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Contemporary Security Studies
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
IN PEACEBUILDING
ACTOR-CONTINGENT AND MALLEABLE JUSTICE
Djeyhoun Ostowar
This book explores the role of actors in determining transitional justice in

peacebuilding contexts.
In recent decades, transitional justice mechanisms and processes have been
introduced to a variety of settings, becoming widely regarded as essential ele-
ments in the ‘peacebuilding toolbox’. While it has increasingly been suggested
that transitional justice is imposed by neo-imperial actors with little regard for the
needs and cultures of local populations, evidence suggests that dismissing these
policies as neo-imperial or neo-liberal impositions would result in grossly over-
looking their dynamics, which involve a whole range of relevant actors operating
at multiple levels. This book interrogates this theme through empirical analysis of
three sites of peacebuilding that have seen extensive international involvement:
Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. It proposes a novel framework for analys-
ing and approaching transitional justice in peacebuilding that disaggregates three
broad sets of actors operating at different levels in relevant processes: external
actors (international and regional levels), transitional justice promoters (local,
national, international and transnational levels), and transitional regimes (national
and local levels). The book argues that transitional justice in peacebuilding must
be conceived of as actor-contingent and malleable due to the significance of
agency and (inter)actions of key categories of actors throughout peacebuilding
transition.
This book will be of interest to students and practitioners of transitional justice,
peacebuilding, law, and International Relations.
Djeyhoun Ostowar is a diplomat at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

and has a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London, UK.
Contemporary Security Studies
This series focuses on new research across the spectrum of international peace
and security, in an era where each year throws up multiple examples of conflicts
that present new security challenges in the world around them.
Series Editors: James Gow and Rachel Kerr, King’s College London
Power Relations in the Twenty-First Century
Mapping a Multipolar World?
Edited by Donette Murray and David Brown
Deterring Russia in Europe
Defence Strategies for Neighbouring States
Edited by Nora Vanaga and Toms Rostoks
British Defence in the 21st Century
John Louth and Trevor Taylor
Cultures of Counterterrorism
French and Italian Responses to Terrorism after 9/11
Silvia D’Amto
Russian Imperialism Revisited
From Disengagement to Hegemony
Domitilla Sagramoso
Targeted Killings, Law and Counter-Terrorism Effectiveness
Does Fair Play Pay Off?
Ophir Falk
Impact in International Affairs
The Quest for World-Leading Research
James Gow and Henry Redwood
Actor-Contingent and Malleable Justice
Djeyhoun Ostowar
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/

Contemporary-Security-Studies/book-series/CSS
Transitional Justice
in Peacebuilding
Actor-Contingent and Malleable Justice
Djeyhoun Ostowar
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Djeyhoun Ostowar
The right of Djeyhoun Ostowar to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-0-367-46310-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-02808-6 (ebk)
Typeset in Times
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents
List of Illustrations vi
Preface vii
Acknowledgements viii
Abbreviations ix
1 Introduction: Liberal Peace and Justice? 1
2 An Actor-Centred Analytical Framework 32
3 Kosovo: Multilayered Accountability 52
4 Parallel Justice for East Timor 88
5 The Near-Absence of Justice in Afghanistan 126
6 Conclusion: Actor-Contingent and Malleable Justice 162
Index 181
Illustration
Figures
1.1 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 8
1.2 United Nations Special Political Missions and Other Political
Presences 2020 9
3.1 Kosovo Region 51
4.1 Regions of Timor-Leste 87
5.1 Afghanistan 125
Table
2.1 Actors of Transitional Justice in Peacebuilding 46
Preface
Researching how transitional justice in peacebuilding is determined may seem a

task so intangible and context-dependent that it might be disregarded as a subject
of serious and feasible inquiry. The question seems neither sufficiently precise in
terms of place, time and content, nor conceptually so uncontroversial and straight-
forward as to be naturally comprehensible. But that is also one of the challenges
for academic inquiry: to grapple with complicated puzzles and ‘big questions’,
sometimes involving hard-to-pin-down concepts, and requiring a level of abstrac-
tion in order to make sense of observed experiences across time and space; this
potentially yields some generalizability that may have the capacity to transcend
the contextual specificities of a given situation. The central question that this book
addresses – ‘Is transitional justice in peacebuilding determined through external
imposition, and if not, how and by whom is it determined?’ – is, at the same time,
uniquely relevant and important. Not only have peacebuilding and transitional jus-
tice become unignorable parts of the political and social transformations of many
countries around the world that have undergone, or attempted, a transition from
conflict to peace, but also the praxis of both transitional justice and peacebuilding
continues to pose a set of not fully resolved, or resolvable, questions and dilemmas
for the stakeholders involved, and for all those affected by the conflict and transi-
tion. Furthermore, in the academic and policy debates, transitional justice has been
increasingly subject to the same critique as has ‘liberal peacebuilding’ – that it is
imposed by neo-imperial actors with little or no regard for the needs, wishes and
cultures of local populations, and that it ignores patterns of injustice and inequality
that caused the conflict in the first place. This book does not present a solution to
the many real quandaries of transitional justice and peacebuilding on the ground.
However, by its engagement with the above question through a novel actor-centred
analytical framework and in-depth qualitative analysis of three instances of peace-
building (Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan), it does attempt to create a more
nuanced understanding of the salient dynamics, processes and conditions that deter-
mine transitional justice outcomes in peacebuilding, thereby showing where the
‘liberal peace’ and other polemics of the debate regarding transitional justice tend
to be confusing. A more accurate and deep understanding of the relevant processes
is a precondition for enabling positive change and for learning the right lessons
from the experiences of transitional justice and peacebuilding around the world.
Acknowledgements
The publication of this book would not have been possible without the support of
many people. I am grateful to my family, friends, colleagues and my academic
advisors and examiners for their support and encouragement. My doctoral the-
sis supervisors at the War Studies Department of King’s College London, pro-
fessors James Gow and Rachel Kerr, not only skilfully guided me through my
doctoral research but also played an important role in making this book project
possible. My academic examiners Olga Martin-Ortega and Eirin Mobekk were
the first to encourage me to publish my research. Particular thanks go to Andrew
Humphrys, Bethany Lund-Yates and Rennie Alphonsa at Routledge for their
excellent support throughout the publication and production processes. I would
also like to thank my employer, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, and specifically several members of its academic committee,
namely Roel van der Veen, Liesbeth Lijnzaad and Dirk Jan Koch, for facilitating
my work towards the completion of this research, as well as its dissemination.
Several former professors, colleagues and friends played an important role in my
research choices and endeavours, and in facilitating or helping out during my
‘field research’ in different countries: Elizabeth Roberts, Barbara Oomen, Herman
Tak, Dila Kadirova, Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Arlinda Rrustemi, Djordje Stikovic, Kai
Hebel, Moritz Baumgärtel, Patrick Walsh, Tricia Johns, and Sarah Spronk. Last
but not least, I am grateful to my parents and brothers for their continued support
for all my professional and academic pursuits.
Abbreviations
AGO Attorney General’s Office

AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
CAVR Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East
Timor
CNRT National Council for Timorese Resistance
COE Commission of Experts
COI Commission of Inquiry
CRDP Centre for Research, Documentation and Publication (Kosovo)
CTF Commission of Truth and Friendship (Indonesia–East Timor)
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPA Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DPK Democratic Party of Kosovo
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DPT Democratic Peace Theory
EU European Union
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FALINTIL Armed Forces of the National Liberation of East Timor
FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICC International Criminal Court
ICT International Criminal Tribunal
ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IGO Intergovernmental Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INTERNFET International Force for East Timor
IR International Relations
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army
JRC Judicial Reform Commission
KFOR Kosovo Force
x Abbreviations
KHAD State Information Services of Afghanistan
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KPP-HAM Commission for Violation against Human Rights in East Timor
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission
KWECC Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
MDSD Most Different Systems Design
MOJ Ministry of Justice
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSSD Most Similar Systems Design
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
SCIU Serious Crimes Investigation Unit
SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPRK Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo
SPSC Special Panels for Serious Crimes (East Timor)
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations
SSR Security Sector Reform
TNI Indonesian National Armed Forces
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor
UPR Universal Periodic Review
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTD Timorese Democratic Union
WCIU War Crimes Investigation Unit
1 Introduction: Liberal
Peace and Justice?
In 2004, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan unequivo-

cally asserted that justice and peace are not just interconnected, but that they
can function in mutually supportive ways. Addressing an oft-articulated concern
about their incompatibility, he claimed in his report – which constituted a water-
shed moment in the debate on peace and justice – that ‘[j]ustice and peace are
not contradictory forces. Rather, when properly pursued, they promote and sus-
tain one another’.1 This stance on peace and justice resonated with the emerging
discourse at that time. Over the years, a level of policy and scholarly consen-
sus had been taking root, maintaining that peace and justice are not mutually
exclusive. The debate markedly shifted from a conflict between justice-advocates
and peace-supporters to a conversation about the possibilities and challenges of
particular justice-seeking measures. In 2009, speaking at an event marking the
sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Annan’s successor, UNSG Ban
Ki-Moon, even asserted that ‘the debate is no longer between peace and justice,
but between peace and what kind of justice’. He hailed this move as a ‘concep-
tual breakthrough’.2 Within a decade, during the high-level event celebrating the
seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 2018, the
new UNSG, Antonio Guterres, had to acknowledge that ‘the human rights agenda
is losing ground and authoritarianism is on the rise’.3 A decline of rights agenda
and an anti-liberal turn are likely to have consequences for transitional justice
because, by and large, the transitional justice agenda depends upon the interna-
tional human rights norms. The general discourse on the relationship of justice
and peace, and by extension transitional justice4 and peacebuilding,5 has shifted
from a tendency to emphasize the mutual tension between peace and justice to an
embracing of their interdependence, though this has recently subsided back into
decreased enthusiasm for human rights, together with a certain decline of confi-
dence in, and even a dismissal of, related practices such as transitional justice.
Conceptual advances towards connecting peace and justice initially built upon,
and went hand in hand with, a real-life linking of peace and justice in the practices
of peacebuilding and transitional justice. In the 1990s, the image of peace and
justice as ‘mutually reinforcing’ was vividly epitomized by the establishment of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ad hoc international criminal tribunals
(ICTs), which were endowed with a responsibility to contribute to peace.6 The
2 Introduction: Liberal Peace and Justice?
ad hoc tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were established
to contribute ‘to the restoration and maintenance of peace’.7 This is also true for
the ICC, whose mandate refers to ‘crimes [that] threaten the peace, security and
well-being of the world’, and explicitly tasks the ICC to contribute to the main-
tenance of international peace and security.8 In fact, the ICC and ICTs are far
from the only products of that development. First of all, in several countries the
turn towards accountability assumed the form of ‘hybrid’ courts, which sought
to combine the national and international levels, and tended to comprise national
and international judges, prosecutors, jurisdictions and the application of different
laws.9 In certain peacebuilding contexts, transitional justice transcended the sole
pursuit of legal accountability, through a focus on truth-seeking (in addition to
accountability). Truth-seeking tended to be pursued in the form of a truth commis-
sion, an inquiry or a documentation effort, with the assumption that such efforts
can contribute to preventing conflict and avoiding conflict relapse.10 Finally, other
mechanisms associated with ‘transitional justice’, such as reparations and vetting
(often also referred to as lustration),11 were also used in post-conflict peacebuild-
ing situations. Vetting and reparations were conceived of as important elements
in dealing with the past and for building peace.12 The invocation of all these meas-
ures hinged on the assumption that justice, in its varied forms, contributes to a
sustainable peace.
Notwithstanding the above developments, and while peace and justice have
been presented as two sides of the same coin, the practices of both transitional
justice and peacebuilding have increasingly been criticized as expressions of ‘lib-
eral peace’.13 This critique had emerged even before the apparent weakening of
the international human rights agenda observed at the time of writing – that is, in
the midst of broader geopolitical trends and a distinct anti-liberal and inward turn
in the politics of certain Western countries. In the academic and critical policy
debates, both practices have already for some time been subjected to the same cri-
tique, which labels them ‘liberal’ projects. In part, the critique has been connected
to the more general disenchantment about the dilemmas and risks associated
with transitional justice, such as potential implications of the pursuit of criminal
accountability for peace negotiations, possible negative effects of truth-seeking
on the victims and survivors and the alleged inability of vetting and reparations to
deliver on what they purport to achieve, in terms of facilitating a positive transfor-
mation and correcting the harms inflicted.14 By and large, however, this particular
critique emerged due to a feeling of unease with, and the problematization of, the
content and dynamics of both phenomena. Criticism was directed at peacebuilding
mainly because of its propensity to promote a liberal-style democracy and market
economy, even in places where these may not be fitting or even possible.15 As for
transitional justice, the critique of ‘liberal peace’ pointed to its interconnectedness
and integration with democratization and human rights goals, its potential to have
negative impacts and its ‘inappropriateness’ for the local context.
This book engages with the core of the ‘liberal peace’ critique: the assertion
concerning the ‘external imposition’ of transitional justice and peacebuilding,
which implicitly and explicitly pervades much of the now prevalent critique of
Introduction: Liberal Peace and Justice? 3
transitional justice as a form, and constituent part, of ‘liberal peace’. Indeed, the
‘liberal peace’ critique of peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as of
transitional justice as a constituent part of peacebuilding, relies on the underly-
ing assumption, and at times explicit claims, regarding the propensity of both
peacebuilding and transitional justice to entail ‘external imposition’.16 However,
and quite startlingly, empirical experience seems to largely contradict this core
premise of the ‘liberal peace’ critique. A closer examination of the dynamics of
the countries considered in this book unveils a much more complex picture than
would be permissible under the premise of ‘external imposition’. Kosovo’s tran-
sitional justice landscape, for example, contains mechanisms that were indeed
established largely by external players, such as the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), European Union Rule of Law Mission in
Kosovo (EULEX) and the new prosecutorial process for addressing war-related
allegations against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the so-called Specialist
Chambers. At the same time, the invocation of the ICTY in one of the most impor-
tant instances – namely the indictment of Milošević, together with a host of other
prominent Serbian leaders – appears to have come about independently from,
and even in defiance of, the preferences of key external players in Kosovo, in
particular, the US and the UK. In East Timor, although the prosecutorial pro-
cess under the Serious Crimes Process was established by the UN, it could not
operate effectively, due to non-cooperation and obstruction by Indonesia and the
central government of East Timor. Moreover, as a response to an internation-
ally supported truth commission, the Indonesian and East Timorese governments
established a separate and joint truth commission, named the Commission for
Truth and Friendship (CFT). In Afghanistan, early in its peacebuilding transi-
tion, in 2002, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) and International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) jointly
supported and facilitated a documentation process by the newly established
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) – a process that
precipitated the adoption of an official government-endorsed transitional justice
Action Plan in 2005, which identified individual criminal accountability amongst
its priorities. However, as seen in 2007 and despite protests by the ‘international
community’, the Afghan parliament adopted an amnesty bill that granted immu-
nity from prosecution for any form of hostility committed prior to the establish-
ment of the interim administration in December 2001. These examples suggest
that the claim concerning external imposition, articulated in the framing of transi-
tional justice and peacebuilding as ‘liberal peace’, demands further interrogation
and scrutiny, at the very least. The central question in this book, therefore, is the
following: Is transitional justice in peacebuilding determined through external
imposition, and if not, how and by whom is it determined?
This book interrogates this critical question by conducting an empirical exami-
nation of three sites of peacebuilding – Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan –
and developing a novel analytical framework based on a disaggregation of the key
actors in peacebuilding into three categories: external actors, transitional justice
promoters and transitional regimes. Through empirical examination of the three
cases, the book reveals that the core proposition within the critique of ‘liberal
peace’ – that it implies external imposition – is, in fact, not only overstated but
potentially even flawed.17 Indeed, the remarkable and entangled agency of differ-
ent sets of actors is grossly overlooked by assertions and suggestions that transi-
tional justice in peacebuilding is externally imposed. As the book demonstrates,
using a large amount of empirical evidence, transitional justice in peacebuilding
is determined not by a single category of actors, nor on a single level, but rather
through a complex, multi-level and, over the course of transitions, protracted web
of agency and interactions among the three actor categories identified.18 Even
where external actors may play a more prominent role in determining specific
measures at specific points in the transition, along the way the same measures
tend to be mediated and further affected by other actors. In other words, differ-
ent actors of peacebuilding leave their impact-footprints on transitional justice
policies and outcomes. At the same time, different actors deploy their agency in
complex, multifaceted and overlapping systems of interactions, where they may
contest an issue or outcome, or indeed unite around a common concern. Saliently,
as actor-dependent factors and interactions change over time, transitional justice
manifestations are also affected. In reality, key parameters of transitional justice
manifestations, such as the type and scope of measures, exist in a state of flux
because of their dependence on, and vulnerability to, the agency and interactions
of different actors throughout peacebuilding. Transitional justice in peacebuild-
ing could, therefore, be better conceived of as something actor-contingent in a
broader sense, rather than only focused on external actors. In addition, transi-
tional justice as an empirical phenomenon appears extremely malleable, rather
than static or fixed, in terms of how, by whom and at what point it is determined,
or how it might play out in practice.
In the following sections, this introductory chapter of the book elaborates on
the concepts of peacebuilding and transitional justice, thereby reflecting on the
complexity of their practical interrelationship. It then reviews the relevant litera-
ture, focusing mainly on the accounts relating to transitional justice determinants
in liberal peace, thereby explaining what gap(s) in current knowledge in the field
will be addressed. The chapter then discusses the research method and design of
this book, namely its use of qualitative research, as well as the case selection and
data collection processes. It concludes with an outline of the rest of the book,
pointing out, amongst others, that the actor-centred analytical framework is dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, while the central argument is presented and elaborated upon
in the final chapter, after the chapters examining the three empirical sites.
Elusive Concepts and Evolving Practice

