not. They also, almost certainly, were only
concerned with crime as a nation state issue, although with only a subtle, yet large,
change in emphasis, we could change the focus to ‘law, crime, and reaction to crime …
as a global concern’.
And while crime is a ‘problem’ if one is trying to understand the nature of that
problem then, for me at least, one should escape from an attitude that David Matza
once called correctionalism. Matza (1969) defined correctional perspectives as
accepting that the aim of study was to achieve the practical result of elimination of
page 22 University of London
crime and the criminal, further that a commitment to the methodological principles
of positivistic social science was appropriate. Thus one never could emphathise with
the subject, never attempt to see the world from their point of view.
‘a thing exists only when it is given a name; any phenomenon is real to us only when
we can imagine it. Without imagination there would be nothing to experience. So it
is with crime. In our relationship with others we construct a social reality of crime.
This reality is both conceptual and phenomenal, a world of meanings and events
constructed in reference to crime.’
… Deviancy is a part of the social reality which organises people’s lives, and this social
reality must be the primary material of analysis. (Rock, 1973, pp.19–20).
2.2 What does the sociological concept of ‘role’ mean? What function does Rock
attribute to deviant roles in society?
No feedback provided.
c. What message, if any, do you think Primo Levi is trying to send to past and
possibly future perpetrators?
Re ‘Apocalypse at Solentiname’:
Cortázar is noted as a ‘magic realist’ writer: he wrote ‘Blow-up’ about a photo he
took of a situation where he thinks a crime has occurred; this was made into a film
of the same name. ‘Apocalypse at Solentiname’ has the narrator (Cortázar) going on
a trip to Latin America to escape comments about ‘Blow-up’.
d. What is the point of the story?
e. Why do you think he never told Claudine what was in the photographs?
f. Is this connected to ideas about witnessing (a very legal concept) and silence?
Re ‘Unwatchable’:
g. What is the meaning of the project?
h. Is it similar to Cortázar’s?
j. Do you consider it successful or not? You may like to read some of the blog posts
on it in the media.
References
¢ Fletcher, R. (ed.) The crisis of industrial civilisation: the early essays of Auguste
Comte. (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974) [ISBN 9780435823030].
¢ Vold, G.B. Theoretical criminology. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979)
[ISBN 9780195025309].
¢ Vold, G.B. and T.J. Bernard, Theoretical criminology. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986) 3rd revised edition [ISBN 9780195036169].
¢ Zehr, H. Changing lenses – A new focus for crime and justice. (Scottdale, PA: Herald
Press, 1990) [ISBN 9780836135121].
page 24 University of London
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 The positive revolution: the imagery of science replacing the moral
discourse of crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Introduction
In the 18th century the modern concept of crime and of criminal justice took shape.
In the late 19th century the concept of the criminal as an identifiable type capable of
identification and empirical study developed. The former is identified with classical
criminology, the latter with the development of positivism. The contrast between
classical, positivist and, later, non-positivist approaches to the study of crime underlies
much of the discussion of crime and the policy implications of such study. For David
Garland (2017) Criminology as an academic subject has been deeply shaped by a
rather contingent convergence between a ‘governmental project’ (of which classical
criminology is an important strand) and a ‘Lombrosian project’ of a science of the
‘criminal’ and ‘criminality’. The nature of these distinctions is clearly linked to the
historical development of the discipline; this chapter outlines the early history of
these approaches and provides a foundation for later study.
Core text
¢ Hopkins Burke, Chapter 2 ‘Classical criminology’, Chapter 3 ‘Populist
conservative criminology’, Chapter 4 ‘Contemporary rational actor theories’ and
Chapter 5 ‘Biological positivism’.
Essential reading
¢ Morrison, 1995, Chapter 4 ‘The problem of classical criminology’, Chapter
5 ‘Reading the texts of classical criminology’ and Chapter 6 ‘Criminological
positivism I’ (available in Dawsons via the Online Library).
¢ Beccaria, C. On crimes and punishments (first published as Dei delitti e delle pene in
1764). (Seven Treasures Publications, 2009) [ISBN 9781438299006] Chapter 16 ‘Of
torture’ (available in Cambridge Core via the Online Library).
Further reading
The list of texts that reference the classical and positivist schools is huge.
¢ Ferri, E. Criminal sociology. (HardPress Publishing, 2010) [ISNB 9781407628363].
¢ Foucault, M. Discipline and punishment: the birth of the prison. (London: Penguin,
1977) [ISBN 9780140137224].
¢ Jones, S. Criminology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) sixth edition [ISBN
9780198768968] Chapter 4 ‘The classical and positivist traditions’.
¢ Lilly, L., F.T. Cullen and R.A. Ball Criminological theory: context and consequences.
(London: Sage, 2019) seventh edition [ISBN 9781506387307] Chapter 2 ‘The search
for the “criminal man”’.
¢ Radzinowicz, L. Ideology and crime: a study of crime in its social and historical
context. (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1966) [ISBN 9780435827427].
¢ Snipes, J.B., T.J. Bernard and A.L Gerould Vold’s theoretical criminology. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019) 8th edition [ISBN 9780190940515] Chapter 1
‘Theory and crime’, Chapter 2 ‘Theory and policy in context’ and Chapter 3
‘Classical criminology’.
¢ Taylor, I., P. Walton and J. Young The new criminology: for a social theory of
deviance. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013; first published 1973) 40th anniversary
edition [ISNB 9780415855877].
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter and the relevant readings, you should be able to:
u identify the main features of the classical and positive traditions in criminology
u give an account of their formation and the major figures involved
u assess their continued influence
u be aware of some of the criticisms of positivism and classicism.
The chapters in Morrison (1995) should be read closely, even if they are difficult at first
reading. Hopkins Burke may be approached first. For an introductory account of the
full range of perspectives read Walklate (2007).
What does the phrase ‘the modern human subject’ mean? It denotes trying to see
humans as devoid of the religious tradition of created objects; it is a secularity that
underpins a new and secular gaze. The 18th century in Europe worked many changes
in science, religion and the mechanical arts and effectively overturned the settled
notions of the natural order of social and natural life that the medieval period had
given primacy to. However, modern secular social theory did not emerge in one
dominant form. Certainly we can agree with Foucault’s notion of the birth of the
sciences of man that the Enlightenment is characterised by placing man and the
page 28 University of London
structures of the world as the new frames of reference. But the ways in which it does
this exhibits qualities of both pessimism as well as extreme optimism and is romantic
as well as ‘realist’ on its views of the human condition. It can be either empiricist
or rationalist, indulgent of a priori reasoning and the grappling with ‘essences’ or
determined to be based only of ‘observation’ of phenomenon and inductions therein.
It can be ‘methodologically individualist’ (i.e. assume man as an analytically individual
and complete object of study) or holist (i.e. deny that man can be studied as individual
phenomena but is necessarily social) or it can lay stress on man as voluntarist or
determinate objects, to mention only some of the possible contrasts it is possible to
draw.
When we think of the classical tradition we think philosophy. It is the use of reason
to undercut previous positions and expose them as myths. Take Thomas Hobbes. In
his classic work, Leviathan (1651), he argues for the need for strong government and
so is, to that extent, against the revolutionaries and reformers, but he helped found
Enlightenment political theory by stripping government of any non-rational defence.
In particular, he sets up social contract theory; thus political authority is grounded in
an agreement (often understood as ideal, rather than real) among individuals, each
of whom aims in this agreement to advance his rational self-interest by establishing
a common political authority overall. In this general contract model (taken up with
variations by Locke and Rousseau), political authority is grounded not in conquest,
natural or divinely instituted hierarchy, or in obscure myths and traditions, but rather
in the rational consent of the governed and officials of the state perform rational tasks.
As the basis, Hobbes takes a naturalistic, scientific approach to the question of how
political society ought to be organised (constantly asking the reader to agree on the
basis that that is how the reader reads mankind – in a pessimist rationalist fashion).
Hobbes paves the way for secularisation and rationalisation in political and social
philosophy.
The early Enlightenment rejected mythology and religious belief and thereby
introduced many ethical issues and positions that remain contemporary today.
Instead of religious doctrines concerning God and mankind’s position in the afterlife
(with our highest good and thus also moral duties conceived in immediately religious
terms), we speak in terms of human desires, human wants and needs and satisfying
them in this life. Thus contexts such as industrialisation, urbanisation and the
expansion of education, turn our attention to the contexts and factors influencing
human progress in this world, rather than union with God in the next. Also, the
violent religious wars that devastated Europe in the early modern period (which end
with the Treaty of Westphalia at roughly the same time Hobbes published Leviathan)
require a secular, this-worldly ethics, insofar as they indicate the failure of religious
doctrines concerning God and the afterlife to establish a stable foundation for social
and political interaction. If the ancient Greeks had dealt with many gods (and gods
that could not be trusted) the development of monotheistic religions (Christianity,
Islam and Judaism) had surpassed classical Greek and Roman ethical systems. Now
there could be no return to the answers on nature and cosmology offered by Plato
and Aristotle. The Platonic identification of the good with the real and the Aristotelian
teleological understanding of natural things are both difficult to square with the
Enlightenment conception of nature. The general philosophical problem that emerged
in the Enlightenment was how to understand the source and grounding of ethical
duties and how to conceive the highest good for human beings, within a secular,
broadly naturalistic context, and within the context of a transformed understanding of
the natural world.
Hobbes founded social order upon individuals, their reasoning and their desires. His
reasoning was nominalisitic and relativist: what is good, as the end of human action, is
‘whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire’ and evil is ‘the object of his
hate, and aversion’, ‘there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common
rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves’ (2017,
Chapter 6). Hobbes’ conception of human beings as fundamentally motivated by their
perception of what is in their own best interest demands that duties of justice and
benevolence relate to such individualist material. Man is reduced to basic drives; this
Criminology 3 Competing traditions? Legacies of classical and positive criminology page 29
allows only a set of moral duties to be constructed that is demystified, and almost
mechanical.
Writers such as Beccaria and Bentham owe a large debt to Hobbes. After Hobbes, a
crime is not an evil act against God but simply an act or omission which the sovereign
has not allowed. Crime and one’s reaction to it should be understood rationally and
without reference to God. It is often said that classicism is not concerned with the
causes of crime and you may wish to see whether you agree with this. Alternatively,
some argue that classicism clearly acknowledges a link between crime and social
conditions but that writers such as Beccaria were actually conservatives (see Morrison,
1995 and Jenkins, 1984) and mostly concerned with how criminals should be dealt with
in a way that promoted social stability. Moreover, classicism gives the state the role of
defining and mediating the social conceptions of crime and the reaction and control
of it. For classicism, the state is central, the influence of positivism, conversely, is to
lower the attention given to state power.
certainly one feature of positive criminology has always been its belief in an objective
external reality capable of measurement. Public disclosure of the understood reality, the
procedures used for its measurement, and frequent independent replication are essential
tenets of this perspective.
You should be careful not to use the term positivism in criminology as simply
denoting individualist approaches. It has also a wide sociological use influenced by
Durkheim or Marx as is apparent when looking at the way criminal statistics are often
used to denote perceived changes in social and economic conditions. However, the
individualist version of positive criminology is characterised by the search to discover,
within the composition of the individual, the causes of criminal and delinquent
behaviour. The scientific method is used to differentiate offenders from non-offenders
on a variety of characteristics. The method of positive criminology assumes that there
are identifiable factors that make people act as they do (the logic of determinism)
and that the variability to be explained is associated with the variability in the casual
agents (the logic of differentiation).
