Age Discrimination Labor Cases

1. Pantranco North Express v. NLRC, G.R. No. 95940, 24 July 1996

FACTS:
Private respondent Peronila was employed as a driver of Pantranco North Express, Inc., a domestic
corporation engaged in the public transportation business as a common carrier, and of which its co-
petitioner Abelardo de Leon is a manager. Peronila was administratively investigated by the corporation for
his absence from work of more than two and one-half months without leave. Respondent was then
dismissed from service due to unauthorized absences. Fifteen years after such termination of his
employment, Peronila reappeared and implored petitioner to reconsider his dismissal, which plea was
initially denied by petitioner. However, due to insistent appeals by Peronila, petitioner eventually acceded
and hired him as a driver, but on a contractual basis for a fixed period of one month. Barely fifteen days from
such employment as a contractual driver, private respondent was involved in a vehicular mishap, hence his
employment contract was terminated and was no longer renewed thereafter.

ISSUE:
WON the employment contract which stipulates that there is no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and Peronilla is valid?

RULING:
Yes. What said Article 280 seeks to prevent is the practice of some unscrupulous and covetous employers
who wish to circumvent the law that protects lowly workers from capricious dismissal from their
employment. The aforesaid provision, however, should not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive
employers of the right and prerogative to choose their own workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse an
employee a regular status. Management has rights which should also be protected.

2. Caltex [Phil.], Inc. v. Philippine Labor Organization, G.R. No. L-5206, 29 April 1953
FACTS:
Eleven women were claiming from the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. one year gratuities being distributed to its prewar
male employees who were in its employ prior to the last war and currently working. The Court of Industrial
Relations ordered payment on despite the fact that these women were not reinstated after the liberation. It
found no reason why the female prewar employees should be treated differently from the prewar male
employees on grounds of equity, remembering always the Government’s constitutional duty to protect
labor, especially women.

ISSUE:
Whether or not pre-war employees are entitled to gratuitous pay from the company considering they were
not reinstated after the liberation.

HELD:
No, these female pre-war employees have no legal right to backpay. In the settlement of industrial disputes
it is proper and convenient for the court to insist, in exercising its ample powers, that capital shall make no
discrimination between male and female laborers. But discrimination only exists when one is denied
privileges given to the other under identical or similar conditions. Material conditions of course. And the
condition as to actual employment required by the company is undoubtedly material, the purpose of
gratuity being obviously to induce the company’s workers to render better service in return for such
generosity, or simply to improve the finances and morale of its helpers with consequent beneficial effects
upon the corporate business operations.
In the instant controversy, the conditions were different: the male beneficiaries were employees; whereas
these female claimants were not.:
3. Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines Inc. (G.R. No. 168081, 17 October 2008)
Facts:
- The BFOQ is applied as an exception to the law vs discrimination
- The case is about obesity of the flight attendant
- His weight exceeds the limit the company’s hiring policy allows
- He was given opportunity to meet an acceptable weight, but he failed
- For that reason, the employer, an airline company, terminated his employment
- The employee cited discrimination in his illegal dismissal complaint

Ruling:
- The court upheld the dismissal and explained that becoz of BFOQ, an employer may be allowed to
engage in an otherwise unlawful form of discrimination when the action is based on a….
- BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise

4. Duncan Assocn of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994, 17 September
2004).
TOPIC: Stipulation against marriage

FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson signed a contract of employment as Medical Representative with Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.

The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company, the management
and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking
position” or preparation for employment outside the company after 6 months.

Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, a Branch Coordinator in Albay for Glaxo’s
competitor, Astra Pharmaceuticals. Despite receiving several reminders from his District Manager regarding
the possible conflict of interest which may arise from his relationship with Betty, Tecson married Bettsy on
September 1998.

ISSUE:
Whether Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid

RULING:
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from
competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical
industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and
procedures.
 As held in a Georgia, USA case, it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality and
protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or
employees who are married to a competitor. The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and
women equally, and noted that the employer’s business was highly competitive and that gaining inside
information would constitute a competitive advantage.

From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that
Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of
competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships.

The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company remains free to
marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that
belongs only to the individual. However, an employee’s personal decision does not detract the employer
from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success.

5. Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, 12 April 2006

Facts:
-the employers policy prohibits marriage between co-employees
-An employee, male or female, who marries another employee of the company is compuylsorily required to
resign from his or his job

Issue:
- is the policy valid?

Ruling:
- no, its discriminatory, hence invalid. The company violates the right vs discriminayionb afforded all women
under the labor code

6. NAFLU et. al. v NLRC, G.R. No. 90739, 3 October 1991

FACTS:
Florante Ongbueco was an OIC and First Production Staff Engineer of the private respondent,
Union Ajinomoto, Inc. Sometime, the Bureau of Energy, pursuant to B.P. 73, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Energy Conservation Law, required Ajinomoto to appoint an employee who would act as its
Energy Manager. The task of preparing the required reports in conformance with BEU's April 25, 1983 letter
was thus assigned to Engr. Ongbueco from then on, plus he was given the additional assignment of preparing
all the reports required by the BEU. In a succeeding correspondence, the BEU requested
Ajinomoto to submit the name and bio-data of the employee it had designated as its Energy Manager. And,
in compliance with this directive, Ajinomoto, on December 8, 1983,appointed Engr. Ongbueco as Energy
Manager. Thereafter, by using the form attached to the letter, as advised, Ajinomoto furnished the BEU with
the name and bio-data of its newly appointed Energy Manager, Florante Ongbueco. Ajinomoto deemed it
unnecessary to provide Engr. Ongbueco with a salary increase since his designation as Energy Manager
supposedly did not entail additional responsibilities other than the preparation of the required consumption
reports which he had already been attending to even prior to his appointment.
For nearly three years, Engr. Ongbueco performed his role as Energy Manager. The arrangement remained
undisturbed. However, on July 7, 1986, Engr. Ongbueco filed a complaint with NLRC.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a salary increase upon his assumption of office as an Energy
Manager.
RULING:
No, the petitioner is not entitled to a salary increase upon his assumption of office as an Energy Manager.
The Labor Code and it implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of
the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The employer is free to determine, using his own
discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment "from hiring to firing," except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided for by law. There is none in the instant case.
Here, the Court agreed with the respondents that the petitioner was not promoted, but he was merely given
the functional title of Energy Manager to comply with B.P. 73, as distinguished from his official title of Staff
Engineer. There is no showing that he has ceased from performing his duties as Staff Engineer. Of primordial
consideration is not the nomenclature or title given to the employee, but the nature of his functions. There
is no substantial proof that the petitioner was vested with any of the power and prerogatives of a
managerial employee, as defined by the Labor Code. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to a salary increase
upon his assumption of office as an Energy Manager:

7. Norkis Trading Co., Inc. et.al. v Melvin Gnilo, G.R. No. 159730, 11 February 2008

Labor Law – Post-Employment – Constructive Dismissal – Invalid Practice of Management Rights

FACTS:
Melvin Gnilo was the Credit and Collection Manager of Norkis Trading Co., Inc. and is in charge of the Albay
and Catanduanes branches of the company. In 2000, Gnilo was found to be submitting overstated reports
about his area of management which misled the management into believing that Gnilo was doing a good
job. He was subsequently transferred from his position to being the marketing assistant of the company’s
senior Vice President Manuel Albos. Gnilo took the position under protest. He sued Norkis and the case
reached the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC ruled that the transfer is actually a constructive
dismissal. Norkis assailed the decision of the NLRC alleging that Gnilo’s previous and current position in the
company is of equal rank.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer of Gnilo from being a Collections Manager to a Marketing Assistant constitutes
constructive dismissal.

HELD:
Yes. While the transfer of respondent from Credit and Collection Manager to Marketing Assistant did not
result in the reduction of his salary, there was a reduction in his duties and responsibilities which amounted
to a demotion tantamount to a constructive dismissal as correctly held by the NLRC. As Credit and Collection
Manager, Gnilo was clothed with all the duties and responsibilities of a managerial employee. On the other
hand, the work of a Marketing Assistant is clerical in nature, which does not involve the exercise of any
discretion. Such job entails mere data gathering on vital marketing information relevant to the company’s
motorcycle products and making reports to his direct supervisor. He became a mere staff member in the
office of the Senior Vice-President for Marketing.

Magna Carta of Women

1. HRET vs Panga-Vega, GR 228236-27, January 27, 2021

TOPIC: CEDAW; Role of the OSG

FACTS:
On February 2, 2011, Atty. Panga-Vega, Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), requested authority to avail of the 15days of special leave benefit under the Magna Carta
of Women, on February 7-11, 14-18, and 21-25, 2011, but not to exceed two months, to undergo
hysterectomy.
On February 3, 2011, the HRET approved the request for special leave. On February7, 2011, she underwent
total hysterectomy. On March 7, 2011, after a month of availing of the special leave, Panga
Vega informed the HRET Chairperson that she was reassuming her duties and functions. She also presented
a medical certificate stating that she was already "fit to work" after her physical examination on March 6,
2011.On March 10, 2011, the HRET directed Panga-Vega to consume her 2-month special leave given her
need for prolonged rest following her hysterectomy, and in view of a pending investigation on her
alleged alteration or tampering one minutes of the meeting that could subject her to more stress. On
April 13, 2011, Panga-Vega filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) assailing the HRET
Resolutions. CSC issued a Decision granting the appeal of Panga-Vega. The HRET sought
reconsideration, but the CSC denied this in its Resolution. HRET filed a Petition for Review assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CSC with the CA. CA dismissed the petition. Adopting the CSC's findings, it
ruled Panga-Vega may opt not to consume the full leave she applied for upon her submission of the medical
certificate. Hence, this petition. The HRET argues that the CSC should not have applied suppletorily the rules
on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710. It also contends that Panga-Vega did not
sufficiently comply with the "CSC Guidelines on the Availment of the Special Leave Benefits for Women
Under RA No. 9710" (CSC Guidelines), warranting her return to work.

ISSUE: Whether the rules on maternity leave under Sec. 14, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, which provides that the commuted money value of the
unexpired portion of the special leave need not be refunded, and that when the employee returns to work
before the expiration of her special leave, she may receive both the benefits granted under the maternity
leave law and the salary for actual services rendered effective the day she reports for work, may have a
suppletory application.

RULING:
RA No. 9710 to suppletorily apply the rule on maternity leave to the special leave benefit. The
special leave benefit should be liberally interpreted to support the female employee so as to give her
further means to afford her needs, may it be gynecological, physical, or psychological, for a holistic
recuperation. The recovery period may be a trying time that she needs much assistance and compassion to
regain her overall wellness. Nothing in RA No. 9710 and the CSC Guidelines bar this more humane
interpretation of the provision on special leave benefit.
Under the CSC Guidelines, a total hysterectomy is classified as a major surgical procedure
requiring a minimum period of recuperation of three weeks to a maximum period of two months. The
employee, before she can return to work, shall present a medical certificate signed by her attending surgeon
that she is physically fit to assume the duties of her position. Based on these facts on record, the CSC found
that Panga-Vega sufficiently complied with the CSC Guidelines warranting her return to work.
The Court accords finality to these findings acknowledging the CSC's special knowledge and
expertise on matters falling under its jurisdiction as an administrative agency, and given the affirmance by
the CA.

ROLE OF THE OSG:

The OSG was constituted as the law office of the Government and shall discharge duties requiring the
services of a lawyer as such. It shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies,
instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. It is tasked to represent the Government and its officers in the Court, the
CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity is a party, among others. The OSG, however, may
be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities when there is an express
authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized in cases involving their
respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG takes a position different
from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent