Barcellano c. Conchita Dela Cruz, et.al. vs.

People, GR 236807, January 12, 2021

(Estafa through falsification)
Facts:
This controversy involves the alleged fictitious transactions in the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) made during the period of March to December 2001. The
Page | 1 accused in the criminal cases are high-ranking public officials and employees of the
DPWH and private individuals, who allegedly forged and falsified documents to cause the
payment of fictitious repairs and purchases of spare parts purportedly in the amount of
P6,368,364.00 from public funds.

The amounts paid covered 409 transactions purportedly for the emergency repairs of 39
DPWH service vehicles, 274 of which were made in the narrie of accused Martinez, while
others were made in the name of petitioner Maximo A. Borje (Borje) and other co-
accused. The spare parts were purportedly supplied by J-CAP Motorshop (J-CAP) owned
by accused Capuz, and DEB Repair Shop and Parts Supply (DEB) owned by petitioner
Conchita Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).

SB ruled Borje and Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa through
falsification of Documents and violation of Sec 3e of RA 3019.

Issue:
Whether the SB committed a reversible error when it found petitioners Borje and Dela
Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa through falsification of
Documents.

Held:
NO. Estafa was committed through the falsification of public documents, under Article 1
71 paragraph 4 of the RPC, by the accused public officers/employees taking advantage
of their official positions and making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. As held
by the Sandiganbayan:

First. There were false pretenses, fraudulent acts or: fraudulent means in that it was made
to appear, through the use of the falsified documents, that the DPWH service vehicles in
question underwent emergency repairs that required purchases of spare parts, and that
reimbursements were due to
accused Martinez;
Second. The false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means, in the form of
falsification of documents, were employed prior to the commission of the fraud; that is to
deceive the government in paying the claims for the fictitious emergency
repairs/purchases of spare parts;
Third. The government was induced to pay the claims relying on the false pretenses,
fraudulent acts or fraudulent means employed;
Fourth. The government suffered damages in the total amount of P5,166,539.00, the sum
total of the false claims paid.
 Illegal Recruitment (RA 8042)
Buenconsejo a. People vs. Marissa Bayker, G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016
(estafa and recruitment) (repeated case)

FACTS:
Page | 2
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Makati two informations against the accused-appellant and her two co-accused, namely:
Nida Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo, for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale
and Estafa arising from the complaints filed by Basilio T. Miparanum, Virgilio T.
Caniazares and Reynaldo E. Dahab. The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of both
crimes. The CA affirmed. CA opined that the Prosecution had established the elements
of illegal recruitment in large scale by proving that the accused-appellant lacked the
authority or license to engage in recruitment and placement, and had promised the
complainants employment abroad and had then received money from them; and that the
Prosecution had also established the estafa by showing that she had misrepresented to
Miparanum about her power and authority to deploy him for overseas employment,
thereby inducing him to part with his money.

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy.

RULING:
YES. The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large
scale did not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 3l5(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy. The active representation
by the accused-appellant of having the capacity to deploy Miparanum abroad despite not
having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit as the first
element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim to part with his money, resulting
in damage that is the second element of the estafa. Considering that the damage resulted
from the deceit, the CA's affirmance of her guilt for estafa as charged was in order.

Bouncing Checks Law (BP No. 22)

Cunanan d. Socorro and Marie Paz Ongkingco vs. People (receipt of written notice
of dishonor; presumption)
Facts:
Sugiyama entered into a "Contract Agreement" with New Rhia Car Services, Inc. where
Socorro is the President and Chairperson of the Board of Directors, and petitioner Maria Paz is a
Board Director. Under the Agreement, Sugiyama would receive a monthly dividend of P90,675.00
for five years in exchange for his investment of P2,200,000.00 in New Rhia Car Services, Inc.

To cover Sugiyama's monthly dividends, petitioners issued six (6) checks. The first three
(3) checks, dated September 10, 2011, October 10, 2001 and November 10, 2001, were good

Here, petitioner Socorro should be held civilly liable for the amounts covered by the dishonored
checks, in light of her conviction of the four (4) charges for violation of B.P. 22 and because she
made herself personally liable for the fixed monthly director's dividends
 Granted that Socorro is authorized to sign checks as corporate officer and authorized signatory of New
Rhia Car Services, Inc., there is still no evidence on record that she was duly authorized, through a Board
Resolution or Secretary's Certificate, to guarantee a corporate director thereof [Sugiyama] fixed monthly
dividends for 5 years
checks, but the remaining 3 checks bounced for having been draw against insufficient funds. In a
Memorandum of Agreement, Socorro, obtained a loan from Sugiyama amounting to P500,000.00
with a five percent (5%) interest for a period of one (1) month. As a guarantee and payment for
the said obligation, Socorro issued a check amounting to P525,000.00.
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored for having been drawn
Page | 3 against insufficient funds, just like the 3 other checks initially issued by petitioners. A formal
demand letter was delivered to Socorro's office, but no payment was made.
Thus, Sugiyama filed a complaint against petitioners for four (4) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22. Both petitioners pleaded not guilty to the four (4) charges.
Subsequently, Socorro and Sugiyama executed an "Addendum to Contract Agreement," agreeing
on a new schedule of payment with interests, but the obligation remain unpaid.
MeTC ruled that both accused are guilty of (4 counts) in violation of BP 22.
RTC- affirmed
CA- affirmed
Issue:
WON petitioners are criminally liable even if they only sign it as a mere officer of the corporation.
(YES)

Held:
The petition is partly meritorious. To sustain a conviction of violation of B.P. 22, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt three (3) essential elements, namely: 1. The accused makes,
draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reasons, ordered the bank to stop payment. The
presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. However, while the prosecution established
the second element, i.e., receipt of the notice of dishonor, with respect to petitioner Socorro, it
failed to do so in the case of petitioner Marie Paz. It is of no moment that the subject checks were
issued as a guarantee and upon the insistence of private complainant Sugiyama. What is significant
is that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and those same
checks were dishonored upon presentment, regardless of the purpose for such issuance.

It is clear that the real intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum and, thus, punishable under such law.

Calimlim e. Ariel Lim vs. People, GR 190834, November 26, 2014 (payment beyond
5 days)

Facts:
Lim issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30, 1998
and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of P100k for each check.
He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation to the Castor’s
candidacy in the elections of 1998.
Castor ordered the delivery of printing materials and used Lim’s checks to pay for it.
Castor told Lim that the printing materials were delivered too late, so Castor instructed
 Lim to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the 2 checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored
because of said order.
Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent 2 demand letters to Lim, dated July 20, 1998
and July 23, 1998. After the lapse of more than 1 month from receipt of the demand
letters, and after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, Lim issued a
Page | 4 replacement check dated September 8, 1998 for P200k. Badiee was able to encash said
replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after Lim paid the amount of the
bounced checks, 2 Informations were filed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether Lim is liable for BP 22, since he paid the bounced check beyond the 5-day grace
period - NO

RULING:
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day
grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but,
as the Court further elaborated in Tan:
xxx the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to the
institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of the foreclosure
and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded properties, with more than a million pesos
to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner.
In this case, the money value of the 2 checks issued by Lim had already been effectively
paid 2 years before the informations against him were filed.

Access Device Regulation Act (RA No. 8484) as amended by RA 11449

Buenconsejo a. Anthony De Silva Cruz vs. People, GR 210266, June 7, 2017 (J.
Leonen; Possession and use)
FACTS:

According to the prosecution, on April 18, 2006, at around 7:30 p.m., Cruz
allegedly tried to purchase two (2) bottles of Calvin Klein perfume worth
US$96.00 from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall. Danilo Wong (Wong), the
cashier at the Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for the purchase using
a Citibank Visa credit card.The transaction was approved, although Wong
doubted the validity of the credit card since the number at the back was not
aligned.

At around 8:00 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo

shoes worth US$363.00. Ana Margarita Lim (Lim), the cashier on duty,
facilitated the sales transaction. Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank
Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos," with credit card number
4539 7207 8677 7008. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping card,
Cruz presented a shopping card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked
 for another identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing
the name "Gerry Santos."

Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit card for
approval. The card was approved, but she noticed that the last four (4) digits
Page | 5 of the card were not properly embossed and its validity date started in
November 2006. She called Citibank to verify the credit card.

Upon verification, Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit
and that the real Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk
Management Division.

RTC found Cruz guilty of violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
8484. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of Cruz for violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act
of 1998 is proper.

RULING:

YES. RA 8484 defines an access device as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, personal
identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or
instrumental identifier, or other means of account access that can be used to
obtain money, good, services, or any other thing of value or to initiate a
transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument).

Since a credit card is "any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device
existing for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor or services
or anything of value on credit," it is considered an access
device.

