Afghanistan–

Pakistan relations

Afghanistan–Pakistan relations refer to the bilateral ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In
August 1947, the partition of British India led to the emergence of Pakistan along Afghanistan's
eastern frontier, and the two countries have since had a strained relationship; Afghanistan was
the sole country to vote against Pakistan's admission into the United Nations following the
latter's independence.[3][4] Various Afghan government officials and Afghan nationalists have
made irredentist claims to large swathes of Pakistan's territory in modern-day Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistani Balochistan, which complete the traditional homeland of
"Pashtunistan" for the Pashtun people. The Taliban has received substantial financial and
logistical backing from Pakistan, which remains a significant source of support. Since the
Taliban's inception, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has been providing them
with funding, training, and weaponry. However, Pakistan's support for the Taliban is not without
risks, as it involves playing a precarious and delicate game.[5] Afghan territorial claims over
Pashtun-majority areas that are in Pakistan were coupled with discontent over the permanency
of the Durand Line which has long been considered the international border by every nation other
than Afghanistan,[6][7] and for which Afghanistan demanded a renegotiation, with the aim of
having it shifted eastward to the Indus River.[8] Territorial disputes and conflicting claims
prevented the normalization of bilateral ties between the countries throughout the mid-20th
century.[9] Further Afghanistan–Pakistan tensions have arisen concerning a variety of issues,
including the Afghanistan conflict and Afghan refugees in Pakistan, water-sharing rights, and a
continuously warming relationship between Afghanistan and India, but most of all the Taliban in
Kabul providing sanctuary and safe havens to TTP terrorists to attack Pakistani territory.[10][11]
Nonetheless, the Durand Line witnesses frequent occurrences of suicide bombings, airstrikes, or
street battles on an almost daily basis.[12]
 Pakistan–Afghanistan relations

Pakistan Afghanistan

Diplomatic mission

Embassy of Pakistan, Embassy of

Kabul Afghanistan,
Islamabad

Envoy

Ambassador Charge d'Affaires

Mansoor Ahmad Mohammad
Khan Shokaib[1][2]
Shortly after Pakistani independence, Afghanistan materially supported the failed armed
secessionist movement headed by Mirzali Khan against Pakistan.[13][14] Afghanistan's immediate
support of secessionist movements within Pakistan prevented normalised ties from emerging
between the two states.[4] In 1952 the government of Afghanistan published a tract in which it
laid claim not only to Pashtun territory within Pakistan, but also to the Pakistani province of
Balochistan.[15] On 30 March 1955, a pro-Pashtunistan group attacked the embassy and the
ambassador's residence. They also tore down the Pakistani flag, to protest against the
unification of the Pashtun-dominated North-West Frontier Province into West Pakistan as part of
the One Unit policy. The protestors were stirred up by the Afghan Prime Minister Mohammed
Daoud Khan and bussed to the site.The Afghan police did not intervene, Pakistanis in Peshawar
reacted by attacking the Afghan consulate in the city following which the diplomatic relations
were severed by Pakistan[16]

Diplomatic relations were cut off between 1961 and 1963 after Afghanistan supported more
armed separatists in Pakistan, leading to skirmishes between the two states earlier in 1960, and
Pakistan's subsequent closure of the port of Karachi to Afghan transit trade.[8] Mohammed
Daoud Khan became President of Afghanistan in 1973, Afghanistan—with Soviet support—again
pursued a policy of arming Pashtun separatists within Pakistan.[17]

In 2017, the Pakistani military have accused Afghanistan of sheltering various terrorist groups
which launch attacks into Pakistan,[18] while Afghan authorities have blamed Pakistan's
intelligence agency, the ISI, for funding warlords and the Taliban, and for basing terrorist camps
within Pakistani territory to target Afghanistan.[19][20][21] There is considerable amount of anti-
Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan,[22] while negative sentiment towards the Afghan refugees is
widespread in Pakistan,[23][24][25] even in Pashtun-dominated regions.[26] Border tensions
between Afghanistan and Pakistan have escalated to an unprecedented degree following recent
instances of violence along the widely known 'Durand Line'.[27]

However, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai (in office 2004–2014) has described Pakistan
and Afghanistan as "inseparable brothers" along with that he alleged that Pakistan uses
terrorism against Afghanistan,[28] which is due to the historical, religious, and ethnolinguistic
connections between the Pashtun people and other ethnic groups of both countries, as well as
to trade and other ties.[29] Each of the two countries features amongst the other's largest trading
partners, and Pakistan serves as a major conduit for transit trade involving landlocked
Afghanistan. Both countries are member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation,
Economic Cooperation Organization and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The
Pakistani government has taken significant action against undocumented migrants inside the
country and is expelling all the Afghan people.[30]

Historical context
Southern and eastern Afghanistan is predominately Pashto-speaking, like the adjacent Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and northern Balochistan regions in
Pakistan. This entire area is inhabited by the indigenous Pashtuns who belong to different
Pashtun tribes.[31] The Pashtuns were known as (Pathans in Pakistan and India) and have lived
in this region for thousands of years, since at least the 1st millennium BC.[32][33]

The Durand Line border was established after the 1893 Durand Line Agreement between
Mortimer Durand of colonial British India and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan for fixing
the limit of their respective spheres of influence. The single-page agreement, which contained
seven short articles, was signed by Durand and Khan, agreeing not to exercise political
interference beyond the frontier line between Afghanistan and what was then the British Indian
Empire.[34]

Shortly after the demarcation of the Durand Line, the British began connecting the region on its
side of Durand line to the vast and expansive Indian railway network. Concurrently, the Afridi
tribesmen began to rise up in arms against the British, creating a zone of instability between
Peshawar and the Durand Line. As a result, travel across the boundary was almost entirely
halted, and the Pashtun tribes living under the British rule began to orient themselves eastward
in the direction of the Indian railways. By the time of the Indian independence movement,
prominent Pashtun nationalists such as Abdul Ghaffar Khan advocated unity with the nearly
formed Dominion of India, and not a united Afghanistan – highlighting the extent to which
infrastructure and instability began to erode the Pashtun self-identification with Afghanistan. By
the time of the Pakistan independence movement, popular opinion among Pashtuns was in
support of joining the Dominion of Pakistan.[35][36]

Pakistan inherited the Durand Line agreement after its independence in 1947 but there has never
been a formal agreement or ratification between Islamabad and Kabul. The Afghan government
has not formally accepted the Durand Line as the international border between the two states,
claiming that the Durand Line Agreement has been void in the past.[37] This complicated issue is
very sensitive to both the countries. The Afghan government worried that if it ever ratified the
agreement, it would've permanently divided the 50 million Pashtuns and thus create a backlash
in Afghanistan. Pakistan felt that the border issue had been resolved before its birth in 1947.
This unmanagable border has always served as the main trade route between Afghanistan and
the South Asia, especially for supplies into Afghanistan.

Shortly after Pakistan gained independence in 1947, Afghanistan crafted a two-fold strategy to
destabilize the frontier regions of Pakistan, in an attempt to take advantage of Pakistan's post-
independence instability. Firstly, it strongly aligned itself with Pakistan's rival, India, and also the
USSR. Secondly, it politically and financially backed secessionist politicians in the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa in the 1960s. In January 1950, the Afghan king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, had an
anti-Pakistan speech which was condemned by Pakistan's Liaquat Ali Khan.[38] A serious
incident took place on September 30, 1950, when Pakistan claimed Afghan troops had crossed
into their territory near the Bogra Pass as a low-scale invasion. The Afghan government denied
involvement, saying they were pro-Pashtunistan tribesmen.[39] Zahir Shah mentioned in a 1952
speech the friendly feelings towards Pakistan, but that the Pashtunistan issue cannot be
ignored.[40] The 1954 military pact between Pakistan and the United States concerned
Afghanistan and India, and it brought Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union but whilst
maintaining non-alignment.[41][42]

The Afghan government denounced the merger of West Pakistan provinces, and on March 30,
1955, Afghan demonstrators attacked the Pakistani embassy and consulates in Kabul, Kandahar
and Jalalabad.[38] Pakistan retaliated by closing the border, an economic blockage. Diplomatic
relations were restored in September.[43] Again due to the Pashtunistan issue, the two countries
accused each other of border mispractices in 1961. In August, the consulates in both countries
closed and relations were broken in September 1961. The situation wasn't defused until 1965.[44]

Afghanistan's policies placed a severe strain upon Pakistan–Afghan relations in the 1960s, up
until the 1970s, when the Pashtunistan movement largely subsided as the population came to
identify with Pakistan. The Pashtun assimilation into the Pakistani state followed years of rising
Pashtun influence in Pakistani politics and the nation's bureaucracy, culminating in Ayub Khan,
Yahya Khan, Ishaq Khan – all Pashtuns, attaining leadership of Pakistan. The largest nationalist
party of the time, the Awami National Party (ANP), dropped its secessionist agenda and
embraced the Pakistani state, leaving only a small Pakhtunkhwa Millat Party to champion the
cause of independence in relation to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite the weaknesses of
the early secessionist movement, this period in history continues to negatively influence
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the 21st century, in addition to the province's politics.[45]
Confederation proposal
In order to solve the disputes, mainly centered around the borders issue with the Durand line,
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, a veteran diplomat who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Pakistan (2002–2007), says that "at one time serious efforts were made at government level for
an Afg–Pak Confederation", precising that these initiatives were taken during the time of
President Mohammed Daoud Khan, generally considered to be anti-Pakistan for his
galvanization of the Pashtunistan issue. Aslam Khattak, a politician who also served as an
ambassador to Afghanistan, talked about this process in his book A Pathan Odyssey, and says
that Prime Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon and President Iskandar Mirza both agreed with the
plans, the former also agreeing to take King Zahir Shah "as the constitutional Head of State",
proclaiming that "after all, for some time after independence, we had a Christian Queen
(Elizabeth II). Now, we would have a Muslim man!’." As per Kasuri, the United States supported
the idea as well. He blames the failure of the project to the assassination of Daud Khan and the
advent, in 1978, of the pro-Soviet PDPA party and Nur Muhammad Taraki.[46]

The Durrani Empire at its maximum

extent under Ahmad Shah Abdali.[47]

Afghan scholar Hafizullah Emadi says that "the initial blueprint suggested that both sides would
maintain their internal autonomy, but in the matter of defense, foreign policy, foreign trade and
communication, there would be a central government. The prime minister would be by rotation."
He also explains the failure of the proposition : Iskandar Mirza was replaced by General Ayub
Khan, after a coup d'état in 1958, an ethnic Pashtun who "regarded himself as the leader of the
Pashtuns in Pakistan, and believed that the Pashtuns in Afghanistan should join Pakistan under
his leadership" instead of a confederation. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto rejected the idea because "an
economically underdeveloped Afghanistan would not benefit Pakistan."[48] In his diaries, in an
observation dated to 9 January 1967, Ayub Khan noted that "it is people from the Punjab like
Feroz Khan Noon and Amjad Ali who keep on emphasizing to me the need to make up with
Afghanistan."[49]

President Zia-ul-Haq too was for such confederation. "Charles Wilson recalled a map that Zia
had also shown to him in which overlay indicated the goal of a confederation embracing first
Pakistan and Afghanistan and eventually Central Asia and Kashmir. Zia further explained about
the Pakistan-Afghanistan confederation in which Pakistanis and Afghans could travel freely back
and forth without passports."[50] General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, considered Zia's right-hand man
and more importantly the DG-ISI (1979–1987), himself a Pashtun, "also shared Zia’s vision of a
post-Soviet "Islamic Confederation" composed of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir and even the
states of Soviet Central Asia."[51]

Even more than a confederation, recently declassified CIA documents point out that, in 1954, the
Afghan government approached the US in order to have a merger with Pakistan, being
threatened by the Soviet Union's economic envelopment. Pakistan's then Prime Minister
Mohammad Ali Bogra was skeptical of a total merger, but the idea of a confederation in itself, on
the other hand, was already floating around, as "the CIA report hinted that there had been some
talk in Afghan and Pakistani official circles of some sort of confederation."[52]

Some analysts have noted that present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan have already been
amalgamated into a single geographical unit during the Durrani Empire (1747–1826). For
instance, scholar Muhammad Shamsuddin Siddiqi says that "Ahmed Shah's empire with its
power base in Kandahar, and later transferred to Kabul, incorporated Kashmir, Punjab, Sind and
Baluchistan" and thus "the Durrani empire bears the closest resemblance to Pakistan",[53] while
others have noted that "since the Durrani Empire included the present-day Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the forces of history, the principle of national self-determination, and the aspiration
for the unity of Muslim Ummah have all come into line",[54] explaining the interconnected
geopolitics of both countries, its latest example being the AfPak doctrine, theorized under the
Obama administration from 2008 onward, concluding that Afghanistan and Pakistan should be
the aim of common security policies considering their similarities.

Contemporary era
 George Crile III and Charlie Wilson
(Texas politician) with an unnamed
political personality in the background
(person wearing the aviator glasses
looking at the photo camera). They
were the main players in Operation
Cyclone, the code name for the United
States Central Intelligence Agency
program to arm and finance the multi-
national mujahideen during the
Soviet–Afghan War, 1979 to 1989.

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan began deteriorating again in the 1970s when
Afghanistan hosted Pashtun-Baluch militants operating against Pakistan under the leadership of
National Awami Party led by Abdul Wali Khan[55] and in retaliation Pakistan started supporting
Islamist movements against the progressive and Soviet-influenced Afghan government of
Mohammed Daoud Khan, and encouraged the Islamists to rise up against the government.[56]
The figures included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud-both members of the
Jamiat-e Islami students' political society-[57] and the Haqqanis.[58] In April 1978, Afghan
President Daoud Khan was assassinated in Kabul during the self-declared Marxist Saur
Revolution. This was followed by the execution of deposed Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto in April 1979 and the assassination of Afghan leader Nur Muhammad Taraki in
September 1979. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States
joined Pakistan to counter Soviet influence and advance its own interests in the region. In turn,
Afghan, Indian and Soviet intelligence agencies played their role by supporting al-Zulfikar – a
Pakistani leftist terrorist group responsible for the March 1981 hijacking of a Pakistan
International Airlines (PIA) plane.[59] Al-Zulfiqar was a Pakistani left-wing organisation formed in
1977 by Mir Murtaza Bhutto, son of former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Its goal
was to overthrow the military regime that ousted Bhutto.[60][61] After March 1981 Al-Zulfiqar
claimed no further attacks.[60] The Bhutto family and Pakistani military dictator Zia-ul-Haq
shared a common enemy, as Zia was the one supporting attacks against the Afghan
government.[62]
 Pakistan side near the Afghanistan–
Pakistan border.

During the 1980s, the Durand Line was heavily used by Afghan refugees fleeing the Soviet
occupation in Afghanistan, including a large number of Mujahideen insurgent groups who
crossed back and forth. Pakistan became a major training ground for roughly 250,000 foreign
mujahideen fighters who began crossing into Afghanistan on a daily basis to wage war against
the communist Afghanistan and the Soviet forces. The mujahideen included not only locals but
also Arabs and others from over 40 different Islamic nations. Many of these foreign fighters
married local women and decided to stay in Pakistan, among them were radical Muslims such
those of Saudi-led Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as well as prisoners from Arab
countries.[63] Relations between the two countries remained hostile during the Soviet-Afghan
War. Afghan leader Babrak Karmal refused to improve relations with Pakistan due to their refusal
to formally recognize the PDPA government.[64]

Following the death of Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, U.S. State Department blamed the
WAD (a KGB created Afghan secret intelligence agency) for terrorist attacks inside Pakistan in
1987 and 1988.[65][66] With funds from the international community channeled through the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pakistan hosted over 3 million
Afghans at various refugee camps, mainly around Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[67] The
United States and others provided billions of dollars in humanitarian assistance to the refugees.
There were no regular schools provided for the refugees but only madrasas in which students
were trained to become members of the Taliban movement.[68] When the Soviet Union began
leaving Afghanistan, during the presidency of Mohammad Najibullah, the UNHCR and the
international community assisted 1.5 million Afghan refugees in returning to Afghanistan.[69]
Pakistan were also thought to have played a part in the attempted coup in 1990 against
Najibullah's government.[70][71]

Although the victorious mujahideen formed a government in 1992 through the Peshawar
Accords, Pakistan remained unhappy with new leaders Rabbani and Massoud, including their
foreign policy of maintaining friendly relations with India as during the communist era. Pushing
for a "trusted" friendly government in Afghanistan, the Pakistani intelligence started funding
Hekmatyar-the only mujahideen commander not to sign the Accords-to fight against the new
Afghan government in hopes that he would win and install a new government. Through Pakistani
funding, Hekmatyar's forces sieged Kabul city with thousands of rockets for three years, killing
thousands. However, upon realizing that Hekmatyar was unable to take power in Kabul, Pakistan
looked elsewhere. The Taliban movement had just formed with the help of then-Pakistani Interior
Minister, Naseerullah Babar, and the Pakistani intelligence threw its weight behind the new
movement.[71] Around September 1994, the Taliban movement captured the Afghan city of
Kandahar and began its long conquest with help from Pakistan. The Taliban claimed that they
wanted to clean Afghanistan from the warlords and criminals. According to Pakistan and
Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated few Pakistanis
volunteers trained and fought in Afghanistan" keeping the Taliban regime in power.[72] The role of
the Pakistani military during that time has been described by some international observers as a
"creeping invasion" of Afghanistan.[72] UN documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani
support troops in the Taliban massacre campaigns.[73]

In late 1996, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan emerged and established close relations with
neighbouring Pakistan. However, the relations began to decline when the Taliban refused to
endorse the Durand Line despite pressure from Islamabad, arguing that there shall be no borders
among Muslims.[74] A discussion over the Durrand Line between the-then Taliban leader
Mohammed Omar and Naseerullah Babar ended abruptly. Omar called Babar, who was an ethnic
Pashtun, a traitor for saying that "all problems would be resolved" should the Durrand Line be
recognised by the Taliban government.[75]

When the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was toppled and the new Afghan government was
formed, President Hamid Karzai began repeating the previous Taliban statement.[76]

"A line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers."

— Hamid Karzai
 Afghan President Hamid Karzai with
U.S. President Barack Obama and
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari
during a US-Afghan-Pakistan Trilateral
meeting at the White House in
Washington, DC.

The Karzai administration in Afghanistan has close relations with the Pashtun Nationalist Awami
National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). In 2006, Afghan President Hamid
Karzai warned that "Iran and Pakistan and others are not fooling anyone" when it comes to
interfering in his country.

"If they don’t stop, the consequences will be … that the region will suffer with us
equally. In the past we have suffered alone; this time everybody will suffer with us.
… Any effort to divide Afghanistan ethnically or weaken it will create the same
thing in the neighboring countries. All the countries in the neighborhood have the
same ethnic groups that we have, so they should know that it is a different ball
game this time."[37]

— Hamid Karzai
The Durand Line border has been used in the last decade as the main supply route for NATO-led
forces in Afghanistan as well as by Taliban insurgents and other militant groups who stage
attacks inside Afghanistan. The American government decided to rely on drone attacks, which
began to negatively affect the US-Pakistan relations.
 U.S. Armed Forces checking the
border checkpoint at Torkham,
between Nangarhar Province of
Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
in Pakistan.

In 2007, Afghan intelligence captured Muhammad Hanif, the Taliban spokesman. During his
interrogation which was recorded, Hanif claimed that the Taliban leader was being kept in Quetta
under the protection of the ISI.[77] Pakistan denied the claims.[78]

Relations have become more strained after the Afghan government began openly accusing
Pakistan of using its ISI spy network in aiding the Taliban and other militants. Pakistan usually
denies these allegations but has said in the past that it does not have full control of the actions
of the ISI. There have been a number of reports about the Afghanistan–Pakistan skirmishes,
which usually occur when army soldiers are in hot pursuit chasing insurgents who cross the
border back and forth. This leads to tensions between the two states, especially after hearing
reports of civilian casualties.[79]

After the May 2011 death of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, many prominent Afghan figures
began being assassinated, including Mohammed Daud Daud, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Jan
Mohammad Khan, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, Burhanuddin Rabbani and others.[80] Also in the same
year, the Afghanistan–Pakistan skirmishes intensified and many large scale attacks by the
Pakistani-based Haqqani network took place across Afghanistan. This led to the United States
warning Pakistan of a possible military action against the Haqqanis in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas.[81] The U.S. blamed Pakistan's government, mainly Pakistani Army
and its ISI spy network as the masterminds behind all of this.[82]

"In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government

of Pakistan, and most especially the Pakistani army and ISI, jeopardizes not only
the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistan's opportunity to be a
respected nation with legitimate regional influence. They may believe that by using
 these proxies, they are hedging their bets or redressing what they feel is an
imbalance in regional power. But in reality, they have already lost that bet."[83]

— Admiral Mike Mullen,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, told Radio Pakistan that "the attack that took
place in Kabul a few days ago, that was the work of the Haqqani network. There is evidence
linking the Haqqani Network to the Pakistan government. This is something that must stop."[84]
Other top U.S. officials such as Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta made similar statements.[82][85]
Despite all of this, Afghan President Hamid Karzai labelled Pakistan as Afghanistan's "twin
brother".[86]

After the May 2017 Kabul attack, the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) claimed that
the blast was planned by the Afghan insurgent group Haqqani Network, and reiterated
allegations that those elements had support and presence across the border in Pakistan.[87]
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani stated that Pakistan has instigated an "undeclared war of
aggression" against the country.[88] Pakistan's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Nafees Zakaria
rejected the Afghan allegations as "baseless".[89]

In 2015, Inter-Services Intelligence and National Directorate of Security inked a memorandum of

understanding. Under the memorandum of understanding, both nations agreed to fight terrorism
together and also to share intelligence information.[90][91] On 16 May 2015, the Pakistani army
launched an operation to save the life of an injured Afghan soldier on the Afghanistan side of the
border. The soldier was injured in a clash with militants and he was evacuated by the Pakistan
military.[92] There have been instances where Afghan soldiers injured in fighting the militants
near the Pakistan Afghanistan border are sent to Pakistan for treatment.[93][94]

After the Afghan Taliban took power in Kabul, Pakistani PM Imran Khan describing it as Afghans
breaking "the shackles of slavery".[95] Although Pakistan still not officially recognizes the
Taliban's Islamic Emirate, it launched a diplomatic effort urging the international community to
engage with the Taliban, help ease Afghanistan's humanitarian crisis and prevent it from
descending into chaos again. In December 2021, foreign ministers of the 56 nations belonging
to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, along with Taliban delegates, gathered in Islamabad.
The meeting focused on Afghanistan's humanitarian crisis.[96] But the Pakistani Taliban (TTP)
attacks lead to growing tension between the Afghan Taliban government and Pakistan.[97]

In April 2022, Islamabad urged Kabul "to secure Pak-Afghan Border region and take stern actions
against the individuals involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan",[98] and Pakistan Air Force
conducted air raids across its border with Afghanistan, claiming to strike TTP militants operating
in the porous border regions.[99] In late 2022, Pakistan's embassy in Kabul came under attack
with gunfire wounding a Pakistani security guard, IS-K claims responsibility for the attack,
Pakistan asked the attack to be thoroughly probed by the Taliban authorities.[100]

On September 6, 2023, two military posts located close to the Afghanistan border in Chitral
district's area of Kalash were attacked by Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in which two Pakistani soldiers
and twelve militants were killed.[101][102] Pakistan claimed that TTP militants crossed the Afghan
border to attack those posts within Pakistan. A firing incident occurred near Torkham border
crossing resulted in closure of the border. Pakistan claimed that Afghanistan is building unlawful
structures on the border which violates Pakistan's territorial sovereignty.[103][104] On October 6,
2023, Pakistan announced the deportation of 1.7 million undocumented Afghan immigrants. A
deadline of Nov.1 was announced for people to leave or face forcible expulsion.[105][106] Around
1.3 million Afghans are registered refugees in Pakistan and 880,000 more have legal status to
remain, according to the latest United Nations figures.[107] On November 10, 2023, Pakistan
announced that it has extended the legal residence status of registered Afghan refugees till
December 31, 2023, who have Proof of Registration, or PoR, cards[108] issued by the Government
of Pakistan.[109]

Afghan-Pak Transit Trade

Agreement
In July 2010, a Memorandum of understanding (MoU) was reached between Pakistan and
Afghanistan for the Afghan-Pak Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), which was observed by U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The two states also signed an MoU for the construction of rail
tracks in Afghanistan to connect with Pakistan Railways (PR),[110] which has been in the making
since at least 2005.[111] In October 2010, the landmark APTTA agreement was signed by
Pakistani Commerce Minister Makhdoom Amin Fahim and Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, Afghan Ministry
of Commerce. The ceremony was attended by Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a number of foreign ambassadors, Afghan parliamentarians
and senior officials.[29] The APTTA allows Afghan trucks to drive inside Pakistan to the Wagah
border with India, and also to the port cities of Karachi and Gwadar.[112]

In November 2010, the two states formed a joint chamber of commerce to expand trade
relations and solve the problems traders face.[113][114] The APTTA agreement has taken effect
after several Afghan trucks delivered fruits from Afghanistan to the Wagah border with India in
June 2011. With the completion of the APTTA, the United States and other NATO states are
planning to revive the ancient Silk Road. This is to help the local economies of Afghanistan and
Pakistan by connecting South Asia with Central Asia and the Middle East.[115] The APTTA is
intended to improve trade between the two countries but Pakistan often delays Afghan-bound
containers,[116] especially after the 2011 NATO attack in Pakistan.

In July 2012, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to extend APTTA to Tajikistan in what will be the
first step for the establishment of a North–South trade corridor. The proposed agreement will
provide facilities to Tajikistan to use Pakistan's Gwadar and Karachi ports for its imports and
exports while Pakistan will enjoy trade with Tajikistan under terms similar to the transit
arrangement with Afghanistan.[117] Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan is expected to
reach $5 billion by 2015.[118] Afghanistan's economy is one of the fastest growing economies in
the world. A 2012 World Bank report added, "In contrast, Afghanistan’s economy grew robustly
by about 11 percent mostly due to a good harvest."[119]

Towards the end of the same year, both the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan drafted
plans to talk to the Taliban.[120]

Cooperation between the two countries includes possible defence cooperation[121][122] and
intelligence sharing as well as further enhancing the two-way trade and abolishment of visas for
diplomats from the two nations.[123][118]

See also

Politics
portal
Afghanistan
portal
Pakistan
portal

List of ambassadors of Afghanistan to

Pakistan
Afghanistan–Pakistan sports rivalries
Afghanistan–Pakistan border barrier
Afghanistan–Pakistan border
skirmishes
Anti-Afghan sentiment
AfPak
Durand Line
Khyber Pass Economic Corridor
References

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Taliban appoint new envoy to run embassy
in neighbouring Pakistan" (https://www.reut
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appoint-new-envoy-run-embassy-neighbouri
ng-pakistan-2021-10-29/) . Reuters.
Retrieved 26 April 2022. "Mohammad
Shokaib was appointed first secretary or
charge d'affaires at the embassy"
2. "Russia Latest Country to Establish
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voanews.com/a/russia-latest-country-to-es
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Further reading
Abbas, Hassan. The Taliban Revival:
Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan Frontier (Yale UP, 2014)
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Tara
Vassefi. "The forgotten history of
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations." Yale
Journal of International Affairs 7 (2012):
38+ online (https://www.yalejournal.org/
publications/the-forgotten-history-of-afg
hanistan-pakistan-relations)
Hussain, Rizwan. Pakistan and the
Emergence of Islamic Militancy in
Afghanistan (Ashgate, 2005), excerpt (ht
tps://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Emer
gence-Islamic-Militancy-Afghanistan/d
p/0754644340/)
Nadiri, Khalid Homayun. "Old Habits,
New Consequences: Pakistan's Posture
toward Afghanistan since 2001."
International Security 39.2 (2014): 132–
168. online (https://www.mitpressjourna
ls.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00178)
Paliwal, Avinash. "Pakistan–Afghanistan
Relations Since 2001." in Pakistan at the
Crossroads ed by Christophe Jaffrelot;
(Columbia UP, 2016) pp. 191–218.
Rashid, Ahmed. Pakistan on the Brink:
The future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and
the West (Penguin, 2012).
Raza, Muhammad Amjad, and Ghulam
Mustufa. "Indo-Afghan Relations:
Implications for Pakistan." Central Asia
84.Summer (2019): 53–79. online (htt
p://asc-centralasia.edu.pk/index.php/c
a/article/download/20/16)
Shahrani, M Nazif, ed. Modern
Afghanistan: The Impact of 40 Years of
War (Indiana UP, 2018)
Siddique, Abubakar. The Pashtun
Question The Unresolved Key to the
Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan
(Hurst, 2014)
Zahab, Mariam Abou, and Olivier Roy.
Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan
Connection (Columbia UP, 2004)
Former British Commander Cautions
Taliban May Get Control of Pakistan
Nuclear Weapons (https://timesofindia.i
ndiatimes.com/world/south-asia/former
-british-commander-cautions-taliban-ma
y-get-control-of-pakistans-nuclear-weap
ons/articleshow/85380026.cms)
Pakistan-Afghanistan Nuclear Sectarian
Policy emerges after Benazir Bhutto
Nuclear Sectarian policy with Iran leaks
(https://www.understandingwar.org/pak
istan-and-afghanistan)
Pakistan Ranked 1st in Muslim
Countries Nuclear Business (https://ww
w.statista.com/chart/amp/5777/the-co
untries-with-the-biggest-nuclear-arsenal
s)
Afghanistan, Pakistan as chef, logistics
driver for drugs (https://www.unodc.org/
unodc/drug-trafficking/index.html)
Afghanistan-Pakistan Drug Trafficking
and Aviation Business (https://www.uno
dc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/ove
rview.html)
Afghanistan-Pakistan Drug Sales in
International Airports (https://www.stati
sta.com/chart/amp/19277/total-level-of
-cannabis-consumption)
Retrieved from
"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Afghanistan–
Pakistan_relations&oldid=1221817541"

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