FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

G.R. No. 236263 July 19, 2022

OCEANMARINE RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner.
vs.
JENNY ROSE G. NEDIC, on behalf of her minor son, JEROME NEDIC ELLAO,
Respondents.
J. ZALAMEDA.

FACTS:
This case is about the complaint filed by the respondent on behalf of her minor son,
Jerome Nedic Ellao, for Php3,383,640.00 representing the “Lost Future Income” of
Jerome’s father and her common-law partner, Romeo.

The deceased was an employee of the petitioner as a company driver. Sometime on

November 2011, petitioner commanded the deceased to drive for several company
employees. The latter followed the instructions of the petitioner he drove all the
employees to their designated places. However, when they are driving along Bayview
Drive in Barangay Tambo Parañaque City, two (2) unidentified motorcycle-riding
assailants stopped the vehicle and shot Romeo to death. In result, the assailants
immediately took the bag of money in the vehicle and escaped.

Subsequently, the respondents wrote a letter to the petitioner demanding

Php3,382,560.00 in damages by way of loss of future income. Petitioner, denied the claim
for being unfounded and premature since she had yet to be designated as the guardian
of Jerome.

Petitioner’s refusal prompted respondent to file the present claim under Article 1711 of
the Civil Code.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Article 1711 has been repealed by the Labor Code, which was enacted in
1974.
2. Whether the CA misappreciated the Candano case.
3. Whether Candano should still be applied to this case.
4. Whether the election of remedies under the Labor Code and the Civil Code is still
valid.
5. Whether the benefits received under SSS are covered by the barring effect of
Article 179 of the Labor Code.
6. Whether the respondent common law wife can be assigned as beneficiary.

LAWS APPLICABLE:
1. ARTICLE 1711. - Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay
compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or
other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or
entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and
in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as

the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's
own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not
be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to
his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

2. ARTICLE 179. Exclusiveness of liability. - Unless otherwise provided by law, the

liability of the System under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his legal representative, dependents or
nearest of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages under the Civil
Code on account of such injury or death.

In the case of government employees, the right to compensation under this Title
shall be a bar to the recovery of benefits for the same injuries or death provided
for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, and other
existing laws, except those granted by the Government Service Insurance System.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court clarified that compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act is meant to mitigate the hardships of industrial life, while
damages under the Civil Code are awarded as indemnity for wrongful
invasion of rights. The court also stated that under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, liability is established regardless of negligence, whereas under the Civil Code,
the claimant must prove the causal relation between negligence and the injury.
(Floresca) Exceptions to the exclusivity rule exists, such as when the claimant has
already been paid under the compensation laws but later discovers supervening
facts or developments, allowing them to sue for damages under the Civil Code.
The Court reiterated that the choice between remedies is exclusive, and once an
election has been made, the claimant cannot pursue the other remedy.

The above analysis espouses the understanding that Article 1711 of the Civil Code
must give way to the law on Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund
established by the Labor Code. This interpretation is in accordance with the basic
tenet in statutory construction decreeing the prevalence of a special law over a
general law, regardless of the laws’ respective dates of passage. Not only was the
Labor Code enacted later than Article 1711 of the Civil Code, but it is also a special
law covering employee compensation for work-related injury or death.

Given the irreconcilable inconsistency between the aforesaid laws and their nature
as a special law and general law, the Court declares that Title II, Book IV of the
Labor Code has impliedly repealed Article 1711 of the Civil Code.

While damages can provide more extensive financial recovery than compensation,
the burden of proving the employer’s negligence and the extent of damages falls
on the claimant. Relying on Article 1711 of the Civil Code for a claim of damages,
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

particularly loss of future income, is in inappropriate. Article 1711 has been

repealed by the Labor Code and cannot serve as the basis for such claims.
Damages, including loss of earning capacity, are considered actual damages
and fall under the realm of civil law, requiring proof of the employer’s breach
of duty or violation of the worker’s rights.

2. Yes. The court abandoned now the Candano case. Although Article 1711 is no
longer applicable, Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Sugata-on its use. In
Candano, the Court upheld that employees should choose between filing a
compensation claim under the Labor Code or pursuing damages under the Civil
Code, as the basis for compensation and damages are distinct. In that case, the
Court clarified that damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and later
sought damages under the Civil Code due to supervening facts or developments.

However, there is a need to overturn the Candano ruling. Since Article 1711 is a
law on compensation and not damages, then said article cannot be
considered as an option that may be invoked by injured workers or their
heirs in an action for damages against the employer.
➢ An award under Article 1711 of the Civil Code would be inconsistent with
the very nature of damages. Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for injury sustained, or as
otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences imposed by the law for
the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. A claim for loss of
earning capacity or loss of future income is a form of actual damages, which
is a relief resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause within the realm of
civil law. Thus, it was incumbent to prove a breach of duty, or a violation of
the claimant’s right.

In view of all the foregoing, Candano, in so far as it sanctions the filing of an action
work-related compensation under Article 1711 of the Civil Code, is hereby
abandoned. Article 1711 of the Civil Code can no longer be used by employees
against their employers for purposes of claiming compensation for work-related
injury or death, which is exclusively regulated by Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code.

3. Yes. Because abandonment of Cadano ruling must be prospective. Th Court

clarifies that the abandonment of the Candano ruling should only be applied
prospectively. It states that judicial decisions become part of the law and should
be recognized as “good law” until reversed. The Court sets guidelines for the
application and transition to the abandonment of the Candano ruling:

a. Actions filed before the finality of Candano (before August 6, 2007) cannot
rely on Article 1711 of the Civil Code for indemnity since the provision was
impliedly repealed by the Labor Code.
b. Actions filed during the applicability of Candano (August 6, 2007, until the
finality of the present decision) can rely on Article 1711 of the Civil Code
based on the Candano ruling.
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

c. Actions filed after the finality of the present decision cannot use Article 1711
of the Civil Code for indemnity since it has been repealed by the Labor
Code.

Application to the case:

In the specific case being discussed, the respondent filed her complaint in April
2012, so the Candano ruling should apply to her claim. The Court emphasizes that
the respondent has reasonable grounds to assume that she could file a claim
under Article 1711 of the Civil Code, considering the prevailing doctrine at the time.
Therefore, indemnity for loss of earning capacity may be awarded based on
Candano and Article 1711 of the Civil Code in light of the death in the course of
employment.

4. Yes. The prevailing rule, as established in the Floresca case, allows for the pursuit
of both compensation and damages. The Court reexamined the Floresca ruling
and concludes that while the choice of action is selective, the remedies of
compensation and damages are not cumulative. Pursuing one remedy precludes
the pursuit of the other. The Court also clarifies errors in the application of certain
provisions and principles in Floresca. It highlights that Article 179 of the Labor
Code establishes the exclusivity of the compensation remedy, barring the
simultaneous pursuit of compensation and damages. Exceptions to this exclusivity
are specified in Article 179, but the Civil Code is not among them.

The court applies the doctrine of election of remedies, which states that once a
choice between inconsistent remedies is made, it is final and bars any action
inconsistent with the choses remedy. In this case, pursuing compensation under
the Labor Code waives the right to claim damages under the Civil Code. The court
harmonizes the Civil Code with Article 179 of the Labor Code and concludes that
the choice between compensation and damages is selective, not cumulative or
exclusive.

The Floresca ruling is still good law. The remedies of compensation and damages
are selective. Employees or their heirs may choose between an action for
damages under the Civil Code or a claim for compensation under the Labor Code.
Upon electing a remedy, the employees or their heirs shall be deemed to have
waived the other remedy, save for recognized exceptions, such as a when “the
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or mistake of fact, which nullifies
the choice as it was not intelligent choice,” or when there are “supervening facts or
developments occurring after the claimant opted for the first remedy.”

5. No. Beneficiary may claim benefits under SSS. The court clarified that the barring
effect under Article 179 of the Labor Code only applies to compensation claimed
and given under the Labor Code. Benefits received under the Social Security
Act, such as pensions, are not covered by this barring effect. Therefore, the
dependents of an employee may receive both compensation under the Labor
Code and benefits under the Social Security Act.
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

The court emphasized that the nature and purpose of sickness or disability benefits
provided by the Social Security Act are different from compensation claimed under
Labor Code. The benefits under the Social Security Act aim to provide insurance
and protection against various risks, regardless of whether they arise from
employment. On the other hand, the Labor Code specifies compensability for work-
related injuries or death.

The court further explained that the payment of social security benefits to a
member employee does not extinguish the employer’s liability under the Civil Code
or a claim for compensation under the Labor Code.

Application to the case:

In the specific case discussed, the recipient of benefits from the Social Security
System (SSS) received a death benefit derived from the deceased employee’s
SSS contributions. The documents presented clearly indicated that the amount
represented SSS benefits and not compensation under the Labor Code.

6. Yes. While Article 1711 of the Civil Code does not specify the recipients of
compensation, Article 2206 of the Civil Code explicitly states that indemnity for loss
of earning capacity should be paid to the heirs of the deceased. The court in the
Villa Rey case determined the amount of the award for loss of earning capacity
based on the losses or damages sustained by the dependents and intestate heirs
of the deceased. The court adopted the same formula in the Candano case to
ensure that the purpose of the law, which is to indemnify the employee or their for
death or injury in employment, is realized.

Therefore, the court concluded that the proper recipients of the award should be
the heirs of the deceased employee, consistent with the Villa Rey case and the
adoption of its formula in the Candano case.
OPINION OF THE STUDENT re THE RULING:

While I agree with the ruling of the ponencia, I disagree on the discussion of which the
worker or their dependents has a choice in case of work-related illness, injury, or death,
to file either an action claiming compensation or one for damages.

Thus, in the dissenting opinion of Justice Caguiao he opined that:

“It is my submission that this compensation remedy under Title II,

Book IV of the Labor Code is the only recourse available to
workers and their dependents in case of work-related illness, injury, or
death. Recovery of damages under the Civil Code, based on breach
of contract, quasi-delict, or abuse of rights, is not an available remedy.”

The wordings of Article 179 of the Labor Code, gives the State Insurance Fund
the exclusive responsibility to pay the workers or their dependents compensation
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

in case of work-related illness, injury, or death, and relieves the employer

of any further liability.1

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE:

The respondent through its counsel wrote a letter to petitioner demanding for the payment
of damages. Petitioner denied the claim for being unfounded and premature since she
had yet to be designated as the guardian of Jerome. Because of the refusal respondent
filed a case before the RTC under Article 1711 of the Civil Code.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC), through its Decision8 dated 22 September 2014,
dismissed respondent's complaint for failure to establish the causal connection between
petitioner's negligence and Romeo's death. The respondent filed an appeal before the
CA.

In the assailed Decision dated 19 December 201 7, the CA reversed the RTC's ruling and
awarded respondent actual damages for loss of earning capacity.

The CA stated that the trial court directed too much of its attention to the concept of
negligence vis-a-vis Article 1711 of the Civil Code. However, said provision absolutely
makes no mention of the notion of negligence.

1
Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, “Separate and Dissenting Opinion: GR No. 236263 – Oceanmarine Resources Corporation, petitioner, versus
Jenny Rose G. Nedic, on behalf of her minor son, Jerome Nedic Ellao, respondent.”, Supreme Court of the Philippines, Padre Faura St., Ermita,
Manila, Philippines, SCPh_PIO, 2022, Pg. 2, c.judiciary.gov.ph/236263-oceanmarine-resources-corporation-vs-jenny-rose-g-nedic-on-behalf-of-
her-minor-son-jerome-nedic-ellao/, (September 14, 2023)
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

G.R. No. 214290 July 6, 2021

CROWN SHIPPING SERVICES / DOLPHIN SHIPMANAGEMENT INC. and/or
CARISBROOKE SHIPPING LTD. and/or MR. EMMANUEL P. GOMEZ and/or MS.
SUSAN AGUSTIN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOHN P. CERVAS, Respondent.
J. GAERLAN.

FACTS:
On September 12, 2012, Carisbrooke Shipping Ltd., through its local manning agent,
Crown Shipping Services/Dolphin Ship Management Inc. (petitioners) hired Cervas as an
Able Seaman. Cervas boarded MV Vectis Falcon on September 13, 2012. On December
20, 2012, Cervas met an accident while on board. During a Life Boat Drill being conducted
in the high seas amidst bad weather and big waves, Cervas injured his left leg. The
following day, Cervas' left leg became swollen. Cervas was advised not to work for more
or less a week. On December 29, 2012, the vessel dropped anchor at Panama and stayed
there for three days. Cervas assisted his fellow crewmate even with a swollen leg. He
was given medicine by the Second mate but no relief was afforded. On January 8, 2013,
the vessel dropped anchor again in Ecuador. Cervas then informed the chief mate that
his leg was still swollen and he was brought to a hospital in Guyaquid. There, Cervas was
diagnosed with "Fibular Diaphral Fracture". Cervas' left leg was then plastered and was
prescribed to take medications. His immediate repatriation was likewise recommended.

On January 23, 2013, Cervas was repatriated. Upon his arrival, Cervas was referred by
petitioners to the company-designated physician, Dr. Carlos Lagman (Dr. Lagman) of St.
Jude Hospital, for further evaluation and management. Dr. Lagman treated Cervas as an
out-patient. In the Medical Report dated January 28, 2013, Dr. Lagman confirmed that
Cervas was suffering from Fibular Fracture and declared the injury to be work-related and
that Cervas is unfit to work. Cervas was further advised to return to him on February 18,
2013 for the removal of the cast.

Cervas was still diagnosed to be unfit to work and was advised to report back on May 20,
2013. 14 However, Cervas did not went back on the said date. Instead, he demanded
from the petitioners his disability compensation. Cervas contended that he has been
going for medical treatment for more or less four months already with Dr. Lagman but his
condition has not improved.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in awarding total disability
benefits to Private Respondent despite the fact that the instant complaint was
prematurely filed.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it overlooked the
fact that Respondent unilaterally abandoned his medical treatment with the
company-designated physician.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously brushed aside the absence of any
medical report as to Respondent's alleged total and permanent disability.
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

4. Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the provision of the law by ruling
that a seafarer's inability to resume his work after the lapse of more than 120 days
from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness automatically warrants the grant
of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor.

LAWS APPLICABLE:
1. Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 [Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC)], when a seafarer
suffers a work-related injury or illness in the course of employment, the company-
designated physician is obligated to arrive at a definite assessment of the former's
fitness or degree of disability within a period of 120 days from repatriation. During
the said period, the seafarer shall be deemed on temporary total disability and shall
receive his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his
condition is defined under the PO EA-SEC and by applicable Philippine laws.
However, if the 120- day period is exceeded and no definitive declaration is made
because the seafarer requires, further medical attention, then the temporary total
disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the
right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. But before the company-designated physician may avail
of the allowable 240-day extended treatment period, he must perform some
significant act to justify the extension of the original 120-day period. Otherwise, the
law grants the seafarer the relief of permanent total disability benefits due to such
noncompliance.
2. Under Section 20(D) of the PO EA-SEC "[ n Jo compensation and benefits shall
be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer
resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided
however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or
death is directly attributable to the seafarer."
3. The second paragraph of Section 20(A)(3) provides:

xxxx

The seafarer shall be entitled to reimbursement of the cost of medicines prescribed

by the company-designated physician. In case treatment of the seafarer is on an
out-patient basis as determined by the company-designated physician, the
company shall approve the appropriate mode of transportation and
accommodation. The reasonable cost of actual traveling expenses and/or
accommodation shall be paid subject to the liquidation and submission of official
receipts and/or proof of expenses.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, Disability benefits are granted to an employee
who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness resulting in temporary total,
permanent total, or permanent partial, disability. For the injury and the resulting
disability to be compensable, they must have necessarily resulted from an accident
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

arising out of and in the course of employment. It was undisputed that the injury
was sustained by Cervas while he was doing his job as an Abled Seainan on board
the vessel. It is clear that Cervas injury is work-related and such being the case,
the injury is compensable.

Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 [Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC)], when a
seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness in the course of employment,
the company-designated physician is obligated to arrive at a definite
assessment of the former's fitness or degree of disability within a period of
120 days from repatriation. During the said period, the seafarer shall be
deemed on temporary total disability and shall receive his basic wage until
he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is
defined under the PO EA-SEC and by applicable Philippine laws. However,
if the 120- day period is exceeded and no definitive declaration is made
because the seafarer requires, further medical attention, then the temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days,
subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a
permanent partial or total disability already exists. But before the company-
designated physician may avail of the allowable 240-day extended
treatment period, he must perform some significant act to justify the
extension of the original 120-day period. Otherwise, the law grants the
seafarer the relief of permanent total disability benefits due to such
noncompliance.

Thus, the rules regarding the duty of the company-designated physician to issue a
final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading is as follows:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical

assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days
from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within

the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within

the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification ( e.g. seafarer required
further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period
of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer
has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has
sufficient justification to extend the period; and
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment

within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Based thereon, two requisites must concur for a determination of a seafarer's

medical condition: 1) an assessment must be issued within the 120/240 window,
and 2) the assessment must be final and definitive. Case law states that without a
valid final and definitive assessment from the company-designated physician
within the 120/240-day period, the law already steps in to consider petitioner's
disability as total and permanent. Thus, a temporary total disability becomes total
and permanent by operation oflaw.

2. Medical abandomnent by a seafarer carries with it serious consequences. Under

Section 20(D) of the PO EA-SEC "[ n Jo compensation and benefits shall be
payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer
resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided
however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or
death is directly attributable to the seafarer." It is but the seafarer's duty to comply
with the medical treatment as provided by the company-designated physician,
otherwise, when a sick or injured seafarer abandons his or her treatment, such
may result to the forfeiture of his/her right to claim disability benefits.

In Lerona v. Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Jnc., citing CF. Sharp Crew
Management, Inc. v. Orbeta, this Court held that a seafarer commits medical
abandomnent when he fails to complete his treatment before the lapse of the 240-
day period, which prevents the company physician from declaring him fit to work
or assessing his disability.

It was clear that Cervas is remiss of his duty to complete his medical treatment.
Although his reason for discontinuing treatment may be valid, this must still be
clearly presented and proven before the Court. Mere allegation will not suffice. As
recently held in the case of Antolino v. Hanseatic Shipping Phils., Jnc., financial
incapacity to travel to and from the place of treatment may serve as an acceptable
justification for failure to attend a check-up. That said, an allegation of financial
incapacity, like all allegations, must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. This is especially true in situations where the manning agency has
consistently provided the seafarer with sickness allowance during the treatment
period.

Verily, it was Cervas who abandoned his treatment. Because of his action,
petitioners were not able to finish its obligation to have Cervas treated and finally
give a definitive disability rating. Further, the second paragraph of Section 20(A)(3)
provides:

xxxx
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

The seafarer shall be entitled to reimbursement of the cost of medicines

prescribed by the company-designated physician. In case treatment of the
seafarer is on an out-patient basis as determined by the company-
designated physician, the company shall approve the appropriate mode of
transportation and accommodation. The reasonable cost of actual traveling
expenses and/or accommodation shall be paid subject to the liquidation and
submission of official receipts and/or proof of expenses.

3. While it is true that our jurisprudence also provides that absence of final
assessment and definitive disability rating does not prevent the seafarer from
claiming total and permanent disability, this must still be reconciled with the periods
provided by the rules. In Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan, it was held
that:

Disability should be understood more on the loss of earning capacity rather

than on the medical significance of the disability. Even in the absence of an
official finding by the company-designated physician to the effect that the
seafarer suffers a disability and is unfit for sea duty, the seafarer may still
be declared to be suffering from a permanent disability if he is unable to
work for more than 120 days. What clearly determines the seafarer's
entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more
than 120 days. Although the company-designated physician already
declared the seafarer fit to work, the seafarer's disability is still considered
permanent and total if such declaration is made belatedly (that is, more than
120 days after repatriation).

4. Clearly, the declaration of permanent and total disability must still observe the
120/240 day-period provided by the rules. A seafarer may only be declared to
be permanently incapacitated if he is still unable to work for more than 120 days.
Not only that, the seafarer must provide substantial proof that his injury caused
him to be incapacitated to do his usual work. In the instant case, there was no
clear finding that Cervas was not able to work for more than 120 days. To
reiterate, he stopped his treatment prior the expiration of the 120-days period.
Also, records show that Cervas did not provide any medical reports or findings
to support his claim that his injury is permanent. There were also no record
showing that Cervas consulted or sought a doctor of his choice who diagnosed
him that he can no longer work or that his present condition incapacitates him
to engage in a gainful employment. It is an established principle that these
allegations must be substantiated by evidence in order for it to be recognized
by this Court.49 While it is true that what is important in disability cases is not
the medical findings but the capacity of the employee to be gainfully employed
in the same line of employment, these facts must still be established and
supported by substantial evidence before ruling that the employee is entitled to
the benefits he is seeking. Thus, Cervas' claim that his injury was total and
permanent merely on the basis of his incomplete medical treatment will not
suffice. It was Cervas' decision not to continue with his treatment and thus, it
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

would be impossible to determine the degree of disability Cervas suffered or

whether he could have fully recover as such facts can no longer be established
at this juncture. At most, the rules provides that Cervas is entitled to sickness
benefit and medical allowance which herein petitioners had already provided in
the span of his treatment.

OPINION OF THE STUDENT re THE RULING:

I concur with the ruling of the Supreme Court, tt was undisputed that the injury was
sustained by Cervas while he was doing his job as an Abled Seaman on board the
vessel. It is clear that Cervas injury is work-related and such being the case, the injury
is compensable.

Furthermore, it is but the seafarer's duty to comply with the medical treatment as
provided by the company-designated physician, otherwise, when a sick or injured
seafarer abandons his or her treatment, such may result to the forfeiture of his/her right
to claim disability benefits.

Thus, It is but the seafarer's duty to comply with the medical treatment as provided by
the company-designated physician, otherwise, when a sick or injured seafarer
abandons his or her treatment, such may result to the forfeiture of his/her right to claim
disability benefits.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE:

Cervas demand was ignored by petitioners thus, on May 2, 2013, he formally lodged
a Complaint against petitioners for total and permanent disability benefits, medical
expenses, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC.

In its Decision18 dated October 30, 2013, Labor Arbiter (LA) Virginia T. Luyas-Azarraga
dismissed Cervas' complaint. The LA held that Cervas had no cause of action when
he filed the instant case for having discontinued his treatments with the company-
designated physician. The LA found that only ninety-three (93) days had lapsed from
the time Cervas was initially seen by the company-designated physician up to the time
he filed his complaint. Cervas's failure to return for re-assessment of his medical
condition deprived the company-designated physician of the opportunity to determine
whether or not respondent was already fit for sea duty.

Cervas then appealed before the NLRC and the NLRC found merit on his appeal. In
its Decision20 dated May 6, 2014, the NLRC set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
ruling that Cervas is entitled to total permanent disability benefits. The NLRC ruled that
the absence of an assessment by the company doctor, either because he did not issue
on or probably because he was unable to examine the seafarer, will not automatically
bar the latter from claiming disability or death benefit.

In their petition with the CA, petitioners asseverated that Cervas is not entitled to a
permanent and total disability benefit as he unilaterally terminated his medical
FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

treatment thus preventing the company-designated physician from giving his disability
assessment.

The CA, however, denied their petition. CA finds no reversible error with the decision
of the NLRC, granting Cervas his disability claim considering that his Fibular Diaphral
Fracture prevented him from regaining full use of his leg and returning to his usual work
as seafarer for more than 120 days.

On July 28, 2014, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration but the same was
likewise denied by the CA thru its Resolution dated September 12, 2014. Hence, the
present recourse.

Submitted by:

DANICA LOU S. FLORES