Section 9(a) and (e) make the possession and use of a counterfeit access
device as "access device fraud" that is punishable by
law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 9. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts shall constitute access device
fraud and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
 (a) producing, using, trafficking in one or more counterfeit access devices;

(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied
Page | 6
for.

A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is counterfeit, fictitious,

altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or
counterfeit access device."

Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use
of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession
and use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the
crime is not merely the access device, but also any evidence that proves that
it is counterfeit.

Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card number 4539
7207 8677 7008, which bore the name "Gerry Santos." He used the same
credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00 at Duty Free Fiesta
Mall. Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was later proven
to be a counterfeit access device.

Pelayo a. People vs. Alamada Macabando, GR 188708, July 31, 2013 (Destructive v.
simple arson)
Facts:
On December 21, 2001, Alamada Macabando shouted that he wanted to get even and
he uttered that he would burn his house.

At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was
a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from
Macabando’s house. Macabando told the people around that whoever would put out the
fire would be killed.

The prosecution charged Macabando with the crime of destructive arson under Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC. RTC and CA
convicted Macabando of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC.

Issue:
Whether or not Macabando is guilty of the crime charged.

Held:
No, Macabando is guilty of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613.
 The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Both these elements have been proven in the present case.

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
Page | 7 regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that
constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security
implications than destructive arson.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People is particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson.

The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house,
but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses. Hence, the crime is not
destructive arson but simple arson.

Zara b. People vs. Aubrey Enriquez Soria, GR 248372, August 27, 2020 (Arson with
homicide; Qualified arson)
Facts:
1. February 22, 2012, at about 2 a.m., Parcon, Jr. and his family were sleeping in their
house at Holy Family Village I, Banilad, Cebu City;

2. After having been roused from his sleep by the smell of smoke, Parcon, Jr. leaped from
his bed and slightly opened the door of his room to check outside;

3. Parcon, Jr. saw a thick cloud of smoke on the second floor and fire spreading on their
stairs;

4. Parcon, Jr. opened the fire exit by the window of their bedroom and hi s family passed
through it to jump onto the roof of their garage, away from the fire;
 5. The firemen recovered the burned remains of Cornelia Tagalog (house helper) and
noted that accused-appellant (house helper) was missing;

6. At early dawn on even date, Parcon, Jr.'s neighbor, the witness Umandak spoke with
accused-appellant who had with her a bag which later turned out to be owned by the
Page | 8 deceased Cornelia Tagalog, and that appellant had fled the village by climbing over a
fence and jumping over to the adjacent Holy Family Village II;

7. At about 6:00 a.m., another resident of Holy Family Village I, witness Umandak, told
Parcon, Jr. that he saw and spoke with a woman, later identified as the appellant;

8. After the appellant was arrested following a hot pursuit operation, police investigators
recovered from the appellant two cellular phones that belonged to Parcon, Jr. as well as
a handbag, cash and personal effects belonging to the deceased Cornelia Tagalog as
identified by Parcon, Jr. and Cornelia.

9. Appellant admitted to a news reporter that she burned employment documents inside
Parcon, Jr.'s house and that she was willing to face the consequences of her actions.

The RTC found Aubrey Soria guilty of Qualified Arson as defined and penalized under
Section 1, in relation to Section 5, of Presidential Decree No. 1613 and to pay Marciano
P. Parcon, Jr. a temperate damage of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P50,000.00, as well as the heirs of Cornelia Tagalog P50,000.00 as compensation for the
latter's death and exemplary damages of P50,000.00.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering accused-appellant Aubrey Enriquez Soria to
indemnify the heirs of Cornelia Tagalog the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, in
addition to the damages already awarded by the trial court.

The appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to convict her for the crime charged. Appellant further posits that Sorote's
testimony, surrounding the interview wherein appellant admitted committing the offense,
cannot be given credence because the purported admission was not done intelligently
and knowingly, and not without improper pressure and coercion, as they were made while
already detained at the Cebu City Police Office. Lastly, she contends that the testimony
of Umandak that he caught appellant escaping the village should not be given weight
because the same was not corroborated by the testimonies of the other witnesses.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of Qualified Arson.

Held:
Yes. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613, otherwise known as the New Arson Law, provides that
the penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Section 5 of the same law states that if by
 reason of or on the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
to death shall be imposed. As such, the elements of the crime are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to identify appellant as the perpetrator of the arson.

Page | 9
In the case at bar, there is no direct evidence to link appellant to the commission of the
offense, there being no eyewitness as to how the fire commenced. However, the lack or
absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused cannot
be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means
of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt because circumstantial evidence, if
sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence.