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Antony JREEL Hugh C. Foot
Editors

With a new introduction by Peter Derks

 Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
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https://archive.org/details/humorlaughtertheOO000unse
Humor and
Laughter
Theory, Research,
and Applications

Antony J. Chapman
and Hugh C. Foot
Editors
With a new introduction by Peter Derks

TRANSACTION PUBLISHERS
New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)
New material this edition copyright © 1996 by Transaction Publishers, New
Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Originally published in 1976 by John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conven-

tions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any
information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing
from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Transaction Publishers,
Rutgers—The State University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903.
This book is printed on acid-free paper that meets the American National Stan-
dard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials.
Library of Congress Catalog Number: 95-23378
ISBN: 1-56000-837-7
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Humor and laughter : theory, research, and applications / edited by Antony
J. Chapman and Hugh C., Foot ; with a new introduction by Peter Derks.
p. cm.
Originally published: London ; New York : Wiley, c1976.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-56000-837-7 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Laughter. 2. Wit and humor—Psychological aspects. I. Chapman,
Antony J.
BF575.L3H87 1995
152.4—dc20 95-23378
CIP
 Contents

Introduction the the Transaction Edition

Preface (1995)
Preface (1976)

Introduction . RP Fi yer
Antony J. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot

Section I: Perceiving and Responding to Humour

1 A Cognitive-Developmental Analysis of Humour
Thomas R. Shultz
2 Incongruity, Problem-Solving and Laughter
Mary K. Rothbart
3 Incongruity and Funniness: Towards a New Descriptive Model
Géran Nerhardt
4 Superiority, Enhanced Self-Esteem, and Perceived Incongruity
Humour Theory
Lawrence La Fave, Jay Haddad and William A. Maesen
5 A Disposition Theory of Humour and Mirth
Dolf Zillmann and Joanne R. Cantor
6 Physiological and Verbal Indices of Arousal in Rated Humour 117
Michael Godkewitsch
7 Cognitive Aspects of Humour in Social Interaction:
A Model and Some Linguistic Data Log
Howard Giles, Richard Y. Bourhis, Nicholas J. Gadfield,
Graham J. Davies and Ann P. Davies
8 Social Aspects of Humorous Laughter 155
Antony J. Chapman
9 The Social Responsiveness of Young Children in Humorous
Situations 187
Hugh C. Foot and Antony J. Chapman
10 Comedians and Comic Style 215
Howard R. Pollio and John W. Edgerly

Section II: Using Humour

11 Humour as Creative Experience: The Development of a
Hollywood Humorist 245
William F. Fry Jr. and Melanie Allen
12 Calypso Humour in Trinidad 259
James M. Jones and Hollis V. Liverpool
13. Wit and Humour in Mass Communication 287
Charles R. Gruner
14 Freudian Humour: The Eupsychia of Everyday Life 313
Walter E. O’Connell
15 The Use and Abuse of Humour in Psychotherapy 331
Harvey Mindess

Index 343
 Introduction to the Transaction Edition

Twenty Years of Research on Humor:

A View from the Edge

Humor is a distorted mirror of the mind. Research on humor reveals attention,

memory, emotion, and personality, but the images are often vague and unclear.
For centuries it has been the “little problem,” the “pert challenge” for explana-
tions of human nature (Bergson, 1911). Keith-Spiegel (1972) rendered research-
ers a great service with her careful survey of the many philosophical approaches
over that span of time. Morreall (1987) helped further with a representative col-
lection of the writings of many of those theorists.
Experimental investigations of humor appeared sporadically at least from the
time Wundt founded the first psychological laboratory in 1879 (Boring, 1957).
His three-dimensional theory of feeling included “pleasant” and “excited,” as
well as “relaxed,” a foundation for the study of humor (Ruch, 1993a). Joking
and joy are mentioned briefly in the development of the James-Lange theory of
emotion (James, 1896). Hall and Allin (1897) explored tickling, Martin (1905)
evaluated introspections about the comic, and Heim (1936) examined memory
for humorous materials. This work was scattered and isolated and had no par-
ticular impact. Investigators continued to introduce their articles on humor by
decrying the lack of research on this “important and ignored” topic.

ORGANIZING AND STRUCTURING THE FIELD

There was, however, a wrinkle in the Zeitgeist about two decades ago. Levine
(1969) presented a provocative collection of papers with a motivational, quasi-
clinical theme. Chapman and Foot (1976a, this volume) and Goldstein and
McGhee (1972) edited a pair of wide-ranging, scholarly works that gathered a
collection of stimulating, insightful, and challenging articles. Perhaps just as
important, Chapman and Foot organized an international humor conference in
1976 that brought many of the researchers together. The results of that meeting
were quickly documented (Chapman and Foot, 1977) and televised. Eysenck, in
the Goldstein and McGhee collection proposed that, “perhaps the bringing to-
gether of so much knowledge and expertise in one place will encourage others to
try their hand at research into one of the most difficult, as well as one of the most
fascinating, fields of psychological study” (1972, p. xvii). Chapman and Foot
viii
added, “We hope that those taking up new research find [this] book a stimulating
and enlightening source of ideas. We hope also that they find it provides some
insights into ways of tackling investigations into these fascinating topics” (1976b;
introduction, this volume, p. viii). The endeavor was off to a promising start.
It is indeed encouraging to examine the list of contributors to the first confer-
ence and realize how many are still active in the field. The international humor
conferences have now become a yearly affair with the schedule already (1995) in
place up to 1998 when the meeting will be held in Bergen, Norway. There Sven
Svebak, one of the original participants, will be the chair. These conferences have
been marked by excellent scholarship and enthusiastic interdisciplinary exchange.
Another indication of the health of the venture is the presence of an organiza-
tion and a journal devoted to humor scholarship. Humor is the journal of the
International Society of Humor Studies and has been edited by Victor Raskin
since its inception. The newsletter section, originally by Larry Mintz and more
recently by Don L. F. Nilsen, has kept a diary of the past conferences, along with
other fascinating memorabilia.
There have, then, been many who have joined in the research. It probably seemed
like a good idea to study this important and ignored topic. What a surprise to
discover that we were not alone. These days, a look from the perimeter of this
activity makes possible a selection of some significant studies and programs that
are making contributions to our understanding of “the little problem.” The synthe-
sizing efforts of about twenty years ago presented the questions and outlined the
methods. What had previously been a diverse collection of observations and ex-
periments, with each new investigator starting fresh, had become a coherent topic
with an explicit empirical and theoretical foundation. Rather than just more of the
same, subsequent research strengthened and broadened that foundation.
The present review will be a consideration of studies and programs that seemed
to make the most salient contributions to the study of humor for at least one such
“new” researcher, a psychologist. The particular emphasis will be on cognitive
factors as they have been revealed in various types of research. The review,
then, is not intended to be complete. Since the “Handbook” reviews edited by
McGhee and Goldstein (1983a, 1983b) are now over ten years old, it is time for
a more complete update of specific topics than is possible here. There will also
be an effort to rely on published and readily available material.

DEFINITION THROUGH PERSONALITY

Eysenck (1942, 1943) had already made a strong methodological beginning in
an effort to use personality theory to get a handle on humor. Using an empirical
and distinctly anti-Freudian approach he had found that extraverts tended to
prefer sexual and aggressive humor. There was little evidence that humor was
used as an excuse to release the repressed. People’s sense of humor suited their
personality quite directly without unconscious subtlety.
Another early effort to relate humor to personality was conducted by the IIli-
nois Personality and Aptitude Testing Group (IPAT), led by Cattell (Cattell and
 ix
Luborsky, 1947a, 1947b; Tollefson and Cattell, 1966). Rather than the clear
relationship reported by Eysenck, the IPAT humor test measured thirteen dimen-
sions of personality. These were not as definitive, empirically or theoretically, as
extraversion, sex, and aggression. Eysenck and Wilson (1976) presented their
test in a popular version, but neither it nor the IPAT Humor Test was used to a
great extent, either to test personality or for research. The IPAT test was revived
by Carroll (1989) who found that men and women had become closer in their
ratings in 25 years. Both sexes had become more appreciative of the “grue-
some” as opposed to the flirtatiously playful, more theatrical rather than realis-
tic, and more evasive of responsibility. Both sexes were also less anxious and
less scornful of the ineffectual male. The face validity of these changes indicates
the usefulness of the test.
Also examining the humor-personality link was the “Antioch” test of Mindess,
Miller, Turek, Bender, and Corbin (1985). The seed for this work had already
been sewn (Mindess, 1976, chapter 15, this volume; O’Connell, 1976, chapter
14, this volume). The personality traits were more interesting (social satire, philo-
sophical, as well as sexual and “sick”) and the jokes were funnier. The test also
gave the participants an opportunity to make up their own funny material, but it
was not clear how any but a clinician could score it. Although presented as a
popular treatment, this material has also appeared in more scholarly work (Wyer
and Collins, 1992).
It was appropriate that so much research on humor began with and has contin-
ued to examine the relation to personality. Personality theory provides a reason-
ably well-defined set of constructs to evaluate differences in human behavior.
Individual differences in humor appreciation were obvious. The relatively known
personality constructs could give leverage to the understanding of the relatively
unknown mechanisms of humor. There are, after all, two fundamental questions
that drive curiosity about humor. As characterized by Chapman and Foot (1976b,
introduction, this volume) they are theory (What is it?) and application (What
can it do?).

THEORY

This background indicates that personality was a first and important step to get
theory, then application, off the ground. A model that related humor to personal-
ity through content was only a beginning, however, and not very satisfactory at
that. From the standpoint of philosophical, rational theories, to say that jokes
about a topic are appreciated by someone with an interest in that topic seems to
say little about the basic mechanism of humor.

Manipulation of salience

One of the most influential experiments on content and amusement was by

Goldstein, Suls, and Anthony (1972). Instead of passively measuring what people
liked, they primed their participants with particular topics. The most extensive
x

and effective priming pitted automobiles against aggression. Six photographs of

automobiles or six photographs of physical violence produced a significant and
appropriate interaction in the humor ratings of six subsequent cartoons. Just two
jokes about either music or medicine also had an appropriate, and nearly signifi-
cant, effect on seven subsequent jokes. The cognitive set of these participants
was manipulated and seemed to have a more immediate effect than a personality
trait that would result in a consistent preference for, say, aggressive humor. Cer-
tainly neither set nor trait can be ignored; rather, the task is to determine their
relative roles in the various situations of interest (Carson, 1989).
Aggression is a salient part of personality, not to mention life. As cautioned
by Eastman, “If they are going to identify humorous laughter with egotistical
cruelty, they must prove that there is more egotism and more cruelty in humor-
ous laughter than in the general behavior of man, and that I confidently chal-
lenge them to prove” (1936, p. 32). As something of a test of this hypothesis,
Nevo and Nevo (1983) manipulated humor production by asking their partici-
pants to make up either ordinary or humorous responses to frustrating situations,
that is, captions to cartoons. One picture showed an innocent pedestrian splashed
by mud from a passing car. As would be expected, most of the responses to
frustration were aggressive. When an ordinary response was given about 73
percent were aggressive. When asked to respond humorously the percentage
rose to 83 percent. More striking was the shift in intensity. For the ordinary
response, 53 percent were low aggressive, in the order of “Next time, don’t do
it.” When shifted to a humorous response, the medium aggressive, for example,
“You are a son-of-a-bitch” and extreme aggressive, something like, “Scram,
before I throw you in the mud” accounted for 70 percent of the responses. These
responses were certainly aggressive. The mechanism for being funny was to
make them incongruously so. Nevo and Nevo also noticed that sexual responses
appeared in the humorous answers although the frustrating pictures were any-
thing but sexy. Salience and incongruity of intensity or content played a comple-
mentary role (Deckers and Buttram, 1990).
The experiments of Goldstein, Suls, and Anthony (1972) and Nevo and Nevo
(1983) are classics in the sense that they set a style for the examination of the
nature of humor. Neither pretended to settle the issue. Both inserted a critical
variable and examined the impact. To discover the nature of humor, variables
like funny-ordinary or relevant-irrelevant were manipulated and their effect on
quality and content measured. The line between active and passive manipula-
tion cannot, however, be sharply drawn.
Another significant experiment of the early 1980s took a passive approach to
the selection of participants and material, but manipulated the questions asked.
Wicker, Thorelli, Barron, and Ponder (1981) asked about the funniness of jokes,
but instead of assessing the personality of the individuals in their study they
assessed the theoretical “personality” of the stimuli. Based on material similar
to that of Keith-Spiegel (1972), they selected thirteen theoretical characteriza-
tions of humor and asked their participants to judge the jokes on these dimen-
sions, as well as on humor. The judgments of “originality, surprise, resolution,
 xi
pain, anxiety, and emotional involvement” all correlated with “funniness.” These
dimensions also separated into two factors. The first three, plus “freedom,” best
represented incongruity-resolution. In a footnote the authors report that “En-
couraging results were obtained in two other unpublished studies.... A strong
incongtuity-resolution factor...was found in both” (p. 369). The next three,
which might be considered either motivational or salient, formed the other di-
mension. Normal, unsophisticated college students had organized the major hu-
mor theories into a plausible, coherent structure.

Humor structure and appreciation

In this context another, more structurally oriented, test for personality and hu-
mor was evolving (Hehl and Ruch, 1985; Ruch, 1992; Ruch and Hehl, 1983,
1986a, 1986b; Ruch, Ott, Accoce, and Bariaud, 1991). By obtaining both humor
and aversion ratings and by testing a broad cross-cultural sample, these researchers
succeeded in developing a test, the 3-WD (3-witz-dimensionen), which found
two humor styles to reveal two personality characteristics. Jokes and cartoons
that relied on the resolution of an incongruity were preferred by individuals who
scored high on conservatism (Wilson, 1973). On the other hand, jokes and car-
toons that left the incongruity unresolved, or made it still more out of balance,
were relatively funnier and less aversive to those who responded as sensation
seekers (Zuckerman, 1979). Although nonsense did not play a consistent role
for the college students of Wicker et al., it was a very relevant factor for a more
mature sample.
The most striking example of nonsense humor was the “divergence from ex-
pectancy” approach of Nerhardt (1970, 1976, chapter 3, this volume). Typically
in this research a judgment was made in some fairly narrow stimulus range, for
example, lifted weights. Then a stimulus was introduced that departed dramati-
cally from the norm, a much heavier or a much lighter weight. The judges often
laughed when confronted with this anomaly. They certainly rated it as surprising
and amusing (Deckers, 1993). The only resolution to this salient incongruity lies
outside the stimulus, “It’s a joke” (Forabosco, 1992).

Content and appreciation

As for the salience of content, sexual humor is the third dimension of the 3-
WD. Although extraversion, following Eysenck, cannot be rejected as a pre-
dictor of the amusement of sex it is not strongly correlated either. Instead, the
more obvious factors of sexual activity and enjoyment determine the apprecia-
tion of sexual humor.
For example, Prerost (1984) managed to find people to fill groups based on
sexuality and involvement. There were those who were engaged in a sexual
relation and enjoying it, those who were not engaged in a sexual relation and
were perfectly happy about it, those who were not engaged in a sexual relation
and sorry about it and, even sorrier, those who were enga ged in a sexual relation
xii
and did not like it. Salience of content was fairly equivalent here, but funniness
was highly related to the quality of that salient factor. “Unenjoyed” sex resulted
in lower humor ratings for sexual material.
Extraversion does make a more general contribution to overall enjoyment.
Although humor type, including sex, may not differentiate extraverts from intro-
verts, extraverts laugh more and give higher ratings overall to 3-WD items (Ruch,
1993b). An important discovery from this line of research is that, properly mea-
sured and observed, the subjective ratings of how funny something is do agree
significantly with overt expressions of amusement. Ruch (1995) has shown that
it is important to calculate the correlations of laughing and rating within subjects
to reduce the role of individual differences. Furthermore, the proper observation
of the overt response also requires the assessment of the crinkle around the eyes
that accompanies a genuine laugh. This realization is thanks to rediscovery of
the “Duchenne smile” by Ekman (Duchenne, 1990/1862; Ekman, 1992; Frank
and Ekman, 1993).

Content and structure

Progress, then, has been made in determining the nature of the iceberg outlined
by these emergent peaks. Structure in humor depends on incongruity (Shultz,
1976, chapter 1, this volume). People enjoy it more if it is resolved or at least,
not seen as a problem (Rothbart, 1976, chapter 2, this volume). Still there is fun
in just playing with the situation and making it even more nonsensical, the es-
sence of children’s humor. In fact, from the production standpoint, incongruity
production is easier than incongruity resolution.’
Content plays a dual role. Primarily the material should be familiar. The cog-
nitive state of the audience can, however, be manipulated. It is valuable to have
“real world” (ecologically valid) examples of the effect of salience and motiva-
tion. The salience of enjoyable sex and justified aggression is readily available.
Many people do like to feel superior and to disparage those they do not like
(La Fave, Haddad, and Maesen, 1976, chapter 4, this volume; Zillmann and
Cantor, 1976, chapter 5, this volume). Zillmann and Bryant (1980) directly
demonstrated this aggressive tendency in humor. They invited college stu-
dents to participate in the evaluation of toys for advertising. One set of partici-
pants was greeted by a female research assistant and treated in a professional,
polite manner. Another set was treated in a condescending manner by the same
researcher acting rudely. Then she exited bruskly to show them the toys on a
closed-circuit TV. The two groups of toy evaluators saw one of three episodes
that had been videotaped for the experiment. In one incident the research as-
sistant had an accident handling a box and spilled hot tea on herself. In another
instance the box flew open and a jack-in-the-box jumped out. There was no
spilled drink in this case. In the third episode the box flew open and the jack-
in-the-box jumped out and caused the tea to spill on the assistant. For the
polite research assistant, the spilled tea alone resulted in very little mirth by
the observers. The jack-in-the-box alone was not particularly funny either. In
 xiii
fact, this condition did not produce much response from the people who had
been treated rather rudely by the research assistant. They did, however, find
the spilled tea alone mildly amusing. The politely treated subjects also found
the tea spilled by the jack-in-the-box somewhat amusing. The big hit was the
tea spilled by the jack-in-the-box on the obnoxious assistant. In this instance,
the observers showed a “strong mirth reaction.” Humor expressed aggression
in a salient “real life” experimental situation.
It has also been shown that salient affiliation can play a role in humor. Raven
and Rietsema (1957) studied the value of individuals knowing what they are
doing in appreciating working on some task. Does it help the workers accept the
task if they know where it fits into a broader scheme, even if the task is trivial?
Their participants were instructed to cut pieces of colored paper into various
shapes. They received their instructions over a speaker while alone in a booth.
This arrangement was supposed to eliminate interpersonal variables such as fa-
cial expressions and eye contact. In fact, each participant was alone in the ex-
perimental situation, and the request for colored shapes, like the activity of the
assistant in Zillmann and Bryant’s study, had been tape-recorded earlier. The
difference here was the participants’ knowledge of what was being done with
the colored shapes. For some, no goal was specified. Cutting the shapes was an
end in itself. For others, they were to be used to construct a little model house.
Admittedly this was not very stimulating intellectually, but it was enough to
make the participants more interested and involved in their task.
Laughter was manipulated almost by accident. In the original recording of the
tape that gave directions, one of the actors gave an involuntary and rather loud
burp. This led to much merriment among the other actors on the tape. If the
person cutting out paper shapes was uninformed and disinterested, the laughter
was usually ignored. Those who “knew what was going on” frequently laughed
along with the people on the tape, joining in with the merry, prerecorded crew.
Amore direct example of both affiliative and aggressive laughter comes from
a study by Lefcourt, Sardoni, and Sardoni (1974). Lefcourt investigated differ-
ences between people who believe they control their own destiny and people
who believe they are victims of circumstances. In other words, how does it af-
fect behavior if one’s “locus of control” is internal as opposed to external? One
difference is in how much one laughs. When asked to free associate to a list of
words the external locus-of-control “victims” apparently saw this as an imper-
sonal, irrelevant requirement and participated with a relatively straight face. The
internal locus-of-control “masters of their fate,” however, were quite animated
and laughed frequently at the beginning of the study. Furthermore, the laughter
had a “quality of warmth,” the eyes were “wide open,” the “teeth visible,” and
there was a “body lean toward (the) experimenter.” The laughter of these self-
confident individuals was social and affiliative.
As the list of words continued the experimenters added double entendres;
words with progressively more obvious sexual interpretations. The aim seemed
to be to make the experimental situation into a kind of joke. The last list of items
for association was quite obscene and sexually rich with not such subtle mean-
xiv
ing. At this point, the “external locus of control” people did laugh a little. It was
mostly “tension relief,” however, with a “strained smile,” a “quizzical facial
expression,” “fidgetiness,” and so forth.
On the obscene part of the list those with a self-image of personal control
laughed even more. Some of their laughter was social and some was tension
relief. The majority of their laughter, however, was with “challenging looks—
intense with narrowed eyes” and a “pleased or prideful look.” As the salience of
the situation changed, their laughter changed to match, from friendly to asser-
tive, from affiliative to aggressive. Their response did not match the mood of the
list but revealed their own control of the circumstances.
Along with the situation, then, the type of individual is still important. Not
only are control, conservatism, and sensation-seeking relevant, but so are the
concerns of the individual, such as sex, aggression, and affiliation. As these
studies indicate, the relative contribution may vary but the general interaction
will be consistent.

Theory construction and computation

Out of this framework, theories of humor with postulates and predictions are
appearing. For instance, as argued here:
Humor = Salience (State + Trait) x Incongruity + Resolution
or, a more quantitative:
“If they laugh when he jumps twenty feet, they'll laugh twice as hard if he
jumps forty feet.... It’s simple mathematics” (from Walt Disney’s Dumbo).
Wyer and Collins (1992) have given added weight to the time and effort re-
quired to resolve an incongruity. Forabosco (1992) suggested possible quantifi-
cations of incongruity. Russell (1987) has proposed “disturbance” and
“adjustment” as a more general and, in some ways, more explicit, characteriza-
tion than incongruity resolution. Katz (1993) has recognized the role of non-
sense, and, along with Disney’s clowns, postulated a linear relation between
amount of humor and the development of a to-be-frustrated expectation. Attardo
and Raskin (1991) presented a carefully reasoned multiple-script model, but did
not seem to make predictions about the role of salience. Testing those theories
with manipulation and measurement of the relevant variables will continue to
clarify the answer to “What is humor?”
The usual way to test such models is to see if they predict amusement. The
other side of the coin is to use them to create humor. Hoppe (1976) took the first
step by using some semi-randomly generated sentences of Miller and Isard (1963).
The sentences were meaningful, for example: “Gadgets simplify work around
the house. Accidents kill motorists on highways. Trains carry motorists across
the country.” Another set was composed of random shufflings of the same words:
“Passengers gadgets on the highways around. Carry work accidents the house
trains. Across kill the country motorists simplify.” The third set, however, main-
tained the sentence structure but inserted the subjects, verbs, and objects at ran-
dom. Examples would be: “Gadgets kill passengers around the country. Accidents
 XV
carry motorists across the house. Trains simplify work on the highway.” Miller
and Isard were interested in intelligibility, given the structure and meaning of
language. Hoppe was curious about how funny the sentences were, given the
incongruity and nonsense of an apparently organized message. The anomalous
sentences were funniest, like “madlibs” where meaningful ideas are placed in
incongruous relations.
More recently, and with greater linguistic sophistication, computational mod-
els running on computers have been producing jokes. Raskin and Attardo (1994)
have made the formal justification for this activity and give some possible ex-
amples. The most “artificial,” non-subjective success has been reported by Binsted
and Ritchie (1994). A lexicon representing homonymic and other relations was
created, and a number of semantic frames for riddles were devised. The program
inserted words and phrases from the lexicon into these frames, taking account of
the relations. For example, “handsome” is pleasing in appearance and “hansom”
is a two-wheeled carriage. So what is a good-looking taxi? A handsome cab!
“Cereal” is related to grain and “serial” is something repeated. So what is a
murderer that has fiber? A cereal killer! This last was one of the funnier ones, so
aggressive content even helps computer humor.
Here is incongruity resolution of a simple, perhaps presently too simple, kind.
The step to personal or societal salience of the homophones, or other more mean-
ingful connections, would be, nevertheless, a short one. Furthermore, the step to
the creative acts of the comedy writer and the stand-up comedian is also qualita-
tively short. The advantage of the author and the performer over a less creative
individual is the vast network of readily activated, salient connections in addi-
tion to a readily activated collection of successful schematic manipulations of
semi-congruous ideas (Fry and Allen, 1975, 1976, chapter 11, this volume; Mintz,
1985). In other words, they are experts at being funny and a computational model
is the beginning of understanding that expert system. The examination of per-
formed humor will enrich the realization of the content and structure of that
system. The presentation of Calypso humor by Jones and Liverpool (1976, chapter
12, this volume) was another good start in that direction.

APPLICATION

The paradigm to assess the value of humor is the inverse of that for determining
its nature. Humor is presented and its effects on happiness, health, creativity,
and so forth are measured. Although Cousins (1979) did not invent either the
paradigm or the hypothesis, “laughter is the best medicine,” he certainly fo-
cused attention on their possibilities. As has often been reported, he watched
“Candid Camera” episodes to relieve a rheumatism-like inflammation of the
vertebrae that results in immobility and pain (ankylosing spondylitis). The treat-
ment was a success. What is not always mentioned is that he also took massive
doses of vitamin-C and took charge of his situation by checking out of the hos-
pital and into his own room. Langer (1989) has shown that such “mindful” ac-
tion can relieve symptoms by itself. The role of humor as a monolithic panacea
Xvi
was left uncertain through lack of control and, amazingly, lack of a replication.
Goldstein (1987) has given a sobering evaluation of the topic. More significant
than the humor manipulation was Cousins’ (1989) contribution to the whole
concept of psychological concern for the patient as well as the physiological
treatment of a disease.
In essence, the paradigm suffers from two related problems. First, since hu-
mor had not been well defined, the type of humor used has not always been
evaluated. There were, however, exceptions. For example, Baron (1978a) found
that while hostile humor would increase the amount of shock that a person was
willing to give an obnoxious confederate, less hostile humor would reduce it.
Even “exploitive” sexual humor reduced the administration of an apparent shock
(Baron, 1978b). Therefore, humor type was critical in determining its “thera-
peutic” value.
Second, the selection of the individuals with their different experiences and
personalities and their consequent reaction to the different humor types was
usually left to chance. This analysis was the goal of the humor-personality tests.
The practical jokes that were the basis for “Candid Camera” were usually ag-
gressive, and Cousins was fond of practical jokes. This appropriate match of
salience is not usually manipulated.

Assessment of humor use and health

Consequently, one of the most successful efforts to evaluate humor has bypassed
the first problem and carefully measured the second. Martin and Lefcourt (1983)
developed the Coping Humor Scale (CHS) to measure the extent to which indi-
viduals would use humor, never mind what kind, to deal with problems in gen-
eral. They also proposed the Situational Humor Response Questionnaire (SHRQ)
for an estimate of how often humor would be used in specific situations; that is,
seeing an old friend on the street or getting a low grade on an exam (Martin and
Lefcourt, 1984). The CHS and the SHRQ correlate positively, but not highly (.3
to .4).
The tests have been extensively validated and do indicate something about
people who use humor in their lives, both to cope with specific situations and in
general (Lefcourt and Martin, 1986). The extraverted laughers of Ruch and Deck-
ers (1993) scored high on the SHRQ as well as on sensation seeking. Extrover-
sion is most clearly related to the scores on these humor use tests (Ruch, 1994).
Such individuals tend to have a positive self concept (Kuiper and Martin, 1993)
and a positive view of life (Martin, Kuiper, Olinger, and Dance, 1993). The
more general CHS was more stable in relation to self-esteem. The SHRQ, with
its specific instances, may have been more influenced by daily changes in affec-
tive state. Yovetich, Dale, and Hudak (1990) found that low scorers on the SHRQ
were most relieved by a comedy tape while waiting for a painful electric shock.
If humor use is already a trait, introducing irrelevant amusement in a situation
may not help much. As a state manipulation for the unhappy, it may be more
valuable. Nezu, Nezu, and Blissett (1988), for example, reported that anxiety
 xVii
was not particularly affected by the strategies implied by high scores on the
CHS or the SHRQ, that is, frequent humor use. In contrast, depression following
negative life events showed relative alleviation. Anxiety about the future is no
laughing matter and best translated into excitement (Apter, 1982). Depression
about the past is a waste of time and best transformed into optimism (Seligman,
1991). Humor has been found to correspond to denial, reversal, replacement,
and other-directed blame (Rim, 1988). These defensive styles all correspond to
the rejection of personal responsibility in a particular situation at a specific time
that Seligman reports the optimist uses to handle failure. The SHRQ does corre-
late with a measure of optimism (Korotkov and Hannah, 1994). Thus, using
humor as a trait seems to go along with self-confident, extraverted optimism and
the laughter helps distance the individual from the problem. Ruch (1993a) makes
a strong argument that the appropriate emotion should be called “exhilaration.”
Although perhaps a bit extreme, that is certainly the direction that we are taken
by humor.
There is some evidence that humor, even undifferentiated, can have positive
effects not only on emotional state but on physical well-being. Martin and Dob-
bin (1988) found that high scores on the CHS and SHRQ indicated a resistance
to the reduction in immune function that usually goes with stress. Stress was
assessed by a questionnaire about the presence of frustrating inconvenience, the
Daily Hassles Scale, and immune function by the salivary amount of secretory
immunoglobin-A, important in the body’s defence against upper respiratory in-
fections. In a situational study, Berk, Tan, Fry, Napier, Lee, Hubbard, Lewis,
and Eby (1989) found increased immune activity and white cell vitality in on-
line blood samples while the participants watched a comedy routine.
Such research is demanding and difficult to repeat. Since these are just a few
of the available studies, from a meta-analytic standpoint, the effects seem real if
not robust. There is some evidence that similar benefits may be obtained from
viewing tragedy, eating chocolate, or doing aerobic exercises (Weisenberg, Gerby,
and Mikulincer, 1993; Zillmann, Rockwell, Schweitzer, and Sundar, 1993). The
placebo demand characteristics are also difficult to eliminate. It is important,
then, to evaluate the individual, the situation, and the humor type and include
appropriate controls when examining these applications. What worked for Norman
Cousins probably will not work for everybody.

Neurophysiology and laughter

Consequently, a reductionistic approach to both the theory and application of

humor is justified (Godkewitsch, 1976, chapter 6, this volume; Winkel, 1993).
By this, reductionism should be taken not as “simplification” but as “source”
of causes.2 Humor works on the whole physiology and psychology of an indi-
vidual, or a group (Fry, 1994). Laughter activates the entire cortex sending
waves of positive and negative polarization through both hemispheres. Se-
quential and parallel processing mechanisms are involved (Grumet, 1989;
have
McGhee, 1983). Real laughter, feigned laughter, and no laughter at all
XViii
different effects (Bick, 1989; Fry, 1994; Svebak, 1982). A real laugh seems to
be accompanied by electroencephalographic activity that is related to deeper,
more extensive evaluation of a situation—the check for a quick resolution to
an incongruity. Specific brain mechanisms that perform other cognitive activi-
ties should be studied during laughter as well. Such specific localization is
possible with positron emission tomography (PET) scans or magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) (Posner and Raichle, 1994). Eliciting laughter under
such conditions would not be easy. Besides, the people who support such re-
search (optimistic, self-confident, and extraverted though they may be) do not
appear to be interested in humor and laughter!

Humor and other uses

Health, either mental or physical, is not the only area where attempts have been
made to apply humor. Another issue that would also benefit from a concern for
the relation between humor type and the individual is the role of entertainment
in the acquisition and use of knowledge. Humor’s role in education has received
extensive examination, with mixed results. Several reviews suggest that the overall
effect of humor is probably positive as it often improves attention in the class-
room (Chapman and Crompton, 1978; Zillmann and Bryant, 1983). The humor,
in other words, should be salient with the material to be learned. From a direct
perspective humor has been shown to improve memory for shapes and for sen-
tences over just meaningfulness alone (McAninch, Austin, and Derks, 1992-93;
Schmidt, 1994). It also seems to improve mood and flexibility of thinking in that
it makes people more creative (Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki, 1987; Ziv, 1976,
1984). Again the effect seems to derive from salience (attention) and incongru-
ity resolution (flexibility).
Another topic relating knowledge and humor is the role of funny messages in
opinion change. Does all that editorial sarcasm really help educate the masses?
Since humorists are probably liberal sensation-seekers and use nonsense to criti-
cize people they do not like, is it likely to have an impact on the conservatives
who look for resolved incongruity? Since even before his masterful review, Gruner
(1976, chapter 13, this volume) had found “not much.” He has continued his
investigation and has reported that one way at least to understand sarcasm is to
be a member of a fraternity or sorority (Gruner, 1989). It is not surprising that
frequent exposure to irony, subtle deprecation, and just plain kidding should
lead to an awareness of sarcasm (Lyman, 1992). Still other variables, like intel-
ligence, that might have been expected to be influential, were not. There are still
many questions to be answered about attitudes and humor.
The last twenty years of humor research have resulted in real progress, per-
haps more in the understanding of humor itself than in its applications. A re-
reading of Leventhal and Safer (1977) as well as the first ten chapters of Chapman
and Foot (1976a, this volume) and the first five in Goldstein and McGhee, (1972)
does show the good foundation referred to earlier. With the evaluative tools of
Willi Ruch, Rod Martin, and their colleagues an even more solid platform has
 xix
been constructed. It is appropriate to the multidimensional nature of humor that
a measure of humor appreciation and a measure of humor use do not seem to
correlate (Deckers and Ruch, 1992).

THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS

So our understanding of the “little problem” is not complete. The more recent
humor theories do incorporate the many facets of humor appreciation and pro-
duction. Quantification, using consistent measuring instruments, is under Way.
The development of humor tests of various kinds has long been a flourishing
cottage industry (Babad, 1974). A general review and evaluation of these instru-
ments, new and old, would be very helpful.
The effect of humor has been reasonably well-documented. The magnitude of
the effect is in the process of being assessed. There is also still room for the
inspired, empirical experiment for purely exploratory purposes.
At the same time, application is receiving more extensive and more sophisti-
cated attention. Humor and laughter play some role in health, mental and physi-
cal. The same state-trait, emotional-cognitive-social factors need to be considered
in understanding humor and education, memory, attitude, and creativity. The
developmental nature of humor deserves continued examination (Masten, 1989;
McGhee and Chapman, 1980; Sherman, 1988).
It is in the merger of theory and application, however, that the future looks
most exciting. Humor has always been seen as an explicitly social phenom-
enon (Apte, 1985; Chapman, 1976, chapter 8, this volume, 1983; Fine, 1983;
Foot and Chapman, 1976, chapter 9, this volume; Giles, Bourhis, Gadfield,
Davies and Davies, 1976, chapter 7, this volume; Martineau, 1972). A smiling
face is more attractive than the same face not smiling (Otta, Lira, Delavati,
Cesar and Pires, 1994). “Sense of humor” is prized in one’s self, one’s com-
panions, and in one’s partner. Of course what that means is a sense of humor
“like mine.” The interaction of people through humor has received some at-
tention. Pollio and Edgerly (1976, chapter 10, this volume) examined the in-
teractions of friends and strangers while listening to “aggressive” or “nice
guy” humor. Friends tended to move and look at each other. Strangers were
more quite. Grammer (1990) has investigated social interactions of strangers.
Smiling and laughing, along with body language may indicate interest. Women,
having more to lose, are more subtle in their display. Norrick (1993) has re-
ported on humorous exchanges among friends and family and found frequent
sharing with some social control. The humor seemed more cooperative than
aggressive. Mulkay, Clark, and Pinch (1993) analyzed a real-world instance of
buying and selling. Here humor use indicated the presence of “interactional
difficulties” in the transaction.
Again, such research is difficult. The ecological validity of real humorous
exchanges in social situations is extremely important. The careful control of the
experimental manipulations is also important. The social-psychological device
of the scenario can give such control without a great loss of reality.
XX

The little stories in experimental situations may be derived from, and intro-
duce, the investigation of literature and art. A most encouraging prospect for the
future of humor research is the potential for interdisciplinary cooperation and
understanding. In the last analysis humor is fun. It is disturbing to think that the
upswing in interest in humor might be powered by the appeal of the negative;
the aggressive, hostile, dark side of humor as an escape from the “tenderness
tabu” (Allport, 1960; Chapman and Foot, 1976b, introduction, this volume).
The multifaceted, multidimensional, multidisciplinary nature of humor reveals
the positive, pleasant side as well. Instead of eliminating our joy in the salient
incongrtuities of life, the study of the bright, colorful reflections of humor will
enrich our appreciation and focus our use of the “pert challenge” as a central and
critical aspect of human nature. This volume remains an excellent place to start.

PETER DERKS
July 1995

NOTES
Thanks to Kim Binsted, Willi Ruch, and Rod Martin, as well as the editors of this volume,
for their willingness to give assistance and advice. Their information and suggestions are
appreciated although they were not all used or taken.
1. Thanks to W. Larry Ventis for making this point explicit.
2. Thanks to Howard Pollio for emphasizing this distinction.

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XX1V

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 l? be
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 Preface

It is almost twenty years since the publication of our edited volume on the psy-
chology humor and laughter and, in some respects, little has changed. Many of
the problems that challenged us then are still the subject of theoretical and em-
pirical enquiry. Sex and aggression in humor are still recurrent themes in re-
search; humor as a means of resolving incongruity, and of expressing
disparagement and superiority has remained a lively issue; and the eternal search
for personality correlates of humor is never far below the surface in explorations
of humor appreciation.
The changes that have occurred have been more in the manner in which re-
search has been conducted. The series of International Conferences on Humour
which started in Cardiff in 1976 and have continued annually or biennually
brought together humor researchers from a variety of disciplines. This has re-
sulted in a move away from the lone, maverick researcher to a more integrated
and collaborative research endeavor. Humor research has, therefore, “found” its
academic community and benefitted from more concerted research approaches.
In his introductory chapter Peter Derks has highlighted many of the lines of
research that have attracted attention over the past two decades and, while many
of these themes are just the same, significant advances have been made in our
understanding. We are, for example, clearer about the relationship between per-
sonality type and humor appreciation. The pioneering work of Willi Ruch has
succeeded in developing measures which differentiate various personality styles
on the basis of different types of humor appreciation, a relationship which had
largely eluded previous researchers. We also know more now about the link
between expressions of amusement and ratings of funniness and have a clearer
idea about how to measure them properly. In addition to the continued emphasis
upon personality dimensions, research has also remained focused upon the situ-
ational determinants of humor and its potential as a social skill. Its function as a
coping mechanism in different kinds of social situations has been more fully
explored. Through the work of Rod Martin and others we understand better the
manner in which it is used to control our social interactions, to cope with stress
and to improve our sense of well-being.
In its applications, too, present-day research themes echo those of the 1970's
and we have expanded our knowledge of the value of humor for alleviating
unhappiness, depression, and anxiety and for changing our self-image. As Derks
argues, “humor works on the whole physiology and psychology of an individual”;
xxviii
it activates our state of mood and our state of arousal and sharpens our senses in
a variety of ways. While many scholars of humor had an implicit belief that
humor can facilitate our acquisition of knowledge there is now much stronger
empirical support for the claim that it can improve attention in the classroom,
help us recall objects and facts, and stimulate creativity of thought by encourag-
ing more flexible thinking.
Research has moved us forward. It isn’t just a question of more of the same.
There have been qualitative as well as quantitative advances in our understand-
ing, and we have a better methodological base for developing appropriate mea-
sures and tools. Humor research is still exciting and still challenging: the extra
precision in our methods of enquiry does not detract one jot from the essential
fun and interest of putting humor under the microscope. The chapters in this
book are still refreshing and stimulating to re-read. They still offer insights into
human nature and are still a sound platform for new research.
We look forward with interest to the next twenty years.

ANTONY J. CHAPMAN
Huau C. Foor
July 1995
 Preface

This book is concerned with the psychology of humour and laughter

and is
designed to bring together in a single volume some of the most important
current thinking and research in these subjects. Most of the fifteen chapters are
written by psychologists with long-standing academic interests in humour
and laughter. Many of our authors are engaged in on-going projects and have
been working in the area for some years. It is their published works which have
largely provided the impetus for the recent upsurge of interest in empirical
studies. The chapters they have written for the book map out, therefore, the
main areas in which research is currently being conducted. Also well-represented
in the book is the wide variety of techniques employed in examining the key
issues relating to humour and laughter. The reader will find approaches ranging
from rigorous controlled scientific study, through in-depth, personalized
analyses, to the purely anecdotal. The elusive and ephemeral nature of humour
and laughter demands that we retain a broad-based methodology if research
as a whole is to progress fruitfully.
The book is divided into two sections, the first focusing upon theoretical
developments and the second dealing with the uses of humour in society and
professional relationships. Chapters in Section I concentrate particularly upon
incongruity, superiority and arousal theories, and upon humour and laughter
in social settings. Chapters in Section II are concerned with humour in relation
to creativity, West Indian calypso, and mass communication, and the final
chapters in the Section speculate about the potential value of humour in
psychotherapy. The format generally adopted by authors in both Sections is to
review their own research in the context of empirical and theoretical literatures
and to present in addition some fresh ideas and new data.
We envisage that our book will appeal to many research-oriented behavioural
scientists and that the main readership will be drawn from those with academic
or professional interests in social, child and clinical psychology, sociology,
education, and other related disciplines. In general it will be of interest to all
those who are concerned with human attributes, human emotions and social
interaction. This will include many embarking on studies of behaviours which,
book
like laughter, are difficult to subject to systematic investigation. The
and laughter and aims to
addresses many crucial questions about humour
appear most likely to produce a coherent
direct future research in ways which
KXX

body of knowledge. We hope that those taking up new research find the book a
stimulating and enlightening source of ideas. We hope also that they find it
provides some insights into ways of tackling investigations into these fascinating
topics.

UWIST ANTONY J. CHAPMAN

Cardiff Hucu C. Foot
 Introduction
_ Antony J. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot

To possess a good sense of humour or at least to laugh freely and frequently at

humorous and pleasurable events is regarded as thoroughly healthy and desir-
able by virtually all those who have concerned themselves with the subject of
humour. The average man is also firmly committed to the belief that having a
reputation for a keen sense of humour is something to be treasured and
protected. Amongst samples of college students Allport (1961) and Omwake
(1937) found that only 6% and 1-4°% respectively were prepared to admit toa
lower-than-average sense of humour. In the words of Frank Moore Colby
[quoted by Bergler (1956)]: ‘Men will confess to treason, murder, arson, false
teeth or a wig. How many will own up toa lack of humour”
But man has not always held humour and laughter on such a pedestal of
desirability. From an _ historical perspective, humour has often been
characterized as base and degenerate, fit only for the ignorant and foolish.
In Philebus, Plato claimed that the ridiculous was based on an unfortunate
lack of self-knowledge. Laughter, although pleasurable enough, was seen as
malevolent behaviour stemming from hurtful aggression, envy, or spite at
seeing the enemy vanquished. Ancient Roman nihilistic theories were put
forward by Cicero and Quintilian, both of whom were sceptical that anyone
could adequately explain laughter. They agreed with Aristotle that laughter
has its basis in some kind of shabbiness or deformity, and described it as
degrading to morals, art and religion, a form of behaviour from which civilized
man should shrink. The view that laughter was closely allied to derision and was
a socially disruptive force persisted for some time and Ben Jonson (1599) was
one of the first notable littérateurs to suggest that comedy inevitably functioned
as a social corrective in its use as criticism of the follies of mankind. Later,
Moliere and Swift likewise used humour in the form of satire mirroring the
social foibles and hypocrisy of seventeenth and eighteenth century Western
society.
Returning to more modern times, the values placed upon humour and the
humour ‘industry’ are clearly reflected in the popularity (sometimes bordering
on reverence) accorded comedy artists and comedy routines in the world of
show-business. Such popularity is itself evidence enough of the emotional
2
needs which comedy fulfils in our everyday humdrum lives. Yet, despite all
this, it is striking how comparatively little research has been done in the area of
humour and laughter.
Only a few years ago the editor of one social science magazine, after announc-
ing that one whole issue would be devoted to humour research, reported
receiving a number of antagonistic reactions to this announcement from his
readers —even though he had alluded to articles by several eminent academics
(cf. Friedman, 1969). The lack of research interest in humour and laughter
coupled with an apparent unwillingness to take the subject seriously is very
strange, particularly in view of Keith-Spiegel’s (1969) assessment that “humor
related behavior exceeds all other types of emotional behaviors combined ...
by ten or more times’. Perhaps the lack of interest is at least partially a product
of what Allport (1960) has termed the ‘tenderness tabu’ amongst psychological
investigators. He complained that the majority of research workers have been
preoccupied with decidedly unpleasant emotions at the expense of pleasant
emotions such as love, joy and happiness.
To check that this was not just a ‘tenderminded illusion’ Carlson (1966)
analysed the content of 172 introductory psychology texts published between
1877 and 1961. He reported that more terms were available to identify
unpleasant emotional states than pleasant emotional states and that there was a
disproportionate emphasis upon the unpleasant emotions. They received
about twice as much space as pleasant emotions in the books of the late 1940s
and over three times as much space (with six times as many references) in the
early 1960s. The trend, from 1900 onwards, was towards an ever-increasing
emphasis upon the unpleasant emotions. Lindauer (1968) cautiously concluded
that ‘psychology is idiosyncratically preoccupied with the negative aspects of
emotion’ after a frequency count in non-psychological literature had revealed
that pleasant emotions were more frequently referred to than unpleasant
emotions, with little change in the balance in recent years.
Let us now examine the nature of humour and laughter. In general theorists
are divided over the causes, mechanisms and functions of laughter and there
has been little consensus of terminology in the literature as a whole, although in
psychoanalytic writings terms like ‘humour’, ‘wit’ and ‘comic’ have clearly
defined meanings and are never interchanged. The word laughter is used by
most to refer to an exclusively human attribute but by others, notably Darwin
(1890) and van Hooff (1972), as a response common to the apes. In fact, amongst
psychological humour theorists, there appears to have been a distinct reluctance
to define humour and laughter, although many have emphasized particular
ingredients (such as incongruity or surprise) as necessary prerequisites for a
stimulus to appear humorous. In Drever’s (1952) 4 Dictionary of Psychology
(published by Penguin Books Ltd.) humour is defined as the ‘character of a
complex situation exciting joyful, and in the main quiet, laughter, either directly,
through sympathy, or through empathy’. Laughter is defined as an emotional
response, normally expressing joy, ‘in the child and the unsophisticated adult’.
(Could this be evidence for a tenderness taboo?). Webster's New International
 3
Dictionary (2nd edition) makes more insightful and convincing reading:
laughter is defined as ‘a movement (usually involuntary) of the muscles ofthe
face, especially of the lips, usually with a peculiar expression of the eyes,
indicating merriment, satisfaction or derision and attended by an interrupted
expulsion of air from the lungs’.
Outside the psychological literature there is no such reticence to define what
humour and laughter are: everyone thinks he knows. It is difficult to refrain
from passing judgement upon those who have asserted their opinions in an area
where ‘angles fear to tread’ (although so far no humour theorist has sprouted
wings !). Drever would no doubt have found support for his ‘inciteful’ definition
of laughter in the person of Lord Chesterfield, who wrote that ‘there is nothing
so illiberal, and so ill-bred as audible laughter’, but would have been subjected
to severe criticism by Erskine (1928), for example, who promoted the view
that a sense of humour was something ‘to cultivate and achieve’. Elsewhere,
laughter has been variously defined as ‘the hiccup of a fool’ (John Ray) and
‘the mind sneezing’ (Wyndham Lewis), while, according to Wasson (1926),
‘humour is something which causes a tickling of the brain’ and ‘laughter was
invented to scratch it’. Escarpit (1969) has hypothesized that the role of laughter
is to ‘change the angle of view on reality’ and Shaw (1960) has offered laughter
as a paradigm of growth.
One obvious problem that bedevils definitions of humour is whether it is to
be viewed as a stimulus, a response or a disposition. The Penguin English
Dictionary allows all three possibilities: humour may refer to that which causes
‘good-tempered laughter’ (stimulus); or ‘cheerful and good-tempered amuse-
ment’ (response); or ‘the capacity for seeing the funny side of things’
(disposition). While no one would dispute that laughter is generally a response,
it is just as much a response to non-humorous stimuli as it is to humour stimuli.
In fact, though not a humour stimulus itself, laughter can act as a stimulus in
inducing or augmenting laughter in other persons.
Although the words ‘humour’ and ‘laughter’ have sometimes been used
synonymously in discussions of theory, Dewey (1894), Potter (1954) and others
have argued that laughter can be irrelevant to the study of humour, and vice
versa, because each can be experienced independently of the other. Stephen
Potter spelt out the obvious when he wrote:

There are in fact very few situations to which laughter is not appropriate. We laugh
when the sea touches our navel ... But we only laugh in company ... We laugh at
something because it is familiar and something else because it is unfamiliar. We
laugh at misfortunes if they do not incur danger, though what constitutes ‘danger’
varies enormously between nations and centuries. The day before yesterday, in
ethnological time, we laughed to see a lunatic on the end ofa chain, or a bear tied toa
post and bitten to death by dogs ... We laugh because other people are laughing
uncontrollably; but controlled or calculated laughter, on the other hand, can drive
our own smiles underground: for hours. We laugh if and because we are supposed
not to laugh ...
Then there is the laugh which fills up the blank in the conversation ... The laugh
to attract attention ... The laugh of the lone man at the theatre, who wishes to show
 he understands ... The laugh of creative pleasure ... The laugh of relief from
physical danger ... [and so on].
(Reprinted by permission of A. D. Peters and Company).

Strictly speaking, therefore, a distinction can (and indeed should) be drawn

between theories of humour and theories of laughter, and clearly theories of
laughter need to take into account the numerous types of non-humorous as
well as humorous situations which can cause laughter. Undoubtedly, in this
context, one of the most difficult problems, for empiricists and theorists alike
is to determine precisely what causes laughter in any given situation. Brief
taxonomies of laughter and humour have been put forward in a number of
articles (e.g. Flugel, 1954; Ghosh, 1939; Hall and Allin, 1897; Monro, 1951)
but no classification has yet done justice to the tremendous diversity of situa-
tions which can provoke laughter. Presumably each category of humour or
laughter-evoking situation has its own antecedents. In recent times, Berlyne
(1969) has attributed laughter to triumph, relief from anxiety, agreement,
sudden comprehension, embarrassment and scorn. Giles and Oxford (1970)
have described seven ‘mutually exclusive’ categories of laughter situations
which produce seven different types of laughter: namely, humorous, social,
ignorance, anxiety, derision, apologetic and laughter in response to tickling.
No all embracing theory of humour and/or laughter has yet gained
widespread acceptance and possibly no general theory will ever be successfully
applied to the human race as a whole when its members exhibit such vast
individual differences with respect to their humour responsiveness. The paradox
associated with humour is almost certainly a function of its being incorrectly
viewed as a unitary process. Humour plays a myriad of roles and serves a
number of quite different functions. As Zigler, Levine and Gould (1966) have
pointed out, the understanding of humour is far more complex than has gen-
erally been acknowledged. Most theories of humour and laughter are concerned
with the situations under which laughter is regularly elicited rather than with
an analysis ofits nature or functions. The theories are, in the main, explanations
of laughter which occurs fairly reliably under specific sets of circumstances but
‘theories of humour’ may be something of amisnomer in the sense that not all
those situations would always be described as humorous by those who laugh.
Much has been said about the problems of definition and the difficulties
encountered in deveioping theory. There is no doubt that researchers are still
a long way from formulating any general theoretical framework which will
account for all aspects of humour and laughter, assuming this is even feasible.
A substantial part of this book (Section I) is devoted to representing some cf the
research currently being conducted which is seeking to extend man’s knowledge
of the processes involved in appreciation of, and responsiveness to, humour.
We have made every effort to ensure that most of the active research areas are
represented in the book and if any particular formulations appear to be receiving
more than their fair share of space then it is because they are currently attracting
a large proportion of the research interest. The first section then is concerned
with theoretical developments and empirical research in the perception of, and
 5
response to, humour. Our first inclination was to separate those chapters which
laid more emphasis upon the perception of humour stimuli from those which
paid attention to response conditions and measures of humour appreciation.
However, it became clear that such a distinction would be rather arbitrary in
view of the close interrelationship and dependency between input and output.
The first major theoretical theme which is taken up in the book is represented
in the first three chapters by Shultz, by Rothbart and by Nerhardt. These
authors take up the notion of incongruity as a basis for perceiving a stimulus
as humorous, although they differ on the question of whether the discovery of
incongruity alone is a sufficient condition for humour. The developmental
studies of Shultz and Rothbart which draw upon Piagetian ideas about cogni-
tive development have much in common. The second main theoretical research
area is represented in the chapters by La Fave, Haddad and Maesen, and by
Zillmann and Cantor, who discuss their research findings in the context of
superiority theory. Specifically they are concerned with humour as a form of
disparagement or deprecation and they examine humour responsiveness as a
function of the respondent’s attitude towards, and relationship with, those
being disparaged. La Fave and his colleagues seek also to show the connecting
links between superiority and incongruity theories. The third main area of
research, pursued by Godkewitsch, is aimed at exploring the relationship
between psychophysiological measures of arousal and judgements of funniness;
it is based upon Berlyne’s theory of collative motivation which regards jokes
(pleasurable stimuli) as having arousal inducing properties (cf. Berlyne, 1969).
A similar orientation is also expressed by Rothbart in her arousal-safety model
of laughter which is characterized by a state of pleasurable ‘safety’ in a child
after a period of tense uncertainty due to a sudden, surprising or incongruous
stimulus.
A fourth research area represented by our own work emphasizes the social
situation as a determinant of humour responsiveness. Our studies attempt to
show how even subtle modifications in the social situation can affect overt
behaviour in humour situations, through processes such as social facilitation
and social intimacy. Added to this, Giles, Bourhis, Gadfield, Davies and Davies
sketch out a model to define, in any given social context, the processes which
are brought to bear upon the encoder and decoder of the humour. Pollio and
Edgerly also examine the social settings in which humour and laughter occur
and relate this to the comic style of some well-known professional comedians.
This leads into Section II which brings together some of the main research that
has focused upon the purposes for which humour is, or could be, used in society
and in professional relationships.
The ten to five chapter split between the two sections does reflect the greater
emphasis placed upon the problems and processes concerned with perceiving
and responding to humour than upon attempts to explore the impact of humour
in society. But this is not intended to suggest that the chapters in Section II
are non-theoretical. Onthe contrary they draw heavily upon dynamic theoretical
constructs as a springboard for explaining and speculating upon the creation
6
of humour and the purposes which it serves. Following on from Pollio and
Edgerly’s consideration of comic style, Fry and Allen, rather appropriately,
consider in some detail the creative process involved in producing humour and
illustrate this process by reference to the life-style and habits of a well-known
(but unidentified) comedy scriptwriter. Jones and Liverpool’s chapter
introduces an altogether novel perspective by analysing the social functions of
humour and satire in the calypsos of the Trinidadian Carnival. Gruner examines
the role of humour in relation to mass communication where it is often used for
the express purpose of enhancing the communicative effect of the message.
Finally, two related chapters by O’Connell and by Mindess speculate about
the potential use of humour in psychotherapy, emphasizing its importance to the
development of a healthy relationship between therapist and patient.

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Lindauer, M. S. (1968). Pleasant and unpleasant emotions in the literature: as compared to
the affective tone of psychology. Journal of Psychology, 70, 55—67.
Monro, D. H. (1951). Argument of Laughter. Melbourne University Press.
 7

Omwake, L. (1937). A study of sense of humor: its relation to sex, age and personal
characteristics. Journal of Applied Psychology, 21, 688-704.
Potter, S. (1954). The Sense of Humour. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Shaw, F. J. (1960). Laughter: paradigm of growth. Journal of Individual Psychology, 16,
151-157.
Wasson, M. (1926). What is humor? Forum, 76, 425—429.
Zigler, E., Levine, J. and Gould, L. (1966). Cognitive processes in the development of
children’s appreciation of humor. Child Development, 37, 507-518.
 Section I

Perceiving and Responding

to Humour
 an

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 Chapter 1

A Cognitive-Developmental Analysis
of Humour
Thomas R. Shultz

This chapter is concerned with the ontogenetic development of humour

appreciation, particularly with the cognitive aspects of this development.
Answers are sought to questions of the following sort: What are the cognitive
processes which are engaged during the appreciation of humour? What is the
relation between the structural characteristics of the various forms of humour
and these cognitive processes? How do these cognitive processes change with
psychological development? And how are these developmental changes related
to other more general aspects of cognitive growth?
Although the focus of this chapter is developmental, it is of course necessary
to examine the cognitive nature of humour appreciation in adults. Any cogni-
tive-developmental analysis must include the terminal stage towards which
development progresses. The chapter begins with such an analysis of the
cognitive processes used in adult humour and then travels backwards in
ontogenetic time in an attempt to delineate the important developmental
milestones that bring the child closer to this final stage. As will become apparent,
the farther back the analysis goes, the less certain it becomes in terms of both
theory and data. The younger the child, the less is known about the cognitive
processes that characterize his appreciation of humour. In fact, for the very
young child, the nature of humour itself becomes relatively uncertain.

HUMOUR IN ADULTS

In order to study the cognitive processes involved in humour appreciation,

many theorists have attempted to identify the structural characteristics of those
situations and events which produce humour. It is commonly assumed that,
regardless of what the joke happens to be about, it has the same underlying
structure as jokes dealing with other content areas. It is further assumed that
the person’s cognitive processes must correspond to this universal joke structure
in order for him to fully appreciate any given joke.
 Analyses of humour material

If one decides to follow this strategy the next step is to develop a representative
collection of humour which can be analysed for its structural properties.
Substantial amounts of time and energy can be invested at this point in determin-
ing what constitutes humour and what does not. A number of criteria can be
used to make these decisions: (a) Does the event elicit laughter or smiling?
(b) Was it produced with the intention of eliciting laughter or smiling? (c)
Would other members of the culture agree that it was an instance of humour?
Each of these criteria can be applied in either an inclusive or an exclusive
manner and they can be applied singly or in combination. Each criterion can be
quantified to enable decisions about the intensity and consensus with which it
can be applied to any given event. A great many events can be classified as
humorous or not on all three criteria with little or no disagreement. And there
are a great many borderline cases which can generate endless discussion and
disagreement. The prudent humour researcher avoids these definitional
controversies and proceeds with his research on issues of greater theoretical
substance. This can best be accomplished by selecting humour stimuli which
clearly satisfy all three criteria simultaneously. In this author’s experience, a
good strategy is to use published collections of humour materials such as jokes,
riddles and cartoons. These were clearly produced with the intention of eliciting
humour, they do in fact elicit humour on empirical test, and most observers
would agree to call them humorous. In addition, they are somewhat easier to
analyse than many instances of spontaneous humour. This is because sponta-
neous, real-life humour may depend very much on the context for interpretation
and appreciation. Published materials, while they may have at one time been
spontaneous, can most often be adequately analysed without detailed know-
ledge of the surrounding context.
Once having chosen his sample of humorous materials, the cognitive theorist
must then analyse their underlying structure. This is largely an intuitive process
whereby the theorist attempts to abstract those structural features which are
essential to the humour of large numbers of jokes which differ widely in content.
Not all humour theorists have reached the same conclusions. Theorists such as
Kant (1790), Schopenhauer (1819), Maier (1932) and Koestler (1964) have
proposed that the structure of humour is characterized by incongruity.
Incongruity is usually defined as a conflict between what is expected and what
actually occurs in the joke. It is a concept which accounts well for the most
obvious structural feature of jokes, the surprisingness of the punchline.
A number of other theorists, including Beattie (1776), Freud (1960), Willman
(1940), Jones (1970), Shultz (1970) and Suls (1972), have argued that incongruity
alone is insufficient to account for the structure of humour. They have proposed
in various arguments that there exists a second, more subtle aspect of jokes
which renders incongruity meaningful or appropriate by resolving or explaining
it. Within this framework, humour appreciation is conceptualized as a biphasic
sequence involving first the discovery of incongruity followed by a resolution
 2)
of the incongruity. The mechanism of resolution is apparently necessary to
distinguish humour from nonsense. Whereas nonsense can be characterized
as pure or unresolvable incongruity, humour can be characterized as resolvable
or meaningful incongruity.
In verbal jokes, the incongruity consists in the relation between the last line,
or punchline, and the part that precedes the last line. Consider the old W. C.
Fields’, joke where someone asked, ‘Mr. Fields, do you believe in clubs for
young people?’ and he replied, ‘Only when kindness fails’. At first, his answer
does not seem to fit with the question. Whatever expectations were set up by the
question are disconfirmed by the answer. This incongruity can be resolved by
noticing that part of the material coming before the punchline was ambiguous.
The ambiguity in this case resides in the semantic ambiguity of the word ‘clubs’.
After initially interpreting ‘clubs’ as social groups, the listener later discovers
that ‘clubs’ could also refer to large sticks. A very similar joke was used by
Groucho Marx who maintained, ‘I ought to join a club, and beat you over the
head with it’. In a one-liner such as this, there is no strict separation between
the punchline and the rest of the joke. Nevertheless, the second part of the
statement is clearly incongruous in relation to the first part; and the resolution
is based on the semantic ambiguity of ‘clubs’,
About half the verbal jokes this author has analysed are resolved on the
basis of some sort of linguistic ambiguity. In addition to those resolutions
based on lexical ambiguity or semantic ambiguity, resolutions based on
phonological and syntactic ambiguities are quite common. Phonological
ambiguity occurs when a given sound sequence can receive more than one
interpretation. This often resuits from a confusion about the boundaries
between words. An example is given in the joke where the teacher asks the
student to construct a sentence containing the phrase ‘bitter end’ and the student
replies, “The dog chased the cat and he bitter end’. This is quite an incongruous
use of the phrase ‘bitter end’ until the listener realizes that it could also be
interpreted as ‘bit her end’. Recent developments in transformational theory
(Chomsky, 1965) have made it possible to distinguish two types of syntactic
ambiguity. Surface structure ambiguity occurs when the words of a sentence
can be grouped or bracketed (unlabelled) in two different ways with each
bracketing expressing a different interpretation. An example of resolution by
surface structure ambiguity is provided in the joke where the stranger asks,
‘Can you tell me how long cows should be milked? and the farmer answers,
‘They should be milked the same as short ones, of course’. The farmer’s answer
is incongruous but it can be resolved by re-interpreting the initial bracketing of
(how long) (cows) as (how) (long cows). In the case of surface structure ambi-
guity, two different deep structures are projected onto two different surface
structures. In contrast, deep structure ambiguity occurs when two different
deep structures are projected onto a single surface structure. An example of
resolution by deep structure ambiguity is provided in the following joke:
‘Did you know that the natives like potatoes even more than missionaries?”
‘Yes, but the missionaries are more nutritious’. The initially incongruous reply
Another random document with
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[Inhoud]
 HOOFDSTUK II.

Van Vleuten was gelukkig geweest. Ruim vier jaar had hij te
Soerabaja doorgebracht, en er de filiaal van het Bataviaasch huis
gevestigd en doen bloeien. Financieel was hij daar zelf ook bij
welgevaren, en achtte zich thans sterk genoeg om te repatrieeren.
Wel zouden zij van de rente van hun geld slechts zeer bescheiden
kunnen leven, doch voor leegzitten was hij toch te jong; dus zou hij
in het vaderland naar iets omzien, dat hem bezighield en de kas
hielp stijven. Iets wat niet moeielijk te vinden zou zijn, naar hem
dacht; immers als men het niet bepaald noodig heeft, komt zooiets
van zelf.

Betsy vond zijn denkbeeld uitstekend. Niet dat zij naar Holland
verlangde. Zij had het land daartoe te jong verlaten, en was in Indië
zóó thuis, dat zij aan eenigerlei verandering geen behoefte
gevoelde. Doch zij koesterde een stille hoop, dat de wisseling van
klimaat dienstig kon zijn tot de vervulling van een hartewensch.
Langer dan vijf jaar was zij nu getrouwd, en nog steeds kinderloos.
En naar den aard der menschen, bij wie het instinct door het
aangeleerde is verdrongen, wees de natuur haar noch van Vleuten
den weg in deze, en beschouwden zij het al dan niet krijgen van
kinderen afhankelijk van een toeval, een invloed van buitenaf, of een
bijzondere bestiering van [18]het Opperwezen. En op dien
vruchtbaren ondergrond tierde welig het bijgeloof, als overal waar
kennis ontbreekt.

Te ’s Gravenhage huurde van Vleuten een kleine woning in de

Riouwstraat, en toen de eerste drukte van het zich inrichten voorbij
was, besloot hij zich te gaan wijden aan zijn voornemen om
bezigheid te zoeken. Hij had feitelijk nog geen vast plan gevormd,
hoe daartoe te geraken, en slenterde dan ook maar wat rond, in de
vaste overtuiging, dat wat men niet zocht, zich het eerst liet vinden.

Op zekeren middag was hij op het kantoor van zijn kassier, dien hij
had opgedragen voor hem soliede effecten te koopen, zonder
bepaalde aanwijzing welke, mits niet teveel van één soort, daar hij
van oordeel was, dat men door van alles wat te nemen, het risico
verdeelde. Dit was geschied, en hij kwam nu zijn papieren kapitaaltje
halen. Terwijl hij in een ontvangkamertje met den procuratie-houder
bezig was de ingekochte stukken met de afrekening te verifieeren,
werd na een vluchtig geklop de deur geopend. De binnentredende
bleef aarzelend staan, de knop van de deur in de hand houdend.

„Pardon.… ik dacht dat u alleen was,” zeide hij, zich tot den
procuratiehouder wendend, na eerst een snellen blik te hebben
geworpen op van Vleuten en zijn effecten.

Laatstgenoemde had opgekeken, en gedurende de korte

oogenblikken dat de procuratie-houder den vreemde toesprak, hem
verzoekende op het kantoor te gaan, waar hij onmiddellijk tot zijn
dienst zou zijn, had hij dien met een belangstelling, waarvoor hij
geen reden kon vinden, scherp opgenomen.

Er was iets eigenaardigs in dien man, vond van Vleuten. Twee

helderbruine varkensoogjes schitterden listig in een strak wasbleek
gelaat, waarop overigens een ijl krulsnorretje de eentonigheid brak.
Om den mond een trekje van [19]harde brutaliteit, voortkomende uit
het met geweld bedwingen van aangeboren verlegenheid. De
kleeding, schoon van goede stof, klaarblijkelijk niet volgens den
smaak van den coupeur gemaakt, doch eer op eigenwijze aangifte
van den drager, de schouders te laag, de rug teveel getailleerd,
waardoor de zware heupen sterk uitkwamen. De pantalon van onder
sterk ingevouwen en met fietsgespen vastgemaakt.
„Iemand die ons telkens komt vervelen,” meende de procuratie-
houder te moeten uitleggen, toen de deur weer dicht was. „Noemt
zich bankier of zooiets.”

„Een titel is gemakkelijk,” zeide van Vleuten. En opstaande, pakte hij

zijn stukken bijeen en vertrok, van plan zich onmiddellijk huiswaarts
te begeven.

Doch langs Café Central komende, kreeg hij trek in een glas bier, en
liep er binnen. Geen kennissen hebbende, vond hij het eenvoudiger
zich aan de leestafel neer te zetten, waar hij in de illustraties
bladerde.

„Zag ik u zooeven niet bij Karsten & Co.?” zeide opeens iemand
naast hem, met onnatuurlijk hoog stemgeluid, en opziende
bespeurde hij den man van daareven.

„Dat kon wel,” antwoordde van Vleuten, minder koel dan hij bedoeld
had.

De ander scheen dat te bemerken en zich daardoor gerechtigd te

gevoelen het gesprek voort te zetten.

„U moest voor den eten geen bier drinken,” zeide hij. „Dat is niet
goed voor de maag. Neemt u liever een glas port of een bittertje, dat
zet eiwit aan.”

„Eiwit?” herhaalde van Vleuten verbaasd.

„Ja, dat is goed voor de spieren en het centrale zenuwgestel.”

„Is u dokter ….? Ik dacht.…”

„Pardonneer! Ik ben Wiechen, bankier. Maar iemand moet zoo’n

beetje zijn eigen lichaam kennen. En.… ik zag u bij Karsten. Soliede
firma, maar duur.” [20]

„Men heeft mij heel schappelijk behandeld. Een achtste percent,

meen ik.”

„Per hoeveel tijd?”

„Geen tijd. Provisie, bedoel ik, voor het inkoopen van effecten.”

„O! Ja, dat is de prijs. Maar ik meende als men zaken met hen doet,
geld opneemt.—Kijk u eens hier,” en Wiechen vouwde een rekening-
courant open; „dáár bijvoorbeeld. Daar staat een post van precies
duizend gulden. Provisie ƒ 25.— voor 30 dagen. Dat is.…?”

„Twee en een half percent,” zeide van Vleuten, „per maand!”

„Juist. En ziet u,” ging de ander voort, het blad omslaande en op het
eindcijfer wijzende, „ik doe nogal zaken met hen. Ruim twee en
veertig mille. Ze laten particulieren natuurlijk meer betalen.”

„Maar wat laat u dan de particulieren wel betalen, als uzelf zoo’n
ontzettende rente moet opbrengen?”

„Dat is ongelijk. Mijn stelregel is vijf percent.”

„Ook per maand dan?”

„Ja, dat spreekt. Ik ben erg goedkoop. In mijn buurt woont een
zekere van der Wal, die niet onder tien percent uitzet. Eens heb
ikzelf vijf bij hem moeten betalen. Enfin, het moest, om iemand te
helpen. Maar daarom noem ik Karsten duur. Mijn meeste geld is van
particulieren, die blij zijn anderhalf tot twee percent te maken. Dat
zult u van uw effecten niet halen, wel?”
„Neen, zeker niet,” zeide van Vleuten. „Maar.… als ik onbescheiden
ben, zegt u het gerust.… is er voor dergelijke transacties veel
omzet?”

„U heeft mijn rekening-courant met Karsten gezien. Als u eens bij mij
wilt komen, zal ik u heel wat anders laten zien. Misschien krijgt u wel
lust eens iets bij mij te plaatsen.” [21]

„U woont?”

„Hier is mijn kaartje met adres.—Laat ons nu over wat anders

praten. Daar komen namelijk een paar heeren, die graag alles
weten. Mag ik u een borrel aanbieden? Hé, kellner!”

Een drietal jongelieden naderde het hoekje van de leestafel. Van

Vleuten was eigenlijk van plan geweest op te staan, doch de
beleefdheid van Wiechen, die een glas Catz voor hem besteld had,
weerhield hem. En daardoor kon hij aan een voorstelling niet
ontkomen.

Van aard weinig spraakzaam als hij voor het eerst iemand
ontmoette, bepaalde van Vleuten zich tot luisteren en het
bestudeeren der nieuwe kennissen. Onverdeeld gunstig was de
indruk dien zij op hem maakten, nu juist niet.

Arnolds was een spichtige figuur met dwalende oogen en een

scheeve neus. Viehof een goede middelmatiger met schonkige
vormen, Boom een ietwat fatterige reus met een geweldigen knevel
en kaal hoofd. Naar hun gesprekken te oordeelen was de eerste een
hartstochtelijk liefhebber van wedrennen, waarop hij enorme
sommen moest hebben omgezet, de tweede een man van Wiechens
slag, den mond vol van „slagjes” op financieel gebied, de derde
eindelijk een uitvinder, sprekend over zijn „machine”, die een
revolutie in het wereldverkeer zou teweegbrengen.
Hoewel alle drie volgens van Vleuten’s oordeel het hunne deden aan
opsnijderij, was de strekking daarvan verschillend. Terwijl de beide
eersten er een eer in schenen te stellen hun medemenschen
zooveel mogelijk geld afhandig te maken, onverschillig of de
middelen daartoe den toets van stricte eerlijkheid konden doorstaan,
leek de laatste weliswaar niet ongeneigd zijn voordeel te zoeken,
doch hiermee tevens de menschheid een dienst te willen bewijzen,
door het geven van iets werkelijk nuttigs. [22]

Alleen kwam het den toehoorder voor, dat de uitvinding in quaestie

leed aan het gewone gebrek van een zoogenaamd perpetuum
mobile, namelijk het bewegen zelf. Althans daartoe scheen het nog
niet gekomen, niettegenstaande het werk dat Boom, financieel
gesteund door Wiechen, daaraan besteed moest hebben.

Toen van Vleuten meende genoegzaam lang in het gezelschap te

zijn gebleven, om zijn weggaan niet onbeleefd te doen schenen,
stond hij op, en nam afscheid.

„Wanneer kan ik u wachten?” vroeg Wiechen hem zacht, nadat hij

hem tot aan de uitgang begeleid had.

„Morgenmiddag?” stelde van Vleuten voor.

„’s Middags ben ik veelal bezet of uit, althans na tweeën. Mijn

kantoortijd is van negen tot twee.”

„Dan morgen ochtend?”

„Goed; ik wacht u dan liefst tusschen elf en twaalf.”

Met nieuwsgierige blikken keken de drie jongelui Wiechen aan, toen

hij terugkwam.
„Niets voor jelui,” zeide deze, „’n prutsje geld uit Indië meegebracht,
en al bij Karsten & Co. gedeponeerd.”

„Laat hij het terughalen. Ik weet een schitterenden coup.”

„Sst, heeren! Laat hem maar aan mij over. Ik zal jelui er wel bij
noodig hebben; maar niet te driftig. Je weet, om een gaatje open te
maken, is beleid en geduld alles.”

Zij zagen hem alle drie een oogenblik wantrouwend aan.

„Leen me een kopstuk tot morgen,” zeide Arnolds toen.

Wiechen greep in zijn vestzak, en spreidde hetgeen hij daaruit

haalde op de vlakke hand uit: twee kwartjes en vier dubbeltjes.

„Dat is alles,” zeide hij, „en mijn borrel nog niet betaald. Daar, ik kan
nog net een sectie trammen.”

De ander trok de schouders op en draaide zich half om.

„Wie speelt een partij biljart?” [23]

„Ik,” riep Viehof. „Wie houdt?”

„Drie tegen één, om een gulden!”

En nu volgde een verward geroep, waaruit Wiechen niet wijs kon

worden, een nabootsing van het geschreeuw der bookmakers op de
rennen.

„Hou je?” vroeg Arnolds hem, en op een toestemmend knikje begon

men te spelen.

„Wat is dat voor een spel?” vroeg Wiechen, die Arnolds midden in
een serie zag ophouden, terwijl Viehof voortspeelde.
„Gewoon vijftig punten.”

„Waarom hield je dan op, zooeven?”

„Omdat ik den bal gemist had.”

„O, ik dacht dat hij raak was,” zeide Wiechen, die Viehof door zag
spelen tot hij een enorm eind vóór was, en begreep zijn gulden kwijt
te zijn, dien hij dan ook even later betaalde, uit een ander zakje
echter dan waarin het klein-geld van daareven.

„Wat is dat?” vroeg Viehof. „De côte is vijf tegen één gebleven. Vier
pop erbij, alsjeblieft.”

En Wiechen, bij zich zelf zwerende dat hij hem die vier gulden duur
zou laten betalen, betaalde, uit vrees dat men zou denken dat hij de
terminologie der paris niet kende, wat toch inderdaad het geval was,
en de anderen zeer goed wisten.

Inmiddels was van Vleuten thuisgekomen, en had zijn

wederwaardigheden van den middag aan Betsy verteld.

„Wees vooral voorzichtig,” waarschuwde zij. „Ik heb al lang

begrepen, dat menschen, die geruimen tijd in Indië zijn geweest, te
naief zijn geworden voor Europa. Wij worden van alle kanten
beetgenomen, als we niet oppassen. En het is alsof men elkaar het
wachtwoord geeft.”

„Nu ja,” zeide hij; „dat kan zijn bij groentenboer en [24]dergelijken,
doch ernstige geldmannen.… Trouwens die Wiechen doet zelf zaken
met Karsten & Co.”

„Is het je niet vreemd voorgekomen,” viel zij in, „dat, als hij dan zulke
groote zaken doet met hen, die meneer met wien je sprak, zich zoo
wegwerpend over hem uitliet?”
„Ja, dat is vreemd. Enfin, ik zal morgen goed toekijken.”

„Gut, man, weet je wie ik gezien heb?” vroeg zij opeens, van het
onderwerp afstappend. „Onze buurvrouw in het hôtel te Soerabaja;
weet je nog? Wier man toen gestorven is.”

„Mevrouw van Groningen?”

„Ja! Maar ik was haar naam vergeten; daarom durfde ik haar niet
aanspreken?”

„Zooveel te beter. Nu kan ik je het compliment van zooeven

teruggeven!” lachte van Vleuten. „Ik denk dat het meer dan naief zou
zijn, om kennissen uit Indië zoo maar aan te spreken, vooral op
straat.”

„Waarom? Zij groette heel vriendelijk.”

„Kan zijn. Ik spreek in het algemeen trouwens. Je weet nooit onder

welke omstandigheden de menschen zich hier bevinden, en dus ook
niet of zoowel de een als de ander op het hervatten van de vroegere
kennis gesteld zijn. Verbeeld je dat een oud-resident hier moet
wonen, die winkelier in blikjes en inmaakgroenten geworden is.”

„Och kom!” deed zij ongeloovig. [25]

[Inhoud]
 HOOFDSTUK III.

„Binnen!”

„Morgen, Wiechen,” groette Arnolds met slepende stem, het kantoor

binnentredend. „Ik heb een zaakje voor je. Heb je geld?”

„Jawel, voor een goede zaak altijd.”

„Twintig mille voor zes weken. Er zit goed wat op.”

„Waarvoor is het? Voor de paardjes?”

„Hm, een fameuse coup. ’n Tuyau van beste soort.”

„Zoo. Wie moet het hebben, en wie teekenen mee?”

„David Beenhuis. Op zijn handteekening alleen moet je ’t geven.

Maar die is goed; daar sta ik voor in.”

„Ja,” zeide Wiechen, die een stuk papier en potlood genomen had.
„Ga voort. Waar woont hij?”

„Parijs. Vroeger in Amsterdam. Je kunt overal naar zijn vader

informeeren, waar hij van moet erven. Meermalen millionnair, en
stokoud.”

„Pas dood was beter. Maar enfin, ik zal informeeren. Wanneer moet
het er zijn?”

„Een dag of vier.”

„Nu, vanavond weet ik het. Kom je in Central?

„Ja, dat is goed. En.… ik moet twee mille hebben voor mijn moeite,
denk erom.”

„Dan moet hij voor vijf en twintig accepteeren.” [26]

„Goed. Ik heb de blanco wissels bij me; je hebt maar in te vullen.”

„Dankje. Teekenen waar ik bij ben.”

„Onzin. Hij ontvangt zelf het geld. En ik ben Viehof niet, zou ik
denken.”

„Als hij zelf komt, is het goed,” antwoordde Wiechen, zonder op de

laatste woorden weerwerk te geven. „Zie eens of je Boom vinden
kunt.”

„Dat is gemakkelijk genoeg. Tot twaalf uur in zijn bed. Ik zal hem bij
je sturen. Dag Wiechen.”

„Bonjour,” zeide Wiechen, op een electrisch schelknopje drukkend,

voor het uitlaten.

Toen hij de voordeur had hooren dichtvallen, belde hij nogmaals,

waarop de bediende binnenkwam.

„Is er iemand?”

„Deze meneer,” antwoordde de bediende, een stukje papier op tafel

leggend. „Hij was juist binnen toen u belde.”

„Goed,” zeide Wiechen, den naam lezende van van Vleuten. „Als ik
bel, kan je meneer binnenlaten.”

Hij ging naar het telefoon-toestel, en had reeds de hand aan de kruk,
toen hij zich plotseling bedacht, en terugkeerde naar zijn schrijftafel,
waar hij op de bel drukte. Toen van Vleuten binnenkwam, was
Wiechen bezig eenige papieren vóór hem terecht te leggen, alsof ze
bijeen hoorden, quasi druk.

„Aha!” deed Wiechen, die zich in zijn kantoorstoel had omgedraaid.

„Blij u te zien, meneer. Hoe vindt u dat ik hier zit?”

Hij was al sprekende opgestaan, en wees met de hand zijn kantoor

rond.

„Ruim en gezellig,” zeide van Vleuten; „maar als die lessenaar en

brandkast er niet stonden, zou men niet denken op een kantoor te
zijn. Vooral die schilderijen.…” [27]

„Bekijkt u ze eens goed,” noodde Wiechen. En half fluisterend: „Ze

zijn van een barones!”

„Zoo?” zeide van Vleuten, onplezierig aangedaan, door het

parvenuachtige van den toon. „En nu onze zaken.”

„Alsublieft. Neemt u plaats.” En na de brandkast geopend te hebben,

haalde hij er een dikke enveloppe uit. „Voor meer dan twee ton
polissen!”

„Een heel bedrag,” vond van Vleuten. „Als ze wat lang geloopen
hebben, krijgen ze waarde, anders beteekenen ze niet veel. De
zoogenaamde contante waarde hangt af van de gestorte premieën.”

„Die worden geregeld door mij betaald.”

„Maar meneer.… de zaak gaat mij natuurlijk niet aan … doch als u
de premie geregeld betaalt, houdt u er een soort levensverzekering
op eigen houtje op na. Dat is alles.”

„Als er maar één dood gaat, krijg ik meer kapitaal dan ik betaald
heb.”
„Dat zou toevallig zoo kunnen wezen, maar regel is het niet. U, die
man van zaken is, zult begrijpen, dat de
levensverzekeringmaatschappijen, om winst te maken, meer aan
premieën en rente daarvan moeten ontvangen dan hun uitkeeringen
bedragen. Dooreen genomen, betaalt dus het publiek meer dan het
ontvangt.”

„Nu,” zeide Wiechen, op den toon van iemand wiens

lievelingsdenkbeeld wordt afgekeurd; „nu, ik zou ze ongaarne
afstaan. Maar kijkt u eens in deze portefeuille.”

En hij bladerde in de wissels en accepten, die zich daarin bevonden,

zoodat van Vleuten de bedragen kon zien.

„Dat ziet er beter uit,” merkte deze op.

„Nietwaar? De eenige zorg is goede informatie te nemen omtrent de

personen die teekenen. Want u begrijpt, de acceptant is zelden
goed. Anders zou hij zulk duur geld niet nemen. De borgen, meneer,
daar zit het hem in!” [28]

„Natuurlijk. En onder welk soort menschen zit uw geld

voornamelijk?”

„Van allerlei. Het liefst heb ik menschen van naam en goede familie.
Die betalen om hun fatsoen op te houden. En moet ik ze al eens in
rechte vervolgen, dan maakt dat weer reclame, ziet u. Zoo heb ik
laatst een jonkheer failliet laten verklaren.”

„Een schadepost dus?”

„Och, wat zal ik u zeggen. Hij had het geld duur; tien percent. Ik had
het zelf tegen vijf percent moeten opnemen, om hem te helpen,
maar natuurlijk gauw terugbetaald. En nu had hij al ruim anderhalf
jaar rente betaald, dus was ik gedekt. Als het niet was geweest om
de familie plezier te doen, zou ik een streep door de post gehaald
hebben.”

„Een raar soort plezier! Of bedoelt u andersom?”

„Neen, werkelijk. Ik deed het op verzoek van een oom, die vond dat
het jongemensch teveel verkwistte, en die hem nu hiermee onder
een streng régime kreeg, terwijl hij tevens buiten staat was nog meer
schulden te maken. Puur om van dienst te zijn; want ik wist vooruit,
dat ik nauwelijks de kosten eruit zou krijgen. Ik zal u nu mijn boek
eens laten zien, omdat u behoort te weten wie ik ben, en met wie ik
zaken doe, als u mij uw geld toevertrouwt.”

Wiechen ontsloot een kastje in zijn bureau en haalde er een paar

boeken uit, die hij op tafel legde. En de bladzijden omslaande,
toonde hij zijn verbaasden bezoeker de namen zijner debiteuren, nu
en dan met den vinger erop wijzende, als het een naam gold uit den
adelstand, waarvoor hij blijkbaar groote voorliefde koesterde.

De stemming waarin van Vleuten door het waarschuwend woord

zijner vrouw was gebracht, veranderde geheel. Toen hij
binnenkwam, had hij het voornemen den „bankier” op [29]beleefde
wijze voor zijn aanbod te bedanken, en er geen gebruik van te
maken. Er was iets in die groote winst van geleend geld, dat hem
stuitte. Doch, en vooral nadat hij in het crediteuren-boek ook gezien
had, wie buiten de firma Karsten & Co. geld bij Wiechen geplaatst
hadden, en daaronder ook particulieren van goeden naam, begon hij
te redeneeren.

Als die allen het deden, en aan den anderen kant het nemen van
geld tegen hooge rente onder de fatsoenlijke lui zoo algemeen was,
waarom zou hij er zich buiten houden? Daarenboven, welk verschil
was er eigenlijk in gelegen, of men waren van de hand zette met
hooge winst, dan wel geld leende met nauwelijks zooveel winst?
Waarom mocht men op een artikel als dameshoeden, in één seizoen
van drie maanden, wel twee à driehonderd percent verdienen, en
van geld in dienzelfden tijd geen vijftien percent? Wat deed iemand
die aandeelen nam in een of andere onderneming, anders dan geld
leenen aan zoo’n instelling, die toch—getuige de tabaksindustrie in
Deli—niet zelden zestig tot honderd percent dividend uitkeerde?

„Ik zal mijn stukken morgen laten verkoopen, meneer Wiechen,”

zeide hij als slotsom van zijn overwegingen, „en breng het kapitaal
bij u.”

„Dat verkoopen is onnoodig,” meende Wiechen. „Het zou u maar

weer provisie kosten aan Karsten & Co. Als u de effecten hier in
deposito wilt geven, zal ik ze tegen beursnoteering overnemen en in
uw credit boeken. Ik geef u dan een bewijs voor het bedrag, en, als u
het goedvindt, zullen we van weerszijden het met zes maanden
opzegbaar stellen. Hoeveel denkt u ongeveer dat het is?”

„Ik bracht bij Karsten & Co. rond vijftig mille. Maar dan kon ik u de
stukken wel dadelijk brengen; na de koffie.” [30]

„Zooals u wilt. Tot straks dan. Dag meneer.… Wacht, ik zal u even
uitlaten.”

Toen van Vleuten vertrokken was, ging Wiechen een oogenblik voor
den spiegel staan. Op zijn voorhoofd vertoonde zich een roode vlek.
Hij bette die met water uit een fonteintje in den hoek van de kamer,
en eerst toen ze geheel verdwenen was, schelde hij.

„Juffrouw Bosch heeft twee kwartjes gebracht,” zeide de bediende,

het geld neerleggend. „Ze zou morgen nog twee kwartjes brengen.
En dan is meneer Boom in de wachtkamer.”
„Goed, laat binnen. En als juffrouw Bosch morgen niet komt, ga je er
heen, en zeg dat ik haar man laat gijzelen, als het zoo door gaat. Ze
moet geregeld elken maandag één vijftig brengen.—Dag Boom,”
vervolgde hij toen deze binnenkwam. „Ga zitten. We moeten eens
ernstig spreken. De zes maanden zijn straks om, en ik geloof dat je
over mij niet te klagen hebt, wel?”

„Ik krijg nog vijf gulden van de vorige week, toen je …”

„Al wel, ik zal ze je geven. Maar hoe staat het nu met de machine? Ik
betaal je geregeld elke week twintig gulden, zonder iets te zien,
eenvoudig op goed vertrouwen. Het wordt tijd, dat ik voor mijn geld
iets krijg.”

„En wou je dan voor die stomme twintig pop in de week, binnen zes
maanden een half millioen hebben?” riep Boom verontwaardigd uit.

„Dat is de quaestie hier niet. Jij zat aan lager wal, en had noch geld
om te leven, noch om je machine af te maken. Toen heb je mij
gevraagd om je te helpen, en dat heb ik gedaan op je eerlijke gezicht
af. Want van je machine heb ik geen verstand. Maar ons contract
zegt, dat je in zes maanden het ding klaar moet hebben, en ik je
daarvoor zou verstrekken driehonderd gulden voor gereedschap—
die je [31]gehad hebt, zonder dat ik zelfs maar gezien heb of je er wel
één stuk gereedschap voor gekocht hebt.…”

„Ik heb je toch een asje laten zien.…”

„Dat misschien één gulden gekost heeft, als je ’t al niet had. Doch
dat is tot daaraantoe. Je hebt het geld gehad èn de twintig pop ’s
weeks. Ik zal je niet op één dag dringen, maar wil een begin aan de
zaak zien. En vertel me nu eens eerlijk: Vóór twaalven ben je niet
op. Dan loop je wat rond, en gaat om vier uur naar de kroeg. Om
acht uur heb je gegeten, en slentert wat achter de meisjes in de
Spuistraat. Dan ga je weer naar de kroeg, en blijft biljarten of
kaartspelen tot half één. Gesteld dat je dan niet meer naar een of
andere nachtkroeg gaat, wat ook wel gebeurt, dan maak je mij niet
wijs, dat je nog werkt. Vooral waar, zooals je zegt, de heele machine
afhangt van een helder hoofd en een vaste hand.”

„Ik heb je toch stukken laten zien!”

„Jawel, maar wie waarborgt mij, dat het stukken van je machine zijn?
Als ik eens een ingenieur bij je sturen kon.…”

„Dat kan niet, zooals je weet. Mijn denkbeeld is zóó eenvoudig, dat
het geheim dadelijk zou verraden zijn. Maar, als het je niet bevalt,
laat ons er dan maar mee uitscheiden.”

Wiechen zweeg, terwijl een vluchtig rood over zijn gelaat trok. De
brutaliteit van den ander was hem te sterk. Die man had nu zoo veel
geld van hem gehad, dat hij hem niet meer los kon laten, zonder
tevens van zijn geld afscheid te nemen, en vooral de kans te
verspelen op de groote winsten, die de uitvinding van Boom moest
afwerpen. Doch aan den anderen kant zou Boom ook vastzitten, en
zijn machine niet kunnen gereed maken. Of.…? En het koude zweet
brak hem uit.… Zou soms de machine [32]klaar zijn, of zóó ver, dat
een ander er geld voor gaf? En Boom nu van hem los willen, om de
vijf ton, die hem bij contract waren toegezegd, in zijn eigen zak te
houden? Het gold hier voorzichtig te zijn!

„Hoor eens, Boompje,” begon hij zoetsappig. „We moeten geen ruzie
maken. Daar hebben jij noch ik belang bij. Ik wil alleen zien dat de
zaak opschiet, anders niet. Dat stukje ijzer en die verroeste
kachelsleutel geven mij er geen kijk op. Je kunt mij toch gerust eens
laten zien wat je hebt. Als ik maar zie, dat het ergens op lijkt, ben ik
tevreden. Ik ben toch geen deskundige, en zal je het geheim niet
afkijken.”
„Ik heb je al eens meer gezegd, dat ik niets in elkaar laat, en de
stukken op verschillende plaatsen bewaar, tot alles gereed is. Dan
moet ik voor een paar dagen een rustig plekje hebben, dat kan ik
afsluiten, en waar ik het geheel samenstel, en er een kist om timmer,
zoodat niemand de werking kan zien. Als het zoover is, mag je
kijken, en zullen we de machine een paar weken laten loopen. Nu—
waar zijn de vijf pop?”

Wiechen haalde met een zucht twee rijksdaalders uit de brandkast

en legde ze vóór Boom neer, die ze met een gemoedelijk knikje
opstreek.

„Kom je vanmiddag in Central?” vroeg hij opstaande.

„Neen,” antwoordde Wiechen, „vanmiddag moet ik op Scheveningen

zijn. Bonjour, je kent den weg.”

Toen Boom weg was, zat hij nog lang na te denken. Hij vond het een
ergerlijk iets, geld te moeten geven zonder eenige zekerheid van
winst, zonder zich zelfs maar te kunnen overtuigen, al was het
gebrekkig, wat hij aan Boom had. Hij was door Arnolds met hem in
kennis gekomen, en deze had hem van die wonderlijke uitvinding
verteld. Een machine, die instede van telkens kosten te vragen voor
[33]brandstof en onderhoud, geheel uit zichzelf bleef werken, na een
belasting voor één keer met 1200 kilogram per paardenkracht, en
met elken slag één vijfde van de gebruikte kracht overhield ter
benuttiging. De aanschaffing was duurder dan die eener
stoommachine; doch dat beteekende niets, daar zij later nagenoeg
niets kostte. Enkel wat smeerolie.

Hijzelf had toen Boom voorstellen gedaan, waar deze in ’t eerst geen
ooren naar had. Philantropisch aangelegd, wilde de uitvinder niet
hebben, dat door zijn toedoen honderdduizenden van arbeiders
broodeloos zouden worden; hij schreide half bij de gedachte, hoe