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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING A POLICY IMPLEMENTER


Author(s): SARABJEET DHODY NATESAN and RAHUL R MARATHE
Source: Public Administration Quarterly , Vol. 41, No. 4 (WINTER 2017), pp. 612-642
Published by: SPAEF

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26420254

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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING A POLICY
IMPLEMENTER

SARABJEET DHODY NATESAN


S.P. Jain Institute of Management and Research
Mumbai, India

RAHUL R MARATHE
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
Chennai, India

ABSTRACT

Public policy is used to tackle market imbalances, failures and also


restore societal requirements of equity and justice. Research on policy
implementation has been substantial and there is enough literature to
support its importance. There is no guarantee however, that selected
policy prescriptions will be implemented efficiently. This study has
attempted to understand the factors affecting implementation of the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005
(MGNREGA) synthesizing variables and constructs from policy
implementation literature and analyzing survey responses data obtained
from mid-level implementers in the south Indian state of TamilNadu.
This paper focuses on the implementing stakeholders and investigates
their role in policy implementation and endeavours to achieve a deeper
understanding of the factors governing implementation of a welfare
oriented public policy scheme over ‘networks and processes’. The
results pointed to ‘administration factors’ defined by accountability,
process clarity and power devolution to the implementer, as important
to implementation. Resources were also significant to implementation.
Surprisingly governance and planning were not found to be significant.
And perhaps therein lies the disconnect between implementers and
implementation – the central idea of this paper.

BACKGROUND

The Directive Principles of the Constitution define India


as a welfare state in which the state plays a key role in the
protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being

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PAQ WINTER 2017 613

of its citizens. Formulated on the triad of ‘provision of equality,


opportunity and equitable distribution of wealth along with
social responsibility of those not able to provide for themselves’,
it runs concurrent with how Marshall (1950) identified welfare
state as a distinctive combination of democracy, welfare, and
capitalism. To promote ‘inclusive growth’, Indian policymakers
have tried to bridge the ever widening income inequality gap by
improving social protection of the poor through policy
prescription. India currently spends approximately $60 billion
per year on welfare (Economic Survey, 2015). Being a resource
challenged country, the allocative trade-offs of this welfare and
its opportunity costs are rather high to other avenues of
governance.
The Government of India in enabling and enacting
MGNREGA, a flagship rural employment guarantee scheme in
2005, fulfilled a longstanding demand of the agricultural sector
and the social activists. MGNREGA design made it obligatory
for the government to provide on demand, one hundred days of
unskilled, manual employment to one adult member of a
registered household seeking employment, at the then starting
minimum wage rate of INR 100 (roughly $1.50) per day –
currently linked to the cost of living index. Thus, creating a
social safety net via an employment option that would stave off
economic distress (Hirway, 2006). MGNREGA also hoped to
prevent migration to urban centers by rural population unable to
find sustenance in villages during lean agricultural seasons. It
hoped to usher in social equality in the rural landscape mired
with caste and gender inequality. It aimed at strengthening the
environment as well as the resource base of agriculture. To do
this, it provides basic manual works that can be undertaken for
the purpose of creating wage employment for unskilled workers.
It was designed as a ‘bottom up’ policy with the guidelines
coming from the top and democratic implementation from the
bottom (Ravallion, 2008).
Extending social protection on equity, empowerment,
economic, social and cultural rights as a transformative social
policy (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004), MGNREGA has
received critical scrutiny for the promises it made and the extent
to which they have and have not been realized. Being a rural

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614 PAQ WINTER 2017

scheme, it faces challenges because both implementers and


beneficiaries confront political and power obstacles. The
complex mechanics of the scheme, involving the central, state
and three tiers of local government, encourages its decentralized
implementation (Rabbe et al, 2010). The three tier local
administrative divisions of India are a nested hierarchy of sub-
division of districts, blocks and villages. States are divided into
Districts which are sub divided into blocks. Blocks are the next
level of rural subdivisions after the districts and are followed by
the village. Blocks are administered by Block Development
Officers (BDO’s) who work for the state government. The
village level governance units (Village (Gram) Panchayat) is an
elected body at the lowest democratic level and controls five or
six villages. Village Panchayat heads are elected and are called
Village Panchayat Presidents (VPP). A smaller body of
panchayat and non-panchayat members constitute a ‘Gram
Sabha’. Every village with a population of 200 or more has a
Gram Sabha. It consists of all the eligible voters living in the
area of the Gram Panchayat. Gram Sabha has the highest
importance quotient as its members elect the members of the
village panchayat. Dependent on the requirements of the village,
the Gram Sabha helps in planning the works to be undertaken
under the MGNREGA scheme. Along with the district, block
and village, it is an important stakeholder in MGNREGA’s
decentralized implementation process (MGNREGA Operational
Guidelines, 2013; Jain, 1997).

RESEARCH GAP

Policy implementation often interrupts achieving policy


objectives and delays its impact (Pressman and Wildawsky,
1973). Many well designed policies meet their nemesis at the
implementation stage. This study has tried to unravel the
importance of implementers on policy implementation. The
literature on implementers primarily identifies them as: top-level
leaders-policy designers and framers (Brugha and Varsovsky,
2000, Hupe and Hill, 2007; Sinclair, 2001); mid-level managers
and implementers (Tadlock et. al.2005); and frontline workers or
street-level workers (Lipsky, 1980).

