Conflict, Conflict Prevention,

Conflict Management and Beyond:

a conceptual exploration

Niklas L.P. Swanström

Mikael S. Weissmann

CONCEPT PAPER
Summer 2005
Conflict, Conflict Prevention and
Conflict Management and beyond:
a conceptual exploration

Niklas L.P. Swanström

Mikael S. Weissmann

CONCEPT PAPER
Summer 2005

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program –

A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center
Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW,
Washington, D.C. 20036
Uppsala University, Box 514, 75120 Uppsala, Sweden
www.silkroadstudies.org
 2

“Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual

Exploration” is a Concept Paper published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk
Road Studies Program. The Concept Paper Series is the Joint Center’s paper series
addressing topics and concepts of foremost importance for understanding the dynamics of
security, conflicts and development in the region.

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 3

Table of Contents

Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and Beyond: A

Conceptual Exploration _________________________________________________ 5

SECTION 1: DEFINITION OF CONFLICT AND THE LIFE

CYCLE(S) OF A CONFLICT
Conflict _______________________________________________________________ 7
Definition of conflict__________________________________________________ 7
The life cycle(s) of a conflict__________________________________________ 9
Different conflict curves _____________________________________________ 15
A development of the single conflict curve model _____________________ 15
The multi-curve model _____________________________________________ 17

SECTION 2: CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT
Conflict prevention __________________________________________________ 19
Conflict management ________________________________________________ 23
Conflict management and conflict resolution ___________________________ 25
Conflict management and conflict prevention __________________________ 26
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution – the need for an
integrated approach? _________________________________________________ 28
Biographical note ____________________________________________________ 30

This paper was written as part of the project “Peace and Security:
Conflict Management and Conflict Prevention in Northeast Asia”,
funded by the Swedish Research Council (grant 2002-3126) and the
project “Conflict and Security in Asia” funded by the Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
4
 5

Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict

Management and Beyond: a conceptual exploration1

This paper will provide an overview of the concepts conflict, conflict

prevention and conflict management. It will also briefly discuss related
concepts, including conflict resolution, crisis management, preventive
diplomacy, and a culture of prevention. The aim of the paper is to set the
stage for a discussion on how to come to terms with the lack of consensus
and differences in interpretation of these concepts within the academic
and policy community. 2
On a general level, conflict prevention and conflict management are
broad terms for methods and mechanisms used to avoid, minimize, and
manage conflicts between different parties.3 Conflict prevention is a set
of instruments used to prevent or solve disputes before they have
developed into active conflicts. 4 Conflict management is a theoretical
concept focusing on the limitation, mitigation, and/or containment of a
conflict without necessary solving it. 5 Conflict resolution has
traditionally referred to measures attempting to resolve the underlying

1
A draft version of this paper was written to provide a starting point for the discussions
on the Silk Road Studies Program’s workshop "Theory Development on Conflict
Prevention and Conflict Management" organized in Uppsala April 8-9, 2005. The paper
you now are reading is a somewhat altered version of the paper presented at the workshop.
It should also be noted that this paper is based on, but extends beyond, Dr. Swanström’s
dissertation Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific Rim
(Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2002).
2
The problem of a lacking consensus was identified at the Silk Road Studies Conference
on Conflict Prevention and Management in Northeast Asia held in Beijing November 26
– 28, 2004. It was also one of the topics of discussion on the Uppsala workshop in April
2005.
3
Bruce Russett, “Preventing Violent Conflict Through the Kantian Peace”, in Preventing
Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges, ed. Peter Wallensteen, Report No 48
(Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998); Michael Lund, Preventing
Violent Conflicts (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Niklas
L.P. Swanström, Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific Rim
(Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2002); Niklas L.P. Swanström
“Conflict Management in Northeast Asia”, Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30,
No. 1 (2003); Peter Wallensteen, ed., Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future
Challenges, Report No 48 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998).
4
Sophia Clément, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of the Fyr Macedonia
(Alencon: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1997).
5
Fred Tanner, “Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution: Limits of Multilateralism”,
International Review of the Red Cross, September (2000).
 6

incompatibilities of a conflict, including attempts to get the parties to

mutually accept each others' existence.6 It is important to note here that
the traditional separation of conflict prevention, management and
resolution not only treat them as different concepts, but also as separate
processes. Such ideas are opposed in this paper, in which also the
concepts are seen as being closely related and in many ways even
inseparable. This will be elaborated upon in section two of this paper.
Before that, however, the definition and dynamics of a conflict needs to
be addressed.
Consequently, the first section of this paper will focus on the concept of
conflict and conflict cycles. After presenting a working definition of
conflict, a theoretical model of the conflict lifecycle will be provided.
This section also presents an extended model of the conflict lifecycle
which includes both the conflict intensity level and measures to prevent,
limit and resolve the conflict. This model is thereafter used to elaborate
upon different forms of conflict cycles, including addressing the problem
with a conflict consisting of a large number of conflictual issues, or sub-
conflicts. In the second section focus moves from the conflict as such to
the concepts of conflict prevention and conflict management. This
section includes, but is not limited to, an overview of research on conflict
prevention and conflict management, including related concepts such as
preventive diplomacy, culture of prevention, and crisis management.
Thereafter, the section moves on to explore the overlapping and
integrated aspects of conflict prevention and conflict management,
thereby addressing the necessity of linking the two. To the extent
overlapping with the two core concepts, conflict resolution and crisis
management will also be addressed in this overview.

6
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding conflict resolution: war, peace and the global system
(London: Sage, 2002).
 7

SECTION 1:

Definition of Conflict and the Life Cycle(s) of a Conflict

Conflict
Definition of conflict
The perception of threat, or actual occurrence of conflict, is necessary for
the initiation of conflict prevention or management measures, and hence
it is essential to address the concept of conflict before exploring how to
prevent and manage such occurrences.
The first step is to understand what a conflict is made up by exactly. The
starting point for this paper is the traditional definitions of conflicts
(presented below), according to which a conflict is the result of opposing
interests involving scarce resources, goal divergence and frustration. The
paper then addresses more recent perceptions of the conflict concept. We
suggest that conflicts should not be defined simply in terms of violence
(behavior) or hostility (attitudes), but also include incompatibility or
“differences in issue position” (Positiondifferenzen)7 Such a definition is
designed to include conflicts outside the traditional military sphere and is
based on behavioral dimensions.

7
Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Internationale Politik; Ein Konfliktmodell (Paderborn: Schöningh,
1981), 198-203.
 8

According to Mitchell, the Model 1: Mitchell’s Conflict Model

conflict structure consists
of three parts: attitudes,
behavior and situations that
interact and create conflicts
between actors. 8 Mitchell’s
conflict structure simplifies
the complex reality in an
understandable way (Model
1). The model was created
for political and military
conflicts, but is also 1. The situation impacts the behavior (failure to reach targeted
applicable to the changes in goals, especially important goals, creates frustration and increases
the willingness to reach these goals).
perception of conflicts that 2. The situation impacts attitudes (incompatible goals increase the
the international suspicion and distrust between the actors).
3. Behavior impacts the situation (success can introduce new
community has experienced questions in the conflict as demands increases).
4. Behavior impacts the attitudes (destruction increases hatred,
- economic, environmental success can impact the group solidarity and the notion of "us").
and human security have 5. Attitudes impact the behavior (expectations such as "our
traditional enemies will attack again" will impact the defensive
became fundamental planning and preventive actions).
aspects of international and 6. Attitudes impact the situation (the longer the conflict continues
the more questions will be introduced).
regional interaction.
Mitchell’s model is able to
incorporate this. However, this model is complicated by the fact that
conflicts often occur in mixed-motive relationships where the involved
parties both have cooperative and competitive goals and Mitchell’s model
seems to have neglected this pluralistic/multifaceted/more complex
dimension to the relationship. 9 The competitive element creates conflict
and the cooperative element creates incentives to negotiate an
agreement.10 There are, however, studies that confirm that conflicts tend
to occur even when the involved parties have highly compatible goals.11
This can be explained by including frustration, obstruction, and
interference in the definition. The theoretical framework presented here
has been adjusted to leave room for an interpretation of conflict which
8
C.R.. Mtchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1981), 55.
9
Kwok Leung and Dean Tjosvold, Conflict Management in the Asia Pacific: Assumptions and
Approaches in Diverse Cultures (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1998); Walton, R. and R.
Mckersie, A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
10
M. Deutsch and M. Krauss, “Studies in interpersonal bargaining”, Journal of Conflicr
Resolotion, vol 6 (1962).
11
M. Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
 9

includes tensions, misunderstandings, political and economic interests,

and historical animosity.
A conflict has generally been defined as a situation in which two or more
parties strive to acquire the same scarce resources at the same time. 12
Scholars generally agree that there needs to be more than one part to have
a conflict, and that the time factor is important. What does cause concern
is the term scarce resource. The central point in this argument is scarcity,
but resources need also be included in the discussion. Peter Wallensteen
has pointed out that resources are not only economic in nature,13 and that
the terminology might miss conflicts involving economic orientation,
human security, environment, historical issues, etc. Such conflicts are not
necessarily about resources, and when they are, these resources are, more
importantly, not necessarily scarce. A conflict is, moreover, in many
cases based on perceptions, rather than on attitudes or behavior as it has
generally been defined.
When discussing the concept of conflict, perception should be included as
a central concept since the conflicts and the opponent’s intentions often
are defined according to subjective perceptions. There could be an
abundance of space for agreement in a conflict, but if the parties perceive
the conflict as being impossible to resolve or the opponent to be
untrustworthy this might not help in resolving the conflict. The
normative disputes (often subjectively defined) are also left out of the
rational definitions. These disputes involve religion, values and beliefs
and do not always have a military outcome. In conclusion, we suggest the
following definition of conflict: perceived differences in issue positions
between two or more parties at the same moment in time.

The Life Cycle(s) of a Conflict

A conflict is not a static situation, but a dynamic one – the intensity level
changes over a conflicts’ life cycle. An understanding of the conflict cycle
is essential for an understanding of how, where and when to apply
different strategies and measures of conflict prevention and management.
Over time, numerous suggestions and models of conflict patterns have

12
Peter Wallensteen, Från krig till fred - Om konfliktlösning i det globala systemet (Stockholm:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1994), 14-15; Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution War,
Peace and The Global System (London: Sage Publishing, 2002), 16.
13
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution War, Peace and The Global System
(London: Sage Publishing, 2002), 16-17.
 10

been put forward. Among these models and suggestions, a number of

patterns stand out. Conflicts tend to be described as cyclical in regard to
their intensity levels, i.e. escalating from (relative) stability and peace
into crisis and war, thereafter deescalating into relative peace. Most
scholars also agree that these cycles are reoccurring. This proposition is
strongly supported by empirical research on conflict patterns. Here, it
should also be noted that many scholars add stable, sometimes called
durable, peace as an additional phase in which the conflict is considered
resolved – i.e. the reoccurring pattern of the conflict has been stopped.
Also, most models divide both the escalation and de-escalation of the
conflict cycle into phases. It can also be noted that in many cases the
conflict model has taken the form of a U, or an upside-down U.
The division into phases, and the cyclical perception of conflict, has also
become the starting point for research on conflict prevention,
management and resolution. In principle, conflict prevention, conflict
management and conflict resolution are regarded as applicable in
different phases of a conflict. In sum, conflict prevention measures are
designed for the early phases, before a conflict has become manifest
(open). Management measures are applied in later phases when a conflict
is manifest, but before violence has occurred. Conflict resolution could,
on the other hand, be applied in the de-escalation phase after a violent
conflict has occurred.14 As illustrated below, the division into phases is a
much simplified description of reality. Also, there are disagreements both
within the academic and the policy community, as well as between the
two as to how these measures should be understood and applied.
The model of the life-cycle of conflicts presented here includes both the
conflict process itself and possible prevention, management and
resolution measures (Model #2). This conflict cycle is presented in the
form of an upside-down U-curve, illustrating a conflict cycle in its most
simplified form, i.e. the rise from stable peace to war and the de-
escalation to stable peace. The model presented below is an ideal model of
the conflict cycle, an analytical construction developed to simplify
analysis. As will be noted in the coming section (see “Different conflict
curves”), this model is simplified and is not always in line with the
empirical reality.

14
The authors however argue that resolution can be applied in all phases as soon as the
conflict is manifest.
 11

Model 2: The Conflict Cycle

Conflict Escalation Phase De-escalation Phase

intensity
level
War
Peace enforcement

Crisis Crisis management Peace keeping

Open
conflict Conflict management Conflict management

Unstable
peace Direct prevention Peace building

Stable
peace Structural prevention Peace consolidation

Duration
of conflict
Early stage Mid-stage Late-stage

∗ Model based on Michael Lund, 1996

The curve is divided into five levels of conflict intensity (stable peace,
unstable peace, open conflict, crisis, and war) in a total of nine chronological
phases. Stable peace is a situation where tension between the parties is low
and there exists different forms of connections and cooperation between
them, often including economic and environmental cooperation, as well as
cooperation within other non-sensitive issue-areas. During a period of
unstable peace, tension has increased. This is a situation where, albeit the
existing negative peace, there are such high tensions between the parties that
peace no longer seems guaranteed. An open conflict is when the conflict is
defined and the parties have taken measures to deal with it, even if
militarized options are not adopted. In the crisis phase, the risk of war is
imminent and militarized options are the preferable or likely option. There
may be sporadic violence between the parties at this stage, but there is no
regular open violence. In the war phase, on the other hand, there is
widespread and intense violence. In the de-escalation phase the pattern is
reversed, moving from war to crisis, through open conflict and unstable
peace to finally reach a situation of stable peace.
 12

Just as the phases of the conflict cycle are important, the connection
between conflict prevention and conflict- and crisis managing needs to be
developed further. The easiest way to separate between the concepts is by
focusing on the time factor. Starting with conflict prevention, it is by
definition applied before the conflict has become open and violent, i.e. to
prevent a conflict from emerging in the first place (or to prevent a
conflict from re-escalating in a post-conflict phase). Conflict prevention
measures are effective at the levels of stable- and unstable peace before a
conflict has become manifest. Here, it is important to differentiate
between structural- and direct preventive measures. The former are most
applicable in the stable peace phase and consist of structural measures
that often aim at specific groups or issues such as economic development,
political participation or cultural autonomy. The benefits of applying
structural measures at an early stage is simply that the acceptance of
preventive measures tends to be higher at low levels of inter-party
suspicion and hence more far-reaching and institutional measures can be
implemented. If structural preventive measures are implemented at an
early stage, including both the building of institutions and development
of trust and (longer-term) cooperation, they decrease the perceived need
to, and hence risk of, escalating a potential conflict issue into the level of
unstable peace. The more pronounced a conflict becomes the more
specific measures it requires. At the same time, structural measures are
loosing importance as a probable strategy.
In the unstable peace phase, the direct preventive measures are directed at
issues with a shorter term goal in mind, i.e. to reduce tension and create
trust between the actors. Simultaneously, the window of opportunity for
longer-term initiatives, such as the building of institutions, fades away
slowly and the conflict becomes more issue specific and more costly in
financial and political terms. Direct preventive measures can, for
example, be formal or informal workshops dealing with the possible
conflict issues. They can also aim at creating openness in certain fields
such as the military, reducing military spending, or achieving cooperation
in rescue operations. Other examples include sanctions, coercive
diplomacy, the dispatch of special envoys, and problem-solving
workshops. It should be noted that the border between structural and
direct prevention is unclear and that aspects of the two are often
overlapping.
 13

Conflict management and crisis management do, on the other hand,

involve tactics that are enforced when violent conflict is deemed likely
(conflict management) or imminent (crisis management), but before a
situation escalates into war. Conflict management can be enforced, as
soon as the conflict has been identified by the actors, as an effort to
reduce tension and prevent further escalation. Direct measures, such as
reduction of military forces, third party intervention, informal and
formal communication or general CBMs, can be designed to handle the
conflict and reverse destructive behavior into constructive. The measures
are often bilateral as questions many times are sensitive and not seen as
threatening at this stage. However, multilateral forums, such as the UN,
are increasingly being used.
Crisis management is employed in the short time frame before a war is to
erupt, when the conflict escalates rapidly and the time for management
measures is limited. This period is characterized by a scarcity of time and
other resources to address the conflict, as well as inadequate information.
Crisis management entails more drastic measures than conflict
management and aims at containing the outbreak of militarized conflicts
with all available means. Examples of such measures include third party
intervention by actors such as NATO or the UN. Some analysts also
view preventive strikes as possible conflict- and crisis management
measures. However, in this paper, conflict and crisis management
measures do not include preventive strikes and similar extreme military
measures.
During the stage of war, neither prevention nor management is possible.
Military means are used as the primary tool, even if political, economic
and social tools are used simultaneously to decrease the opponent’s
willingness and/or capability to fight. At this stage, the actors either have
to fight things out until reaching a so-called hurting stalemate where both
parties realize the need to end the conflict, or peace has to be enforced by
external actors. At this stage there are of course many different measures
that could be utilized, but few of these are peaceful. One example of a
measure is to prevent military conflicts from spreading to other states or
regions. It should be noted that there often is a great reluctance to allow
external intervention before war tiredness and a hurting stalemate has
been reached.
 14

If the militarization of a conflict is temporarily controlled, either through

a peace treaty or a cease fire, it may be possible to reverse the positions of
the actors and make them adopt more constructive behavior. Initially, the
focus is on separating the actors and preventing further mistakably or
deliberate escalation (peace keeping). This stage is comparable to the
crisis stage in the escalation phase and often involves third party actors
that assist with peacekeeping and/or monitoring. When the more
imminent threats of re-escalation have been dealt with, further
opportunities exist for less short-term and direct measures, and the
conflicts move into the conflict management phase. There is still a risk
for escalation, but no imminent threat of war. When the conflict has
deescalated further, a phase of peace building follows, which gives room
for more long-term measures. Finally, if the peace building efforts meet
with success, the conflict moves to the peace consolidation phase where
the aim is to make actors more cooperative and create an inclusive peace
for all involved parties. In other words, the de-escalation phase shares
many similarities with the escalation phase.
The later stages of peace building and peace reconciliation are often
financially costly and require enormous political and economic
commitment from the international community as well as the involved
actors. This is not to mention the economic and social costs that affect
the population at large, but especially the poorer sections of society. Thus,
the conviction that resolution and other mechanisms applied to deal with
conflicts have to be introduced after the conflict is militarized is
humanitarian as well as financially unsound. In general, the measures
used in the de-escalation phase are often much more financially and
politically demanding than pro-active measures in the escalation phase.
Furthermore, measures taken after a war often have to involve third
parties, like the UN or stronger military actors that can guarantee
security for all actors involved, which is not needed to the same extent in
the escalation phase. This takes a lot of political compromises and intense
negotiations in an environment that lacks trust. Without exception, trust
is lacking after a militarized conflict and trust between the involved
parties is tremendously difficult, although not impossible, to rebuild. In
the real world, there are often no, or limited, trust until the peace
consolidation phase has been initiated.
Finally, a few comments need to be made in regard to conflict resolution
measures. Such measures may in fact be initiated in all levels of the
 15

conflict curve, although some authors confine such actions to after the
militarized phase. We disagree to this conclusion, as it is, of course,
possible to resolve differences in issue positions without going to war.
Indeed, the Cuban missile crisis, the dispute in Cyprus, the border
conflicts between China and Kyrgyzstan are all examples of conflicts and
crisis that were handled or resolved before war erupted.

Different conflict curves

A development of the single conflict curve model
As mentioned earlier, in reality the conflict cycle is re-occurring over
time and passes through the different stages over and over again. In an
ideal model of the conflict curve,, a conflict moves trough all stages in
each cycle until the conflict is eventually resolved. In this case, the upside
down U-curve will look
like a wave of U-curves, Model 3:a

reaching the level of war

and then de-escalating to
the level of stable peace,
until the conflict is
ultimately resolved (if
ever) (model 3:a).15
However, it should be noted that in reality all waves of the conflict do
not look the same. The conflict cycle in figure 3:a simply does not
correspond to the patterns of real conflicts despite the fact that it has a
more flexible curve. A re-escalation of a conflict can occur at any point
during the de-escalation
Model 3:b phase and does not
necessarily follow the
standardized ideal curve. In
fact, it is more likely that a
conflict re-escalates the
higher the intensity level
(model 3: b). A conflict tends to “bounce” between the higher levels of
15
An argument could be made that the ideal wave pattern would be one that re-escaletes
during the unstable peace phase, before becoming a stable peace. In this paper the authors
nonetheless prefers using an ideal conflict curve which includes the stable peace level as
this is suitable considering the definition of stable peace used here (see “The Life Cycle(s)
of a Conflict”).
 16

the conflict cycle and it tends to be difficult or even impossible, to reduce

the conflict intensity and increase the long-term trust. These patterns are
often seen in protracted conflicts, such as the Israel/Palestine conflict.
It is also important to note that not every escalation of a conflict reach
the intensity level of war (model 3: c). The parties might not be able to
find any means to
Model 3:c
ultimately resolve the
conflict, or even move into
the level of unstable peace.
At the same time, however,
the conflict’s intensity
level might never reach
the war level. This pattern is especially noticeable in conflicts that are
pro-longed and disregarded by the international community.
To add further complexity to the wave pattern, it should be noted that
the same kind of pattern can, and is, occurring in the escalation phase of
the conflict (model 3: d) where the conflict moves between the intensity
levels of open conflict, crisis and unstable peace without reaching a level
where more concrete and long-term solutions can be found and
implemented. A conflict’s
life cycle is simply not Model 3:d
properly represented by a
simple line that follows one
specific pattern, neither
during the escalation phase,
nor during the de-escalation
phase.
 17

The multi-curve model

In reality, the wave pattern is far more complex than has been indicated
so far. In fact, each conflict arguably includes a large number of sub-
conflicts over a wide array of issues. Each of these sub-conflicts has its
own conflict cycle (model 3: e) at any set point in time. The sub-conflicts
will thus be at different
Model 3:e
points of their respective
cycle. Consequently, the
sub-conflicts will be in
different conflict phases,
phases that need not
overlap with the current
phase of the core conflict (Model 3:f). Consequently, at any point in time
different types of measures for different sub-conflicts will be needed.
These measures will not always be identical to the ones used in the core
conflict. At the same point in time there might thus be a need for
structural prevention, direct prevention, conflict management, as well as
crisis management and
resolution measures, or Model 3:f

even peace building and

peace consolidation. Each
sub-conflict requires a
unique kind of prevention,
management or resolution
measure, suitable to both
its conflict intensity level and conflict phase, as well as to the
characteristics of the particular sub-conflict. In short, at each point in
time, different kinds of measures need to be applied to maximize the
ability to handle a conflict. If overarching conflicts between two or more
actors are to be managed or prevented, focus needs to be on further issues
than solely the core issues. This is essential for the building of trust and
confidence between the parties and vital for the successful prevention of
further escalation, and/or the possibly resolution of the conflict in the
longer term.
It is often easier to build confidence, and possibly even bring about
cooperation, in sub-conflicts on less sensitive issues. Such confidence has
a potential of creating positive spill-over effects on the development of
 18

the overarching conflict by setting examples and providing an

opportunity for new ways of interaction. Even if the possibility of
affecting the overarching conflict is limited, there is still a potential for
spill-over effects on other sub-conflicts, which over time enhances the
chances for possible effects on the core conflict. To exemplify, if two
actors find a formula for cooperation regarding cross-border rescue
operations during sea emergencies, this might set an example for how to
manage other types of cross-border natural disasters. Cooperation
methods successfully used in different rescue operation can then serve as
an example for other areas, which in turn might serve as examples for
even more conflictual issues, and so on. Also, successful cooperation and
exchange on some issues provides a certain level of confidence and
increased trust. Confidence building through cooperation on less
sensitive issues can for example be seen between South- and North Korea
as well as between mainland China and Taiwan.16 One concrete example
is the ongoing cooperation between the Taiwan-based Strait Exchange
Foundation (SEF) and the China-based Association of Relations across
the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) that are negotiating people-to-people
exchange aiming at preventing civil disputes between mainland China
and Taiwan.17 In sum, the dynamics of conflicts are most complex, and
each conflict consists of a large number of issues, or sub-conflicts. This
complexity must also be taken into account when addressing how to
prevent, manage, and/or resolve a conflict. By trying to reduce the idea
of what a complex phenomena a conflict is, ones ability to prevent,
manage and resolve the conflict will inevitably be hampered. A holistic
approach is needed both to understand conflicts, as well as to handle
them. This will also be addressed throughout the next section on conflict
prevention and conflict management, which both questions the (artificial)
separation of the concepts and argues for the need of integrating them.

16
Arthur S. Ding, “Conflict Prevention and Management in Northeast Asia: A
Perspective from Taipei”; Kyudok Hong, “Dilemmas of South Korea 's New Approaches
to Conflict prevention”; and Chyungly Lee, “Conflict Prevention in Northeast Asia:
Theoretical and Conceptual Reflections”, in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in
Northeast Asia, ed. Niklas L.P. Swanström (Uppsala & Washington: CACI & SRSP, 2005).
17
Chyungly Lee, “Conflict Prevention in Northeast Asia: Theoretical and Conceptual
Reflections”, in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia, ed. Niklas
L.P. Swanström (Uppsala & Washington: CACI & SRSP, 2005).
 19

SECTION 2:

Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management

Conflict prevention
Conflict prevention means different things to different people and there
is no single definition that is agreed upon. During the Cold War, many
practitioners and academics viewed preventive action as synonymous
with pre-emptive strikes.18 After the Cold War, this has changed, and
preventive measures have come to receive a new meaning and the
emphasis has shifted to the peaceful prevention of disputes. With regard
to the development of the concept of conflict prevention, Anders Bjurner
has pointed out that conflict prevention is a fairly new sub-culture of
security and foreign policy studies. 19 This is in a sense true, but one
should note that it is a sub-culture with a long history. Indeed, the idea of
prevention was central during the congress of Vienna in 1815 (A.D.) and
in the writings of Sun Tzu (c. 403-221 B.C.).20 Conflict prevention was
never mentioned as a concept but in practice there was a practical concern
to prevent conflicts and deter the reoccurrence of conflicts.
Conflict prevention is often divided into two categories: direct
prevention and structural prevention. Direct conflict prevention refers to
measures that are aimed at preventing short-term, often imminent,
escalation of a potential conflict. Structural prevention focuses on more
long term measures that address the underlying causes of a potential
conflict along with potentially escalating and triggering factors.
Economic development assistance or increased political participation are
examples of structural prevention, while the dispatch of a mediator or the
withdrawal of military forces are examples of direct prevention. The
distinction between structural and direct prevention is important,

18
Peter Wallensteen, ed., Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges,
Report No. 58, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden,
(Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998).
19
Anders Bjurner, “Security for the Next Century: Towards A Wider Concept of
Prevention”, in Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges, Report No. 58,
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, ed. Peter
Wallensteen (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998).
20
For a more extensive overview of the history of conflict prevention see Alice Ackerman,
“The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention”, Journal of Peace Research, vol 40, no 3
(2003), 339-347; Karin Aggestam, “Conflict Prevention: Old Wine in New Bottle?”,
International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, No. 1 (2003).
 20

especially in the policy field although many measures such as military

disarmament can have both structural and direct effects.
The next concept that needs to be defined is conflict prevention. Despite
the wide array of writings on conflict prevention, there is a lack of
consensus regarding its definition. 21 Thus there is a wide range of
definitions, ranging from more narrow ones focusing on limited ways of
prevention such as Michael Lund’s definition of preventive diplomacy, to
broad ones such as David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel’s definition of
conflict prevention (see below).
Michael Lund defines preventive diplomacy as
“actions taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed
force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political
disputes that can arise from destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and
international change.”22
Boutros Boutros-Ghali has defined preventive diplomacy as “the use of
diplomatic techniques to prevent disputes arising, prevent them from
escalating into armed conflict … and prevent the armed conflict from
spreading.” 23 These definitions are limited to diplomatic measures and
exclude non-diplomatic measures such as economic development or
military measures.
It needs to be noted that preventive diplomacy is a problematic term. As
has been noted above the term focuses on diplomatic efforts of conflict
prevention during the early stages of a conflict, while conflict prevention
defines a wider set of preventive measures of which diplomacy merely is

21
Alice Ackerman, “The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention”, Journal of Peace
Research, vol 40, no 3 (2003), 339-347; Karin Aggestam, “Conflict Prevention: Old Wine in
New Bottle?”, International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, No. 1 (2003); Fen Osler Hampson and
David M. Malone, eds., From Reaction to Conflict Prevention :Opportunities for the UN System
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘Preventive Diplomacy: A
Conceptual and Analytic Framework’, in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized:
Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette
Verhoeven, eds., Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict
Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); William I.
Zartman, “Preventing Deadly Conflict”, Security Dialogue 32(2) (2001), 137–154.
22
Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 1996), 37.
23
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy. The role of the United
Nations and its Secretary-General”, in Preventive diplomacy. Stopping wars before they start,
ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: BasicBooks and the Center for International Health and
Cooperation, 1996), 18.
 21

one aspect. However, some even argue that in order to be considered

diplomacy, or even an effective tool, preventive diplomacy needs to be
official. More recent publications on conflict prevention do not always
make this division between preventive diplomacy and conflict
prevention, but at the same time many keep the old separation. This
sometimes creates a communication problem when actors believe that
they understand each other, whereas they in fact are talking about
different types of preventive measures. Many believe that they are
limiting themselves to the official efforts, while others consider the same
discussion as entailing additional non-official strategies.
Among the more inclusive definitions is David Carment and Albrecht
Schnabel’s definition of conflict prevention as “a medium and long-term
proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of
actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable
and more predictable international security environment.” 24 Another
broader definition is provided by Gabriel Munuera, who defines conflict
prevention as the application of non-constraining measures that are
primarily diplomatic in nature. 25 Non-constraining measures are those
that are not coercive and depend on the goodwill of the parties involved.26
Michael Lund has also suggested a wider definition:
“any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tension and
disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to
strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such
disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that
produce these issues and disputes”27.
This definition takes into consideration any measures that prevent
violent conflicts and strengthen the capacity of concerned actors to act
structurally to reduce the possibility of conflict.

24
David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, “Introduction – Conflict Prevention: A concept
in search of a policy“, in Conflict Prevention. Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?, eds. David
Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 2003), 11.
25
Gabriel Munuera, “Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons learned from recent
experience”, Chaillot Paper 15/16 (1994), 3 .
26
Gabriel Munuera, “Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons learned from recent
experience”, Chaillot Paper 15/16 (1994), 3 .
27
Michael Lund, “Preventing Violent Intrastate Conflicts: Learning lessons from
experience”, in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention
and Peacebuilding Activities, eds. Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen & Juliette
Verhoeven (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 117, note 6.
 22

It is currently being discussed whether a more narrow definition is

needed to make conflict prevention researchable28, or whether a broader
definition is preferable since it allows for a broadening of the operational
alternatives and an expansion outside the box. 29 The Swedish Foreign
Ministry has, for example, emphasized the importance of a broad
definition of conflict prevention. It promotes a definition that takes a
holistic view on conflict prevention and human security and includes
both individuals and states. The argument for the inclusion of both
individuals and states is that a focus solely on political disputes would be
to narrow of a definition to incorporate all possible threats to stability
and peace. This broader definition is a reaction against earlier failures to
see security threats. It could be said that the international community has
been slow, or in some cases, inactive in its response to new security
threats. It has also been slow to adapt to the non-conventional manner in
which these threats materialize and the levels they are materializing on,
i.e. trans-national and non-governmental levels.30
The broader approach acknowledges the importance of economic and
social development, as well as security, military, and judicial measures.
These aspects form an integral part of conflict prevention and have
contributed to the growing effectiveness of prevention measures. The
importance of conflict prevention has also been emphasized by the
World Bank.31 The World Bank views conflict prevention together with
post-conflict reconstruction as critical to the bank’s mission of poverty
reduction, thereby acknowledging the vicious circles in many of the
world's poorest states, where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes
poverty.32 This new more inclusive approach is increasingly accepted by
policy-makers and has introduced new security threats onto the agenda.

28
Peter Wallensteen and Frida Möller, Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the
Unknown, Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 7, Department of Peace and Conflict
Research, Uppsala University, Sweden (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict
Research, 2004).
29
David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., Conflict Prevention. Path to Peace or Grand
Illusion? (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 2003).
30
Niklas L.P. Swanström, Mikael S. Weissmann and Emma Björnehed, "Introduction", in
Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia, ed. Niklas L.P. Swanström
(Uppsala & Washington: CACI & SRSP, 2005).
31
The World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy
(Washington, DC: World Bank; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
32
The World Bank has noted that as much as eighty per cent of the world's 20 poorest
countries have suffered from at least one major war in the past 15 years, and that post-war
 23

Finally, the idea of a cultural of prevention needs to be mentioned as it is

central to thinking about conflict prevention in the 21st century. This idea
indicates a regional or global understanding of the need and methods of
prevention and is being promoted by the UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan who has been trying to move his organization away from a
culture of reaction to one of prevention. 33 Also the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has emphasized the
need for a culture of prevention, both in development cooperation and
foreign policy. In its DAC guidelines, the OECD urges the international
community to apply a conflict prevention dimension to all its actions.
According to the OECD, a culture of prevention could be accomplished if
the international community was better able to “analyze the causes and
dynamics of conflict and peace in order to understand how their actions
will affect the “structural stability” of a society or country”. 34
Furthermore, it urges the international community to be more aware of
“the political aspects of any activity and understand how its aims, design,
and implementation may interact with the political and economic
dynamics in that society, including their effect on poverty”35 The idea of
a culture of prevention has also been discussed by prominent scholars and
practitioners in a recent volume on conflict prevention which was
published in memory of the late Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lind.36
Nevertheless, the concept has been less than successful in practice,
despite its rhetoric power in the international community.

Conflict management
Fred Tanner has defined conflict management as the limitation,
mitigation and/or containment of a conflict without necessarily solving
it. 37 Peter Wallensteen and Niklas Swanström have added to this

states have, on avarage, a 44 percent chance of relapsing in their first five years of peace.
(World Bank, Conflict and Development (2005)
<http://www.worldbank.com/conflictprevention.htm> (August, 2005).
33
Kofi Annan, Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985-
S/2001/574, June 7 (2001).
34
OECD, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (OECD, 2001), 31
<www.oecd.org> (April 28, 2003).
35
OECD, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (OECD, 2001), 31
<www.oecd.org> (April 28, 2003).
36
Anders Mellbourn, ed., Developing a Culture of Conflict Prevention, Anna Lindh
Programme on Conflict Prevention (Hedemore: Gidlund, 2004).
37
Fred Tanner, “Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution: Limits of Multilateralism”,
International Review of the Red Cross, September (2000).
 24

definition and argue that conflict management should imply a change,

from destructive to constructive, in the mode of interaction.38 William I.
Zartman has argued that conflict management refers to eliminating
violent and violence-related actions and leaving the conflict to be dealt
with on the political level. 39 Zartman’s argument has been somewhat
criticized as NGOs, academic institutions and half-formal (track-two)
structures have emerged as important actors and now influence the
conflict management process.
Wallensteen has also claimed that conflict management typically focuses
on the armed aspects of a conflict.40 Swanström, on the other hand, has
argued that an armed conflict not necessarily is needed for conflict
management to be applied. 41 Swanström’s argument is that as soon a
structural problem is defined or a direct conflict is manifest, without
being militarized, it can and should be addressed by the active parties and
the international community. As soon as a conflict has been militarized,
the momentum has been lost and the political and economic cost to solve
or manage the conflict escalates quickly. It is far easier to change the
mode of interaction from destructive to constructive in an early rather
than late phase. In this process confidence-building measures (CBMs) are
crucial as they serve to strengthen the conflict management process by
increasing trust between the actors. This is true both in the case of formal
and informal conflict management. It should indeed be noted that the
best result often are achieved by combining informal and formal conflict
management. The importance of using both formal and informal
mechanisms can for example be seen in the negotiations regarding the
Korean Peninsula, negotiations which would not have taken place
without the use of both formal and informal measures and mechanisms.42

38
Peter Wallensteen, Från krig till fred - Om konfliktlösning i det globala systemet (Stockholm:
Almqvistt&Wiksell, 1994), 50; Niklas L.P. Swanström, Regional Cooperation and Conflict
Management: Lessons from the Pacific Rim (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict
Research, 2002).
39
William I. Zartman, "Towards the Resolution of International Conflicts", in
Peacemaking in international conflict: methods & techniques, eds. William I. Zartman and J.
Lewis Rasmussen. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 11.
40
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution War, Peace and The Global System
(London: Sage Publishing, 2002), 53.
41
Niklas L.P. Swanström, Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the
Pacific Rim (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2002).
42
Niklas L.P. Swanström and Mikael S. Weissmann, "Chinese Influence on the DPRK
Negotiations", Peace Review, 16:2 June (2004), 219-224; Niklas L.P. Swanström and Mikael
 25

Conflict management and conflict resolution

The process of conflict management is the foundation for more effective
conflict resolution. A distinction between conflict management and
conflict resolution is, however, needed as a starting point as the concepts
often are confused or integrated in an inappropriate manner. Conflict
resolution refers to the resolution of the underlying incompatibilities in a
conflict and mutual acceptance of each party’s existence43, while conflict
management refers to measures that limit, mitigate and/or contain a
conflict without necessary solving it.
William I. Zartman has pointed out that both the conflict resolution
aspect (negotiation) and the conflict management aspect is needed to
arrive at a positive result.44 He argues that they are both ends of the same
continuum. One end aims at resolving the current conflict so that
business or peace can move on while the other aims at resolving the
deeper underlying conflict over time.
Conflict resolution can be both formal and informal. It can either aim at
resolving or terminating conflicts in an open and predictable process in
accordance with legal principles45 or focus on
“efforts to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and deepen their
relationship by addressing the conditions that led to the dispute, fostering positive
attitudes and allaying distrust through reconciliation initiatives, and building or
strengthening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact”.46
The final aim of resolving the conflict is however shared by both
perspectives regardless of process.
A number of scholars, especially from non-Western societies, have
argued that conflict management is a successful tool for resolving
conflicts over a longer time period, and that it creates the foundation for

S. Weissmann, "Can China Untie the Gordian Knot in North Korea?", Korean Journal of
International Studies, No. 1 (2004).
43
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution War, Peace and The Global System
(London: Sage Publishing, 2002).
44
William I. Zartman, “Conflict Management: The Long and Short of It”, SAIS Review,
vol 20, no 1 (2000).
45
Frederic Kirgis, International Organizations in their Legal Setting, 2nd (St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1993); Afzalur Rahim, “Empirical Studies on Managing Conflict”, International
Journal of Conflict Management, vol 11 (2000).
46
Michael Lund, Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners
(Washington, D.C., Creative Associates International, 1997), 3-4.
 26

effective conflict resolution. 47 This is contrasted to a more Western

argument that the importance of conflict management lies in its ability to
solve short-term conflicts. Both of these views are entirely accurate, and
compatible, and there might just be a cultural difference in our focus.
Both of these views can, and should, be incorporated in a theoretical
framework for conflict management and resolution, since they entail no
inherent contradiction. They are in fact often applied in different stages
of a conflict and address fundamentally different issues. Nevertheless, a
number of Western scholars claim that the difference is one of long-term
versus short-term perspectives and that it is a question of either resolving
the underlying problem or the current problem.48 Kwok Leung and Dean
Tjosvold, and other scholars focusing on Asia, have taken the opposing
view and argue that it is more about relationships and that blind justice
could terminate long-term relationships. 49 However, in reality, the
integration of two fundamentally opposing cultures of conflict
management and resolution into one organization has resulted in
apparent cases of stalemate. 50 When comparing two or more cultural
settings, the difference in perception is an interesting factor when dealing
with mechanisms for handling conflicts.
In sum, conflict management and conflict resolution are different
concepts, but at the same time they are closely interrelated. They are two
mechanisms at different sides of a continuum, used to deal with the same
conflicts but at different stages of these conflicts (see “The Life Cycle(s)
of a Conflict”).

Conflict management and conflict prevention

Conflict management and conflict prevention has, in a similar way, been
argued to be different sides of the same coin. It has also been argued that
conflict management is required in order to enable the initiation of
preventive measures aiming at resolving the dispute. Zartman argues that
the difference merely exists in theory and that both concepts are

47
Kwok Leung and Dean Tjosvold, Conflict Management in the Asia Pacific: Assumptions and
Approaches in Diverse Cultures. (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 1-12.
48
William I. Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., Peacemaking in international conflict:
methods & techniques (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).
49
Kwok Leung and Dean Tjosvold, Conflict Management in the Asia Pacific: Assumptions and
Approaches in Diverse Cultures. (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1998).
50
Niklas L.P. Swanström, Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the
Pacific Rim (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2002).
 27

intertwined in the practical implementation. 51 Preventive measures are

designed to resolve, contain and manage conflicts so that they do not
erupt into violent conflicts. This makes conflict management an
important part of conflict prevention. It is important to point out that
conflict management can be introduced at all levels of a conflict spiral
and that it is widely used in crisis management and war situations.
Referring back to the different conflict curves (Model 3:e-f) at any point
in time a number of sub-conflicts (issues) in need of management
measures can be expected.
At the operational level of conflict prevention, Michael Lund argues that
preventive measures are especially effective at the level of unstable peace,
which is a “situation where tension and suspicion among parties run high
but violence is either absent or only sporadic”. 52 This is arguably not
always the case since some preventive measures are best operationalized
at an earlier stage, preferable during stable peace where there is a
minimum of suspicion between potential adversaries. The reason for this
is simply that the acceptance of preventive measures is higher when no
suspicion disturbs the situation. If institutions, trust and cooperation is
built at an early stage, it is less likely that the conflict reaches the stage of
unstable peace.
It is clear that many states and regional organizations see little or no
point in working with conflict prevention since there are no military
conflicts. The old saying "why fix it when it is not broken" becomes a sad
reality. This is the same as saying "why buy insurance if you are not
sick". The simple answer is that when you need the insurance, it is too
late to get it. It is not argued that all potential conflicts can be prevented,
only that early prevention will decrease the amount of conflicts that will
escalate to unstable peace or war, thereby preventing human suffering
and saving economic capital. This argument has, over time, become more
accepted among international organizations. They have gradually moved
towards emphasizing the importance of pro-active and structural
measures to prevent conflicts, especially in their development policies.
This tendency can not least be seen in the emphasis on the development
of a culture of prevention. However, in practice the implementation is

51
William I. Zartman, “Conflict Management: The Long and Short of It”, SAIS Review,
vol 20, no 1 (2000).
52
Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 1996), 39.
 28

still problematic as it tends to be difficult to legitimize huge costs to

prevent potential conflicts that have not yet reached a critical level. It is
simply easier to successfully argue for spending more money once an
open conflict has started, despite the waste of political and economic
resources, not to mention the social and humanitarian suffering.

Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution – the need for an

integrated approach?
The separation of the three concepts, even when approached as different
sides of the same coin or as a certain continuum, creates a problem with
existing theory. In theory, it has been regarded necessary to make a
distinction between the resolution, management and prevention of
conflicts, as a way of simplifying reality to enable the construction of a
theoretical model. However, this separation is not only artificial, but also
incoherent as different scholars use their own definition of the respective
concepts. A more coherent definition of prevention and management is
thus needed, a definition that can be integrated with other mechanisms
for handling conflicts.
In addition, a theory that differentiates between conflict prevention,
conflict management and conflict resolution also risks being
counterproductive when applied to a reality in which these concepts in
fact are indistinguishable. In practice these measures can be seen as
working side by side at different levels and within different issues in a
larger conflict (also see “Different conflict curves”). It is thus possible, as
argued earlier, to resolve certain issues in a conflict, while at the same
time managing or preventing other issues from taking a violent form.
This does not imply that the conflict has been resolved, or even that
tension has been reduced since new issues can be brought into the conflict
at any time.
Due to the complexity of the conflict cycle there is a dire need of a
holistic approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and
the tool box needs to be open for alternative thinking. Disseminating a
conflict into several subgroups and core issues increases the possibility to
act even in conflicts that seem difficult to act in. Prevention,
management, and resolution measures need to be applied in a coordinated
and integrated fashion that leaves nothing open to minimize lost
opportunities to act.
 29

The problems that the separation of these concepts entail need to be

addressed in future research. Although we acknowledge that
simplifications are needed to develop a working theory, we argue that an
integrated approach would enhance theory development since it will
allow for a theory with greater empirical relevance. As opposed to the
existing theoretical frameworks, an integrated theoretical approach would
have the potential to minimize conflicts, both in number and intensity.
Policy-makers and military staff is often put off by the non-
operationality of many of the models that are presented and regard the
concepts as mere academic exercises. This can, in many cases, be traced
back to a practical realization that the differences between the concepts
are small and that they often go hand in hand. Arguably, this last point is,
on its own, a good enough reason to explore the possibility of an
integrated framework.
 30

Biographical note

Niklas L.P Swanström

Dr. Niklas Swanström is Program Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
and Silk Road Studies Program, a joint transatlantic research and policy center
affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and Uppsala University. He is
Associate Professor at the Department of East European Studies at Uppsala
University and Research Fellow at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University. He is editor of the China
Eurasia Forum Quarterly, a publication on China and Eurasia. His main areas of
expertise are: conflict prevention, conflict management and regional cooperation;
Chinese foreign policy and security in Northeast Asia; narcotics trafficking and its
effect on regional and national security; and negotiation.
Dr. Swanström is the author of four books: Conflict Prevention and Conflict
Management in Northeast Asia, Transnationell brottslighet: ett säkerhetshot?
(Transnational Crime: A Security Threat?), Regional Cooperation and Conflict
Management: Lessons from the Pacific Rim, and Foreign Devils, Dictatorship or
Institutional Control: China's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia.

Mikael S. Weissmann
Mikael Weissmann is Lecturer and Researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, a joint transatlantic research and policy
center affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and Uppsala University.
He is also holder of a Ph.D.-fellowship at the Swedish School of Advanced Asia
Pacific Studies and is currently working towards his Ph.D. at the Department of
Peace and Development Research (PADRIGU) at Gothenburg University,
Sweden. Weissmann has been Visiting Fellow and Lecturer at the School of
International Studies at Renmin University, Beijing, and Visiting Researcher and
Lecturer at China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing. Previously, he was
working at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Weissmann is researching conflict management, security issues, regionalism, and
negotiation in East Asia, with special emphasis on the impact of informal
networks and informal mechanisms.