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CHAPTER 3—The Role of Community Policing

MULTIPLE CHOICE

1. What event during the 1970s helped “set the stage” for new approaches to policing?
a. research indicating that citizen engagement reduces crime
b. research indicating that problem solving reduces crime
c. “nothing works” research
d. “everything works” research

ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: p. 56


OBJ: Describe the naive imagery of policing as "the way it should be."

2. The term “community policing” fits the word usage category of


a. metaphor.
b. illusion.
c. idiom.
d. rhetorical sponge.

ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: p. 56


OBJ: Describe the naive imagery of policing as "the way it should be."

3. Police agency responses to a PERF survey measuring progress in implementing community policing in
2002 indicated that at least 50 percent had an initiative of
a. citizens on patrol programs.
b. court watch programs.
c. citizens helping evaluate officer performance.
d. citizen participation in the promotional process.

ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: p. 56


OBJ: List the three community policing programs reported as implemented by almost all respondents
on a Police Executive Research Forum survey, and a second grouping of activities for which about 50
percent of the departments indicated some level of implementation.

4. The inclusion of neighborhood management as a component of comprehensive community policing is


best described by the term
a. appropriate.
b. inappropriate.
c. far sighted.
d. short sighted.

ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: p. 57


OBJ: Cite the primary components of an appropriate model of community policing.

5. It is suggested that tagging what term onto a descriptive phrase of a strategic approach is harmful?
a. aggressive
b. policing
c. deployment
d. initiative

ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: p. 59


OBJ: Explain the ramifications of integrating the term "policing" into a descriptive phrase of a
strategic approach.

6. Cordner’s assessment of published reports of the effect of community policing reported results as
a. overwhelmingly positive.
b. overwhelmingly negative.
c. mixed.
d. never directly identified.

ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: p. 60


OBJ: Characterize the outcomes of four attempted evaluations of the effect of community policing
upon crime.

7. Of four empirical assessments of community policing, how many reported an impact on crime?
a. one
b. two
c. three
d. four

ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: p. 60


OBJ: Characterize the outcomes of four attempted evaluations of the effect of community policing
upon crime.

8. A macro-analysis of the effect of community policing on homicide and robbery reported


a. overwhelmingly positive effects.
b. strongly positive effects.
c. little effect.
d. no effect.

ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: p. 60


OBJ: Characterize the outcomes of four attempted evaluations of the effect of community policing
upon crime.

9. Analysis of the array of community engagement programs tested in Redlands, California, found what
difference in citizen attitudes between experimental and control areas?
a. Experimental areas were more supportive of the police.
b. Experimental areas were less fearful of crime.
c. Control areas were actually more supportive of the police.
d. No differences were found.

ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: p. 61


OBJ: Characterize the outcomes of four attempted evaluations of the effect of community policing
upon crime.

10. Among the array of community engagement programs tested in Redlands, California, which would
likely draw criticism for overextending the police role?
a. neighborhood watch
b. parenting classes
c. citizen police academy
d. citizens on patrol program

ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: p. 61


OBJ: Characterize the outcomes of four attempted evaluations of the effect of community policing
upon crime.
11. An assessment comparing how regular patrol officers versus “community” officer spend their time
found
a. that community officers spend far more time on foot patrol.
b. that community officers spend far more time engaged in conversation with citizens.
c. that community officers spend far more time gathering information from citizens.
d. no significant difference in how the officers spend their time.

ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: p. 61


OBJ: Explain why police officers typically place a higher importance upon traditional crime control
than do citizens.

12. Analysis of citizen feedback in Fort Worth, Texas, indicated that a valid measure of the effect of
community policing was
a. the absence of crime.
b. a reduction in petty or nuisance offenses.
c. citizen satisfaction with the police.
d. direct citizen engagement in neighborhood crime control.

ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: p. 62


OBJ: Explain why police officers typically place a higher importance upon traditional crime control
than do citizens.

13. The fact that police officers rate generic community engagement as less important than citizens, as
compared to direct law enforcement functions, is best explained by
a. the traditional police subculture.
b. police officers’ more realistic assessment of the value of community engagement.
c. greater officer exposure to the consequences of criminal victimization.
d. cynicism among police officers.

ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: p. 63


OBJ: Explain why police officers typically place a higher importance upon traditional crime control
than do citizens.