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Policy framers and designers were seen by Top Down


theorists as central actors, doling out proactive advice (Matland,
1995) that required and emphasized consistency in behavioural
patterns. The assumption inherent was that of a self-
implementing policy. However, designers started to take refuge
in legality of words and put too much emphasis on the
administrative process, often at the expense of political
immediacy (Berman, 1978; Saetren, 1996). Bottom Up theorists
credited the target population and service deliverers and
providers with a better grasp of the implementation process
(Cline, 2000). Dividing policy implementation into macro level
(central actors) and micro level (local level), Berman (1978)
pointed out that policy implementation variations arose due to
‘local contextual factors’ that policy designers were unable to
control. Lipsky (1980) coined the term ‘street-level bureaucrats’
and emphasized their importance in micro implementation, using
this term for ‘schools, police, welfare departments, lower courts,
and legal service officers’. Further, Hupe and Hill (2007) opined
that the street-level bureaucrats were the most suited for the
policy implementation process as they had the discretion of
choice making and found ways to manage work. In between the
stakeholder-ship of the policy framers and the street-level
bureaucrats were the mid-level implementers. Tadlock et al.
(2005) focused on the role of effective mid-level leadership in
implementing welfare schemes and examined demographics and
the contextual factors affecting it. While they found the
leadership skills of mid-level managers affecting project
implementation success, May and Winter (2007) observed that
politicians and managers play a limited role in comparison to the
street-level bureaucrats or the case workers in implementing
employment policy reforms.
A scan of the MGNREGA literature (too huge to
document here) reveals that is has diffused to micro studies and
geographic area specific work on gender, wages and income
factors. Studies of MGNREGA have focused heavily on its
effect on incomes, migration, wages and gender equality,
environmental convergence, leakages of the scheme, corruption,
and beneficiary profile among other issues. Literature has also

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focused on micro level implementation in various geographical


areas of India.
Macro challenges facing MGNREGA implementation
and evaluation studies (documented below) on MGNREGA can
be broadly categorized into three: governance (administrative),
planning, and resource utilization. The governance challenge—
defined in terms of administration ability and the role of
implementers—is felt in numerous ways, such as the absence of
‘sufficiently large number of trained support staff’ (Hirway,
2006; Raabe et al. 2010). The vacant posts of Program Officers
(Districts) who were intended to helm MGNREGA
implementation illustrate this shortfall (MGNREGA Operational
Guidelines, 2013). Most of these posts remain open and the work
is being done by junior level Block Development Officer (BDO).
The BDOs are already implementing multiple state- and center-
sponsored welfare schemes and their workload affects program
results. Research has also documented how structural
deficiencies and procedural lapses affect ground level
implementation by gram panchayats and program outcomes
(Chakraborty, 2014).
A major implementation hurdle cited in the literature is
the beneficiary demand expectations versus the implementers’
provision of work (Chopra, 2014). This echoes ‘major problem
cited in implementation is the matching of the demand for work
to supply of work’ (Hirway, 2006; Chakraborty, 2007). The
assumption that ‘all those who need employment will come
forward, get work within fifteen days or receive an
unemployment allowance in lieu of work, [and] will get wages
paid every week on a regular basis’ requires ‘quantum jump in
planning and administrative commitment’ (Hirway, 2006).
‘Low organizational capacity, low funds utilization, low
existing institutional arrangements in smaller poorer low
performing states paradoxically get pushed back even more as
the budget outlays are based on planning and implementation
outcomes and low performing states in need of better planning
and resources get significantly less of these’ (Chakraborty,
2007). States in need of better planning and resources are caught
in a vicious circle because their budgets are determined by their
already low performance and relatively poor implementation

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outcomes, while better planned states appropriate a larger share


of the MGNREGA funds. Planning is inextricably tied to
resource usage as better planned states appropriate a larger share
of funds, thus creating a vicious cycle of sorts. The role of proper
planning in ensuring the success of MGNREGA found echoes in
many studies (Hirway, 2004; Chakraborty, 2007; Raabe et al.
2010).
Not much work has been reported on the role of
implementers in implementing MGNREGA other than the
literature cited (Hirway, 2006 and Rabbe et al. 2010), and this
paved the way for this study which was to assess the importance
of the implementer and the factors important to them in the
implementation of the MGNREGA.

METHODOLOGY

The initial impetus for this research came from Tadlock


et al. (2005) which studied implementation of social welfare
schemes and role of the implementer, in rural Appalachian
region of Ohio, in the United States of America. This was
significant to our study of the rural welfare scheme
MGNREGA’s implementation issues and the role of the
implementer. While Tadlock et al. 2005, focused on power
devolution and leadership issues, our study focused largely on
policy implementation issues. Implementation issues concerning
MGNREGA have been largely ignored barring a few studies
mentioned earlier. A ‘hands off’ attitude of policy designers
leads to almost no importance accorded to the implementers,
assigning them to the background as administers, akin to ‘cogs in
wheels’ (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980), expected to do their
jobs mechanically. However, an implementer’s attitude, vision
and creativity in implementing a scheme can lift a mediocre one
to excellence or mar a well-designed policy. Thus this article
focuses on implementation issues and anchors on the role of
implementing officers of MGNREGA.
The study was conducted in three steps and crossed over
three disciplines; qualitative, ethnographic and empirical. The
first qualitative step focused on policy implementation literature
and helped to unravel constructs and variables from extant policy

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implementation literature which were used to develop a


conceptual quantitative model, the MGNREGA Implementation
Factor Model (MIFM) and the questionnaire to be used for
primary data collection. Though very robust and extensive,
implementation and policy process research has been largely
western in its outlook (Araral and Amri, 2016). This presented
the first challenge; to ordain variables from literature with
western sensibilities and to test it in Indian surroundings.
Ethnographic study, the second step of the research, involved
visits to the Director in-charge of MGNREGA implementation in
TamilNadu, Block Development Officers, Village Panchayat
Presidents, beneficiaries and a small sample of rural non-
beneficiaries of the scheme. This culminated with visits to the
MGNREGA worksite in TamilNadu. Additional interviews
were also conducted with subject and domain experts. This step
helped to align the questionnaire to Indian titles and governance
organizations and to understand the context of stakeholders in
MGNREGA implementation process. It also led to the
identification of the BDO as the unit of analysis and provided
qualitative data for analysis later (in the section titled “Goal
Alignment, Implementers and Implementation: The
Disconnect”). The third and last step yielded the statistical output
for inferential and model fit validation of this research. The
contribution of this paper is based on the primary data collected
in the third step of the study, and the empirical and qualitative
implications drawn from that data. Primary data collected was
analysed by combining a factor and path analysis technique, an
extension of the generalized linear model called the Structural
Equation Model (SEM) (Kline, 2011). SEM’s advantage over
other traditional regression techniques is that it offers to test
multiple dependent variables and explains many relationships
through model building (Hair et al. 2006) and leads to discovery
of significant paths of the model (Bollen, 1989). The process is
explained in Figure 1.

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Figure 1
Research Steps

Step 1- Qualitative Step 2- Ethnographic Step 3- Quantitative

To obtain Interviews with - Primary data


constructs and implementers of -Validate model
variables from MGNREGA fit (MIFM)
policy - Draw inferences
implementation
literature

Unit of Analysis: The Implementer


Individual officers translate the behavior of the
organization by performing on its behalf. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that the ‘individual views on issues will be
a function of their organization roles’ (Ring and van de Ven,
1994). Individual officers occupying ‘important (strategic)
positions would be more knowledgeable about the strategic
aspects of inter organizational exchange relationships’ (Paulraj et
al. 2008).
As a part of second stage of study, an in-depth interview
with the Director-in-charge of MGNREGA Implementation,
Department of Rural Development (DoRD), TamilNadu revealed
that the Project Director at the District level and the Program
Officer at the Block level were the conduit point of the top down
and bottom up implementation. The Program Officers provide
the actual administration and consolidate the planning exercise
undertaken by the Gram Sabha at the individual village level.
Their importance in unraveling policy instructions to the village
level administrators and directing information upwards to district
level officers is important to MGNREGA implementation and
rests on the networks that they build. To arrive at an impartial
selection of the implementing officer to be the pivot point of this
study, an initial assumption was made that MGNREGA
implementation success depended on the ingenuity of the Village
Panchayat President (VPP) and his networking with the
authorities and his knowledge of local issues. Hence, three
VPP’s were interviewed and the observations noted. Focus
interviews were also conducted with five BDO’s; two face to

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620 PAQ WINTER 2017

face interviews in TamilNadu, a telephonic interview with one


BDO’s from Bihar and three BDO’s from Punjab answered
questions sent through emails. From this exercise the following
could be gleaned: The Project Directors at the District level were
providing the macro-managerial view but were not overseeing
the day to day implementation. The post of Program Officer at
the block level was either not created or not staffed in the blocks
of TamilNadu. At the block level, the day to day
implementation was being taken care of and overseen by the
Block Development Officer. The Village Panchayat Presidents
did not have much clarity and were simply following orders from
the block officers.
Thus these interviews amply demonstrated that Block
officers were indeed in charge of MGNREGA implementation
and in control of the day to day administration of the scheme and
were adjudged to be the pivot point of implementation. Taking
forward the concept of ‘key informant as sources of data as
standard practice in strategic management research’
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986), this study relied on the
BDO as the key informant to provide responses to the survey
items.
This entire exercise also led to some modification of the
survey instrument. A very important outcome of the field visits
and interviews with the BDO’s was the alignment of the key
variables of this study to the policy implementation literature.
Since it was understood that the data was going to come from the
rural implementers with vastly different viewpoints from the
western literature, it was considered imperative that the variables
were understood by them. The variables were thus identified by
the BDO’s and used in the questionnaire. Further, this process
and analysis lead to the identification of a construct heading
‘Administration factors’ to encapsulate implementers
accountability, power devolution to the implementer and process
clarity to the implementer, as seen fit in categorizing the
variables given the job specifications of the BDO’s. In addition,
the personal views of the implementers were also solicited by an
in depth question section where they could share their
experiences. This yielded information on which the section titled

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“Goal Alignment, Implementation and Implementers: The


Disconnect”, of this paper is based.
Data collection was facilitated by the Department of
Rural Development, Government of India. The final
questionnaire was administered to the 389 BDOs in 31 districts
of TamilNadu implementing the MGNREGA. According to Hair
et al. (2006), adequate sample size requires a minimum of 5
cases for every item. Since the final scale had 45 items the study
required a sample of 225 cases. Of the 389 questionnaires
administered and returned, 311responses were complete in all
aspects. The response rate was recorded at 80% (311/389). Thus,
non-respondent bias was ruled out. Additionally, the initial 110
responses were put through statistical tests to re-establish
validity of the constructs. The statistical tests substantially
validated the constructs. Analysis on which conclusions of the
study are drawn is from the entire sample of 311 responses.

Demographics of the Implementer: the Block Development


Officers
The age profile of the 311 block level implementers
(BDOs) sampled ranged from 38 to 58 years. 92% were locally
domiciled from the blocks. 78% of the BDOs were male. 76%
of the local domiciled were males. 14% of the BDO’s have a
master’s degree, 60% of the male BDO have a bachelor’s degree,
and the remaining 26% have a high school diploma. Whereas,
1% of women BDO’s have a master’s, 65% a bachelor’s degree
and 34% have a high school education. The average experience
of the BDOs was found to be between 2-3 years, with about 35%
of the BDOs having one year of experience.
The interviews conducted with the implementers yielded
a perception of the state of TamilNadu slowly turning into a
welfare state, given the slew of schemes for the poor doled out
by the various local governments in power. Additionally, a study
on efficiency benchmarking of MGNREGA implementing states
showcased 16 efficient states, one among which was the
southern state of TamilNadu (Natesan and Marathe, 2015a).
This paved the way for conducting primary data analysis in
TamilNadu.

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After a small pilot study, the questionnaire was


administered to the 389 BDOs of the 31 districts of TamilNadu
implementing the MGNREGA. Of the 389 questionnaire
administered, 311 responses were returned, complete in all
aspects and the response rate was recorded at 80%.

The Model and Statistical Inference


Aligning policy implementation literature (Natesan and
Marathe, 2015b) to MGNREGA implementation, the variables
adopted for this study were ‘administrative factors’, ‘governance
factors’, resources, planning understanding, planning adequacy
and strategic communication. Administrative factors
encapsulated accountability of the implementer, the perceived
power under his/her control and understanding of the process of
implementation. Workload and attitude were assigned as
‘Governance factors’. This factor measured the vision of the
implementer and empathy for the beneficiary. Planning
measured the understanding of the local area requirements by the
implementer and its adequacy in arranging the works to be done
on a day to day basis. The importance of networks in
implementation has been the subject matter of much research
(O’Toole, 2000; Lecy et al. 2014). The demographics of the
implementer and implementation networks were built into the
model to understand their moderating effect on MGNREGA
implementation (Tadlock et al. 2005).The selection of the
outcome variables was done to assess the impact of the
MGNREGA as a catalyst; a change agent, in transforming the
lives, the livelihood and the ecology of the villages upon
implementation. As such socio-economic, infrastructural and
environmental factors capture those trends. Figure 2 presents the
conceptual MGNREGA Implementation Factor Model (MIFM).

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Figure 2
MGNREGA Implementation Factor Model

Demographics
Networks

Predictor Variables Criterion Variables

1. Administrative Factors Impact of MGNREGA


ü Accountability trends on:
ü Power devolution 1. Socio-economic
ü Process clarity factors
2. Governance Factors 2. Infrastructural factors
ü Workload
ü Attitude 3. Environmental
factors
3. Planning Adequacy
4. Planning Understanding
5. Resources
6. Strategic Communication

The data collected was sufficiently supported by


statistical tests and results obtained validated the model on which
the findings of this paper are anchored. The ratio of CMIN/DF
(Chi square test statistic/ degrees of freedom) was 2.34; less than
3.0, the recommended value for a model fit to data (Hair et al.
2006). Other values CFI=0.960, GFI=0.945, RMSEA=0.079,
RMR=0.016, were also within acceptable deemed values (Chin,
1988; Hooper et al. 2008). Thus the statistical values mentioned
above indicated model validity. Additionally, administration
(β=0.65, p<.01*) and resources (β=0.222, p<.05**) were found
to be statistically significant to the BDO’s in the implementation
of MGNREGA. Here β measures the significant of the path in
the SEM analysis.

Implementers, Implementation and the State.


The study statistically determined that in the state of
TamilNadu the age of the implementer (age group of 50-55
years) positively affects implementation. Table 1 depicts
normalized strength of association between two variables (only

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624 PAQ WINTER 2017

when the statistically significant associations are mentioned).


Older implementers’ effect on administrative factors was
significant as was the impact on planning adequacy, thus
implying that that older implementers affect planning adequacy
and administrative factors more. Gender (male) effect on
administrative factors was significant and was found to be the
highest among the moderators studied. Education however, has a
limited affect localized to planning adequacy. Domicile has a
small yet significant effect on planning understanding and
resources, and affects administration factors the most. Time (in
years) spent in a block significantly affect implementation
outcome and experience of the implementer affects the planning
adequacy significantly. It was also found that networks affect
planning understanding.

Table 1
Significant association amongst study variables
Yrs of
Variables and Age(50- Gender Education Domicile Experience
Domicile Networks
Paths 55) (Male) (Bachelor) (40 (< 2 years)
years)

Admin Fac. 0.661 0.918 - 0.708 - 0.014 -

Planning
Adequacy impact 0.317 - 0.368 - - 0.765 -
on implementation
Plan
Understanding
- - - 0.177 - - 0.414
impact on
implementation
Resource impact
- - - 0.228 0.549 - -
on implementation
Blank cells represent a weak association between the two variables.

Administrative factors are significantly affected by age,


gender and domicile. Domicile was considered to mean the
permanent place of residence. In a society still governed by
caste and creed, local domicile of the implementer and the
understanding of local requirements and the empathy it creates
are sharply visible. Older, local and male implementers, with

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PAQ WINTER 2017 625

perhaps increased understanding of the requirements and the


process, coupled with personal responsibility, intuitively control
implementation better. Though there is a moderating effect of
education (bachelor’s degree) and experience (less than 2 years),
the most important significant effect on planning adequacy is
from gender (male). Interestingly, planning understanding is
moderated by domicile and networks, leading us to conclude
that perhaps a local implementer understands the requirements of
his block and is able to work through the networks and with
other top and bottom level implementers to get the ‘shelf of
projects’ in order.
Thus, the following trends appear in the southern state of
TamilNadu: administrative factors are affected by age, gender,
domicile and experience of the implementer; planning adequacy
is affected by age, education and experience of the implementer;
planning understanding is affected by domicile and networks;
and resources are affected by domicile and years of domicile.

MGNREGA OUTCOMES

It was empirically found (Table 2) that the scheme has a


significant impact on socio-economic outcomes (0.58), the
environmental outcomes (.72) and infrastructural outcomes (.82).
This is a positive re-affirmation of the scheme impact on the
objectives set by the government. It also validates this study’s
variables and larger hypothesis of inputs positively affecting the
outcomes. The trends in socio-economic outcomes have further
shown that MGNREGA does indeed ‘provide a safety net’ for
rural households, one of its major objectives.

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Table 2
Parametric estimates: Standard regression weights
Paths (outcome variables) β Estimate p value
Socio-economic outcomes 0.580 ***
Infrastructural Outcomes 0.820 ***
Environmental Outcomes 0.720 ***
***Significant at p<.001

IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS

The announcement and implementation of MGNREGA


changed welfare from entitlements to work. Unlike other
schemes, the onus was placed on ‘bottom-up’ governance of
‘top-down’ policies thus creating a democratic form of
implementation. However, rural economies face challenges far
removed from those faced by urban centers and dealing with a
low base effect require more robust and far sighted
implementation methods. This section presents the analysis of
the factors important to the BDO’s in the implementation of
MGNREGA.

Administrative Factors
The output supported the significance of administrative
factors—accountability, power devolution and process clarity on
implementation. The BDOs implementing MGNREGA in
TamilNadu seemed very cognizant of the expectations placed on
them and their interpretation of the factors that they hold
important to implementation.
Accountability was characterized by tracking funds
usage and return, ensuring audits and monitoring worksite
timings. 67% of the BDOs strongly agreed that tracking funds
was an important factor in implementation. 72% strongly agreed
to the importance of monitoring worksite and its timings in
implementation. 64% of BDOs surveyed strongly agreed that
vigilance and social audits are done on time, and 79% strongly
agreed that unutilized funds were routinely returned. 69% of the
BDOs strongly agreed that beneficiaries routinely complete 100
days of work, an important requirement of the scheme.

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Power devolution as envisioned by the policy designers,


moved much of the responsibility of the finer details of
implementation to the mid- and street-level implementers, i.e.,
the Blocks, Gram Panchayats and the Gram Sabhas. Power
devolution was characterized by fiercely defending the scheme
and maintaining its outcomes. It also placed the burden of
understanding the requirements arising from the new legislation
of policy and hence its implementation on the BDO’s. 75% of
the BDO’s surveyed, supported the MGNREGA legislation and
the shared responsibility of its implementation. However, only
half of them liked the new authority it gave them. This in part
can be explained by the underlying factor of extra work
involved. 63% of the BDOs’ surveyed viewed their inability to
override the decisions regarding ‘measurement of work’
undertaken by the ‘Junior Engineers’; the junior officers
evaluating the physical outcomes, as contrary to the
requirements of power devolution.
The ability to implement is also interrupted by the time
given to learn new processes and the understanding of
accountability required from the BDO. 55% of the BDO’s
surveyed described the process of implementation as smooth,
while 76% strongly agreed that they exercised control over the
general direction of implementation. Process clarity for the
implementer is of paramount importance. 81% of the surveyed
BDO’s help the beneficiaries to obtain unemployment benefits
and register complaints using the process provided.
Overall, the result points to the importance implementers
give to good administration. The ability to be in control of
implementation and take decisions suited for making spot
decisions based on local area requirements seem an important
requirement of the officer. In context of the rural areas where
the BDO is stationed, it also shows the importance that this
factor brings with it to the job and the power it creates. Process
clarity further brings benefits to the beneficiaries and enhances
the prestige value of their implementer’s position. In addition,
since the majority (90%) of the BDO’s have local domicile, this
importance translates into empathy for the local and hence,
known beneficiaries. This could also hint at subtle targeting and
selection of beneficiaries. BDO’s viewed their loyalty to

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628 PAQ WINTER 2017

beneficiaries and integrity to fund management and adherence to


process as important. However, their hesitation in taking
independent decisions to exercise autonomy affects
implementation, specifically in situations where spot decision
making is important.

Governance Factors
Defined operationally as consisting of workload and
attitude of the implementer, governance factors were not found
to be significant to the implementer. Of the BDO’s surveyed,
66% agreed that MGNREGA was a difficult scheme to
implement. However, they saw themselves as followers of the
order in letter and spirit rather than leaders of implementation.
Workload and attitude of the implementers can go a long way in
affecting implementation. 49% of the BDO’s disagreed with the
hypothesis that increased work load affected implementation,
48% did not want more help in implementing the scheme while
42% of the BDOs’ surveyed strongly agreed to being tired of
implementation. 55% of the respondents strongly rejected ever
diverting from stated policy to achieve results. Surveyed BDO’s
strongly disagreed that the beneficiaries were lazy (56%) and put
the reasons to them being old and therefore unproductive (60%).
With around 90% of the BDO’s having local domicile, this
empathy for the beneficiary is not surprising. 78% of the BDO’s
reported that they go out of their way to make sure that benefits
reached the beneficiaries.
77% of the BDO’s did not agree that workload affected
implementation. This is perhaps reflective of the cultural mindset
of the respondents and one reason could be existence of power
circles and the ‘perceived inefficiency’ in the immediate
supervisor’s eyes of the BDO’s ability were they to have this
perception. This significantly contributes to our governance
factors being not accepted as contributory to implementation
impact.

Planning
The structural bottlenecks experienced by rural areas
preclude welfare from being effective – the biggest bottleneck
being planning. Planning was studied as planning understanding

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PAQ WINTER 2017 629

and adequacy. Though both are extremely important in policy


implementation and outcomes literature (Najam, 1995) they have
come up statistically insignificant in this study.Only 45% of the
BDO opined that the local issues were not understood in
planning the projects while 48% of the respondents strongly
agreed to the importance of the local issues in planning. Over all,
there was a clear agreement among the surveyed BDO’s that
work required for MGNREGA’s implementation was adequately
planned. However, looking at the numbers emanating from the
variable ‘planning understanding’, 63% strongly agreed to being
active in local economic development planning, 42% of them
found the time given for planning sufficient. In a question that
centered on the adequacy of planning, half of the BDO’s
strongly agreed to its importance. Further 50%, 53% and 58%
strongly agreed that work planned incorporated flexibility,
planning was controlled by Gram Sabha and that the state policy
makers understood the ‘local area needs’ of the TamilNadu
districts, respectively. The implementers’ indecisiveness to
accord importance to planning has been one puzzling aspect of
this study. However there are two points to ponder over:
• There is a majority of BDO’s (50%+) who do think that
planning issues are important.
• The qualitative responses point out to ‘dilution of
authority and control over planning’ of the ‘shelf of
works’ for the scheme as the ‘biggest bottlenecks’ to
implementation.
Clearly, the BDO’s claim of ‘local area needs’ of the rural
sector of TamilNadu not being understood by state and central
planners does hold firm.
Surprisingly, networks are significant only to planning
understanding. Once again this, perhaps, highlights the low
degree of importance assigned to networks in the implementation
process. Given that literature is replete with use of governance
networks in successful implementation of large scale projects
(Lecy et al.2014; Natesan and Marathe, 2015b), it is strange that
MGNREGA operating through one of the biggest public
administration networks, is not using them adequately to get
better implementation and thus an efficient impact of such an
ambitious scheme.

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630 PAQ WINTER 2017

Resources
Resources for the scheme have been dedicated and are
significant on the implementation of the scheme (0.22). Being a
scheme with budgeted financial resources, BDO’s agree to
returning unutilized funds. Half of the BDO’s put personnel,
management of information systems and technical knowledge of
the implementation process as strongly important to
implementation. 80% of the BDO’s ascribe financial
responsibility as the most important factor important to
implementation. The process of implementation also ensures
that unspent funds are returned as part of the accountability of
the BDO’s.
However, the issues obviously go beyond financial
outlays and accountability and require a closer look at the pace
of fund utilization and the leakages to the system, if any.
Additionally, BDO’s want the post of Program Officer created
for MGNREGA implementation to be filled in and the quality of
Management Information Systems (MIS) for the manpower
resources to be improved.

Strategic Communication
Strategic communication, an important policy
implementation variable in the literature, has also tested as not
significant to MGNREGA implementation in our statistical
analyses. On a closer look, 97% of the respondents claimed to
communicate information on setting up of the worksites with the
beneficiaries on a timely basis. Though strategic communication
should definitely expect to test significant on the implementation
of the scheme, it perhaps is indicative of the dissemination of
worksite information by people known to supervisors (street
level implementers). Field trip interviews with the supervisors of
the work sites bear testimony to the fact that they control who
gets to know about the work site. This, once again, could also be
a subtle indication of targeting of the scheme. Other factors that
may have affected the result could be the diffidence and
hesitation on the part of the respondent of the survey to share
information which they perceive to be ‘in conflict’ with higher
authority. Probably a more structural reason could also be that
using Western policies processes and their implementation

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PAQ WINTER 2017 631

theories may not be prudent in countries with and democratic


processes grappling with ‘constitutional choice processes’
(O’Toole, 1994).

GOAL ALIGNMENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND


IMPLEMENTERS: THE DISCONNECT

The decision to enact yet another welfare scheme was


met with resistance by the three tier rural administrative system.
To the already overworked implementer, MGNREGA
implementation was an additional responsibility and work load.
The challenges faced by the implementer converged (as recorded
by the percentages), even though the respondents were divided
by geographical boundaries of districts and blocks. A study of
these challenges helped to understand the BDO’s perspective.
The challenges require a great deal of thought and perhaps a
change in the policy design. However, this is out of scope of
context of this study.
Block officers understand the importance of this scheme
yet feel helpless and constrained in their ability to implement it.
Though administrative, field and technical training was provided
to a majority of implementers, there are some who were either
left out or chose not to participate and therefore do not feel in
control of the process of implementation. Effective training
before appointment to the post of officers in charge of
implementation would help tremendously.
A large number of implementers expressed empathy for
the beneficiaries based on same local domicile. This empathy
translated into keeping a benign eye on the old and women
beneficiaries of the scheme. However, BDO’s also agreed to
certain weariness from implementing the scheme. Assurance of
work for the old people of a village allows them to join the work
force, but brings productivity down. Supervisors find it very
difficult to extract work from such beneficiaries. Many BDO’s
agreed that the age of the beneficiary hindered implementation.
There was confusion expressed over the interaction and
communication between the different levels of implementers
resulting in information not flowing from the center to state. The
BDO’s also expressed displeasure over changes in guidelines not

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632 PAQ WINTER 2017

being reported to the Blocks. This, as expected, led to


differential implementation giving rise to an unknown ‘black-
box’ of implementation (Thomson and Perry, 2006). Field
interviews support this viewpoint.
“As there are many processes, it requires more transparency
and strict adherence to rules.”- MGNREGA Official,
TamilNadu.
Populated by too many stakeholders on the
implementer’s side, MGNREGA has become a policy whose
implementation process and approvals go through many layers
and power circles. Though it is understandable that a policy
commanding such huge resources should have many checks and
balances, it can also be counter argued that this clutters the
process and leads to sluggish implementation as both fatigue and
ennui sets in.
“Only BDO’s should implement the scheme, it will be a success
under them. They have the patience to talk to the beneficiaries
about what is expected out of them.”- MGNREGA Official,
TamilNadu.
‘It lights up the life of the rural poor’; the reason for
MGNREGA given as providing dignity through work was not
understood by all, though they came close in identifying the
scheme as being pro-poor aiming at rural poverty reduction.
Other reasons given were to ‘prevent migration,’ ‘create durable
assets,’ ‘empower rural women,’ and ‘a totally political one,’ yet
the main objective of ‘moving welfare from handouts to right to
work’ was missed by almost all. This perhaps is a worrisome
point, because if the implementer is not aware of the ‘why’ then
the ‘how’ may not follow smoothly. Without adequate power in
the hands of the implementers creativity in implementing the
MGNREGA seems a substantial step forward. Officers however,
concur that the beneficiaries border on being unproductive and
that the increased work load affects their performance.
“People want to work less and earn more; they should realize
that if the scheme is withdrawn then they alone will be losers.”
BDO- TamilNadu.
With regard to the perception of the implementer as to
who and what was negatively affected by the scheme, the
answers were unanimously ‘agricultural productivity due to

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PAQ WINTER 2017 633

shortage of labor’. Those near commercial centers also surmised


that the shortage of labor due to MGNREGA implementation
had affected industrial production. Among the positive impacts,
the implementers cited land development and improved water
storage as primary with improved economic condition of rural
women and child health taking a close second position. Some
asset creation on the rural landscape, better child health, and
lower school dropout rates was also noted with positivity.
On the supply of labor, by the beneficiaries of the
scheme, the BDO’s felt that the outcomes of the scheme were
impacted as the work was found to be too tedious at the
prevailing wage rates. Since the MGNREGA plantation work
could take up to three years to complete, implementers report a
growing sense of boredom on the part of the beneficiary in
completing the work. Citing too much pressure to implement
from the top with no initiatives for local implementation, the
scheme according to some was fast becoming a ‘target
satisfying’ one.
A majority of BDO’s reported that they did not deviate
from stated policy to achieve results. A repeated observation of
many implementers was the disregard shown by policy framers
for local issues and requirements. With very specific guidelines,
there isno flexibility in implementation. Work selection should
be made area specific to bring into prominence local area
requirements. The responding officers want importance assigned
to local micro level selection of work.
“Local area issues should be addressed; guidelines are general
but there is too much pressure to perform.” - BDO, TamilNadu.
“The policy makers should study the difficulties, problems and
needs of every village at grass root level before implementing
project or scheme.”- BDO, TamilNadu.
“The success of the scheme depends upon the guidance of the
government.”- BDO, TamilNadu.
With missing focus and no attention to monitoring,
MGNREGA is being bundled with many other schemes for
implementation. However, higher program outcomes with other
schemes are not taking place and since it was getting spread over
many layers, there is no motivation to improve it. Insisting on
transparency of implementation also was reported as a major

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634 PAQ WINTER 2017

factor for implementation breakdown. Additionally, missing


attention to planning is a basic problem with the scheme with
most of the implementing officers unhappy with the way the
scheme was being planned and administered. It was felt that
village committees should participate in the planning of the shelf
of work for the MGNREGA along with the Gram Sabhas as well
monitor the maintenance of the finished projects.
“Micro level planning is needed and should be contextual from
state, to district to village.” – District Project Director,
TamilNadu.
“A big problem is no regard for specific planning and no
planning for maintenance of assets created under MGNREGA.”-
District Program Director, TamilNadu.
Accountability and power devolution were found to be
important in implementation.
“There are approximately 18,000 MGNREGA worksites
operational in TamilNadu on any given day; this requires a
great deal of administrative and planning effort and an efficient
MIS reporting system for proper documentation of the
beneficiaries.” –Director of Rural Development, in-charge of
MGNREGA, TamilNadu.
MGNREGA designed as a democratic scheme, aimed to
be a synthesis of Top Down and Bottom Up policy. However,
this study has revealed it to be more of a ‘top-down’ scheme.
Policy directives come from the top and the mid-level and street
level implementers fulfill those directives. There is a big need
for power-devolution to be passed on to the implementers so as
to take ‘local area requirement’ requirements into account. This
also adversely affects the flow of communication between the
networks and organizations and the officers manning them. The
implementing agencies are the state and local rural bodies.
Multiple organizational bodies combined with the complicated
process of implementation along with the existence of power
circles are being used as an excuse to follow top –down
directives instead of taking the initiative to monitor and
implement better.
“Implementation is spread over many layers and no one has the
motivation to improve it.”- BDO, TamilNadu.

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Implementing networks are not clear and lack of process


clarity compounds the problem even more. The mindset of the
implementer is still synchronized to following orders and
obeying a chain of command. Fractured networks do indicate
that this chain is perhaps not the best conduit for creativity in
implementation.
“MGNREGA is bunched up with many others for implementing,
yet convergence is not happening. (Due to this), it also does not
get the importance it deserves.”– District Project Director,
MGNREGA, TamilNadu.

LESSONS FROM MGNREGA IMPLEMENTATION

Despite the fact that BDO’s are crucial in


implementation, not much focus has been directed at them. They
have reacted and voiced their opinions in many ways. Some
have taken the challenge to provide the best implementation for
their block while others have carried out their work with a sense
of resignation. The extent to which the BDO’s understand the
design and welfare measures affects the implementation process
which can drastically alter the lives of many. The implementers
are aware of the problems and have pragmatic solutions to offer.
The message that the officers want to share with the
policy makers and designers runs along expected lines. To start
with, since MGNREGA guidelines insisted on hundred percent
labor powered projects, not only do they become unproductive
(cleared land run over by weeds and bush in a matter of months),
but they also impact on availability of labor for other sectors of
the rural and semi-urban economy. The implementers want the
labor component reduced and the material component increased
to seventy percent from the current forty percent.
In the context of labor and the difficulty of work, the
implementers also want to increase the daily wage rates, reduce
the quantum of work and let the work requirements be less
stringent in scope though exact in measurement. To implement
with certainty, the implementing officer needs to understand the
process and handle the impediments of structural bottlenecks.
Both these requires a greater commitment than is present
currently. Concurrent to the number of days worked and wages

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636 PAQ WINTER 2017

earned, the implementing officers also want to reassess the


Below Poverty Line (BPL) beneficiaries to implement the policy
efficiently. Other suggestions that have been made and which
point to the contextual factors that may improve implementation
include: scrapping unemployment allowance; improving the
interaction between the administrators and beneficiaries; better
and more efficient monitoring; extending the scheme to poor and
marginal farmers and their land; and removing targets for
enrolment as it makes the scheme a waste of money since all and
sundry of the village are enrolled for the sake of numbers.
The mid-level implementer requirements for
implementation point to a strong and deep desire to hold a
leadership position with actual transfer and devolution of power.
Mid-level implementing officers’ clamor for leadership can be
analyzed through the importance given to accountability and thus
power devolution, as a significant factor in implementation in
this study. The implementers are hesitant to take independent
decisions and exercise autonomy in implementation.
“Needs local thinking and a conscious and responsible officer
willing to take decisions.” – MGNREGA Officer, TamilNadu.
The perception of legislation of MGNREGA being
created for political purposes has been gaining ground. On the
policy designer’s side, it should result in greater commitment to
local planning, needs and local administrators, and on the
implementer’s side a commitment to carry out the policy’s vision
and implement it in letter and spirit.
The requirement of a good strong leader to implement a
scheme carrying forth the vision as envisioned by the policy
framers seems the most important factor that is inhibiting
implementation. In the end, the implementers themselves
appropriate the blame, if any of the lackadaisical performance at
their own doorsteps by factoring in the integrity of the
implementer as the most important requirement for successful
implementation. To sum up, local area planning, flexibility in
following guidelines and effective power devolution to the
implementing officer are factors that complement policy
implementation.

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POLICY CONTRIBUTIONS

This research documented (state level) implementation


evaluation using a conceptual model based on policy
implementation literature. This has provided a platform on which
to present holistic findings on the implementation challenges in a
standalone sample showcasing the factors important to the
implementer. This platform lends itself for deployment in any
local area and will align local Indian policy implementation
challenges with the broader implementation literature. It will
also provide local contextual factors and help to design better
policies in the future. The research led to the assessment of
demographic factors as being important to implementation
wherein male implementers were found to implement the
schemes better in of TamilNadu. In addition to bringing to
forefront the growing need to understand the social and gender
inequality that still persist in Indian villages and find ways to
break the logjam, this finding also highlights the need to perhaps
provide better training to the female implementers. In addition,
there must be a focused effort to increase the number of
implementers. The position of Program Officer, created at the
block level, should be staffed quickly. The insights obtained
from the survey research can be imparted to the officers’ in-
charge of implementation through proper training and will
facilitate and strengthen program delivery. At the same time,
deployment of new Program Officers will free the BDOs for
other work issues. Increased staffing must definitely be
accompanied by adequate power devolution to ensure a higher
level of outcomes.
This study has also highlighted the inadequate use of
networks to implement MGNREGA. To make it a truly
democratic scheme, the accent should shift from top down
instructions to building ‘collaborative networks’ (Thomson and
Perry, 2006). Collaborations between implementers at different
levels will encourage team building spirit and oneness of
ownership of the implementation results.
Program administrators and designers should appreciate local
area problems and needs, tailoring prescriptions appropriately.
Resources allocated for work should include implementer

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638 PAQ WINTER 2017

training in addition to implementation costs. Central government


should encourage utilization of regional resources.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

With governments assuming social responsibility of their


populations, policy making and implementation are here to stay.
Governmental directives are supplanting the invisible hand of the
market with visible hands of both micro and macro policy.
Policy implementation research seems to be gaining a similar
momentum. Being a rather new area of research in MGNREGA,
this study faced the following limitations. Firstly, the empirical
results are based on data provided by BDO’s. The inherent bias
in reporting positive results and the bigger problem of power
circles influencing responses can prejudice results. However, this
is a minor limitation as data was collected on the condition of
maintaining the anonymity of the respondent. A second
limitation arose from the survey being carried out only in the
blocks of TamilNadu. Though, doing a comparative study on
two or more states would definitely have added rigor to the
research, this is also a minor limitation as the variables for the
study were obtained from policy implementation literature.

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