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Employment Discrimination in Massachusetts
Employment
& Labor Law
PRINT & EBOOKS
Employment
Discrimination
in
Massachusetts
2nd Edition 2020
2nd Edition 2020
Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc.

Ten Winter Place, Boston, MA 02108-4651
MCL E
MCLE
1-800-966-6253 | www.mcle.org
NEW ENGLAND
2140521B02
2200271B02 Keep raising the bar.®
Employment Discrimination
in Massachusetts
2ND EDITION 2020
AUTHORS
Richard L. Alfred
Shannon M. Berube
Gavriela M. Bogin-Farber
Alida Bográn-Acosta
Mary L. Bonauto
Justine H. Brousseau
Anthony S. Califano
David Conforto
Sherley Cruz
Alexandra H. Deal
Patrick J. Hannon
Anne L. Josephson
Nina Joan Kimball
Gwen Nolan King
Daniel B. Klein
Arielle B. Kristan
Allyson E. Kurker
Jennifer L. Levi
Robert S. Mantell
Johanna L. Matloff
Stephen T. Melnick
Katherine J. Michon
Julie M. Muller
Sean P. O’Connor
Mary E. (Beth) O’Neal
Lucia A. Passanisi
Dahlia C. Rudavsky
Robert M. Shea
Michael E. Steinberg
James S. Weliky
2200271B02
© 2020 by Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. All rights reserved. Published 2020. Permis-
sion is hereby granted for the copying of pages or portions of pages within this book by or under the direc-
tion of attorneys for use in the practice of law. No other use is permitted without prior written consent of
Printed in the United States of America
This publication should be cited: Employment Discrimination in Massachusetts (MCLE, Inc. 2020)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019951458
ISBN: 9781683451853
All of Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc.’s (“MCLE’s”) products, services, and communica-
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Ten Winter Place, Boston, MA 02108-4751
800-966-6253 | Fax 617-482-9498 | www.mcle.org
PREFACE
Employment Discrimination in Massachusetts brings together a concentrated set of
materials from MCLE’s comprehensive employment practice manual, Massachusetts
Employment Law, into one resource focusing on discrimination in the workplace.
You’ll find practical guidance and black letter law from experts representing both the
employer and the employee sides of the bar so that you can find fast answers to your
daily practice questions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
MCLE Press benefits greatly from the attorneys and judges who serve as volunteer
editors and authors of our books. Their willingness to share their time and expertise
is an integral part of our continuing effort to educate the bar and help enhance the
quality of legal services provided to the public.
Publication of the Employment Discrimination in Massachusetts was made possible

by the authors and editors whose work is represented in this publication. We offer
special thanks to Patrick J. Hannon, Kimberly Y. Jones, and Brian J. MacDonough
for reviewing the chapters in conjunction with their dual publication in Massachu-
setts Employment Law. We also thank all of the authors for their time, their contribu-
tions, and their genuine commitment to the mission of continuing legal education.
We also would like to acknowledge the work of dedicated MCLE staff members in
producing this book.
On behalf of Jack Reilly, publisher, Maryanne G. Jensen, editor-in-chief, and the

MCLE Board of Trustees, our appreciation extends to all whose talent and hard work
helped with this book.
Alexis J. LeBlanc
Publications Attorney
January 2020
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

RICHARD L. ALFRED is a partner in the Boston office of Seyfarth Shaw LLP. As
chair of the firm’s wage and hour litigation practice group, he focuses on the defense
of wage-and-hour class and collective actions under federal and state laws in juris-
dictions throughout the country, including the defense of multiplaintiff class actions
alleging discrimination on the basis of all protected classifications. Mr. Alfred is a
fellow of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers and a former chair of the
college’s First Circuit credentials committee. He is a graduate of Harvard College
and Harvard Law School.
SHANNON M. BERUBE is a staff attorney with Seyfarth Shaw LLP in Boston,

where she represents management in matters involving discrimination, harassment,
MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 iii

retaliation, misclassification, wage and hour regulations, breach of contract claims,

and unemployment benefits. She has successfully defended employers in state and
federal courts and before administrative agencies, including the U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, and the Massachusetts Department of Unemployment Assistance.
Previously, she was with Littler Mendelson, PC, and worked for the Enforcement
Division of the EEOC. Earlier in her career, she worked for Vice President Joseph R.
Biden in his constituent relations department. Ms. Berube is a member of the Wom-
en’s Bar Association and the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations, and is a
mentor for Running Start. She is a graduate of the University of Delaware and Suffolk
University Law School.
GAVRIELA M. BOGIN-FARBER is an associate attorney in the firm of Messing,

Rudavsky & Weliky, PC, in Newton. Her practice focuses on representing individuals
in employment discrimination cases at the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination and in state and federal court. She also advises clients on other labor and
employment matters. Ms. Bogin-Farber is serving her second term as vice president
of the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association and previously served as its
program committee cochair. She has presented on and moderated bar association and
law school panels related to labor and employment law, and was named a Super
Lawyers “Rising Star” from 2016 to 2018. Prior to joining Messing, Rudavsky &
Weliky in 2013, Ms. Bogin-Farber was a staff attorney and Parmet fellow at Health
Law Advocates, Inc. She is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University and Northeastern
University School of Law, where she was a Public Interest Law Scholar.
ALIDA BOGRÁN-ACOSTA is an investigator with the Office of Equal Opportunity

at Tufts University in Medford. Previously, she was of counsel at Sugarman, Rogers,
Barshak & Cohen, PC, where she specialized in wage-and-hour compliance, fair
employment practices, personnel manuals and workplace policies, employee rela-
tions, and negotiation of employment and severance agreements. Ms. Bográn-Acosta
also developed and conducted presentations and training programs on employment
law topics. She is a former commission counsel at the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination. Ms. Bográn-Acosta is a graduate of Boston University and
Northeastern University School of Law.
MARY L. BONAUTO is the civil rights project director at GLBTQ Legal Advocates
& Defenders in Boston. She has litigated on discrimination issues, free speech and
religious liberty, and relationship and parental rights. In 2015 Ms. Bonauto success-
fully argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in the historic case of Obergefell v.
Hodges, which established the freedom to marry for same-sex couples nationwide.
She was lead counsel in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003), which
made Massachusetts the first state where same-sex couples could legally marry; co-
counseled in Baker v. State and Kerrigan v. Connecticut DPH; served on the 2009
and 2012 Maine ballot campaign executive committees; led GLBTQ Legal Advo-
cates & Defenders’ Gill and Pedersen challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act;
and coordinated the amici strategy in Windsor v. United States at the U.S. Supreme
Court. Ms. Bonauto holds a law degree from Northeastern University School of Law,
is the Shikes fellow in civil liberties and civil rights and a lecturer on law at Harvard
iv 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

Law School, is a 2014 MacArthur fellow, and is on an advisory board for the American
Constitution Society.
JUSTINE H. BROUSSEAU is a founding partner of Kimball Brousseau LLP in Bos-

ton, where she focuses on employment law, employment litigation, executive coun-
seling, and employment coaching. She represents individuals, small businesses, and
nonprofits in state and federal courts, before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, in arbi-
tration and mediation, and on appeal. She advises clients on employment contracts,
executive compensation, severance/separation agreement negotiation, employment
policies, noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreements, discrimination matters,
disability issues, and wage-and-hour laws. Ms. Brousseau is a member of the Boston,
Women’s, and Rhode Island Bar Associations. She is a graduate of Providence College
and New England School of Law.
ANTHONY S. CALIFANO is a partner in the labor and employment department of

Seyfarth Shaw LLP in Boston. His practice includes counseling employers regarding
antidiscrimination laws and defending employers against claims of discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation. He also represents employers regarding wage-and-hour
matters. Mr. Califano is a graduate of Saint Anselm College and New England
School of Law.
DAVID CONFORTO is the founder of Conforto Law Group in Boston. He dedicates

his practice to employment law and exclusively represents employees. A leader in the
field of executive advocacy, Mr. Conforto regularly advises senior-level professionals
in complex, time-sensitive matters involving employment contract and severance
negotiations; noncompetition disputes; whistle-blowing activity; and unlawful dis-
crimination. He maintains a unique focus counseling employees as they raise dis-
crimination concerns internally and providing advice during the investigation pro-
cess. Mr. Conforto was selected by his peers for inclusion in the 2019 edition of The
Best Lawyers in America, holds the highest rating of AV preeminent from Martin-
dale-Hubbell, and has been recognized as a “Super Lawyer” by Thomson Reuters.
He is a graduate of Brandeis University and Boston College Law School.
SHERLEY CRUZ is an assistant professor at the University of Tennessee College of

Law in Knoxville, Tennessee. Previously, she was a practitioner in residence at
American University Washington College of Law in Washington, DC, and a clinical
fellow at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, where she led the fair housing
litigation and enforcement efforts for the Housing Discrimination Test Program and
the Accelerator Practice. From December 2016 to September 2017 she served as
president-elect of the Massachusetts Association of Hispanic Attorneys. Ms. Cruz is
a graduate of Boston University and Boston University School of Law.
ALEXANDRA H. DEAL is principal of Deal Law in West Medford, where she fo-
cuses on criminal and civil appeals, employment counseling and litigation, civil rights
litigation, and student misconduct. She is also of counsel at Strang, Scott, Giroux &
Young LLP, Boston, where she handles the firm’s employment counseling and em-
ployment litigation matters. Previously, she was with Burns & Levinson LLP and
MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 v

Stern, Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin LLP. Ms. Deal is a graduate of Cornell University
and Boston College Law School.
PATRICK J. HANNON is a partner at Hartley Michon Robb LLP in Boston. He con-

centrates his practice on employment and employment-related litigation and arbitra-
tion, as well as disputes between partners and shareholders in closely held corpora-
tions. Mr. Hannon handles a wide range of matters, including wrongful termination,
discrimination, and noncompete/nonsolicitation matters as well as cases involving
breaches of contractual and fiduciary duties, whistle-blowing, and violations of the
Wage Act. He is a graduate of Boston College and Boston College Law School.
ANNE L. JOSEPHSON is a partner with Kotin, Crabtree & Strong LLP in Boston.
She concentrates in employment law and litigation, including civil rights, business,
real estate, and health law. Previously, she was with Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP,
clerked for the Honorable Edward F. Hennessey of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court, and was an assistant attorney general with the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Ms. Josephson is a graduate of Smith College
and Boston College Law School.
NINA JOAN KIMBALL is a founding partner in Kimball Brousseau LLP in Boston.

Her extensive employment practice includes advising and representing individuals,
executives, nonprofit organizations, and small businesses in state and federal court
and in administrative proceedings, as well as resolving disputes for her clients
through negotiation, arbitration, and mediation. She has served as an outside investi-
gator to conduct investigations into claims of discrimination and harassment. Ms.
Kimball cochaired the pay equity task force of the Women’s Bar Association of Mas-
sachusetts legislative policy committee, through which she helped draft a compre-
hensive bill to amend the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act that was passed into law in
2016. She cochaired a bipartisan committee to draft parental leave regulations for the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. In 2016, Ms. Kimball was ap-
pointed to serve as a commissioner on the Massachusetts Commission on the Status
of Women, and in 2018, she was elected chair of the commission. She has been con-
sistently recognized as a Massachusetts and New England “Super Lawyer,” and was
named as one of the Top Women of Law for 2012 by Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly.
Ms. Kimball is a graduate of Yale College and the George Washington University
Law School, where she was editor in chief of the George Washington Law Review.
GWEN NOLAN KING is counsel in the Boston firm of Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak
& Cohen, PC, where she focuses her practice on complex business, employment,
professional liability, real estate, and products liability litigation. She has successful-
ly represented clients in complex commercial disputes before both federal and state
judiciaries. In addition to representation in litigation, she regularly advises clients on
contractual negotiations and employment issues in an effort to reduce the risk of fu-
ture litigation. Ms. King is an active member of both the Boston Bar Association,
where she is on the steering committee for the College & University Section, and the
Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts, where she is a member of the board.
She is a graduate of Fairfield University and Cornell Law School.
vi 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

DANIEL B. KLEIN is a partner in the labor and employment department and a
member of the complex discrimination litigation practice group in the Boston office
of Seyfarth Shaw LLP. He counsels employers on disability accommodation, family
and medical leave, workplace investigations, wage-and-hour compliance, commis-
sions disputes, performance assessment and discipline, terminations, reductions in
force, training, background checks, whistle-blower claims, defamation, handbook
and policy review, and trade secrets protection strategies. He defends employers in
multiplaintiff discrimination lawsuits, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
pattern-or-practice cases, and collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Mr. Klein is a graduate of Colgate University and Boston College Law School.
ARIELLE B. KRISTAN is an attorney with Hirsch Roberts Weinstein LLP in Bos-

ton, where she represents businesses and nonprofits in employment and business dis-
putes. She frequently represents employers in defending claims of discrimination and
retaliation before the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Ms. Kristan also advises and counsels
clients in avoiding employee conflict, minimizing litigation risks, and compliance
with federal and state employment laws. She is a member of the Boston Bar Associa-
tion and the Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts, and has served as a director
of the Massachusetts LGBTQ Bar Association. She has been recognized as a “Rising
Star” by Massachusetts Super Lawyers each year since 2014. Ms. Kristan is a graduate
of Tufts University and Boston University School of Law.
ALLYSON E. KURKER is a partner at Kurker Paget LLC in Waltham. She counsels

businesses on preventive measures to avoid litigation. When litigation cannot be
avoided, Ms. Kurker represents her clients in state and federal courts, as well as be-
fore administrative agencies. She is a member of the committee tasked with redraft-
ing the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination’s parental leave regula-
tions. Ms. Kurker has earned an AV preeminent peer review rating from Martindale-
Hubbell and has been named a Massachusetts “Super Lawyer” each year since 2013.
Prior to forming Kurker Paget LLC, she was an associate in the labor and employment
group at Bingham McCutchen. Ms. Kurker is a graduate of Connecticut College and
Northeastern University School of Law.
JENNIFER L. LEVI is director of the transgender rights project of GLBTQ Legal

Advocates & Defenders in Boston. She is also a professor at Western New England
University School of Law and a member of the Transgender Law and Policy Insti-
tute, the Massachusetts Transgender Political Coalition, and the legal committee of
the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. She is a graduate of
Wellesley College and the University of Chicago Law School.
ROBERT S. MANTELL is a partner at Powers, Jodoin, Margolis & Mantell LLP in

Boston. He represents employees in discrimination, harassment, and wages-benefits
issues, including negotiating separation and severance agreements, obtaining unem-
ployment benefits, and opposing the enforcement of onerous noncompetition agree-
ments. Mr. Mantell is a member of MCLE’s Employment Law Curriculum Advisory
Committee, and served a two-year term on the Massachusetts Bar Association’s Labor
MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 vii

& Employment Section council. Mr. Mantell is a graduate of Tufts University (B.A.),
Duke University (M.A.), and Duke University School of Law (J.D.).
JOHANNA L. MATLOFF is a partner at Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford

LLP in Boston, where she practices in the area of civil litigation, including employee
benefits, nonprofit litigation, commercial disputes, products liability, and insurance.
She counsels employers regarding employment-related policies and agreements, in-
cluding noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreements, severance agreements, and
employee handbooks. Ms. Matloff has been selected as a “Rising Star” by Law &
Politics and the publishers of Boston magazine for each year in which she was eligible
since 2005. Outside of the office, she uses her legal skills to support her community,
including serving on The Jewish Journal’s executive committee and board of overseers.
She also enjoys running and coaching youth soccer. Ms. Matloff is a graduate of the
University of Pennsylvania and Suffolk University Law School.
STEPHEN T. MELNICK is a shareholder of Littler Mendelson, PC, in Boston,

where he counsels and represents employers in a broad range of employment matters.
In particular, he focuses his practice on wage-and-hour law, discrimination and har-
assment, unfair competition and trade secrets, whistle-blowing and retaliation, and
complex litigation and class actions. His clients come from a variety of industries,
including health care, technology, retail, and transportation. Prior to joining Littler
Mendelson, Mr. Melnick worked as a field representative for both the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination. He is a graduate of Cornell University and Boston College Law School.
KATHERINE J. MICHON is a partner of Hartley Michon Robb LLP in Boston,

where she focuses her practice on employment law. She is particularly well known
for her work on senior executive transition matters, including change-in-control, sev-
erance, retention, retirement, and compensation agreements, as well as noncompeti-
tion covenants. She also advises small companies in sophisticated employment mat-
ters. Along with her partners, she cofounded the firm’s nationally ranked executive
advocacy practice. Ms. Michon has been recognized as a top attorney in her field by
Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Boston magazine, The Best Lawyers in America, and
Chambers USA. A frequent author and speaker on cutting-edge issues in employment
law, she is a coauthor of the commentary for the Massachusetts Discrimination Law
Reporter and is a past cochair of the Boston Bar Association’s Labor & Employment
Law Section.
JULIE M. MULLER is an associate at Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford

LLP in Boston, where she practices in the area of civil litigation, including business
litigation, employment litigation, and probate litigation. She also maintains a pro
bono practice representing survivors of domestic violence in family law cases. Ms.
Muller is a member of the Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts and the Boston
Bar Association. Prior to joining Conn Kavanaugh, she was a member of the invest-
ment management practice group at Morgan Lewis and a law clerk to the Honorable
Francis X. Spina of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. She is a graduate of
Allegheny College and Suffolk University Law School.
viii 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

SEAN P. O’CONNOR is a partner at Morgan, Brown & Joy LLP in Boston. His
practice focuses on the representation of employers in a full range of labor and em-
ployment matters, including claims of employment discrimination, retaliation,
wrongful discharge, wage-and-hour disputes, misappropriation of trade secrets, re-
strictive covenant violations, and unfair labor practice charges. He advises clients in
nonlitigation matters such as workplace investigations, employee discipline, reduc-
tions in force, separation and severance agreements, commission and bonus plans,
employment policies and handbooks, employee accommodation and leave issues, as
well as other issues involving state and federal labor and employment laws. Mr.
O’Connor drafts and enforces employment agreements, noncompetition and nonso-
licitation agreements, and nondisclosure agreements. He zealously represents his
clients when their practices are challenged, including before state and federal courts,
arbitrators, and administrative agencies. He has successfully defended clients in class
actions, collective actions, and individual actions, including multiple appellate cases
before the First Circuit Court of Appeals and the Massachusetts Appeals Court. Mr.
O’Connor is a member of the bars of Maine, Massachusetts, and New York and is
admitted to practice in numerous federal courts. He is a graduate of the University of
Maryland and Northeastern University School of Law.
MARY E. (BETH) O’NEAL is a partner with Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch &
Ford LLP in Boston. She focuses her practice on employment law and employment
litigation, representing management clients and executives; business litigation; and
alcoholic beverages franchise litigation and licensing. She has extensive litigation
experience in state and federal courts and before administrative agencies (including
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission), defending employers in all aspects of employment-
related matters, including wage-and-hour, discrimination, and unlawful termination
claims. She advises employers on issues involving best employment practices and
procedures, as well as state and federal employment laws and regulations that impact
the workplace, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical
Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and numerous other state and federal
laws. Ms. O’Neal also prepares employment policies for employers and conducts
training for management and human resources personnel. In addition, she advises
and negotiates on behalf of her clients, employers and executives alike, in the area of
employment, severance, noncompetition, nonsolicitation, and change in control
agreements. She is a graduate of Boston College and Suffolk University Law School.
LUCIA A. PASSANISI is an associate attorney at Todd & Weld LLP in Boston. She
focuses her practice in employment law, counseling clients in a variety of matters,
including noncompetition and nonsolicitation issues, nonpayment of wages and
Wage Act claims, breach of fiduciary duty issues, trade secret disputes, and sexual
harassment and discrimination claims. Ms. Passanisi graduated summa cum laude
from Boston College and received her law degree from Northeastern University
School of Law.
DAHLIA C. RUDAVSKY is a partner of Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, PC, in New-

ton. A fellow of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers, she concentrates
her practice on the representation of individual employees and unions, with an em-
MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 ix

phasis on discrimination cases. She was the 1990 recipient of the Georgina Smith
Award of the American Association of University Professors for “outstanding advo-
cacy on behalf of academic women,” and continues to represent large numbers of
university faculty in tenure, promotion, equal pay, and other discrimination cases. In
2011, Ms. Rudavsky won a victory at the Supreme Judicial Court that extended the
antiretaliation provisions of the Massachusetts law against discrimination to former
employees. Recognized in the 2014, 2017, and 2019 editions of The Best Lawyers in
America as “Lawyer of the Year” for the Boston area in the representation of individ-
uals in employment matters, Ms. Rudavsky was named one of Massachusetts Law-
yers Weekly’s “Lawyers of the Year” for 1999 and Boston Area Lawyer of the Year in
the area of union representation by The Best Lawyers in America for 2016. She has
taught labor law at Harvard Law School as a lecturer in law. Ms. Rudavsky is a grad-
uate of Yale University (magna cum laude) and the University of California at Berkeley
School of Law.
ROBERT M. SHEA is a shareholder with Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stew-
art, PC, in Boston, where he handles employment litigation and advises clients on the
full range of employment law matters, including employment agreements, independ-
ent contractor agreements, and separation agreements; discipline and discharge; har-
assment complaints; wage-and-hour compliance; noncompetition; and workforce
reductions. He also conducts workplace training and employment law audits and is an
arbitrator and mediator, resolving employment contract disputes and statutory claims.
Mr. Shea is a graduate of Boston College and the George Washington University
National Law Center.
MICHAEL E. STEINBERG is an associate in the labor and employment department

of Seyfarth Shaw LLP in Boston. His practice includes counseling employers regard-
ing antidiscrimination laws and defending employers against claims of discrimina-
tion, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination. He also represents employers
in wage-and-hour matters. Mr. Steinberg is a graduate of Tufts University and Boston
University School of Law.
JAMES S. WELIKY, a partner at Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, PC, in Newton, con-
centrates his practice in plaintiff’s employment law. For more than twenty years, Mr.
Weliky has successfully represented employees in cases involving discrimination,
sexual harassment, wrongful termination, and a variety of other employment claims
in federal and state court and before numerous administrative agencies, including the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Mr. Weliky has also been an active member of a number
of bar associations, including the Boston and Massachusetts Bar Associations and the
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. He is a regular panelist for MCLE
and has authored or coauthored a number of amicus briefs in key cases that have
helped shape the practice of employment law in Massachusetts.
x 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Overview of Employment Discrimination

David Conforto, Esq.
Conforto Law Group, Boston
Alexandra H. Deal, Esq.
Strang, Scott, Giroux & Young LLP, Boston
Chapter 2 Age Discrimination

Robert S. Mantell, Esq.
Powers, Jodoin, Margolis & Mantell LLP, Boston
Sean P. O’Connor, Esq.
Morgan, Brown & Joy LLP, Boston
Chapter 3 Gender Discrimination

Gavriela M. Bogin-Farber, Esq.
Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, PC, Newton
Alida Bográn-Acosta, Esq.
Tufts University, Medford
Gwen Nolan King, Esq.
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, PC, Boston
Dahlia C. Rudavsky, Esq.
James S. Weliky, Esq.
Chapter 4 Disability Discrimination

Richard L. Alfred, Esq.
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Boston
Anthony S. Califano, Esq.
Patrick J. Hannon, Esq.
Hartley Michon Robb LLP, Boston
Daniel B. Klein, Esq.
Michael E. Steinberg, Esq.
MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 xi

Chapter 5 Pregnancy Discrimination

Johanna L. Matloff, Esq.
Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford LLP, Boston
Katherine J. Michon, Esq.
Hartley Michon Robb LLP, Boston
Julie M. Muller, Esq.
Mary E. (Beth) O’Neal, Esq.
Lucia A. Passanisi, Esq.
Todd & Weld LLP, Boston
Chapter 6 Race, Ethnicity, and National Origin Discrimination

Sherley Cruz, Esq.
University of Tennessee College of Law, Knoxville, TN
Allyson E. Kurker, Esq.
Kurker Paget LLC, Waltham
Chapter 7 Religious Discrimination

Anne L. Josephson, Esq.
Kotin, Crabtree & Strong LLP, Boston
Robert M. Shea, Esq.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, Boston
Chapter 8 Sexual Harassment

Shannon M. Berube, Esq.
Justine H. Brousseau, Esq.
Kimball Brousseau LLP, Boston
Nina Joan Kimball, Esq.
Kimball Brousseau LLP, Boston
Stephen T. Melnick, Esq.
Littler Mendelson, PC, Boston
Chapter 9 Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Same-Sex

and LGBTQ Sexual Harassment
Mary L. Bonauto, Esq.
GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, Boston
Arielle B. Kristan, Esq.
Hirsch Roberts Weinstein LLP, Boston
Jennifer L. Levi, Esq.
GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, Boston
xii 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

Chapter 10 Gender Identity Discrimination
Arielle B. Kristan, Esq.
Hirsch Roberts Weinstein LLP, Boston
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes, Rules, and References
Index
TABLE OF CHECKLISTS AND EXHIBITS

CHECKLIST 2.1—Age Discrimination Strategy Checklist
for Defense Attorneys ........................................................................................... 2–29
CHECKLIST 4.1—Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof When Alleging Employer’s
Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation ................................................. 4–105
CHECKLIST 4.2—Disability Discrimination: Strategy Options
for Employers...................................................................................................... 4–106
CHECKLIST 6.1—Strategy Options for Plaintiff in Race, Ethnicity,
or National Origin Discrimination Claim.............................................................. 6–18
CHECKLIST 6.2—Strategy Options for Defendant in Race, Ethnicity,
or National Origin Discrimination Claim.............................................................. 6–19
CHECKLIST 8.1—Harassment Investigation Checklist ...................................... 8–54
EXHIBIT 8A—MCAD Sexual Harassment Guidelines ....................................... 8–57
EXHIBIT 8B—MCAD’S Model Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy.............. 8–82
CHECKLIST 9.1—Same-Sex Sexual Harassment and Sexual Orientation
Discrimination Checklist of Possible Defenses for the Employer ........................ 9–49
MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 xiii

CHAPTER 1
Overview of Employment
Discrimination
David Conforto, Esq.
Conforto Law Group, Boston
Alexandra H. Deal, Esq.
Strang, Scott, Giroux & Young LLP, Boston
§ 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 1–1

§ 1.2 “Black-Letter Law” in Disparate Treatment Cases ............................. 1–2
§ 1.3 Adverse Impact Claims of Discrimination............................................ 1–5
Scope Note
This chapter provides a basic introduction to employment discrimi-
nation law, covering both theories of liability: disparate treatment
and disparate impact. It lays out the elements of a case, the parties’
respective burdens of proof, and relevant case law.
§ 1.1 INTRODUCTION
An employee who has been discriminated against on the basis of their race, gender,
age, or membership in another protected category rarely has “direct” evidence of
discrimination because an employer is unlikely to tell an employee that it is making
an adverse decision about the employee because of the employee’s legally protected
characteristic. Instead, the vast majority of discrimination cases involve “indirect” or
circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment. Circumstantial evidence is no less
powerful than direct evidence, however. See Desert Place, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
100 (2003) (“Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more
certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.”) (citing Rogers v. Mo. Pac.
R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508, n.17 (1957)). For example, a highly qualified woman
may claim that she was denied a promotion because of her gender when the employ-
er promoted a less qualified man instead. The plaintiff would present circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory treatment and the fact finder may draw inferences from
the evidence to determine that the employer’s decision violated G.L. c. 151B or the
applicable federal statute. Both federal and state courts have adopted frameworks for
considering claims of disparate treatment where there is no direct evidence of the
employer’s discriminatory intent.
This overview of Massachusetts discrimination law focuses on both disparate treatment

and disparate impact cases. The overview sets forth “black letter” law on the ele-
ments of and the parties’ respective burdens in a disparate treatment case and presents
a summary of the burdens in disparate impact discrimination cases.
MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 1–1

§ 1.2 Employment Discrimination in Massachusetts
§ 1.2 “BLACK-LETTER LAW” IN DISPARATE

TREATMENT CASES
Where an employee relies on indirect evidence of discrimination, the employee
“must demonstrate four things: that he or she is a member of a protected class; that
he or she was subject to an adverse employment action; that the employer bore ‘dis-
criminatory animus’ in taking that action; and that animus was the reason for the
action (causation).” Bulwer v. Mt. Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 680 (2016) (citing
Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 502 (2001)). Where there is no direct evi-
dence, an employee may instead provide indirect or circumstantial evidence of dis-
crimination. One method of doing so is by “using the familiar three-stage, burden-
shifting paradigm first set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–805 (1973).” Bulwer v. Mt. Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. at 680.
In the first stage, the plaintiff must produce “evidence of a prima facie case of dis-
crimination,” showing that
• they are a member of a class protected by G.L. c. 151B;
• they performed their job at an acceptable level;
• they were treated differently than another person not in their protected class
but otherwise similarly situated; and
• they suffered an adverse action.
Yee v. Mass. State Police, 481 Mass. 290, 294–95 (2019) (citing Trs. of Health &
Hosps. of Bos., Inc. v. MCAD, 449 Mass. 675, 681–82 (2007); Verdrager v. Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 396 (2016). See Yee v.
Mass. State Police, 481 Mass. at 295 n.5 (“The elements of the prima facie case may
vary depending on the nature of the discrimination claim.”). “[T]he plaintiff’s initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case is not intended to be onerous.” Sullivan v.
Liberty Mut. Ins., 444 Mass. 34, 45 (2005). Rather, “[i]t is meant to be a small show-
ing that is easily made.” Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 444 Mass. at 45. If the plaintiff
meets the burden of establishing a prima facie case, “unlawful discrimination is pre-
sumed” and the burden of production shifts to the employer. Matthews v. Ocean
Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 128 (1997).
In the second stage, the employer must articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its employment decision.” Yee v. Mass. State Police, 481 Mass. at 302 (cit-
ing Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. at 397
(additional citation omitted)). The employer’s obligation is “to produce both ‘lawful
. . . reasons for [its] employment decision’ and ‘credible evidence to show that the
. . . reasons advanced were the real reasons.’” Bulwer v. Mt. Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass.
at 683 (quoting Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 442
(1995)). Such reasons must have been known to the employer at the time it took the
adverse action. City of Boston v. MCAD, 39 Mass. App. 234, 241 (1995) (“[t]he basis
for discharge must be one which is known to the employer at the time of termina-
tion” where employer sought to rely on an allegedly falsified application). Like the
plaintiff’s burden in the prima facie stage, the employer’s burden is “not meant to be
1–2 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

Overview of Employment Discrimination § 1.2
onerous.” Yee v. Mass. State Police, 481 Mass. at 302 (citing Blare v. Husky Injection
Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. at 442). “Even if the reasons given are arguably
suspect, so long as the [employer] has produced a lawful reason backed by some
credible evidence, it has satisfied this burden.” Yee v. Mass. State Police, 481 Mass. at
302 (citing Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. at 128). Neverthe-
less, in order to meet its burden, the employer’s “explanation must not be wholly
unbelievable such that an underlying discriminatory motive is obvious.” Yee v. Mass.
State Police, 481 Mass. at 302 (citing Wheelock Coll. v. MCAD, 371 Mass. 130, 138
(1976)). It is important to note that an employer’s contention that an employee was
not performing at an acceptable level must only be viewed at the “pretext” and final
stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and cannot be used as a
means to challenging the employee’s prima facie case. Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415
Mass. 309, 312 n.6 (1993); Williams v. Frank, 757 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D. Mass. 1991)
(the incident involving alleged poor performance “is more logically viewed as a de-
fense to be raised by the employer at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework rather than an impediment to the plaintiff’s prima facie case”).
At the third stage, the burden shifts back to the employee to produce evidence that
“the employer’s articulated justification [for the adverse action] is not true but a pre-
text.” Bulwer v. Mt. Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. at 681 (quoting Blare v. Husky Injec-
tion Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. at 443) (alteration in original)). Since direct,
“smoking gun” evidence is rare, the employee may carry their burden of persuasion
with circumstantial evidence that persuades the fact finder that the employer’s expla-
nation is not credible. City of Salem v. MCAD, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 627, 642 (1998).
The employee’s proof of pretext may include showing “weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legiti-
mate reasons for its action.” City of Salem v. MCAD, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 643 (cita-
tions omitted); see also Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (“The
reasonableness of the employer’s reasons may of course be probative of whether they
are pretexts. The more idiosyncratic or questionable the employer’s reason, the easier
it will be to expose it as a pretext, if indeed it is one.”).
Massachusetts is a “pretext only” jurisdiction. Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys.

Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 444–45 (1995) (“once a plaintiff has established a prima
facie case and further shows either that the employer’s articulated reasons are a pre-
text or by direct evidence that the actual motivation was discrimination, the plaintiff
is entitled to recovery for illegal discrimination under G.L. c. 151B”). This means
that discrimination can be proved by showing that the employer’s justifications were
not the real reasons “even if that evidence does not show directly that the true reasons
were, in fact, discriminatory.” Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky &
Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. at 397. Presenting evidence that just one of the many reasons
advanced by an employer to justify the adverse action is false is sufficient to allow a
jury to infer unlawful motive. Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. at 499. It is im-
portant to note that proof of pretext combined with the established prima facie case
“‘eliminates any legitimate explanation for the adverse hiring decision and warrants,’
but does not require, ‘a determination that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful dis-
crimination.’” Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474
Mass. at 397 (quoting Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. at 446).

The particulars of the prima facie case may vary depending on the specific circum-
stances giving rise to the claim of discrimination. Blare v. Husky Injection Molding
Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. at 441. For example, in Yee v. Massachusetts State Police,
the Supreme Judicial Court observed that courts must necessarily examine the ques-
tion of whether a plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action on a case-by-case
basis, since what is adverse to one employee may not be adverse to another in a dif-
ferent set of circumstances. Yee v. Mass. State Police, 481 Mass. at 296–97 (holding
that where an employee can show material differences between two positions in the
opportunity for compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, the failure to grant a lateral transfer to the preferred position may constitute an
adverse employment action under Chapter 151B).
Additionally, the first element of the prima facie case, “membership in a protected
class,” has been expanded under Massachusetts law to allow for claims of “associa-
tional discrimination.” Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23 (2013). As the Supreme
Judicial Court explained in Flagg, “[t]he term ‘associational discrimination’ refers to
a claim that a plaintiff, although not a member of a protected class himself or herself,
is the victim of discriminatory animus directed toward a third party who is a member
of the protected class and with whom the plaintiff associates.” Flagg v. AliMed, Inc.,
466 Mass. at 27 (citations omitted). Thus, where an employer takes an adverse action
against an employee premised on discriminatory animus directed at a person with
whom that employee associates (a spouse, for example), “this form of discrimination
fits within the scope of c. 151B.” Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. at 27, 37 (associa-
tional discrimination based on handicap is prohibited under Section 4(16)). Subse-
quent cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts have limited
Flagg’s application in federal litigation, however. Fenn v. Mansfield Bank, 2015 WL
628560 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2015) (Flagg did not require that a reasonable accommo-
dation be made for an employee on account of their spouse’s condition, and that Sec-
tion 4(16) would not be violated merely because an employee was discharged after
demanding a work accommodation, because of a disabled spouse, that the employer
denied); Perez v. Greater New Bedford Vocational Tech. Sch. Dist., 988 F. Supp. 2d
105, 111 (D. Mass. 2013) (Flagg limited its analysis to associational claims involv-
ing immediate family members; declined to extend Flagg reasoning to a special-
educator who worked with disabled children, finding that the plaintiff was fired “be-
cause she advocated for the interests of disabled children . . . [not because] she was
subject to the same prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear that accompanies dis-
crimination against the handicapped”).
As with Chapter 151B, the plaintiff’s proof that the defendant’s proffered reasons for
the adverse action are not credible may be sufficient for a plaintiff to prevail under
federal antidiscrimination statutes (i.e., the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII). Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). This discretion to infer unlawful motive based on
an employer’s dishonesty alone marked a departure from the “pretext-plus” standard
created by the Supreme Court in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993). Compare Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. at 147 (“the trier of
fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dis-
sembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose”), with St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

Overview of Employment Discrimination § 1.2
509 U.S. at 523–24 (“Title VII does not award damages against employers who can-
not prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only
against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by rea-
son of (in the context of the present case) race.”).
§ 1.3 ADVERSE IMPACT CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION

In addition to disparate treatment, a plaintiff can prove discrimination under Title VII
using an adverse impact theory of liability. Adverse impact claims involve a facially
neutral employment practice or policy that, when applied, causes a significant ad-
verse impact on a protected group of employees, of which the plaintiff is a member.
These claims focus not on the intent of the employer but on the consequences of the
employer’s practice or policy. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971) (non-job-related requirement of high school diploma had adverse impact on
African Americans).
Federal courts have extended the adverse impact theory of liability from Title VII
cases to cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Raytheon
Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (dictum) (“Both disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the ADA.”), and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA), Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
However, the scope of disparate impact liability under the ADEA is narrower than
under Title VII because the ADEA contains a provision that permits employment
actions, otherwise prohibited, if they are based on “reasonable factors” other than
age. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 237. The Court held that, to pursue a dis-
parate impact claim under the ADEA, plaintiffs must “isolate and identify the specif-
ic employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities.” Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241.
Adverse impact claims are also recognized under G.L. c. 151B. See, e.g., Cox v. New
Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 385 (1993) (adverse impact theory available in
handicap discrimination claim); Sch. Comm. of Braintree v. MCAD, 377 Mass. 424,
429 (1979) (disparate treatment and disparate impact are available theories of liability
in gender discrimination case); Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 709 (2012)
(disparate impact available in race, color, or national origin discrimination case).
Age discrimination claims based on a theory of disparate impact are also available
under Chapter 151B. See Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 38 n.10
(2005) (while noting plaintiff’s claims were based on disparate treatment theory,
Supreme Judicial Court commented on theory of disparate impact); Luyen Huu Ngu-
yen v. William Joiner Ctr. for the Study of War & Soc. Consequences, 450 Mass. 291,
294 (2007) (availability of disparate impact theory in age discrimination cases alt-
hough claims dismissed on procedural grounds); Porio v. Dep’t of Revenue, 80 Mass.
App. Ct. 57, 66 (2011) (citing Sch. Comm. of Braintree v. MCAD, 377 Mass. at 429
n.10 (disparate impact theory available in age discrimination cases)).
MCLE and the authors are grateful to Lynn G. Weissberg, Esq., for her contributions
to a previous version of this chapter.

CHAPTER 2
Age Discrimination
Robert S. Mantell, Esq.
Powers, Jodoin, Margolis & Mantell LLP, Boston
Sean P. O’Connor, Esq.
Morgan, Brown & Joy LLP, Boston
§ 2.1 Controlling Authority and Types of Claims .......................................... 2–2

§ 2.1.1 The General Prohibition Against Age Discrimination............ 2–2
§ 2.1.2 The Burden of Proof............................................................... 2–3
(a) Disparate Impact ............................................................. 2–4
(b) Disparate Treatment ........................................................ 2–5
§ 2.1.3 Firing Older Workers to Save on Salary or Benefits Costs ... 2–13
§ 2.1.4 Retirement and Succession Issues ........................................ 2–14
§ 2.2 Defenses ................................................................................................. 2–15
§ 2.2.1 Statutory Defenses ............................................................... 2–15
(a) Bona Fide Occupational Qualification .......................... 2–16
(b) Reasonable Factors Other Than Age and Good Cause .. 2–16
(c) Bona Fide Seniority System, Bona Fide Employee
Benefit Plan, or Retirement Policy ................................ 2–17
(d) Other Statutory Defenses .............................................. 2–17
(e) General Defenses .......................................................... 2–18
§ 2.2.2 Remedies and Damages ....................................................... 2–19
(a) ADEA Damages............................................................ 2–19
(b) General Laws Chapter 151B Damages ......................... 2–20
§ 2.2.3 Deadlines and Procedural Requirements .............................. 2–21
(a) Administrative Charge .................................................. 2–21
(b) Other Prerequisites for Pursuing a Civil Action
Under G.L. c. 151B ....................................................... 2–22
(c) Other Prerequisites for Pursuing a Civil Action
Under the ADEA ........................................................... 2–23
§ 2.2.4 Choice of Law and Forum .................................................... 2–23
§ 2.2.5 Survival of Claims ................................................................ 2–25
§ 2.3 Settlements and Releases ...................................................................... 2–25
§ 2.3.1 General Requirements .......................................................... 2–25
§ 2.3.2 Requirements Specific to Employment Termination
Programs .............................................................................. 2–26
§ 2.3.3 EEOC’s Enforcement Power ................................................ 2–27
§ 2.3.4 The OWBPA’s Danger—No Tender Back Requirement ...... 2–28
CHECKLIST 2.1—Age Discrimination Strategy Checklist for Defense
Attorneys .............................................................................................................. 2–29

Scope Note
This chapter provides an overview of age discrimination claims based
on theories of disparate impact and disparate treatment. It sets forth
the elements of a claim under federal and state statutes, along with
defenses, available remedies and damages, choice of forum, stat-
utes of limitations, procedural requirements for filing, settlements,
and releases.
§ 2.1 CONTROLLING AUTHORITY AND TYPES

OF CLAIMS
Massachusetts and federal statutes prohibit age discrimination in employment. The
law presents a daunting array of legal and procedural issues.
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B and the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., are the principal focus of this
chapter. However, it should also be recognized that other common law or statutory
remedies for age discrimination may be applicable. See G.L. c. 93, § 103; G.L. c. 31,
§ 1; G.L. c. 149, § 24A; 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2); Comey v. Hill, 387 Mass. 11, 20
(1982) (tort claims may be brought based on age discrimination).
§ 2.1.1 The General Prohibition Against Age Discrimination

An employer may not subject an employee to an adverse employment action because
of the employee’s age if that employee is over forty. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a);
G.L. c. 151B, §§ 1(8), 4(1B). This prohibition prevents an employer from preferring
a younger employee to an older employee based on the employees’ ages. However, it
is clear, at least under the ADEA, that an employer is free to favor older employees
over younger employees because of their ages. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 599–600 (2004).
The prohibition of age discrimination applies to a wide range of adverse actions,

including
• termination or constructive discharge;
• reassignment or suspension, see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 68–73 (2006);
• refusal to hire or promote;
• provision of compensation, benefits, or privileges of employment;
• harassment, Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2008) (with limits
on remedies);
• retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4); see Gomez-Perez v. Pot-
ter, 553 U.S. 474, 479–87 (2008) (recognizing ADEA retaliation claim for
federal employees); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. at 67
(Title VII antiretaliation provision extends to reprisals taking place outside the
workplace);

Age Discrimination § 2.1
• segregation or limitation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2);

• publication of job advertisements indicating any preference or limitation based
on age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); G.L. c. 151B, § 4(3); and
• some inquiries with regard to the age of a job applicant, 804 C.M.R. § 3.02.
The general prohibition against age discrimination restricts the conduct of certain
private employers, governmental entities, labor organizations, and employment agen-
cies. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(b), 623(c), 630(b), 630(c), 630(d), 633(a); G.L. c. 151B,
§§ 4(1C), 4(2), 4(3). An important exception is that the ADEA does not apply to state
employers that fail to consent to such suits. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
79 (2000). However, a public employee’s right to sue the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts for age discrimination remains under G.L. c. 151B.
The ADEA applies to private employers in industries affecting commerce with twen-
ty or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (setting forth test for determining number
of employees). The ADEA applies to governmental entities of all sizes. Mt. Lemmon
Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 25–27 (2018). General Laws Chapter 151B applies
to private employers with six or more employees. G.L. c. 151B, § 1(5). When a Mas-
sachusetts employer with fewer than six employees engages in age discrimination,
G.L. c. 93, § 103 may provide a remedy. Section 103 provides that older persons and
handicapped persons have the same rights as other persons “to make and enforce
contracts, inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real estate and personal
property, sue, be parties, give evidence and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property.” G.L. c. 93, § 103.
As the ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging age dis-
crimination, federal employees may sue under the ADEA but not under Chapter
151B. Rossiter v. Potter, 257 F. Supp. 2d 440, 442 (D. Mass. 2003), rev’d on other
grounds, 357 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2004). The ADEA prohibition against age discrimina-
tion against federal employees, that all personnel actions must be “free from any
discrimination based on age,” appears to be broader than ADEA protections for private
employees. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
Individuals such as harassers, or managers initiating discriminatory job actions, may

be sued in their individual capacities under G.L. c. 151B. G.L. c. 151B, §§ 4(4A),
4(5); Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 480 (2000). While the First
Circuit has not yet addressed whether there is individual liability under the ADEA,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts has ruled that there is not.
See Butler v. Adecco USA Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 305, 309 (D. Mass. 2016); Ventura v.
Hanitchak, 719 F. Supp. 2d 132, 137 (D. Mass. 2010).
§ 2.1.2 The Burden of Proof

The plaintiff-employee’s ultimate burden of proof is to demonstrate that they were
subjected to an adverse employment action because of their age. The employee re-
tains the burden of persuasion to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
adverse employment action would not have taken place “but for” the employee’s age.

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–78 (2009). The employee may use
direct or circumstantial evidence. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. at 177. In
further discussing burden of proof, this chapter will focus on wrongful termination
claims, as these are the most frequent types of age claims.
There are two principal types of age discrimination claims: disparate treatment and
disparate impact. Where an employee asserts that they were terminated because of
their age, the case is considered one of disparate treatment. Where an employee as-
serts that they were terminated due to a facially age-neutral policy that adversely
impacts older workers, that case is considered one of disparate impact. Disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories may be applied to the same set of facts. The
plaintiff’s lawyer should explicitly state in the complaint which theory or theories
will be pursued.
(a) Disparate Impact

The disparate impact theory permits a plaintiff to demonstrate age discrimination
with proof that an apparently neutral employment practice disproportionately and
negatively affects older workers. The Supreme Court has held that the ADEA author-
izes recovery under the disparate impact theory. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S.
228, 238 (2005).
The state of the law under G.L. c. 151B is more complicated. The First Circuit has
held that there is no age/impact claim under G.L. c. 151B. Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,
164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999). The Supreme Judicial Court has not yet directly re-
solved the issue of whether an age/impact claim exists under G.L. c. 151B. However,
because the Supreme Judicial Court has relied on federal court interpretations of
analogous federal statutes when construing G.L. c. 151B, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), raises a question as to the
continuing viability of the First Circuit’s holding in Mullin. It has been argued that
there may be a cognizable age/impact theory under G.L. c. 151B. See Sullivan v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 39 n.10 (2005); R. Mantell, “Age Discrimination
Shown by Disparate Impact,” 6 MBA Section Rev. No. 2, 24 (2004). Moreover, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court has held that age discrimination claims brought against
the Commonwealth may be brought under a disparate impact theory. See Porio v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 57 (2011). The U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts has also held that a G.L. c. 151B age discrimination claim may
be brought against a private employer under a disparate impact theory. Seifaee v. Are-
va, Inc., No. 14-12621-RGS, 2015 WL 6962833, at *4–5 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2015)
(relying on Smith and Porio to conclude that Mullin v. Raytheon Co. is no longer
good law).
The initial prima facie burden in a disparate impact case is on the plaintiff to show
that they have been harmed by an ostensibly age-neutral employment practice that
nevertheless has a significant adverse impact. For example, a policy requiring the
termination of all employees with more than twenty-five years’ experience with the
company could constitute a disparate impact case. Moreover, a procedure for laying
off employees relying on subjective standards could be challenged in this manner, if

the procedure disproportionately affects older workers. Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834
F. Supp. 33, 39 (D. Me. 1993).
Disparate impact may be demonstrated with statistical proof. However, under the
ADEA, where statistics are relied upon as proof of age discrimination, the plaintiff
must “isolat[e] and identif[y] the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities.” Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. at 241.
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then is on the employer to
demonstrate that the challenged employment practice has a manifest relationship to the
employment in question. Finally, the burden is back on the plaintiff to demonstrate
either that the employer’s professed rationale for the practice is pretextual or that
some other practice, without a similarly discriminatory side effect, would have served
the employer’s legitimate interests equally well. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
446–47 (1982); EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 602 (1st
Cir. 1995). It is noteworthy that, under the disparate impact framework, proof of dis-
criminatory motive is not required. Smith Coll. v. MCAD, 376 Mass. 221, 227 (1978).
Under the ADEA, the employer may have an affirmative defense, to the extent that it
acted based on a “reasonable factor other than age.” Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. at 236–43. Under the reasonableness test, an employer need not establish that
there was no other way for it to achieve its goals that would not have resulted in a
disparate impact on the protected class of employees. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S.at 236–43.
The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that, where an employer asserts its reliance
upon reasonable factors other than age as an affirmative defense to liability from dis-
parate impact claims under the ADEA, it bears both the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion in asserting this defense. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power
Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008).
Practice Note
Given the controversy concerning whether disparate impact analysis is
appropriate for G.L. c. 151B age discrimination claims, the safest route
for the plaintiff’s lawyer is to allege a parallel disparate treatment claim
along with any disparate impact claim.
(b) Disparate Treatment

The most commonly asserted kind of age discrimination arises under the disparate
treatment theory. Unlike a disparate impact claim, which is often directed toward
corporate-wide policies or practices affecting numerous employees, disparate treat-
ment claims tend to be used when an individual employee believes that they were
targeted and treated adversely because of their age. A disparate treatment claim may
be used to address an employer’s consciously biased decision making or decisions
based on a stereotype. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58–60 (1st Cir.
1999); Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 503 n.16 (2001) (“Employment

decisions that are made because of stereotypical thinking about a protected characteris-
tic or members of a protected class, whether conscious or unconscious, are actiona-
ble under G.L. c. 151B.”).
There is a wide range of ways to demonstrate that the reason for a discharge was
because of a person’s age. First, there may be direct evidence of age discrimination—
for example, a letter from the human resources department stating that the employ-
ee’s termination is due to her age.
Where the discriminatory motive for a termination is not stated so bluntly, there are
other ways to prove age discrimination using circumstantial evidence. Such circum-
stantial evidence may include the following:
• evidence that similarly situated younger workers were treated better than the
plaintiff;
• evidence that other older workers were discriminated against (see Sprint/
United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008) (whether such ev-
idence is admissible is a decision left to the discretion of the trial judge);
• evidence that age-discriminatory remarks were made by superiors and decision
makers;
• statistical evidence that age was a factor in the employer’s employment decisions;
• the presence of unnecessary age-neutral policies that significantly disadvantage
older workers; and
• evidence that the employer’s stated reason for the employee’s termination was
pretextual.
While it may not be necessary to prove that the employer is hostile or angry toward
older people in order to prove a discriminatory motive, it still must be demonstrated
that age was the motivating or animating force behind the decision. Gates v. Flood,
57 Mass. App. Ct. 739, 745 n.12 (2003). In one case, for example, evidence that the
employer sought to “reach a younger, affluent clientele, and to change the face of the
marketing personnel” was found sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory animus.
DiIorio v. Willowbrook Country Club, 33 M.D.L.R. 166–67 (2011) (Full Commission
decision).
Burden-Shifting Analysis
The most commonly utilized avenue for proving discrimination with circumstantial
evidence follows a burden-shifting formula set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973), as modified by later cases; however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that it “has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. . . . is appropriate in the ADEA context.”
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2 (2009). Plaintiffs bringing
claims under the ADEA retain the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the
“but for” cause of the employer’s actions, and that burden never shifts to the employer
to prove otherwise. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. at 177. The McDonnell

Douglas Corp. analysis requires that the plaintiff first prove a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to produce le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination. Finally, the burden returns to
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s articulated reasons are not the real reasons
for the termination but, instead, are pretexts for discrimination. These burdens are
further described below.
The Prima Facie Case
First, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination.
The prima facie case is a flexible set of proofs that raise a presumption that age was
the reason for an employee’s discharge. The burden is not meant to be onerous. The
evidentiary burden required to satisfy the prima facie case of age discrimination for
G.L. c. 151B claims is the subject of dispute. Plaintiffs would argue that the evidence
required for a prima facie case has been modified by the Supreme Judicial Court to
require a three-step burden:
• the plaintiff was over forty years old;
• the plaintiff was qualified for the position; and
• the plaintiff was terminated.
See Bulwer v. Mt. Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 681 (2016) (race discrimination);
Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 396–
397 (2016) (gender discrimination); Massasoit Indus. Corp. v. MCAD, 91 Mass. App.
Ct. 208, 210 (2017) (age discrimination); Gordon v. Earthlink, Inc., No. 14-14145-
FDS, 2017 WL 3203385, at *7, n.8 (D. Mass. July 27, 2017) (age discrimination
under G.L. c. 151B). However, some appeals courts continue to use the four-step
approach described below. Welgoss v. MBTA, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2016); Perry
v. Franklin Pub. Schs., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 1115 (2016).
Prior to Bulwer, Massachusetts, like the federal courts, used a four-step approach.
Given that the four-step prima facie case may still apply to Chapter 151B age claims
and remains valid for ADEA claims, that approach will be discussed in further depth.
An example of a four-step prima facie case is where
• the plaintiff was more than forty years old;
• the plaintiff met the employer’s legitimate job performance expectations;
• the plaintiff was terminated; and
• the plaintiff was replaced by a person who was five or more years younger.
See Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 424–25 (2003).
The fourth element of the prima facie case is subject to wide variations; it must con-
stitute evidence merely raising an inference that age discrimination was involved.
Under Massachusetts law, for example, it is not imperative that the replacement be
five years younger if the plaintiff is able to present other evidence that would give
rise to a reasonable inference of age discrimination. Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438

Mass. at 425. However, in Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2000), the
First Circuit sided with other appellate circuits in holding that an age difference of
less than five years between the plaintiff and their replacement was insufficient as a
matter of law to support a prima facie case of age discrimination.
It is not fatal to the prima facie case if the replacement is more than forty years old.
O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309–13 (1996). Sometimes
a prima facie case may be demonstrated with proof that the job position remained
open after the employee’s termination and the employer continued to seek applica-
tions from persons with the plaintiff’s qualifications. Whalen v. NYNEX Info. Res.,
Co., 419 Mass. 792, 796 (1995). Plaintiff’s counsel should research the variety of
prima facie cases to find the one most strongly favorable to their case.
Allegations of age discrimination commonly arise from layoffs, where employees

perceive that they were targeted in a reduction in force (RIF) due to their ages. From
the plaintiff’s perspective, such cases raise difficult issues of proof, since an employ-
er may easily assert that it made a legitimate business decision to scale back its work-
force. Nevertheless, it remains possible to demonstrate that individual workers were
improperly selected for RIF due to age.
In an RIF case, the fourth element of the prima facie burden may be satisfied with
proof that the layoff occurred under circumstances that would raise a reasonable in-
ference of unlawful discrimination. Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34,
44–45, n.14 (2005) (if an employer had five employees in a department [four female
and one male], and the employer laid off the only male and retained all the females,
that would satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie burden for sex discrimina-
tion); Scarlett v. City of Boston, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 598–99 (2018) (out of seven
provisional teachers considered for layoff, the employer fired the only two black
teachers). In some circumstances, the retention of younger employees may be able to
satisfy the burden, even if they are over forty years of age. Caputy v. Quad/Graphics,
Inc., No. 14–14159–FDS, 2015 WL 2208825, at *2–4 (D. Mass. May 11, 2015) (sixty-
four-year-old plaintiff was laid off, while employees aged fifty-three, fifty-two, forty-
nine, and twenty-nine were retained). But see Caputy v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 14-
14159-FDS, 2016 WL 7045702, at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2016) (under federal law,
retention of younger employees in the same position is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case, but that same proof is not necessarily sufficient under G.L. c. 151B). A
plaintiff may also be able to satisfy the burden with proof that the employer retained
a lower-rated employee who is younger. Doherty v. Kenseal Constr. Prods. Corp., 87
Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2015). A prima facie case may also be shown where the em-
ployer sought some form of replacement for the plaintiff, demonstrating a continued
need for the same services and skills. Another RIF fourth element would be to prove
that the employer did not treat age neutrally. Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins.
Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 333 (1st Cir. 1997).
Defense lawyers should be aware of cases that have held that an inference of discrim-
ination is not generated where the plaintiff shows only that the duties of the eliminat-
ed positions are being performed by younger employees. See, e.g., Hoffman-Garcia
v. Metrohealth, Inc., 918 F.3d 227, 230–31 (1st Cir. 2019); Welgoss v. Mass. Dep’t of

Transp., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2016); Plante v. Shawmut Bank, 8 Mass. L. Rptr.
643, 646 (Super. Ct. 1998). But see Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 24,
31 (1st Cir. 1999) (prima facie case satisfied where some of plaintiff’s duties were
assumed by younger employees).
The Defendant’s Articulated Response
After the plaintiff succeeds in proving their prima facie case, the burden of produc-
tion is on the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
termination. The burden requires the defendant to produce evidence of the nondis-
criminatory reason for the termination. Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies,
Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 334 (1st Cir. 1997). Under Massachusetts law, an employer must
not only give a lawful reason for its employment decision but must also produce
credible evidence to show that the reason advanced was the real reason. Blare v.
Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 441–42 (1995).
The defendant’s articulation must be clear and specific, and not vague. Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
846 F.2d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 1988); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011–12 n.5
(1st Cir. 1979). Requiring the defendant to satisfy this burden serves in part the pur-
pose of framing the factual issues with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have
a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. Holden v. Comm’n Against Dis-
crimination, 671 F.2d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1982).
The requirement imposed on employers to proffer a supported and detailed articulat-

ed reason is not an onerous one; however, it is more onerous under G.L. c. 151B than
under the ADEA. Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir. 1994),
abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000); Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. at 443 (cit-
ing Wheelock Coll. v. MCAD, 371 Mass. 130, 138 (1976)). This is an important dis-
tinction, since the defendant’s failure to satisfy this burden of production could result
in a judgment for the plaintiff. Sch. Comm. of Bos. v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 40
Mass. App. Ct. 327, 335 (1996) (where employer asserted that employees were laid
off for budgetary reasons but failed to describe the decision-making process or iden-
tify the decision maker, this articulation was insufficient and warranted judgment
favoring the employees).
Usually, the employer will satisfy its burden to articulate a legitimate business rea-
son. The articulation rebuts the initial presumption of discrimination.
Proof of Pretext
Once the defendant has successfully articulated its reason for the termination, the
plaintiff must prove that the reason articulated by the defendant is a pretext for dis-
crimination.
A remaining issue of contention is whether proof of pretext alone will generate an infe-
rence of discrimination or whether additional evidence is required to find discrimination

at this third stage. The First Circuit has indicated that the Massachusetts law regard-
ing proof of pretext is perhaps more liberal than federal law. Joyal v. Hasbro, Inc.,
380 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004).
Under Chapter 151B, the plaintiff generates an inference of discrimination sufficient

to prevail at the Rule 56 (summary judgment) or Rule 50 (directed verdict) stages by
demonstrating a prima facie case and that one or more of the reasons advanced by
the defendant was a pretext (and not the real reason). Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434
Mass. 493, 502 n.14 (2001); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 432
Mass. 107, 118 (2000). Thus, it is said that Massachusetts is a “pretext only” juris-
diction. Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 443 (1995).
While cases articulating this burden sometimes require proof of “pretext for discrim-
ination” or “pretext concealing discrimination,” Massachusetts law does not require
additional proof of discrimination over and above evidence that one of the employ-
er’s reasons is consciously false. Bulwer v. Mt. Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. at 681–82.
Pretext alone, along with a prima facie case, will get a plaintiff over the summary
judgment hurdle in a G.L. c. 151B case because it generates an inference of discrim-
ination. However, a jury nevertheless is free to find that no discrimination existed
even if pretext is established at trial. Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard
Coll., 432 Mass. at 117–18; Bulwer v. Mt. Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. at 682. Thus,
proof of a prima facie case and proof of pretext will preclude summary judgment
against the plaintiff; however, such evidence will not guarantee a win at trial.
In contrast, under the ADEA, proof of a prima facie case and proof of pretext alone
may, but will not necessarily, generate an inference of discrimination sufficient to
withstand a summary judgment motion. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000); Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort, 218 F.3d
1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Reeves and holding that “thin” evidence of pretext
does not indicate discrimination as the employer’s true motive).
In practice, federal courts appear extremely reluctant to find that a prima facie case
and proof of pretext alone are sufficient to overcome summary judgment in particular
cases, although the cases do acknowledge that such evidence can theoretically be
sufficient in other cases. See Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir.
2000); Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 337 (1st Cir.
1997); Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995). But see Parra v. Four Seasons Ho-
tel, 605 F. Supp. 2d 314, 328 (D. Mass. 2009) (stating “plaintiffs are no longer re-
quired to show both pretext and animus to avoid summary judgment”). For example,
even following Reeves, a plaintiff must still demonstrate a discriminatory animus
behind an employer’s pretext. Baralt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 251 F.3d 10, 18–19 (1st
Cir. 2001) (jury verdict for the plaintiffs in an age discrimination case set aside be-
cause, despite evidence of pretext, the record contained no evidence of age discrimi-
nation); see Bonefont-Igara Videz v. Int’l Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d 120, 125 (1st Cir.
2011).
Many practitioners believe that federal courts are dismissing discrimination cases
using a standard for “pretext for discrimination” that is more stringent than the
G.L. c. 151B standard. Whether by law or by practice, it seems likely that the ADEA

imposes greater evidentiary requirements than the “pretext only” requirements of

Chapter 151B. See Joyal v. Hasbro, Inc., 380 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); see Gordon
v. Earthlink, Inc., No. 14-14145-FDS, 2017 WL 3203385, at *8–10 (D. Mass. July
27, 2017).
In proving pretext under either state or federal law, the plaintiff must do more than
cast doubt on the appropriateness or wisdom of the employer’s articulated reason.
Rather, “[i]n assessing pretext, a court’s focus must be on the perception of the deci-
sionmaker, that is, whether the employer believed its stated reason to be credible.”
Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omit-
ted); see also Mahon v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1110 (2014).
One line of cases stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may not prevail simply by
attacking the employer’s business judgment as “[c]ourts may not sit as super personnel
departments, assessing the merits—or even the rationality—of employers’ nondiscrim-
inatory business decisions.” Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 F.3d at 81 n.5 (internal
quotations omitted). However, another line of cases supports the view that pretext can
be proven by attacking the reasonableness of the employer’s asserted business deci-
sions. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1356 n.1 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Wexler v.
White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2003); Kelley v. Correction
Med. Servs., 707 F.3d 108, 118 (1st Cir. 2013) (calculated overreaction to plaintiff’s
alleged wrongdoing). Pretext may be shown by weaknesses and implausibilities in the
employer’s justifications. Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 F.3d at 79.
Impugning the veracity of a tangential aspect of a defendant’s explanation might not

be sufficient. Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 F.3d at 79. Rather, pretext is shown by
proving that the defendant’s articulated reason was not the real reason for the termi-
nation. See Bonefont-Igara Videz v. Int’l Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d at 124–25.
Pretext may be proven in a variety of ways. Where it is alleged that an older worker
has been terminated for violation of a company rule, pretext may be shown where
younger employees violating the same rule were not terminated. Assertions of poor
performance can be rebutted by positive performance reviews or by the fact that no
job warnings or criticisms were directed at the plaintiff. However, conflicting per-
formance reviews may be insufficient to prove pretext. Pierson v. Stembridge, 27
Mass. L. Rptr. 274 (Super. Ct. 2010) (citing Batchelder v. Andover Police Dep’t, 71
Mass. App. Ct. 1120 (2008)). Terminations based on patently ridiculous rationales, or
on very old or stale job criticisms, may be deemed pretextual. See Molloy v.
Blanchard, 115 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 1997).
Claims that an employee was unqualified may be rebutted by introducing the em-
ployer’s job advertisements and postings that list the required qualifications for the
job. An employer’s failure to follow standard disciplinary and termination procedures
may support a finding of pretext.
The defendant’s failure to articulate the specifics of its reasons for termination and its
failure to provide records supporting its decision to terminate may reflect on the

credibility of its articulated reasons. Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies,

Inc., 120 F.3d at 336–37; Durante v. E. Props., Inc., 18 M.D.L.R. 1, 4 (1996). In ad-
dition, all other direct and circumstantial evidence of age discrimination further
demonstrates pretext.
On the other hand, the fact that a plaintiff was recently hired may indicate an unlike-
lihood that their termination was due to age. The decision maker’s age might indicate
a lack of discriminatory intent. Older workers need not be hired or treated preferen-
tially simply to remedy an imbalance in the employer’s workforce. G.L. c. 151B,
§ 4(19), ¶ 5. Moreover, statistics reflecting an employer’s practice of retaining older
workers in a layoff may help demonstrate lack of discriminatory animus.
Mixed-Motive Analysis
Mixed-motive analysis represents an alternative method of demonstrating that a dis-

criminatory motive was the determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
In cases where a plaintiff proves that age was a motivating factor in an employment
decision, the employer may nevertheless avoid liability if the employer would have
made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive. The employer,
in this scenario, argues that a separate, lawful motive determined the outcome, and
was dispositive, even if ageist motives were present.
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the mixed-motive analysis for ADEA claims
involving private litigants. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009).
It is possible, however, that mixed-motive analysis does apply to ADEA claims
against the federal government because that protection is written especially broadly.
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (all personnel actions must be “free from any discrimination
based on age”); see Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 203–07 (D.C. Cir. 2010). While the
Supreme Judicial Court has yet to decide whether it will follow the Gross rule, it is
assumed that the analysis continues to apply to Chapter 151B claims. See Diaz v.
Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 671 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (interpreting Haddad v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. 91, 114 (2009), as implicitly affirming ongoing validity
of mixed-motive framework in all Chapter 151B cases); see also DiIorio v. Wil-
lowbend Country Club, Inc., 33 M.D.L.R. at 167.
To reach the mixed-motive analysis the “plaintiff must show, at a minimum, ‘that
there was differential treatment in an employment action and that the adverse em-
ployment decision was caused at least in part by a forbidden bias.’” Rossiter v. Pot-
ter, No. 02-12192, 2005 WL 1288063, at *3 (D. Mass. May 23, 2005) (quoting Hill-
strom v. Best W. TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2003)). Under Massachusetts
law, the mixed-motive analysis may be accessed only by a showing of direct, or
strong, evidence that discrimination played a motivating role in the employment de-
cision. See Wynn & Wynn, PC v. MCAD, 431 Mass. 655, 666–67 (2000), overruled
on other grounds by Stonehill Coll. v. MCAD, 441 Mass. 549 (2004); Connolly v.
Suffolk Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 194 (2004). Circumstantial evi-
dence of discrimination alone may arguably be sufficient to invoke the mixed-motive
analysis. Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. at 114 (dicta construing
G.L. c. 151B in a gender discrimination claim).

Satisfaction of the plaintiff’s burden “shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer,
who . . . must establish that he would have reached the same decision regarding the
plaintiff even if he had not taken the proscribed factor (age) into account.” Febres v.
Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2000). The mixed-motive
analysis thus differs from the burden-shifting analysis, in that the burden of proof is
actually transferred to the employer.
Practice Note
Unlike Title VII, under the ADEA, defendants do not buy some immediate
liability by admitting that one of the factors (though not the motivating
one) for the employment action at issue was an individual’s age. Title VII
provides for certain equitable relief and attorney fees upon evidence that
one of the factors an employer used in rendering its decision was an im-
permissible one, i.e., that one of the reasons for the decision was the in-
dividual’s race, color, gender, etc., even if there is evidence that the em-
ployer would have made the same decision anyway. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m). This provision does not apply to the ADEA. Under the
ADEA, even if one of the factors for the employment decision was the in-
dividual’s age, there is no liability as long as it was not the “but for” cause
of the decision.
§ 2.1.3 Firing Older Workers to Save on Salary or Benefits Costs

Workers with the greatest tenure at companies tend to have the highest salaries and
benefits. An employer seeking to rid itself of its most expensive personnel may ap-
pear to be selecting older workers for termination. However, firing employees simply
because they are too expensive is not necessarily age discrimination. Pagliarini v.
Gen. Instrument Corp., 855 F. Supp. 459, 462 (D. Mass. 1994). The ADEA is violated
under such circumstances if the policy to terminate expensive employees exists as a
proxy for age discrimination. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612–13
(1993) (interference with vesting of pension benefits is not evidence of age discrimi-
nation). But see Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 588–89
(2004) (legislative history of the ADEA suggests that the higher benefit and pension
costs associated with older workers may increase employers’ reluctance to hire and
retain such workers); McMullin v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 16 M.D.L.R. 1427, 1436
(1994) (statement that “we could go out and hire two college graduates for every one
[of the older employees] and they come to us trained” indicated discriminatory animus
toward older workers).
Age discrimination and expense reduction are sometimes related. Stereotypes about
older workers and the resources they require may dovetail with pressures on manag-
ers to pare down expenses. A plaintiff’s lawyer should attempt to frame the issues
such that it is clear that recovery is sought for actions based on age-related stereo-
types or animus and not simply for expense reduction.
An employer implementing an RIF is under no obligation to demote an older worker

and fire a younger worker in order to save the older worker’s job or to offer the older
employee continued employment at a lower salary. See Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797

F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, it may be advisable for a plaintiff’s lawyer
to suggest to employees facing an RIF to volunteer to be demoted or to take a pay cut
in order to save their jobs. Plaintiff’s counsel may argue that, if the motive of an RIF
is to cut costs, an employer’s failure to retain the employee at a reduced cost could
indicate pretext for discrimination. See Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuari-
as, 929 F.2d 814, 823 (1st Cir. 1991) (no evidence of discrimination where, in con-
text of RIF, employer offered to retain older workers with reduction of salary); Es-
trada-Izquierdo v. Aponte-Roque, 850 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (in a political dis-
crimination case, employer demoted plaintiff even though it had the option to transfer
the plaintiff to known vacant positions instead).
§ 2.1.4 Retirement and Succession Issues

Employers’ offers of early retirement packages and inquiries regarding when em-
ployees will retire, raise various issues under the discrimination statutes. The exist-
ence of a voluntary retirement program does not, by itself, indicate age discrimina-
tion. Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986). However,
offering a retirement package or developing a recruitment plan for the purpose of
getting rid of older employees may constitute evidence of discrimination. See Aceve-
do-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d 128, 146 (1st Cir. 2012) (recruitment
plan developed for purpose of “substituting persons who were retirement age”); Oli-
vera v. Nestlé P.R., Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds
by Cuello-Suarez v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 988 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 1993) (where
goal of offering retirement package was to “flatten” the organization in terms of age).
But see Templeton v. Mansfield Pub. Sch., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1112, at *2 n.9 (2015)
(defendants’ offer of a voluntary early retirement package to the plaintiffs and to
other employees in the protected age category, did not evince age discrimination).
Requests about retirement plans, and suggestions to retire, may indicate discrimina-
tory bias. Davidson v. City of Pittsfield, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1131 (2014); Calhoun v.
Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 562–63 (1st Cir. 1986); Carlton v. Mystic
Transp. Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (even single suggestion to retire may
be probative when considered along with other evidence); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed
Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 450 (8th Cir. 1993) (suggestion after termination that the
plaintiff consider retiring). However, isolated or ambiguous remarks tending to sug-
gest animus based on age may not be sufficient, standing alone, to prove an employ-
er’s discriminatory intent even if such remarks are made by the decision makers but
are unrelated to the decision-making process. Rooney v. Bank of Am., No. 12–11173–
TSH, 2014 WL 1347124, at *8 (D. Mass. Apr. 3, 2014); see also Canovas v. Univ. of
Mass. Med. Sch., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 (2013).
Where an employer seeks releases in connection with exit incentives or other em-
ployment termination programs offered to a group of employees, the employer is
required to furnish the affected employees information on the ages and job titles of
those employees affected. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H). This requirement enables em-
ployees to determine whether age discrimination was a factor in their terminations or
exit incentives.

According to the Supreme Court, age and pension status are analytically distinct
concepts. Thus, an employer is permitted to make decisions because of an employ-
ee’s pension status, even where pension status is itself based on age, and even where
younger employees are treated better than older employees. Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC,
554 U.S. 135, 142–43 (2008) (no ADEA violation where employee received a lower
pension because he became disabled after he turned fifty-five years old and where he
would have received more had he become disabled at a younger age).
The fact that a minimum age is set for an attainment of retirement benefits is not a
violation of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(1). Reasonable inquiries relating to when
and if an employee is planning to retire are not discriminatory. However, constant,
harassing demands that an employee accept a retirement package and inquiries about
an employee’s age may indicate an employer’s view that individuals of a certain age
should no longer be working.
Employers have a legitimate interest in succession planning. Boston v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 431 Fed. App’x 763, 767 (10th Cir. 2011) (“compliance
with the ADEA and succession planning need not be mutually exclusive”). Succes-
sion plans may focus on use of nondiscriminatory factors such as expected longevity
with the company. Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc., 726 F.3d 789, 800–01 (6th
Cir. 2013) (“An inquiry about how long an employee intends to work if hired has
been held to reflect a legitimate employer concern that is analytically distinct from
age.”). However, a succession plan that focuses on age when computing an employ-
ee’s potential longevity may evidence age discrimination. Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs.
Grp., Inc., 726 F.3d at 799–801.
§ 2.2 DEFENSES
Practice Note
An age discrimination strategy checklist for defense attorneys is included
as Checklist 2.1.
§ 2.2.1 Statutory Defenses

Under federal law, the ADEA offers a number of statutory defenses that defense law-
yers should assess immediately upon receiving notice of a potential age discrimina-
tion claim. While G.L. c. 151B does not articulate some of these affirmative defens-
es, the ADEA’s defenses should be reviewed even in actions that assert a claim of age
discrimination only under state law. Clear legal precedent provides that the Massa-
chusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the Massachusetts courts
will look to federal law in interpreting discrimination claims under G.L. c. 151B. See
Wheelock Coll. v. MCAD, 371 Mass. 130, 134–36 (1976) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

(a) Bona Fide Occupational Qualification

The ADEA exempts age-based employment decisions when age is a “bona fide oc-
cupational disqualification reasonable and necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Age-based decisions premised on a “bona
fide occupational qualification.” are similarly permitted by G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1B). In
other words, both state and federal law permit using age as a criterion in an employ-
ment decision if it is necessary for the normal operation of the business. However,
the defense is narrowly construed. The burden is on the employer to present evidence
justifying its reliance on the exception. See 804 C.M.R. § 3.01(3); W. Airlines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985); Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st
Cir. 1993). Moreover, hard evidence such as expert testimony, studies, and the like
are generally necessary to support the defense. In any event, to successfully utilize
the defense, employers must be able to demonstrate that the age criterion is neces-
sary to the “essence” of their business operation. See W. Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472
U.S. at 413–14; Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d at 1226. Additionally, employers
must show that it is “highly impractical” to assess each employee over the age limit
individually to determine their qualifications or that there is a “substantial basis” for
determining that older employees generally do not possess the qualifications to per-
form the job. See W. Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413–14; Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of
Balt., 472 U.S. 353 (1985); Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d at 1226. An employer
may not assert as a defense that it discharged an employee solely on the basis of age
under the mistaken belief that age was a bona fide occupational qualification for the
employee’s job. Gates v. Flood, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 739, 745 (2003).
(b) Reasonable Factors Other Than Age and Good Cause

Actions based on “reasonable factors other than age” are similarly exempted from
the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(1), 623(f)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
this is an “affirmative defense” available to employers for which they bear the burden
of persuasion in proving. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008).
Whenever the “reasonable factors other than age” defense is raised, the employer
bears the burdens of production and persuasion to demonstrate the defense. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.7(d). However, individuals who challenge the allegedly unlawful practice are
responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practice that alleg-
edly causes any observed statistical disparities. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c).
To establish a “reasonable factor” defense, an employer must show that the employ-
ment practice was both reasonably designed to further or achieve a legitimate busi-
ness purpose and administered in a way that reasonably achieves that purpose in light
of the particular facts and circumstances that were known, or should have been
known, to the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e). However, this defense will not excuse
facially discriminatory conduct. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7. Moreover, it will not justify dis-
criminatory policies, practices, and mandates, including a state statute, that will conflict
with the ADEA. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 987 F.2d 64, 73–74 (1st Cir. 1993).

Employers may also assert the defense of a good cause. This defense requires affirm-
ative proof that the decision was not only motivated by reasons other than the em-
ployee’s age but the action was supported by “good cause.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3).
Given that, in the typical circumstantial case of age discrimination, the defendant
merely has a burden of production as to evidence of its legitimate and nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the disputed employment action, the affirmative defense of “good
cause” is seemingly superfluous. Simply put, in these cases the defendant does not
have to prove it was motivated by good cause but may simply produce evidence of its
legitimate motivation. A defense of good cause should be considered, however, in
cases where direct evidence of discrimination is asserted.
(c) Bona Fide Seniority System, Bona Fide Employee Benefit

Plan, or Retirement Policy
Generally, employers will not be liable under state or federal law for actions imple-
menting bona fide seniority systems or employee benefit plans that make distinctions
based upon an employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2); G.L. c. 151B, § 4(17)(a).
Accordingly, employers can rely on seniority systems to justify employment actions

even if the system ultimately has a disparate effect on older employees. The defense
is thwarted and liability will result, however, when an employee can show that the
system was created with discriminatory intent as subterfuge for the employer to en-
gage in age discrimination. EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp.
927 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Employers can also amend such seniority systems without fear
of liability under the ADEA, so long as the amendments are not a shroud for age
discrimination. Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Ill.
1991), aff’d, 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
Similarly, employers generally may implement the terms of bona fide retirement,
pension, insurance, and other employee benefit plans without fear of liability. How-
ever, adherence to such plans will violate the ADEA when they mandate retirement,
unless the employee has been a bona fide executive or key management employee
and is vested in a “substantial” employee retirement plan. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1);
G.L. c. 151B, § 4(17)(b); see also Morrissey v. Bos. Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27
(1st Cir. 1995); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Moreover,
employers must comply with the provisions of the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 631, in implementing such plans.
In any event, in order to properly assert and support a defense based upon any em-
ployment plan, employers need to remember to implement these plans consistently.
Arbitrary implementation will permit plaintiffs to argue the action is not justified by
the plan and that the action is really subterfuge for discrimination.
(d) Other Statutory Defenses

Other statutory exceptions to the general prohibition against age discrimination include
• certain law enforcement officers and firefighters employed by state or local
government bodies, under some circumstances, 29 U.S.C. § 623(j);

• certain employees in certain foreign countries, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1);

• certain tenured employees at an independent institution of higher learning,
G.L. c. 151B, § 4(17)(c); and
• political entities in Massachusetts, which may discriminate if so permitted by a
general or a special law, G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1C).
(e) General Defenses

While not true affirmative defenses, the following can be asserted to defend against a
claim of age discrimination:
Business Justification
Layoffs, reorganizations, restructuring, and other employment actions instituted for

business-related reasons clearly may be relied upon in defending a claim of age dis-
crimination so long as age was not a factor considered in the action.
Neutral Criteria
Using neutral criteria to implement adverse employment actions, such as a layoff or
termination in the face of corporate restructuring, will also provide a defense to a
claim of age discrimination. See Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d
231, 235 (4th Cir. 1991) (endorsing reliance on “an ostensibly neutral, merit-based
system, its internal rating system”); see also Goclowski v. Gen. Elec. Co., 19
M.D.L.R. 42, 45 (1997) (following a written RIF policy, including applying the RIF
criteria, evidence that the complainant was “selected for layoff because, overall, his
work performance was . . . among the weakest . . . (thus the Respondent) . . . present-
ed substantial credible evidence that the reason the Complainant was selected for
layoff was poor work performance and business necessity, [and] Respondent has
clearly articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions”). But see
§ 2.1.2(a), Disparate Impact, above.
Similarly, relying on seniority as the basis for an employment action, such as imple-
menting layoffs in reverse order of seniority, will bolster an employer’s defense and
support its “legitimate and nondiscriminatory” reason for the complained-of action.
See Cruz v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., PR, 699 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding
a “ranking system that considered only . . . professional skills and seniority” to be
age neutral).
Finally, job actions based upon neutral and uniformly applied employment policies
and practices, such as performance evaluations, will also offer a defense to a claim of
age discrimination.
Age
As strange as it may seem, emphasizing the ages of those involved may also assist in
defending against a claim of age discrimination. For example, if those involved in the

decision-making process are as old as or older than the plaintiff, this fact may mili-
tate against a presumption that these individuals were age biased in implementing the
complained-of action. See LaGrant v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir.
1984). Similarly, when the replacement is a few years younger or older than the ter-
minated plaintiff, a claim that the employer had an impermissible motive in institut-
ing the action rings hollow. See Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2000)
(replacement less than five years younger than the plaintiff fails to support prima
facie case); Grubb v. W.A. Foote Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 741 F.2d 1486, 1498 (6th Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 759 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1985).
§ 2.2.2 Remedies and Damages
(a) ADEA Damages

The ADEA authorizes all legal and equitable remedies as may be appropriate to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the act, including, without limitation,
• injunctive relief;
• lost wages and benefits (the doctrine of mitigation of damages applies; plain-
tiffs’ attorneys should advise clients to aggressively seek other employment af-
ter termination, and to document their job search);
• front pay and future pension benefits (front pay is lost pay for the period from
the date of judgment into the future; to bolster front pay claims, plaintiffs may
request to be reinstated by the employer and should request this type of relief
in their complaint);
• promotion, reinstatement, and other equitable relief;
• interest;
• “liquidated damages” (punitive damages that double the amount of monetary
damages) may be recovered in cases of willful violations of the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b); and
• attorney fees and costs.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b).
A violation is willful if the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the mat-
ter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. While liquidated damages
are punitive in nature, the plaintiff does not need to show that the employer’s conduct
was outrageous. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 614–18 (1993).
The ADEA has been interpreted to preclude the award of damages for pain and suf-
fering and emotional distress. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326
(1995); Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2008). A plaintiff’s lawyer
may argue that 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which permits “legal” remedies, should be inter-
preted to allow for emotional distress damages. However, some courts in other jurisdic-
tions have recognized an exception under the ADEA and held that pain and suffering

and medical expenses may be available for retaliation claims. See Marinelli v. Potter,
661 F. Supp. 2d 69, 82–83 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing Moskowitz v. Trs. of Purdue Univ.,
5 F.3d 279, 283 (7th Cir. 1993); Lyons v. Hader–Seitz, Inc., No. 03-C-645, 2005 WL
2077358, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 19, 2005)). Awards of attorney fees are discretionary
when the plaintiff is a federal employee. Marinelli v. Potter, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 84 n.19.
(b) General Laws Chapter 151B Damages

General Laws Chapter 151B provides similar remedies and damages as the ADEA,
with some important differences. First, emotional distress damages may be awarded
under G.L. c. 151B, while they are probably not awardable under the ADEA. Sec-
ond, a G.L. c. 151B plaintiff who pursues a civil action may be entitled to multiplied
damages of up to three times actual damages upon a showing that the act was com-
mitted with knowledge, or reason to know, that the act violated the law. G.L. c. 151B,
§ 9, ¶ 4. In contrast, the ADEA provides for only a doubling of damages. Third, the
prejudgment interest often awarded in G.L. c. 151B actions, currently at 12 percent, is
higher than the interest rate that could be assessed in federal court under the ADEA.
If the case is tried before the MCAD and not in court, the MCAD may award civil
penalties against the employer in an amount up to $50,000, depending on whether
the employer has engaged in other discriminatory conduct in the past. G.L. c. 151B,
§ 5, ¶ 4. However, the MCAD may not award multiple damages.
With respect to reinstatement, that remedy might be available for claims tried at the
MCAD (G.L. c. 151B, § 5) but might not be available for claims initially litigated in
court under G.L. c. 151B. Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 127–
29 (2014). As the Supreme Judicial Court explained, G.L. c. 151B provides “two
largely independent avenues for redress of violations . . . one through the MCAD
(G.L. c. 151B, §§ 5–6), and the other in the courts (G.L. c. 151B, § 9).” Fernandes v.
Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. at 128 (internal quotations omitted). While the Su-
preme Judicial Court acknowledged that reinstatement is an available remedy in the
context of an MCAD administrative proceeding under G.L. c. 151B, § 5, it noted that
“[t]he remedies available under G.L. c. 151B, §§ 5 and 9, differ.” Fernandes v. Attle-
boro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. at 128 (internal quotations omitted). The ADEA permits
orders of reinstatement.
While both the ADEA and Chapter 151B provide for the award of attorney fees, it
appears that a plaintiff may be more likely to receive fees under the “catalyst theory”
for a state claim than a federal claim. See, e.g., Ferman v. Sturgis Cleaners, Inc., 481
Mass. 488, 491–92 & n.9 (2019) (addressing the standard for determining an award
of attorney fees for wage claims under G.L. c. 149 and G.L. c. 151). However, it is
not certain that the catalyst theory will be applied to Chapter 151B.

§ 2.2.3 Deadlines and Procedural Requirements

(a) Administrative Charge
Individuals seeking to recover under the ADEA or G.L. c. 151B must file a timely
administrative complaint. The deadline for filing a charge under G.L. c. 151B is 300
days. G.L. c. 151B, § 5. The charge should be filed with the MCAD.
In a deferral jurisdiction such as Massachusetts, claimants seeking to pursue their

rights under the ADEA must file an administrative charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the MCAD within 300 days of the viola-
tion. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2); see 29 C.F.R. § 1626.10(c); Ford v. Bernard Fineson
Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1996); Bousquet v. PolyForm Corp., 401 Mass.
1002, 1003 (1987) (rescript). It is possible to file a G.L. c. 151B/MCAD charge that
also includes an ADEA claim.
Special rules govern the initiation of claims involving federal employees. See Ma-
ziarz v. Brennan, No. 15-30098-MAP, 2016 WL 7799647, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Aug. 3,
2016) (discussing option of federal employees to bypass administrative remedies/
requirements). Such employees should notify an EEO counselor within forty-five
days of the discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). Other deadlines and require-
ments are imposed on federal employees after this initial deadline, and they should
be carefully researched. See Rossiter v. Potter, 357 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2004); Tapia-
Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 744 (1st Cir. 2003).
There are many complicated issues relating to the limitations period in discrimina-
tion cases that are beyond the scope of this chapter. However, a few general rules
should be noted. The limitations period for filing a charge of discrimination begins to
run once an employee receives unequivocal notice of the asserted adverse employ-
ment action. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (termination notice
needed to be explicit and final in order to trigger limitations period); Wheatley v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. 394, 398 (1994). This does not necessarily mean that the
period commences when the job action occurs—it can actually commence before that
time. Indeed, if an individual is unequivocally notified that a job action is scheduled to
occur on some future date, the limitations period will begin to run from the date such
notice is received. Wheatley v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. at 398–400. According-
ly, defense attorneys should be sure to review when the employee became aware that
the action was going to occur. If unequivocal notice of the complained-of conduct
was received outside of the limitations period, the charge may be untimely. On the
other hand, a plaintiff’s attorney should be mindful that, even after an employee has
been terminated or has been informed of their termination, the limitations clock may
be restarted when the employee first discovers or first has reason to discover that
their discharge was discriminatory. Doctrines of continuing violations, equitable toll-
ing, and waiver may also affect the limitations period.
The discrimination charge should be reasonably detailed. The scope of the charge
should cover all potential bases for recovery. It is important to list all the individuals
or entities that the employee intends to sue as “respondents.” Failure to file a timely

and sufficiently detailed complaint could preclude recovery both at the MCAD and in
court. Under some circumstances, submission of an EEOC intake questionnaire may
satisfy the requirements for filing a charge. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552
U.S. 389 (2008).
(b) Other Prerequisites for Pursuing a Civil Action

Under G.L. c. 151B
Removing Charge from the MCAD
A plaintiff seeking to file a civil action under G.L. c. 151B must remove the pending
case from the MCAD. The plaintiff may remove their claim from the MCAD after
ninety days have elapsed since the charge was filed (and earlier if the MCAD per-
mits). G.L. c. 151B, § 9. A defendant, however, cannot remove an employment case
from the MCAD. See Stonehill Coll. v. MCAD, 441 Mass. 549, 565–66 (2004)
(“[s]hould the complainant choose to remain within the MCAD, then both parties are
subject to the formal administrative process”). Removal is accomplished simply by
writing to the MCAD, informing it that a civil action has been filed and asking the
MCAD to dismiss the charge so that the plaintiff may pursue a civil action.
G.L. c. 151B, § 9. The MCAD charge will be dismissed without prejudice to the civil
action, but the plaintiff will be barred from reasserting the same action at the MCAD.
The burden falls on the plaintiff to file a timely complaint in Superior Court.
In cases that are no longer pending at the MCAD (for example, where a charge has
been dismissed pursuant to a finding of lack of jurisdiction or lack of probable
cause), a plaintiff may still file a civil action. Pelletier v. Town of Somerset, 458
Mass. 504, 510 n.13 (2010). A similar letter of removal should be sent to the MCAD
if such a suit is initiated.
Trials at the MCAD are called “public hearings.” Plaintiffs lose the right to remove a
case from the MCAD once a public hearing begins because plaintiffs are required at
that time to sign a waiver of the right to a civil action.
After the MCAD has held a public hearing and the Full Commission has issued a
final order, the plaintiff or the defendant may seek a G.L. c. 30A judicial review.
G.L. c. 151B, § 6; see also Temple Emanuel of Newton v. MCAD, 463 Mass. 472, 479
(2012). The party seeking judicial review must do so within thirty days after the service
of the MCAD’s final order. G.L. c. 151B, § 6.
Limitations Period for Filing G.L. c. 151B Civil Action
The plaintiff’s deadline for filing a civil action under G.L. c. 151B is three years
from the date of the unlawful practice. G.L. c. 151B, § 9. The period in which the
claim was pending at the MCAD does not toll the deadline for filing a civil action.

(c) Other Prerequisites for Pursuing a Civil Action

Under the ADEA
Required Waiting Period
Under the ADEA, a civil action may be filed when sixty days has elapsed after the
filing of the EEOC complaint. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Moreover, plaintiffs should wait
at least sixty days after their age discrimination charge has been filed with the
MCAD before bringing a civil action under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).
Practice Note
Plaintiffs forgetting to file an ADEA charge with the MCAD may file one
after the civil action has commenced, even if the G.L. c. 151B limitations
period has run. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 759–60
(1979); Ciccone v. Textron, Inc., 651 F.2d 1, 1–2 (1st Cir. 1981); Bousquet
v. PolyForm Corp., 401 Mass. 1002, 1002–03 (1987); Clark v. Am. Home
Foods Div., 34 F.E.P. 813, 814 (D. Mass. 1982).
Limitations Period for Filing an ADEA Civil Action

An ADEA civil action must be filed within ninety days after the EEOC informs the
claimant that the claim has been dismissed or that the proceedings have been termi-
nated. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). Time limitations for suits against the federal government
are governed by 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d).
§ 2.2.4 Choice of Law and Forum

There are many considerations for plaintiffs to keep in mind when deciding whether
to remain at the MCAD or to pursue a civil action. For example, backlogs and delays
are sometimes a problem at the MCAD.
The MCAD may be a convenient venue for use in performing some investigation
prior to committing to a civil action. On a case-by-case basis, the MCAD will deter-
mine whether parties to a claim are entitled to conduct predetermination discovery.
(Note that the standing order specifically providing for such a determination on a
case-by-case basis was revoked effective June 3, 2014. See Standing Order of the
Commissioners Regarding Pre-Determination Case Process, Feb. 20, 2007, available
at http://www.mass.gov/mcad/docs/press-releases/2007-02-20-pr-standing-order-
revoked.pdf.)
Multiple damages are not awarded in the MCAD; they are awarded only if a civil
action is pursued. On the other hand, the MCAD may award civil penalties against an
employer in an amount of up to $50,000, based on a tiered analysis of the employer’s
history of discriminatory conduct. G.L. c. 151B, § 5, ¶ 4(a), (b), (c).
If a civil action is filed, the plaintiff secures the right to a jury trial. There is no jury
trial provided at the MCAD. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2); G.L. c. 151B, § 9.

Where the parties have signed a valid mandatory arbitration provision, arbitration
will be compelled; but the MCAD may elect to continue with its own independent
investigation of a claim. Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 459 Mass. 88 (2011); see also
MCAD Policy 96-1(I)(1)(d). In such a situation, the complaining party may not in-
tervene in the MCAD action or participate as a litigant or a party; however, the com-
plaining party may still provide evidence to the MCAD. Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 459
Mass. at 97–98. The MCAD continues to have the authority to award remedies spe-
cific to the complaining party under these circumstances. Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 459
Mass. at 95.
At the MCAD, pro se complainants are provided the opportunity to receive free legal
guidance. The MCAD has shown some willingness to award substantial emotional
distress awards. Finally, the MCAD may prove to be a better forum when a case
turns on a very technical interpretation of law; it may be better in some cases to have
discrimination law experts deciding a case rather than a jury or a court of general
jurisdiction.
As discussed above, reinstatement is a remedy for claims tried at the MCAD, but
might not be available for claims initially litigated in court. Fernandes v. Attleboro
Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 127–29 (2014). Victims of discrimination for whom
reinstatement is a priority may wish to keep their cases at the MCAD and not remove
the case to court. Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. at 127–29.
Assuming that a civil action is filed, the next question is whether to pursue a
G.L. c. 151B claim, an ADEA claim, or both. Generally, G.L. c. 151B provides
plaintiffs with many advantages over those of the ADEA. Chapter 151B covers a
wider group of private and public employers, provides for greater damages, and pro-
vides, generally, for less onerous burdens of proof. Chapter 151B should be used
when individuals are named as respondents.
An ADEA claim in federal court may permit the employee to introduce evidence that
would be excluded in state court proceedings. Gargiulo v. Baystate Health, Inc., 826
F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Mass. 2011) (refusing to adopt state medical peer review privi-
lege in age discrimination claim before the court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction). A
federal court action will generally provide the opportunity for a speedier trial than
the state court will permit and is more likely to be overseen by a single judge.
While G.L. c. 151B and the ADEA may be asserted together in a complaint, assert-
ing G.L. c. 151B claims alone may facilitate the opportunity to pursue the case in
Superior Court without the risk of removal to federal court. Many plaintiffs’ lawyers
think that the state court is more favorable to employment discrimination claims,
while defense counsel prefer to litigate such actions in federal court. Accordingly,
defense counsel should quickly and carefully review state court complaints asserting
age discrimination in order to seriously consider removal to federal court.
Another possible forum is arbitration. Many employers, especially in the securities

industry, require employees to agree to submit all employment-related claims to arbi-
tration. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the U.S. Supreme

Court upheld the mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims. How-

ever, in the subsequent decision, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002),
the Supreme Court upheld the ability of the EEOC to maintain its own agency action
on behalf of an individual employee, even if that employee had signed an agreement
to arbitrate employment law claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court has since clarified its stance on arbitration of ADEA claims
as mandated by collective bargaining agreements. In 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett,
556 U.S. 247 (2009), the Court held that “a provision in a collective-bargaining
agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA
claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.”
§ 2.2.5 Survival of Claims

A Chapter 151B age discrimination claim survives the death of the plaintiff. Gasior
v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 446 Mass. 645, 651–52 (2006). A deceased plaintiff continues
to have available all remedies provided under the antidiscrimination statute, includ-
ing punitive damages. Gasior v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 446 Mass. at 654. While the fed-
eral courts in Massachusetts have not yet ruled on the matter, other jurisdictions have
found that a claim under the ADEA survives the death of the plaintiff. Gasior v.
Mass. Gen. Hosp., 446 Mass. at 652. That said, some cases have found that federal
common law does not support the survival of the penal remedies available under the
statute. See Gasior v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 446 Mass. at 653 n.11.
§ 2.3 SETTLEMENTS AND RELEASES

In 1990 Congress amended the ADEA to “clarify the prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of age” by adding certain requirements that must be met before em-
ployees can properly waive and release their right to raise a claim of age discrimina-
tion thereunder. The amendment, entitled the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA), outlines minimum standards that must be met when employers attempt to
obtain such waivers from employees, as well as additional standards that must be
followed when waivers are offered to a group or a class of employees in connection
with voluntary or involuntary termination programs.
§ 2.3.1 General Requirements

The OWBPA specifically provides that waivers under the ADEA are valid only when
they are “knowing and voluntary.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1). The waiver must be part of
an agreement between the individual and the employer and must be in writing, in
plain language “geared to the level of understanding of the individual party to the
agreement or individuals eligible to participate.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A), (H).
When offered to a class of employees, the writing must be drafted in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by the “average participant.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A), (H).
Valid waivers cannot mislead or misinform “participants or affected individuals.” 29
C.F.R. § 1625.22(b)(4). They must state that rights under the ADEA are waived as
part of the agreement and specifically advise employees “to consult with an attorney

prior to executing the agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B), (E); see American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Cardoza, 133 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 1998) (employers must directly advise
employees to consult a lawyer in order to obtain a valid waiver of rights under the
ADEA). Such waivers will be valid only if they are obtained in exchange for “con-
sideration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled.”
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D).
Releases cannot be so broadly drafted that they prohibit an employee’s participation

in an EEOC or MCAD investigation. Commonwealth v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 143
F. Supp. 2d 134, 149 (D. Mass. 2001). Releases can preclude monetary recovery
from, but not cooperation with, such an action. Commonwealth v. Bull HN Info. Sys.,
Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
Waivers will not be considered knowing and voluntary unless an employee is given
up to twenty-one days to consider the terms of the waiver or, if part of an employ-
ment termination program, up to forty-five days to consider it. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(f)(1)(F)(i)(ii). Additionally, employees must be provided seven days following
the execution of any such waiver to revoke it. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(G). The law does
not permit the parties to waive, shorten, or forgo the seven-day revocation period. 29
C.F.R. § 1625.22(e)(5).
§ 2.3.2 Requirements Specific to Employment Termination

Programs
Again, waivers obtained from employees as part of an exit incentive or employment
termination program must meet additional criteria in order to be valid. At the outset,
however, it is important to know what such a program is. Such programs exist when
an employer offers additional consideration to two or more employees to obtain a
waiver pursuant to some type of reorganization, reduction in force, or other employ-
ment termination plan. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iii)(B). According to the regulations
to the OWBPA, generally, such programs offer a standardized package of benefits that
is not subject to negotiation. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(i)(iii)(B).
Employees included in such programs must receive in writing, at the commencement of

the forty-five-day consideration period, a list of “any class, unit or group of individuals
covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time lim-
its applicable for such program,” as well as “the job titles and ages of all individuals
eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job
classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.”
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H). If employees in established grade levels or other subcate-
gories within a job category or title are included in the program, the information must
also be broken down to reflect such subcategories. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(iii). Ad-
ditionally, if both voluntary and involuntary terminations are included in the pro-
gram, the information must identify those terminations that are voluntary and those
that are not. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(iv). Finally, if an involuntary termination pro-
gram occurs in successive increments over a period of time, the information must be
cumulative to allow employees affected later in the program to have information on

Another random document with
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— Herra ylipäällikkö voi huoletta luottaa sanoihini, joista panen
pääni pantiksi. Jos Ujsciessa olisi vakituisia sotajoukkoja jonkun
hetmanin johdolla, silloin olisin ensimmäinen kehoittamaan
odottamaan, kunnes hänen kuninkaallinen majesteettinsa saapuisi
itse tänne koko sotajoukon kanssa, mutta yleisessä kutsunnassa
koottuja joukkoja ja Suur-Puolan herroja vastaan ovat meidän
sotavoimamme enemmän kuin riittävät..
— Eivätkä he saa mistään apua?
— Eivät… kahdestakin syystä: ensiksikin, koska kaikilla

sotajoukoilla, ja niitä ei ole kovinkaan paljon, on täysi työ Liettuassa
ja Ukrainassa; toiseksi, koska Varsovassa ei kuningas Jan Kasimir,
kanslerit eikä senaatti usko, että hänen kuninkaallinen
majesteettinsa Kaarle Kustaa vastoin aselepoa, huolimatta
viimeisestä lähetystöstä ja välittämättä myönnytyksistään, on
todellakin aloittanut sodan. He luottavat siihen, että rauha tulee
tehdyksi vielä viime tingassa… hahahaa!
Tuo lihava mies otti hatun päästään, pyyhkäisi hien punaisilta

kasvoiltaan ja lisäsi:
— Tiubecki ja Dolgoruki Liettuassa, Chmielnicki Ukrainassa, ja me

marssimme Suur-Puolaan!… Kas siihen on Jan Kasimir asiat
johtanut!
Wittenberg katsoi häneen ihmetellen ja kysyi:
— Iloitsetteko te siitä?
— Iloitsen, sillä minua kohdannut vääryys tulee nyt kostetuksi.

Sitäpaitsi näen päivänselvästi, että teidän miekkanne ja minun
neuvoni laskevat uuden, mitä kauneimman kruunun Kaarle Kustaan
päähän.
Wittenberg antoi katseensa kiitää kauas yli metsien, niittyjen ja

vainioitten ja virkkoi hetken kuluttua:
— Te olette oikeassa, tämä on kaunista ja hedelmällistä maata…

Voitte olla varma siitä, että sodan päätyttyä kuningas nimittää teidät
tänne maaherraksi.
Lihava mies otti taas hatun päästään.
— Enkä minä tahtoisikaan ketään muuta herraa, — sanoi hän

kohottaen katseensa taivaaseen.
Taivas oli kirkas, eikä yksikään salama iskenyt alas murskaamaan

petturia, joka jätti jo kahdesta sodasta nääntyneen isänmaansa
vihollisen käsiin.
Mies, joka keskusteli Wittenbergin kanssa, oli Hieronim

Radziejowski, Puolan entinen varakansleri, joka nyt ruotsalaisia
palvellen kavalasti vehkeili isänmaataan vastaan.
He seisoivat ääneti jonkin aikaa. Sillävälin oli kaksi viimeistä

brigadia, nerikeläinen ja vermlantilainen, kulkenut rajan poikki, ja
sitten seurasi tykkien vuoro. Torvet soivat yhä ja rummut pärisivät
täyttäen metsän pahaaennustavin kaiuin. Vihdoin läksi esikuntakin
liikkeelle. Radziejowski ratsasti Wittenbergin vieressä.
— Oxenstiernaa ei vain näy, — virkkoi Wittenberg. — Pelkään,

että hänelle on jotakin tapahtunut. Luulenpa, ettei ollut mikään
onnellinen ajatus lähettää juuri hänet kirjettä viemään Ujscieen.
— Kyllä se oli, — vastasi Radziejowski. — Hän voi tarkastaa leiriä
ja päälliköitä ja ottaa selvää mitä siellä yleensä ajatellaan. Sitä ei
olisi mikä kuormarenki hyvänsä pystynyt suorittamaan.
— Mutta jos hänet tunnetaan?
— Ei tunneta. Ja vaikkapa tunnettaisiinkin, niin he eivät hänelle

kuitenkaan pahaa tee; antavatpa oppaan kotimatkalle… Minä tunnen
puolalaiset niin hyvin ja uskallan sanoa, että he tekevät mitä
hyvänsä, jos on kysymyksessä saada ulkomaalainen vakuutetuksi
puolalaisen kohteliaisuudesta. Kaikki meidän pyrkimyksemme
tavoittelevat ulkomaalaisten ylistystä… Oxenstiernasta voitte olla
aivan huoletta, sillä hänen päästään ei tule putoamaan ainoatakaan
hiusta. Hän ei olisi vielä voinutkaan ennättää takaisin.
— Entä mitä luulette, tulevatko meidän kirjelmämme

vaikuttamaan?
Radziejowski rupesi nauramaan.
— Jos suvaitsette, herra ylipäällikkö, minun ennustaa, niin sanon

mitä tulee tapahtumaan. Posenin vojevoda on hovimies ja oppinut ja
tulee vastaamaan erittäin kohteliaasti ja kauniisti. Mutta koska hän
tahtoo käydä roomalaisesta, niin tulee hänen vastauksensakin
olemaan roomalainen. Hän sanoo tahtovansa ennemmin vuodattaa
viimeisen veripisaransa kuin antautua, sanoo, että kuolema on
häpeätä kauniimpi ja että rakkaus isänmaahan kutsuu häntä
kaatumaan sen puolesta rajalla.
Radziejowski rupesi nauramaan yhä äänekkäämmin, ja

Wittenbergin synkät kasvot kirkastuivat jonkin verran.
— Ettekö luule, että hän tekee niinkuin kirjoittaa? — kysyi tämä.
— Hänkö? — vastasi Radziejowski. — Hänen

isänmaanrakkautensa on vain paperilla, ja se on laihempi kuin
hänen hovinarrinsa, joka auttaa häntä sepittämään puheita. Olen
varma siitä, että noitten roomalaisten sanain jälkeen tulee olemaan
onnentoivotuksia, kohteliaisuuksia, vakuutuksia valmiudesta
palveluksiin ja lopuksi rukous, että säästäisimme hänen ja hänen
sukulaistensa hengen ja omaisuuden, josta me saisimme palkaksi
hänen ja hänen sukulaistensa kiitollisuuden.
— Entä lopputulos kirjeistämme?
— Että mieliala painuu maahan, että herrat senaattorit alkavat

neuvotella kanssamme ja että me valloitamme koko Suur-Puolan
ampumalla muutamia laukauksia ilmaan.
— Käyköön ennustuksenne toteen!
— Siitä olen varma, sillä tunnen heidät, minulla on ystäviä ja

puoluelaisia koko maassa, ja minä tiedän miten pitää menetellä… Ja
että olen tehnyt voitavani, sen takaa se vääryys, jota Jan Kasimir on
minulle tehnyt, ja se rakkaus, jota tunnen Kaarle Kustaata kohtaan.
Meillä katsotaan enemmän omaa parasta kuin valtakunnan etua.
Kaikki ne maat, joitten läpi kohta tulemme kulkemaan, kuuluvat
Opalinskeille, Czarnkowskeille, Grudzinskeille, ja kun nämä juuri
ovat joukkoineen Ujsciessa, niin tulevat neuvottelut päättymään mitä
parhaiten. Mitä aatelisiin tulee, niin he kyllä seuraavat vojevodiaan,
kunhan heille vain vakuutetaan heidän oikeutensa.
— Teidän perinpohjaiset tietonne maasta ja kansasta tuottavat

hänen kuninkaalliselle majesteetilleen suurta hyötyä, joka varmasti
palkitaan runsaasti. Kaikesta siitä, mitä olen kuullut, päätän, että voin
pitää tämän maakunnan otettuna.
— Voitte, herra ylipäällikkö, voitte, voitte!… — toisti Radziejowski

innostuneesti moneen kertaan.
— Minä omistan sen siis hänen kuninkaallisen majesteettinsa

Kaarle
Kustaan nimessä, — lausui Wittenberg juhlallisesti.
Ruotsalaisten joukkojen näin marssiessa Suur-Puolaan, vieläpä

aikaisemmin, jo 18 päivänä heinäkuuta, saapui puolalaisten leiriin
ruotsalainen lähetti tuoden kirjeen vojevodille Radziejowskilta ja
Wittenbergilta.
Herra Wladyslaw Skoraszewski itse saattoi hänet Posenin

vojevodan luo, ja aatelissotilaat katselivat uteliaasti »ensimmäistä
ruotsalaista» ihmetellen hänen suurta kasvuaan, tuimaa muotoaan,
keltaisia, pystyjä viiksiään ja uljasta ryhtiään. Katsojajoukko seurasi
jonkin matkan päässä aina vojevodan asunnolle saakka, tuttavat
vaihtoivat katseita, mutta useimmat nauroivat lähetin roimia
saapasvarsia ja pitkää, kömpelötekoista miekkaa, joka riippui
hopealla kirjaillusta kannikkeesta. Ruotsalainen katseli myöskin
uteliaasti ympärilleen, ikäänkuin hän olisi tahtonut tutkia leiriä ja siinä
olevan sotavoiman suuruutta.
Vihdoin lähetti vietiin vojevodan luo, jonne kaikki leirissä olevat

ylimykset olivat saapuneet.
Kirjelmät luettiin, ja neuvottelu alkoi. Vojevoda luovutti lähetin

hovimiehilleen, jotka saivat käskyn pitää hänelle seuraa ja kestitä
häntä. Mutta aateliset vaativat pian lähetin omaan seuraansa ja
alkoivat hänen kanssaan juopotella rajusti.
Herra Skoraszewski katseli lähettiä myöskin alinomaa, mutta siitä

syystä, että epäili häntä valepukuiseksi upseeriksi. Hän ilmaisi tämän
epäilyksensä vojevodallekin, mutta tämä vastasi, että yhdentekevä,
eikä antanut vangita häntä.
— Olkoonpa vaikka itse Wittenberg, — sanoi vojevoda, — lähetin

täytyy saada lähteä yhtä rauhallisesti kuin tulikin… Minä käsken
antamaan hänelle kymmenen dukaattia matkalle.
Sillävälin lähetti keskusteli murteellisella saksankielellä niitten

aatelisten kanssa, jotka olivat sitä läheisissä preussilaisissa
kaupungeissa oppineet, ja kertoi Wittenbergin voitoista eri maissa,
Ujsciea kohti marssivista ruotsalaisten sotavoimista ja etenkin
ruotsalaisten kauaskantavista tykeistä, joita ei voi vastustaa.
Aateliset säikähtivät aikalailla, ja liioiteltuja huhuja alkoi kiertää
ympäri leiriä.
Sinä yönä kukaan ei Ujsciessa nukkunut. Puoliyön aikaan

saapuivat ne joukot, jotka tähän saakka olivat olleet sijoitettuina
Pilaan ja Wieluniin. Ylimykset neuvottelivat vastauksesta aina
valkenevaan aamuun saakka, ja aateli kulutti aikaansa kertomalla
ruotsalaisten mahtavuudesta.
Aamun sarastaessa saapui herra Stanislaw Skrzetuski

ilmoittamaan, että ruotsalaiset olivat jo Walczissa, yhden päivän
marssin päässä puolalaisten leiristä. Siitä syntyi heti kova hälinä.
Suurin osa hevosia oli viety laitumille, ja nyt lähetettiin kiireimmän
kaupalla niitä hakemaan. Hetket ennen taistelua ovat
tottumattomalle sotilaalle kauheimmat. Kesti kauan, ennenkuin
ratsumestarit saivat aikaan jonkinlaisen järjestyksen. Jos silloin olisi
edes yksikin tykinlaukaus jyrähtänyt, olisi sekamelska helposti voinut
muuttua pakokauhuksi.
Vähitellen syntyi rivejä. Aatelisten synnynnäinen taipumus

sotimaan korvasi harjoitusten puutteen, ja keskipäivällä teki leiri jo
verraten hyvän vaikutuksen. Jalkamiehet seisoivat valleilla
muistuttaen kirjavissa puvuissaan kukkasia. Tykinsytyttimet
savusivat. Vallien takana tykkien suojassa olivat niityt täynnä
ratsuväkeä.
Sillävälin Posenin vojevoda laski lähetin takaisin viemään

vastausta, joka oli hyvin samanlainen kuin Radziejowski oli
ennustanut. Hän päätti myös lähettää pienen osaston Notecan
pohjoiselle rannalle vakoilemaan vihollista.
Piotr Opalinski, Podlahian vojevoda, määrättiin johtamaan

vakoiluosastoa. Sitäpaitsi ratsumestarit Skoraszewski ja Skrzetuski
saivat käskyn ottaa aatelin joukosta vapaaehtoisia ja lähteä myöskin
ottamaan vihollisesta selvää.
Molemmat ratsastivat pitkin rintamaa ilahduttaen katsojia hyvällä

ryhdillään ja huusivat kerta toisensa jälkeen:
— Hyvät herrat! Kuka haluaa vapaaehtoisena lähteä ruotsalaista

vastaan?
Kuka tahtoo haistaa ruutia?!
He olivat ratsastaneet jo pitkän matkan ilman tulosta, sillä kukaan

ei astunut esille rivistä. Toinen vilkuili toiseen. Oli sellaisia, jotka
olisivat halunneet, mutta ujous pidätti heitä eikä pelko. Naapuri
tökkäsi naapuria kylkeen sanoen: »Jos sinä lähdet, lähden minäkin.»
Ratsumestarit alkoivat jo hermostua, kun yht'äkkiä rivistä astui
kirjavapukuinen mies huutaen:
— Hyvät herrat! Minä lahden vapaaehtoiseksi, ja te rupeatte

narreiksi!
— Ostrozka! Ostrozka! — huudettiin.
— Yhtä hyvä aatelinen kuin joku teistä! — vastasi narri.
— Hyi olkoon! Saakeli soikoon! — huusi herra Rosinski,

alituomari. —
Mitä tämä tällainen narrinkujeilu on! Minä lähden!
— Ja minä! Ja minä myös!-huusivat monet.
— Kerran olen syntynyt, kerran myös kuolen! Äskeinen

epävarmuus oli muuttunut yleiseksi innostukseksi, ja aatelisia
ilmaantui joka puolelta vapaaehtoisiksi. Pian oli viisisataa
ratsumiestä koolla. Herra Skoraszewski rähähti leveään,
hyväntahtoiseen nauruun ja huusi:
— Riittää, hyvät herrat, riittää! Kaikki eivät voi päästä mukaan!
Sitten hän yhdessä Skrzetuskin kanssa järjesti miehet, ja he

läksivät.
Podlahian vojevoda liittyi heihin leirin toisessa päässä Saattoi

selvästi nähdä, kuinka he kulkivat Notecan yli, sitten näkyivät he
vilahdukselta vielä tienkäänteessä, kunnes vihdoin katosivat.
Puolisen tunnin kuluttua Posenin vojevoda käski miehien

hajaantua telttoihinsa, koska vihollinen oli vielä päivän marssin
päässä. Vahteja asetettiin eri puolille ja kiellettiin viemästä hevosia
laitumelle. Ensimmäisen merkkipuhalluksen kuultuaan jokaisen tuli
nousta hevosensa selkään ja asettua paikoilleen riviin.
Poissa oli odotus ja epävarmuus, poissa kinastelu ja eripuraisuus.

Vihollisen läheisyys nostatti mielialaa, kuten herra Skrzetuski oli
sanonut. Yksi ainoa voitto olisi voinut lietsoa sen ylimmilleen ja
johtaa sitten uusiin voittoihin.
— Osastomme palaa!… Hyvin on käynyt! Ruotsalaiset eivät ole

syöneet heitä! — alettiin yht'äkkiä ilmoittaa miehestä mieheen.
Osasto palasi todellakin valkoisten pölypilvien ympäröimänä ja tuli

vihdoin virran yli.
— Mutta heitähän on nyt enemmän! — huudahti herra Schlichting,

joka katsoi lähestyviä varjostaen kädellä silmiänsä.
— Vankeja tuovat mukanaan, totta totisesti! — huusi joku

aatelisista, joka ei ollut uskoa silmiään.
— Vankeja tuovat!… Vankeja tuovat!…
Tiedusteluosasto oli nyt niin lähellä, että kasvoista voi tuntea

miehet. Etumaisena ajoi herra Skoraszewski, nyökäytellen päätään
tapansa mukaan ja keskustellen iloisesti Skrzetuskin kanssa. Heidän
takanaan ajoi joukko ratsumiehiä, jotka piirinä ympäröivät muutamia
kymmeniä tuuheahattuisia vangiksi otettuja jalkamiehiä. Ne olivat
todellakin ruotsalaisia vankeja.
Näky innostutti aatelisia, jotka eivät enää voineet pidättää itseään,

vaan karahduttivat vastaan huutaen:
— Eläköön Skoraszewski! Eläköön Skrzetuski!
Sankat joukot ympäröivät heti tiedusteluosaston. Kutka

tarkastelivat vankeja, kutka utelivat miten kaikki oli tapahtunut,
uhkailivatpa jotkut ruotsalaisia.
— No!… Miltäs tuntuu, senkin lurjukset! Tekeekö teidän mielenne

tapella puolalaisten kanssa?
— Antakaa selkään niille! Lyökää sapelilla palasiksi!…
— Hyvät herrat, älkää huutako kuin poikanulikat, sillä vangit

voisivat luulla, että olette ensikertaa mukana sodassa! — huusi herra
Skoraszewski. — Ainahan sodassa vankeja otetaan.
Retkeen osaaottaneet vapaaehtoiset katselivat ylpeästi

ympärilleen, ja aateliset tekivät heille kysymyksiä minkä ennättivät.
— Mitenkä se oikein tapahtui? Antautuivatko ne helposti?

Taistelevatko ne hyvin?
— Kelpo sotureita ovat, — vastasi herra Rosinski, — tuimasti

puolustautuivat, mutta eivät ne sentään raudasta ole.
— Eivätkö voineet pitää puoliaan teitä vastaan?
— Eivät kestäneet meidän hyökkäystämme.
— Kuulkaa, mitä hän sanoi: hyökkäystämme eivät kestäneet!…

Hyökkäys — siinä se meidän valttimme onkin!
Jos noita aatelisia olisi heti käsketty hyökkäämään vihollisen

kimppuun, niin siihen heiltä ei olisi rohkeutta puuttunut, mutta
vihollista ei näkynyt vielä Sensijaan kajahti torventoitotus myöhään
illalla etuvartijain puolelta. Uusi lähetti saapui tuoden kirjettä
Wittenbergiltä, joka kehoitti aatelisia antautumaan. Kun sotaväki sai
siitä tiedon, oli se tappaa lähetin siihen paikkaan, mutta vojevoda otti
kuitenkin kirjeen käsiteltäväksi, vaikkakin sen sisällys oli hyvin
hämäräperäinen.
Ruotsalainen kenraali kirjoitti, että Kaarle Kustaa oli lähettänyt

sotajoukkoja sukulaisensa Jan Kasimirin avuksi kasakoita vastaan,
ja sentähden oli Suur-Puola velvollinen antautumaan ilman
vastarintaa Kun herra Grudzinski oli lukenut kirjeen, löi hän kiukusta
nyrkillä pöytään, mutta Posenin vojevoda rauhoitti häntä kysyen:
— Luuletteko voittavamme?… Montako päivää kestämme?…

Vastaatteko kaikesta aatelisverestä, joka huomenna mahdollisesti
vuotaa?…
Pitkän keskustelun jälkeen päätettiin olla vastaamatta kirjeeseen

ja odottaa. Mutta odotus loppui hyvin lyhyeen. Lauantaina 24
päivänä heinäkuuta etuvartiostolta tuli sana, että koko ruotsalainen
armeija on näkyvissä vastapäätä Pilaa. Leirissä syntyi surina kuin
mehiläispesässä vähän ennen parveilua.
Ratsumiehet nousivat hevosilleen. Vojevodat ajoivat rivejä pitkin

jaellen ristiriitaisia käskyjä, kunnes herra Skoraszewski otti yli johdon
käsiinsä ja ajoi muutaman sadan vapaaehtoisen kanssa leiristä
koetellakseen väkeään jossakin kahakassa ja totuttaakseen sitä
näkemään vihollista.
Ratsumiehet seurasivat johtajaansa mielellään, sillä ollen

tottuneita käyttämään miekkaa he eivät pelänneet kahakoita eivätkä
kaksintaisteluita. He ratsastivat joen yli ja pysähtyivät vihollisen
eteen, joka lähestyi lähestymistään häämöttäen mustana juovana
taivaanrannalla.
Joka hetki odotettiin, että vihollisen puolelta lähtisi ratsujoukko

heitä vastaan, mutta sitä ei kuitenkaan näkynyt. Sensijaan pysähtyi
kummulle muutaman sadan askelen päähän joukko hevosia ja
miehiä, jotka alkoivat puuhata jotakin. Heti kun herra Skoraszewski
huomasi sen, hän komensi:
— Vasemmalle — mars!
Tuskin oli komentohuuto kajahtanut, kun kummulla näkyi pitkiä,

valkoisia savunsuikaleita, kuului kuin siipien suhinaa, sitten jyrinää ja
haavoittuneitten huutoja.
— Seis! — huusi herra Stanislaw.
Taas kuului siipien suhinaa, ja taas seurasi tuskallisia huutoja.

Aateliset eivät kuunnelleet enää päällikkönsä komentoa, vaan
peräytyivät yhä nopeammin huutaen ja pyytäen taivasta auttamaan.
Tuossa tuokiossa oli joukko hajaantunut ja ajoi täyttä laukkaa
takaisin leiriin. Herra Skoraszewski kirosi — mutta mikään ei
auttanut.
Hajoitettuaan helposti kahakoitsijajoukon Wittenberg jatkoi matkaa

ja pysähtyi vasta vastapäätä Ujsciea vihollisen vallien eteen, joita
kaliszilaiset puolustivat. Puolalaisten tykit alkoivat paukkua, mutta
ruotsalaiset eivät vastanneet tuleen. Savu levisi pitkinä suikaleina
läpi kirkkaan ilman, mutta savun välistä nähtiin ruotsalaisten
rykmenttien valmistautuvan peloittavan rauhallisesti taisteluun.
Korkeammille paikoille vietiin tykkejä, valleja luotiin, sanalla
sanoen, vihollinen varustautui vähääkään välittämättä puolalaisten
kuulista, jotka eivät sattuneet heihin.
Vielä kerran ajoi Stanislaw Skrzetuski kahden kaliszilaisen

lippukunnan kanssa kentälle aikoen yllättää vihollisen rohkealla
hyökkäyksellä. Mutta lippukunnat seurasivat häntä haluttomasti ja
joutuivat pian epäjärjestykseen, sillä rohkeitten rientäessä eteenpäin
arat tahallaan vitkastelivat. Kaksi Wittenbergin lähettämää
ratsuväenrykmenttiä karkoitti ne kentältä ja ajoi niitä takaa melkein
leirille saakka.
Sillävälin oli hämärä jo tullut ja lopetti verettömän taistelun.
Mutta tykit jyrisivät aina yön tuloon saakka. Sitten ne vasta

vaikenivat. Silloin syntyi puolalaisten leirissä sellainen melu, että se
kuului aina Notecan rannoille saakka. Syynä oli se, että muutama
sata miestä yritti paeta pimeän tultua leiristä, mutta toiset, jotka
huomasivat mitä oli tekeillä, estivät sen. Tartuttiin miekkoihin, ja
sanat: »Kaikki tai ei kukaan!» lensivät taas suusta suuhun. Vähitellen
rupesi näyttämään yhä todenmukaisemmalta, että kaikki lähtevät
matkoihinsa. Johtajiin oltiin tyytymättömiä, ja heitä syytettiin siitä,
että he olivat lähettäneet nälkäisiä miehiä ruotsalaisten tykkejä
vastaan.
Haukuttiinpa Wittenbergiäkin, joka vastoin sotilaallisia tapoja oli

ampunut tykeillä pientä kahakkajoukkoa. »Jokainen tehköön niinkuin
parhaaksi näkee», — sanottiin, — »mutta kurja on se kansa, joka ei
uskalla asettua rinta rintaa vasten vihollisen kanssa». Toiset
paljastivat epätoivonsa: »He savuttavat meidät täältä pois, kuten
ketun luolastaan.» »Leiri on huonosti varustettu, vallit heikot, paikka
sopimaton puolustukseen.» Ja tuon tuostakin huudettiin: »Hyvät
herrat, pelastakaa henkenne!» Mutta toiset huusivat: »Pettureita!
Pettureita!»
Se oli kauhea yö. Sekasorto ja hälinä kasvoi hetki hetkeltä.

Käskyjä ei toteltu. Vojevodat joutuivat ymmälle eivätkä edes
yrittäneet palauttaa järjestystä. Heidän kykenemättömyytensä
samoin kuin nostoväenkin kävi ilmi aivan selvästi. Wittenberg olisi
voinut sinä yönä vallata koko leirin peräti helposti.
Aamu valkeni.
Seuraava päivä oli pilvinen ja alakuloinen, ja sen kelmeä valo

valaisi masentuneita, valittavia, juopuneita ja suureksi osaksi
petokseen valmiita ihmisiä. Kaiken pahan lisäksi olivat ruotsalaiset
yön kuluessa kulkeneet Notecan yli Dzienbowin kohdalla ja
piirittäneet puolalaisen leirin.
Maan puolella ei ollut ensinkään valleja, ja niitä oli tehtävä nyt

kiireimmän kaupalla. Skoraszewski ja Skrzetuski pyysivät ja
rukoilivat niitä luomaan, mutta kukaan ei välittänyt mistään.
Vojevodain ja aatelisten huulilla kajahteli sana: »Neuvottelemaan!»

Ja neuvottelijoita lähetettiin. Vastaukseksi saapui ruotsalaisten
puolelta loistava lähetystö, jonka etunenässä ratsastivat
Radziejowski ja kenraali Wirtz, molemmilla vihreä oksa kädessä.
He ajoivat Posenin vojevodan asunnolle, mutta matkalla

Radziejowski pysähtyi aatelisten sankassa parvessa, nosti hattuaan,
hymyili, tervehti tuttuja ja lausui kuuluvalla äänellä:
— Arvoisat herrat, rakkaat veljet, älkää olko levottomia! Me emme

ole tulleet tänne vihollisina, Teistä itsestänne riippuu, vuodatammeko
enää yhtäkään veripisaraa. Jos te tyrannin sijaan, joka sortaa teidän
vapauttanne, jonka mielessä väikkyy absolutum dominium [ehdoton
ylivalta], joka on vienyt isänmaansa perikadon partaalle, jos te
sellaisen tyrannin sijaan tahdotte hyvän, jalosydämisen isännän ja
uljaan soturin, jonka pelkkä nimi voisi karkoittaa kaikki Puolan
viholliset, niin antautukaa hänen kuninkaallisen majesteettinsa
Kaarle Kustaan suojelukseen… Arvoisat herrat, rakkaat veljet!
Minulla on tässä mukanani kirjelmä, jossa vakuutetaan kaikki teidän
oikeutenne, teidän vapautenne ja uskontonne. Teidän pelastuksenne
riippuu teistä itsestänne… Arvoisat herrat! Ruotsin armollisin
kuningas lupaa tukahduttaa kasakkakapinan ja lopettaa sodan
Liettuassa, ja hän yksin voi sen tehdä. Armahtakaa isänmaatanne,
jollette soisikaan itsellenne armoa…
Tässä värisi petturin ääni itkusta. Aateli joutui ymmälle, mutta

Radziejowski ajoi eteenpäin kumartaen taas ympärilleen. Vihdoin
hän yhdessä Wirtzin ja koko seurueen kanssa katosi Posenin
vojevodan taloon.
Aateliset tunkeutuivat niin tiukasti talon ympärille, että päitten

päällä olisi voinut kävellä. He käsittivät, että tuossa talossa ratkaistiin
ei ainoastaan heidän, vaan koko maan kohtalo. Vojevodan
punapukuisia palvelijoita tuli ulos pyytämään muutamia
huomatuimpien sukujen edustajia sisälle. Nämä tottelivat mielellään,
ja muut jäivät ulos odottamaan… Vallitsi syvä hiljaisuus… Seinän
luona seisovat kuulivat sisältä kiivasta puhetta.. Kului tunti, toinen,
mutta neuvottelua kesti yhä.
Yht'äkkiä paukahti eteisen ovi auki ja herra Wladislaw

Skoraszewski syöksyi ulos.
Ympärillä olevat peräytyivät peloissaan.

Kyllä herra Skoraszewski olikin kauhistuttavan näköinen, tuo
tavallisesti niin rauhallinen ja hyväntahtoinen mies, josta sanottiin,
että haavat paranivat hänen kätensä kosketuksesta. Hänen silmänsä
olivat veripunaiset, katse harhaileva, puku epäjärjestyksessä. Hän
piti kaksin käsin päästään kiinni.
— Petos! Murha! Häpeä! Nyt me olemme ruotsalaisia emmekä

enää puolalaisia! — huusi hän vihlovasti.
Ja hän hyrskähti epätoivoiseen itkuun, repi tukkaansa kuin

mieletön. Mutta ympärillä vallitsi haudan hiljaisuus. Jonkinlainen
peloittava tunne valtasi kaikki läsnäolijat.
Yht'äkkiä Skoraszewski ojensi vartalonsa ja huusi hurjalla äänellä:
— Aseihin! Aseihin jokainen, joka Jumalaan uskoo! Aseihin!
Humaus kävi halki väkijoukon, synkkä, katkonainen humaus kuin

ensimmäinen tuulenpuuska myrskyn lähestyessä. Epäröitiin…
epäröitiin. Mutta epätoivoinen ääni, jossa oli syvä, traagillinen sointu,
huusi yhä:
— Aseihin! Aseihin!
Kohta häneen liittyi vielä kaksi muuta: herra Piotr Skoraszewski ja

herra Skrzetuski… sitten kolmas Klodzinski, Posenin lippukunnan
urhea ratsumestari.
Aateliset tunkeilivat yhä taajemmin heidän ympärillään. Kuului

uhkaavaa puheensorinaa, silmät säihkyivät, posket punoittivat,
miekat kalisivat. Wladyslaw Skoraszewski sai vaivoin hillityksi hurjan
epätoivonsa ja huusi osoittaen taloa, jossa neuvottelua käytiin:
— Hyvät ystävät, tuolla he ovat myyneet isänmaansa kuin Juudas!
Me emme kuulu enää Puolaan! Sen enempää epäröimättä ovat nuo
herrat tuolla jättäneet vihollisen käsiin teidät kaikki, koko leirin sekä
armeijan ja tykit. Murskatkoon salama heidät säpäleiksi! Vielä he
allekirjoittivat omasta ja teidän puolestanne, että eroavat
isänmaasta, eroavat hallitsijasta, että koko maakunta, kaikki
kaupungit, linnoitukset ja me kaikki tulemme kuulumaan Ruotsille.
Armeija voi antautua, sellaista sattuu, mutta kuka on antanut heille
oikeuden luopua isänmaasta, kuninkaasta?! Kuka on antanut heille
oikeuden lohkaista kokonaisen maakunnan irti isänmaasta ja liittää
sen vieraaseen maahan?! Kuka on antanut heille oikeuden siirtyä
toiseen kansallisuuteen ja kieltää oman verensä. Hyvät herrat, se on
petosta, murhaa, häpeällistä!… Pelastakaa isänmaa, rakkaat veljet!
Jumalan nimessä, se, joka on aatelismies ja kunniallinen, rientäköön
pelastamaan!… Uhratkaamme henkemme ja veremme! Me emme
tahdo olla ruotsalaisia, emme tahdo olla!… Emme!… Parempi, kun
ei olisi syntynyt sellaista miestä, joka nyt vertaan säästää…
Pelastakaa isänmaa!…
— Se on petosta! — huusivat kymmenet äänet. — Petosta! Surma

pettureille!
— Tänne se, joka mies on! — huusi Skrzetuski.
— Ruotsalaisia vastaan! Kuolemaan! — huusi Klodzinski.
He ryntäsivät eteenpäin läpi leirin huutaen: »Tänne, miehet! Se on

petosta!» Heihin liittyi muutamia satoja aatelisia, jotka paljastivat
miekkansa, mutta suurin osa jäi kuitenkin paikoilleen.
Neuvottelutalon ovet avautuivat taas ja ovesta astuivat ulos

Posenin vojevoda Krzysztof Opalinski, kenraali Wirtz edellisen
oikealla ja Radziejowski vasemmalla puolella. Heidän takanaan
näkyi joukko puolalaisia ylimyksiä.
Krzystof Opalinski piti kädessä pergamenttikääröä, josta riippui

sinetti. Hän piti päätään pystyssä, mutta kasvot olivat kalpeat, katse
hämärä, ja hän koetti näyttää tyytyväiseltä. Hän silmäili ympärilleen
joukkoja ja aloitti keskellä kuolonhiljaisuutta kuuluvalla, vaikka hiukan
käheällä äänellä:
— Hyvät herrat! Me olemme tänään antautuneet Ruotsin

kuninkaallisen majesteetin suojeluksen alaisiksi. Vivat Carolus
Gustavus rex! Eläköön kuningas Kaarle Kustaa!
Kukaan ei yhtynyt eläköönhuutoon. Samassa kajahti ääni

joukosta:
— Veto!
Vojevoda katsoi suuntaan, josta ääni kuului, ja sanoi:
— Me emme ole nyt valtiopäivillä, eikä kenelläkään ole siis täällä

veto-oikeutta. Mutta ketä haluttaa, se asettukoon ruotsalaisten
tykkien eteen, jotka yhdessä tunnissa voisivat pommittaa meidän
leirimme raunioiksi.
Hän vaikeni, mutta kysyi hetken kuluttua:
— Kuka sanoi »veto»? Ei kuulunut vastausta.
Vojevoda rupesi taas puhumaan ja lausui yhä kuuluvammin:
— Aatelis- ja pappissäädyn kaikki oikeudet säilytetään, veroja ei

suurenneta, ja ne kannetaan entiseen tapaan… Kukaan ei tule
kärsimään vääryyttä eikä sortoa. Hänen majesteettinsa sotajoukoilla
tulee olemaan samat oikeudet kuin vakituisilla puolalaisilla kruunun
sotajoukoilla…
Vojevoda pysähtyi ja kuunteli uteliaasti väkijoukon kuiskauksia,

ikäänkuin olisi tahtonut päästä selville sen mielipiteestä, mutta jatkoi
kohta taas annettuaan merkin kädellään:
— Sitäpaitsi meillä on kenraali Wittenbergin Ruotsin kuninkaan

nimessä antama lupaus, että jos koko maa seuraa meidän
pelastavaa esimerkkiämme, niin Ruotsin sotajoukot hyökkäävät
Liettuaan ja Ukrainaan eivätkä herkeä sotimasta, ennenkuin kaikki
alueet ja linnat on palautettu takaisin Puolalle. Vivat Carolus
Gustavus rex!
— Vivat Carolus Gustavus rex! — huusivat sadat äänet.
— Vivat Carolus Gustavus rex! — kaikui ympäri leiriä.
Sitten Posenin vojevoda kääntyi kaikkien nähden Radziejowskin

puoleen ja syleili häntä sydämellisesti; sitten hän syleili kenraali
Wirtziä. Alkoi yleinen syleileminen. Aateliset seurasivat ylimysten
esimerkkiä. Innostus oli yleinen. Vivat-huudot kaikuivat, että
ympäristö jylisi. Sitten Posenin vojevoda puuttui vielä puheeseen
pyytäen hetken hiljaisuutta ja ilmoitti sydämellisellä äänellä:
— Hyvät herrat! Kenraali Wittenberg pyytää meitä tänään juhlaan

hänen leiriinsä, jotta me malja kädessä tekisimme veljesliiton
urhoollisen Ruotsin kansan kanssa.
— Vivat Wittenberg! Vivat! Vivat! Vivat!,

— Ja senjälkeen, — hyvät herrat, me palaamme kukin kotiimme ja
aloitamme Jumalan avulla elonkorjuun siinä uskossa, että olemme
tänään pelastaneet isänmaamme häviöstä.
— Tulevat sukupolvet tulevat tunnustamaan, että me olimme

oikeassa, — sanoi Radziejowski.
— Amen! — lopetti Posenin vojevoda. Silloin hän huomasi, että

suurin osa hänen ympärillään seisovista katseli johonkin hänen
päänsä päällä.
Hän kääntyi ympäri ja näki hovinarrinsa, joka varpaillaan seisoen

ja pitäen toisella kädellään kiinni ovenpielestä kirjoitti hiilellä
neuvottelutalon oven yläpuolelle seuraavat sanat:
»Mene — Tekel — Ufarsin.» [Babylonian viimeisen kuninkaan

Belsasarin toimeenpanemissa juomingeissa ilmaantui seinälle outo
kirjoitus, jota kukaan ei osannut lukea, paitsi profeetta Daniel, joka
luki sen: mene, tekel, ufarsin — ja sanoi sen tietävän kuninkaan
kuolemaa ja valtakunnan häviötä. Suom. huom.]
Taivas peittyi pilviin, ja myrsky teki tuloaan.

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Employment Discrimination in

Massachusetts 2nd Edition Various

Feminist Judgments Rewritten Employment Discrimination

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Massachusetts Guide to Evidence 2019th Edition Supreme

A.I. and Remote Working: A Paradigm Shift in Employment

Ethical Lawyering in Massachusetts 4 (w/supp.) Edition

Massachusetts Courtroom Advocacy David L. Ferrera

Adventures in Wool First (195?) Edition Various

The Massachusetts General Hospital Handbook of

2nd Edition 2020

Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc.

Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc.

Publication of the Employment Discrimination in Massachusetts was made possible

On behalf of Jack Reilly, publisher, Maryanne G. Jensen, editor-in-chief, and the

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

SHANNON M. BERUBE is a staff attorney with Seyfarth Shaw LLP in Boston,

MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 iii

retaliation, misclassification, wage and hour regulations, breach of contract claims,

GAVRIELA M. BOGIN-FARBER is an associate attorney in the firm of Messing,

ALIDA BOGRÁN-ACOSTA is an investigator with the Office of Equal Opportunity

iv 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

JUSTINE H. BROUSSEAU is a founding partner of Kimball Brousseau LLP in Bos-

ANTHONY S. CALIFANO is a partner in the labor and employment department of

DAVID CONFORTO is the founder of Conforto Law Group in Boston. He dedicates

SHERLEY CRUZ is an assistant professor at the University of Tennessee College of

MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 v

PATRICK J. HANNON is a partner at Hartley Michon Robb LLP in Boston. He con-

NINA JOAN KIMBALL is a founding partner in Kimball Brousseau LLP in Boston.

vi 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

ARIELLE B. KRISTAN is an attorney with Hirsch Roberts Weinstein LLP in Bos-

ALLYSON E. KURKER is a partner at Kurker Paget LLC in Waltham. She counsels

JENNIFER L. LEVI is director of the transgender rights project of GLBTQ Legal

ROBERT S. MANTELL is a partner at Powers, Jodoin, Margolis & Mantell LLP in

MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 vii

JOHANNA L. MATLOFF is a partner at Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford

STEPHEN T. MELNICK is a shareholder of Littler Mendelson, PC, in Boston,

KATHERINE J. MICHON is a partner of Hartley Michon Robb LLP in Boston,

JULIE M. MULLER is an associate at Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford

viii 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

DAHLIA C. RUDAVSKY is a partner of Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, PC, in New-

MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 ix

MICHAEL E. STEINBERG is an associate in the labor and employment department

x 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

Chapter 1 Overview of Employment Discrimination

Chapter 2 Age Discrimination

Chapter 3 Gender Discrimination

Chapter 4 Disability Discrimination

MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 xi

Chapter 5 Pregnancy Discrimination

Chapter 6 Race, Ethnicity, and National Origin Discrimination

Chapter 7 Religious Discrimination

Chapter 8 Sexual Harassment

Chapter 9 Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Same-Sex

xii 2nd Edition 2020 | MCLE, Inc.

Table of Statutes, Rules, and References

TABLE OF CHECKLISTS AND EXHIBITS

MCLE, Inc. | 2nd Edition 2020 xiii