CASES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PART I:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. Constitutional Provisions in relation to the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Arts. III,

VI, VII, VIII & IX):

(Cadajas v. People, G.R. No. 247348, November 16, 2021)

(Office of the Court Administrator v. Atillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-21-018, September 29,
2021)
(Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017)
(Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
(Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

Due Process:

1. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021;

2. Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013;
3. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013;
4. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158;
5. Apo Cement Corporation vs. Mingson Mining Industries Corporation, G.R. No.
206728, November 12, 2014;
6.Palacios v. People, G.R. No. 240676. March 18, 2019;
 7. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 09, 2018;

Equal Protection before the laws:

1. Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No.
189185, August 16, 2016)

5 Search and Seizure:

1. People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020;

2. Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019;
3. Sindac v. People, G.R. No. 220732, September 06, 2016; People v. Cristobal, G.R.
No. 234207, June 10, 2019;
4. People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018;
5. People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592, March 21, 2000;
6. Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017;
7. People v. Sison, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019;
8. Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018;
9. Pilapil v. Cu, G.R. No. 228608, August 27,2020;
10. People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019;
11. People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018; mj airport final
check, consented search
12. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016; seaport check firearms,
consented search
13. People v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018;mj bus passenger, no S&F
hence no valid search
14. Saluday v. People, April, 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305; firearm discover in bag upon
lifting it hence valid S&F
15. People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014; mj in bag while riding a jeep
from a tip. No valid S&F hence no valid search

Privacy of communication and correspondence:

1. Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017; The article dealt with
the letter-complaint of the Waray employees of the DTI, Region VIII on the
"mismanagement, low morale, improper decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism, etc." in the
office. No libel, report in good faith
2. (Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, 1February 11, 2014; Whether or not
several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violated freedom of expression
and privacy. - YES

3. Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013; The respondents then illegally set-up
and installed on their building 2 video surveillance cameras facing the petitioners’ property,
without the consent of the petitioners, and took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction.
The spouses allege that these acts violate their right to privacy.

4. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014; Daluz,
Suzara, among others, who were graduating high school students of St. Theresa’s College,
took digital pictures of themselves being covered only in their undergarments, drinking hard
liquor, and smoking cigarettes.
5. Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016) Asserting that the
posts made by Guevarra were designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to
close BMGI and all its clinics, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment
against respondent before the IBP.
Miranda Rights during Investigation:

1. People v. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017; Qualified theft of maid of
owner’s stuffs, Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada's admission made in CIU does
not necessarily entitle her to a verdict of acquittal. Her admission during the general inquiry
is still admissible.

2. People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015; PO1 Fidel Torre
and PO1 Alexis Macusi were standing in front of the Camiling Police Station when the
accused-appellant (GUTING), all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand,
suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his father. Whether or not the
oral confession of Guting, without the assistance of counsel, in violation of his constitutional
right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution? NO.

3. Manila Water Company v.Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014;
WoN the investigation performed by Manila Water was legal and sufficient ground to
terminate Del Rosario? (as against his assertion that he was coerced to admit such
misconduct?) YES Nonetheless, it may be mentioned that the constitutional right to
counsel is available only during custodial investigation. If the investigation is merely
administrative conducted by the employer and not a criminal investigation, the
admission made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify dismissal.

4. People v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018. Was Fernandez was
guilty of robbery with homicide. YES but not as to the admissibility of Fernandez’s
extrajudicial confession.

It is settled that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence against the

accused, the same must (a) voluntary, (b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, (c) express and (d) in writing. Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of his Miranda rights or right against self-incrimination shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

Rights of the accused:

1. Fuertes v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020) Devie Ann Isaga
Fuertes is one of the 46 individuals charged with violating the Anti-Hazing Law (Republic
Act No. 8049) for the death of Chester Paolo Abracia during initiation rites of the Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity. Whether paragraph 4 of Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law is
unconstitutional for dispensing with the constitutional presumption of innocence? (1) The
Court rules that paragraph 4 of Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law is not unconstitutional for
dispensing with the constitutional presumption of innocence. Disputable presumptions in
criminal laws have been upheld in the past. Fuertes fails to show that there is no logical
relation between the fact proved (presence during hazing) and the ultimate fact presumed
(participation as a principal in hazing). Section 14 does not do away with the requirement of
proving participation beyond reasonable doubt.

Right to Speedy disposition of cases:

1. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438, July 31, 2018; Whether or not the Motion to
Quash/Dismiss should be granted, [No] Delay, however, is not determined through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of
how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the
complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional
rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver
of right.

2. People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018; Joel Domingo was
acquitted of two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder due to the prosecution's
failure to present evidence in a timely manner and the unreliable testimony of the sole
eyewitness. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of balancing the interests of the
accused with those of the state and the offended parties.
3. Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019. Whether or not the period
spent from filing of the complaint (violating Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019) before the
Ombudsman up to the time of filing of the information in the SB transgressed petitioner’s
constitutional right to speedy disposition of his case? → NO. Petitioner didn’t assert his right
to a speedy disposition of his case at the earliest possible time. Petitioner took more than a
year after the filing of the information in the SB before he invoked his right. Petitioner’s
failure to invoke his right to a speedy disposition of his case during preliminary investigation
amounted to a waiver of said right.

Right against self-incrimination:

1. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014) The drug test showed dela Cruz
positive for the use of shabu. The entrapment operation which led to the arrest of dela Cruz
by the NBI stemmed from a complaint that dela Cruz and the local police were involved in
trying to extortPhp40,000 from the parent and live-in partner of a person the local police
previously arrested for allegedly selling drugs. Whether the drug test conducted on dela
Cruz is legal, and whether the evidence obtained therefrom is admissible. (NO) The
drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for
drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising
his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit
his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

2. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008;
The constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165 was being challenged insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities.

It is unconstitutional only as to the testing of public officers. The drug test prescribed under
Sec. 36 (c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well-being of the
citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs".

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug
test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy",
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36
(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Right against Involuntary Servitude:

1. Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014) whether or not the rh law is
unconstitutional. No

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind
of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether
to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them
to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the
same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

Rights against excessive fines and cruel punishment:

1. Fuertes v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 07, 2020; Whether the
Anti-Hazing Law imposes cruel and unusual punishments? NO. Life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua does not violate the prohibition. The Anti-Hazing Law seeks to prevent
organizations from making hazing a requirement for admission and aims to punish the
conspiracy of silence and secrecy that would otherwise shroud the crimes committed.

2. Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017; WoN the
imposition of perpetual disqualification to hold public office for those who failed to file their
SOCE more than once is gravely excessive and disproportionate? NO. The petitioner has
not demonstrated herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed the Constitution.
On the contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly indicates that perpetual
disqualification from public office has been prescribed as a penalty for the repeated failure to
file the SOCE and does not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.

3. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021; Does the exception to the
“finality-of-acquittal" rule apply in this case? The "finality-of-acquittal" rule has one
exception: it is inapplicable where the Court which rendered the acquittal did so with—

x x x grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the
prosecution's right to due process such as when it is denied the opportunity to present
evidence or where the trial is sham or when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment
of acquittal void.

4. Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015;
 In the case of Saldariega v. Panganiban, the court denied the petition and
affirmed the Orders granting the motion to reopen the provisionally dismissed
criminal cases, stating that the state has the right to revive such cases within the
provided time period and that the provisional dismissal does not constitute an
acquittal.

B. Criminal Jurisdiction:

C. Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110):

1. Public vs. Private Crimes

2. Role of Public Prosecutor – Section 5
3. Complaint and Information – Sections 1-4
4. Sufficiency of Complaint or Information – Sections 6-12

Read:

1) The People of the Philippines vs. Dante Cubay y Ugsalan, G.R. No. 224597, July
29, 2019)

 The Informations did not validly charge the crime of rape because they failed to allege
the element of force or intimidation.
 The accused is acquitted of all charges of rape.

Ratio:

 The Informations must clearly and accurately allege every element of the offense
charged.
 The element of force or intimidation is necessary to establish rape.
 Since the Informations did not sufficiently charge an offense, the accused is acquitted.
 The victim's testimony was vague, equivocal, and lacked details regarding the
presence of force or intimidation.
 The victim did not resist the accused's advances and did not report the incidents until
her relatives discovered her pregnancy.
 The prosecution failed to establish all the elements of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
 The importance of ensuring that the Informations sufficiently charge the offense and
that the prosecution proves all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt is
emphasized.

5. Duplicity of Offense – Section 13

Read:

1) People of the Philippines vs. Armando Chingh y Parcia, G.R. No. 178323,
March 16, 2011
The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being
charged with two counts of rape. Although two offenses were charged, which is a
violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense,
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses."
Nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also
states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict
the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
 penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense." Consequently, since Armando failed to file a motion to quash the
Information, he can be convicted with two counts of rape.

6. Amendment or Substitution of Complaint or Information – Section 14

Read:

1) Cezar T. Quiambao vs. People of the Philippines and Star Infrastracture

Development Corporation, G.R. No. 195957, January 15, 2020)

The Court ruled that the amendments made to the information were merely formal
and did not prejudice Quiambao's rights.

The Court emphasized that Quiambao had not yet entered a plea in the proceedings,
indicating that no substantial rights had been violated.

The Court noted that the determination of probable cause is within the jurisdiction of
the trial court, and the trial court had already found probable cause to charge
Quiambao with estafa.

Therefore, a new preliminary investigation was not necessary in this case.

7. Venue of Criminal Actions – Section 15

Read:

1) Hector Trenas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012
Lawyer Hector Treñas is accused of misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client,
leading to a lack of jurisdiction in the case and a referral for disciplinary proceedings.

 The court emphasized that jurisdiction is determined by the place where the offense was
committed.
 The prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential elements of the offense took place
in Makati City, where the trial court had jurisdiction.
 The prosecution evidence did not mention the place of delivery of the money or any acts
material to the crime of estafa occurring in Makati City.
 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case.
 The court highlighted the ethical obligations of lawyers, particularly the duty to account
for all money or property received from clients and to keep client funds separate from their
own.
2) Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No. 9684,
September 18, 2013)

Three prosecutors were found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for mistakenly filing a
libel case in the wrong court, resulting in a delay of five months and a violation of the
complainant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
 Jurisdiction over libel cases is explicitly lodged with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as
stated in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Assistant City Prosecutor De Dios's filing of the information with the wrong court was
due to plain carelessness and deserved a reprimand.
 City Prosecutor Manabat, as the approving prosecutor, should have been more cautious
and careful in reviewing the report and recommendation of his subordinate. He was
admonished to be more careful in the future.
 Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena mishandled the case by opposing the motion to
quash and failing to take the initiative to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. His lack of
prudence and failure to apply the basic rule on jurisdiction amounted to ignorance of the law.

3) Eileen P. David vs. Glenda S. Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017)
Eileen David challenges the jurisdiction of the court in reinstating criminal cases against her
for illegal recruitment and estafa, but the Supreme Court affirms that the court has
jurisdiction and the cases can proceed.

 The Supreme Court emphasized that venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction, and in this case, the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment
may be done in the court where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.
 The Supreme Court clarified that the dismissal of the cases by the RTC was null and void
for lack of due process, as David was not given the opportunity to present her defense.
 Therefore, double jeopardy did not apply, and the cases were reinstated and remanded to
the RTC for appropriate proceedings.

8. Intervention of Offended Party – Section 16

9. Injunction in Criminal Cases – OCA Circular No. 79-03, Item 14
It is an established doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal
prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately
investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society (Asutilla v. PNB, 225 Phil.
40, 43 (1986). However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid
down exceptions to this rule, among which are: a. To afford adequate protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused; b. When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; c.
When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub[-]judice; d. When the acts of
the officer are without or in excess of authority; e. Where the prosecution is
under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; f. When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; h. Where there
is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; i. Where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; j. When there is clearly
no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied; and] [k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

D. Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111):

1. Implied Institution of Civil Action Arising from Crime

Read:

1) Bernardo Mesina vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015,
BERSAMIN, J)
Case is malversation

2. Prior Reservation, Suspension, Waiver of Civil Actions

3. Independent Civil Actions (See also Civil Code, arts. 31-34)

4. Civil Liability Ex-delicto

a) In cases of Acquittal (See also Civil Code, art. 29)

b) Death of the Accused
 5. Prejudicial Question (See also Civil Code, art. 36)

Read:

1) San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Sec. Hernando Perez, G.R. No. 166836, September
4, 2013, BERSAMIN, J)

Whether the HLURB administrative case for specific performance could be a

reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of
PD No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

HELD:YES, an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an

administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the
criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 could be resolved.

Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisions.

Here, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not
SMP was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former (admin case)
must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold SMP to be not entitled
to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent
BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis
for the criminal liability for the violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 would evaporate, thereby
negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

2) Nari K. Gidwani vs. People of the Philippines, GR No. 195064, January 15, 2014)
The Supreme Court dismisses charges against Nari K. Gidwani for violation of B.P. 22, ruling
that the SEC order for the suspension of payments is a valid reason to stop payment of the
checks and that Gidwani cannot be held personally liable for the civil obligations of the
corporation.

 The suspension of GSMC's obligations temporarily ceased the contract, and Gidwani
cannot be held liable for the civil obligations of the corporation covered by the
checks.
 El Grande still has the right to pursue its claim through other remedies available to it,
subject to the SEC proceedings regarding the application for corporate rehabilitation.

Ratio:

 The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuing a check
to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
there are insufficient funds in the drawee bank for the payment of the check; and (3)
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank.
  The purpose of suspending proceedings under P.D. No. 902-A is to protect the rights
of party litigants and the interest of creditors, and to give breathing space for the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business viable again.
 The present case is distinguished from Tiong v. Co because there was a lawful SEC
order suspending GSMC's obligations, and therefore, Gidwani cannot be held liable
for the civil obligations of the corporation.
 El Grande still has the right to pursue its claim through other remedies available to it,
subject to the SEC proceedings.

3) Teodoro A. Reyes vs. Ettore Rossi, GR No. 159823, February 18, 2013, Bersamin
J.)
The rescission of contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension
of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer
issued in connection with the sale.
E. Preliminary Investigation (Rule 112)

1. Authorized Officers; Determination of Probable Cause – Sections 2-4

Read:

1) Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) vs Christina Sagun, G.R. No. 205698,
July 31, 2018)

The conduct of the preliminary investigation by the DOJ was invalidly enjoined

In support of its move to reverse and set aside the adverse resolutions of the CA, the DOJ
argues in C.A.-G.R. No. 208744 and C.A.-G.R. No. 210095 that the CA should not have
dismissed its petition for certiorari for being allegedly filed out of time because there existed
special and compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the procedural rules. Worthy to
note is that the CA had denied petitioner's motion for special extension of time to file the
petition for certiorari because there was no compelling reason to extend the period for doing
so.

Under Section 4, 107 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
any aggrieved party has a non-extendible period of 60 days from receipt of the assailed
decision, order or resolution within which to file the petition for certiorari. The period is non-
extendible to avoid causing any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional
rights of parties to the speedy disposition of the case. 108 Regrettably, when the DOJ finally
filed the petition for certiorari during the extended period sought, the petition lacked the
proper docket number due to inadvertence, which prompted the CA to assign a new docket
number to the petition. This move on the part of the CA resulted in the outright dismissal of
the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

In view of the obtaining circumstances, we find merit in the DOJ's argument.

In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals,109 the Court allowed the petition filed almost four months
beyond the reglementary period to proceed. We emphasized therein that meritorious cases
should be allowed to proceed despite their inherent procedural defects and lapses in keeping
with the principle that the rules of procedure were but tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, and that the strict and rigid application of rules that would allow
technicalities to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. The
Court explained that excusing a technical lapse and affording the parties a review of the case
to attain the ends of justice, instead of disposing of the case on technicality and thereby
causing grave injustice to the parties, would be a far better and more prudent course of action.

Time and again, the Court, in resolving the OSG's requests for extension, has taken
cognizance of the heavy workload of that office. It should not be any different now. Worthy
to note is that the OSG, representing the DOJ, offered suitable explanations and apologies,
like the associate solicitor in charge of filing the petition having been rushed to the hospital
and thus being denied the opportunity to supervise or see to the filing of the intended petition.
Also, the omission of the docket number from the petition that was ultimately filed did not
look as if it was aimed either to delay the proceedings or to confuse the CA. The explanation
for the delay in the filing of the petition in the CA tendered by the OSG thereon, coupled with
its invocation of liberality or the relaxation of the rules, was fully acceptable. As such, the
petition should be allowed to proceed. We further find that the CA's dismissal of the petition
was disproportionate to the inadvertence committed considering the substantial merits of the
DOJ's case. Verily, the petition deserves to be given due course and resolved in view of the
fact that the injunction issued by the RTC against the DOJ on the conduct of the preliminary
investigation was a patent nullity on its very face.

2) Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015)

SPO2 Rolando Jamaca appeals his conviction for Grave Threats, arguing that the
dismissal of a similar complaint by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman should have
barred his prosecution, but the Supreme Court rules that the dismissal did not
constitute double jeopardy and affirms his conviction based on sufficient evidence.

 The dismissal of the complaint by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
did not bar petitioner's prosecution because there was no valid indictment or complaint
brought before a competent court. Double jeopardy only applies when there is a valid
indictment or complaint filed before a competent court.
 The Office of the City Prosecutor had jurisdiction to proceed with the case despite
the dismissal by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman. The dismissal by the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman does not automatically nullify the jurisdiction of the Office
of the City Prosecutor.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413, July
25, 2017.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring that detainees who have been
held without a case being filed in court and without definite findings of probable cause are
entitled to be released, as their constitutional rights to liberty and against unreasonable
seizures were being violated.

 The Court declared that all detainees whose cases have gone beyond the mandated
periods for the conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose cases have already
been dismissed on inquest or preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal,
reconsideration, reinvestigation, or automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are
entitled to be released pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their
constitutional right against unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other
lawful cause.

Ratio:

 The Court held that the detainees' constitutional rights to liberty and against
unreasonable seizures were being violated by the prolonged detention without a case
being filed in court and without definite findings of probable cause.
  The Court emphasized that the waiver of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
which allows for the continued detention of a person pending the conduct of
preliminary investigation, cannot be used to detain a person indefinitely.

2. Cases Not Requiring Preliminary Investigation – Section 1

3. Motion to Reopen; Motion for Reinvestigation

4. Modes of Review – DOJ Department Circular No. 027, Series of 2022

5. Inquest Proceedings; Waiver of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code

Read:

1) Rene C. Figueroa, vs. Sandiganbayan, Special Third Division, Office Of The

Ombudsman Represented by The Office Of The Special Prosecutor And
Philippine Amusement And Gaming Corporation, G.R. Nos. 235965-66, February
15, 2022, J. M.V. Lopez

the Court clarified the mode of analysis in situations where the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked, thus:

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy
trial. While the rationale for both, rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may
only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to
speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may
already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of
cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a
conduct of a preliminary investigation. [The] Court acknowledges, however, that
the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with
due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this
period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding
investigations prior to the Filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in
the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the
right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right
was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the
right, is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is
motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by
utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the
delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it
followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the
prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence
made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result
of the delay.
 Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must
consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed
to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the

case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically
motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of
evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution
throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and
substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of
further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the
accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be
properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must
be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate
motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they
are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.

F. Arrest, Search and Seizures:

1. Warrant of Arrest

a) Requisites
Read:

1) Liza L. Maza vs. Hon. Evelyn A. Turla, G.R. No. 187094; February 15, 2017, J.
Leonen)

 Whether the judge gravely abused her discretion in remanding the cases for another
preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and set aside the orders of the
RTC.
 The Court held that trial court judges have the authority to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the prosecutor's
report and supporting documents.
 They can dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or require the submission of
additional evidence.
 However, they cannot remand the case for another preliminary investigation on the
ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.
 The Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause by the trial court
judge is a judicial function, while the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutors is an executive function.
 The judge's role is to evaluate the prosecutor's report and supporting evidence and
make a personal determination of probable cause.
 2) Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830,
February 11, 2014.)

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for
the determination thereof.111 In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining
the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.112

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable
cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.113

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the
records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the
charge against them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not
point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest.

Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the
complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for
petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As
stated above, the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based
thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he
sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews the
[I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that
the accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged

3) Mayor “Jong”Amado Corpus vs Judge Ramon Pamular, G.R. No. 186403,

September 5, 2018)

whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he conducted further
proceedings on the Amended Information and consequently issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. despite the pendency of his and
petitioner Carlito Samonte's Petition for Review before the Department of Justice;

NO. Two (2) kinds of determination of probable cause exist: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court . The
judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. Once the information is already filed in court, the court has acquired
jurisdiction of the case. Any motion to dismiss or determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused is within its discretion. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal is terminated by the filing of the information in the proper
 court. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.

b) Enforcement – Rule 113, Sec. 7

b) Lawful Warrantless Arrest – Rule 113, Sec. 5

Read:

1) People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Solamillo Amago and Cerilo Bolongaita
Vendiola, Jr., G.R. No. 227739, January 15, 2020

the instant case falls within paragraph (a). For a warrantless arrest of an accused
caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. It is apparent that
Amago's act of making an abrupt U-turn, instead of stopping at the checkpoint
sign, made a reasonable belief for the police officers to suspect that accused-
appellants might have committed some traffic violations or delivering something
illegal. The police officers stopped them and, in the course, Amago intentionally
slumped down the motorcycle he was riding causing his t-shirt to be lifted,
thereby exposing the handle of a handgun that was tucked in his waistband. At the
same time, Piñero saw a folding knife protruding from the left pocket of Vendiola
who had fallen from the motorcycle. Due to the failure of Amago to produce any
license to carry the firearm and for the illegal possession of a bladed weapon by
Vendiola, they were arrested.

Meanwhile, regarding the admissibility of the confiscated items, they fall within the
exception of warrantless search. The search conducted inside the utility box of the motorcycle
was legal. A search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court

2) Leniza Reyes vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229380, June 6, 2018)

the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself admitted that
Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she
smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the
act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.39

Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined
from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not
justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on
their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime."41 In this
case, records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2)
teenagers' tip and that, everything happened by "chance."42 Surely, to interpret "personal
knowledge" as to encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a dangerous
precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under Section 5 (b), Rule 113.

3) Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being
no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At the time that he was waiting
for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have
been under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are
the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus,
their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.

4) People of the Philippines vs. Vicente Lugnasin And Devincio Guerrero, G.R. No.
208404, February 24, 2016
Accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero are found guilty of kidnapping
for ransom, with the court ruling that the victim's identification of the abductors is credible
and the accused-appellants' rights were not violated during custodial investigation.
The court also ruled that accused-appellant Devincio's argument regarding the illegality of his
warrantless arrest and violation of his rights under the Constitution were waived since he
failed to raise these issues before his arraignment.
4) (People of the Philippines vs. Lean Noel Dizon @ “Jingle”, G.R. No. 223562,
September 4, 2019
Was appellant's warrantless arrest, including the incidental search of his person, valid?
The court found that appellant's warrantless arrest, including the incidental search, was valid
because he was caught in flagrante delicto selling drugs during a buy-bust operation.
In the case of People v. Dizon, appellant Lean Noel Dizon is acquitted of drug charges due to
a breach in the chain of custody rule, despite a valid warrantless arrest and the absence of the
informant's testimony.

5) Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared Proclamation No. 1
and its implementing guidelines null and void.

The Court held that only the President, as the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, has the authority to exercise calling-out powers.

The Court emphasized that there is only one repository of executive powers, which is
the President, and that the calling-out powers are exclusive to the President.
 The Court also held that Section 465 of the Local Government Code, which was
invoked by Governor Tan to justify his actions, does not grant him the authority to
declare a state of emergency and exercise calling-out powers.

2. Search Warrant – Rule 126:

a) Requisites

Read:

1) People of the Philippines vs Amador Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21,
2018)
The Court held that the search warrant no. 01-118 is null and void because it
violates the requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection with
one specific offense only. It reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. In this case, Search
Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33 First, violation of the SRC is
not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said law
such as manipulation of security prices,34 insider trading,35 acting as dealer or
broker without being registered with the SEC,36 use of unregistered exchange,37
use of unregistered clearing agency,38 and violation of the restrictions on
borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers39 among others. Even the charge of
"estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of
committing the said crime: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by
means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The
three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of
abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be
easily discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect. Here, the
applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the
license to operate as brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the
view that at the time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary
as to what offense to charge respondents with. Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null
and void for having been issued for more than one offense and for lack of
particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.

b) Enforcement – Sections 7-13

Read:

1) Jasper Tan Y Sia, vs. People of The Philippines, G.R. No. 232611, April 26,
2021, Lopez, M., J.
Jasper Tan is acquitted of charges for illegal sale and possession of drugs due to the
prosecution's failure to establish the validity of the buy-bust operation and the chain of
custody, as well as violations in the search conducted.

 The Court applied the "objective test" to determine the validity of the buy-bust operation.

 The prosecution failed to clearly establish the details of the sale, such as the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the seller, the offer to buy, and the agreed purchase price.

 The testimony of the police officer who conducted the surveillance and the buy-bust
operation was lacking in detail and did not satisfy the requirements of the "objective test."
 The Court also noted that the poseur-buyer, who could have provided crucial testimony,
was not presented as a witness.

 The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of
the seized drugs.

 There were gaps in the testimony of the police officer regarding the handling and marking
of the seized items.

 The Court also noted discrepancies in the weight of the seized drugs as stated in the
Information and as testified by the forensic chemical officer.

 Furthermore, the Court found that the search conducted was invalid because Jasper was
not present to witness the search, as required by law.

 The presence of the barangay captain alone was not sufficient to comply with the
requirement of having the lawful occupant or a member of his family present during the
search.

 Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the evidence obtained from the buy-bust
operation and the search was inadmissible, and there was not enough evidence to prove
Jasper's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2) Petron Gasul Lpg Dealers Association And Totalgaz Lpg Dealers Association
V. Elena Lao, Imelda Lao, Pompidou Golangco, Jeremy Wilson Golangco,
Carmen Castillo, And/Or Occupants Of Baguio Gas Corporation, G.R. No.
205010, July 18, 2016
 Hence, there is no dispute that in this case, both the RTC-La Trinidad and the CA
found that there exists probable cause that respondents had committed an offense and
that the objects used in committing the offense are in the place to be searched.
Consequently, the only issue for resolution is whether there is any compelling reason
warranting the RTC-La Trinidad's issuance of SW on respondents, whose business
presence is in Baguio City, not in La Trinidad.

In this regard, Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper
court where an SW application shall be filed, to wit:
 Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An
application tor search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission
of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

xxxx
 The foregoing provision is clear. Generally, the SW application must be filed with the
court which has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the offense was alleged to
be committed. This, however, is not an iron-clad rule. For compelling reasons, which
must be expressly stated in the application, an SW application may be filed in a court
other than the one having jurisdiction over the place where the purported offense was
committed and where the SW shall be enforced.[40]

In this case, Using cited the foregoing compelling reasons on why the two separate
 SW applications against respondents were filed with the RTC-La Trinidad instead in
RTC-Baguio City, to wit:
 4.1. The 'compelling reasons of urgency, subject, time and place' in the instant
applieation[s] are:

(a) Time is absolutely of the essence in the case.

As attested to by [Lising] and his witness [Fortea] in their attached affidavits,

the volume of the LPG cylinders being illegally refilled by the respondents
reflects the capacity of respondents' facilities to perpetrate their unauthorized
and illegal acts. Respondents' continued and unhampered acts of illegally
tracing LPG products, in violation of Section 2 (a), in relation to Sections 3 (c)
and 4, of BP 33, as amended; [and of underdelivery or underfilling of LPG
products or possession of underfilled LPG cylinders for the purpose of sale,
distribution, transportation, exchange or baiter, in violation of Section 2 (c), in
relation to Section 4, of BP 33, as amended[,] will result in the unabated and
unhampered endangerment of consumers, deprivation of business from the
legitimate LPG industry players, and denial of payment of proper taxes to the
government.

(b) Tine brisk sales of the subject LPG cylinders might result in the depletion
of available stocks, leaving nothing to be seized in case a search warrant be
issued but on a later date.

(c) The immediate hearing on and issuance of the search warrant applied for
are precautions against possible leakage of information to respondents.

3. Martin Villamor Y Tayson, And Victor Bonaobra Y Gianan, V. People Of

The Philippines, G.R. No. 200396, August 22, 2017, Del Castillo, J.
In a case of illegal gambling, the Supreme Court acquits two defendants due to
an unlawful search and seizure conducted by police officers without a valid
warrant, emphasizing the importance of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

 The SC ruled that the police officers' entry into the compound without a valid warrant
violated petitioners' constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The SC emphasized that an anonymous tip alone does not give police officers the
authority to enter private homes without a warrant.
 The SC also found that the police officers' observations from a distance of 15 to 20
meters were not sufficient to establish that petitioners were committing a crime.
 Therefore, the evidence seized during the illegal search and seizure was deemed
inadmissible.

Clarification on Arrest and Evidence

 The SC clarified that while petitioners did not raise the issue of the legality of the
arrest before arraignment, their waiver only applies to the defects of the arrest and not
to the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest.

4) Jorge Dabon vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208775, January 22, 2018
A man charged with drug-related offenses is acquitted by the Supreme Court due
to the violation of his right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
 The Court emphasized that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is inviolable.
 Section 8 of Rule 126 requires that a search of a house or premises must be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant or any member of his family, or in the absence of the latter,
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
 In this case, it was established that Dabon and his wife were present in their residence
during the search, but only one witness was present, in violation of the mandatory
requirement.
 The Court ruled that the evidence obtained in violation of this requirement is inadmissible,
and the exclusionary rule applies.
 Dabon's failure to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence does not
waive his right to question its admissibility.

c) Lawful Warrantless Search

Read:

1) (People of the Philippines vs Renante Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4,

2018)
Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is acquitted of illegal possession of
marijuana due to an invalid stop-and-frisk search and the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained from an illegal search and arrest.

1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures is inviolable.

 Warrantless searches and seizures are only allowed in certain exceptions, such as a
stop-and-frisk search.
 In this case, the Court found that there was no genuine reason to justify a stop-and-
frisk search on accused-appellant.
 The police officers did not observe any overt physical act that would indicate
accused-appellant's involvement in criminal activity.
 Therefore, the search conducted by the police officers was deemed invalid.

2. The search incidental to a lawful arrest must precede the arrest.

 Accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was not valid because there was no overt act
indicating that he had just committed a crime.
 The arresting officers did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating his
involvement in an offense.
 As a result, the search conducted after the arrest was also deemed invalid.

3. The evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible.

 Since the search and seizure were found to be invalid, the evidence obtained from the
illegal search, which includes the seized marijuana, was deemed inadmissible.
 Without the confiscated marijuana, there was no evidence left to convict accused-
appellant.

2) World Wide Web Corporation, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al./Planet

Internet Corporation v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,G.R.
Nos. 161106/161266, January 13, 2014.)
The Philippine Jurisprudence case involves the validity of search warrants issued for toll
bypass operations, with the Court ruling that the search warrants were valid and effective
based on probable cause and the violation of Presidential Decree No. 401.

 The Supreme Court ruled that PLDT had the personality to question the quashal of the
search warrants, as an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.
 The Court held that the order quashing the search warrants was a final order that
could be appealed.
 Regarding the issue of probable cause, the Court upheld the trial judge's finding of
probable cause, as it was based on evidence showing that a crime had been committed
and that petitioners were involved in the offense.
 The Court also held that the search warrants were not general warrants, as the items
described in the warrants had a direct relation to the offense for which the warrants
were sought.

3) Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz V. People of The Philippines, G.R. No. 209387,
January 11, 2016)
Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz is convicted of possessing unlicensed firearms during the 2007
election period after voluntarily submitting his bag for inspection and waiving his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, resulting in a modified prison sentence of one to
two years.

 Dela Cruz was indeed in possession of the illegal firearms.

 Dela Cruz voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection and consented to the search.
 The search conducted by the port authorities was valid.

Ratio:

 The prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense, as the firearms
were found inside Dela Cruz's bag and he did not have the necessary authorization to
possess them during the election period.
 Dela Cruz voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection and consented to the search,
waiving his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The search was conducted as part of routine port security measures, and there was
probable cause to conduct the search based on the results of the x-ray scan.
 The search conducted by the port authorities was valid, as it was done in accordance
with reasonable security regulations to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles
within the port.
 The search was not unreasonable per se, and there was no violation of Dela Cruz's
constitutional rights.

4) People of the Philippines vs. Rosemarie Gardon-Mentoy, G.R. No. 223140,

September 4, 2019)
A woman accused of illegal drug transportation is acquitted after the Supreme
Court rules that her warrantless arrest and subsequent search were
unreasonable and violated her right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
 A lawful arrest must precede a warrantless search conducted upon the personal effects of
an individual, and the search must rest on probable cause existing independently of the arrest.
 In this case, the search of the accused-appellant's personal belongings was not based on
probable cause.
 The police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.
 Their suspicion of the contents of the block-shaped bundle being marijuana was subjective
and not supported by objective facts.
 Both the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search were unreasonable and violated the
accused-appellant's right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The marijuana seized from her should be deemed inadmissible in evidence.

5) Pilapil v. Cu, G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020)

The court rules that the warrantless seizure of explosives during an
illegal mining inspection was illegal and violated the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, resulting in the
dismissal of the case and quashing of the warrant of arrest against the
accused.
 The warrantless seizure of the explosives was not justified under the plain view doctrine.
 The first requisite of the plain view doctrine, which requires the law enforcement officer
to have a prior justification for an intrusion or be in a position to view a particular area, was
not present in this case.
 Mayor Pilapil and his team conducted the inspection without a search warrant and were
not in a lawful position when they discovered the explosives.
 The third requisite of the plain view doctrine, which requires the incriminating character
of the seized item to be immediately apparent to the officer, was not satisfied.
 The circumstances surrounding the discovery and seizure of the explosives did not
reasonably indicate that they were contraband or evidence of a crime.
 Therefore, the warrantless seizure violated the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The seized explosives were considered "fruits of a poisonous tree"
and could not be used as a basis for probable cause to arrest and detain
the accused.

d) Rules on Cybercrime Warrants – A.M. No. 17-11-03

Read:

1) Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017)

The Supreme Court of the Philippines overturns the conviction of Jeffrey
Miguel for illegal possession of drugs due to an illegal search and arrest
conducted by non-government Bantay Bayan operatives, leading to the
inadmissibility of the seized evidence and his subsequent acquittal.

 The Bantay Bayan operatives, although not government agents, should be considered as
law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights.
 The search and arrest made by the Bantay Bayan operatives were illegal because there was
no overt act constituting a crime committed by Miguel in their presence.
 It was implausible that a valid warrantless arrest was made on Miguel based on the alleged
public display of his private parts, as no separate charge was filed against him for such
offense.
 The Supreme Court concluded that the search conducted on Miguel was
illegal, and therefore, the seized marijuana was inadmissible as evidence.

2) (Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that the
installation of surveillance cameras without their consent violated their
right to privacy, and found that the respondents were the proper parties
to the suit.
  The court based its decision on the right to privacy, which is enshrined in the
Constitution and in Philippine laws.
 The court defined the right to privacy as the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one's person or intrusion into one's private activities.
 The court applied the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether
there was a violation of the right to privacy.
 The court found that the petitioners had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
property, whether it was used as a residence or a business office.
 The installation of surveillance cameras directly facing the petitioners' property
without their consent was deemed a clear violation of their right to privacy.

Regarding the issue of proper parties:

 The court found that the respondents were the proper parties to the suit.
 Despite not being the registered owners of the building, the court held that the
respondents were responsible for the installation of the surveillance cameras.
 The court found that the respondents were using the corporate fiction of Aldo
Development & Resources, Inc. as a shield to protect themselves from the suit.
 Therefore, the court concluded that the respondents were the proper parties to be
impleaded in the case.

e) Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Read:

1) Cadajas v. People, G.R. No. 247348, November 16, 2021)

In summary, the court rules that the evidence obtained from the
petitioner's Facebook Messenger account is admissible, as it was
obtained by a private individual and not by the state. The court also
finds the petitioner guilty of violating the Anti-Child Pornography
Act based on the evidence presented by the prosecution.

The court ruled that the evidence obtained from the petitioner's Facebook Messenger account
is admissible and upheld the petitioner's conviction for child pornography.

Ratio:

The court first discusses the concept of the right to privacy, stating that it encompasses the
right not to be exposed on the internet in matters involving one's private life. It also includes
the right to prevent the first disclosure of information and the right to prevent the storage of
data. The court emphasizes that the right to privacy, as recognized in the Constitution, is
primarily intended to protect individuals against government intrusions and is not applicable
between private individuals.

The court then examines whether the evidence obtained from the petitioner's Facebook
Messenger account should be admissible. It concludes that since the evidence was obtained
by a private individual and not by the state or its agents, the rules on admissibility under the
Constitution do not apply. The court also notes that the evidence was properly authenticated
by the victim in open court and that the Data Privacy Act allows the processing of data and
sensitive personal information for the determination of criminal liability.

Regarding the petitioner's claim of a violation of his right to privacy, the court applies the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. It finds that the petitioner voluntarily gave his
Facebook Messenger password to the victim, thereby authorizing her to access his account.
The court concludes that the petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy, in relation to the
victim, had been limited, and therefore, there was no violation of privacy.

The court also addresses the petitioner's failure to timely raise his objection to the
admissibility of the photos during the proceedings in the trial court. It states that objections to
evidence must be made at the proper time and that failure to do so results in a waiver of the
objection. Therefore, the court deems the photos admissible.

Finally, the court finds the petitioner guilty of violating the Anti-Child Pornography Act
based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. It establishes that the victim was a
minor, that she was induced to send explicit photos, and that the photos were performed
through electronic means.

2) (Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017)

The Supreme Court of the Philippines overturns the conviction of Jeffrey
Miguel for illegal possession of drugs due to an illegal search and arrest
conducted by non-government Bantay Bayan operatives, leading to the
inadmissibility of the seized evidence and his subsequent acquittal.

G. Bail (Rule 114); Recognizance Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10389)

1) The People of The Philippines, Vs. Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr., Richard A. Cambe,
And Janet Lim Napoles, Accused, Janet Lim Napoles, G.R. No. 247611, January
13, 2021, J. M.V. Lopez)
Convicted of Plunder, Janet Lim Napoles fails to secure temporary release on
humanitarian grounds due to COVID-19, as the Court denies her motion for bail
pending appeal and rejects her claim of being at risk of contracting the virus inside
prison.