3.2.1 Beccaria
It has been common to describe the work of Cesare Beccaria as a reaction to a time
when the criminal law and its enforcement were barbarous and arbitrary and to see
him as a humane reformer. This interpretation stresses a social context of secret
accusations, brutal executions, torture, arbitrary and inconsistent punishments and
class-linked disparities in punishments.
for example, is the issue of the limits of criminal justice. How could a criteria of
justice be constructed which could provide legitimation for new social institutions
and withstand the sceptical/critical attitude which philosophers such as Kant had
declared all ‘modern’ institutions had to withstand. Moreover, classical criminology
should be understood within the development of philosophical radicalism and the
full consequences of the developing notion of ‘the rule of law’, the changing political
struggles where a growing middle class sought political power to accompany their
economic power and break down the political monopoly enjoyed in England, for
instance, by the landowning class, and for the hopes of progressive social engineering
epitomised here by the Englishman Jeremy Bentham.
Beccaria considered crime as an injury to society; a notion which fitted well with
the development of a rule of law ideology. It was the injury to society, rather than to
the immediate individual(s) who experienced it, that was to direct and determine
the degree of punishment. Behind this thinking was the utilitarian assumption that
all social action should be guided by the goal of achieving ‘the greatest happiness
for the greatest number’. From this viewpoint, the punishment of an individual for a
crime was justified, and justifiable only, for its contribution to the prevention of future
infringements on the happiness and well-being of others. In today’s world, these ideas
may seem common enough but they needed to be ‘constructed’ to reform the world
of Beccaria and lead on to our own. For example, Beccaria reasoned that certain and
quick, rather than severe, punishments would best accomplish the above goals:
in order for punishment not to be ... an act of violence of one or many against a private
citizen, it must be ... public, prompt, ... the least possible in the given circumstances,
proportionate to the crimes, [and] dictated by the laws. (2009 [1764])
Torture, execution and other ‘irrational’ activity must be abolished. In their place,
there were to be quick and certain trials and, in the case of convictions, carefully
calculated punishments. Beccaria went beyond this to propose that accused persons
be treated humanely before trial, with every right and facility extended to enable
them to bring evidence on their own behalf. Note, at Beccaria’s time accused and
convicted persons were detained in the same institutions, and subjected to the
same punishments and conditions. In place of this, Beccaria argued for swift and
sure punishments, to be imposed only on those found guilty, with the punishments
determined strictly in accordance with the damage to society caused by the crime.
It is often said that classical criminology has no idea of the causes of crime but Beccaria
certainly held that economic conditions and bad laws could cause crime. Additionally,
he was clear that property crimes were committed primarily by the poor and mainly
out of necessity. Moreover, he was aware of what has come to be called opportunity
transfer; that is, when putting a severe punishment on a particular crime could deter
someone from committing it, but at the same time make another crime attractive by
comparison. Beccaria was also aware of the cultural power of severe punishments to
add to the desperation of the populace and encourage them to indulge in violence.
As he put it, laws could promote crime by diminishing the human spirit. A careful
matching of the crime and its punishment, in keeping with the general interests
of society, could make punishment a rational instrument of government. Jeremy
Bentham extended this with his notion of a ‘calculus’ for realising these interests.
Activity 3.1
Read the following extract from Beccaria (2009 [1764]), Chapter 16 ‘Of torture’.
a. What are Beccaria’s arguments against torture? In particular what is the
relationship between torture and truth? Why would the innocent confess to
crimes they did not commit?
The torture of a criminal during the course of his trial is a cruelty consecrated by custom in
most nations. It is used with an intent either to make him confess his crime, or to explain
some contradictions into which he had been led during his examination, or discover his
accomplices, or for some kind of metaphysical and incomprehensible purgation of infamy,
or, finally, in order to discover other crimes of which he is not accused, but of which he
may be guilty.
No man can be judged a criminal until he be found guilty; nor can society take from him
the public protection until it have been proved that he has violated the conditions on
which it was granted. What right, then, but that of power, can authorise the punishment of
a citizen so long as there remains any doubt of his guilt? This dilemma is frequent. Either
he is guilty, or not guilty. If guilty, he should only suffer the punishment ordained by the
laws, and torture becomes useless, as his confession is unnecessary, if he be not guilty, you
torture the innocent; for, in the eye of the law, every man is innocent whose crime has not
been proved. Besides, it is confounding all relations to expect that a man should be both
the accuser and accused; and that pain should be the test of truth, as if truth resided in
the muscles and fibres of a wretch in torture. By this method the robust will escape, and
the feeble be condemned. These are the inconveniences of this pretended test of truth,
worthy only of a cannibal, and which the Romans, in many respects barbarous, and whose
savage virtue has been too much admired, reserved for the slaves alone.
There is another ridiculous motive for torture, namely, to purge a man from infamy. Ought
such an abuse to be tolerated in the eighteenth century? Can pain, which is a sensation,
have any connection with a moral sentiment, a matter of opinion? Perhaps the rack may
be considered as the refiner’s furnace.
It is not difficult to trace this senseless law to its origin; for an absurdity, adopted by a
whole nation, must have some affinity with other ideas established and respected by
the same nation. This custom seems to be the offspring of religion, by which mankind,
in all nations and in all ages, are so generally influenced. We are taught by our infallible
church, that those stains of sin contracted through human frailty, and which have not
deserved the eternal anger of the Almighty, are to be purged away in another life by an
incomprehensible fire. Now infamy is a stain, and if the punishments and fire of purgatory
can take away all spiritual stains, why should not the pain of torture take away those
of a civil nature? I imagine, that the confession of a criminal, which in some tribunals is
required as being essential to his condemnation, has a similar origin, and has been taken
from the mysterious tribunal of penitence, were the confession of sins is a necessary
part of the sacrament. Thus have men abused the unerring light of revelation; and, in
the times of tractable ignorance, having no other, they naturally had recourse to it on
every occasion, making the most remote and absurd applications. Moreover, infamy is a
sentiment regulated neither by the laws nor by reason, but entirely by opinion; but torture
renders the victim infamous, and therefore cannot take infamy away.
This infamous test of truth is a remaining monument of that ancient and savage
legislation, in which trials by fire, by boiling water, or the uncertainty of combats, were
called judgments of God; as if the links of that eternal chain, whose beginning is in the
breast of the first cause of all things, could ever be disunited by the institutions of men.
The only difference between torture and trials by fire and boiling water is, that the event
of the first depends on the will of the accused, and of the second on a fact entirely physical
and external: but this difference is apparent only, not real. A man on the rack, in the
convulsions of torture, has it as little in his power to declare the truth, as, in former times,
to prevent without fraud the effects of fire or boiling water.
Every act of the will is invariably in proportion to the force of the impression on our
senses. The impression of pain, then, may increase to such a degree, that, occupying the
mind entirely, it will compel the sufferer to use the shortest method of freeing himself
from torment. His answer, therefore, will be an effect as necessary as that of fire or boiling
water, and he will accuse himself of crimes of which he is innocent: so that the very means
employed to distinguish the innocent from the guilty will most effectually destroy all
difference between them.
The result of torture, then, is a matter of calculation, and depends on the constitution,
which differs in every individual, and it is in proportion to his strength and sensibility;
so that to discover truth by this method, is a problem which may be better solved by a
mathematician than by a judge, and may be thus stated: The force of the muscles and the
sensibility of the nerves of an innocent person being given, it is required to find the degree
of pain necessary to make him confess himself guilty of a given crime.
The examination of the accused is intended to find out the truth; but if this be discovered
with so much difficulty in the air, gesture, and countenance of a man at case, how can
it appear in a countenance distorted by the convulsions of torture? Every violent action
destroys those small alterations in the features which sometimes disclose the sentiments
of the heart.
These truths were known to the Roman legislators, amongst whom, as I have already
observed, slaves only, who were not considered as citizens, were tortured. They are known
to the English a nation in which the progress of science, superiority in commerce, riches,
and power, its natural consequences, together with the numerous examples of virtue and
courage, leave no doubt of the excellence of its laws. They have been acknowledged in
Sweden, where torture has been abolished. They are known to one of the wisest monarchs
in Europe, who, having seated philosophy on the throne by his beneficent legislation, has
made his subjects free, though dependent on the laws; the only freedom that reasonable
men can desire in the present state of things. In short, torture has not been thought
necessary in the laws of armies, composed chiefly of the dregs of mankind, where its
use should seem most necessary. Strange phenomenon! That a set of men, hardened by
slaughter, and familiar with blood, should teach humanity to the sons of peace.
It appears also that these truths were known, though imperfectly, even to those by whom
torture has been most frequently practised; for a confession made during torture, is null,
if it be not afterwards confirmed by an oath, which if the criminal refuses, he is tortured
again. Some civilians and some nations permit this infamous petitio principii to be only
three times repeated, and others leave it to the discretion of the judge; therefore, of two
men equally innocent, or equally guilty, the most robust and resolute will be acquitted,
and the weakest and most pusillanimous will be condemned, in consequence of the
following excellent mode of reasoning. I, the judge, must find someone guilty. Thou, who
art a strong fellow, hast been able to resist the force of torment; therefore I acquit thee.
Thou, being weaker, hast yielded to it; I therefore condemn thee. I am sensible, that the
confession which was extorted from thee has no weight; but if thou dost not confirm by
oath what thou hast already confessed, I will have thee tormented again.
Criminology 3 Competing traditions? Legacies of classical and positive criminology page 33
A very strange but necessary consequence of the use of torture is, that the case of the
innocent is worse than that of the guilty. With regard to the first, either he confesses
the crime which he has not committed, and is condemned, or he is acquitted, and has
suffered a punishment he did not deserve. On the contrary, the person who is really guilty
has the most favourable side of the question; for, if he supports the torture with firmness
and resolution, he is acquitted, and has gained, having exchanged a greater punishment
for a less.
The law by which torture is authorised, says, Men, be insensible to pain. Nature has indeed
given you an irresistible self-love, and an unalienable right of self-preservation; but I create
in you a contrary sentiment, an heroic hatred of yourselves. I command you to accuse
yourselves, and to declare the truth, amidst the tearing of your flesh, and the dislocation
of your bones.
Torture is used to discover whether the criminal be guilty of other crimes besides those of
which he is accused, which is equivalent to the following reasoning. Thou art guilty of one
crime, therefore it is possible that thou mayest have committed a thousand others; but
the affair being doubtful I must try it by my criterion of truth. The laws order thee to be
tormented because thou art guilty, because thou mayest be guilty, and because I choose
thou shouldst be guilty.
Torture is used to make the criminal discover his accomplices; but if it has been
demonstrated that it is not at a proper means of discovering truth, how can it serve to
discover the accomplices, which is one of the truths required? Will not the man who
accuses himself yet more readily accuse others? Besides, is it just to torment one man
for the crime of another? May not the accomplices be found out by the examination
of the witnesses, or of the criminal; from the evidence, or from the nature of the crime
itself; in short, by all the means that have been used to prove the guilt of the prisoner?
The accomplices commonly fly when their comrade is taken. The uncertainty of their fate
condemns them to perpetual exile, and frees society from the danger of further injury;
whilst the punishment of the criminal, by deterring others, answers the purpose for which
it was ordained.
Bentham meant to make the law an efficient and economical means of preventing
crime. Like Beccaria, Bentham insisted that prevention was the only justifiable
purpose of punishment, and furthermore that punishment was too ‘expensive’
when it produced more evil than good, or when the same good could be obtained
at the ‘price’ of less suffering. His recommendation was that penalties be fixed so as
to impose an amount of pain in excess of the pleasure that might be derived from
the criminal act. It was this calculation of pain compared to pleasure that Bentham
believed would deter crime. These ideas were formulated most clearly in his
Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain
of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. (2009 [1789] Ch. 1 Sect. 1)
A scaffold painted black, the livery of grief – the officers of justice dressed in crepe
– the executioner covered with a mask, which would serve at once to augment the
terror of his appearance, and to shield him from ill-founded indignation – emblems of
his crime placed above the head of the criminal, to the end that the witnesses of his
sufferings may know for what crimes he undergoes them; these might form a part of
the principal decorations of these legal tragedies ... Whilst all the actors in this terrible
drama might move in solemn procession – serious and religious music preparing the
hearts of the spectators for the important lesson they were about to receive ... The
judges need not consider it beneath their dignity to preside over this public scene.’
(Bentham, quoted in Radzinowicz, 1948, pp.383–84.)
The article by Douglas Hay, ‘Property, authority and the criminal law’, in Fitzgerald
et al. (1981), will give you some idea of the actual conditions which surrounded the
operation of the criminal law in England at this time. The opening chapter of Foucault
(1977) gives a graphic illustration of the spectacle of public punishment.
There were three features to the panopticon. First the architectural dimension; the
panopticon was to be a circular building with a glass roof and containing cells on every
story of the circumference. It was to be so arranged that every cell could be visible
from a central point. The omniscient prison inspector would be kept from the sight
of the prisoners by a system of ‘blinds unless ... he thinks fit to show himself’. Second,
management by contract; the manager would employ the inmates in contract labour
and he was to receive a share of the money earned by the inmates, but he was to be
financially liable if inmates who were later released re-offended, or if an excessive
number of inmates died during imprisonment. Third, the panopticon was to open
to the inspection of the world which would control the manager. Two prisons of the
panopticon design were actually built in the United States; however, the first was
rebuilt seven years after construction, and the second was redesigned before it was
finished. Foucault has used Bentham’s ideas for the panopticon as a prime example of
Criminology 3 Competing traditions? Legacies of classical and positive criminology page 35
In time several of Bentham’s ideas were picked up. He argued strongly for the
establishment of the office of public prosecutor, and he furthered the notion that
crimes are committed against society rather than against individuals. Beyond this, he
argued that many victimless crimes were imaginary rather than real offences, and he
argued for the development of official crime statistics or ‘bills… indicating the moral
health of the country’.
Self-assessment question
Is Bentham a humanitarian reformer or a ruthless servant of power?
Crime does not therefore consist of actions rationally chosen by the offender; the
notion of free will was seen by the positivists as inhibiting the study of the causes
of crime and as diverting attention away from the real causes. Positivism shifted
study away from crime to the criminal and sought the answers in differentiating the
offender from the normal member of society.
But therein lies a danger, for it assumes that the criminal exists as some determinate
entity, or, as Gottefredson and Hirschi (1987) redefined it, that criminality as a stable
propensity of individuals exists. The search for the criminal (type, mind, etc.) and
criminality (as a stable propensity such as rates of self-control) is a constant theme
in individualistic forms of positivism. Positivism is also said to be uncritical in that its
authors often appear to assume a consensual culture where all deviation is simply
attributed to lack of socialisation or deficiency of the individual.
A linkage between a technical interest in crime control and the positive approach in
criminology was first evident in the work of the so-called ‘cartographic criminologists’
of 19th century Europe, such as the Belgian Adolphe Jacques Quetelet (1842), the
Frenchman André-Michel Guerry (1833) and the Englishmen Rawson (1839), Alison
(1840) and Fletcher (1849). Their work attempted to match spatial patterns of crime
and offender rates as visible from the developing ‘criminal statistics’ with other
indices of the ‘moral’ health of the nation (including such mixed features as literacy,
page 36 University of London
Quetelet argued that in well-organised societies this ratio would be close to unity
for serious crimes, and further from unity for less serious crimes. Thus we could be
relatively certain of the ‘moral statistics of crime’ within these constraints. These
statistics showed that men commit more crimes and thus we could infer that they
have a greater ‘propensity’ for crime than women, and that the young have a greater
propensity than the old. Using findings constructed out of many observations and in a
variety of times and places:
we can enumerate in advance how many individuals will soil their hands in the blood of
their fellows, how many will be frauds, how many prisoners; almost as one can enumerate
in advance the births and deaths that will take place. Society contains within itself the
seeds of all the crimes that are to be committed, and at the same time the facilities
necessary for their development. It is society that, in some way, prepares these crimes,
and the criminal is only the instrument that executes them. (ibid., p.97)
Such patterns were material to work upon to effect improvements. Statistics provided
evidence of a moral condition of society that required remedy:
there is a budget which we pay with a frightful regularity – it is that of prisons, chains, and
the scaffold: it is that which, above all, we ought to endeavour to abate. (ibid., p.96)
The worker lived in poverty and want and saw that other people were better off than he
was. The worker was not sufficiently intelligent to appreciate why he, of all people, should
be the one to suffer – for after all he contributed more to society than the idle rich, and
sheer necessity drove him to steal in spite of his traditional respect for private property.
(2009 [1845], p.242)
Acts of violence committed by the working classes against the bourgeoisie and their
henchmen are merely frank and undisguised retaliation for the thefts and treacheries
perpetrated by the middle classes against the workers. (ibid., p.242)
Engels saw the growth of criminality not only among the deprived working class but also
in the ‘surplus population’ of casual workers, what Marx called ‘the lowest sediment’, and
others ‘the residuum’. Engels saw the position is starkly determinist terms:
Apart from over-indulgence in intoxicating liquors, the sexual immorality of many English
workers is one of their greatest failings. This too follows from the circumstances in which
this class of society is placed. The workers have been left to themselves without the moral
training necessary for the proper control of their sexual desires. While burdening the
workers with numerous hardship the middle classes have left them only the pleasures of
drink and sexual intercourse. The result is that the workers, in order to get something out
of life, are passionately devoted to these two pleasures and indulge in them to excess and
in the grossest fashion. If people are relegated to the position of animals, they are left with
the alternatives of revolting and sinking into bestiality. If the demoralisation of the worker
passes beyond a certain point then it is just as natural that he will turn into a criminal... as
inevitably as water turns into steam at boiling point. (ibid., pp.144–45)
This sounds not unlike recent American writings on the ‘underclass’ (see Morrison,
1995, Chapter 17 ‘Contemporary social stratification and the development of the
underclass’; Walklate (2007), Chapter 6 ‘Crime, politics and welfare’). The emphasis
upon faulty ‘training’ early in life is very familiar if you consider recent writings from
the control perspective. However, Engels is clearly putting this behaviour into a social
context, albeit with a reductionism to environmental determinism, which is missing
from much recent conservative writings. (See the criticisms of the conservative
position made by Elliott Currie (1988).) Furthermore, Engels located the worthy
working class as prospective radicals whose criminality was an inarticulate and
unconscious social rebellion.
In all his work, Engels did not merely describe conditions but chose to interpret his
material. In his work the author’s values are obvious, indeed self-consciously exposed.
His work is deliberately a treatise against capitalism and the absence of any concern
with the general welfare of society or of social justice on the part of the capitalists.
The weakness with his writing is the possibility that the immediacy and purity of the
experience of the subjects being communicated will be distorted and twisted by the
interpretation.
contains much that is repetitive, conjectural, and fanciful. It also contains a great deal
of valuable material and sensible observation. Properly read, it may be recognised as an
anticipation of the theorising that now passes for the sociology of deviance. (1982, p.51)
His ‘street biography’ appears as an early form of social ecology approach to the
study of crime based on observation and description of the social conditions of the
developing urban centres. His four volume London labour and the London poor offered
vivid accounts of the expanding masses which filled the growing cities of Victorian
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