Disasters - 2021 - Werther - Help Yourself by Helping Others Self Interest in Appeals For Russian Famine Relief 1921 23

doi:10.1111/disa.
12494
Help yourself by helping others: self-

interest in appeals for Russian famine
relief, 1921–23
Steffen Werther Researcher, Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn
University, Sweden
The hypothesis of psychological egoism is a commonplace in disciplines like economics, psychol-

ogy, and biology. As an explanatory model it includes prosocial behaviour such as providing aid
for distant strangers. But the inclusion of self-interest in humanitarian appeals can prove dif-
ficult because the moral economy of charitable work is regulated by different standards than the
liberal market economy. This paper analyses the use of self-interest in appeals for humanitarian
aid during the Russian famine of 1921–23 through the lens of modern philanthropic studies,
while simultaneously assessing theories of philanthropic behaviour from a historical perspective.
It points out the need for the systematic inclusion of historical experience in philanthropic research
and concludes that the specific conditions surrounding the international campaign favoured the
widespread use of appeals to donors’ self-interest. An ideal–typical categorisation of such appeals
into four groups—national, economic, group-specific, and psychological—is proposed as an ana-
lytical tool for similar studies.
Keywords: altruism, American Relief Administration, appeals, humanitarianism,

psychological egoism, relief, Russian famine, Save the Children Fund, self-interest
Introduction
This paper views fundraising campaigns for Russian famine victims in the early 1920s
through the lens of modern philanthropic studies, while simultaneously assessing
theories of philanthropic behaviour from a historical perspective. The objective is
threefold. First, to understand the reasons for, the extent of, and the mechanisms
behind appeals to the self-interest of donors during Russian famine relief in 1921–23.
Second, to introduce a generalisable categorisation of self-interest in humanitarian
appeals, based on results from social psychology and historical studies. Third, to
demonstrate the fruitfulness of interdisciplinary approaches in philanthropic research.
When the international food aid campaign for the starving masses in Russia reached
its peak in 1922, the political theorist and revolutionary Leon Trotsky stated that
‘philanthropy is tied to business, to enterprises, to interests – if not today, then
tomorrow’ (Patenaude, 2002, p. 639). His depiction of humanitarian aid as donor-
driven is shared by many modern commentators (de Waal, 1997; Vaux, 2001). At the
same time, there is an ongoing debate among philanthropic researchers about the
extent to which prosocial behaviour is motivated by altruism and self-interest (Sober
and Wilson, 1998; Nelson, 1999; Maner and Gailliot, 2007; Diacon, 2014; Povey, 2014).
Disasters, 2022, 46(3): 700−719. © 2021 The Authors Disasters © 2021 ODI
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Help yourself by helping others: self-interest in appeals for Russian famine relief, 1921–23 701
The notion of psychological egoism that sees all of our actions as ultimately moti-
vated by self-interest is dominant in such disciplines as economics, social psychology,
and evolutionary biology (May, n.d.). As this hypothesis claims general validity, any
counterexample might tend to refute it, were it not that the definition of self-interest
is so broad it can even encompass apparent exception. When, for example, Batson
et al. (1981, p. 302) suggested that ‘empathic motivation for helping may be truly
altruistic’ (see also Batson 1987), critics provided an alternate explanation, asserting
that empathy only indirectly increases the tendency to help, by arousing negative per-
sonal emotions such as sadness, guilt, anger, and distress (Cialdini, 1991; Cialdini et al.,
1997). Helping others is then a way of relieving one’s own discomfort, rather than
originating in selfless interest in another’s welfare (Nelson, 1999). Consequently, these
debates have produced terms like impure altruism, competitive altruism, and recipro-
cal altruism (Andreoni, 1990; Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; Fong, 2007; Kitcher, 2012).
All imply the expectation that donor benefits may result from acts that appear altru-
istic, such as a feeling of satisfaction, an improvement in social status, or a future quid
pro quo. Furthermore, some researchers have expressed doubts about the assumed
dichotomy between self-interest and altruism and have developed alternative interpre-
tations—even allowing self-interested action to be altruistically motivated (Badhwar,
1993; Schramme, 2017).
Rather than probing the nature of human beings, humanitarian practitioners are
concerned with donor behaviour and how it is stimulated by different fundraising
strategies. Ample research has made it possible for contemporary fundraising cam-
paigns to base their strategies on scientific data. Guidebooks summarise experimental
results and advise organisations on how to profit best from proven fundraising tac-
tics (Parker, 2018). Such studies confirm that empathy ranks high as a stimulus to
prosocial behaviour, but also show that there are ‘more powerful things besides altru-
ism’ that motivate donor responses (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011, p. 936). Thus,
humanitarian organisations are warned against focusing entirely on altruistic moti-
vation and are advised against relying on the assumption that people have ‘a selfless
concern for others’ (Parker, 2018, p. 23). Instead, a spectrum of motivations should
be addressed, including different kinds of self-interest.
Ideas like the above have long been part of the history of humanitarianism. Since
the nineteenth century, fundraising campaigns have promised social and psychologi-
cal benefits in the form of heavenly rewards, increased reputation, and enhanced self-
image in soliciting donations (The Record, 1922a; Kinealy, 2015). Rolls of honour
and other forms of praising donors and contemporary slogans such as ‘feel good about
yourself – give blood!’ (Andreoni, 1990, p. 464) are prominent examples. For two
centuries, providing aid for others has been linked to economic or geopolitical advan-
tages for the donor communities and to boosting national or religious reputations.
However, addressing a potential donor’s self-interest remains a difficult task for a
fundraising campaign because the moral economy of charitable work is regulated
by different standards than the liberal market economy (Götz, Brewis, and Werther,
2020). Many believe that economic self-interest, at least in an explicit form, does not
702 Steffen Werther
belong in the humanitarian field and taints it, a view that is often rooted in religious
values (Newman and Cain, 2014). Among the numerous disadvantages that conse-
quently arise in the philanthropic sector are inadequate compensation for staff, low
public acceptance of risk-taking, limited time horizons, and restricted marketing
possibilities (Palotta, 2013). This points to the difficulty of applying the idea of
investment and profit to the humanitarian field. In practice, a person who donates
USD 10 will generally not approve of the money being used for advertising purposes
or a fundraiser’s salary, although by so doing their donation might be multiplied
several times over and finance further beneficial activities. Another example is the
humanitarian sector’s widespread disdain of commission-based compensation or
bonuses. During the Russian famine of 1921–23, the British Save the Children Fund
(SCF) was severely criticised when it adopted this then innovative business-like
approach (Mahood and Satzewich, 2009).
Such cultural norms result in and are in turn reinforced by a language of altruism
that characterises the discourse surrounding charitable organisations. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that psychologists and social behaviourists are ambivalent about
how successful appeals to self-interest are in a charity context. Some studies claim
that such appeals can have a negative impact on donors who feel that their altruistic
intentions are compromised (Zagef ka and James, 2015). The pioneering social sci-
entist Richard Titmuss (1970) argued that giving monetary compensation to blood
donors will result in fewer donations, a phenomenon he described as a ‘crowding
out effect’ (Mellström and Johannesson, 2008). Other studies show that numerous
donors do, in fact, appreciate token recognition of self-interest (an ‘exchange fiction’)
that enables them to justify their prosocial behaviour to themselves and to their scep-
tical peers (Simpson, Irwin, and Lawrence, 2006; Zlatev and Miller, 2016).
When seen in historical perspective, these ambivalent findings of experimental
research suggest that, rather than human nature, cultural norms and other influences
are at the core of donor behaviour. Just as donation patterns vary across borders and
over time, since they are ‘shaped by different historical, cultural, social, religious,
political and economic conditions’ (Breeze and Scaife, 2015, p. 570), so the preva-
lence and success of appeals to self-interest depend on such factors. For example, the
French social philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1997 [1899], para. 6) observed in
the early nineteenth century that those in the United States, as opposed to Euro-
peans, were ‘fond of explaining almost all the actions of their lives by the principle
of self-interest’, and that they were ‘more anxious to do honor to their philosophy
than to themselves’.
The collective and arguably sometimes self-fulfilling belief in the power of self-
interest has become more predominant since de Tocqueville travelled in the US. The
rise of the rational choice theory may be an indication of this. Many donors, espe-
cially in modern Western societies, seem to welcome a psychological cover—a ‘self-
interested justification’—when performing acts of compassion (Holmes, Miller, and
Lerner, 2002). Yet, belief systems can also have the opposite effect. Kulow and Kramer
(2016) show that offering a self-incentive can be counterproductive if potential donors
have strong ‘karmic beliefs’, that is, if they live in the expectation of a just ‘compen-
sation’ by the universe or a god for doing good deeds.
Accordingly, a donor’s ultimate reasons for helping and their actual behaviour in
a fundraising context are correlated, although not identical. A person who believes
in the assumption of self-interest, as characterised above by de Tocqueville, may want
to donate out of a sense of compassion, but only does so if the act can be justified as
self-interest. Another may donate out of self-interest and yet want the act to appear
altruistic. For instance, White and Peloza (2009) suggest that appeals implying some
kind of self-benefit to the donor are more effective if the act of giving remains pri-
vate, whereas in the presence of a real or imagined public, appeals focusing on benefit
to the other are more successful.
Effective fundraisers base decisions about invoking donor self-interest on the
humanitarian setting. The many factors involved include the organisation’s relief
philosophy, donor attitudes, time, place, cause, and political, social, and cultural cir-
cumstances. Although compassion remains a key aspect of charitable campaigning,
as it has for the past 200 years, relief organisations sometimes downplay altruistic moti-
vation and emphasise the self-interest of donors. The international relief campaign
during the Russian famine of the early 1920s provides a historical example of this.
The Russian famine 1921– 23 and humanitarian aid

In 1921, when Central and Western Europe had barely recovered from the worst
consequences of the First World War (1914–18), a severe famine in parts of Soviet
Russia threatened the lives of approximately 20 million people. It was caused by bad
harvests and a drought in conjunction with seven years of economic and social dis-
turbance brought about by the Great War, the October Revolution of 1917, and the
ensuing Russian Civil War of 1918–21 (Patenaude, 2002, p. 197; Cabanes, 2014,
pp. 239–40). Especially affected were the regions around the Volga and Ural Rivers.
After a period of reluctance, in August 1921, the Bolshevik government signalled,
through an appeal by world-renowned author Maxim Gorky (American Relief
Administration, 1921b), its willingness to accept foreign aid. Gorky’s dramatic plea
immediately triggered international relief campaigns, not least because he was unsus-
picious of communist sympathies. By the time operations peaked in August 1922,
more than 11 million people were receiving food aid through foreign organisations
(International Committee for Russian Relief, 1922, p. 20; American Relief Admin-
istration, 1923).
Relief was mainly delivered by two umbrella agencies: the American Relief
Administration (ARA), headed by Herbert Hoover, which united major US relief
organisations (Fisher, 1927; Weismann, 1974; Patenaude, 2002); and the International
Committee for Russian Relief (ICRR), led by Norwegian explorer and humanitarian
Fridtjof Nansen, which represented a conglomerate mainly composed of European
organisations (Vogt, 2007; Maul, 2011). The ARA drew on the experience of its
704 Steffen Werther
vast relief efforts in post-war Europe. It relied partly on governmental funds and
provided more than four-fifths of all foreign aid to Russia. The ICRR was a crea-
tion of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in cooperation with
the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Its main contributors were the SCF and the
Friends’ Emergency and War Victims Relief Committee (FEWVRC), a Quaker
organisation (Kelly, 2018), as well as a number of national Red Cross societies.
Communist and socialist organisations, such as the Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (IAH),
or International Workers’ Relief, acted outside of these umbrella administrative systems
(Braskén, 2015).
The First World War had reinforced an ongoing transformation of philanthropic
methods, such as the secularisation and the consolidation of organisational structures
(Curti, 1988; Cabanes, 2004; Paulmann, 2013; Little, 2014; Watenpaugh, 2015; Kind-
Kovács, 2016). A method of ‘organised humanitarianism’ emerged, resembling the
management ideas of Taylorism, which it combined with an increasingly transna-
tional orientation (Götz, Brewis, and Werther, 2019). Efficiency and professionali-
sation were key to this phase of humanitarianism. In light of the magnitude of the
Great War and the following period of instability, small-scale charity was thrust
aside, and many humanitarian organisations adopted business practices in their relief
efforts (Barnett, 2011, p. 86). Growing awareness of global interconnectedness ben-
efitted the humanitarian sector (Arsan, Lewis, and Richard, 2012, p. 163). At the same
time, the war experience led to the nationalisation of transnational aid. Governments
began to coordinate and seek control over humanitarian efforts from their territories
(Mahood, 2009, p. 174; Maul, 2011; Paulmann, 2013; Cabanes, 2014, p. 5; Laqua,
2014, p. 182). Humanitarian aid was increasingly treated as diplomacy by other means
and, especially from a US perspective, also served to fight the spread of communism
in post-war Europe (Cabanes, 2014, pp. 212–14). Other newly founded organisations,
such as the SCF and the relief committees of the Society of Friends in the United
Kingdom and the US, had an explicit transnational pacifist agenda.
Advocating relief for the population of a foreign country after the First World War
was not without controversy. In the case of Russia, nearly all charitable organisations
other than pro-communist groups faced an even greater challenge: raising money
for a foreign nation with a hostile ideology. During the Russian Civil War, most
Western nations had supported the Whites in their fight against the Reds (Vogt,
2007, pp. 56–58). In 1921, the Bolshevik government was still fragile and not recog-
nised by most Western governments, which complicated the situation. Exiled Russians
and conservative politicians alike were either sceptical or openly opposed to the idea
of supplying Soviet Russia with food, warning that this would only stabilise the
tottering regime. Most European governments were unwilling to support a relief
mission to Russia. Others, like Nansen, saw the famine as an opportunity to come
to terms with the new administration or to elicit pro-Western attitudes among the
populace and increase the chance of regime change, which was Hoover’s view. In any
case, Russia’s communist leaders deeply mistrusted foreign organisations and feared a
counterrevolution in humanitarian disguise (American Relief Administration, 1921a).
Relief organisations soon realised that, regardless of their motivation, they had to
be prepared ‘for attacks from every side’ if engaged in relief for ‘Red Russia’ (The
Record, 1921; Sasson, 2016). To counter criticism in the press and public protests (Vogt,
2007, pp. 210–214; Mahood and Satzewich, 2009), and to optimise donor responsive-
ness, they defended their efforts not only by making reference to Christian values,
humanity, and compassion, but also by appealing to self-interest, putting potential
benefits for the donor community in the foreground. The omnipresent promise
of a business-like organisation of relief efforts during the 1920s, with an emphasis
on economic efficiency (Götz, Brewis, and Werther, 2020), reinforced such tenden-
cies further.
Categories of self-interested justification for aid to Russia

Bekkers and Wiepking (2011), in their meta-analysis, highlight eight general mech-
anisms that drive charitable giving: altruism; solicitation; awareness of need; costs/
benefits; reputation; values; psychological benefits; and efficacy. Some of the factors
described, such as social, material, and psychological benefits to the donor, include
elements of self-interest. While Bekker and Wiepking (2011) evaluate studies of
contemporary donor behaviour that are conducted in a controlled environment by
means of experimental research, I provide below a generalisable categorisation of self-
interested justifications used by humanitarian agencies during the Russian famine.
On the basis of material from relief organisations with different national, religious,
political, and ethnic backgrounds, four main sets of arguments were identified,
referring to: (i) national self-interest; (ii) economic self-interest; (iii) group-specific self-interest;
and (iv) psychological self-interest.
These sets of arguments are partly overlapping and often refer to each other. None
of the categories can be exclusively ascribed to a specific organisation. Campaigns
utilised various self-interest justifications, tailoring the content to suit their relief
philosophy and their potential supporters. Some appeals to self-interest were subtle,
whereas others were blunt and direct. The four categories of argument are pre-
sented below with examples from the Russian famine and viewed in the context of
recent philanthropic research.
National self-interest: ‘our honour as a nation is involved’

An important motivation for foreign aid and its acceptance by the public has always
been a ‘domestic return’. Accordingly, the most promising way to lobby for gov-
ernmental support was to claim that relief for Russia was in the donor nation’s own
interest. While Nansen could not persuade European governments to co-fund a
Russian relief mission, Hoover was more successful. He convinced the US Congress
that providing aid to Soviet Russia served the national interest by invoking humani-
tarian, economic, and geopolitical arguments. By winning the hearts and minds of
a distressed population, Hoover announced that relief would not support a tottering
706 Steffen Werther
regime but prove the most effective way to halt the ‘Bolshevik disease’. He claimed
that fighting famine meant fighting Bolshevism and safeguarding US geopolitical
interests (Patenaude, 2002, p. 635; Cabanes, 2014, pp. 212–14).
Another way to invoke national self-interest was to describe the famine and its
consequences as a potential threat to the donor country’s domestic security. Zagefka
and James (2015) show that concern for one’s own nation’s safety does influence
humanitarian donations positively. The British SCF, for example, reminded its
compatriots that ‘disease stalked behind hunger’ (The Record, 1922b). Ignoring the
famine was, therefore, not an option, as ‘even Britain’s geographical insularity would
not preserve her from the possibility of a scourge analogous to the Black Death’
(The Record, 1922c). The German Red Cross campaign similarly argued that provid-
ing relief to Soviet Russia would stop epidemics from spreading to German terri-
tory (Mühlens, 1923; Braskén, 2015, p. 35; Eckart, 2016). Closely connected to the fear
of disease, yet seldom publicly expressed, were apprehensions about famine refugees.
As Sasson (2016, p. 525) reminds us, relief was not merely provided out of sympathy
‘toward the suffering masses in Russia but also because it became a way to protect
Europe from them’.
More common than such ‘external threat’ narratives were appeals that stressed
national pride, something that can be described as competitive altruism. While also
linked to national self-interest, such appeals frequently appear detached from the
emergency. Zagef ka and James (2015, p. 176) suggest that people are ‘particularly will-
ing to donate’ if the charitable act ‘is positively related to the national self-image’
(see also Stevenson and Manning, 2011). In fact, the All-British Appeal for Russia
claimed that donating was a ‘national duty’ as ‘our honour as a nation is involved’
(Robertson, 1922, p. 14). Similarly, the ARA suggested to its donors that their aid
was transmitting ‘American ideals’ to the Russians, engendering gratitude and ‘the
reward of friendship for generations to come’ (Stutesman, 1922a, 1922b). The SCF
attempted to blend altruistic motivation and national self-interest when claiming that
helping Russian children was teaching them how ‘to love Britain’ (The Record, 1921).
Such strategies have been found to be successful if ‘helping can be used to reaffirm
a threatened social identity’ and assert one’s own superiority (van Leeuwen, 2007;
van Leeuwen and Mashuri, 2012). Arguably, the German Red Cross tried to exploit
these mechanisms in 1921 when it praised the ‘German willingness to make sacri-
fices’ and stated that as Germans were a ‘much slandered people’, they could hardly
stand by while the whole civilised world was sending relief to Russia (Mühlens, 1923,
p. iv; Braskén, 2015, p. 35). Similarly, some British organisations presented philan-
thropic engagement as a way to compensate for a weakened geopolitical position.
Thus, the Imperial War Relief Fund (IWRF) employed a nationalistic rhetoric and
declared altruism a genuinely British trait. Set in such a context, donations that ben-
efited enemies could be exalted as acts of true patriotism and a demonstration of
the nobility of the British people (Baughan, 2012). A visitor to the famine region
stated, accordingly, that the SCF’s accomplishments filled him ‘with pride in the
British race’. The same spirit that made the British people such great colonisers of
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, he continued, was now enabling them ‘to colo-
nize in another sense the frozen steppes of Russia’ (The Record, 1922d).
For smaller nations, participation in international relief offered an opportunity
to demonstrate their sovereignty and to gain foreign prestige. The founders of the
IWRF considered it humiliating that Britain was being surpassed, not only by the
US, but also by its former colonies, Canada and New Zealand, in providing gov-
ernmental funds for Russian relief (Baughan, 2012). Appeals to collective pride are
especially effective when directed at ‘high identifiers’, that is, those who are com-
mitted to a particular group—in this case, the nation (van Leeuwen, van Dijk, and
Kaynak, 2013). During the Russian famine, even communist organisations, such as
the Friends of Soviet Russia (FSR), responded to what amounted to a competition
over a nation’s reputation. In a letter appealing for donations in support of children’s
homes in Russia, the FSR underlined that since similar homes were already being
financed by Dutch and German comrades, American workers, with their higher sala-
ries, should be able to do the same (Soviet Russia Calls, n.d.).
Sometimes national self-interest in supplying aid to Russia was depicted by con-
juring up scenarios of what might happen if help were denied. Building on Hoover’s
argument that communism was caused by desperation and famine, a SCF spokes-
person reminded a critic that hunger promotes hatred, and that letting enemy chil-
dren starve would only harm British interests in the long run (Lord Weardale, c. 1920).
Hence, feeding Russian children was ‘warding off the otherwise inevitable revenge’
(Zangwill, 1921).
Economic self-interest: ‘an investment rather than an expenditure’

Economic self-interest often overlaps with national self-interest, but it can also have
a transnational or individual dimension. Typical of economic self-interest appeals
are their use of rationality and the technique of psychological egoism. It may have
been the business-minded relief philosophy of organised humanitarianism that
prompted the recourse to business sales tactics by relief organisations during the
Russian famine. In addition, some fundraisers hoped to overcome accusations that
they were ‘helping the enemy’ by focusing on the economic, rather than the moral,
dimension of the emergency.
In its publication The Record, the SCF cited ‘leading economists’ in proclaiming
that ‘self-interest dictates that we should send relief ’, as the reconstruction of Russia
would benefit European markets and reduce unemployment at home (Atkinson, 1922;
The Record, 1922e). Relief for Russia was presented, therefore, as ‘an investment
rather than an expenditure’ (The Record, 1922f ). It was further claimed that ‘no [other]
investment would bring so great a return’ (The Record, 1922b). Hoover, too, described
famine relief as an ‘act of economic soundness’ (Patenaude, 2002, p. 638) and argued
that buying grain would stabilise the market and thereby help American farmers.
‘Helping ourselves helps others’ had been US President Warren G. Harding’s sum-
mary of this idea in a speech on Russian relief in December 1921 (The Wall Street
708 Steffen Werther
Journal, 1921; see also Riley, 2017, pp. 63–67). Besides unloading an agricultural sur-
plus, by providing help to Russia, there was also the hope of securing future markets.
The All-British Appeal made by the FEWVRC, the IWRF, and the SCF urged
potential donors to ‘think of the future of Europe’s food supply’ (Robertson, 1922,
p. 14). Similarly, a British Member of Parliament pointed out that ‘keeping the peas-
ants of the Volga region alive’ was a necessity if one did not want to risk having ‘one
of the most important sources of food supply to this country’ run dry (Lords Sitting,
1922). Nansen defended the aid of the Norwegian government in a statement to the
Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, by stating that Russian
relief would contribute to the economic stabilisation of war-ridden Europe. In the
end, he said, it was not ‘humanitarian sentiment’ but ‘cold economic importance’
that determined Norway’s actions in this matter (League of Nations, Official Journal,
1922). A conference organised by the ICRC in Berlin, Germany, in December 1921
passed a resolution embodying a similar notion, namely, that the world economy
depended on the restoration of Russian markets and production (Société Russe de la
Croix-Rouge Bulletin, 1921).
The willingness to support a charitable cause can be increased by presenting the act
as an economic transaction and offering the donor a product or service in return
(Holmes, Miller, and Lerner, 2002). During the Russian famine, several organisa-
tions sold stamps, postcards, buttons, and similar items, announcing that the profit
would go to relief. An auction organised by the ARA gave famine-stricken Russian
artists the chance to sell their works (Rosenberg, 1922). The FSR sold Russian hand-
craft at Thanksgiving bazaars (Soviet Russia, 1922). Similar events are known from
nineteenth-century relief. Although most of the products or services offered to the
donors had little economic value attached to them, they nevertheless provided some
donors with a rational justification for their behaviour. Furthermore, when a donation
is seen as a business transaction one does not get emotionally involved, and many pre-
fer it that way. Accordingly, this ‘exchange fiction’ may also be good for donors who
fear ‘unwanted psychological burdens’, such as further commitments, that may arise
from their compassionate acts (Holmes, Miller, and Lerner, 2002). Ironically, during
the Russian famine, when donations began to decline, humanitarian organisation tried
to create similar burdens by suggesting that previous donors should contribute more
in their own economic interest: they claimed that the earlier ‘philanthropic invest-
ment’ will be lost without a follow-up donation, meaning children so far supported
will die. For instance, a SCF fundraiser unapologetically told donors that ‘the money
they have previously spent will have been wasted, unless they can make a further
effort’. This argument was also used during campaigns in mid and late 1922, when
it was suggested to initial donors that they had an obligation to give more, because it
would be irrational (and unforgivable) to let children who were fed during one winter
die in the next one (Kitchen Letter Draft, 1922; The Record, 1922g).
Some relief initiatives during the Russian famine blurred the boundaries between
business and philanthropy. The ARA food remittance programme is one example.
It allowed people in the West to send food to friends or relatives in Russia. However,
25 per cent of every USD 10 went to the general feeding programme. Despite this
‘forced donation’, the ARA initiative was the cheapest way to provide specific indi-
viduals in Russia with food, making it an economically rational option. While in any
other context the 25 per cent would have been considered as commercial profit, it
was made a donation here. Another borderline case is the attempt of the IAH to sell
commercial bonds, advertising them as ‘furthering reconstruction in the famine
areas’ (Minor, 1922; The Literary Digest, 1922; Braskén, 2015, p. 65). The money col-
lected was invested in agricultural and industrial ventures in Soviet Russia that were
operated according to the capitalist system, with the expected surplus to be used for
famine relief (Braskén, 2015, pp. 67–68). This would be called ‘philanthrocapitalism’
or ‘impact investment’ in contemporary discussions. A prominent predecessor of such
a combination of capitalist venture and charity was the ‘five per cent philanthropy’ in
Victorian Britain: investors contented themselves with relatively low return (such as
the eponymous five per cent) when participating in social housing projects (Tarn, 1973).
Group-specific self-interest: ‘it may create a certain amount of good will

among . . . Russians toward their Jewish fellow citizens’
A longstanding motivation for charitable giving has been identification with benefi-
ciaries ‘via some shared identity’ (Chapman, Masser, and Louis, 2020, p. 2). During
the Russian famine, many private contributions were made because of religious or
ethnic kinship between donors and beneficiaries. As in the case of national self-
interest, collective self-interest was at play, namely that pertaining to transnational
religious or ethnic communities. However, rather than the prestige of the nation or
strategic national interests, the primary self-interested motivation was now in-group
solidarity. This impetus was often linked in appeals to what was declared a natural,
collective drive for self-preservation. For example, the London-based Federation of
Ukrainian Jews urged its members to donate by stressing: ‘These are your people,
bound to you by the sacred bonds of blood and faith, and you must assume the
responsibility of helping them!’ (Spare Them a Garment, 1922). Similarly, Swedish
collections for compatriots in Gammalsvenskby, Ukraine, Mennonite relief for co-
religionists in Russia, German Red Cross campaigns for Volga German settlers, and
Turkish donations for Crimean Muslims were also motivated by contentions of in-
group survival abroad (Hiebert and Miller, 1929; Weindling, 2000, pp. 173–178;
Kirimli, 2003). Exploiting the in-group mechanism was not unique to ethnic and
religious communities: the communist FSR suggested to American workers that their
donations to Russia would serve their own self-interest since Soviet Russia was not an
ethnic nation, but a state based on class affiliation. In this context, class was equated
with kinship—brotherhood, more specifically—and Russians were described to
potential US donors as ‘blood of your blood because they belong to your class’ (Nation-
Wide Holiday Drive, 1922).
Some appeals addressed self-interests more overtly by listing specific group advan-
tages for sending relief. For instance, communist organisations pointed out that fighting
710 Steffen Werther
the famine would not only help Russians, but also would destroy the hopes of the
global bourgeoisie. Saving Russian children would serve workers’ self-interest across
the world because at some time in the future, these children ‘may defend this first
worker’s republic against its enemies’ (Soviet Russia Calls, n.d.). Although it was pur-
suing spiritual aims, the Papal Relief Mission in some way had an equally pragmatic
approach. Its efforts were guided by the hope of reclaiming ground it had lost to
the Orthodox Church, rather than solely by benevolence (Zatko, 1963, p. 60; Gribble,
2009, p. 652; Trythall, 2018, pp. 79–80, 86–87). Catholic fundraisers acted on the
principle that ‘charity will be the most effective means, as Jesus himself said, to draw
the people to the true Church and prepare the ground for future apostolic activity’
(Trythall, 2018, p. 79).
The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) had similar ideas about
influencing societal developments and alleviating the plight of fellow believers when
it earmarked a portion of its relief aid specifically for Russian doctors. Its hope was
that when recipients learned that their aid came from a Jewish organisation, ‘it may
create a certain amount of good will among a cultured and intelligent group of
Russians toward their Jewish fellow citizens’ (Strauss, 1921). Ironically, the anti-
semitism it wanted to combat by diverting funds was why the JDC did not exclu-
sively support members of its own in-group in the famine area: it had been warned
by the ARA that feeding Jews alone with JDC money would ‘reflect adversely’ on
all Jews in Russia and Ukraine (American Relief Administration, c. 1922), bringing
upon them the ‘displeasure of the government’ and the hate of the population, ‘with
possible resulting pogroms’ (Herter, 1923).
Psychological self-interest: ‘our Christianity, our humanity at stake’

This last category can be ambiguous, as its boundaries when appealing to collective
self-interest are often fluid. National reputation, for example, will be an effective
motivator to give only if it appears relevant to the individual donor, that is, if it has
a positive impact on a person’s emotional condition or social status (van Leeuwen,
2007; van Leeuwen and Mashuri, 2012). Thus, the act of charitable giving allows
donors to express their identity (Chapman, Masser, and Louis, 2020).
Charitable giving, as indicated above, can be motivated by non-material rewards,
such as enhanced prestige and social acclaim, as well as by feelings of guilt, since
social pressure can prompt action to avoid the scorn of others (Andreoni, 1990). Both
pride and guilt are psychological motivators based on self-interest. With regard to
the former, help is provided because it makes donors feel good about themselves,
whereas in relation to the latter, it is offered because donors want to avoid feeling
bad about themselves (van Leeuwen et al., 2013). The SCF, for instance, has called
charity ‘a cloak to cover sins’ (Zangwill, 1921). Donations, for that reason, were ‘not
so much alms as blood money’, not unlike the restitution that archaic religious codes
required for murder (Zangwill, 1921). From this perspective, prosocial behaviour
served psychological self-interest by relieving individuals from guilt.
While a person’s feeling of satisfaction for good doing—what in philanthropic

research is called the ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 2006, p. 1220)—was seldom addressed
directly in appeals, humanitarian organisations did provide donors with information,
photographs, or other documentation on the effects of their contributions. Citing the
names of donors and publicly acknowledging the amount they gave remains the
most common means of ‘compensation’. Such ‘rolls of honour’ were published in
newspapers, bulletins, leaflets, and the like (The Record, 1922a). These lists are often
a positive incentive, but they can also serve as a disciplining tool, such as in groups
like church congregations where shaming creates social pressure. For example, when
the communist FSR announced that the names of donors would be ‘kept in the
archives of the Soviet government, as a testimonial of their active sympathy at an
hour of need’ (The Russian Famine: One Year of Relief Work, 1922), this could be inter-
preted as a promise of some kind of reward once the world revolution succeeded. But
it was also a subtle threat to those who did not give.
A shift in perspective was another fundraising strategy. Instead of asking ‘what
happens to the starving victim if you do not help?’, the question was rather ‘what
will happen to you if you do not act?’. A major article in The Record suggested that
ignoring Russian suffering would have more severe consequences than economic
losses. It puts ‘our Christianity, our humanity’ at stake, the writer argued, and if
that happens ‘we shall be killing our own humanity within us, and we shall soon
show the signs of it in increasing brutality, in social misery and in personal desolation’.
Such reasoning focused on the psychological well-being of the donors and down-
played empathy for the hungry. The crucial issue was no longer that millions were
dying, but that ‘others are willing to let them die’. A people who would stand by
and let this take place were seen as ‘morally doomed’ (The Record, 1922h). The
images of starving Russians that were used in appeals, another fundraiser warned,
would fill those unwilling to give with remorse for the rest of their lives (Kurasawa,
2012, p. 69).
Arguments in this category may be described as ‘emotional appeals noted in
motivational frames’ (Mahood and Satzewich, 2009, p. 66). For example, an SCF
spokesman explained that while his organisation cared for ‘the individual sufferer’,
children were being saved because they constituted the ‘citizen[s] of the future’.
Adding this non-altruistic dimension to relief work allowed it to be described as
‘constructive as well as palliative’ (Lord Weardale, 1920).
Psychological self-interests in a wider sense were also intentionally evoked. The
SCF’s kitchen system, which was the instrument of its food provision in Russia,
rewarded donors who contributed GBP 100 or more by naming a kitchen after them
in Russia. They then received information from their kitchen, such as photographs,
the number of children fed, the amount and kind of food distributed, and indi-
vidual stories. The system created personal bonds and the belief that a particular
kitchen depended on a specific donor, rather than on general funding. As described
in the discussion of economic self-interest, donors received letters asking whether
they were willing to fund a further period when the (normally) 20 weeks covered
712 Steffen Werther
by their contribution were about to end. These letters stated that ‘if we cannot con-
tinue to feed the children preserved so far [by your kitchen] . . . they will certainly
die’, thus putting children’s lives in the donor’s hand (Kitchen Letter Draft, 1922).
Suddenly they felt a greater moral pressure—and psychological self-interest—to give
again than a person who had donated nothing before.
Conclusion
Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) identify general forces that motivate donors to give,
but their meta-analysis also reveals the unpredictability of the outcomes of specific
fundraising strategies. Not only do external circumstances play an important role, but
it also remains largely unknown how different approaches may work in combination.
In the case of Russian famine relief, self-interested motivations were more widely
used than during transnational famine relief campaigns in recent times. The reasons
for this are multifaceted: helping distant strangers was still an unusual concept after
the First World War; the deservingness of the beneficiaries was disputed; ideological
disagreements were wide; nationalist sentiments were high; and the post-war global
economic situation was fragile. In addition, Taylorism and rationality were part of the
Zeitgeist, and humanitarianism had entered a phase of business-like self-definition.
Nevertheless, motivating and legitimising relief on the basis of self-interest was not
the norm during the Russian famine neither, and at times caused a sense of unease
in some groups. In the US, Hoover was warned by a Senator to ‘not dilute our gen-
erosity with any selfish purposes’ (Patenaude, 2002, p. 638). Furthermore, all too
open references to self-interest allowed communist leaders and media to understate
the altruistic dimension of Western aid and depict the provision of food as a capitalist
endeavour (American Relief Administration, 1921a; Izvestia, 1922). Such propagan-
distic ‘unmasking’, in turn, ironically endangered the pursued self-interest of donors.
The unusually rich number of examples that this in-depth case provides makes a
generalisation possible. Thus, although based on empirical material from 1921–23,
the categories presented can be seen independently of Russian famine relief and
described as ideal types applicable to other contexts. Table 1 summarises both the dif-
ferences and similarities, showing general factors that characterise appeals arranged
by categories of national, economic, group-specific, and psychological self-interest.
This categorisation departs from philanthropical studies and current debates on altru-
istic versus egoistic prosocial behaviour. It complements existing typologies by con-
centrating on appeals to donors’ self-interest.
Although directed at the individual donor, most fundraising in the first three cat-
egories invokes collective self-interest, whether of a nation, a religious group, or an
ethnic community. Exceptions in the economic category include campaigns based
on ‘exchange fictions’, as they appeal to what the individual perceives as personally
advantageous. Appeals to group-specific interests are unique in that the imagined col-
lective may encompass both donors and beneficiaries. In the psychological category,
Table 1. Characteristics of appeals in four main categories
National Economic Group-specific Psychological

self-interest self-interest self-interest self-interest
Driving force Competition Profit Shared identity Compassion
Social form Collective Collective, individual Collective Individual
Method of addressing Directly Directly Directly/indirectly Indirectly

self-interest
Mention of beneficiaries Occasionally Occasionally Yes Yes

in appeals
Mention of donors Yes Yes Occasionally Occasionally

in appeals
Nature of self-interest Emotional, rational Rational Mostly emotional Emotional
Prospective reward Prestige, influence Material goods Prestige, survival Prestige, emotional
of the in-group satisfaction
Source: author.
appeals mostly target individual self-interest, yet forms of collective guilt may occa-
sionally play a role. Appeals to national and economic self-interest tend to address
potential benefit directly and concentrate on donors; beneficiaries are merely viewed
as a means to an end. The framing of those campaigns is mostly rational, but some-
times coloured emotionally when it comes to national prestige. However, the two
broad categories differ regarding the main driving force and prospective reward:
while appeals to national self-interest are based on competition and hold out enhanced
standing among other nations as their return, appeals to economic self-interest are
founded on the promise of material benefit. Group-specific and psychological self-
interest, meanwhile, are generally addressed indirectly and framed emotionally in
appeals that have beneficiaries as their central focus. In both cases rewards are non-
material. Most visible in appeals to psychological self-interest are compassion and
empathy, preconditions for donations that aim to avoid feelings of guilt.
The success of appeals to national and group-specific self-interest depends sig-
nificantly on so-called high identifiers, that is, people for whom the repute of the
collective is important enough to make a personal material sacrifice. Accordingly,
such appeals can be especially successful if the image of the nation or the ethnic or
religious group is somehow threatened, such as by geopolitical events. In many
cases, members of one’s own group, presented by fundraisers as extended kin, are
endangered. The occurrence of appeal to economic self-interest depends greatly on
the Zeitgeist, as such arguments must appear appropriate in a humanitarian context.
Economic appeals can also serve as a tool to disguise altruism, especially when those
in need of aid are looked upon by some as unworthy. Under such circumstances it
may be easier for compassionate donors to legitimise their contributions as in their
own self-interest rather than expose themselves to public outrage or shaming by
peers. The success of appeals to psychological self-interest plays on feelings of guilt
714 Steffen Werther
and pride that are easier to awaken by stereotypical reference to starving mothers
and children. Psychological self-interest may be particularly effective in the case of
value-oriented donors for whom humanitarian action serves as a statement of their
religious, political, or ethical convictions.
The self-interest versus altruism dichotomy and donor motivations are major topics
in experimental philanthropic research. Yet, analysis of actual historical appeals has
seldom been included systematically in these debates. This paper constitutes a step
in this direction, showing that historical and social psychological philanthropic
research can complement and enrich each other’s terminology and evaluations. Apart
from proposing universally applicable categories of ideal–typical appeals, this study
indicates that, at times, self-interest has been used more widely in humanitarian
fundraising than is acknowledged in current debates. By doing so, it serves as yet
another confirmation of Barnett’s (2011, p. 7) dictum of humanitarianism as ‘a mor-
ally complicated creature, a flawed hero defined by the passions, politics and powers
of its times even as it tries to rise above them’.
Acknowledgements
This paper was written as part of the project on ‘The Moral Economy of Global
Civil Society: A History of Voluntary Food Aid’, funded by the Swedish Research
Council (grant number 2012–614). Special thanks go to my fellow project members,
Georgina Brewis and Norbert Götz, as well as to Pamala Wiepking, who introduced
me to research on humanitarian appeals.
Correspondence
Steffen Werther, Researcher, Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn Uni-
versity, Alfred Nobels allé 7 Flemingsberg, 141 89 Huddinge, Stockholm, Sweden.
E-mail: steffen.werther@sh.se
Data availability statement

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed
during the current study.
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doi:10.1111/disa.

Help yourself by helping others: self-

The hypothesis of psychological egoism is a commonplace in disciplines like economics, psychol-

Keywords: altruism, American Relief Administration, appeals, humanitarianism,

The Russian famine 1921– 23 and humanitarian aid

Categories of self-interested justification for aid to Russia

National self-interest: ‘our honour as a nation is involved’

Economic self-interest: ‘an investment rather than an expenditure’

Group-specific self-interest: ‘it may create a certain amount of good will

Psychological self-interest: ‘our Christianity, our humanity at stake’

While a person’s feeling of satisfaction for good doing—what in philanthropic

Table 1. Characteristics of appeals in four main categories

National Economic Group-specific Psychological

Driving force Competition Profit Shared identity Compassion

Social form Collective Collective, individual Collective Individual

Method of addressing Directly Directly Directly/indirectly Indirectly

Mention of beneficiaries Occasionally Occasionally Yes Yes

Mention of donors Yes Yes Occasionally Occasionally

Nature of self-interest Emotional, rational Rational Mostly emotional Emotional

Data availability statement

Lords Sitting (1922) ‘Famine in Russia’. Series 5, Volume 49. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-

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