 The Court explains that the presumption of innocence and the Constitutional right to
bail end after the accused's conviction of a capital offense.
 While bail is a matter of right before conviction, it becomes discretionary after
conviction.
 In this case, Napoles was convicted of Plunder, a capital offense, and the
Sandiganbayan determined that the evidence of her guilt was strong, leading to the
denial of her bail application.
 Therefore, her motion for bail pending the appeal of her conviction must be denied.

The Court also rejects Napoles' claim for provisional release on humanitarian grounds.

 The Court distinguishes previous cases where release was granted due to specific and
compelling circumstances, such as advanced age and ill health.
 In contrast, Napoles' claim of being at risk of contracting COVID-19 due to her
diabetes is not sufficient to grant her provisional liberty.
 The Court emphasizes that unless there is clear showing that an accused is actually
suffering from a medical condition that requires immediate and specialized attention
outside of their current confinement, they must remain in custody.
 The Court also dismisses Napoles' argument regarding the worldwide call for the
temporary release of PDLs, stating that it does not provide sufficient basis to grant
bail.
 Ratio:

The Court's decision is based on the following legal principles:

1. The presumption of innocence and the Constitutional right to bail end after the
accused's conviction of a capital offense.
2. Bail after conviction is discretionary and must be exercised with caution, considering
the ascertainment of the accused's guilt.
3. The release of an accused on humanitarian grounds requires exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as advanced age and ill health.
4. The worldwide call for the temporary release of PDLs due to COVID-19 does not
provide sufficient basis to grant bail.
5. The Constitutional and statutory requisites for the grant of bail are not suspended or
supplanted by the existence of a pandemic.

2) Allen C. Padua and Emelita F. Pimentel vs. People of the Philippines, Family
Choice Grains Processing Center, Inc., and Golden Season Grains Center, Inc.,
G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019)
Petitioners charged with estafa for falsely claiming to be in the business of power plant
construction are entitled to bail as a matter of right, according to the Supreme Court,
reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordering the trial court to resolve the
motion to quash and fix an amount of bail.

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that they are entitled to
bail as a matter of right since they are charged with a bailable offense.
 The Court emphasized that bail is a constitutional demandable right, and the
petitioners should be granted bail unless they are charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
guilt is strong.
 The Court clarified that the petitioners' Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam
is not an application for bail, but a motion to question the court's jurisdiction and to
fix the amount of bail.
 The Court also emphasized that custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon an application for bail, but it is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the accused.
 Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals, and ordered the trial court to resolve the motion to quash with reasonable
dispatch and to fix an amount of bail following the guidelines in Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court.

3) (Juan Ponce Enrile, V. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), And People Of The

Philippines, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)

he Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a
matter right and is safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the
personal appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court requires and at
the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of
his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for
the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be
allowed independently of the merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is
injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to
observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to bail it will enable him to have his
 medical condition be properly addressed and attended, which will then enable him to
attend trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is
further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from
the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment
for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a
similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both
his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of
him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

4) (People of the Philippines vs. Novo Tanes y Belmonte,G.R. No. 240596, April 3,
2019)

A man charged with violating drug laws is granted bail due to doubts regarding
the chain of custody of the seized drugs, highlighting the importance of strict
compliance with procedures in drug cases.

 The CA did not err in affirming the RTC's decision to grant Tanes' application for bail.
 The right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, and bail becomes a matter of
discretion if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of guilt is strong.
 The RTC conducted bail hearings and found that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not
strong due to doubts regarding the chain of custody of the seized drug.
 The RTC followed the proper procedure in granting Tanes' bail application and petitioner
was not deprived of procedural due process.
 The non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody negated a strong
evidence of Tanes' guilt.

5) People of the Philippines vs. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017)
 Manuel Escobar, a suspect in a kidnap-for-ransom case, files a second petition for
bail after his co-accused is granted bail, leading to a legal battle over the
application of res judicata in criminal proceedings.

Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case,1 not in an

interlocutory order in a criminal case.2 An order disposing a petition for bail is
interlocutory.3 This order does not attain finality when a new matter warrants a
second look on the application for bail.

1. Res judicata does not apply in criminal proceedings. It only applies to final judgments
in civil cases, not to interlocutory orders in criminal cases.
2. Escobar's Second Bail Petition should not be denied on the technical ground of res
judicata.

 Escobar's co-accused, Rolando Fajardo, was granted bail based on weak evidence.
 Escobar's bail was fixed at P300,000.00.
 The grant of bail does not prevent the prosecution from submitting additional
evidence to prove Escobar's guilt in the main case.

H. Rights of the Accused (Rule 115)

Read:

1) Fuertes v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 7,

2020)

Whether or not Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law are unconstitutional.

Held:
No. Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law, which provides that an
accused's presence during a hazing is prima facie evidence of his or her participation,
does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence. This disputable
presumption is also not a bill of attainder.
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated when there is a
logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. When
such prima facie evidence is unexplained or not contradicted by the accused, the
conviction founded on such evidence will be valid. However, the prosecution must
still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of a
disputable presumption does not preclude the presentation of contrary evidence.

2) People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)

Whether or not the conviction of accused violated his right against double
jeopardy and speedy trial, inasmuch as the trial Court already dismissed the
case against him.

HELD: Yes, the Court held that accused convictions violated his right against
double jeopardy and speedy trial. Prejudice to the accused is determined
through its effect on three interests of the accused that the right to a speedy
trial is designed to protect, which are: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Accused-appellant was
therefore prejudiced when the prosecution failed to present its evidence during
all the settings that were given to it. Every day spent in jail is oppressive, more
 so when the reason for the prolongation of incarceration is the prosecution's
unreasonable motions for postponement. In instances where the State has been
given every opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to do so, it cannot
claim to have been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its evidence. Such
failure and the resulting dismissal of the case is deemed an acquittal of the
accused even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case. To
the mind of the Court, an accused cannot be made to needlessly and baselessly
suffer incarceration or any anxiety arising from criminal prosecution, no
matter the duration. Any day in jail or in fear of criminal prosecution has a
grave impact on the accused. When the

prosecution is needlessly and baselessly prolonged, causing him prejudice, the

Court is constrained, as in this case, to arrive at a finding that accused-
appellant's right to a speedy trial was violated.

2) Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438, July 31, 2018)

A petitioner files a motion to quash the Informations and Order of Arrest

against him due to alleged inordinate delay, but the Sandiganbayan denies the
motion, ruling that there was no inordinate delay.

Issue:

 Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Cagang's

Motion to Quash/Dismiss due to inordinate delay.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court does not suspend the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued.
 The denial of a motion to quash may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
 The Supreme Court also held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying Cagang's motion, as there was no inordinate delay.

Ratio:

 The right to speedy disposition of cases is a constitutional right that applies to all
cases before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
 The length of delay, reason for delay, assertion or non-assertion of the right, and
prejudice to the accused are factors to be considered in determining whether there was
inordinate delay.
 The period for determining inordinate delay starts from the filing of the formal
complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.
 In this case, there was no inordinate delay as the delay was not unreasonable
considering the complexity of the case and the efforts made by the prosecution.
 Cagang did not timely invoke his right to speedy disposition of cases.
 The pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
is issued.
 The denial of a motion to quash may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari.

I. Arraignment and Plea (Rule 116)

Read:
. People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Brendo P. Pagal, A.K.A. "Dindo,",
G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020, En Banc. C.J. Gesmundo)

A man charged with murder pleads guilty, but the court convicts him without any evidence
presented by the prosecution, leading to his acquittal.

 Accused-appellant's conviction cannot be sustained.

 An improvident plea of guilt does not automatically result in the remand of the case
for re-arraignment and further proceedings.
 The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
 The prosecution failed to present any evidence to establish accused-appellant's guilt.
 Accused-appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

Ratio:

 The trial court's failure to comply with the duties imposed by the rules resulted in an
improvident plea of guilty and a lack of evidence presented by the prosecution.
 The plea of guilty alone cannot be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
 The prosecution has the burden to prove the accused's guilt through the presentation
of evidence.
 The prosecution failed to present any evidence despite being given multiple
opportunities to do so.
 The Court acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, this Court adopts the following guidelines
concerning pleas of guilty to capital offenses:

1. AT THE TRIAL STAGE. When the accused makes a plea of guilty to a capital
offense, the trial court must strictly abide by the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In particular, it must afford the
prosecution an opportunity to present evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability. Failure to comply with these mandates constitute
grave abuse of discretion.

a. In case the plea of guilty to a capital offense is supported by proof beyond

reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a judgment of conviction.

b. In case the prosecution presents evidence but fails to prove the accused's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a judgment of
acquittal in favor of the accused.

c. In case the prosecution fails to present any evidence despite opportunity to

do so, the trial court shall enter a judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused.

In the above instance, the trial court shall require the prosecution to explain in writing
within ten (10) days from receipt its failure to present evidence. Any instance of
collusion between the prosecution and the accused shall be dealt with to the full extent
of the law.
 2. AT THE APPEAL STAGE:

a. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense on the basis of his plea
of guilty, whether improvident or not, and proof beyond reasonable doubt was
established, the judgment of conviction shall be sustained.

b. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense solely on the basis of his
plea of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof beyond reasonable
doubt because the prosecution was not given an opportunity to present its
evidence, or was given the opportunity to present evidence but the
improvident plea of guilt resulted to an undue prejudice to either the
prosecution or the accused, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside and
the case remanded for re-arraignment and for reception of evidence pursuant
to Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

c. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense solely on the basis of a

plea of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof beyond reasonable
doubt because the prosecution failed to prove the accused's guilt despite
opportunity to do so, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside and the
accused acquitted.

J. Motion to Quash Information (Rule 117)

1. Grounds – Sections 3 and 9

2. Double Jeopardy – Section 7
3. Provisional Dismissal – Section 8

Read:

1) Philippine Savings Bank vs. Spouses Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Bermoy, G.R.
No. 151912, September 26, 2005)

The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged
with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is
prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of
such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same
case.19 The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court20 which
provides that "[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if
the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."

On Petitioner’s Claim that the Trial Court’s

Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was Void

Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal.
By mandate of the Constitution21 and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such
appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can inquire into the
merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 was void. They contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disregarded evidence allegedly proving
respondent spouses’ identity.24

The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal
admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited to the case where
the trial court "act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction due to a violation of due process i.e. the prosecution was denied the opportunity
to present its case xxx or that the trial was a sham xxx."25

None of these circumstances exists here. There is no dispute that the prosecution, through
petitioner’s counsel as private prosecutor, was afforded its day in court. Neither is there any
question that the proceedings in the trial court were genuine. What petitioner points to as
basis for the trial court’s alleged grave abuse of discretion really concerns its appreciation of
the evidence. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the
trial court on this point can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.

People of the Philippines, et al. vs. Panfilo Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, May 28, 2002)

Whether or not Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
applicable to Criminal CAses Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689

NO. Pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the o±ended party. The provisional dismissal of o±enses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to o±enses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. In this case, the
respondent failed to prove the existence of the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule when Judge Agnir dismissed criminal cases Q-99-81679 to
Q-999-81689. Therefore, the state is not barred from the time limit. The State can
revive or re-file those cases mentioned or file a new information for multiple murder
against the respondent. Applying the new rule in the aforementioned criminal cases
would be to add to ar make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or
impliedly included therein. Thus, the State is not barred by the time limit in
accordance with paragraph two of Section 8 Rule 117.

2) Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)

The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal was
made with the express consent of the accused, thus, there is no double jeopardy.

As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a
valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the
accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or
the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However,
there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the
dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of
evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an
unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.

In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express
consent of the accused-petitioner. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned
exceptions under requisite 5 because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the
presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of
evidence cannot be established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in the proceedings
that would be tantamount to violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. The delay in the
proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the provisional dismissal of the case on
May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay contemplated under the law as to violate the accused’s
right to speedy trial.

K. Pre-trial (Rule 118)

L. Trial (Rule 119)

1) Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial – A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC
Read:

Byron Cacdac, vs. Roberto Mercado, G.R. No. 242731, June 14, 2021, Lopez, M., J.)
The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrines surrounding the filing of a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, resulting in a waiver to present evidence, and the
principle that civil liability can still arise from a criminal action even if the accused is
acquitted, provided that the acquittal is not due to a declaration that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not occur.

**Demurrer to Evidence**: By filing a demurrer to evidence without leave of court,

the accused waives the right to present further evidence, and the case is decided based
on the prosecution’s evidence.
– **Civil Liability in Criminal Cases**: An accused can still be found civilly liable
even if acquitted criminally if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt or if the court
declares that the liability is only civil in nature and not based on the crime which the
accused was acquitted.
– **Burden of Proof in Civil Cases**: Preponderance of evidence, or the greater
weight of evidence, is the standard required to establish civil liability.

2) Order of Trial

L. Judgment (Rule 120)

1) Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012)

At the outset it must be emphasized that the special civil action of certiorari is not
the proper remedy to challenge a judgment conviction rendered by the SB.
Petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,17 as amended by Republic

Act No. 8249, decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of
law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the x x x Sandiganbayan x x x whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition x x x shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth." Section 2 of Rule 45 likewise provides that the petition
should be filed within the fifteen-day period from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed
in due time after notice of judgment.
 As observed by the SB, the 15-day period of appeal, counted from the date of the
promulgation of its decision on May 26, 2008, lapsed on June 10, 2008, which
rendered the same final and executory. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
thus filed 6 days late. Petitioner’s resort to the present special civil action after
failing to appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary period, cannot be done. The
special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which
the petitioner already lost

There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his
counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the
validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was
prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced.20

It is worth mentioning that petitioner never raised issue on the fact that his counsel was not
around during the promulgation of the judgment in his motion for reconsideration which
merely prayed for reopening of the case to enable him to present liquidation documents and
receipts, citing financial constraints as the reason for his failure to attend the scheduled
hearings. Before this Court he now submits that the gross negligence of his counsel deprived
him of the opportunity to present defense evidence.

2) Horacio Salvador vs. Lisa Chua, G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015, BERSAMIN, J)

As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction

may be done in absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days
from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final.29 The accused who fails to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under the
Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for
new trial or for reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment
of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his
standing in court in order to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from
the date of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his surrender; and
(b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating
therein the reason for his absence. Should the trial court find that his absence was
for a justifiable cause, he should .be allowed to avail himself of the remedies
within 15 days from notice of the order finding his absence justified and allowing
him the available remedies from the judgment of conviction.30

Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation
of the judgment in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was mandatory
because the offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony or
offense.31 He was charged with and actually found guilty of estafa, and meted the
indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Based on the records,
the promulgation of the judgment was on March 30, 2011; hence, the petitioner
had only until April 14, 2011 within which to meet the mandatory requirements
under Section 6, supra.

In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the Rules
of Court, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and
attached thereto the medical certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel David. Yet, he
did not thereby establish that his absence had been for a justifiable cause because
the purported issuer himself, Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David, directly impugned the
credibility of this certificate by denying to have issued the certificate, and to have
examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011, or to have signed the certificate, or
that the Rizal Medical Center issued the certificate. The petitioner later submitted
 another medicate certificate, which, aside from being belatedly issued, went
unsupported and unauthenticated by the testimony of the alleged issuing
physician, who turned out to be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA justly discredited
the certificates.32

Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly
excused his absence from the promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other
requirement of Section 6, supra, to surrender himself to the trial court. The term
surrender used in the rule visibly necessitated his physical and voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the
verdict against him.33

In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner to

have lost his standing in court because of his non-compliance with Section 6,
supra. His failure to fulfill the requirements rendered the conviction final and
immutable

3) Salvador Estipona, Jr. Y Asuela, V. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo, Presiding Judge of The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, And People Of The
Philippines, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is constitutional.

No. Pursuant to Section 5 (5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court.
Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure. Hence, Section 23 of RA 9165, an act of Congress, is unconstitutional.

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as
“a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common
in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense
make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

4) In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Michael Labrado Abellana (Detained at the
New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) vs. Hon. Meinrado P. Paredes, G.R. No.
232006, July 10, 2019)

Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
Ruling:

 The petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

Ratio:

 The writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, but it can only be availed of in exceptional circumstances.
 The petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process and competent counsel.
 The petitioner had ample opportunities to be heard and present his defense, but it was
his own negligence and that of his counsel that led to his current predicament.
  A client is bound by the acts and negligence of his counsel, unless there is clear
abandonment of the client's cause.
 The negligence of the counsel in this case does not amount to clear abandonment, and
the petitioner himself was negligent in monitoring the status of his case.
 Therefore, the petitioner's claim for the writ of habeas corpus is without merit.

5) People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 233437, April 26, 2021)

Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari is barred by respondent
Lauro L. Baja, Jr.'s right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:

 The Petition for Certiorari is dismissed, and the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
granting the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissing the case against Lauro L. Baja, Jr.
are affirmed.

Ratio:

 Once a demurrer to evidence has been granted in a criminal case, the grant amounts to
an acquittal, and any further prosecution for the same offense would violate the
accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy.
 The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove that Baja's
reimbursements were fictitious or non-existent.
 Improper documentation does not necessarily mean that the expenses did not exist.
 The prosecution failed to present enough evidence, such as statements from persons
with personal knowledge of the alleged nonpayment, to show that the expenses did
not exist.
 The fact-finding team did not sufficiently inquire if the expenses reimbursed were
indeed made.
 The Sandiganbayan's grant of the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissal of the case
were proper, and any further prosecution would violate Baja's right against double
jeopardy.

M. New Trial or Reconsideration (Rule 121)

(Farouk B. Abubakar vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202408, 202409, 202412,
June 27, 2018)

this Court holds that petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir are not entitled to a new trial.First,
they failed to convince this Court that they have a meritorious defense and that the evidence
they seek to introduce would probably lead to their acquittal.

Second, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir's former counsel was not grossly negligent. Their
former counsel may have failed to present other pieces of evidence in addition to what their
co-accused had presented. He may have also failed to incorporate other arguments in the
record of the case. However, these cannot be considered as grossly negligent acts.

Petitioners failed to establish discriminatory intent on the part of the Ombudsman in choosing
not to indict other alleged participants to the anomalous transactions. Their contention that
several other public officials were not criminally charged, by itself, does not amount to a
violation of petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir's right to equal protection of laws. The
evidence against the others may have been insufficient to establish probable cause. There
may have been no evidence at all. At this point, all this Court could do is speculate. In the
absence of extrinsic evidence establishing discriminatory intent, a claim of selective
prosecution cannot prosper.

N. Appeal (Rule 122)

Read:

1) Mamerto Austria,Vs. AAA And BBB, G.R. No. 205275, June 28, 2022. J. M.V.
Lopez)
 The private complainants have the right to question the dismissal of the criminal case due
to a violation of due process.
 The private complainants have an interest in the civil aspect of the case and can file a
special civil action for certiorari to protect their rights.
 The private complainants' right to question judgments and orders in criminal proceedings
is not absolute and is limited to certain circumstances, such as when there is a denial of due
process or grave abuse of discretion.
 The private complainants' right to appeal or file a petition for certiorari is limited to the
civil aspect of the case, such as the amount of damages awarded.
 Private complainants cannot question judgments or orders involving the criminal aspect of
the case without the OSG's conformity.
 Private complainants can only question judgments or orders in criminal proceedings if
there is a denial of due process or grave abuse of discretion.
 There are exceptional circumstances where private complainants can appeal or file
a petition for certiorari without the OSG's participation, such as when there is a grave
error committed by the judge or when the private complainant has no other suitable
recourse.
3) Anselmo De Leon Cuyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192164, October
12, 2011)

 Whether the Motion for Probation was filed within the reglementary period.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court upheld the denial of the Motion for Probation.
 The court ruled that the motion was filed out of time.
 According to Rule 120, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the accused has 15 days from
the promulgation of judgment to surrender and file a motion for leave to avail of the
remedies against the judgment.
 Since Anselmo failed to appear during the promulgation of judgment and did not file a
motion for leave, he lost the remedies available to him under the Rules of Court.
 The court also noted that perjury is not a light offense, so Anselmo was required to be
present during the promulgation of judgment.

3) (Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz V. People Of The Philippines, G.R. No. 209387,
January 11, 2016)

 Dela Cruz voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection and consented to the search.
 The search conducted by the port authorities was valid.
 Ratio:

 The prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense, as the firearms
were found inside Dela Cruz's bag and he did not have the necessary authorization to
possess them during the election period.
 Dela Cruz voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection and consented to the search,
waiving his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The search was conducted as part of routine port security measures, and there was
probable cause to conduct the search based on the results of the x-ray scan.
 The search conducted by the port authorities was valid, as it was done in accordance
with reasonable security regulations to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles
within the port.
 The search was not unreasonable per se, and there was no violation of Dela Cruz's
constitutional rights.

4) Jose Sanico vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015,
BERSAMIN)

The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed
appeals in criminal cases. The relevant portions of Rule 122 are the following:

Section 3. How appeal taken.—

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

The dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of an appeal by an accused on the ground
of his failure to submit his memorandum on appeal should be nullified because the pertinent
rule of procedure governing the appeal specifies such submission as optional on his part, and
commands the resolution of the appeal by the RTC on the basis of the records of the trial
court and of any memoranda of appeal as the parties may file in the case.

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal
only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c),
supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of
the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the
appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence,
the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the
memorandum on appeal. Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in
the MCTC, the petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due
course, whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the
appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that
occasioned severe prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time
appeal being a matter of right, and because his conviction was then declared to have attained
finality, causing the execution of the decision as to its civil aspect.

O. Provisional Remedies (Rule 127)

F. Rules on the Use of Body-Worn Camera in the Execution of Warrants (A.M.

no. 21-06-08-SC)
 PART II:

EVIDENCE (A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: (ART. III)

A. Key Concepts

1. Factum Probandum vs. Factum Probans

2. Proof vs. Evidence
3. Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence
4. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence – Rule 133
Read:

1) The People of The Philippines, vs. Carlo Diega Y Zapico, G.R. No. 255389,
September 14, 2021, J. M.V. Lopez)

An accused is responsible not only for the Rape he personally committed but also for the
other counts of Rape that his co-conspirators perpetrated although they were unidentified or
are at large.1 We observe this dictum in this appeal assailing the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated June 29, 2020 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11398.

Contrary to Carlos' theory, there was no inconsistency in AAA's testimony as to who raped
her. To be sure, there is proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that Carlo and his three (3)
companions conspired and took turns in raping AAA. The rapes were committed in the
following order, first by Carlo, second by Kalbo, third by Ismael, and fourth by Obat. Thus,
the victim was raped four (4) times. In several cases, the Court held the accused-appellant
responsible not only for the Rape he committed but also for the other counts of Rape that his
co-conspirators perpetrated although they were unidentified or at large. This is clear from the
decisions in People v. Plurad,31 People v. Catubig, Jr.,32 People v. Sabal,33 and People v.
Rondina,34 consistent with the rule that where there is a conspiracy, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all.

Lastly, Carlo's uncorroborated denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive declaration of
the prosecution witness. These negative defenses are self-serving and undeserving of weight
in law absent clear and convincing proof.35 Notably, Carlo did not adduce evidence that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for
him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

5. Admissibility; Relevance and Competence – Rule 128

2) People of the Philippines vs. De Guzman y Danzil, G.R. No. 186498, March
26, 2010, Nachura, J.)
Issue:

 Whether the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the seized items and the
chain of custody, as required in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:

 The court ruled in favor of the appellant, Ronaldo de Guzman y Danzil, and acquitted
him of the crime charged.
 Ratio:

 The prosecution has the burden to overcome the presumption of innocence and
present evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
 In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the elements that must be proven
are: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.
 The court found that the first and third elements were established, as the buy-bust
transaction took place and the buyer and seller were identified.
 However, the court found a problem in the prosecution's effort to establish the
integrity of the seized items.
 The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty, and the
chain of custody requirement ensures the removal of unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence.
 The court cited Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, which
mandates the physical inventory and photographing of seized items in the presence of
the accused or their representative, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.
 The court found that the apprehending officers failed to comply with these guidelines,
as the marking of the seized items was done in the police station and not immediately
after the buy-bust operation.
 There was also no physical inventory made or photographs taken of the seized items
as required.
 The court noted a gap in the chain of custody of the seized items, as there was no
clear explanation on who had custody of the items from the time they were seized
until they were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
 An unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable when the item of real evidence
is not readily identifiable or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical.
 The failure to establish the integrity of the seized items through an unbroken chain of
custody engendered reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
 The court rejected the prosecution's invocation of the presumption of regularity in the
apprehending officers' performance of official duty, as the failure to observe proper
procedure negates the operation of this presumption.
 Based on these reasons, the court acquitted Ronaldo de Guzman y Danzil of the crime
charged.

2) Spouses Marcelian Tapayan and Alice Tapayan, vs. Ponceda M. Martinez, G.R.
No. 207786, January 30, 2017)

Spouses Marcelian and Alice Tapayan are ordered by the court to execute a mortgage
on their property in favor of respondent Ponceda Martinez, unless they reimburse her
the amount of One Million One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-
Nine Pesos and 55/100 (P1,114,879.55), in a case involving a disputed Deed of
Undertaking and a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines.

Issue:

 Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision directing the petitioners to
execute a mortgage in favor of the respondent

held
 Supreme Court held that there was no misapprehension of facts committed by the lower
courts, except for the amount that the petitioners were liable to reimburse the respondent
 Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the Deed of Undertaking was
inadmissible as evidence, as they failed to timely object to its admission
 Supreme Court upheld the presumption of regularity ascribed to the Deed of Undertaking
as a notarized public document
 Supreme Court found that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence to
support their claim that they were mere accommodation borrowers

3) Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino, vs. People of The Philippines And

Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 216745-46, November 10, 2020)

Former Mayor Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino is acquitted by the Supreme Court after being
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the evidence presented was deemed
inadmissible hearsay evidence.

Issue:

 Whether Buencamino can be convicted based on gross negligence when he was only
charged with evident bad faith.
 Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Buencamino's guilt.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Sandiganbayan and acquitted
Buencamino.
 The Court found a variance between the mode of commission Buencamino was
charged with (evident bad faith) and the one he was convicted with (gross inexcusable
negligence), violating his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him.
 The Court also found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Buencamino's actions were attended by evident bad faith.
 The documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, including photocopies of
certain resolutions and reports, were deemed inadmissible hearsay evidence.
 There was no evidence to show that Buencamino misappropriated the fees collected
or that he had any ill will or dishonest purpose in imposing the fees.

4) Liza Maza et al. vs. Hon. Evelyn Turla, et al., G.R. No. 187094, February 15,
2017)

Former members of the House of Representatives file a petition to nullify the orders of a
Regional Trial Court, arguing that the judge improperly remanded the case for another
preliminary investigation and that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
establish probable cause.

Issue:

 Whether the judge gravely abused her discretion in remanding the cases for another
preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and set aside the orders of the
RTC.
  The Court held that trial court judges have the authority to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the prosecutor's
report and supporting documents.
 They can dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or require the submission of
additional evidence.
 However, they cannot remand the case for another preliminary investigation on the
ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.
 The Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause by the trial court
judge is a judicial function, while the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutors is an executive function.
 The judge's role is to evaluate the prosecutor's report and supporting evidence and
make a personal determination of probable cause.
 The admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary
investigation.

5) Martin Villamor Y Tayson, And Victor Bonaobra Y Gianan, vs. People of The
Philippines, G.R. No. 200396, August 22, 2017, Del Castillo, J.)

In a case of illegal gambling, the Supreme Court acquits two defendants due to an unlawful
search and seizure conducted by police officers without a valid warrant, emphasizing the
importance of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Issue:

 Whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 as
amended by Republic Act No. 9287 is valid, considering the unlawful search and
seizure conducted by the police officers without a valid warrant.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court found the petitioners' conviction to be invalid due to the violation
of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The Court held that the police officers did not have the authority to barge into the
petitioners' homes without a valid warrant.
 The Court found that the circumstances in this case did not justify a warrantless arrest
and search.
 The Court emphasized that evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure
is tainted and should be excluded.
 Therefore, the evidence seized from the petitioners' homes is inadmissible, and the
petitioners are acquitted.

6) People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015)

A man's conviction for parricide is upheld by the Supreme Court based on his voluntary oral
confession to the police officers and sufficient circumstantial evidence, overcoming the
presumption of innocence, resulting in the imposition of various monetary awards to the
victim's heirs.
Issue:

The main issues raised by accused-appellant in his appeal are: (1) whether his oral confession
to the police officers is admissible in evidence; (2) whether there is sufficient circumstantial
evidence to support his conviction; and (3) whether the prosecution was able to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
 Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that accused-appellant's oral confession to the police officers is
admissible in evidence. The Court explained that accused-appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he made the confession, as he voluntarily approached the police officers
and confessed to the crime without being questioned. The Court also cited the case of People
v. Andan, where a similar uncounselled confession was deemed admissible because it was
made spontaneously and voluntarily.

The Court also found that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support accused-
appellant's conviction. The prosecution presented testimonies from the police officers who
witnessed accused-appellant's confession, as well as the autopsy report showing the multiple
stab wounds suffered by the victim. The Court considered these pieces of evidence
collectively as circumstantial evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime.

7) People of the Philippines vs. Jonie Sabandal Pilen, G.R. No. 254875, February
13, 2023

Accused-appellant Jonie Sabandal Pilen's appeal to reverse his conviction for multiple counts
of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder is denied, with the court affirming his
guilt but modifying the penalties imposed.

At this juncture, the Court disagrees with the argument of the defense that "the trial court
erred in giving weight to the opinions of Dr. Sibud and Dr. Borres despite the fact that they
were not shown to be expert witnesses."[77]

It is an elementary rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be made after the
evidence is formally offered.[78] Thus, Section 35, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
provides when to make an offer of evidence, to wit:
SEC. 35. When to make offer. — As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must
be made at the time the witness is called to testify.

Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be
done in writing.
On the other hand, Sec. 36, Rule 132 of the same rules, provides when objection to the
evidence offered shall be made, thus:
SEC. 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness

shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice
of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
Based on the foregoing provisions, objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest
possible time, that is, after the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if
the objectionable issue becomes apparent only after the answer was given. [79]

In this case, the defense failed to timely raise its objections on the qualifications of Dr. Sibud
and Dr. Borres as expert witnesses. Records of the case show that when the two doctors
testified, the defense did not object to the admissibility of their testimonies nor conduct cross-
examinations. The defense also did not oppose the Formal Offer of Exhibits of the
prosecution.[80] Thus, for the failure of the defense to make known its objection at the proper
time, the procedural error or defect was waived. [81]

At any rate, it must be pointed out that the admissibility of evidence should not be confused
with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether
the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence.[82]

Here, this Court finds that the trial court correctly considered and gave credence to the
testimonies of Dr. Sibud and Dr. Borres, which ultimately prove that the wounds of Aiza,
April Rose, and Jolito were fatal, and that the only reason they did not die was because of the
timely medical assistance they received. The problem of the credibility of expert witnesses
and the evaluation of their testimonies are left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion. [83] As such, the crime
committed against Aiza, April Rose, and Jolito was Frustrated Homicide.

For the cases of Georgia and Zenaida, the doctors that attended to them testified that their
wounds were not fatal and that they would have survived even without medical intervention.
[84]
For this reason, the crime committed against them was only Attempted Homicide.

Lastly, for the case of Maximo, the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the
victim would have died from his wound without timely medical assistance, as his medical
certificate[85] alone, absent the testimony of the physician who diagnosed arid treated him, or
any physician for that matter, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of his injury. It is
settled that, "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if
not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful," then such doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused.[86] Thus, the crime committed against Maximo was
Attempted Homicide.

In sum, the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established that Pilen committed the
crime of Homicide against Princess and Maria, Frustrated Homicide against Roger,
Wenefredo, Genara, Love Joy, Jolito, April Rose, and Aiza, and Attempted Homicide against
Georgia, Zenaida, and Maximo.

8) People of the Philippines vs. Mario Panis, G.R. No. 234780, March 17, 2021,
Hernando, J.)

Aurelio Santiago is found guilty of murder after conspiring with others to

assassinate a barangay captain, with the court ruling that the elements of murder
were proven beyond reasonable doubt and the defenses of alibi and denial were
not considered.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly found Santiago guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder.

Ruling:

The appeal is dismissed. The Court of Appeals correctly found Santiago guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
 Ratio:

 The elements of Murder, as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, were
duly established by the prosecution.
 The attendance of treachery was proven, as the victim was shot suddenly and
unexpectedly from behind, leaving him with no chance to defend himself.
 The positive identification of Santiago as one of the assailants by the eyewitness was
sufficient to support his conviction.
 The defenses of alibi and denial were not given consideration, as Santiago failed to
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
 Minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses do not impair their
credibility,

6. Judicial Notice; Mandatory and Discretionary – Rule 129, Secs. 1-3

Read:

1) Republic of the Philippines vs. Segundina Rosario, G.R. No. 186635, January 27,
2016)
A petition for the reconstitution of a land title is granted by the RTC, but the Supreme
Court reverses the decision, recognizing the titles of the University of the Philippines and
dismissing the petition due to doubtful evidence and the need to protect the stability of land
titles.

Issues Raised in the Petition for Review on Certiorari

 In the present petition for review on certiorari, the Republic raises several issues,
including the alleged fraudulent nature of TCT No. 269615, the sufficiency of other
documents presented by Rosario, and the alleged contradiction with previous
Supreme Court decisions on the indefeasibility of UP's titles.

Supreme Court's Ruling

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic, finding that the petition is
meritorious.
 The Court emphasized that a reconstitution of title is not a ministerial task and should
involve a diligent evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of the evidence
presented.
 The Court recognized UP's indefeasible title over its landholdings, as confirmed by
law and jurisprudence.

2) Republic of the Philippines vs. Science Park of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
237714, November 12, 2018)

The Supreme Court denies Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.'s application for land

registration due to insufficient evidence of possession and occupation of the land since June

12, 1945.
 Issue:

 Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the MCTC's grant of SPPI's
application for land registration.

In the present case, petitioner maintains that SPPI failed to prove that the subject land is

within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain since DAO 97-37 was never

properly identified in court, and the MCTC should not have taken judicial notice of the record

of other cases even when the said other cases have been heard or pending in the same court.

As correctly ruled by the CA, the conditions necessary for the exception to be applicable
were established in this case. Notably, the handling Government Prosecutor (a) did not object
to the dispensation of the testimony of the DENR legal custodian of official records, Ms.
Bautista, in view of the similar stipulation between him and the same counsel of SPPI in LRC
No. N-127 previously heard and decided by the MCTC, and (b) satisfied himself that the
copy of DAO 97-37 presented was duly certified by Ms. Bautista. Only then was the
photocopy of the certified copy duly marked as exhibit. ETHIDa

Moreover, contrary to petitioner's protestation, the land sought to be registered need not have
been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier in order for the
applicant for registration to secure the judicial confirmation of its title. Such contention had
already been declared as absurd and unreasonable in Republic v. Naguit. Registration under
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 is based on possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to
whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time. "The applicant needs only
to show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time prior to
the filing of the application for registration," which SPPI was able to do.

However, notwithstanding the alienability and disposability of the subject land, the Court
finds that SPPI failed to present convincing evidence that its alleged possession and
occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property. Possession is: (a) open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; (b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and
not intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and (d)
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or
the people in the neighborhood.

n sum, the Court finds that SPPI's unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of possession

and occupation do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and

occupation of the subject land of the nature and duration required by Section 14 (1) of PD

1529. Accordingly, the CA erred in affirming the MCTC's grant of SPPI's application for

original registration of its imperfect title over the subject land. AIDSTE
 3) ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal and Ministry of Public Health-
Kuwait vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010)
ATCI Overseas Corporation and the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait are
held jointly and solidarily liable for the illegal dismissal of an overseas
Filipino worker, affirming the application of Philippine labor laws and
rejecting the claim of immunity from suit by the foreign government agency.
Issue:

1. Whether ATCI and the Ministry can be held jointly and solidarily liable for
the illegal dismissal of the respondent.
2. Whether Philippine labor laws or Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations
govern the employment contract.
3. Whether ATCI's officer, Amalia Ikdal, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court held that ATCI and the Ministry are jointly and solidarily
liable for the illegal dismissal of the respondent.
 The Court affirmed the application of Philippine labor laws and rejected the
claim of immunity from suit by the foreign government agency.
 The Court also held that Ikdal, as an officer of ATCI, can be held jointly and
solidarily liable.

Ratio:

 The Court based its decision on the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment
agencies with their foreign principals.
 The law states that the responsibilities of the recruitment agency towards the
contracted employees extend until the expiration of their employment contracts.
 The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the state's policy to protect
and alleviate the plight of the working class.
 Regarding the choice of law, the Court ruled that the party invoking the application of
a foreign law has the burden of proving it.
 In this case, ATCI failed to prove the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws

4) David Noveras vs. Leticia Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014,
PEREZ, J.)
A US citizen couple's divorce in California is not recognized in the
Philippines, leading to a Supreme Court ruling on the division of
properties and support for their children.

Issue:

1. Whether David committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity that

would result in the forfeiture of the properties in favor of Leticia and their
children.
2. Whether the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the properties in the USA.
 3. Whether a Joint Affidavit executed by Leticia and David amounted to a
waiver or forfeiture of David's property rights.
4. Whether Leticia is entitled to reimbursement from the sale of a property in
Sampaloc, Manila.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether attorney's fees and litigation expenses should be charged against the
conjugal properties.
7. Whether the children are entitled to support and presumptive legitimes.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court denied David's petition for review and affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
 The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in recognizing the
California divorce decree without complying with the requirements of
presenting the foreign judgment and the pertinent California law on divorce.
 The Supreme Court also held that the trial court erred in proceeding directly
to liquidation without first granting the petition for judicial separation of
property.
 The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' modifications
regarding the division of the Philippine properties and the payment of the
children's presumptive legitimes.

7. Judicial Admission – Rule 129, Sec. 4

Read:

1) Paulo Castil y Alvero vs. People of the Philippines, Hernando, J.)

the court affirms the conviction of Paulo Castil for illegal possession of firearms,
ruling that his warrantless arrest and subsequent search were valid during a buy-bust
operation where he was caught in the act of an illegal drug sale.

Issue:

 Is Castil's conviction for illegal possession of firearms proper?

Ruling:

 Castil's conviction for illegal possession of firearms is affirmed.

 The court found that Castil's warrantless arrest and subsequent search were
valid.
 The arrest was conducted during a legitimate buy-bust operation, where
Castil was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in an illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.
 In such cases, the police officers are authorized and duty-bound to apprehend
the violator and conduct a search for anything that may have been used in the
commission of the crime.
 Therefore, the firearm and ammunition seized during the search were
admissible as evidence.
  Castil is guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
 The prosecution established the elements of the offense, namely the existence
of the firearm and the lack of a corresponding license.
 Castil's judicial admission during cross-examination, where he admitted to
not having a license to own a gun and not having previously applied for one,
was considered sufficient proof of the second element.
 A judicial admission is binding and does not require further proof.
 Therefore, the court found Castil guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

2) Susan B. Villafuerte vs. Disc Contractors, Builders, and General Services,

Inc., G.R. Nos. 240202-03, June 27, 2022, Hernando)

The pivotal issue for this Court's consideration is the entitlement of Villafuerte et al. to their
monetary claims. Specifically, whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that the National
Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
Villafuerte et al. are:

(a) not entitled to mid-year bonus when they were still engaged as project or contractual
employees or the period covering the date they were initially hired until May 20, 2013;

(b) entitled to separation pay at the rate of one-half month pay for every year of their service
from the date of their initial hiring until Disc Contractors ceased its operations on September
30, 2015;

(c) not entitled to vacation leave, sick leave, anniversary bonus, birthday leave, uniform
allowance, moral damages, and exemplary damages;

(d) entitled to rice subsidy, health maintenance organizations benefits, and attorney's fees.

Villafuerte et al. are entitled to anniversary bonus, birthday leave, uniform allowance, rice
subsidy and health maintenance organizations benefits

In deleting the anniversary bonus, birthday leave pay, and uniform allowance awarded to
Villafuerte et al., the Court of Appeals agreed with the National Labor Relations Commission
that they failed to show that they are qualified to receive the same. In retaining the award for
health maintenance organizations benefits and rice subsidy in favor of Villafuerte et al., the
Court of Appeals likewise agreed with the National Labor Relations Commission that the
Certification of Benefits presented sufficiently proves Villafuerte et al.'s entitlement thereto.

Disc Contractors insists that the Court of Appeals and National Labor Relations Commission
correctly deleted the awards for anniversary bonus, birthday leave pay, and uniform
allowance given that Villafuerte et al. failed to prove the existence of a contractual agreement
between them for the grant of the same. However, it has a different stance as regards the
grant of rice subsidy and health maintenance organizations benefits to these employees.
According to the company, the Court of Appeals and National Labor Relations Commission
erred in using the Certification of Benefits as its basis for granting rice subsidy and health
maintenance organizations benefits for the period prior to May 21, 2013 because the
document merely enumerated the benefits they can claim for the period covering May 21,
2013 to September 20, 2015, and not before this period.

It is not lost on this Court that at the outset, Disc Contractors' main argument in claiming that
Villafuerte et al. are not entitled to these benefits is that such benefits are reserved only for
regular employees. It made its position clear on this matter in its Supplemental Position
Paper.108 However, when the labor arbiter ruled that they are regular employees and are
therefore entitled to all the benefits enjoyed by the other regular employees of Disc
Contractors, which includes the benefits being claimed by them, Disc Contractors changed
tack and now claims they cannot be granted these benefits because they have not proven their
entitlement thereto. This Court cannot allow this.

It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court will not be considered by the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer
cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would
be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence in connection with
the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair play.109

It is worth noting that Section 4,110 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which supplements the
National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure,111 provides that judicial
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case need no proof
with respect to the matter or fact admitted; and the same may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

In Gonzales-Saldana v. Spouses Niamatali,112 this Court held:

A party who judicially admits a fact, cannot later challenge [the] fact as judicial admissions
are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in
the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is (sic) cannot
be controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive as to such party, and
all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded.113

Having made such statement in its Supplemental Position Paper, Disc Contractors cannot be
allowed to take a stand contrary to what it had pleaded for the same are considered judicial
admissions, not needing any proof, and are conclusive against the pleader. As such, it was
grave error for the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission to still
require Villafuerte et al. to present evidence to prove their entitlement to anniversary bonus,
birthday leave pay, and uniform allowance as these benefits automatically vested upon them
when they were pronounced as regular employees of Disc Contractors without the need of
any proof by virtue of statement made by the company. Corollarily, the Court of Appeals
ruled correctly when it found the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission to grant
health maintenance organizations benefits and rice subsidy to Villafuerte et al. supported by
substantial evidence. To repeat, Disc Contractors' own declaration that regular employees are
entitled to health maintenance organizations benefits and rice subsidy provides sufficient
basis for the grant.

8. Presumptions – Rule 131

B. Kinds

1. Object Evidence – Rule 130, A

Read:
 1) PO2 Jessie Flores vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 222861 April 23,

2018)

PO2 Jessie Flores y De Leon is convicted of simple robbery (extortion)

after demanding money in exchange for returning a driver's license, with the

Supreme Court upholding his conviction and penalty.

Issue:

 Did the prosecution establish the guilt of Flores beyond reasonable doubt?
 Does the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment apply in this case?

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Flores for simple robbery
(extortion).
 The Court found that the prosecution successfully established all the elements
of the crime charged.
 The Court ruled that Flores unlawfully took possession of the marked money
from France with the intent to gain and through intimidation.
 The non-presentation of the original marked money did not affect the
prosecution's case, as the serial numbers were duly recorded and the
photocopies of the marked money were admissible as evidence.
 The presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder was not indispensable to
prove the receipt of the marked money.
 The testimony given in open court carries more weight than statements in
affidavits.
 The exoneration in the administrative case did not automatically result in the
dismissal of the criminal case.
 Administrative and criminal cases are independent from each other, and the
findings and conclusions in one proceeding are not necessarily binding on the
other.
 The administrative and criminal proceedings involved different quantum of
evidence and procedures.

 In People v. Tandoy, the Court held that the best evidence rule applies only when the
contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
 In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting for
the original. In contrast with People v. Dismuke, where the accused was acquitted
partly because of the dubious circumstances surrounding the marked money, the
existence of the marked money in the case at bar was never questioned. It was not
disputed that the four (4) pieces of P500 bills which were used as marked money,
were produced and thereafter turned over to the police officer for dusting of
fluorescent powder. The serial numbers of these marked money were duly recorded in
 the memorandum prepared by the PAOCTF in connection with the entrapment
operation, and the same set of P500 bills bearing similar serial numbers was reflected
in the request for laboratory examination after the conduct of the entrapment
operation. More importantly, these four pieces of P500 bills were positively identified
by the prosecution witnesses during the trial. As such, the absence of the original
pieces of the marked money did not militate against the cause of the prosecution.

2. Documentary Evidence – Rule 130, B

a) Original Document Rule

b) Secondary Evidence

Read:

1) Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc., Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego,
Kuok Khoon Chen, And Kuok Khoon Tsen, vs. BF Corporation, G.R. No.
145842, June 27, 2008]; Cynthia Roxas-Del Castillo, Vs. Bf Corporation, G.R.
No. 145873, June 27, 2008)

EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. appeals a court decision ordering
them to pay BF Corporation for unpaid construction work, while also seeking
restitution of garnished funds, but the Supreme Court upholds the decision
and denies their claims.

Issue:

 Did the CA err in admitting photocopies of the progress billings, project

manager's instructions, and work variation orders as evidence?
 Was BF guilty of delay and performing defective work?
 Did the CA err in finding ESHRI guilty of malice and bad faith and awarding
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees to BF?
 Should ESHRI be entitled to restitution of the garnished funds?
 Is Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo personally liable for the breaches of contract
committed by ESHRI or for the actions of the company's board or officers after
she had left her position as director?

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision and dismissed ESHRI's petition.

 Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs

 Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission
in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the
complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to petitioners, BF, before being
allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the
basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence, conformably to
the best evidence rule.
  Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis
requirement. Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the
photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present
the original of the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which
refused to hand them over to BF despite requests. cSEaDA
 We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is the
rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced
17 and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original
cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence
rule:
 SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
 (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror; EaHcDS
 (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(Emphasis added.)
 Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
 SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the
document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as
in the case of loss. CScTDE
 Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to
evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. 18 A party may present
secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or
destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party.
In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can
resort to secondary evidence.
 In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied
documents in question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay
the required basis for presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19
instead of their originals has to be dismissed. The stenographic notes of the following
exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF and ESHRI,
respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements: IDScTE

c) Parol Evidence

Read:

1) Shemberg Marketing Corporation vs. Citibank, G.R. No. 216029, September 4,

2019)

3. Testimonial Evidence – Rule 130, C

a) Qualifications and Disqualifications of Witnesses – Sections 21-

24
b) Testimonial Privilege – Sections 25-26
c) Admissions and Confessions – Sections 27-34

Read:
 1) People of the Philippines vs. Reynante Manzanero et al., G.R. No. 216065
April 18, 2018)
Accused-appellant Arthur Fajardo is convicted of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention but acquitted of robbery, based on the victim's positive
identification and coordination of actions among the accused.

Positive identification of eyewitness is a

direct evidence of the commission.

To further his claim of innocence, Fajardo insists that he should not be prejudiced by the
extrajudicial confessions of his co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule. In addition, he
assails that their extrajudicial confessions were inadmissible because they were not
continuously assisted by an independent and competent counsel when they executed the
same.

The Court, however, agrees with the observation of the appellate court that even if the
extrajudicial confessions of his co-accused were disregarded, there is still sufficient evidence
to convict Fajardo of the crime charged. The identification by an eyewitness of a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of the crime constitutes direct evidence thereof. Here, Tony was
able to clearly, categorically, and steadfastly identify Fajardo as one of his abductors. Thus,
his credible testimony alone would suffice as it is direct evidence against Fajardo; and even if
the extrajudicial confessions were discarded, it would not be fatal to the prosecution because
it would merely corroborate Tony's testimony.

2) Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013)

a man accused of forging promissory notes and cashier's checks is found guilty of

estafa through falsification of commercial documents, with his written statement being

deemed admissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

 Whether the petitioner's written statement, given during an administrative

inquiry conducted by his employer, is admissible as evidence against him.

Ruling:

 The petitioner's written statement is admissible as evidence.

 The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of
guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution applies only to
custodial interrogations initiated by law enforcement authorities.
 The questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but by an internal
affairs manager of the bank.
 The petitioner was not under custodial investigation or deprived of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning.
 Therefore, the petitioner's written statement is admissible as evidence.
 The petitioner's written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
 The petitioner's claim of duress and intimidation lacks basis and there is no evidence
to support it.
  The details contained in the written statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish, indicating its voluntariness.
 The petitioner's failure to raise any protest or file charges against the alleged
intimidators further weakens his claim.

3) People of the Philippines vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009)
Three individuals are found guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide, based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and their
own confessions, despite their defense of alibis and frame-up.

Issue:

The main issue in the case is whether the accused-appellants are guilty of the special complex
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

Ruling:

The court ruled that the accused-appellants are indeed guilty of the crime. The court based its
decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, including the members of the Yao
family who were kidnapped, as well as the extra-judicial confessions of the accused-
appellants. The court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution established the
guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Ratio:

The court considered the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who positively identified
the accused-appellants as the kidnappers. The witnesses' testimonies were consistent with
each other and supported by documentary evidence. The court also found that there was
sufficient lighting during the incident and the witnesses had ample opportunity to see the
faces of the accused-appellants. The court also noted that the witnesses' relationship with the
victims made their testimonies more credible.

 The extra-judicial confessions of the accused were found to be admissible as they

were made voluntarily and with the assistance of competent and independent counsel.
 The confessions were corroborated by other evidence and contained details that only
the accused would know.

3) Ana Lou Navaja vs. Hon. Manuel De Castro, G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015,
Peralta J)
Petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja challenges the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in a case of falsification of
private document, but the Supreme Court rules in favor of the MCTC,
affirming its jurisdiction and the denial of the motion to quash.

Issue:

 Whether the MCTC has jurisdiction over the criminal case for falsification of
private document filed against the petitioner due to improper venue.
 Ruling:

 The MCTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio:

 Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.

 In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the
document is actually falsified.
 The allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a
prima facie case that the crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol, which falls
within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC.
 The separate filing of the falsification cases in different jurisdictions would
not result in multiplicity of actions because there are as many acts of
falsification as there are documents falsified, and the venue of such cases is
where the document was actually falsified.

 Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State
Prosecutor as to the sworn statement of a certain Cheryl Labarro for purposes of
determining venue was misplaced, as her sworn statement pertains to an incident in
Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and distinct from the
facts material to the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said statement in
upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it
allowed that the actions of the accused on a different occasion maybe used to confer
venue in another case, since venue must be determined solely and exclusively on the
facts obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or presumed from other
collateral allegations.
 The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the
factual issue of whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed
in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.
 Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari
"shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v.
People, et al., the Court held:
 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions
of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt
centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the
doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
 There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need
of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be
limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites
a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
 Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna,
Bohol or in Cebu City, is a question of fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of
review, the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties during
trial. In certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and
resolve factual issues, Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is
present.

d) Previous Conduct as Evidence – Sections 35-36

e) Hearsay; Exceptions – Sections 37-50
Read:

1) DST Movers Corp. vs. People’s General Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627,
January 13, 2016)
In a case involving a traffic accident, the Supreme Court reverses the
decision of lower courts and dismisses a complaint against DST
Movers, ruling that their liability was not proven and a traffic accident
investigation report should not have been admitted as evidence.

Issue:

 Whether DST Movers' liability was established by a preponderance of

evidence.
 Whether it was an error for the Metropolitan Trial Court to admit and give
evidentiary weight to the traffic accident investigation report.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of DST Movers, reversing the decision of
the lower courts.
 The Court held that the traffic accident investigation report should not have
been admitted as evidence because it was hearsay.
 The report was prepared by a police officer who did not have personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the report.
 The Court emphasized that for the report to be admissible as prima facie
evidence, the officer who prepared it should have been presented as a witness
and testified on the report.
 Since this was not done, there was no basis for holding DST Movers liable.
 The Court also noted that DST Movers presented evidence that their truck
was undergoing repairs and maintenance on the day of the accident, further
supporting their claim of non-liability.

Ratio:

 The traffic accident investigation report should not have been admitted as
evidence because it was hearsay.
 Hearsay evidence is generally not admissible in court unless it falls under an
exception.
 The report was prepared by a police officer who did not have personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the report, making it hearsay.

2) People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Badillos, G.R. No. 215732 June 6,
2018)
Christopher Badillos is convicted of homicide for the killing of Alex H.
Gregory, with the Supreme Court modifying the initial murder conviction
based on the admission of Alex's statement as part of res gestae and the lack
of proof for the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
 Issue:

The main issue raised in the case is whether the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting
Christopher Badillos for the crime charged when his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

Alex's declaration cannot be

considered as a dying declaration;
admissible as part of res gestae.

Before proceeding to the main issue of this case, the Court notes that the trial and appellate
courts erred when they considered Alex's utterances to Jonathan identifying Christopher as
the perpetrator of the crime as a dying declaration.

A dying declaration is admissible in evidence if the following circumstances are present: (1)
it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death; (3) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she
survived; and (4) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of the inquiry
involves the declarant's death. In order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief
in inevitable and imminent death must be entered into by the declarant. It is the declarant's
belief of his impending death and not the rapid succession of his death in point of fact that
renders his declaration admissible as a dying declaration. The test is whether the declarant
has abandoned all hopes of survival and looks on death as certainly impending.

While Jonathan was under the impression that his brother was in the throes of death, it does
not appear that the declarant himself was conscious of his impending death. The fact that
Alex was ripping his shirt while he uttered the name of his assailant is not sufficient to
qualify such as a dying declaration. DHITCc

Nevertheless, while Alex's statement does not qualify as a dying declaration, the same may
still be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae.

For a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statement was made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances. All the foregoing elements are present in
this case.

First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, there was no
sufficient time for Alex to contrive or devise a falsehood when he uttered the name of his
assailant to Jonathan. Between the infliction of the mortal wound upon Alex and his
statement surrounding this incident, at most two hours had elapsed. This interval of time is
hardly sufficient to conjure up a story or concoct and contrive a falsehood given that even an
interval of four hours is still considered as nearly contemporaneous to the startling
occurrence. Lastly, the statement concerned the circumstances surrounding the stabbing of
Alex.

f) Opinion – Sections 51-53

g) Character Evidence – Section 54

C. Presentation of Evidence (Rule 132)

 1. Examination of Witnesses – Sections 1-18

Read:

a) Leonides Quiap Y Evangelista, Vs. People of The Philippines, G.R. No.

229183, February 17, 2021, Lopez, M., J.

A man charged with illegal possession of drugs is acquitted due to

lapses in the chain of custody, highlighting the importance of following
proper procedures to preserve the integrity of evidence.

Ruling:

 Leonides was acquitted of the charges due to a broken chain of custody and
lack of insulating witnesses during the inventory and photograph of the
seized item.

Ratio:

 Leonides' arrest was valid as it fell under the "stop and frisk" situation. His
suspicious behavior and attempt to throw the plastic sachet out of the
window raised reasonable suspicion, justifying the search and seizure.
 However, there was a broken chain of custody of the seized drugs. The
required procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165 were not followed.
 There were no insulating witnesses present during the inventory and
photograph of the seized item, and there was no explanation or justification
for their absence.

 In sum, the utter disregard of the required procedures created a huge gap in the chain
of custody. We reiterate that the provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165
embody the constitutional aim to prevent the imprisonment of an innocent man. The
Court cannot tolerate the lax approach of law enforcers in handling the very corpus
delicti of the crime. Hence, Leonides must be acquitted of the charge against him
given the prosecution's failure to prove an unbroken chain of custody.

b) People of The Philippines, vs. Roberto G. Campos, G.R. No. 252212, July
14, 2021, Lopez, M., J.

The case revolves around the validity of an out-of-court identification made

during a police lineup, as the accused-appellant challenges the credibility of
the witnesses and argues for reasonable doubt in his conviction for the crime
of Robbery with Homicide.

ssue:

The main issue in the case is whether Roberto should be held liable for the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
 Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA and held Roberto guilty of Robbery with
Homicide. The Court ruled that all the elements of the crime were present in this case.
Roberto was positively identified by the witnesses as the perpetrator who entered the house
and took the victim's cellphone. The taking was done with intent to gain and was
accomplished through intimidation against persons. The killing of the victim was only
incidental to prevent Roberto's apprehension and facilitate his escape. Therefore, Roberto's
original intent was to commit robbery, and the homicide was merely incidental to the crime.

 The Court explains that the admissibility and reliability of the out-of-court identification
must be determined based on the totality of the circumstances.
 The Court considers factors such as the witness' opportunity to view the criminal, their
degree of attention, the accuracy of any prior description given, the length of time between
the crime and the identification, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness, and the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
 The Court concludes that Eric and Marilou's out-of-court identification of Roberto
satisfies the totality of the circumstances test.
 The Court highlights that Eric and Marilou had a good view of the gunman, had a high
degree of attention, and immediately described the assailant to the authorities.
 The Court also notes that there was a short time lapse between the crime and the
identification, and Eric and Marilou were certain in their identification of Roberto.

2. Child Witness Rule – A.M. No. 00-4-07-SC, secs. 4, 6, 8, 20 and 28

3. Authentication and Proof; Public and Private Documents – Sections 19-
33
Public docs:
Passport, brgy cert
Private doc
Rem by clerk of court (defective yng rem kasi bawal magnotary yng clerk of court)
Read:

1) Sheila Marie G. Uy-Belleza, vs. The Civil Registrar of Tacloban City, G.R. No.
218354, September 15, 2021, J. Hernando)

A woman petitions to correct her mother's nationality on her birth certificate from
"Chinese" to "Filipino," and the Supreme Court rules in her favor based on evidence
presented and the presumption of regularity in passport issuance.

Issue:

 Main issue: Is the evidence presented by the petitioner sufficient to support

the correction of her mother's nationality in her birth certificate from
"Chinese" to "Filipino"?

Ruling:

 Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and reinstated the RTC's
decision to grant the correction of entry
 Petitioner sufficiently established her petition for correction of entry
regarding her mother's citizenship
 Evidence considered by the Court:
o Adelaida's Philippine passport, which recognizes her Filipino
citizenship
 o Certificate of live birth of petitioner's brother, stating Adelaida's
citizenship as "Fil"
o Adelaida's testimony on her illegitimacy and her mother's citizenship
 OSG did not present evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity in
the passport issuance
 OSG did not question the sufficiency of the evidence submitted before the
trial court
 Requirement of electing Filipino citizenship does not apply to illegitimate
children
 Illegitimate children automatically become Filipino citizens upon birth

2) Western Sales Trading Company, Inc. vs. 7D Food International, Inc., G.R. No.
233852, September 15, 2021)
The Supreme Court of the Philippines rules that a distributorship
agreement violation case cannot be pursued against a Guam-based company
in the Philippines, while also determining that the Philippine branch of the
company is not involved in the agreement, and dismissing the application of
forum non conveniens to dismiss the complaint.

Issue:

 Whether WSTC Guam can be sued in the Philippines for violating the
distributorship agreement.
 Whether WSTC Philippines is privy to the distributorship agreement.
 Whether the principle of forum non conveniens applies to dismiss the
complaint.

 Pleadings filed in courts and other quasi-judicial tribunals or adjudicative bodies

within our jurisdiction are public documents covered by the judicial notice rule
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules. No further presentation of evidence is
required to prove the authenticity of these pleadings as long as they are certified by
the proper officer of the court, tribunal, board, commission, or office involved.
 In contrast, pleadings filed in courts abroad are treated differently. As much as
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws, pleadings
filed in foreign jurisdiction must similarly be proven as a fact under our rules on
evidence. This means that the sovereign cannot take judicial cognizance of
proceedings and judgments of foreign courts. Parties must first establish that the
proceedings and the pleadings filed abroad duly exist and that the cited allegations
rooted from these foreign pleadings were duly executed, neither spurious nor
counterfeit, nor executed by mistake or under duress.
 Pleadings filed in courts outside of the Philippines are akin to private documents as
defined under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Even if they
were attached by the parties in the proceedings below, their due execution and
authenticity must first be proven as a fact which the adverse party could dispute
before they could be admitted as evidence.
 In the case, the pleadings allegedly filed in the Guam and Hawaii courts are classified
as private documents. Thus, for the parties herein to validly adduce these documents,
they must first prove their genuineness and authenticity by presenting the best proof
available. Moreover, the Court cannot simply deduce from 7D's assertions in its
pleadings before the lower courts that 7D admits the genuineness and authenticity of
the documents.
 Nevertheless, petitioners insist that the requirement for authentication had been fully
met, if not already dispensed with, because of 7D's alleged judicial admission of the
pendency of the cases before the Guam and Hawaii courts.
 A judicial admission is a formal statement, either by a party or his or her attorney, in
the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy. It is a substitute for legal evidence at trial conceding for the purpose of
litigation that the proposition of the fact alleged by the opponent is true and waives or
dispenses with the production of actual proof of facts. To be a judicial admission, it
must be a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact
within that party's peculiar knowledge and not a matter of law.
 The Court is not convinced that the allegations made by 7D in its pleadings filed
below as to the existence of the cases before the Guam and Hawaii courts in response
to petitioners' assertions on the presence of litis pendentia and forum shopping are in
the category of judicial admissions which could excuse the presentation of evidence,
including proof of the authenticity of the foreign pleadings. On the contrary, 7D
refutes the application of litis pendentia and forum shopping to warrant the dismissal
of its complaint in the RTC despite the pendency of the foreign cases as it argues the
absence of the identity of parties, the rights asserted, and the facts on which the relief
were based on the subject cases. EHCcIT
 Nowhere in the subject pleadings did 7D categorically admit that the pendency of the
foreign cases in Guam and Hawaii constitutes litis pendentia and forum shopping that
would merit the dismissal of 7D's complaint. Although the Court agrees that 7D
admitted the existence of the cases filed in the Guam and Hawaii courts, this could not
be deemed as a blanket admission of the contents of the subject foreign pleadings. 7D
neither admitted the veracity and authenticity of the foreign pleadings attached by
petitioners in their Answer. Nor was there any admission made by 7D as to the
correctness of petitioners' version of the contents of these attachments.
 As correctly ruled by the CA, a determination as to whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping requires a determination of the presence of the elements of
litis pendentia or res judicata which necessarily demands a review of the matters and
incidents taken up in the cases filed in the Guam and Hawaii courts, including the
foreign pleadings. But before the foreign pleadings could be given evidentiary weight,
petitioners must first comply with the rules on authentication and proof of documents
provided under Sections 19-33, Rule 132-B of the Rules. It is not enough that the
pleadings pertaining to the Guam and Hawaii cases were simply attached in
petitioners' answer.
 Indeed, the Court is not convinced that authentication could be dispensed with and
that the mere admission of 7D of the existence of the cases in the Guam and Hawaii
courts is sufficient to rule on the presence of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
 Without proper authentication of the copies of the subject pleadings filed abroad, the
Court cannot exhaustively discuss or properly decide on the existence of the elements
of litis pendentia and res judicata in relation to forum shopping. The due execution
and authenticity of the pleadings, and more importantly, the assertions therein must be
proven as a fact, concomitant to the duty of the judge to rest his/her findings of facts
and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence presented by the parties.

3) Herman Antonio M. Bascon and Antonio Villamor vs. Emiliano O. Negre, Jr.,
et al., G.R. Nos. 191299-191302, March 14, 2023)

The Supreme Court affirms the lower courts' decision, allowing certain
individuals to register as qualified voters of Barangay Punta, San
Remigio, Cebu, emphasizing that property ownership is not a
requirement for voter qualification and that their actual residency in
the barangay was sufficiently proven.
 Issue:

 Whether the respondents, who temporarily reside in their employer's bunk

house, can register as qualified voters of Barangay Punta, San Remigio, Cebu.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and denied the
petition.
 The Court held that the petitioners failed to prove that the respondents were
not actual residents of Barangay Punta.
 The Court emphasized that property ownership is not a requirement for voter
qualification.
 It is enough that the respondents actually resided in the barangay for the
required period.
 The Court gave weight to the certification issued by the Punong Barangay,
considering it as compelling proof of the respondents' actual residence.

 Further, as pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, respondents'

evidence in item (c) above is already and by itself a strong refutation of petitioners'
allegations. In Sabili v. Commission on Elections, it was held that a certification of
actual residency issued by a barangay captain is allotted much consideration for its
probative value under our rules of procedure. Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
 SEC. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. (Emphasis supplied)
 By the very mandate of their public office, the punong barangay knows their residents
and all those who are covered under their territorial jurisdiction. The head of the
barangay is also necessarily and immediately privy to records and information
concerning all constituents of their local government unit. The punong barangay's
certification is a compelling proof of one's actual residence, not only because it enjoys
the presumption that it has been regularly issued in the performance of the punong
barangay's public functions, but for the reason that the punong barangay practically
oversees all the goings-on within their respective areas of government.
 Petitioners elevate the case before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, asserting as if it is the truth that herein respondents merely occupy
their employer's bunk house as their temporary residence, and urging this Court to
rule on the purported question of law, i.e., whether an employee who temporarily
resides in his or her employer's bunk house can register as a voter in the barangay and
municipality/city where the bunk house is located. To stress, there is nothing on the
records or findings of the courts a quo as regards the veracity of this alleged
employer's bunk house.
 Petitioners would want this Court to review and evaluate all over again the evidence
already considered and presented before the courts a quo just to ascertain the truth and
falsity of the alleged residence of respondents, i.e., the employer's bunk house. In fact,
petitioners moved for the actual inspection of this alleged employer's bunk house
before the courts a quo. To note, petitioners have the burden of proof to substantiate
their own assertion, that is, herein respondents are not actual residents of Brgy. Punta,
San Remigio, Cebu. It is not the court's duty to investigate on its own in support of the
petitioners' cause and to prove petitioners' allegations. It is a basic evidentiary rule
that the burden of proof is on he or she who alleges, and he or she who relies on such
an allegation as his or her cause of action should prove the same. Sec. 1, Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court states that:
 SECTION 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.
 It is also worth emphasizing that petitioners requested for the actual inspection of the
bunk house in issue. This is an indication that petitioners themselves are second-
guessing their own factual grounds.
 It is incumbent upon petitioners to prove their assertion that indeed respondents are
not actual residents of Brgy. Punta, San Remigio, Cebu. However, based on the
evidence presented by both petitioners and respondents, We hold that petitioners
failed to discharge their burden of proof. The Sworn Statement of Sinagpulo,
Rosellosa, Asingua and Morados and the Affidavit of Rosellosa did not categorically
establish where respondents' residence are. Nor did said piece of evidence
conclusively prove that the respondents are domiciled someplace else other than in
Brgy. Punta, San Remigio, Cebu as they declared in their applications for registration.
To reiterate, petitioners' assertion that the respondents merely occupy their employer's
bunkhouse was not sufficiently proved based on the evidence on record. Indeed, as
between petitioners' bare allegations and respondents' declaration in their application
for registration, certificates of employment and certification of the punong barangay,
the latter are able to justify and substantiate the residency requirement to qualify as
voters of a city or municipality as per Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. (RA)
8189, otherwise known as the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, to wit:
 SECTION 9. Who May Register. All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may
register as a voter.
 Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by
reason of his occupation, profession, employment in private or public service,
educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations within the
Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Police
Forces, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with
law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
 Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or
period of residence but who, on the day of the election shall possess such
qualifications, may register as a voter.
 SECTION 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the
permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to
be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish
an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3)
copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having
acquired the qualifications of a voter.
 The application shall contain the following data:
 a) Name, surname, middle name, and/or maternal surname;
 b) Sex;
 c) Date, and place of birth;
 d) Citizenship;
 e) Civil status, if married, name of spouse;
 f) Profession, occupation of work;
 g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
 h) Exact address with the name of the street and house number for location in the
precinct maps maintained by the local office of the Commission, or in case there is
none, a brief description of his residence, sitio and barangay;
 i) A statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter;
 j) A statement that the applicant is not a registered voter of any precinct; and
 k) Such information or data as may be required by the Commission.
 The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the
applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four (4)
 identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the
expense of the Commission.
 Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer
shall inform him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a
voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application contains all the data
therein required and that the applicant's specimen signatures, fingerprints, and
photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voter's application. CAIHTE
 With petitioners' failure to prove the fact that respondents reside in their employer's
bunk house, there is no point for this Court to rule on the alleged question of law
posed by petitioners, i.e., whether an employee who temporarily resides in his or her
employer's bunk house can register as a voter in the barangay and municipality/city
where the bunk house is located.

4) Iris Rodriguez, vs. Your Own Home Development Corporation (YOHDC),

G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018)

A dispute over a low-cost housing project in Occidental Mindoro leads to a

legal battle between Your Own Home Development Corporation and the
Rodriguez Spouses, as the Supreme Court denies the petition for review and
affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not Your Own Home
Development Corporation is liable to Iris Rodriguez for P424,000.00 based on
the principle of unjust enrichment.

This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals and gives more credence to Delos
Reyes' Affidavit, which is a public document.

A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries evidentiary weight
with respect to its due execution. As such, it need not be proven authentic before it is
admitted into evidence. On its face, it is entitled to full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in
full force and effect.

A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. (Citations omitted)

To nullify a notarized document on account of flaws and defects, there must be a strong,
complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity. The required quantum of proof is a clear, strong,
and convincing evidence: HESIcT

Thus, a notarial document must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who
impugns it does not present strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on
account of some flaws or defects.

Absent evidence of falsity so clear, strong and convincing, and not merely preponderant, the
presumption of regularity must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption
of due execution of a notarial document lies on the party contesting the same. (Citations
omitted)

In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, this Court ruled that to contradict statements in a notarial
document, there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence
against it. A subsequent notarial document retracting the previous statement is not even
sufficient:

No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant. It bears stressing,
however, that Alusitain's Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a notarial document,
hence, prima facie evidence of the facts expressed therein.

Since notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity, to contradict the
facts stated therein, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.

Alusitain explains through his subsequent sworn statement that he only executed these two
documents in order to obtain his retirement benefits from the SSS. His daughter, also by
sworn statement, corroborates his explanation. His position does not persuade.

In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not
enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in
order to contradict the facts stated in a notarial document is clear and convincing evidence.
The subsequent notarial documents executed by respondent and his daughter fall short of this
standard.

The case of Reyes v. Zaballero is instructive. In said case, the creditor executed on December
1, 1944 a notarial document stating that he was releasing a real estate mortgage as the debtor
had already paid his debt. On even date, the creditor subsequently executed an affidavit
without the debtor's knowledge stating that he had accepted the payment under protest and
"obligado por las circunstancias actuales." This Court held that the creditor's statement in his
affidavit that he received the money "obligado por las circunstancias actuales" is self-serving
evidence. (Emphasis in the original and supplied, citations omitted) caITAC

The rationale for this rule is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of notarized
documents.

In contrast, private documents must first be authenticated before they could be admitted in
evidence. To establish their authenticity, the best proof available must be presented. In Salas
v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp.,

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as

evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in
evidence unless they are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

...

During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as

evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor
counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented
a memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue,
prepared by a member of his management team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what
constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best
proof available must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been
the testimony of a representative of Sta. Mesa Market Corp.'s external auditor who prepared
the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the audited financial statements
were never authenticated. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) ICHDca

However, authentication may not be necessary where the document's genuineness and due
execution were admitted by the adverse party.

In Chua v. Court of Appeals:

Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence before
the court, as follows: firstly, the document should be authenticated and proved in the manner
provided in the rules of court; secondly, the document should be identified and marked for
identification; and thirdly, it should be formally offered in evidence to the court and shown to
the opposing party so that the latter may have an opportunity to object thereon.

The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. Only private documents require proof of their due execution and
authenticity before they can be received in evidence. This may require the presentation and
examination of witnesses to testify on this fact. When there is no proof as to the authenticity
of the writer's signature appearing in a private document, such private document may be
excluded. On the other hand, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved. There is also no need for proof of
execution and authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of
which are admitted by the adverse party. These admissions may be found in the pleadings of
the parties or in the case of an actionable document which may arise from the failure of the
adverse party to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
document in his pleading.

After the authentication and proof of the due execution of the document, whenever proper,
the marking for identification and the formal offer of such documents as evidence to the court
follow. (Citations omitted)

However, this rule presents a caveat in that the admission of the document's authenticity must
be categorical:

Nevertheless, petitioner insists on the application of an exception to this rule: authentication

is not necessary where the adverse party has admitted the genuineness and due execution of a
document. The fact, however, was that nowhere in his testimony did Amado Domingo
categorically admit the authenticity of the copies of the audited financial statements. He only
testified that Sta. Mesa Market Corp. regularly submitted its audited financial statements to
the BIR and SEC. There was never any admission that the documents presented by petitioner
were true or faithful copies of those submitted to the BIR and the SEC. (Citations omitted)
TCAScE

In the case at bar, Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement is a private document. Thus, for Iris to
rely on it, she must have first proven its genuineness and authenticity by presenting the best
proof available. As such, she should have presented Delos Reyes to testify on its genuineness
and due execution. However, Iris merely relied on Delos Reyes' Answer and
Acknowledgement on their faces. Delos Reyes neither appeared in court to attest to the
allegations of his Acknowledgement or to explain his Answer, nor presented as Iris' witness.
Assuming that the statements in Delos Reyes' Answer are binding admissions, these
admissions only pertain to the existence of his Acknowledgment. He neither categorically
stated its genuineness and authenticity, nor admitted its allegations. Moreover, while he
admitted the receipt of P424,000.00, he excluded from his admission that it was from the
Metrobank checks stated in the Rodriguez Spouses' Complaint. Thus, the amount he received
cannot be assumed to have been from the proceeds of his Checks or that it was payment made
to him on behalf of YOHDC as these claims must still be proven.

Moreover, this Court notes that Delos Reyes never denied his notarized Affidavit's
allegations even though his Acknowledgement's allegations are inconsistent with them.

Hence, this Court assumes that the Acknowledgement is in the nature of a retraction. This
Court has consistently held that retractions are looked upon with disfavor because of its
unreliable nature and the likely probability that it may again be repudiated.

4. Apostille – Section 24
5. Offer and Objection; Tender of Excluded Evidence – Sections 34-40

Read:

1) Ma. Melissa Villanueva Magsino, vs. Rolando N. Magsino, G.R. No. 205333,
February 18, 2019)
A mother's objections to the testimony of an expert witness and the admissibility of
evidence are deemed waived by the court, resulting in a ruling in favor of the father in a
custody dispute case involving allegations of sexual abuse.

Issue: Whether or not the objection to the admissibility of evidence presented was
timely made. Ruling – NO. In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of
evidence must be made at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Grounds for objections
not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to
on some other ground. In other words, objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest
possible time, that is after the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if
the objectionable issue becomes apparent only after the answer was given. In case of
documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have
testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this
time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. As
correctly found by the CA, the objections interposed by petitioner - as to both oral and
documentary evidence - were not timely made. Petitioner should have objected during the
course of Gates' direct testimony on her qualifications as an expert witness and explaining the
mechanics of the psychological examination which she conducted on respondent. Petitioner
should not have waited in ambush after the expert witness had already finished testifying. By
so doing, petitioner did not save the time of the court in hearing the testimony of the witness
that after all according to her was inadmissible. And thus, for her failure to make known her
objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was waived. Indeed, the reason
why offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify and the objection thereto be
made, so that the court could right away rule on whether the testimony is necessary on the
ground of irrelevancy, immateriality or whatever grounds that are available at the onset.

Here, petitioner allowed a substantial amount of time to be wasted by not forthrightly

objecting to the inadmissibility of the respondent's testimonial evidence. Objections to
documentary evidence should likewise be timely raised. True, petitioner acted prematurely
when it objected to the psychological report at the time when it is still being identified.
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not
earlier. Because at that time the purpose of the offer has already been disclosed and
ascertained. Suffice it to say that the identification of the document before it is marked as an
exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party
presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to
objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the
objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit. However, while
objection was prematurely made, this does not mean that petitioner had waived any objection
to the admission of the same in evidence. Petitioner can still reiterate its former objections,
this time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made.

2) Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Vestas Services Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
255085, March 29, 2023)

The case involved the refund of unutilized input Value-Added Tax (VAT) for a
domestic corporation engaged in wind power systems, with the Court affirming the
partial grant of the refund claim while emphasizing the factual nature of
substantiating such claims.

Issue:

 Is VSPI entitled to a refund of unutilized input VAT for the fourth quarter of 2013?

Ruling:

 The CTA Division partially granted VSPI's claim for refund in the amount of PHP
4,390,198.45.
 The CTA Division found that VSPI timely filed its administrative and judicial claims
for refund.
 The CTA Division ruled that VSPI's sales of services to EDC Burgos are subject to
zero percent VAT.
 However, only a portion of VSPI's claimed input VAT was deemed valid and
attributable to its zero-rated sales.
 The Court upheld the CTA Division's decision, stating that the findings of fact of the
CTA, when supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.

3) Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation vs. Charlie Chua Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 219317, June
14, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation files a complaint against Charlie Chua Uy, Jr. for
failing to remit cash proceeds from the sale of steel products, leading to a legal battle
to prove Uy's liability for the unremitted payments.

Issue:

 Did Cathay fail to prove by preponderance of evidence its cause of action against Uy?

Ruling:

 The Court ruled in favor of Cathay and held Uy liable for the unremitted payments.
 Cathay was able to establish Uy's liability through the testimonies of its witnesses and
the documentary evidence presented.
 The testimonies of Cathay's corporate operations officer, Elmer San Gabriel, and other
employees confirmed that Uy had the duty to accept cash payment for the sale of
retazos and authorize their release.
  The delivery receipts, bearing Uy's signature, and the corresponding statements of
account proved the existence of the unremitted payments.
 Uy failed to rebut Cathay's evidence and did not deny the authenticity of his signature.
 The discrepancies in the delivery receipts between the civil case and a separate
criminal case were deemed irrelevant.
 Therefore, the Court held Uy liable for the unremitted payments amounting to
P391,155.00.

D. Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)

Sec 13 – applicable in civil cases, serve first wit written interrogatories

Sec 14 – laying of the predicate, if the laying didn’t do, it will be objected on the ground of
no basis
Read:

1) Fairland Knitcraft Corporation vs. Arturo Loo Po, G.R. No. 217694, January
27, 2016)

Issue:

 Whether the court correctly dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer due to
Fairland's failure to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case and ordered
Po to vacate the property and pay the rentals-in-arrears.

Ratio:

 The complaint filed by Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer as it
alleged the necessary elements, such as initial possession by contract or tolerance,
termination of the right to possess, and the defendant's continued possession despite
demand to vacate.

The Judicial Affidavit Rule

On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the Judicial Affidavit
Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where documentary or object evidence are required to be
attached. To begin with, the rule is not applicable because such evidence are required to be
attached to a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only on
January 1, 2013, it cannot be required in this case because this was earlier filed on December
12, 2012.

Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially remedial, still it has no
bearing on the ruling of this Court.

In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object evidence to the
affidavits is required when there would be a pre-trial or preliminary conference or the
scheduled hearing. As stated earlier, where a defendant fails to file an answer, the court shall
render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff's motion, based solely on the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. Thus, where there is no answer,
there is no need for a pre-trial, preliminary conference or hearing. Section 2 of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule reads:

Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. (a) The
parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed
courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the
scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses'
direct testimonies; and

(2) The parties' documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial
affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the
plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant.

(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his
possession, he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated,
warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a
faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the
original document or object evidence for comparison during the preliminary conference with
the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.

This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original
when allowed by existing rules.

2) Ng Meng Tam Vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 214054, August 5, 2015,
Villarama, Jr., J.)
- Ja is not needed for a hostile witness. In a collection suit, the Supreme Court ruled
that the Judicial Affidavit Rule does not apply to adverse party witnesses, allowing
the petitioner to proceed with the examination of a witness.

Issue:

 Does Section 5 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule apply to adverse party witnesses like
George Yap?

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner Ng Meng Tam.

 The Court held that Section 5 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule does not apply to adverse
party witnesses.
 The Court annulled and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that
denied petitioner's motion to examine Yap without executing a judicial affidavit.

Ratio:

 Section 5 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule does not apply to adverse party witnesses
because they are expressly excluded from its application.
 The purpose of Section 5 is to allow the requesting party to avail themselves of the
provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of Court when a government employee or official
or a requested witness unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses
to make relevant documents available.
 Since Yap was an adverse witness and there was no showing that he unjustifiably
declined to execute a judicial affidavit, Section 5 did not apply to him.
 3) chinco vs chinco - lopez
E. Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)

Read:

1) People of the Philippines v. Noel Enojas y Hingpit, G.R. No. 204894, March
10, 2014)

Four accused individuals are convicted of murder for their involvement in the
killing of a police officer during a shootout, with the Supreme Court affirming
the conviction based on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and
admissibility of text messages as evidence.

Issue:

 Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to

prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused but modified the
aggravating circumstances and the award of damages.
 The Court held that the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution sufficiently established the guilt of the accused.
 The Court disagreed with the lower court's ruling that the aggravating circumstances
of aid of armed men and use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing to murder.
 Instead, the Court held that the accused should be held liable for homicide with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
 The Court also modified the award of damages to conform to current jurisprudence.

2) Ellery March Torres vs. Phil Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No.
193531, December 14, 2011)

A Slot Machine Operations Supervisor seeks to overturn his dismissal from

the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) after being accused
of involvement in a fraudulent scheme, but his appeal is denied due to
technicalities and the Supreme Court affirms his dismissal.

Issue:

 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Torres' appeal based
on technicalities without considering the allegations of summary and arbitrary
dismissal based on fabricated and unfounded accusations.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Torres' appeal.

 The Court found that Torres failed to file a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
 The Court also ruled that Torres' claim of sending a facsimile transmission of his letter
reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal, as facsimile transmissions are not
considered electronic evidence under the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
  Therefore, the Court concluded that Torres' dismissal from the service had already
attained finality, and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) correctly found that it had
no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in

conformity with the Court's earlier Resolution applying the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. 15 Text messages are to be
proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge of them. 16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in
order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.

3) RCBC Bankard Services Corporation vs. Moises Oracion Jr. and Emily L.
Oracion, G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019)

RCBC Bankard Services Corporation v. Oracion, Jr. involves a credit card dispute
where the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint due to the failure to present
original and admissible evidence, resulting in the denial of the petition and treble
costs against the petitioner's counsel.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in affirming the MeTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint in
that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-
SC), an electronic document is to be regarded as an original thereof under the Best Evidence
Rule and thus, with the presented evidence in “original duplicate copies,” petitioner has
preponderantly proven respondents’ unpaid obligation.

Held: No. In the Memorandum for Appellant which it filed before the RTC, petitioner did
not raise the Rules on Electronic Evidence to justify that the so-called “duplicate original
copies” of the SOAs and Credit History Inquiry are electronic documents. Rather, it insisted
that they were duplicate original copies, being computer-generated reports, and not mere
photocopies or substitutionary evidence, as found by the MeTC. As observed by the RTC,
petitioner even tried to rectify the attachments (annexes) to its complaint, by filing a
Manifestation dated August 9, 2012 wherein it attached copies of the said annexes.
Unfortunately, as observed by the RTC, the attachments to the said Manifestation “are merely
photocopies of the annexes attached to the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp
marks bearing the same inscription as the first stamp marks” that were placed in the annexes
to the complaint. Because petitioner has not raised the electronic document argument before
the RTC, it may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.

Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the proceedings
before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal. Clearly, petitioner, by its acts and
representations, is now estopped to claim that the annexes to its complaint are not duplicate
original copies but electronic documents. It is too late in the day for petitioner to switch
theories.

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “[a]n
electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules.”
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic
documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the
same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by
the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:

SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary
weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must
affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.

With respect to paper-based documents, the original of a document, i.e., the original writing,
instrument, deed, paper, inscription, or memorandum, is one the contents of which are the
subject of the inquiry. Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic document is
regarded as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if
it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately. As defined, “electronic document” refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically; and it includes digitally signed documents
and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. The term “electronic document” may be
used interchangeably with “electronic data message” and the latter refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
identify the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals:

[1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

[2] When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as
originals.49

[3] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with
identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original,
such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Apparently, “duplicate original copies” or “multiple original copies” wherein two or more
copies are executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1
and 3 above. If the copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be called a “print-
out or output” based on the definition of an electronic document, or a “counterpart” based on
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

PART III:

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

B. Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons:

1. Venue and Process – Rule 73

Read:

9) Juan M. Gacad, Jr. vs. Hon. Rogelio P. Corpuz, G.R. No. 216107, August 3,
2022

1. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to file a motion
for reconsideration of the order.
2. Whether the petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing the
petition directly with the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals.
3. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio
dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of improper venue.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner.

Ratio:

 The petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order may be
excused since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the trial court.
 The relaxation of the rules on hierarchy of courts is warranted considering the
circumstances of the case. Although the petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy
of courts, the court deemed it best to relax the strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy and resolve the case on its merits.
 The trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of the petition
for probate on the ground of improper venue.
 Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and objections to venue must be raised in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer.
 The trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.
 The trial court's premature dismissal of the petition prevented the procedure outlined
in the Rules of Court from taking its proper course and pre-empted the parties'
prerogative to object on the venue.
 10) (Dr. Nixon L. Treyes, vs. Antonio L. Larlar, Rev. Fr. Emilio L. Larlar, Heddy
L. Larlar, Et Al., G.R. NO. 232579, September 8, 2020
Issue:

 Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Dr. Treyes'
motions to dismiss.

Ruling:

 The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

 The complaint could not be dismissed on the ground of improper venue because the
rule on venue applies only to special proceedings, not ordinary civil actions.
 The action was not barred by prescription.
 A prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not necessary before filing
an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession of property.
 Legal heirs may assert their rights without a previous judicial declaration of heirship.
 The rights of heirs are transmitted from the moment of the decedent's death.
 The determination of heirship can be made in the ordinary civil action itself.
 The rulings of the lower courts were affirmed and Dr. Treyes' petition was denied.

Ratio:

 The established rule requiring a prior determination of heirship in a special

proceeding should be abandoned.
 Heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to enforce their successional rights
without the need for a separate judicial declaration of their status as heirs, as long as
there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or for
the determination of heirship.
 The purpose of the special proceeding is to establish the rights and status of the heirs.
 If the parties have already voluntarily presented evidence regarding their rights as
heirs in the ordinary civil action, it would be impractical to compel them to institute a
separate special proceeding.
 There are exceptions to the rule, such as when the parties have already presented
evidence regarding their heirship in the ordinary civil action, or when a special
proceeding has been finally closed and terminated.
 The determination of heirship in an ordinary civil action is provisional and limited to
resolving the issue of ownership and possession of the property in question.
 The actual distribution of the estate and determination of the true heirs should be done
in a special proceeding.
 By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when
the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

11) Martin Roberto G. Tirol vs. Sol Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020)

he Court ruled in favor of Martin Tirol and reversed the decision of the CA. The Court held
that Nolasco's intervention in the probate proceeding was unnecessary and should be denied.
It stated that Nolasco's rights and interests, if any, can be fully protected in the settlement of
Roberto Jr.'s estate proceedings. The Court emphasized that the settlement court has
exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the heirs of Roberto Jr. and that the probate
court must yield to the settlement court's determination. The Court also noted that allowing
Nolasco's intervention would enlarge the issues in the probate proceeding and cause undue
delay and prejudice to the original parties. Therefore, the Court denied Nolasco's motion for
intervention in the probate proceeding.

Ratio:

 Nolasco's intervention in the probate proceeding was unnecessary and should be

denied.
 Her rights and interests, if any, can be fully protected in the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s
estate proceedings.
 The settlement court has exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the heirs of
Roberto Jr.
 The probate court must yield to the settlement court's determination.
 Allowing Nolasco's intervention would enlarge the issues in the probate proceeding
and cause undue delay and prejudice to the original parties.

12) (Heirs of Sotero A. Punongbayan, represented by Clarita M. Punongbayan

[deceased], substituted by her heirs, namely: Leticia M. Mapoy, Luisito A.
Mendoza, Yolanda M. Dimagiba, and Elvira M. Burayag; and Henie N.
Punongbayan Vs. St. Peter’s College, Inc., G.R. No. 238762, June 27, 2022)
Issue:

 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Regional Trial Court's orders and
ruling that the Regional Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction and deprived St. Peter's
College of its property without due process of law.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision.

Ratio:

 The Supreme Court held that the petition before the Court of Appeals was compliant
with the requirements of Rule 65.
 It ruled that St. Peter's College had the legal personality to file the petition since it had
a direct interest in the funds.
 The Supreme Court further held that the Regional Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction
by making a conclusive determination on the ownership of the funds.
 It found that St. Peter's College was deprived of its property without due process of
law.
 The Supreme Court rejected the argument of estoppel by laches, finding that allowing
St. Peter's College to challenge the orders would not result in inequity.

13) Estrellita Tadeo-Matias, vs. Republic of The Philippines, G.R. No. 230751,
2018)
Issue:

 Whether or not a judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary for the

granting of benefits to the claimant.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 Ratio:

 The court explains that a judicial declaration of presumptive death is not required for
the granting of benefits.
 The court criticizes the practice of requiring claimants to secure a court declaration of
presumptive death before processing death benefits.
 The court provides guidelines for handling death benefit claims.
 The court issues guidelines for the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to determine claims without the need for a court declaration.
 The court concludes that the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's petition.

2. Summary Settlement of Estates; Liability of Distributees and Estate –

Rule 74

Read:

1) Heirs of Ernesto Morales, namely: Rosario M. Dangsalan, Evelyn M.

Sangalang, Nenita M. Sales, Ernesto Jose Morales, Jr., Raymond Morales,
And Melanie Morales, Petitioners, vs. Astrid Morales Agustin, Represented by
Her Attorney-In-Fact, Edgardo Torres, G.R. No. 224849, June 6, 2018
Issue:

 Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the defendants due to improper service of
summons.
 Whether the RTC properly rendered a summary judgment despite the presence of a
genuine issue.
 Whether the partition of the land should be allowed without first settling the entirety
of the estate.

Ruling:

 The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the defendants as there was proper service of
summons.
 The RTC erred in rendering a summary judgment without a motion from any of the
parties, as there was a genuine issue raised by the petitioners regarding the
respondent's right of participation in the property.
 Summary judgment should only be granted when there are no genuine issues of fact
involved.
 The partition of the land should not be allowed without first settling the entirety of the
estate, as there may be other properties that need to be included in the partition.
 The case is remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

Ratio:

 The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the defendants as
there was proper service of summons. This means that the defendants were properly
notified of the case and given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings.
 The Court found that the RTC erred in rendering a summary judgment without a
motion from any of the parties. A summary judgment should only be granted when
there are no genuine issues of fact involved. In this case, the petitioners raised a
genuine issue regarding the respondent's right of participation in the property, which
should have been resolved through a regular trial.
  The Court emphasized the need to settle the entirety of the estate in the partition
proceedings. This means that all properties and claims related to the estate should be
resolved before the partition of a specific property can be allowed. This ensures that
all parties are properly represented and that the partition is fair and equitable.
 As a result, the Court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings, where
the parties can present their evidence and arguments regarding the partition of the land
and the settlement of the entirety of the estate.

2) Buot v. Dujali, G.R. No. 199885, October 2, 2017)

Issue:

 Whether Buot has the legal capacity to institute the proceedings for letters of
administration.
 Whether there are good reasons to resort to judicial administration.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court denied Buot's petition for letters of administration.

Ratio:

 The Supreme Court held that the issues raised by Buot were questions of fact that
should be resolved by the trial court in the appropriate proceeding.
 The Court emphasized that judicial administration of an estate should only be resorted
to when there are good and compelling reasons.
 The filing of an action for partition would be the proper venue to address the issues
raised by Buot.
 Buot failed to prove her filiation, which is a crucial requirement in establishing her
legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
 The RTC correctly dismissed Buot's petition for administration, as it found that the
estate had already been settled extrajudicially and there were no good reasons to
resort to judicial administration.
 The Court affirmed the RTC's ruling that the issues raised by Buot should be resolved
in an action for partition, which would be the appropriate venue to determine the true
heirs and the properties to be included in the partition.

3. Allowance or Disallowance of Will – Rule 76

Read:

1) In The Matter of The Petition for The Probate of The Will of Consuelo
Santiago Garcia, Catalino Tanchanco and Ronaldo Tanchanco, vs. Natividad
Garcia Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 08, 2020

Issue:

 Whether or not the will should be allowed probate.

Ruling:

 The Court of Appeals (CA) allowed the probate of the will.

 Ratio:

 The court found that the will complied with the formalities required by law, except for
the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause.
 However, this omission was supplied by the acknowledgment portion of the will,
which stated that the will consisted of five pages.
 The court also found that the Tanchancos failed to prove forgery or undue duress in
the execution of the will.
 The court emphasized that the burden of proof is upon the Tanchancos to show that
Consuelo could not have executed the will or that her signature was forged.

2) Migdonio Racca and Miam Grace Dianne Racca, vs. Maria Lolita A. Echague,
G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021

Issue:

 Whether the publication and posting of the notice of hearing bar the participation of
the petitioners.
 Whether the known heirs of the testator are still entitled to personal notice despite the
publication and posting of the notice of hearing.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

 The RTC erred in declaring the petitioners in default.
 The Court emphasized the mandatory requirement of personal notice to known heirs
in the examination of the extrinsic validity of a will.
 The order of general default issued by the RTC does not apply in probate proceedings.
 The court's area of inquiry in probate proceedings is limited to the examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.
 Personal notice to the designated and known heirs, legatees, and devisees is
mandatory under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
 Publication of the notice of hearing is not sufficient when the places of residence of
the heirs, legatees, and devisees are known.
 The RTC failed to properly notify the petitioners in accordance with the law.

Ratio:

 The court's area of inquiry in probate proceedings is limited to the examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will, which pertains to the testamentary
capacity of the testator and compliance with formal requisites.
 Personal notice to the designated and known heirs, legatees, and devisees is
mandatory under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
 Publication of the notice of hearing is not sufficient when the places of residence of
the heirs, legatees, and devisees are known.
 The RTC failed to properly notify the petitioners in accordance with the law.

3) Sofia J. Nepomuceno, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Rufina Gomez,

Oscar Jugo Ang, Carmelita Jugo, G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985)
Issue:

 Whether the court had jurisdiction to declare the testamentary provision in favor of
Nepomuceno null and void in the probate proceedings.
 Ruling:

 The probate court had jurisdiction to declare the testamentary provision in favor of
Nepomuceno null and void.
 The court can pass upon certain provisions of the will in exceptional circumstances.
 The will itself admitted the meretricious relationship between Jugo and Nepomuceno,
and both parties presented evidence on the issue of Nepomuceno's knowledge of
Jugo's true civil status.
 Therefore, the court had the authority to determine the intrinsic validity of the
provision in question.

Ratio:

 The court based its ruling on Article 739 and Article 1028 of the Civil Code.
 Article 739 provides that donations made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage are void.
 Article 1028 extends this prohibition to testamentary provisions.
 The will's provision in favor of Nepomuceno was invalid because it was made
between Jugo and Nepomuceno, who were living in concubinage.
 The court considered the evidence presented by both parties, which showed that
Nepomuceno was aware of Jugo's prior marriage and his children with Rufina Gomez.
 Therefore, the court concluded that the provision in favor of Nepomuceno was null
and void.

4. Letters Testamentary and of Administration – Rule 78

Read:

1) In The Matter of The Petition To Approve The Will Of Gloria Novelo Vda. De
Cea, Diana C. Gozum, vs. Norma C. Pappas, G.R. No. 197147, February 3,
2021, J. M.V. Lopez
Issue:

 The main issue raised in the case is the propriety of revoking Salvio's appointment as
special administrator of Gloria's estate and appointing Norma in his place.