14. The difficulty in measuring the effect of community policing is similar to the difficulty in theoretical
physics of measuring the veracity of
a. string theory.
b. relativity.
c. electromagnetic radiation.
d. Newton’s laws.

ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: p. 53


OBJ: Explain why it is so difficult to measure the outcomes of community-oriented policing
approaches and programs.

15. As a strategic approach, the only universal attribute of community policing is


a. problem solving.
b. structured community contact.
c. foot patrol.
d. deployment by analysis.

ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: p. 64


OBJ: Distinguish the universal attribute of community policing from programs or approaches that
should not be characterized as community policing.
16. The classical misuse of the concept of community policing is characterizing it as
a. a deployment model.
b. everything that works in policing.
c. an analytic tool.
d. a philosophy rather than a strategy.

ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: p. 64


OBJ: Distinguish the universal attribute of community policing from programs or approaches that
should not be characterized as community policing.

17. An Urban Institute publication notes that analysis of a program or intervention’s costs and benefits is
necessary because
a. programs are frequently politically driven.
b. there is usually no measurable benefit.
c. the costs might outweigh the benefits.
d. full costs are seldom accounted for.

ANS: C PTS: 1 REF: p. 64


OBJ: Distinguish the universal attribute of community policing from programs or approaches that
should not be characterized as community policing.

18. A community policing program particularly subject to cost-benefit analysis is


a. neighborhood watch.
b. citizen advising groups.
c. problem solving using the full SARA model.
d. specialized community policing roles/positions.

ANS: D PTS: 1 REF: p. 64


OBJ: Identify the recent trend of agency sponsorship of specialized community policing roles.

19. Survey data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that since 2000, the number of
community policing specialist positions funded by police agencies has
a. decreased dramatically.
b. held steady.
c. increased marginally.
d. increased dramatically.

ANS: A PTS: 1 REF: p. 64


OBJ: Identify the recent trend of agency sponsorship of specialized community policing roles.

20. Of departments serving populations of 1 million or more, what percentage reports to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics that they have a specialized community policing unit?
a. 100 percent
b. 85 percent
c. 45 percent
d. 25 percent

ANS: B PTS: 1 REF: p. 64


OBJ: Identify the recent trend of agency sponsorship of specialized community policing roles.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER); and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).

SI-NGAN-FU,
SINGAN FU, The Chinese Imperial Court at.

See (in this volume)


CHINA: A. D. 1900 (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER).

SIRDAR, Egyptian.

See (in this volume)


EGYPT: A. D. 1885-1896; and 1897-1898.

SLAVERY: A. D. 1885.
Emancipation in Cuba.

See (in this volume)


CUBA: A. D. 1868-1885.

SLAVERY: A. D. 1895.
New anti-slavery law in Egypt.

See (in this volume)


EGYPT: A. D. 1895.

SLAVERY: A. D. 1896.
Abolition in Madagascar.

See (in this volume)


MADAGASCAR: A. D. 1894-1896.

SLAVERY: SLAVERY: A. D. 1897.


Abolished in Zanzibar.
See (in this volume)
AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (ZANZIBAR).

SLAVERY: A. D. 1897.
Compulsory labor in Rhodesia.

See (in this volume)


SOUTH AFRICA (BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY):
A. D. 1897 (JANUARY).

SLAVERY: A. D. 1897.
Subjugation of Fulah slave raiders in Nupé and Ilorin.

See (in this volume)


AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (NIGERIA).

SLAVERY: A. D. 1899.
Forced labor in Congo State.

See (in this volume)


CONGO FREE STATE: A. D. 1899.

SLESWICK:
Complaints of German treatment.

See (in this volume)


GERMANY: A. D. 1899.

SMOKELESS POWDERS, Invention of.

See (in this volume)


SCIENCE, RECENT: CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII. on.

See (in this volume)


PAPACY: A. D. 1901.
SOCIALIST PARTIES.

See (in this volume)


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897, and after;

BELGIUM: A. D. 1894-1895;

FRANCE: A. D. 1896 (APRIL-MAY), and 1900 (JANUARY);

GERMANY: A. D. 1894-1895, and 1897 (JULY);

ITALY: A. D. 1898 (APRIL-MAY);

SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1894-1898;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER),


and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).

SOKOTO.

See (in this volume)


NIGERIA: A. D. 1882-1899.

SOLOMON ISLANDS, The:


Definite division between Great Britain and Germany.

See (in this volume)


SAMOAN ISLANDS.

SOMALIS, Rising of, in Jubaland.

See (in this volume)


BRITISH EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE: A. D. 1900.

SOUDAN.
See (in this volume)
SUDAN.

"SOUND MONEY" DEMOCRATS.

See (in this volume)


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).

{456}

----------SOUTH AFRICA: Start--------

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1881-1888.


Organization of the "Afrikander Bund."

The "Afrikander Bund" or National Party was formed in Cape


Colony in 1881, but held its first Congress, or convention, in
1888, at which meeting the following platform, or formal
statement of objects, was adopted:

"1. The Afrikander National party acknowledge the guidance of


Providence in the affairs both of lands and peoples.

2. They include, under the guidance of Providence, the


formation of a pure nationality and the preparation of our
people for the establishment of a 'United South Africa.'

3. To this they consider belong:

(a) The establishment of a firm union between all the


different European nationalities in South Africa, and

(b) The promotion of South Africa's independence.

4. They consider that the union mentioned in Article 3 (a)


depends upon the clear and plain understanding of each other's
general interest in politics, agriculture, stock-breeding,
trade, and industry, and the acknowledgment of everyone's
special rights in the matter of religion, education, and
language; so that all national jealousy between the different
elements of the people may be removed, and room be made for an
unmistakable South African national sentiment.

5. To the advancement of the independence mentioned in


Article 3 (b) belong:

(a) That the sentiment of national self-respect and of


patriotism toward South Africa should above all be
developed and exhibited in schools, and in families, and in
the public press.

(b) That a system of voting should be applied which not


only acknowledges the right of numbers, but also that of
ownership and the development of intelligence, and that is
opposed, as far as possible, to bribery and compulsion at
the poll.

(c) That our agriculture, stock-breeding, commerce, and


industries should be supported in every lawful manner, such
as by a conclusive law as regards masters and servants, and
also by the appointment of a prudent and advantageous
system of Protection.

(d) That the South African Colonies and States, either each
for itself or in conjunction with one another, shall
regulate their own native affairs, employing thereto the
forces of the land by means of a satisfactory burgher law;
and

(e) That outside interference with the domestic concerns of


South Africa shall be opposed.

6. While they acknowledge the existing Governments holding


rule in South Africa, and intend faithfully to fulfil their
obligations in regard to the same, they consider that the duty
rests upon those Governments to advance the interests of South
Africa in the spirit of the foregoing articles; and whilst, on
the one side, they watch against any unnecessary or frivolous
interference with the domestic or other private matters of the
burgher, against any direct meddling with the spiritual
development of the nation, and against laws which might hinder
the free influence of the Gospel upon the national life, on
the other hand they should accomplish all the positive duties
of a good Government, among which must be reckoned:

(a) In all their actions to take account of the Christian


character of the people.

(b) The maintenance of freedom of religion for everyone, so


long as the public order and honor are not injured thereby.

(c) The acknowledgment and expression of religious, social,


and bodily needs of the people, in the observance of the
present weekly day of rest.

(d) The application of an equal and judicious system of


taxation.

(e) The bringing into practice of an impartial and, as far


as possible, economical administration of justice.

(f) The watching over the public honor, and against the
adulteration of the necessaries of life, and the defiling
of ground, water, or air, as well as against the spreading
of infectious diseases.

7. In order to secure the influence of these principles, they


stand forward as an independent party, and accept the
cooperation of other parties only if the same can be obtained
with the uninjured maintenance of these principles.
SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1884-1894.
The restored independence of the Boers and their
dissatisfaction with its terms.
Frustration of their desire for extended territory.
The London Convention of 1884.

After the British-Boer War of 1880-81


(see, in volume 4, SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1806-1881),
which had been caused by an arbitrary annexation of the
Transvaal State to the dominions of the British crown, the
sense of justice in Mr. Gladstone led him to restore to the
Transvaal Boers (by the Convention or Treaty of Pretoria,
1881) their right of internal self-government, with a
reservation of "the suzerainty of Her Majesty," supposably
relative to nothing but foreign affairs. The Boers were not
satisfied with that concession, and began at once to strive
for the complete independence they had previously possessed,
under a Convention agreed upon and signed at Sand River, 1852,
which guaranteed (quoting its precise terms) "in the fullest
manner, on the part of the British Government, to the emigrant
farmers (boers) beyond the Vaal River, the right to manage
their own affairs and to govern themselves, without any
interference on the part of Her Majesty the Queen's
Government." To regain that status of complete independence
became the first object of the Boers. They went far towards
success in this endeavor, as early as 1884, when the British
Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, was induced to agree to a new
Convention with the South African Republic (as it was then
styled) which superseded the Convention of 1881. The terms of
the later instrument are given below. The second aim of the
Boers appears to have been the widening of their territory, by
advances, in the first instance, southward into Zululand and
westward into Bechuanaland. In the former movement they had
success; in the latter they were thwarted. English
missionaries complained of their treatment of the natives, and
stirred up the British government to take the Bechuana tribes
under its protection. Their eastern frontier they succeeded,
after long controversies with Great Britain, in stretching
beyond Swaziland, but they were not allowed to push it to the
sea. Northward, they would provably have gone far, had it not
been for the appearance, at this time, of Mr. Cecil Rhodes,
who came upon the scene of South African politics with
imperial ambitions, with great energies and capabilities, with
few apparent hesitations, and with a vast fortune acquired in the
Kimberley diamond mines. He organized the British South Africa
Company, under a royal charter, got some settlers into the
country north of the Limpopo and set up a government there, in
1890, just in time, it appears, to forestall the Boers

See, in volume 4,
SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1885-1893.

{457}

Of the effect of the two conventions, of 1881 and 1884, on the


relations of the British government to the South African
Republic, the following is an English view, by a well-known
publicist: "In the Treaty of Pretoria, bearing date the 5th of
April, 1881, it is stated that Great Britain guarantees
'complete self-government, subject to the Suzerainty of Her
Majesty, to the inhabitants of the Transvaal.' … Article 15
declares that 'the Resident will report to the High
Commissioner, as representative of the Suzerain, as to the
working and observance of the provisions of this Convention.'
… On the 31st of March, 1881, Lord Kimberley, who was then
Secretary of State for the Colonies, used these words in the
House of Lords with reference to the terms of the Convention,
upon which the Treaty of Pretoria was afterwards based: 'I
believe the word Suzerainty expresses very correctly the
relation which we intend to exist between this country and the
Transvaal. Our intention is that the Transvaal shall have
independent power as regards its internal government; and we
shall only reserve certain powers to be exercised by the
Queen. … With respect to our control over the relations of the
Transvaal with foreign Powers, … it is quite clear there ought
to be, as regards foreign relations, only one Government in
South Africa; that there ought to be no communication with
foreign Powers upon any subject except through the
representatives of the Queen.'

"On the 25th of June, 1881, Mr. Gladstone, while defending in


the House of Commons an assertion he had made during the
Midlothian Campaign about the blood-guiltiness of the war with
the Transvaal, referred to our Suzerainty in the following
words; 'I apprehend that the term which has been adopted, the
Suzerainty of the Queen, is intended to signify that certain
portions of Sovereignty are reserved. … What are these
portions of Sovereignty? The portions of Sovereignty we desire
to reserve are, first, the relations between the Transvaal
community and foreign governments, the whole care of the
foreign relations of the Boers. The whole of these relations
will remain in the hands of the Queen.'

"From these quotations it is obvious that when we agreed to


restore the independence of the Transvaal, the British public
were led to believe, both by the then Premier and the then
Colonial Minister, that this restoration left the control of
all relations between the Transvaal and foreign Powers
absolutely and entirely in the hands of Her Majesty's
Government. … It is possible, or even probable, that at the
time the Treaty of Pretoria was concluded, Mr. Gladstone, or
at any rate several of his colleagues, imagined that our
Suzerainty would really be made effective. But, when once the
treaty had been signed and sealed, and the South African
Republic had been granted absolute internal independence, it
became evident that our Suzerainty could only be rendered
efficacious, as against the sullen resistance of the Boers, by
the exercise of force—that is, by the threat of war in the
event of Boer non-compliance with the demands of the Suzerain
Power. …
"For the first two years which succeeded our surrender the
Boers were too much occupied in the reorganisation of the
Republic to trouble themselves greatly about their relations
to the Suzerain Power. … Disputes were mainly connected with
the treatment of the native chiefs, residing either within, or
on the borders of, the territory of the Republic, who
asserted, with or without reason, that they were the objects
of Boer hostility on account of the support they had given to
the British authorities during the period of British rule.

"In May 1883 Mr. Gladstone stated in Parliament, in answer to


certain protests about the proceedings of the Boers, that the
British Government had decided to send a Commissioner to the
Transvaal to investigate the working of the Convention
concluded at Pretoria in 1881. This intention, however, was
not carried out owing to the opposition of the South African
Republic. In lieu of the despatch of a British Commissioner to
the Transvaal, it was suggested at Pretoria that a Boer
deputation should be sent to London. The suggestion, as usual,
was accepted; and thereupon the Africander Bond in the Cape
Colony forwarded a petition to the Queen, praying Her Majesty
to entertain favourably the proposals of the Boer delegates
for the modification of the Treaty of Pretoria. The
deputation, consisting of President Kruger and Messieurs Du
Toit and Smit, arrived in London in October, and submitted to
the late Lord Derby, who had succeeded Lord Kimberley as
Minister for the Colonies, a statement of the modifications
they were instructed to demand. The memorandum in question
distinctly declared that the alleged impracticability of the
Treaty of Pretoria related, amongst other matters, 'to the
extent of the Suzerain rights reserved to Her Majesty by
Articles 2 and 18 of the Treaty of Pretoria, and to the vague
and indefinite terms in which the powers reserved to Her
Majesty's Government by the Convention are indicated.'

"To this memorandum Lord Derby replied, on the 20th of


November, 1883, admitting that 'expediency of substituting a
new agreement for that of 1881 might be matter for discussion,
but asking for information, in what sense it is wished that in
such new agreement some connection with England should be
maintained, and, if it is the desire of the Transvaal people
that their State should hereafter stand in any special
relation to this country, what is the form of connection which
is proposed?' In reply to this request the Boer delegates
answered as follows in the somewhat evasive fashion: 'In the
new agreement any connection by which we are now bound to
England should not be broken; but that the relation of a
dependency "publici juris" in which our country now stands to
the British Crown be replaced by that of two contractive
Powers.'

"The above documents were submitted to the Governor of Cape


Colony, the then Sir Hercules Robinson. Characteristically
enough, Sir Hercules recommended the surrender of our
Suzerainty on the ground that 'The Transvaal burghers
obviously do not intend to observe any condition in it (the
Convention of 1881) distasteful to themselves, which Her
Majesty's Government are not prepared to insist on, if
necessary, by the employment of force. Her Majesty's
Government, I understand, do not feel justified in proceeding
to this extremity; and no provision, therefore, of the
Convention which is not agreeable to the Transvaal will be
carried out.'

{458}

"A few days later the delegates submitted a draft treaty, in


which the following clause stands first: 'It is agreed that
Her Britannic Majesty recognises and guarantees by this treaty
the full independence of the South African Republic, with the
right to manage its own affairs according to its own laws,
without any interference on the part of the British
Government; it being understood that this system of
non-interference is binding on both parties.' To the letter
enclosing this draft treaty Lord Derby replied that the
proposed treaty was 'neither in form nor in substance such as
Her Majesty's Government could adopt.' Meanwhile the
discussion between the British Government and the Boer
delegates seems to have turned mainly upon the extension of
the territories of the Transvaal and the relations between the
Republic and the native chiefs, subjects which had only an
indirect bearing on the question of Suzerainty. It was only on
the 25th of January, 1884, that the Colonial Office wrote to
the delegates stating that if a certain compromise with regard
to the frontier line were accepted, the British Government
would be prepared 'to proceed at once with the consideration
of the other proposals for the modification of the Treaty of
Pretoria.' The delegates replied on the next day virtually
accepting the proposed frontier compromise, and requested the
British Government to proceed at once with the substitution of
a new Convention. … The draft treaty was signed on the 27th of
February, 1884. …

"The Convention of London did not repeat the preamble of the


original Convention in which the words 'subject to the
Suzerainty of Her Majesty' are to be found. Nor is the word
Suzerainty mentioned in the Convention of 1884, which declares
that the articles contained therein, if endorsed by the
Volksraad, 'shall be substituted for those of the Convention
of 1881.' No formal withdrawal, however, of the Queen's
Suzerainty is to be found in the Convention of 1884. On the
contrary, it is distinctly affirmed in Article 4 of the
modified Convention that 'the South African Republic will
conclude no treaty or engagement with any State or nation,
other than the Orange Free State, until the same has been
approved by Her Majesty the Queen.'"

Edward Dicey,
British Suzerainty in the Transvaal
(Nineteenth Century, October, 1897).
In its preamble, the Convention of 1884 recites that—"Whereas
the Government of the Transvaal State, through its Delegates,
consisting of [Kruger, Du Toit and Smit], have represented
that the Convention signed at Pretoria on the 3rd day of
August, 1881, and ratified by the Volksraad of the said State
on the 25th of October, 1881, contains certain provisions
which are inconvenient, and imposes burdens and obligations
from which the said State is desirous to be relieved, and that
the south-western boundaries fixed by the said Convention
should be amended with a view to promote the peace and good
order of the said State, … now, therefore, Her Majesty has
been pleased to direct," &c.—substituting the articles of a
new Convention for those signed and ratified in 1881.

Article I. of the new Convention describes the lines of


boundary as amended. Article II. binds the two governments,
respectively, to guard said boundaries against all
trespassing. Article III. provides for the reception and
protection, at Pretoria, of a resident British officer, "to
discharge functions analogous to those of a consular officer."

Article IV. reads as follows: "The South African Republic will


conclude no Treaty or engagement with any State or nation
other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to
the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been
approved by Her Majesty the Queen. Such approval shall be
considered to have been granted if Her Majesty's Government
shall not, within six months after receiving a copy of such
Treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its
completion), have notified that the conclusion of such Treaty
is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain, or of any
of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa."

Articles V. and VI. relate to public debts. Article VII.


guarantees the non-molestation of persons in the South African
Republic who "remained loyal to Her Majesty during the late
hostilities." Article VIII. is a declaration against slavery
in the Republic. Article IX. is in language as follows: "There
will continue to be complete freedom of religion and
protection from molestation for all denominations, provided
the same be not inconsistent with morality and good order; and
no disability shall attach to any person in regard to rights
of property by reason of the religious opinions which he
holds." Article X. relates to graves of British soldiers; XI.
to former grants of land which the present arrangement of
boundary places outside of the Republic; XII. to the
independence of the Swazis; XIII. to non-discrimination in
import duties on both sides.

Articles XIV. and XV. read thus: Article XIV. "All persons,
other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the
South African Republic, (a) will have full liberty, with their
families, to enter, travel or reside in any part of the South
African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess
houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises; (c)
they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any
agents whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be
subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in
respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether
general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed
upon citizens of the said Republic." Article XV. "All persons,
other than natives, who establish their domicile in the
Transvaal between the 12th day of April, 1877, and the 8th day
of August, 1881, and who within twelve months after such last
mentioned date have had their names registered by the British
resident, shall be exempt from all compulsory military service
whatever." Article XVI. provides for a future extradition
treaty; XVII. for the payment of debts in the same currency in
which they were contracted; XVIII. establishes the validity of
certain land grants; XIX. secures certain rights to the
natives; XX. nullifies the Convention if not ratified by the
Volksraad within six months from the date of its
signature—February 27, 1884.
{459}

With considerable reluctance, the Convention was ratified by


the Volksraad of the South African Republic in the following
terms: "The Volksraad having considered the new Convention
concluded between its deputation and the British Government at
London on 27th February 1884, as likewise the negotiations
between the contracting parties, which resulted in the said
Convention, approves of the standpoint taken by its deputation
that a settlement based upon the principle of the Sand River
Convention can alone fully satisfy the burghers of the
Republic. It also shares the objections set forth by the
deputation against the Convention of Pretoria, as likewise
their objections against the Convention of London on the
following points:

1st.
The settlement of the boundary, especially on the western
border of the Republic, in which the deputation eventually
acquiesced only under the express conditions with which the
Raad agree.

2nd.
The right of veto reserved to the British Crown upon treaties
to be concluded by the Republic with foreign powers; and

3rd.
The settlement of the debt.

Seeing, however, that in the said Convention of London


considerable advantages are secured to the Republic,
especially in the restoration of the country's independence,
Resolves, With acknowledgment of the generosity of Her
Britannic Majesty, to ratify, as it hereby does, the said
Convention of London."
Selected Official Documents of the South African
Republic and Great Britain
(Supplement to the Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, July, 1900).

Also in:
State Papers, British and Foreign, volume 75.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1885-1890.


The gold discoveries on the Rand and the influx
of Uitlanders (Outlanders or Foreigners).

"It was not until 1884 that England heard of the presence of
gold in South Africa. A man named Fred Stuben, who had spent
several years in the country, spread such marvellous reports
of the underground wealth of the Transvaal that only a short
time elapsed before hundreds of prospectors and miners left
England for South Africa. When the first prospectors
discovered auriferous veins of wonderful quality on a farm
called Sterkfontein, the gold boom had its birth. It required
the lapse of only a short time for the news to reach Europe,
America, and Australia, and immediately thereafter that vast
and widely scattered army of men and women which constantly
awaits the announcement of new discoveries of gold was set in
motion toward the Randt [the Witwatersrand or
Whitewatersridge]. … In December, 1885, the first stamp mill
was erected for the purpose of crushing the gneiss rock in
which the gold lay hidden. This enterprise marks the real
beginning of the gold fields of the Randt, which now yield one
third of the world's total product of the precious metal. The
advent of thousands of foreigners was a boon to the Boers, who
owned the large farms on which the auriferous veins were
located. Options on farms that were of little value a short
time before were sold at incredible figures, and the prices
paid for small claims would have purchased farms of thousands
of acres two years before. In July, 1886, the Government
opened nine farms to the miners, and all have since become the
best properties on the Randt. … On the Randt the California
scenes of '49 were being re-enacted. Tents and houses of sheet
iron were erected with picturesque lack of beauty and
uniformity, and during the latter part of 1886 the community
had reached such proportions that the Government marked off a
township and called it Johannesburg. The Government, which
owned the greater part of the land, held three sales of
building lots, or 'stands,' as they are called in the
Transvaal, and realized more than $300,000 from the sales. …
Millions were secured in England and Europe for the
development of the mines, and the individual miner sold his
claims to companies with unlimited capital. The incredibly
large dividends that were realized by some of the investors
led to too heavy investments in the Stock Exchange in 1889,
and a panic resulted. Investors lost thousands of pounds, and
for several months the future of the gold fields appeared to
be most gloomy. The opening of the railway to Johannesburg and
the re-establishment of stock values caused a renewal of
confidence, and the growth and development of the Randt was
imbued with renewed vigour. Owing to the Boers' lack of
training and consequent inability to share in the development
of the gold fields, the new industry remained almost entirely
in the hands of the newcomers, the Uitlanders [so called in
the language of the Boers], and two totally different
communities were created in the republic. The Uitlanders, who,
in 1890, numbered about 100,000, lived almost exclusively in
Johannesburg and the suburbs along the Randt. The Boers,
having disposed of their farms and lands on the Randt, were
obliged to occupy the other parts of the republic, where they
could follow their pastoral and agricultural pursuits. The
natural contempt which the Englishmen, who composed the
majority of the Uitlander population, always have for persons
and races not their intellectual or social equals, soon
created a gulf between the Boers and the newcomers."

H. C. Hillegas,
Oom Paul's People,
chapter 3
(with permission of D. Appleton & Co., copyright, 1899).

As the influx of newcomers increased and advanced, "the Boers


realized that the world and civilisation were once more upon
them. In spite of all the opposition that patriarchal
prejudice could muster, railways usurped the place of the slow
moving ox-waggon, and in the heart of their solitude a city
had arisen; while to the north and to the east between them
and the sea were drawn the thin red lines of British boundary.
… A primitive pastoral people, they found themselves isolated,
surrounded—'shut in a kraal for ever,' as Kruger is reported
to have said,—while the stranger was growing in wealth and
numbers within their gates. Expansion of territory, once the
dream of the Transvaal Boers, as their incursions into
Bechuanaland, into Zululand, and the attempted trek into
Rhodesia, all testify, was becoming daily less practicable.
One thing remained,—to accept their isolation and strengthen
it. Wealth, population, a position among the new States of the
world had been brought to them, almost in spite of themselves,
by the newcomer, the stranger, the Uitlander. What was to be
the attitude towards him politically? Materially he had made
the State—he developed its resources, paid nine-tenths of its
revenue. Would he be a strength or a weakness as a citizen—as
a member of the body politic? Let us consider this new element
in a new State—how was it constituted, what were its component
parts? Was it the right material for a new State to
assimilate?
{460}
Cosmopolitan to a degree—recruited from all the corners of the
earth—there was in it a strong South African element,
consisting of young colonists from the Cape Colony and
Natal—members of families well known in South Africa—and many
of them old schoolfellows or in some other way known to each
other. Then the British contingent, self-reliant, full of
enterprise and energy—Americans, for the most part skilled
engineers, miners and mechanics—French, Germans, and
Hollanders. A band of emigrants, of adventurers, and
constituted, as I think all emigrants are, of two great
classes—the one who, lacking neither ability nor courage, are
filled with an ambition, characteristic particularly of the
British race, to raise their status in the world, who find the
conditions of their native environment too arduous, the
competition too keen, to offer them much prospect, and who
seek a new and more rapidly developing country elsewhere; and
another, a smaller class who sometimes through misfortune,
sometimes through their own fault, or perhaps through both,
have failed elsewhere.

"Adventurers all, one must admit; but it is the adventurers of


the world who have founded States and Kingdoms. Such a class
as this has been assimilated by the United States and absorbed
into their huge fabric, of which to-day they form a huge and
substantial portion. What should the Transvaal Boers have done
with this new element so full of enterprise and vigour? This
had been for the last ten years the great question for them to
solve. … Enfranchisement, participation in the political life
of the State by the Uitlander,—this means, they said, a
transference of all political power from our hands to those of
men whom we do not trust. 'I have taken a man into my coach,'
said President Kruger, 'and as a passenger he is welcome; but
now he says, Give me the reins; and that I cannot do, for I
know not where he will drive me.' To the Boer it is all or
nothing; he knows no mean, no compromise. Yet in that very
mean lies the vital spirit of republicanism. What is the
position of the Boers in the Cape Colony? Are they without
their share, their influence, their Africander bond in the
political affairs of the country? And so it is throughout the
world today,—in the United States, in England, in France, in
the British Colonies, wherever the individual thrives and the
State is prosperous—the compromise of divided political power
among all classes, all factions, is the great guarantee of
their well being. … That the enfranchisement of the Uitlander
would mean a complete transference of political power into his
hands involves two assumptions: the first is that the
Uitlanders would form a united body in politics; the second is
that their representatives would dominate the Volksraad. The
most superficial acquaintance with the action of the
inhabitants of the Witwatersrand district on any public matter
will serve to refute the first of these. … The second of these
assumptions—though it is continually put forward—almost
answers itself. The number of representatives from the
Uitlander districts under any scheme of redistribution of
seats which the Boer could reasonably be expected to make
would fall considerably short of those returned from the Boer
constituencies. Such was the attitude of the Boers on this
vital question which led to the Reform Movement of 1895; and I
have stated what I believe to be the injustice of it as
regards the Uitlanders and the unwisdom of it in the true
interests of the Boers."

A. P. Hillier,
Raid and Reform,
pages 24-29 (London: Macmillan & Co.).

SOUTH AFRICA:
Portuguese Possessions: A. D. 1891.
Delagoa Bay Railway question.

See (in this volume)


DELAGOA BAY ARBITRATION.

SOUTH AFRICA:
The Transvaal: A. D. 1894.
Estimated population.

In October, 1894, the British agent at Pretoria, J. A. de Wet,


estimated the population of the Transvaal (on the basis of a
census taken in 1890) as follows:
"Transvaalers and Orange Free Staters, 70,861:
British subjects, 62,509:

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