Although neither ‘transitional justice’ nor ‘peacebuilding’ is easy to delineate
conceptually, and despite the fact that both concepts represent a set of developing
practices, it is nonetheless possible to speak meaningfully about these phenom-
ena. This book adopts an expanded, evolved and contemporary understand-
ing of the concepts. Peacebuilding is understood as a collection of efforts and
processes involving a mixture of local, international and non-state actors, aimed
at advancing sustainable peace in a given situation.19 Importantly, peacebuilding
is about longer-term engagement rather than single, or one-off, interventions or
measures. As pointed out by Goodhand and Hulme, ‘[p]eace building is not an
event with a precise beginning and an end; rather, it refers to processes which
occur before, during and after violent conflict’.20 In addition, peacebuilding may
include an array of activities that precede and follow formal peace agreements.21
It would indeed be unwarranted to have a narrow focus on peace agreements
that obviates other efforts aimed at making a peace agreement possible, or which
attempt only to prevent a relapse of violence. Transitional justice is understood
as a variety of responses undertaken by a mixture of international, national and
non-state actors, in order to address a legacy of past abuses as part of a transition.
Saliently, transitional justice is not limited to transitions from a dictatorship or
another form of repressive regime, but also involves transitions from conflict.
In addition, it encapsulates retributive justice such as trials, ‘restorative justice’
such as truth and reconciliation commissions and ‘distributive justice’ approaches
such as reparations and compensations. This enables an evolved understanding of
the question of transitional justice, as more than a one-dimensional question of
whether and how to seek prosecutions against the perpetrators of atrocities. It is
worth noting that since there are no single fully agreed-upon definitions of the two
terms, certain objections to the framing of the two concepts presented here can
be expected. Nevertheless, the definitional approaches adopted in this book are
in line with the evolution of the terms, their general contemporary understanding
and practice, as well as the general direction of scholarly literature on peacebuild-
ing and transitional justice.
Indeed, looking at the development of these terms makes it clear that the con-
ceptual focus has shifted towards the kind of broad understanding that is adopted
in this book. Various elements of what the notion of ‘peacebuilding’ captures have
been part of the evolving international practice aimed at advancing peace between
and within nations, most clearly in the various peace efforts of the League of
Nations (LON) and the United Nations (UN).22 However, the term itself really
emerged only in the 1970s, and became widely used only following the end of the
Cold War. It appears to have been first coined by Johan Galtung in his seminal
1975 work titled ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and
Peacebuilding’, in which peacebuilding was referred to as ‘structures’ that help
to ‘remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars
might occur’.23 Prior to that, in 1967, Galtung proposed a distinction that nega-
tive peace refers to the absence of physical fighting and hostilities, while posi-
tive peace denotes structures that are necessary for sustainable peace.24 Galtung’s
peacebuilding thesis did not exclude the former category, but his emphasis was
clearly on the latter, namely sustainable positive peace.
Since the term was first used in the 1970s, other explanations of the concept
emerged that further specified and expanded its scope.25 In 1992, the term was
popularized by Annan’s predecessor, UNSG Boutros Boutros Ghali, when as part
of his ‘Agenda for Peace’ report, he defined peacebuilding as ‘action to identify
and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to
avoid a relapse into conflict’.26 He further noted that peacebuilding may include
‘disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody
and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to pro-
tect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and pro-
moting formal and informal processes of political participation’.27 Peacebuilding
became a widely used notion, permeating the policies of many governments,
intergovernmental (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In its
day-to-day use, the term is not clearly demarcated, but it is generally employed
to describe a process consisting of interventions by states, IGOs, NGOs and other
non-state actors, in order to advance and institutionalize peace.
The origin and development of the term ‘transitional justice’ are similar and
yet distinct from those of peacebuilding. Many treat transitional justice practice
as being rooted in the experiences of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after WWII,
whilst some have also noted that the practice is traceable back to various earlier
trials and purges, and is connected with the emergence of international humani-
tarian law at the beginning of the twentieth century.28 Yet the term ‘transitional
justice’ itself really emerged only in the 1990s, ‘at the time of the Soviet collapse
and on the heels of the late 1980s Latin American transitions to democracy’.29 For
those employing the term, the aim had initially been to construct a ‘distinctive
conception of justice associated with periods of radical political change follow-
ing past oppressive rule’.30 Justice was seen as part of the transformation towards
democracy, in which the transition type and level of repression were important
factors.31 Indeed the ‘genealogy’ of transitional justice reveals that the early
approaches to the notion were concerned with how successor regimes of democ-
ratization transitions dealt with, or should deal with, human rights abuses by their
authoritarian predecessors.32
Since then, the understanding of the term ‘transitional justice’ evolved consid-
erably. An important contribution with regard to clarifying and crystallizing the
term was Kritz’s 1995 study, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies
Reckon with Former Regimes, which mapped out different measures that can be
conceived of as forms of transitional justice, including trials, vetting, inquiries
and reparations; this categorization is still commonly used.33 Kritz’s multivol-
ume work effectively demonstrated that transitional justice must be understood
as a broader issue that goes beyond trials.34 Since the 1990s, the term has further
evolved and expanded in its meaning – most importantly, to also include concep-
tions and responses of justice in transitions from conflict.35 IGOs and international
NGOs embraced and employed transitional justice in interventions in post-con-
flict situations.36 In this process, ‘transitional justice’ became increasingly framed
as also relevant to post-conflict societies, although this assertion remained con-
tested.37 According to the UN, transitional justice refers to ‘the full range of
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve
justice and achieve reconciliation’.38 While the development of the conceptual
understanding of these terms appeared to indicate an ever-expanding scope, it did
not mean that they somehow became uncontentious in academia or in practice.
In particular, those positive ideational shifts in the relationship between peace
and justice, as highlighted above, did not mean that the integration of both priori-
ties in practice became entirely clear to the actors involved, nor that it could be
straightforward in any way. Both in scholarly debates and praxis, there appeared
to be continued uncertainty and a lack of agreement surrounding the implications
of integrating peace and justice. Hence, despite international policy-makers’ lofty
formal embrace of peace and justice as mutually reinforcing forces, as well as the
headway in the recognition of the non-exclusivity of the two priorities by policy-
analysts and academics, the nexus of peace and justice and its application in real
settings have remained hazy and contentious for the relevant actors.
Indeed, while it is true that there was growing attention to human rights and
international criminal justice, the implications and challenges of (post-)conflict
accountability are yet to be fully understood by politicians, diplomats, the inter-
national media and civil society. Actual knowledge about the nexus of justice,
peace and conflict is still rather limited. In the early 2000s, Williams and Scharf
lamented that state and sub-state actors ‘lack an understanding of the utility of
justice-seeking in the peace-building process’, and ‘[i]f and when institutions of
accountability and justice have been established they have often failed to meet
objectives or have been inadequately balanced with other approaches’.39 The
thinking and knowledge regarding the nexus have moved on since then, but not
considerably, and policy-choices on how to deal with atrocities still manifest
themselves as real quandaries in contemporary peace processes. Today, many
key stakeholders and participants involved in the debate do not fully comprehend
how justice practically fits in with the pursuit of peace. While the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) has discussed transitional justice on various occasions, in
February 2020, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an open debate on ‘transi-
tional justice’ as a thematic issue for the first time; this followed an open debate
in November 2019 on the role of reconciliation in supporting international peace
and security, where transitional justice was touched upon.40 In both of these recent
debates, a key question was how transitional justice can support victims and lay
foundations for peace: it was debated how transitional justice could be integrated
into the work of UNSC in country-specific contexts, as well as across other rel-
evant thematic areas such as gender, social justice and local ownership.
The interaction between peacebuilding and transitional justice clearly lends
itself to further discussion and scrutiny. Further research into the nexus of peace-
building and transitional justice, as well as practical manifestations of that nexus,
are necessary to gain a more developed understanding of both transitional jus-
tice and peacebuilding. Such research is indeed imperative for the situations on
the ground in countries undergoing transition, as well as for multilateral actors
and organizations involved in those processes. By 2020, there were thirteen UN
peacekeeping operations undertaken across the globe.41 In addition, there were
over twenty country-specific UN special political missions (SPMs) managed by
the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) of the UN.42 In
most of these missions, a number of major IGOs and NGOs, along with a host
of smaller humanitarian organizations, human rights groups and the international
media, have been in some way involved in thinking about and experimenting with
the relationship between justice and peace.
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

MINUSMA MINURSO UNAMID UNMIK UNFICYP UNIFIL UNMOGIP
Mali Western Sahara Darfur Kosovo Cyprus Lebanon India and Pakistan
MINUSCA MONUSCO UNMISS UNISFA UNTSO UNDOF

Central African Republic Dem. Rep. of the Congo South Sudan Abyei Middle East Syria
Map No. 4259 Rev. 26.1 (E) UNITED NATIONS Office of Information and Communications Technology
November 2019 Geospatial Information Section
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara established: 1991
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the established: 2014
Central African Republic
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali established: 2013
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Rep. of the Congo established: 2010
UNAMID African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur established: 2007
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established: 1974
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus established: 1964
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon established: 1978
UNISFA United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei established: 2011
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo established: 1999
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan established: 2011
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan established: 1949
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization established: 1948
Figure 1.1 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Map No. 4259 Rev. 26.1 (E), UNITED
NATIONS, November 2019 (https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/
dpko/P_K_O.pdf)
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS Special Adviser, Cyprus UNSCOL
AND OTHER POLITICAL PRESENCES Special Envoy,
Implementation
2020 of Res. 1559 Special Envoy,
Syria
UNSMIL
UNSCO
UN Representative to the Geneva

International Discussions (UNRGID)
UNRCCA
Kazakhstan
Personal Envoy, Kyrgyzstan
Western Sahara Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
UNAMI
UNAMA
BINUH
Special Envoy, Myanmar
Special Adviser, Sudan
Special Envoy, Yemen
UNMHA
CNMC
UN Verification Mission in Colombia
UNOWAS
Benin
Burkina Faso UNIOGBIS
UNSOM UNOAU
Chad
Côte d’Ivoire
The boundaries and names shown and the Gambia Special Envoy, Burundi Special Envoy, Horn of Africa
designations used on this map do not imply official Ghana Djibouti
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Guinea Eritrea
Guinea-Bissau Personal Envoy, Ethiopia
Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Liberia Mozambique Kenya
Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India Personal Envoy, Bolivia Mali Somalia
and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir Mauritania South Sudan
has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Niger Sudan
Nigeria UNOCA Uganda
Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan Angola
and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been Republic of Cape Verde Special Envoy, Great Lakes Region
Burundi
determined. Senegal Angola
Cameroon
Sierra Leone Burundi
A dispute exists between the Governments of Chad
Togo Central African Republic
Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain Central African Republic
and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over Democratic Republic of the Congo Democratic Republic of the Congo
Equatorial Guinea Kenya
the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Gabon Republic of the Congo
Republic of the Congo Rwanda
Rwanda South Africa
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 km Sao Tomé and Principe South Sudan
Sudan
Tanzania
0 1000 2000 3000 mi Uganda
Zambia
Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)

BINUH: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, Port-au-Prince Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Bolivia A number of sanctions panels, monitoring groups, and other entities and mechanisms not
CNMC: United Nations Support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, Dakar Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Mozambique under the direction or purview of DPPA are also classified as special political missions.
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Kabul Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara For a full list, visit dppa.un.org/dppa-around-world
UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Baghdad Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus
UNIOGBIS: United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau, Bissau Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Sudan DPPA also maintains liaison presences in Bangkok, Beijing, Brussels, Buka, Cairo, Garbon, Jakarta,
UNMHA: United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement, Hudaydah Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi Kathmandu, Kyiv, Nairobi and Vienna.
UNOAU: United Nations Office to the African Union, Addis Ababa Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar
UNOCA: United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, Libreville Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria
UNOWAS: United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, Dakar Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region
UNRCCA: United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, Ashgabat Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa
UNSCO: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Jerusalem Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Implementation of Resolution 1559
UNSCOL: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Beirut Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen
UNSOM: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, Mogadishu United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions (UNRGID)
UNSMIL: United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Tripoli
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Bogotá
Map No. 4561 Rev.9 UNITED NATIONS Office of Information and Communications Technology
January 2020
Geospatial Information Section
Figure 1.2 U
nited Nations Special Political Missions and Other Political Presences 2020, Map No. 4561 Rev.9, UNITED NATIONS, January 2020
(https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/dpa_ousg_4561_r8_oct19.pdf)
Determinants of Transitional Justice:
Liberal Peace and Other Accounts
As stated above, this book interrogates the prevailing assumptions about the role
of external actors in determining transitional justice outcomes in peacebuilding,
namely as a corollary of the ‘liberal peace’. In doing so, the book contributes
to existing knowledge in the field, by helping to advance the understanding of
the nexus between peace and justice, and of transitional justice and peacebuild-
ing. Peacebuilding and transitional justice have mostly been treated separately in
academic debates, resulting in what Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik described as
‘self-referential’ literatures and isolated ‘echo-chambers’, where very few schol-
ars attempt to bridge the divide between them.43 As also observed by Andrieu, so
far relatively few scholars of transitional justice have situated their research in
the context of peacebuilding.44 Vice versa, this is also true for writings on peace-
building and ‘liberal peace’. The majority of writing on ‘liberal peace’ deals with
peacebuilding in general terms, engaging either less directly, or not at all, with
transitional justice.45 At the same time, there has been surprisingly little substan-
tiation of the claims regarding external imposition, as well as a lack of in-depth
empirical examination of how relevant outcomes are actually determined, and
of what roles different actors might play in affecting transitional justice policy
and outcomes. In addition, the issue of the determinants of transitional justice in
peacebuilding is underexplored more generally. Indeed, most research seeking to
explain transitional justice either situates its account specifically in the context
of democratization, or does not make distinctions between transitions from dic-
tatorship and from conflict, or between actors operating in such contexts.46 This
specific gap in the debate will be explained in this section, first by demonstrating
the centrality of claims about external imposition in the available discussions of
transitional justice in relation to peacebuilding, and then by showing what the
existing accounts on transitional justice determinants focus on and fail to tackle.
One could argue that since transitional justice has become an essential part
of many peacebuilding operations, it must automatically, and by default, be sub-
jected to the same critique of ‘liberal peace’. But the currently available accounts
go further than just seeing one concept within or in connection to the other.
Current accounts contain some very overt and direct claims about external impo-
sition, ranging from suggestions of forceful and violent imposition, to institutional
and cultural inappropriateness. They also include some more subtle and indirect
claims, but nonetheless these essentially convey the same message, suggesting
an infliction and compelling of certain outcomes by actors and forces which are
exogenous to a context. As one of those who has most explicitly applied the cri-
tique of ‘liberal peace’ to the two phenomena, Sriram pointed out that ‘transitional
justice strategies are not simply contemporaneous with peacebuilding: they share
key assumptions about preferable institutional arrangements, and a faith that other
key goods – democracy, free markets, “justice” – can essentially stand in for, and
necessarily create, peace’.47 Exploring the nexus of transitional justice and peace-
building, Sriram further argued that transitional justice also has the potential to
lead to more ‘destabilization’, that it may be ‘culturally inappropriate’, and that it
is also usually ‘externally imposed’.48 Whilst Sriram did recognize that the argu-
ment about external imposition should not be ‘overstated’, and acknowledged the
role of local governments and NGOs in calling or pushing for transitional jus-
tice, she did not go on to fully explore these aspects or further clarify the divides
between the external/internal and the national/international levels, thus leaving it
to others to fill the gap.49
Elsewhere, Sriram observed that many decisions regarding transitional justice
are de facto taken by international peacebuilding actors.50 Although transitional
justice might arguably need to be about local perspectives, needs and prefer-
ences, most transitional justice measures in contemporary peacebuilding contexts
involve external actors.51 Sriram has also argued that just as liberal peacebuild-
ing’s emphasis is on the market economy and civil and political rights, and given
the degree to which transitional justice is integrated into peacebuilding, justice
measures fail to address socioeconomic concerns that may be the root causes of
a conflict. A liberal perspective on transitional justice may result in ignoring the
underlying conditions of both conflict and transformation.52 Building on Sriram’s
work, Sharp observed that transitional justice is associated with a narrow under-
standing of the ‘transition to democracy’, and that further integration of transi-
tional justice and peacebuilding may ‘exacerbate some of the tendencies that have
given rise to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them’.53
This idea is in line with calls articulated earlier by Laplante and Mani, who
insisted on a focus on the ‘socioeconomic causes of violence’ by addressing social
inequalities and poverty.54 Mani, who was among the very first to advocate paying
greater attention to the nexus of peacebuilding and transitional justice, empha-
sized the importance of distributive measures to address the structural injustices.55
According to Andrieu, approaches to justice that focus on the physical abuse suf-
fered by the individual might miss the more ‘political’ and ‘structural’ dimensions
of human rights violations, and therefore may not be part of a ‘broader project of
social justice and development that could take the form of redistributive policies
or affirmative action programmes’.56
Potentially problematic effects of the liberal content of transitional justice’s
‘subsumption’ into liberal peacebuilding extend to the sociopolitical dynamics
of transition more generally. Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik, who observed that
both transitional justice and peacebuilding share ‘a concern with scale, asymme-
try and power’, further asked what the production and circulation of knowledge
and ‘the capital’ of both transitional justice and peacebuilding might mean for
the local context and the ‘everyday dynamic’.57 The liberal construction of transi-
tional justice could also result in insufficient attention to bottom-up processes, or
to demands both from within states and internationally. MacEvoy observed that
transitional justice tends to be ‘state-centric’ and ‘top-down’.58 State-centrism and
top-down approaches in turn result in adopting technocratic and one-size-fits-all
methods that may prove to be damaging.59
A particular cause for concern in the critical examination of transitional jus-
tice is found in a supposed ‘imperial dimension’ of transitional justice, in which
‘high-level policy makers in international organizations and governments’ adopt
the discourse of transitional justice to achieve aims other than justice.60 A com-
mon denominator in such analysis is that transitional justice may therefore be
‘dangerous or duplicitous’.61 Partly for these reasons, scholars such as Lambourne
and Andrieu have called for greater emphasis on the local, through greater par-
ticipation of the civil society in the design and implementation of transitional
justice.62 Andrieu argued further that civil society must ‘not be a secondary target:
it should be the primary one’.63
Suggestions about external imposition are also (implicitly) present in existing
arguments about ‘cultural inappropriateness’ and other deficiencies of transitional
justice, which have become especially vocal in recent years. Indeed, scholars
have increasingly pointed to the ‘pervasiveness’ of demands for justice, and to
transitional justice being ‘culturally inappropriate’.64 Various examples are given
of situations where international peacebuilders came up with transitional justice
solutions that are believed to be ill-suited to the cultural context. In reference to
Sierra Leone, for instance, Kelsall argued that with the imposition of international
justice through the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the local culture was
sidelined.65 Similarly, Bulkuluki argued that the ICC’s indictments in relation to
Northern Uganda amounted to Western imposition of a retributive agenda, ignor-
ing the local reconciliation tradition.66 Essentially, the critique about ‘cultural
inappropriateness’ is an argument against silencing some actors within a context.
As pointed out by Ainley, Friedman and Mahony, objections against internation-
alized justice tend to be against the ‘universalizing inclination’ of transitional
justice.67 The target of such critical reflection on transitional justice, and criminal
justice in particular, is therefore often the specific Western and European framing
of human rights and accountability, as pursued in international peacebuilding and
transitional justice.
One the one hand, it is difficult not to acknowledge that elements of transitional
justice can be ineffective, have negative effects and be at odds with certain tradi-
tions and cultures. For example, a strict application of international accountability
can be in tension with an indigenous culture or with a diversity of culture(s) pre-
sent in each place. Using simple (internationally created) templates for complex
local problems can indeed be quite problematic, to say the least. On the other
hand, for the purposes of this book, the main issue that would have to be evaluated
in such claims is whether and to what extent a specific approach to transitional
justice, which may be at odds with the prevailing cultural framework of the con-
text, is really externally imposed upon that context, understood as determined by
actors from outside a given context, that is, by those exogenous to that context.
It is striking that, as shown above, suggestions of external imposition infuse
the analysis and most of the arguments articulated about transitional justice in
connection to peacebuilding and ‘liberal peace’, and yet, the overall debate fails to
focus on exploring real empirical experiences of how concrete transitional justice
mechanisms emerge and operate in practice, as well as what the actual role is of
different actors operating on different levels of a peacebuilding transition in those
processes.68 In the literature mentioned above, the transitional justice measures in
question are often taken as the point of departure, without a more in-depth engage-
ment with the specific conditions and dynamics leading to those mechanisms:
how they are set up and invoked in the first place. Although this literature tends
to include references to different empirical examples to substantiate arguments,
in-depth assessment and interrogation of whether and how specific outcomes of
specific mechanisms emerge and operate empirically tend to be absent from those
works. In part, this important gap can be explained by the reality that much of
the debate on the link between transitional justice and peacebuilding as a ‘liberal
peace’ project concerns the concepts’ normative content; this includes questions
about what peace and justice ought to look like, and about what the practices and
notions of transitional justice and peacebuilding may mean in reality.
This gap in existing accounts related to the ‘liberal peace’ critique is com-
pounded by the fact that the few available explanations of transitional justice
determinants are too general, and almost all lack a focus on peacebuilding. Indeed,
only a handful of scholars, as will be outlined below, have engaged specifically
with the question of transitional justice determinants, and even fewer studies deal
with the question of determinants explicitly in relation to peacebuilding, let alone
exclusively in peacebuilding contexts. This issue is significant, as peacebuilding
often involves distinct dynamics that are manifestly different from the largely
peaceful (though repression may persist) nationally-run transitions from dictator-
ship to democracy, which are examined in the transitional justice literature. One of
the many salient distinct characteristics of peacebuilding contexts is that conflict
and large-scale violence can still be very much part of such transitional contexts,
even where a peace agreement was signed and transformational processes have
been embarked upon.69 In addition, transitional justice might be ‘only one part of
a complex process of transformation and post-conflict reconstruction, some of
which may be copasetic with strategies of transitional justice, and some of which
may not’.70 For these reasons, the explanations generated for explaining transi-
tional justice in other types of transitions are generally less directly applicable to
peacebuilding contexts, and certainly not without reservations or further analysis.
Existing general explorations of the determinants of transitional justice, which
have tended to concern transitions away from a form of dictatorship, have pro-
duced a variety of insights concerning various conditions and actors that are by
and large endogenous to the context of the countries assessed, whilst international
actors tend to be heavily present in peacebuilding environments. As one of the
pioneers in discussing transitional justice, Huntington argued in 1991 that ‘justice
is a function of political power’, and that its features are determined by the spe-
cific type of transition from communism to democracy. Specifically, he argued
that the weaker the exiting dictatorial regime at the time of the transfer of power
to the democratic regime, the more likely its officials and collaborators are to be
held accountable.71 Partly in response to Huntington, in 1994 Moran observed
that ‘psychological’ factors, such as the treatment of dissent under communism,
play a role in determining the transitional justice responses by the new regime:
countries with a more ‘lenient’ communist past are more likely to ‘forgive and
forget’.72 Both Huntington and Moran narrowly focus on issues such as the type of
transition and the scope of past repressions; these could of course be relevant, but
might play out quite differently in internationalized transitions, and in transitions
that are known as peacebuilding transitions.
Since the writings of Huntington and Moran in the early 1990s, the conversa-
tion on the determinants of transitional justice somewhat broadened towards a
consideration of factors that go beyond the type of transition and the nature or
scope of past repression. The conversation entered the realm of the ‘politics of
the present’.73 Yet the debate remained focused on the internal dynamics, mainly
the domestic actors, of the various countries under investigation. For example, in
an edited volume examining a wide pool of post-communist countries, Stan con-
cluded that the relationship between the communist regime and the opposition both
before and after the transition was important; this included such factors as expe-
rience with political pluralism, cooperation and co-option.74 Grodsky discussed
transitional justice as being dependent on ‘political goods’, arguing in relation to
Poland, Croatia and Serbia that ‘political elites pursue transitional justice strate-
gically, implementing popular programs only to the extent they do not interfere
with the provision of other expected goods’.75 Reflecting on the experience of the
Albanian transition from communism, Austin proposed that transitional justice is
very much part of election processes such as ‘electoral politics’ – by being incor-
porated within the electoral processes’ ‘petty politics’, transitional justice can be
nothing more than a tool to achieve other political purposes.76 Moving away from
Central and Eastern Europe, related arguments were formulated to explain the
observed transitional justice experiences in Latin America. Explaining the pres-
ence of prosecutions in Chile and their absence in El Salvador, Collins concluded
that the presence of civil society in Chile and respect for the new regime’s rule of
law made the difference.77 All of these explanations remained within the realm of
domestic politics, past and present.
A few notable exceptions that did look at the determinants of transitional jus-
tice beyond the domestic level did not distinguish between democratization and
peacebuilding contexts, and were in fact largely about the former. In Sriram’s
2004 book Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, for example, the list of
case studies consisted of a mix of transitions from dictatorship and conflict (El
Salvador, Argentina, Honduras, South Africa, Sri Lanka), while the explanatory
framework used to explain what made accountability more or less viable went
beyond the domestic level: alongside the balance amongst former opponents, spe-
cifically including the military, and the extent of past abuses, external influences
were concluded to be important too.78 However, as the list of the countries exam-
ined shows, Sriram’s conclusions were largely informed by democratization tran-
sitions. Similar limitations are also present in Sikkink’s influential contribution
on what she coined the ‘justice cascade’.79 Sikkink argued that the exponential
increase in national and international prosecutions of leaders responsible for past
human rights violations can be attributed to a new accountability norm, which has
been diffused both ‘horizontally’ among states and ‘vertically’ between states and
intergovernmental organizations or international NGOs.80 The norm promulgated
by larger global movements as the ‘justice cascade’ is the result of deliberate and
targeted organizing by human rights advocates.81 As Sikkink herself revealed, her
analysis is informed by, and speaks to, democratization transitions in countries
such as Argentina, Guatemala, Spain and Italy, as well as to international pros-
ecutions using international tribunals and domestic courts, conducted in places
such as Belgium and the Netherlands.82 As such, no effort was made to provide a
differentiation of the types of transitions, or to thoroughly conceptualize different
actors. In addition, Sikkink focuses squarely on prosecutions, whereas, as men-
tioned above, there are other equally pertinent avenues of transitional justice, such
as truth-seeking, reparation and vetting.
Taken together, as the paragraphs above have demonstrated, the existing
assertions about external imposition, as articulated in available writings on lib-
eral peacebuilding and transitional justice, tend to miss an in-depth and empiri-
cal examination of the determinants of transitional justice. At the same time, the
limited academic (and empirically more grounded) debate on the determinants of
transitional justice has so far failed to specifically address peacebuilding contexts,
neither has it offered a clear and systematic conceptualization of actors operat-
ing on different levels, nor of who may have a role in shaping transitional jus-
tice policies and outcomes in such transformations.83 In fact, none of the studies
has examined the determinants of transitional justice by specifically focusing on
peacebuilding while also thoroughly demarcating the different actors’ levels of
operation. With its focus on the question of whether transitional justice in peace-
building is determined through external imposition, and if not, how and by whom,
this book helps to fill this notable gap in the literature. It does so by focusing on
transitional justice in peacebuilding contexts, by examining the determinants of
transitional justice from the perspectives of a multitude of involved actors and by
attempting to shed light on the varied impact of different sets of actors operat-
ing on multiple, and sometimes overlapping, levels of these transformational and
transitional processes of peacebuilding.
This Book’s Research Design and Method

In order to address the question ‘is transitional justice in peacebuilding determined
through external imposition, and if not, how and by whom is it determined?’, this
book conducts a close study of three sites where transitional justice was imple-
mented (or not), in the context of major peacebuilding initiatives in Kosovo, East
Timor and Afghanistan. This section explains this book’s choice of qualitative
research, its selection of these three specific cases, and its procedure for data col-
lection and analysis. The actor-centred analytical framework developed for this
study, which tackles the question at the national, international and transnational
levels, will be discussed separately in the subsequent chapter.
Qualitative Research
The empirical research presented in this book is primarily qualitative. Whereas there
can be many advantages in using quantitative research, or ‘mixed methods’ for that
matter, the topic and question at hand lend themselves particularly well to qualita-
tive research. In order to empirically assess whether transitional justice in peace-
building is determined through external imposition, and if not, how and by whom, it
is necessary to research, describe, explore and explain the dynamics and interactions
leading to particular transitional justice manifestations.84 A quantitative approach
would be more suitable for generalization purposes or theory and hypothesis testing
when the variables of interest are clear and, ideally, few. In contrast, the qualitative
method’s ‘thick description’ of the context and interactions of different actors and
factors involved can aid in discerning conditions and dynamics that contribute, or
lead, to particular outcomes, as these emerge in specific shapes, forms and moments
in time. By closely examining various ‘mechanisms’ that have led to particular
results, a qualitative thick analysis method is also particularly useful for gauging
why certain outcomes, which might be reasonably expected, did not materialize.
Furthermore, a qualitative approach is suitable for this specific research
because peacebuilding contexts tend to involve a multitude of actors operating
and interacting on the international, regional, national and local levels. Analysis of
their role and interactions, as well as relevant causal relations, thorough in-depth
study of contemporary and historical data, amounts to studying what Mahoney
described as ‘dynamic relations and unfolding processes in a way that does not
lend itself to efficient quantification or statistical inference’.85 Finally, this quali-
tative approach allows the analyst not only to understand and interpret complex
processes and interactions, but also to describe and present the results. As noted
by Ponterotto, ‘[t]hick description leads to thick interpretation, which in turns
leads to thick meaning [...]. Thick meaning of findings leads readers to a sense of
verisimilitude, wherein they can cognitively and emotively “place” themselves
within the research context’.86
The ‘thick description’ of qualitative research is closely related in meaning and
application to historical analysis and ‘process tracing’, with the latter referring to
the ‘use of evidence from within a historical case to make inferences about causal
explanations of that case’.87 It is important to point out that process tracing, like
historical explanations, is not necessarily about testing a theory or hypotheses, nor
does it depend on having well-defined independent and ‘intervening’ variables.
It can also be used for explorative research that mixes deductive and inductive
observations (more on this mixture of methods is provided in Chapter 2). Process
tracing is essentially about uncovering descriptive inferences and causal relations
in complex settings by focusing on well-defined and specific events and actions
that constitute ‘a temporal sequencing of events’.88 By getting not one but many
snapshots of the series of events over time, and from different angles, a so-called
‘unfolding of events’ is reconstructed, which enables both descriptive inferences
and causal constitutive relations to be established regarding the outcome of inter-
est. A focus on detailed historical and empirical analysis can help in establishing
the connections and links between certain factors, actors, interactions, processes
and outcomes of interest.
This book uses the qualitative research method in a multiple case-study design
involving three cases of peacebuilding. The rationale for examining multiple case
studies, instead of a single case, is to strengthen the analysis and add to the ‘exter-
nal validity’ of the research. Using a limited number of cases helps in merging two
ostensibly contradictory aims: generating an in-depth understanding of different
cases and, at the same time, producing some level of generalization.89 Importantly,
a prevailing approach to case-study research, even if consisting of a single case,
is not merely to look into a particular instance but to draw certain generalizable
observations. Gerring defined the case study as ‘an intensive study of a single
unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units’.90 Saliently
too, case-study research of multiple cases can be a ‘case-sensitive approach’, in
the sense that ‘each individual case is considered as a complex entity, as a whole
that needs to be comprehended and which should not be forgotten in the course of
the analysis’.91 In order to preserve case-sensitivity, the study has to be limited to
a small number of cases which can be reasonably researched within the scope of
this book, without losing sight of the complexity of each case.
Case Selection
Common case election techniques used in case-study research, specifically in
comparative case-study research, such as Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)
and Most Different System Design (MDSD), tend to be too rigid to be entirely
suitable for this book’s purposes. For example, MSSD is based on the belief and
expectation that ‘systems as similar as possible constitute the optimal samples for
comparative inquiry’, because it makes it easier to identify factors that account for
potential ‘inter-systemic’ differences in the dependent variable.92 In other words,
to understand different outcomes, one looks at factors that vary between cases
which are otherwise similar.93 Conversely, MDSD is a design based on comparing
‘maximally different’ cases in all respects but the variable of interest.94 However,
the criteria of such approaches might be unworkable, especially when countries
constitute the ‘cases’. No matter how similar these countries might appear, the
number of differences in conditions – so-called independent variables – will
usually be sufficiently large that some of these conditions will interact and co-
influence the dependent phenomenon. In the real world, finding countries that are
‘similar’ or ‘different’ to the extent assumed by MSSD and MDSD is extremely
difficult. There are no two countries, and no two situations, that are not different
in some important ways. Similarly, there could always be important commonali-
ties that might be overlooked. Thus, attempts to put emphasis on certain common-
alities for the sake of comparison are potentially problematic.
Against this backdrop, and since comparison is not the main goal here, the
case selection approach in this book is one that attempts to connect conceptually
and substantively to the specific research question posed and the research task
identified. In order to empirically assess the claims regarding the ‘external impo-
sition’ of transitional justice in peacebuilding, it is necessary to focus on situa-
tions which the claims tend to refer to and are generally about. At the very least,
it seems prudent to focus on those cases that would be sufficiently close to the
conditions of the situations addressed in the relevant conversation about so-called
‘liberal peace’. Indeed, if this book undertakes inter alia to seriously engage with
the specific claim about the nature of transitional justice as articulated in the cri-
tique of ‘liberal peace’, then it would be fair to also examine the same cases
that are understood and framed as liberal peacebuilding in this critique. Kosovo,
Afghanistan and East Timor contain features that make their analyses very suit-
able and interesting in relation to the question posed. All three are associated with
largely accepted international peacebuilding undertakings with very high degrees
of international involvement and an expansive scope of peacebuilding. In addi-
tion, all three cases exhibit the characteristic central to the ‘liberal peace’ critique
of peacebuilding and transitional justice: a heavy external, and Western, presence.
It is in fact possible to regard Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan as emblematic
cases of what is understood and labelled as ‘liberal peace’, while each case is
ultimately different. In addition, the fact that the military interventions and sub-
sequent peacebuilding occurred at around the same time (in 1999 in Kosovo and
East Timor, and 2001 in Afghanistan) means that the cases developed in parallel
to each other, within the same international political climate.
These various peacebuilding processes started during the peak of the expan-
sion of international peacebuilding at the end of the 1990s, although the case of
Afghanistan also represents a turn away from further expansion of international
peace operations, but in a very different sense than in, for example, Iraq. Together
with the mission in Kosovo, the UN mission in East Timor was one of the most
ambitious operations undertaken by the UN.95 In the absence of any parallel
national authority, the UN formally exercised full control over the territories.96
Whereas in East Timor the UN transferred these powers to local authorities earlier
than in Kosovo, in 2002 in East Timor compared to 2008 in Kosovo, UN respon-
sibility went, in practice, well beyond the formal independence announcement
on 20 May 2002. While the East Timorese gradually assumed political power
and full sovereignty in 2002, many UN troops and police remained in the coun-
try to protect order and the rule of law. The case of Afghanistan is different in
terms of policy and the initial input of peacebuilding, but it turned out to contain
much of the same ambitious international involvement. In lieu of an East Timor
and Kosovo-style international administration, in Afghanistan a so-called ‘light
footprint’ approach was chosen.97 This ‘light footprint’ meant that the transitional
administration, as well as the UN, relied on a limited international civilian pres-
ence and support.98
Notwithstanding the salient differences among the three cases, the degree of
foreign involvement in all three countries was often the subject of fierce criti-
cism, amounting to a liberal peace critique. Eriksson and Kostic, for example,
referred to Afghanistan and Kosovo (read also East Timor, due to a very strong
commonality with Kosovo) as situations of ‘imposed conflict transformation’,
based on the powerful imposition of specific solutions in the negotiations leading
up to formal transitions.99 The centrality of the same standardized approach to
democratic state-building has also been a strong concern in the discussion of these
cases. According to Bell, East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan exhibit the same
stages regarding the establishment of an interim administration, the establishment
of local administrations with gradually increasing powers, the holding of elections
and the drafting of a new constitution.100 Herein, it is important that in all three
countries, peacebuilding entailed significant elements of ‘liberal’ institutional
reform, including democratization, a human rights agenda and elections.
Original Research and Data Collection

The overall research task in each of the empirical cases was to trace, understand
and explain the trajectories of transitional justice in the peacebuilding practice,
in order to gauge whether transitional justice in peacebuilding was determined
through external imposition, and if not, how and by whom. For all three cases, the
unfolding of relevant events had to be reconstructed and interpreted. In order to
do this meaningfully, it was decided to use a time frame of roughly fifteen years
since the start of peacebuilding processes in each country, but without rigid and
artificial delineations of (exact) start and end dates.101 Because peacebuilding is by
nature a longitudinal process, it was considered appropriate to examine relevant
developments over a long period of time.
The task of investigating and assessing how and by whom transitional jus-
tice was determined in each of the peacebuilding cases, and over a relatively
long period of time, required an intensive and complex process of data gathering
and analysis. Creating ‘thick description’ for the purposes of historical analysis
and process tracing demanded collection of a large amount of data. Generally,
qualitative data include ‘detailed description of situations, events, people and
interaction, observed behaviour, direct quotations from people about their expe-
riences, beliefs and thoughts, excerpts or entire passages from documents, cor-
respondence, records and case histories’.102 Data collection in this book involved
firstly a close study of the secondary material: specifically, publicly available and
electronically archived reports by governments, IGOs, NGOs and think tanks,
and many dozens of journal articles and academic books (books on the current
subjects, historical accounts, as well as memoirs by people personally involved
in relevant processes). In addition, a series of semi-structured interviews was
conducted in London, Oxford, The Hague, Kabul, Pristina, Dili, Belgrade and
Jakarta, and through the use of telecommunication. The fieldwork and visits to
Pristina, Belgrade, Dili and Jakarta took place in 2016. Some of the interviews,
namely twelve out of fifty-four, were held via phone and Skype due to difficulties
of meeting in person. The aim was to interview the most suitable people in terms
of those possessing the knowledge and information sought. The interviews were
held with individuals who were closely observing or involved in the processes
identified as relevant to transitional justice outcomes (e.g. diplomatic and military
interventions, justice sector reform and varied trajectories of the transitional jus-
tice mechanisms in each country). Hence, the respondents were representatives of
IGOs, governments or NGOs; political leaders, lawyers and judges; and independ-
ent experts. In total, sixteen semi-structured interviews were conducted for the
case of Afghanistan; nine out of these sixteen were held during the early stages of
this project, specifically in 2011, during a field visit to Afghanistan. Twenty-two
semi-structured interviews were held for the case of Kosovo, and sixteen for East
Timor. With the exception of a few contacts already known, most interviewees
were initially approached via publicly available contact details or private contact
details obtained from other interviewees. While only some interviewees explic-
itly asked to remain anonymous due to the (political) sensitivity of the subject
matter, the book treats all interviewees in the same way, i.e. confidentially. The
combination of using a large volume of secondary data and a significant number
of in-depth interviews gave a relatively strong foundation for ‘thick’ description,
interpretation and exploration.
Chapter Outline
This book makes three distinctive contributions to knowledge in the fields of tran-
sitional justice and peacebuilding: 1. It demonstrates theoretically and empirically
that the critical approach which posits transitional justice as part of a neo-impe-
rialist, or neo-liberal, external imposition is incorrect, given that both transna-
tional actors (transitional justice promoters) and domestic actors (the transitional
regime) play critical roles in shaping the process and outcome; 2. It develops the
novel actor-centred conceptual framework of external actors, transitional justice
promoters and transitional regimes, which facilitates inquiry into particular out-
comes that in different cases are a function of the agency and (inter)actions of
these different categories of actors; 3. It contributes through the introduction of
new empirical material, both from official documentary sources and generated
through dozens of original research interviews, which together illuminate the role
of the most important actors in the respective peacebuilding and transitional jus-
tice processes.
After this introductory chapter, the book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2
explains how the analytical framework developed in this book can help capture
the complexity of the conduct, role and interactions of actors involved in tran-
sitional justice on the national, international and transnational levels of peace-
building contexts and processes. The framework, as well as the consideration of
multiple facets of agency, consists of studying three main sets of actors involved
in negotiating and making decisions about transitional justice in peacebuilding
and in shaping its operation in practice: external actors, transitional justice pro-
moters and the transitional regime.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 use the above-mentioned framework, employing original
empirical data, in order to answer the central research question of whether tran-
sitional justice in peacebuilding is determined through external imposition, and
if not, how and by whom, in each of the three cases. The chapters provide thick
descriptions, interpretation, exploration and explanation of transitional justice tra-
jectories, based on original research and analysis of a significant amount of data.
The three chapters are structured as follows: starting with an overview of the most
salient background conditions of the relevant conflict and peacebuilding inter-
vention, each chapter proceeds to first analyse the key junctures of peacebuild-
ing and transitional justice; this involves examining the diplomatic and military
interventions which determined the initial direction(s) and opportunities of peace-
building and transitional justice. The chapters then move to examining the trajec-
tories of the most important transitional justice manifestations observable in each
case, over roughly fifteen years.
Chapter 6, the final chapter, draws an overall conclusion regarding what the
findings mean for the notion and practice of transitional justice in peacebuilding,
and it discusses the significance of those implications beyond this book. Here,
the conclusion engages in a limited comparative exercise that brings together the
main findings from each empirical chapter. Although comparison is explicitly
not the aim of this book’s treatment of different cases, a limited comparative
exercise was considered useful for teasing out key findings from the empirical
chapters, and for highlighting how these may enhance the general understanding
of the nature of transitional justice in peacebuilding: specifically, that transitional
justice in peacebuilding could be conceived of as actor-contingent and as mal-
leable justice. The concluding chapter then explains in brief how this book’s
findings and conclusion are also relevant beyond the scope of this book: first,
as a theoretical contribution to interrogating other themes under the rubrics of
peacebuilding and transitional justice; second, as a way to draw more attention
to local dynamics and currents relevant for understanding local-level responses
to transitional justice; third, as a demonstration that transitional justice in peace-
building is a distinct form of justice; fourth, by illuminating how transitional
justice operates beyond the realm of politics; and finally, by highlighting that
transitional justice is not fixed, in terms of the opportunities and risks of possible
policy interventions.
Notes
1 United Nations, UNSC, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies. Report of the Secretary General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616,
http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga07/law.pdf (accessed 23 March 2016).
2 United Nations, Honouring Geneva Conventions, Secretary-General Says ‘No
Longer Between Peace and Justice but Between Peace and What Kind of Justice’, 26
September 2009, Statements and Messages, SG/SM/12494-L/T/4417-HR/5002, http:
//www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12494.doc.htm (accessed 27 February
2013).
3 United Nations, UNSG Secretary-General's remarks at High-level event to commem-
orate 70th Anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December
2018, Statements, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-12-10/sec
retary-generals-remarks-high-level-event-commemorate-70th-anniversary-of-uni
versal-declaration-of-human-rights (accessed 8 February 2020).
4 ‘Transitional justice’ is understood here as a variety of responses undertaken by a
mixture of international, national and non-state actors, in order to address a legacy of
past abuses as part of a transition. A more extensive discussion of the term is provided
in the following subsection of the chapter.
5 ‘Peacebuilding’ is understood here as a collection of efforts and processes, involving
a mixture of local, international and non-state actors, aimed at advancing sustainable
peace in a given situation. A more extensive discussion of the term is presented in the
following subsection of the chapter.
6 Ad hoc international tribunals include the tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and Rwanda (ICTR). Since 2001, there has been a permanent International Criminal
Court (the ICC) in The Hague.
7 United Nations, UNSC, Resolution 1966, Adopted by the Security Council at its
6463rd meeting, on 22 December 2010, 22 December 2010, http://www.icty.org/x
/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/ResidualMechanism/101222_sc_res19
66_residualmechanism_en.pdf (accessed 1 November 2013).
8 ICC, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, http://www
.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/
RomeStatutEng1.pdf (accessed 3 November 2013).
9 Hybrid courts established so far include the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), East Timorese Special Panels and Serious Crimes
Unit (SCU), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the War
Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo International
Judges and Prosecutors Programme, and the Kosovo Specialised Chambers and
Specialised Prosecutor’s Office. For a discussion of hybrid courts, see Sarah M. H.
Nouwen, ‘Hybrid Court: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes
Courts’, Utrecht Law Review 2, no. 2 (2006): 190–214.
10 Notable examples of truth commissions in peacebuilding include Sri Lanka (1994–
1997), Sierra Leone (2002–2004), East Timor (2002–2005 and 2005–2008) and
Kenya (2009–present). For an overview of truth commissions, see Priscilla B. Hayner,
Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions
(New York: Routledge, 2011).
11 The terms lustration and vetting are often used interchangeably. Yet the former has
a specific resonance with the practices in Eastern and Central Europe; this was the
term consistently used at that time. For an in-depth discussion of those practices, see
Lavinia Stan, Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union:
Reckoning with the Communist Past (London: Routledge, 2008).
12 In El Salvador and Afghanistan, for example, vetting featured as a means of transition
and transformation. The emphasis in these vetting processes was on large-scale human
rights abuses and war crimes. Reparations featured in, amongst others, Colombia,
East Timor and Uganda. For a discussion of these different measures, see Pablo de
Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
and Pablo de Greiff and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, Justice as Prevention: Vetting
Public Employees in Transitional Societies (New York: Social Science Research
Council, 2007).
13 See, for example, the following works: Roger MacGinty, ‘Warlords and the Liberal
Peace: State-Building in Afghanistan’, Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 4
(2010): 577–98; Roland Paris, ‘Bringing the Leviathan Back in: Classical Versus
Contemporary Studies of the Liberal Peace’, International Studies Review 8 (2006):
443; David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building (Pluto Press,
2006); Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration (Oxford University
Press, 2008); Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and
Afghanistan (Vintage, 2003); Oliver Richmond, ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming
Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity Via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes
of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 3 (2009):
324–44; Catherine Baker and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, ‘Mapping the Nexus of
Transnational Justice and Peacebuilding’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
10, no. 3 (2016): 281–301; Kora Andrieu, ‘Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional
Justice, Civil Society and the Liberal Paradigm’, Security Dialogue. 41, no. 5 (2010):
537–58; Chadra Lekha Sriram, ‘Liberal Peacebulding and Transitional Justice: What
Place for Socio-Economic Concerns?’ in Justice and Economic Violence in Transition,
ed. Dustin Sharp (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 27–36;
Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace: Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of
Transitional Justice’, Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007); Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond
Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’, Journal of Law
and Society Oxford 34, no. 4 (2007): 411–40.
14 These and other related issues form part of the longstanding ‘peace versus justice’
debate, which suggests that there is an inherent tension between the two goals and
pursuits. While there is currently more consensus on the general compatibility of
peace and justice, it does not mean that the debate has been concluded, nor that there
is agreement on what the various effects of specific mechanisms of justice are in any
given situation, or in general. For recent discussions of the risks associated with transi-
tional justice, see, for example: Clara Sandoval Villalba, ‘Briefing Paper. Transitional
Justice: Key Concepts, Processes and Challenges’, Institute for Democracy and
Conflict Resolution, July 2011, http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4482/ (accessed 25 July
2016); Paige Arthur, Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in
Divided Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 174–75; David
Mendeloff, ‘Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the
Enthusiasm?’, International Studies Review 6 (2004): 3.
15 e.g. Oliver P. Richmond, Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments
and Approaches (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 24; Nancy Bermeo, ‘What the
Democratization Literature Says – or Doesn’t Say – about Postwar Democratization’,
Global Governance 9, no. 2 (2003): 159–77.
16 e.g. Andrieu, ‘Civilizing Peacebuilding’; Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace’; and Dustin N.
Sharp, ‘Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding and Transitional
Justice through the Lens of Critique’, Chicago Journal of International Law 14, no. 2
(2013): 165–196.
17 Importantly, the proposition regarding external imposition does not belong to one
or two specific authors. Rather, the proposition is taken here as a core assertion that
is present in (sometimes quite explicitly) and cuts across many current accounts of
transitional justice, which see it as a form of ‘liberal peace’. See the next section of
this chapter for a review of relevant literature, including concrete examples of direct
and indirect assertions of external imposition.
18 The concept of agency in relation to actors will be explored in detail in Chapter 2 of
this book.
19 Chandra L. Sriram, Jemima García-Godos, Johanna Herman and Olga Martin-Ortega,
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants
(London: Routledge, 2013), 1–2.
20 Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, ‘From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies:
Understanding Conflict and Peace-Building in the New World Disorder’, Third World
Quarterly (print) (1999): 13–26.
21 John P. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 20.
22 For more on this, see, for example, David Last, ‘From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding’,
OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 5.1 Summer: 1–8 (2003).
23 Johan V. Galtung, ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and
Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding 1 (2015): 13–37.
24 Johan V. Galtung, ‘Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking’,
International Peace Research Institute, (September 1967).
25 Paul F. Diehl, ‘Paths to Peacebuilding: the Transformation of Peace Operations’, in
Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Post-War Societies, eds. David Mason and
James D. Meernik (London: Routledge, 2005), 108.
26 United Nations, UNSG, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, 17 June 1992, A/47/277, http://www
.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm (accessed 20 April 2017).
27 Idem.
28 e.g. Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
29 Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays (Oxford
University Press, 2014), 3-4
30 Idem.
31 Nadya Nedelsky, ‘Divergent Responses to a Common Past: Transitional Justice in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia’, Theory and Society, 33.1 (2004): 65–115.
32 Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field” or
“Non-Field”’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 3.1 (2009): 5–27.
33 Paige Arthur, ‘How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional Justice’, Transitional Justice 1 (2017): 139–178.
34 Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former
Regimes (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995).
“Non-Field”’.
36 Patricia Lundy and Mark MacGovern, ‘Whose Justice?: Rethinking Transitional
Justice from the Bottom Up’, Transitional Justice 3 (2017): 58–83.
37 Arthur, ‘How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional Justice’.
38 United Nations Rule of Law, ‘Transitional Justice’, http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx
?article_id=29 (accessed 1 November 2013).
39 Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf, Peace with Justice?: War Crimes and
Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield,
2002), xvii–xxi.
40 Security Council Report, ‘February 2020 Monthly Forecast. Thematic Issues:
Transitional Justice’, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-
02/transitional-justice.php (accessed 15 February 2020).
41 United Nations, ‘Current Peacekeeping Operations’, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/
current-peacekeeping-operations (accessed 18 January 2020).
42 United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), ‘DPPA
Around the World’, https://dppa.un.org/en/dppa-around-world (accessed 18 January
2020).
43 Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik, ‘Mapping the Nexus of Transnational Justice and
Peacebuilding’.
44 Andrieu, ‘Civilizing Peacebuilding’.
45 e.g. MacGinty, ‘Warlords and the Liberal Peace’; Chandler, Empire in Denial; Wilde,
International Territorial Administration; Ignatieff, Empire Lite; Roland Paris, At
War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 22–34; Mandy Turner and Florian Kuhn, The Politics of International
Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace (London: Routledge, 2016); and Richmond,
‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism’.
46 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); John P. Moran, ‘The
Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe: Prosecute and Punish or Forgive and
Forget?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27, no. 1 (1994); Stan, Transitional
Justice in Eastern Europe; Brian K. Grodsky, ‘Transitional Justice and Political
Goods’, and Robert C. Austin, ‘Transitional Justice As Electoral Politics’, 30–50,
both in Post-communist Transitional Justice: Lessons from Twenty-Five Years
of Experience, eds. Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2015); Cath Collins, Post-transitional Justice: Human Rights Trials
in Chile and El Salvador (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011);
and Chandra Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace in
Times of Transition (London: Frank Cass, 2006).
47 Sriram, Chandra L., ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional
Justice’, in The Liberal Peace and Post-War Reconstruction: Myth Or Reality?, eds.
Roger MacGinty and Oliver Richmond. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 89–102.
48 Idem.
49 Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace?’, 100–101.
50 Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 3.
51 Idem.
52 Sriram, ‘Liberal Peacebulding and Transitional Justice’, 27–36.
53 Sharp, ‘Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist’.
54 Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge:
Polity, 2002); and Lisa J. Laplante, ‘Transitional Justice and Peace Building:
Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human
Rights Framework’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008),
331–355;
55 Mani, Beyond Retribution.
57 Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik, ‘Mapping the Nexus of Transnational Justice and
Peacebuilding’.
58 McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism’.
“Non-Field”’.
61 Idem.
62 Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence’,
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 28–48; and Andrieu.
‘Civilizing Peacebuilding’.
64 e.g. Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace?’, and Jennifer J. Llewellyn and Daniel Philpott,
Restorative Justice, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
65 Tim Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
66 Paul Bukuluki, Negotiating Retributive and Restorative Justice in Conflict
Transformation Efforts: A Case of Northern Uganda (Berlin: Lit, 2011).
67 Kirsten Ainley, Rebekka Friedman and Chris Mahony, eds., Evaluating Transitional
Justice: Accountability and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 274.
68 There are, of course, exceptions, but these are very few, and their treatment of the
emergence of exiting mechanisms is limited. Besides the above-cited works of
Kersall and Balkuluki, who examined the specific experiences of Sierra Leone and
Northern Uganda, see also Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Building Peace and Delivering
Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Limits of Externally Driven Processes’, in
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-combatants,
eds. Chandra L. Sriram, Jemima García-Godos, Johanna Herman and Olga Martin-
Ortega (London: Routledge, 2013). Martin-Ortega’s main argument was that the
retributive justice in Bosnia was driven by the ‘international community’ and did
not promote complementary, and broader, processes to establish justice on the local
level.
69 Roger Duthie and Paul Seils, eds., Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional
Justice in Fractured Societies (New York: International Centre for Transitional
Justice, 2017), 12–17.
70 Rachel Kerr, ‘Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Contexts: Opportunities and
Challenges’, in Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in
Fractured Societies, eds. Roger Duthie and Paul Seils (New York: International
Centre for Transitional Justice, 2017), 116–40.
71 Huntington, Third Wave, 211–29.
72 Moran, ‘Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe’.
73 Lavinia Stan, ‘Determinants of Post-Communist Transitional Justice: An Overview’,
paper prepared for the Global Challenges Conference ‘Justice and Imagination:
Building Peace in Post-Conflict Societies’, Mount Holyoke College, 28 February–1
March 2014.
74 Stan, Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe.
75 Grodsky, ‘Transitional Justice and Political Goods’.
76 Austin, ‘Transitional Justice as Electoral Politics’.
77 Collins, Post-transitional Justice.
78 Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations.
79 See, for example, Kathryn Sikkink and Hun J. Kim, ‘The Justice Cascade: The Origins
and Effectiveness of Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations’, Annual Review of
Law and Social Science 9, no. 1 (2013): 269–85.
80 Idem.
81 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are
Changing World Politics (New York: Norton & Co, 2011), 16.
82 Sikkink, Justice Cascade, 6.
83 Several recent PhD dissertations have focused on the domestic-level determinants
and dynamics of transitional justice. See, for example, Valerie Arnould, Beyond
Coercion and Norm Diffusion: The Domestic Politics of Transitional Justice in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (PhD diss., King’s College London, 2012); and
Anna MacDonald, Justice in Transition?: Transitional Justice and its Discontents in
Uganda (PhD diss., King’s College London, 2016). This issue, reflecting on some
recent publications, will be further elaborated upon in the following chapter.
84 Hennie Boeije, Analysis in Qualitative Research (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), 170.
85 James Mahoney, ‘Comparative-historical Methodology’, Annual Review of Sociology
30 (2004): 81.
86 Joseph G. Ponterotto, ‘Brief Note on the Origins, Evolution, and Meaning of the
Qualitative Research Concept “Thick Description”’, Qualitative Report 11, no. 3
(2006): 538–49.
87 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic
Tool (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chapter 1.
88 David Collier, ‘Understanding Process Tracing’, Political Science and Politics 44, no.
4 (2011): 823–30.
89 Idem.
90 Gerring, ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?’.
91 Benoît Rihoux and Bojana Lobe, ‘The Case for Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(qca): Adding Leverage for Thick Cross-Case Comparison’, in The Sage Handbook
of Case-based Methods, eds. D. S. Byrne and Charles C. Ragin (London: SAGE
Publications, 2009), 222–43.
92 Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New
York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 32–34.
93 Daniele Caramani, Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 10.
94 Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe, Encyclopedia of Case Study
Research: L–Z; Index, Volume 1 (Internet resource, SAGE Publications, 2010),
570–71.
95 Ralph Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International
Territorial Administration’, American Journal of International Law 953 (2001):
583–606.
96 Paulo Gorjão, ‘The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (2002): 313–
36.
97 It was reported that the ‘light footprint’ had to do with the size of the country and
other complexities. However, there was also a growing international disillusionment
and scepticism about UN peacebuilding experiences elsewhere. A light footprint
approach was reportedly pushed by UN SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi. For more, see, for
example, Simon Chesterman, ‘Justice under International Administration: Kosovo,
East Timor and Afghanistan’, The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 12 (2003):
143–64
98 Richard Ponzio, Democratic Peacebuilding: Aiding Afghanistan and Other Fragile
States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 115–17.
99 Eriksson and Kostić, Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding, 163.
100 Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 156.
101 In order to avoid forcing an artificial time frame onto the investigation of transitional
justice and peacebuilding in this book, the natural end-point in data collection and
analysis was when all data were gathered, including all interviews, namely the end of
2016 (with the exception of one interview held early in 2017).
102 Michael Quinn Patton, cited in Isadore Newman and Carolyn R. Benz, Qualitative-
quantitative Research Methodology: Exploring the Interactive Continuum
(Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998), 16–17.
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2 An Actor-Centred
Analytical Framework
Introduction
Assessment of the central question of this book – ‘Is transitional justice in peace-
building determined through external imposition, and, if not, how and by whom
is it determined?’ – hinges upon a suitable analytical framework. The frame-
work must be able to aid in identifying the following: what actors are relevant
in the processes of interest; what type of (inter)actions of these actors should be
considered; and, ultimately, what these factors amount to in terms of the deter-
mination of transitional justice in peacebuilding. This chapter presents a novel
actor-centred analytical framework, which is used in this book to investigate the
determinants of transitional justice in the context of peacebuilding in Kosovo,
East Timor and Afghanistan. The framework differentiates amongst three sets of
actors that operate at multiple levels: external actors (international and regional
levels), transitional justice promoters (local, national, international and trans-
national levels), and transitional regime (national and local levels). As will be
illustrated in this chapter, these categories of actors that require different levels
of analysis encompass both state and non-state actors, including such entities as
courts and (inter)national (civil society) organizations. Saliently, the framework
goes beyond solely mapping relevant actors for the purpose of analysing par-
ticular case studies; it also seeks to identify relevant (inter)actions of actors by
looking at possible facets of agency that these actors might possess and deploy
in shaping, enabling and inhibiting transitional justice policies and outcomes.
Considering contextualized forms of agency is an important step in understand-
ing the role of actors in relevant decisions and policy-making processes. For this
reason, a conceptualization of agency and a reflection on how agency may affect
the reality of transitional justice and peacebuilding form part of this analytical
framework.
Combined, the mapping of actors across key categories and the exploration of
their respective agency are meant to assist in systematically addressing the book’s
central question, thereby also developing an account of the dynamics of transi-
tional justice in peacebuilding which is fuller than is typically available in existing
works on the topic. The analytical framework is designed to shed light on political
and other dynamics at play and to examine the real roles and interactions of actors
An Actor-Centred Analytical Framework 33
involved in what are often protracted sets of negotiations and decisions regard-
ing transitional justice mechanisms in peacebuilding environments. As such, the
ultimate implication of the framework for analysing transitional justice in peace-
building should be an increased ability to discern how particular manifestations of
policy on justice-prerogatives emerge and operate in specific empirical settings,
amid efforts to end hostilities. The use of the framework must also assist in more
broadly exploring the dynamics between external and other actors in transitional
justice and peacebuilding.
An Actor-Centred Analytical Framework:

An Abductive Approach
Even though attention to the different actors involved in transitional justice is in
itself not novel, this framework’s disaggregation of actors goes beyond what is
currently available elsewhere in the literature on transitional justice and peace-
building. In part, this involves a further consideration and adjustment of partially
articulated categorizations of actors; this is required in order to facilitate a fuller
inquiry into transitional justice’s determinants and the role of different actors.
Without wishing to understate or disregard in any way their overall contribution,
it has to be noted that existing studies which broadly reflect on actors of transi-
tional justice (in peacebuilding) are typically ambiguous and vague in conceptu-
alizing and demarcating relevant actors, while in the handful of categorizations
of different actors involved in transitional justice, these actors are not grouped
together accurately.1 As such, much more effort can be applied to specifying
which actors participate in relevant processes and what categories would be most
appropriate. For example, Kaufman, who examined the US transitional justice
policy, argued that ‘transitional justice may also include non-state actors’ such
as NGOs. However, he went on to also include IGOs, such as the UN, includ-
ing both the UNGA and the UNSC, as well as individuals such as politicians,
celebrities and business leaders.2 No clarification was provided on whether certain
parts of IGOs, such as the UNSC, which consist of Member States, could truly
be conceived of as non-state actors, and equally, whether the types of individuals
listed would in reality represent the international level, the local level or neither.
Kaufman acknowledged that ‘[t]ransitional justice requires a careful considera-
tion of the interplay within and among all of these actors’.3 Indeed, a more precise
characterization of actors is necessary for systematic engagement with the dimen-
sion of actors, but an analytical framework which would achieve this goal is yet
to be developed.
As alluded to in the Introduction of this book, the main reason for the absence
of a framework which would identify and classify relevant actors, and examine
their interactions and agency in shaping, facilitating or inhibiting transitional
justice in peacebuilding, is the absence of a focus on peacebuilding contexts in
the transitional justice literature. The conceptualization of key players in tran-
sition, as provided in some existing works on transitional justice, is informed
largely by the contexts of transitions from authoritarian regimes. Due to the
34 An Actor-Centred Analytical Framework
manifestly specific dynamics involved in those transitions (as also discussed
in the Introduction), the categories of actors used in such studies are less rel-
evant for peacebuilding contexts. Even the few studies which have looked at
peacebuilding and post-conflict contexts exhibit such omissions. For example, in
examining how and why domestic political elites representing the state manage
to use international institutions and norms of criminal justice for their own politi-
cal ends, such as getting rid of political opponents and obtaining material ben-
efits, Subotić explored the interactions between international and domestic actors
by examining normative and institutional compliance.4 In this process, Subotić
distinguished between domestic ‘norm resisters’, ‘instrumental adopters’ and
‘international norm promoters’.5 While, overall, this is a welcome contribution,
Subotić’s categorization involves chiefly the domestic level and is therefore par-
tial. The international actors’ role is treated as rather monolithic, in other words,
as one that pushes for compliance with international justice, albeit through either
‘coercive’ or ‘symbolic’ means. Moreover, as the choice of case studies dem-
onstrates (Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia), this work, at least in part, draws from
contexts of nationally driven transitions, with Bosnia being an exception. In fact,
in a related work, where the author provides a very similar analysis, the empiri-
cal examination focused solely on the largely domestic Croatian and Serbian
transitional experiences.6
In a similar fashion, Sriram provided highly useful insights with regard to dif-
ferent categories of actors at play in transitional justice; but she did not focus suf-
ficiently on peacebuilding contexts. Sriram distinguished between ‘international
or external actors’ and ‘democratizing regimes’ in her seminal (and critical) work
on factors affecting accountability in ‘times of transition’.7 Even though Sriram’s
work did not exclude other forms of transition – she included in her analysis a
case such as Sri Lanka, where certain transitional justice measures were adopted
by the government ‘in the midst of war’ – much of Sriram’s inquiry focused on
transitions from (military) dictatorships, and cases such as Argentina and South
Africa. As a consequence, while Sriram’s category of international or external
actors is equally relevant to peacebuilding, the label of ‘democratizing regimes’ is
less appropriate to peacebuilding contexts, due to the general uncertainty regard-
ing what type of transition the dominant or empowered actors seek, and how the
overall transition is enacted in practice.
A highly welcome contribution to examining the dichotomies and dynamics
among the international and domestic actors in transitional justice and peace-
building has been provided by Arnould. Focusing on the case of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Arnould examined how domestic and international
actors of transitional justice in peacebuilding frame their relationship, and how
this, in turn, affects the dynamics of contestation surrounding transitional justice.
Noting that both domestic and international actors can act as either ‘promoters’
or ‘resisters’, depending on their views on the conflict and the role of transitional
justice in peacebuilding, Arnould argued that domestic contestation is important
in the forming and framing of transitional justice’.8 Arnould also claimed that a
‘conceptualization of the national and local levels as sites of agency’ is needed.9
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Kapuakahi kuaana aua
Kane,
Wahine a Iwikauikaua i
noho
Loaa hoi o
Kaneikauaiwilani.
Na nalu haki kakala
Haki kualua; 105
I halehale i popoi i na hua
alii,
I na hua haki lumilumi i
ka hohonu,
Lumilumi ka a Liloa,
I ke Kaailani: [17]
O Liloa ka ike lani i
Pakaalana. 110
Ka oha lani o Hakau
Ka puakea i waho
O ka pa kani nana i ka
wai a Umi,
He keha ia no Umi, i ka
lohelohe lani,
Ka lohelohe makomako o
Mako, 115
O Makakaualii alii lani;
O Kamawaelualani,
O Kauinakea, o
Kapaikauanalulu,
O Kaalawai, o
Hinakuluina,
O ka olikoliko muo lau o
Kalani 120
Loaa mai Kuauwa ka au
alii,
Kamehameha, ku kohai i
Kawaluna.
Kaniope, Kaniopinana i
Hakawili,
I luluu kaumaha i ke
kapu.
Kahoukapu o Maheha,
125
Na Nukuilimahi i Hakau i
haka i luna o Hawaii.
These lines seem to explain how these islands were sprung from Ma keia mele e
Wakea and Papa, according to the knowledge or belief held by Pakui, hoomaopopo ai i ka laha
the composer of these songs. He was a priest and a historian ana o keia mau aina e
belonging to the board of historians and genealogist of the order of the Wakea laua me Papa, e
priesthood. But in looking at Chapter I of this story the ideas of the like me ka ike a Pakui ka
historian are very similar in regard to the birth or appearance of these mea nana i haku i keia
islands. Also in the song composed by Pakui in his capacity as a mele, he kahuna ia, he
prophet and historian, as seen in this chapter, but it will be well to note kakaolelo no loko mai o
the setting of the genealogy from the time of Wakea, as shown in the ka papa mookuauhau o
following chapter. na kahuna nui o ka
oihanakahuna. Aka ma
ka nana ana i ka Mokuna
I o keia moolelo, ua
aneane like ka manao o
na kakaolelo ma ka loaa
ana o keia mau aina. A
ma ke mele i hakuia e
Pakui ma kona ano kaula
a kakaolelo hoi e like me
ka hoike ana ma keia
mokuna o keia moolelo;
aka e pono e nana i ka
hoonoho ana o ka
mookuauhau mai a
Wakea mai e like me ka
hoike ana ma ka mokuna
malalo iho.
CHAPTER IV. MOKUNA IV.
The Setting of the Genealogy of the Islands of Ka Hoonoho ana

Hawaii nei from the Time of Wakea. o ka Mookuauhau
o ka aina ana ma
Hawaii nei mai a
Wakea mai.
In this chapter it seems it was the heavens that was first created and Ma keia mokuna, ua
the earth afterwards, and thus read the lines of the song composed by manaoia ma ka
Pakui in Chapter III: hoomaopopo ana, mehe
mea la o ka lewa ka mua,
o ka lani, alaila o ka
honua mai, a penei ka
heluhelu ana i na lalani
mua o ke mele i hakuia e
Pakui ma ka Mokuna III.
“Wakea was the old one of Luamea, and Papa giving birth to islands “O Wakea Kahiko
was the wife. Luamea, o Papa hanau
Tahiti-ku of the rising sun and Tahiti-moe of the setting sun was born, moku ka wahine.
The foundation stones were born Hanau Tahiti-ku, Tahiti-
And also the stones of heaven.” 45 moe,
Hanau Keapapanui.
Hanau Keapapalani.”
Therefore these were the first products of the union of Wakea and A nolaila o na mea mua
Papa; Hawaii was born afterwards, as told here below: keia i loaa i loko o ko
Wakea mau la laua o
Papa, a mahope o Hawaii
ka hanau ana e like me
malalo iho.
“Wakea lived with Papa and five children were born to them: “O Wakea ka i noho aku
First, Tahiti-ku (standing or rising Tahiti); ia Papa hanau elima
Second, Tahiti-moe (setting or lying down Tahiti); keiki:
Third, the foundation stones; O Tahiti-ku, Tahiti-moe,
Fourth, the stones of heaven; Keapapanui,
Fifth, Hawaii. [18] Keapapalani,
Wakea was the husband, Papa the wife, } Hawaii. [19]
Kane was the husband, Walinuu the wife, } of Maui. O Wakea ke kane a Papa
Wakea lived with Papa; offsprings were Kane and Kanaloa.” (w) }
O Kane ke kane a
Walinuu (w) } o Maui.
O Wakea kai noho ia
Papa; hanau o Kane, o
Kanaloa.”
After the birth of these different children Papa went back to Tahiti and Mahope iho o ko Papa
Wakea lived wifeless. Therefore Wakea took unto himself Kaulawahine hanau ana i keia mau
who as a result gave birth to Lanai Kaula. Lanai was afterwards keiki, hoi aku la o Papa i
adopted. And thus runs the genealogy: Tahiti, noho wahine ole o
Wakea. Nolaila, lawe ae
Husband. Wife. Child. o Wakea ia Kaulawahine,
Wakea the husband of Kaulawahine, Lanai was the child. hanau o Lanai Kaula, a
Wakea the husband of Hina, Molokai was the child. mahope laweia ua o
Lanai i keiki hookama. A
penei ka hoonohonoho
ana o ka mookuauhau.
Kane. Wahine. Keiki.

Kane. Wahine. Keiki.
O
Wakea
Kaulawahine, o Lanai.
ke
kane o
O
Wakea o
Hina,
ke Molokai.
kane o
Thus Wakea had two island children with his new wives. On Papa’s Alua mau keiki moku a
return from Tahiti she heard of Wakea’s escapades with the new wives Wakea me na wahine
and got jealous of them and was also angry at her husband, Wakea. hou. Hoi mai o Papa mai
Therefore Papa took Lua for a husband and they had for a child Oahu, Tahiti mai, lohe ua lilo o
known as Oahualua. Papa went back to her first husband Wakea, and Wakea ia Kaulawahine
gave birth to Kamawaelualanimoku, Niihau, Kaula, and also Lehua. laua me Hina; a nolaila
They had four children after their reconciliation, and the genealogy huhu o Papa i na
reads as follows, according to Pakui’s chant, Chapter III: punalua, a huhu pu no
hoi i kana kane ia Wakea.
Nolaila, lawe ae o Papa
ia Lua i kane nana, loaa
ka laua keiki o Oahu
(Oahualua). Hoi hou aku
o Papa me kane mua me
Wakea, hanau o
Kamawaelualanimoku, o
Niihau, o Kaula, o Lehua.
Aha mau keiki a laua ma
ko laua manawa i hoi hou
ae ai. A penei hoi e
heluhelu ai i ka moolelo
ma ke mele i hakuia e
Pakui i hoikeia ma ka
Mokuna III.
“Papa left and went back to Tahiti, “Haalele o Papa hoi i

Went back to Tahiti at Kapakapakaua. Tahiti,
Wakea then slept with Kaulawahine, Hoi a Kahiki
Lanaiakaula was born, Kapakapakaua
A first-born child of that wife. Moe Wakea moe ia
Wakea then turned around and found Hina, Kaulawahine,
Molokai an island was born, Hanau Lanai a Kaula,
Hina’s Molokai is an island child, He makahiapo na ia
The plover Laukaula told the tale wahine.
That Wakea had slept with a woman, Hoi ae o Wakea loaa o
Fierce and fiery was the anger of Papa. Hina,
Papa came back from within Tahiti; Hanau Molokai he moku,
Was angry and jealous of her rivals;
Was wild and displeased towards her husband, Wakea, O Molokai a Hina he keiki
And slept with Lua for a new husband. moku,
Oahualua was born, an island, Haina e ke kolea
A child of Lua’s leaf-opening days. Laukaula
Papa then went back and lived with Wakea, Ua moe Wakea i ka
Papa was restless with child sickness, wahine,
Papa conceived the island of Kauai, Ena ka lani, ku kahaulili o
And gave birth to Kamawaelualanimoku. Papa.
Niihau was only the droppings, Hoi mai o Papa mai loko
Lehua was a border, o Tahiti;
And Kaula the closing one.” Inaina lili i ka punalua;
Hai manawa ino i ke
kane, o Wakea,
Moe ia Lua he kane hou
ia,
Hanau Oahualua, he
moku ia,
He keiki makanalau na
Lua.
Hoi hou aku no noho me
Wakea,
Naku Papa i ka iloli,
Hoohapuu Papa i ka
moku o Kauai
Hanau
Kamawaelualanimoku.
He eweewe Niihau,
He palena o Lehua,
He panina o Kaula.”
And this is the way the genealogy should be set of the children Papa A penei hoi ka
had with Wakea after the reconciliation: Wakea lived again with Papa, hoonohonoho ana o ka
and was born to them Kauai, Kamawaelualanimoku, Niihau, Lehua, moolelo o ka hanau ana
and Kaula. With these children Papa ceased giving birth to islands o Papa i na keiki muli ia
according to the previous historian; but according to the accounts of laua i hoi ae ai me
Kamahualele, another great prophet and historian, he gives the Wakea. Noho hou o
following version: Moikeha left Tahiti and came here on account of Wakea ia Papa, o Kauai,
Luukia, his concubine, [20]becoming crazy on account of Mua’s false Kamawaelualanimoku,
tale of Moikeha’s unfaithfulness. When Moikeha heard that wrong had Niihau, Lehua, Kaula. O
been done him he left Tahiti and sailed to Hawaii, and as his canoes keia mau keiki a Papa,
approached the beach at Hilo Kamahualele stood up on the cross- pau kana hanau moku
boards of the canoe and chanted the following mele in honor of his ana. Aka hoi ma ka ike o
chief: kekahi kaula nui, he
kakaolelo, o Kamahualele
kona inoa: I ka manawa i
holo mai ai o Moikeha
mai Tahiti mai, mamuli o
ka hoaaia i kana wahine
[21]manuahi ia Luukia, no
ko Mua olelo hoopunipuni
ana ia Luukia no ka hewa
i hana oleia e Moikeha,
aka ma kela lohe ana o
Moikeha ua hana pono
ole ia oia, nolaila, haalele
oia ia Tahiti, holo mai oia i
Hawaii nei, a i ka
hookokoke ana mai o na
waa e pae i Hilo, ia
manawa, ku mai o
Kamahualele i luna o ka
pola o na waa, a kahea
mai:
Here is Hawaii, an island, a man, Eia Hawaii, he moku, he

Hawaii is a man, kanaka,
A man is Hawaii, He Kanaka Hawaii-e.
A child of Tahiti, He Kanaka Hawaii,
A royal flower from Kapaahu. He Kama na Tahiti,
From Moaulanuiakea Kanaloa, He Pua Alii mai Kapaahu.
A grandchild of Kahiko and Kapulanakehau. Mai Moaulanuiakea
It was Papa who begat him, Kanaloa,
The daughter of Kukalauiehu and Kahakauakoko. He Moopuna na Kahiko
The scattered islands are in a row; laua o Kapulanakehau.
Placed evenly from east to west; Na Papa i hanau,
Spread evenly is the land in a row, Na ke Kama wahine a
And joined on to Holani. Kukalaniehu laua me
Kaialea the seer went round the land, Kahakauakoko.
Separated Nuuhiwa, 46 landed on Polapola. 47 Na pulapula aina i
Kahiko is the root of the land paekahi,
Who divided and separated the islands. I nonoho like i ka hikina,
Broken is the fish-line of Kahai, komohana,
That was cut by Kukanaloa. Pae like ka moku i lalani,
Broken into pieces were the lands, the islands, I hui aku hui mai me
Cut by the sacred knife of Kanaloa Holani.
Of Haumea, bird of Kahikele. Puni ka moku o Kaialea
Moikeha is the chief who is to reside; ke kilo,
My chief will reside on Hawaii. Naha Nuuhiwa lele i
Life, life, O buoyant life! Polapola:
The chief and the priest shall live; O Kahiko ke kumu aina,
Dwell on Hawaii and be at rest, Nana i mahele kaawale
And attain to old age on Kauai. na moku,
Kauai is the island, Moku ke aho lawaia a
Moikeha is the chief. Kahai,
I okia e Kukanaloa,
Pauku na aina, na moku,
Moku i ka ohe kapu a
Kanaloa.
O Haumea manu
kahikele,
O Moikeha ka lani nana e
noho.
Noho kuu lani ia Hawaii -
a-
Ola! Ola! O Kalanaola.
Ola ke alii, ke kahuna.
Ola ke kilo, ke kauwa;
Noho ia Hawaii a lulana,
A kani moopuna i Kauai.
O Kauai ka moku -a-
Moikeha ke alii.”
According to this chant of Kamahualele, Wakea and his wife were not Aia i loko o keia mele a
the original progenitors of Hawaii nei, and here is this also: it seems Kamahualele, aole o
from this account that the people came from Tahiti to people these Wakea a me kana wahine
islands as stated in the mele chanted by Kamahualele from the cross- na kumu mua o Hawaii
board of the canoe recited above. nei. A eia kekahi; ma ka
nana ana a me ka
hoomaopopo ana, no
Tahiti mai na kanaka i
laha ai keia mau moku, e
like me ke mele a
Kamahualele i hea mai ai
i luna o ka pola o na waa,
e like me ke mele maluna
ae.
CHAPTER V. MOKUNA V.
The Story of Opuukahonua. Ka Moolelo o

Opuukahonua.
It is told in the genealogy of Opuukahonua that they were the royal Ua oleloia ma ka moolelo
parents or ancestors of these islands, and that there were ninety-five o Opuukahonua o laua
generations from him to Kamehameha the Great. And they were found na kupuna alii o keia mau
or obtained by the fishing of Kapuheeuanui, and thus runs the tale: aina, he
When Kapuheeuanui let down his fishing line into the sea from kanaiwakumamaiwa
Kapaahu his line caught something that he thought was a fish and hanauna mai laila mai a
drew the line onto the canoe when, behold, it was a piece of coral. The hiki ia Kamehameha. A o
priest Laulialamakua came along as Kapuheeuanui was disentangling ka loaa ana o keia mau
his line from the coral and preparing to throw it away. Then the priest aina, i lawaia ia e
spoke to him, “Eh! Don’t throw away that piece of coral, for that is a Kapuheeuanui. A penei
chief, a foreteller of events. Go thou and look for a pig and appease the ke kaao ana: I ka wa i
god, and after prayer call its name Hawaiiloa, then throw it back into kuu aku ai o
the sea, and it will grow up into an island.” Kapuheeuanui obeyed the Kapuheeuanui i kana aho
instructions of the priest. The next day Kapuheeuanui went fishing i loko o ke kai mai
again and his line was again caught by a coral. This time he bethought Kapaahu mai, ia
himself of what the priest had said and took the coral to him, and the manawa, mau ana kana
priest said to him, “That is a man, a chief; call his name Mauiloa.” He aho lawaia, a manao ae
did so and then threw the coral back into the sea. On the third day of la oia he ia keia mea e
Kapuheeuanui’s fishing [22]his line was again entangled on a coral, mau nei, alaila, huki ae la
making the third piece of coral brought to the surface by his line, and, oia i kana aho, a i ke kau
as he had done before after freeing it from his line, took it to the priest. ana ae i ka waa, eia ka
The latter on beholding this coral exclaimed, “That is a man, a wohi, a he akoakoa. Ia manawa
chief from the sacred air; call his name Oahunuialaa.” 48 Kapuheeuanui hele mai ke kahuna o
continued fishing and always took to the priest the corals he caught on Laulialaamakua, e
his line, who named them and ordered him to go through the same hoomakaukau ana o
process of deifying them, or rather offering sacrifices to them, until all Kapuheeuanui e wehe ae
the islands now comprising the group were successively raised as i ke akoakoa a kiola aku,
corals. And thus, according to this tale, the islands of this group grew ia manawa, olelo aku ke
up from pieces of coral. But then, this is only a tale, and this is how one kahuna. “E! Mai kiola oe i
can ascertain the truth that these islands of Hawaii nei really did grow na akoakoa, he alii na, he
from corals. hai kanaka, hulia i puaa,
a hoomalielie i ke akua,
alaila pule a pau, alaila
kapa aku oe i kona inoa o
Hawaiiloa, alaila kiola aku
oe i loko o ke kai, e ulu
mai auanei na he moku.”
Alaila, hoolohe aku la o
Kapuheeuanui e like me
ka olelo a ke kahuna. I
kekahi la ae lawaia hou
no o Kapuheeuanui, hei
hou no ke akoakoa,
[23]alaila hoomanao ua
lawaia nei i ke kahuna,
lawe hou aku no i ke
akoakoa, i mai ke
kahuna, “He kanaka, he
alii, e kapa aku oe i ka
inoa o Mauiloa,” alaila
kiola aku la ua lawaia nei
i ka moana. I ka ekolu o
ka la lawaia o
Kapuheeuanui, hei hou
no he akoakoa, o ke kolu
ia o ka akoakoa; e like
me ka hana mau a ua
lawaia nei, a pela no oia i
hana aku ai. A ike mai la
ke hahuna i keia koa: “He
kanaka keia he wohi, he
alii no ka ea kapu, e kapa
aku i kona inoa o
Oahunuialaa.” Pela mau
ka hana mau a ua o
Kapuheeuanui, a pela no
hoi ka ke kahuna olelo i
ua lawaia nei. Ua kapaia
na inoa o keia mau aina
mamuli o ka olelo a ke
kahuna. A ma keia kaao
no Hawaii nei, he
akoakoa keia mau
mokupuni, ua ulu mai
loko ae o ke kai; aka, he
kaao wale no ia. A penei
hoi ka hoomaopopo ana i
ka oiaio ana, he akoakoa
io o Hawaii nei.
This is how the song runs that Makuakaumana 49 chanted at Tahiti, Penei ke mele a
when he and Paao went to get a new chief for Hawaii nei, because all Makuakaumana i oli aku
the old chiefs of Hawaii had sinned, Kapawa 50 being the king of Hawaii ai i Tahiti, ia laua me
at that time, he being of the fortieth generation from the time of Paao i holo ai i alii hou no
Opuukahonua. When Makuakaumana and company were nearing the Hawaii, no ka mea, ua
beach in the harbor of Moaulanuiakea 51 then Makuakaumana chanted pau na alii mua o Hawaii
to Lonokaeho, the priest of that place: nei i ka hewa, o Kapawa
ke alii o Hawaii nei ia
manawa, i ke kanaha o
na hanauna alii mai a
Opuukahonua mai a ia
Kapawa. A ia
Makuakaumana ma i
aneane aku ai e kau i ke
awa o Moaulanuiakea ia
manawa i oli aku ai o
Makuakaumana ia
Lonokaeho ke kahuna:
O Lono, O Lono, listen, O Lonokaeho! E Lono, e Lono - e-! E
Lonokulani, 52 chief of Kauluonana, 53 Lonokaeho!
Here are the canoes, get on board, Lonokulani alii o
Come along and dwell in Hawaii-with-the-green-back, 54 Kauluonana.
A land that was found in the ocean, Eia na waa kau mai,
That was thrown up from the sea, E hoi e noho ia
From the very depths of Kanaloa, Hawaiikuauli,
The white coral in the watery caves He aina loaa i ka moana,
That was caught on the hook of the fisherman; I hoea mai loko o ka ale;
The great fisherman of Kapaahu, I ka halehale poi pu a
The great fisherman Kapuheeuanui. Kanaloa;
The canoes touch the shore, come on board, He koakea i halelo i ka
Sail to Hawaii, an island, wai,
An island is Hawaii; I lou i ka makau a ka
An island is Hawaii for Lonokaeho to dwell on. lawaia,
A ka lawaia nui o
Kapaahu
A ka lawaia nui o
Kapuheeuanui - la
A pae na waa, kau mai,
E holo ai i Hawaii, he
moku;
He moku Hawaii,
He moku Hawaii na
Lonokaeho e noho.
When the canoes were beached, Paao told Lonokaeho he was wanted A pae na waa i uka, olelo
to go to Hawaii to be its ruler. When Lonokaeho heard this from Paao aku o Paao ia Lonokaeho
he said to him, “I will not go there, but I will send Pili and he shall eat of e hoi i alii no Hawaii. A
Hawaii. He shall be the chief to go together with you, and you must be lohe o Lonokaeho i keia
the priest.” And that is how Pili came to come here. It is so told in the olelo a Paao, alaila, olelo
history of Paao. But we must also examine the genealogy of chiefs aku la o Lonokaeho ia
from Opuukahonua to Wakea as is set forth in Chapter VI. Paao, “Aole wau e holo,
aka, e hoouna aku wau ia
Pili nana e ai o Hawaii,
oia ke alii e holo pu me
olua; a o oe no ke
kahuna.” A nolaila oia ka
hiki o Pili ia Hawaii nei.
(Pela i oleloia ma ka
moolelo o Paao). Aka, e
pono ke nana i ka
hoonohonoho ana o ka
mookuauhau alii mai a
Opuukahonua mai a hiki
ia Wakea, e like me ka
hoonohonoho ana ma
kela aoao Mokuna VI.
CHAPTER VI. MOKUNA VI.
In the genealogical tree of Opuukahonua it is not stated who his Ma ka hoonohonoho ana
parents were, but, it is stated in the genealogy of Kualii, that i ka mookuauhau mai a
Opuukahonua came from Tahiti to live in Hawaii when these islands Opuukahonua mai, aole i
were inhabited by human beings. Opuukahonua came with his two ikeia ko Opuukahonua
younger brothers Lolomu and Mihi and one woman, Lana, and they mau makua, aka, o ka
became the progenitors of the people of Hawaii nei, and this is how mea i oleloia i loko o ka
they increased: [24] moolelo o Kualii, mai
Tahiti mai o
The Genealogy of Opuukahonua. Opuukahonua o ka hele
ana mai a noho i Hawaii
HUSBAND. KANE. WIFE. WAHINE. CHILD. KEIKI. nei, i ka manawa, aole he
Opuukahonua. Kanananuikumamao (k). kanaka ma keia mau
aina. Holo mai o
Lolomu. Lana. Ohikimakaloa (w). Opuukahonua me kona
mau kaikaina elua, o
Mihi. Hekilikaaka (k).
Lolomu a me Mihi,
Nakolowailani (k).
hookahi wahine o Lana, a
Hekilikaaka. Ohikimakaloa. o lakou na kupuna mua o
Ahulukaaala (w). Hawaii nei. A penei ka
laha ana: [27]
Mihi. Ahulukaaala. Kapuaululana.
Kapuaululana. Holani. Kekamaluahaku.
Kekamaluahaku. Laamea. Lanipipili.
Laakeakapu. Lanioaka.
Lanipipili.
Hinaimanau. Laakealaakona.
Laakealaakona. Kamaleilani. Haulanuiakea.

Haulanuiakea. Manau. Kahaloalena.
Kahaloalena. Laumaewa. Kahaloalenaula.
Laakealaakona. Laumaewa. Kamaiolena.
Kanehoalani. Kaiwilaniolua.
Kahalolenaula. Hinakului. Kapumaweolani.
Kaihikapualamea. Kukonalaa.
Kaiwilaniolua. Kanehoalani. Kalaniwahine.

HUSBAND. KANE. WIFE. WAHINE. CHILD. KEIKI.
Kapumaweolani. Haweaoku. Manuiakane.
Kukonalaa. Kaenakulani. Kalanipaumako.
Pili. Kamakahiwa.
Kalaniwahine. Makakaile.
Malela.
Makakailenuiaola.
Kamakahiwa. Loe. Kikenuiaewa.

Makakaile. Paweo. Kalanimanuia.
Makakailenuiaola. Kahiko.
Kikenuiaewa. Kupulanakehau (w).

Ewa.
Kalanimanuia. Kukalaniehu.
Kahakauakoko.
Kahiko. Kapulanakehau. Wakea.

Kukalaniehu. Kahakauakoko. Papa (w).
Papa. Hoohokukalani.
Wakea.
Hoohokukalani. Haloa.
Haloa. Hinamanouluae. Waia.

Waia. Huhune. Hinanalo.
Hinanalo. Haumu. Nanakehili.
Nanakehili. Haulani. Wailoa.
Wailoa. Hikawaopuaianea. Kio.
Kio. Kamole. Ole.
Ole. Hai. Pupue.
Pupue. Kamahele. Manaku.
Manaku. Hikohaale. Kahiko.
Kahiko. Kaae. Luanui.
Luanui. Kawaamaukele. Kii.
Ulu.
Kii. Hinakoula.
Nanaulu.
Nanaulu. Ulukou. Nanamea.
Nana.
Ulu. Kapunui. Kapulani.
Nanaiea.
Nanaiea. Kahaumokuleia. Nanailani.

Nanailani. Hinakinau. Waikulani.
Waikulani. Kekauilani. Kuheleimoana.
Kuheleimoana. Mapunaiaala. Konohiki.
Konohiki. Hikaululena. Wawena.
Wawena. Hinamahuia. Akalana.
Mauimua.
Mauihope.
Akalana. Hinakawea.
Mauikiikii.
Mauiakalana.
Mauiakalana. Hinakealohaila. Nanamaoa.

Nanamaoa. Hinaikapaekua. Nanakulei.
Nanakulei. Kahaukuhonua. Nanakaoko.
Nanakaoko. Kohikohiokalani. Heleipawa.[25]
Heleipawa. Kookookumaikalani. Hulumalailani.
Hulumalailani. Hinamaikalani. Aikane.
Puna.
Aikane. Hinahanaiakamalama.
Hema.
Puna. Hainalau. Ua.

Hema. Ulamahahoa. Kahai.
Kahai. Hinauluohia. Wahieloa.
Wahieloa. Koolaukahili. Laka.
Laka. Hikawaolena. Luanuu.
Luanuu. Kapokulaiula. Kamea.
Kamea. Popomaili. Pohukaina.
Pohukaina. Huahuakapalei. Hua.
Hua. Hikimolulolea. Pau.
Pau. Kapohaakia. Huanuiikalalailai.
Kapoea. Paumakua.
Huanuiikalalailai.
Molehai. Kuhelani.
Paumakua. Manokalililani. Haho.

Haho. Kauilaianapa. Palena.
Hanalaanui.
Palena. Hikawainui.
Hanalaaiki.
Hanalaanui. Mahuia. Lanaakawai.

Lanaakawai. Kalohialiiokawai. Laau.
Laau. Kukamolimolialoha. Pili.
Pili. Hinaauaku. Koa.
Koa. Hinaaumai. Ole.
Ole. Hinamailelii. Kukohu.
Kukohu. Hinakeuki. Kaniuhi.
Kaniuhi. Hiliamakani. Kanipahu.
Hualani. Kalahumoku.
Kanipahu.
Alaikaaukoko. Kalapana.
Kalapana. Makeamalamaihanae. Kahiamoeleaikaaikupou.

Kahiamoeleaikaaikupou. Kapohakauluhailaa. Kalaunuiohua.
Kalaunuiohua. Kaheka. Kuaiwa.
Kahoukapu.
Kuaiwa. Kumuleilani. Hukulani.
Manauea.
Kahoukapu. Laakapu. Kauholanuimahu.

Kauholanuimahu. Neula. Kiha.
Kiha. Waoilea. Liloa.
Pinea. Hakau.
Liloa.
Akahiakuleana. Umi.
Kulamea. Kapunanahuanuiaumi.
Makaalua. Nohowaaumi.
Kealiiokalaloa.
Kapulani.
Kapukini.
Umi. Keawenuiaumi.
Aihakoko.
Piikea.
Kumalae.
Kealiiokalaloa. Makuahineopalaka. Kukailani.
Kaikilani.
Kukailani. Kaohukiokalani.
Makakaualii.
Makakaualii. Kapukamola. Iwikauikaua.

Keawenuiaumi. Koihalawai. Kanaloakuaana.
Kanaloakuaana. Kaikilani. Kealiiokalani.
Keakealanikane.
Kalanioumi.
Keakealanikane. Keliiokalani. Keakamahana.

Iwikauikaua. Keakamahana. Keakealani.
Kanaloakapulehu. Keakealani. Keawe.
Kaneikauaiwilani. Keakealani. Kalanikauleleiaiwi.
Keeumoku.
Keawe. Kalanikauleleiaiwi.
Kekela.
Keeumoku. Kamakaimoku. Kalanikupuapaikalaninui.

Kekela. Haae. Kekuapoiwa.
Kalanikupuapaikalaninui. Kekuapoiwa. Kamehameha.
[26]
According to the genealogical table or tree from the time of Ma ka papa kuauhau i
Opuukahonua to Kamehameha there are ninety-nine generations, and hoonohonohoia mai a
that is the royal line of this race. But there were many chiefly branches Opuukahonua mai a hiki
from this royal line and many descendants, but no attention can now ia Kamehameha, he
be paid to them in a genealogical order. kanaiwakumamaiwa
hanauna ka nui, o lakou
ka hanauna alii o keia
lahui. Aka, ua puka mai
he mau lala ohana alii ma
keia mookuauhau, a ua
ulu a lehulehu lakou, aka,
aole e hiki ke
hoomaopopo i ka
hoonohonoho ana o na
lala ohana alii e ae, ma
na lalani like e like me ka
hoonohonoho ana i
hoikeia ma ka papa
kuauhau mai a
Opuukahonua mai.
according to time or epochs. no na wa.
It is well to divide those times into periods from the time of He mea pono ke
Opuukahonua until the reign of Kamehameha, and to credit each reign maheleia i mau wa mai a
with the works or happenings during its time as the story associates Opuukahonua a hiki ia
each king or chief with them. Kamehameha e like me
ka noho aupuni ana, a e
hoakaka pololei ia ka
hana i loko o na wa a me
na hana ano nui a keia
alii keia alii i loko o ko
lakou kaao ana.
The Earliest Times. From Opuukahonua to Kukonalaa, elder brother of Wa Mua. Mai a
Kapawa, was sixteen generations. That was when Pili arrived from Opuukahonua a hiki ia
Tahiti and Kapawa was the reigning sovereign, and there were several Kukonalaa ko Kapawa
battles as a consequence. kaikuaana, he
umikumamaono ia
hanauna, ia manawa hiki
mai o Pili mai Tahiti mai,
oia ke alii o Hawaii nei ia
manawa, aka, he mau
hoouka kaua ma ia
manawa.
Second Epoch. From Pili’s time to Kahiko there were eight Wa Elua. Mai ia Pili a hiki
generations, and there were several great undertakings during that ia Kahiko, ewalu ia
period, and Pili’s was a time of peace and prosperity, for he was wise. hanauna, he wa maikai
ia, a he mau hana
naauao no ka Pili ia
manawa.
Third Epoch. From Wakea to Waia there were four generations. There Wa Ekolu. Mai ia Wakea
were also several important works during that time. a hiki ia Waia, eha ia
hanauna, he mau hana
nui i loko oia manawa.
Fourth Epoch. From Waia to Liloa were fifty-seven generations. There Wa Eha. Mai a Waia a
were several happenings during this interval and many wars. hiki ia Liloa he
kanalimakumamahiku
hanauna, he nui na ano
oia wa, a me na hoouka
kaua ia wa.
Fifth Epoch. From Liloa to Kamehameha were fourteen generations. Wa Elima. Mai ia Liloa a
These divisions of time are not supposed to be strictly correct as there hiki ia Kamehameha, he
had been no one to definitely define the limits of each epoch. But it is umikumamaha hanauna.
settled on in this manner. These several divisions of time were known Ma keia mahele ana i na
to later generations by the legends and tales referring to them, and wa, aole ma ka pololei
made plainer by the prayer of Kukailani, a great priest who lived and maoli, aole no he mea
was of the seventy-ninth generation from the time of Opuukahonua. nana i hoomaopopo mai
ka mahele ana i na wa.
Aka, penei nae: Aia iloko
o keia mau wa i
maheleia, ua akaka ma
ko lakou kaao ana, a ua
akaka ma ka pule ana a
kekahi kahuna, o
Kukailani kona inoa, oia
paha ke
kanahikukumamaiwa o
ka hanauna mai a
Opuukahonua mai.
On the day when Iwikauikaua was taken by Kanaloapulehu to be No ka mea, i ka wa i kiiia

sacrificed on the altar of the temple, because Iwikauikaua had done mai ai o Iwikauikaua e
wrong in promoting rebellion amongst the subordinate chiefs under him Kanaloapulehu e kau i ka
to rebel against Kanaloakuaana, a king of Maui, then when Iwikauikaua lele, no ka hewa ana o
stood on the steps of the altar he looked to the priest, Kukailani and Iwikauikaua no ke kipi
appealed to him: “O prayer of the priest, stand thou before the deity ana i na ’lii malalo ona, a
that he may look towards me, if thou art indeed my priest.” When kipi aku ia
Kukailani heard this call he answered: “Yes, I will stand and pray, but if Kanaloakuaana kekahi
my prayer is not propitious you will die; but if my prayer is uninterrupted alii o Maui, a nolaila, ia
to the Amen you will not die today.” Iwikauikaua i ku ai iluna o
ka anuu, nana ae la o
Iwikauikaua i ke kahuna
ia Kukailani, a kahea aku
la: “E, ka pule a ke
kahuna, kulia i mua o ke
akua, na na mai ia’u ina
he kahuna oe na’u.” A
lohe o Kukailani i keia
mea: “Ae, e ku wau i kuu
pule a i ino kuu pule
make oe, aka i hololea
kuu pule a hiki i ka
amama ana; aole oe e
kau i ka lele i keia la.” A
penei ka pule ana:
O thou Ku, and Uli, and Kama, it is flown. 1 E Ku, e Uli, e Kama, lele
Kalani the languishing chief of Kaiwa. wale. 1
Iwikauikaua in straight line from the depths; O Kalani ke ’lii kaahea o
From the Tahitian stem of the earth’s foundation, Kaiwa.
Whose royal lineage is so old and well established Iwikauikaua haulili mai
From the sacred ancestry of Kukonalaa. lalo;
The kapu was put on Makalii. Mai kumu kahiki ka
This is the first prayer; it is flown. honua ua kele,
The kapu of the island has flown. 2 Ua nao ua pela i ke kapu
The kapus of the islands are in a row; alii
The kapus of the islands are enjoined, I ka pela alii kapu o
The kapu of the island has come forth, Kukonalaa.
It has rested on the sacredness of the island, Ua kau ke kapu i Makalii.
Pili was the one that enjoyed that sanctity; Akahi -a- aha; lele wale.
The island of Hawaii-of-the-green-back. Lele mai ke kapu o ka
This is the second prayer. It has flown; moku. 2
The kapu has flown backwards to Wakea. [28] Lalani ke kapu o ka
Wakea was the priest, the chief 3 moku;
Who was born loaded and covered deep with kapu; Kui mai ke kapu o ka
It was Wakea who broke the kapu of the island. moku,
The kapu was divided to surround the islands, Pii mai ke kapu o ka
The kapu flew backwards to Waia 55 the king. moku,
This is the fourth, the fourth resting of the kapu; 56 Ili aku, kau aku ke kapu o
It was Liloa who enjoyed that kapu. ka moku,
The island is kapued for Liloa, 4 Na Pili e noho ia kapu,
The kapu had grown and flourished in Tahiti, Ka moku i Hawaiikuauli.
By Liloa of Umi was the kapu broken, Alua-a aha, lele wale;
The powers of the kapu were divided; Lele aku ke kapu ia
It is Iwiaulana Iwikauikaua. Wakea. [29]
A kamahele branch that is inclining downwards, 57 O Wakea ke kahuna, ke
That is weighed down by the kapus of Iwikauikaua. alii, 3
Let the bones pay 58 for the kapus of the island; Ke alii i kumu, i nua, i
Iwikauikaua was the wrong one; makolu i ke kapu;
The one who sulked in the waters of Haunaka. Ia Wakea naha ke kapu o
ka moku,
Mahae ke kapu i kiope na
moku,
Lele aku ke kapu o Waia
ke alii.
Aha -aha- ka ilina o ke
kapu,
Na Liloa e noho ia kapu.
Ua kapu ka moku ia
Liloa, 4
Ua kapu kawao i Tahiti,
Liloa o Umi ke kapu i
nahae,
Nahae na mana o ke
kapu,
O Iwiaulana Iwikauikaua.
Lola kamahele i kikiwi,
I pipio i ke kapu o
Iwikauikaua.
Na ka iwi e pani ke kapu
o ka moku;
Iwikauikaua ke kalohe;
Ka hoololohe wai i
Haunaka.
This is the prayer that is referred to in the genealogy of Kamalalawalu. O keia ka pule i oleloia i
And it is shown by the construction of this poetical prayer that time loko o ka molelo o
should be divided into epochs. Because it is only on the reigning kings Kamalalawalu. A ma keia
that the kapu of the islands are conferred, and it would seem time and mele pule i maopopo ai
epochs were divided as shown by the division of the chant referred to he pono ke mahele i mau
above. wa. No ka mea, aia wale
no ma na ’lii aimoku e ili
ai ke kapu moku. A mehe
mea la, ua
hoomaopopoia na wa ma
ia mau ano e like me na
pauku mele pule maluna
ae.
CHAPTER VII. MOKUNA VII.
An Account of the First Sight of Foreigners. No ka Ike Mua ana

i na Haole.
It is told in the history of Hawaii that was printed at Lahainaluna, and Ua oleloia ma ka moolelo
also in the history revised by Pogue of Lahainaluna, that a vessel of o Hawaii nei, i paiia ma
some kind had arrived at Hawaii long ago, and that was the first Lahainaluna, a me ka
knowledge the people of this race had of foreigners; but in the history moolelo i hooponopono
of Kualii, one of the former kings of Hawaii nei and a famous one for hou ia e Mr. Pokuea o
his strength and valor in battle, it is said that he was the first one to visit Lahainaluna, ua ku mua
Tahiti, and that he was the one that first knew or met foreigners in the mai kekahi moku ma
olden times. This is how that is recognized by his prayer in the middle Hawaii nei i ka wa kahiko,
of his history as recited below: a oia ka hoomaka mua
ana o keia lahui e ike i na
haole. Aka hoi, ma ka
moolelo o Kualii kekahi
alii kahiko o Hawaii nei,
ke alii kaulana no ka
ikaika i ke kaua; ua
oleloia, nana i ike mua o
Tahiti, a oia ka mea i ike
mua i na haole i ka wa
kahiko, a penei ka
hoomaopopo ana ma
kona pule, ma ka hapa
waena o kona moolelo e
like me malalo iho:
O Hawaii of the lofty mountains; O Hawaii mauna kiekie;

Pointed to heaven is Kauwiki; Hoho i ka lani Kauwiki;
Below is the cluster of islands floating on the sea; I lalo ka hono o na moku,
Clasping Kauwiki the trembling mountain; i ke kai e hopu ana;
Hewing Kauwiki till it fell. Kauwiki i ka mauna i ke
And now Kauai, Kauai great and peaceful, opaipai;
That is under the lee of Waianae. E kalai a hina Kauwiki-e.
Kaena is a cape, Kahuku is a pandanus. O Kauai, O Kauai nui
Kaala is a mountain ridge covered with dew, kuapapa,
And Waialua is situated below, O Waialua. Noho i ka lulu o Waianae.
Mokuleia is the calabash, the helo, He lae Kaena, he hala
The eight-finned shark; 59 Kahuku.
The tail of the white shark is Kaena, He kuamauna hono i ke
The shark stretching away toward Kauai. hau Kaala,
Below is Kauai, my land, Noho mai ana Waialua i
O great Kauai, island (filled) with lehua, 60 lalo e, O Waialua.
Island stretching out towards Tahiti. O Mokuleia ka ipu, ka
Away down is Tahiti. helo
Wakea controlled the sun creeping along; Ka ia mano lala walu,
Arising from beneath Kumuhonua; Hiu lala kea o Kaena,
Shaking is the foundations of broad Hawaii, Mano hele lalo o Kauai.
Pointing to the rising rays of the sun. O lalo o Kauai, kuu aina,
Kona stands forth to sight; O Kauai nui mokulehua,
The sun stands over Kona, Kohala is in darkness. [30] Moku panee lua ana
O Tahiti, land of the far-reaching ocean, Tahiti.
Land where Olopana dwelt. I lalo Tahiti.
Within is the land, outside is the sun; Ia Wakea ka la kolohia;
Indistinct is the land when approaching. Hooulu i lalo o
Perhaps you have seen it? Kumuhonua;
I have surely seen Tahiti, Nakeke ka papa i
A land with a strange language is Tahiti. Hawaiiakea,
The people of this place ascended up O Kuhia i ka muo o ka la.
To the very backbone of heaven; Kau mai ana Kona i ka
They trampled and looked down below. maka;
Kanakas (men of our race) are not in Tahiti. Ke kau la Kona, ke moe
One kind of men is in Tahiti—the haole; 61 la Kohala. [31]
He is like a god, O Tahiti, moku kai a loa.
I am like a man, Aina a Olopana i noho ai.
Ku is a god. I loko ka moku, I waho ka
la;
Ke aloalo o ka la ke hiki
mai.
Ane ua ike oe?
Ua ike hoi wau ia Tahiti,

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Transitional Justice in Peacebuilding

Actor Contingent and Malleable Justice

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Transitional Justice in Comparative Perspective

This book explores the role of actors in determining transitional justice in

Djeyhoun Ostowar is a diplomat at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/

1 Introduction: Liberal Peace and Justice? 1

2 An Actor-Centred Analytical Framework 32

3 Kosovo: Multilayered Accountability 52

4 Parallel Justice for East Timor 88

5 The Near-Absence of Justice in Afghanistan 126

6 Conclusion: Actor-Contingent and Malleable Justice 162

Researching how transitional justice in peacebuilding is determined may seem a

AGO Attorney General’s Office

In 2004, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan unequivo-

Elusive Concepts and Evolving Practice

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

MINUSCA MONUSCO UNMISS UNISFA UNTSO UNDOF

UN Representative to the Geneva

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This Book’s Research Design and Method

Original Research and Data Collection

An Actor-Centred Analytical Framework:

CHAPTER IV. MOKUNA IV.

The Setting of the Genealogy of the Islands of Ka Hoonoho ana

Kane. Wahine. Keiki.

“Papa left and went back to Tahiti, “Haalele o Papa hoi i

Here is Hawaii, an island, a man, Eia Hawaii, he moku, he

The Story of Opuukahonua. Ka Moolelo o

CHAPTER VI. MOKUNA VI.

Laakealaakona. Kamaleilani. Haulanuiakea.

Kahalolenaula. Hinakului. Kapumaweolani.

Kaiwilaniolua. Kanehoalani. Kalaniwahine.

Kamakahiwa. Loe. Kikenuiaewa.

Kikenuiaewa. Kupulanakehau (w).

Kahiko. Kapulanakehau. Wakea.

Haloa. Hinamanouluae. Waia.

Nanaulu. Ulukou. Nanamea.

Ulu. Kapunui. Kapulani.

Nanaiea. Kahaumokuleia. Nanailani.

Mauiakalana. Hinakealohaila. Nanamaoa.

Puna. Hainalau. Ua.

Paumakua. Manokalililani. Haho.

Hanalaanui. Mahuia. Lanaakawai.

Kalapana. Makeamalamaihanae. Kahiamoeleaikaaikupou.

Kuaiwa. Kumuleilani. Hukulani.

Kahoukapu. Laakapu. Kauholanuimahu.

Kealiiokalaloa. Makuahineopalaka. Kukailani.

Makakaualii. Kapukamola. Iwikauikaua.

Keakealanikane. Keliiokalani. Keakamahana.

Keeumoku. Kamakaimoku. Kalanikupuapaikalaninui.