Ruling:

 The court held that Diana had legal standing to file the petition for certiorari.
 The court then discussed the propriety of appointing Norma as special administratrix
of Gloria's estate.
 The court explained that the appointment of a special administrator is warranted when
there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration.
 The special administrator is considered an officer of the court and is expected to work
for the best interests of the entire estate.
 The rules for the selection or removal of regular administrators do not apply to special
administrators, and the appointment rests on the sound discretion of the probate court.
 In this case, the court found it logical, practical, and economical to appoint Norma as
special administratrix of Gloria's estate.
 Norma had already been appointed as administratrix of Edmundo's estate, and the
conjugal properties of Edmundo and Gloria remained undivided.
 The court believed that Norma's appointment would facilitate the division of the
estates.
 The court also noted that Salvio had abandoned his duties as administrator of
Edmundo's estate and allowed Diana, who had been removed as administrator, to
administer the estate and control the funds.
 Norma's American citizenship was not an obstacle to her appointment as a special
administrator, as the residency requirement, not Filipino citizenship, was the
determining factor.
 Therefore, the court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

5. Claims against the Estate – Rule 86

1) Angelina Puentevella Echaus, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the

Estate of Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, Rene Echaus, V. Hon.
Ramon Blanco, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
late Charles Newton Hodges, Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, G.R. No. 30453. December 4,
1989)

Issue:

 Whether the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 6628 is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, as the money claim should have been filed in the intestate estate of C.N.
Hodges.

Ruling:

 The judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 6628 is not null and void.
 The judgment credit should be admitted as a claim against the estate of C.N. Hodges.
 Immediate payment of the claim by the administrator of the estate is not a matter of
right.
 The petition for mandamus is dismissed.

Ratio:

 The claim should have been filed in the estate proceedings, but the judgment rendered
in Civil Case No. 6628 is not null and void.
 The court cited the case of Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., which held that the
estate waived its right to have the claim re-litigated in the estate proceedings by
actively participating in the civil suit.
 PCIB did not raise the issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings.
 The judgment against the executor or administrator only requires payment in due
course of administration and does not create a lien or give the judgment creditor
priority in payment.
 The time for paying debts and legacies is to be fixed by the probate court.
 Therefore, the petition for mandamus is dismissed, as there is no clear legal right to
immediate payment of the claim.

2) Iona Leriou, Eleptherios L. Longa, and Stephen L. Longa, vs. Yohanna

Frenesi S. Longa (Minor) and Victoria Ponciana S. Longa (Minor),
Represented by Their Mother Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz, G.R. No. 203923,
October 8, 2018)
 Issue:

 Whether there are sufficient grounds to remove Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as
administratrix of Enrique T. Longa's estate.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition due to a technical infirmity and found that
the issues raised were not meritorious.
 The court upheld the appointment of Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix and
emphasized that the removal of an administrator lies within the discretion of the court
appointing him/her.
 There were no sufficient grounds to remove Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix.

Ratio:

 The publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation was

sufficient notice to all interested parties, including petitioners.
 The court upheld the appointment of Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix
considering her interest in protecting the estate for the benefit of her children and the
lack of any indication that she would jeopardize the interests of petitioners in the
estate.
 The court emphasized that the removal of an administrator lies within the discretion
of the court appointing him/her and that there were no sufficient grounds to remove
Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix.

6. Action by and against Executors and Administrators – Rule 87

7. Payment of the Debts of the Estate – Rule 88

8. Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent –

Rule 89

9. Distribution and Partition of the Estate – Rule 90

Read:

1) Ralla vs. Judge Untalan, G.R. Nos. L-63253-54, April 27, 1989)

Issue:

 Whether the project of partition made before the probate of the will is valid and
binding upon the parties.

Ruling:

 The court dismissed the petition and upheld the exclusion of the parcels of land from
the probate proceedings.
 The court emphasized that the partition in the civil case was valid and binding upon
the parties, and they were duty-bound to respect the division agreed upon.
 The petitioner's interest in including the lands in the estate proceedings was
questioned, as his son-in-law was the administrator of the estate.
 The court ordered the petitioner to pay the costs of the case.
 Ratio:

 The court found that the project of partition had already been approved and fully
carried out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them. Therefore, they
were precluded from attacking its validity.
 The court explained that the August 3, 1979 Order was an interlocutory order and
could be corrected or amended by the court. Thus, Judge Untalan acted within his
jurisdiction in reversing the order and upholding the project of partition.
 The court also found that the partition made before the probate of the will was a
nullity argument to be flawed since the partition was made in a separate case
involving the estate of Paz Escarella, not Rosendo Ralla.
 The court upheld the exclusion of the parcels of land from the probate proceedings, as
it was in accordance with the project of partition approved by the court.
 The court emphasized the importance of respecting the division agreed upon in the
partition, as it was valid and binding upon the parties.
 The court questioned the petitioner's interest in including the lands in the estate
proceedings, considering that his son-in-law was the administrator of the estate.
 The court ordered the petitioner to pay the costs of the case.

PART X: (READ CHAPTER IV & VI OF THE BOOK ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS,

2024 EDITION)

C. Guardianship

1. Venue
2. Appointment of Guardians; Kinds of Guardians

Read:

1) (Alamayri vs. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008)

Issue:

 Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings is valid
despite Nave's mental incapacity.

Ruling:

 The Court of Appeals ruled that the Deed of Sale is valid and binding.

Ratio:

 The court's ruling is based on the fact that Nave's mental incapacity was not
established at the time she executed the Deed of Sale.
 The court emphasized that Nave's mental condition in 1986, when she was declared
incompetent, may have been different from her condition in 1984 when she executed
the Deed of Sale.
 The burden of proving Nave's incapacity to enter into contracts falls upon Alamayri,
but she failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claim.
 Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the Deed of Sale and
dismissed Alamayri's petition.
 The court held that there is no identity of parties and issues between the guardianship
proceedings and the civil case, and thus the findings in the guardianship proceedings
do not bind the Pabale siblings.
 3. General Powers and Duties of Guardians

1) Patria Paciente, vs. Hon. Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Presiding Judge of The

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte; Feliciana
Calle, Court-Appointed Guardian of The Minors Shirley and Leandro, Both
Surnamed Homeres; The Solicitor General; The City Fiscal of Tacloban; and,
The Register of Deeds, Tacloban City, G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982)

Issue:

 Whether the guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the cancellation of Paciente's
title and the issuance of a new title.

Ruling:

 The guardianship court does not have the authority to cancel a Torrens title.
 However, it can order the delivery or return of property if the right or title of the ward
is clear and indisputable.
 In this case, the minors inherited a part of the land from their father, and the sale of
the property without court authority is illegal.
 Therefore, the court's order to cancel Paciente's title and issue a new title including the
minors as co-owners is valid.
 The order to deposit an additional consideration of P10,000 was issued without a
hearing and is null and void.
 The guardianship court is directed to conduct regular hearings to determine the
reasonable price of the property and the necessity for its alienation, if it is found to be
in the best interests of the wards and consistent with the rights of all parties involved.

Ratio:

 The guardianship court does not have the authority to cancel a Torrens title.
 However, it can order the delivery or return of property if the right or title of the ward
is clear and indisputable.
 In this case, the minors inherited a part of the land from their father, and the sale of
the property without court authority is illegal.
 Therefore, the court's order to cancel Paciente's title and issue a new title including the
minors as co-owners is valid.
 The order to deposit an additional consideration of P10,000 was issued without a
hearing and is null and void.
 The guardianship court is directed to conduct regular hearings to determine the
reasonable price of the property and the necessity for its alienation, if it is found to be
in the best interests of the wards and consistent with the rights of all parties involved.

4. Termination of Guardianship
5. Rule on Guardianship of Minors – A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC

D. Adoption:

1. Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act –

R.A. No. 11642

2. Re: Rule on Adoption – A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, April 19, 2022

PART XI: (READ CHAPTERS VII – IX OF THE BOOK ON SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, 2024 EDITION)

E. Habeas Corpus (Rule 102); Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC)

Read:

1) Edwin N. Tribiana vs. Lourdes M. Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, September 13,
2004)
Issue:

 Whether the trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus due to the alleged failure to comply with the condition precedent under Article
151 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacked merit and affirmed the lower court's
denial of Edwin's motion to dismiss.
 The Court held that Lourdes had complied with the condition precedent under Article
151 because she attached a Barangay Certification to File Action, which established
that the parties attempted to compromise but were unsuccessful.
 The Court emphasized that the failure to comply with a condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional defect and can be cured by amendment.
 The Court also highlighted the importance of resolving custody issues for the welfare
of a young child and stated that technicalities should not stand in the way of giving
such a child full protection.

Ratio:

 Lourdes had complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family
Code by attaching a Barangay Certification to File Action, which showed that the
parties attempted to compromise but failed.
 The failure to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect and can
be cured by amendment.
 The paramount concern in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and
custody of a child of tender age is to resolve the issue of legal custody immediately.
 The exception in Section 412(b)(2) of the Local Government Code exempts petitions
for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.
 The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to dismiss is to file an answer
and raise the objections as affirmative defenses, rather than filing a petition for
certiorari.
 Litigation of substantive issues should not be delayed by technicalities, especially in
cases involving the custody of a child of tender age.

A husband's motion to dismiss his wife's petition for habeas corpus, claiming failure
to comply with a compromise requirement, is rejected by the Supreme Court due to
the attachment of a Barangay Certification, emphasizing the importance of resolving
custody issues for the welfare of a young child.

2) In Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo V. Warden,

(GR No. 197597, April 18, 2015)
 Mistakenly identified as a suspect in the Maguindanao Massacre, Datukan Malang
Salibo files a Petition for Habeas Corpus to prove his innocence and secure his release
from detention, leading to a legal battle over the appealability of the Regional Trial
Court's decision and the appropriateness of the habeas corpus remedy, ultimately
resulting in Salibo's release.

Issue:

1. Whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court on petitioner Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Ruling:

 The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted the Petition for Habeas Corpus.
 The Court emphasized that habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived
of liberty due to mistaken identity.
 The Court found that Salibo was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process
of law.
 The Court ordered his immediate release from detention.

Ratio:

1. The Court held that the decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus was the decision
of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals.

 The Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial
courts.
 The respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.

(In Re: The Writ Of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa (Detained at The New Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa City), June De Villa, vs. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, G.R. No.
158802, November 17, 2004)

Issue:

 Whether the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and new trial should
be granted based on the DNA evidence presented by the petitioner.

Ruling:

 The petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and new trial is dismissed for
lack of merit.

Ratio:

 The writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to individuals who are illegally
deprived of their liberty or placed under illegal restraint.
 The writ cannot be used to directly challenge a judgment rendered by a competent
court or tribunal that was not deprived of jurisdiction.
 The writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error and should not be used to reexamine
the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in a case.
 The remedy of a motion for new trial is available only within a limited period of time
and for specific grounds, such as newly discovered evidence.
 The DNA evidence presented by the petitioner does not meet the criteria for newly
discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial.
 Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing does not excuse the petitioner
from exercising reasonable diligence in seeking the evidence before or during the
trial.
 Even if it is proven that the petitioner is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his
conviction could still stand based on the victim's testimony and positive identification.
 The paternity of the child is not central to the issue of the petitioner's guilt or
innocence for the crime of rape.
 The petition for habeas corpus and new trial seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary
basis for the petitioner's conviction, which is outside the scope of habeas corpus
proceedings.

3) In Re: The Writ Of Habeas Corpus For Michael Labrador Abellana

(Petitioner, Detained at The New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City), vs. Hon.
Meinrado P. Paredes, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City Branch 13, People of The Philippines, S/Supt Benjamin Delos
Santos (Ret.), In His Capacity as Chief of Bureau of Corrections, G.R. no.
232006, July 10. 2019
Issue:

 Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Ruling:

 The petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

Ratio:

 The writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, but it can only be availed of in exceptional circumstances.
 The petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process and competent counsel.
 The petitioner had ample opportunities to be heard and present his defense, but it was
his own negligence and that of his counsel that led to his current predicament.
 A client is bound by the acts and negligence of his counsel, unless there is clear
abandonment of the client's cause.
 The negligence of the counsel in this case does not amount to clear abandonment, and
the petitioner himself was negligent in monitoring the status of his case.
 Therefore, the petitioner's claim for the writ of habeas corpus is without merit.

4) In Re: In The Matter of The Issuance of A Writ of Habeas Corpus of Inmates

Raymundo Reyes and Vincent B. Evangelista, Duly Represented By Atty.
Rubee Ruth C. Cagasca-Evangelista, In Her Capacity as Wife of Vincent B.
Evangelista and Counsel of both Inmates, vs. Bucor Chief Gerald Bantag, In
His Capacity as Director General of Bureau of Corrections of New Bilibid
Prison, Bureau of Corrections and All Those Persons In Custody of The
Inmates Raymundo Reyes And Vincent B. Evangelista, G.R. No. 251954, June
10, 2020
Issue:

 Whether the continued imprisonment of Reyes and Evangelista after completing their
sentences violates their rights.
 Ruling:

 The court ruled against the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
 The petition was dismissed on procedural grounds.
 The court upheld the confinement of Reyes and Evangelista.

Ratio:

 The petitioner disregarded the basic rules of procedure and the hierarchy of courts.
 Direct recourse to the Supreme Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of
law, not issues that depend on the determination of questions of facts.
 The writ of habeas corpus may only be invoked under extraordinary circumstances.
 The range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed when
the detention complained of finds its origin in a judicial order.
 The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua against Reyes and Evangelista is
valid, as only the imposition of the death penalty has been removed by law.
 They are not entitled to the benefit of Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) as
they were convicted of a heinous crime, which excludes them from the coverage of
the law providing for GCTA.
 Therefore, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued and the discharge of Reyes and
Evangelista from imprisonment should not be authorized.

5) In The Matter of The Petition for Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Corpus
In Favor of Alicia Jasper S. Lucena; Relissa Santos Lucena and Francis B.
Lucena, vs. Sarah Elago, Kabataan Party-List Representative; Alex Danday,
National Spokesperson of Anakbayan; Chary Delos Reyes, Bianca Gacos, Jay
Roven Ballais Villafuente, Members and Recruiters of Anakbayan; and Atty.
Maria Kristina Conti, G.R. No. 252120, September 15, 2020
Issue:

 Whether the petitioners are entitled to the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas
corpus to regain custody of AJ.

Ruling:

 The court dismissed the petition and denied the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas corpus.

Ratio:

1. Amparo Remedy:

 The Amparo Rule is confined to instances of extralegal killings, enforced

disappearances, or threats thereof.
 AJ's situation does not qualify as an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing.
 AJ is not missing, her whereabouts are known, and she is staying with Anakbayan,
which is not acting on behalf of the state.
 Therefore, the petitioners' plea for the writ of amparo is not proper.

2. Habeas Corpus Remedy:

 The court dismissed the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
 It did not appear that AJ was deprived of her liberty or that the petitioners were
excluded from their rightful custody over her.
  There was no evidence that AJ was being detained against her will or that Anakbayan
used violence or force to influence her decision.
 AJ herself denied being abducted and stated that her decision to leave her parents'
custody was reasoned and conscious.
 As AJ has reached the age of majority, she is legally emancipated, and the petitioners'
parental authority and custodial rights over her have been terminated.
 Therefore, the petitioners' prayer for the writ of habeas corpus lacked merit.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas corpus, stating that the remedy of amparo is not applicable in this case, and there was
no evidence of illegal confinement or deprivation of liberty. The court also emphasized that
AJ, as an emancipated adult, has the right to make independent choices regarding her
residence and companionship, as long as they do not violate any laws or rights of others.

6) Office of The Court Administrator, Complainant, vs. Judge Norma C. Perello,

Former Clerk of Court Luis C. Bucayon II, Court Stenographers Thelma A.
Mangilit, Cecilio B. Argame, Maricar N. Eugenio, And Radigunda R. Laman
and Interpreter Paul M. Resurreccion, All of The Regional Trial Court, Branch
276, Muntinlupa City, A.M. No. Rtj-05-1952, December 24, 2008)
Issue:

 Whether the judge, clerk of court, court stenographers, and court interpreter should be
held liable for the irregularities in the disposition of petitions for habeas corpus.

Ruling:

 Judge Perello is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion and
is imposed a fine of P40,000 to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
 Atty. Bucayon's charges are dismissed as moot.
 The court stenographers and court interpreter are found guilty of simple neglect of
duty and fined P5,000 each.

Ratio:

 The audit team's findings of irregularities in the disposition of petitions for habeas
corpus, such as missing case folders and decisions of conviction, raised doubts about
the regularity of the process.
 The audit team also identified substantive and procedural lapses, including failure to
send notices/summons to relevant offices, lack of return of writs, absence of
certificates of detention/confinement, absence of copies of judgments of conviction,
failure to transcribe stenographic notes, and failure to prepare minutes of court
sessions or hearings.
 Judge Perello's argument that the audit team may not be familiar with the law is not
valid, as the audit team is composed of legal professionals.
 Judge Perello's claim of retroactive application of laws favorable to the accused, even
to those already convicted and serving their sentence, does not justify the
irregularities found.
 Atty. Bucayon's failure to present the case folders and records to the audit team is a
lapse in his duty, but the charges against him are dismissed as moot due to his transfer
to the Public Attorney's Office.
 The court stenographers' prioritization of transcribing stenographic notes for
adversarial cases and appeals, and their failure to transcribe notes for non-adversarial
habeas corpus proceedings, is a neglect of duty.
 The court interpreter's claim that all petitions for habeas corpus had corresponding
minutes, but they were not attached to the records due to the Branch Clerk of Court's
refusal, is also a neglect of duty.
 Judge Perello is held liable for gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion due
to the numerous irregularities found in the disposition of petitions for habeas corpus
under her jurisdiction.
 The fines imposed on the court stenographers and court interpreter are justified as a
penalty for their neglect of duty.

7) Pulido vs, Abu, G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007

Issue:

 Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed due to forum shopping
and the petitioner's failure to disclose the pending certiorari case.

Ruling:

 The Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the petition for violation of forum
shopping and imposed a penalty of censure on the petitioner.
 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld the
penalty of censure imposed on the petitioner.

Ratio:

 The relief sought in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases was the release of
Gonzales and Mesa.
 The main issue in both cases was whether they should be released on bail.
 The petitioner's actions constituted forum shopping as he filed two separate cases
seeking the same relief.
 The petitioner also violated his obligation to disclose the pending certiorari case.
 The penalty of censure imposed on the petitioner was upheld by the Supreme Court.
 The petition for habeas corpus had become moot and academic due to the release of
Gonzales and Mesa from detention.

8) Anita Mangila vs. Judge Heriberto Pangilinan, G.R. No. 160739, July 17,
2013, BERSAMIN, J.

Issue:

 Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the
release of Mangila from detention?

Ruling:

 The petition for review lacks merit.

 The court ruled that the writ of habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain
Mangila's release from detention.
 The court explained that habeas corpus is a special proceeding that seeks to enforce
civil rights and relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
 However, when the restraint is lawful and pursuant to a court process, it cannot be
inquired into through habeas corpus.
  In this case, Mangila was arrested and detained by virtue of a warrant issued by Judge
Pangilinan, who had the legal authority to do so.
 Therefore, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy.

Ratio:

 The court emphasized that habeas corpus is a summary remedy to inquire into the
legality of detention.
 It cannot be used as a substitute for other available remedies, and it cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error or irregularities in the proceedings.
 The court also highlighted that the authority of the judge to conduct preliminary
investigations was provided by law, and the warrant of arrest was issued in
accordance with the rules.
 The court concluded that Mangila's proper recourse was to bring the alleged
irregularities to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had the power to order her
release if no probable cause was found.
 Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Mangila's petition for habeas corpus.

9) Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante In Behalf of The Minor Criselda M. Cada Vs.

Raquel M. Cada-Deapera (G.R NO. 210636, July 128, 2014
Issue:

1. Whether the RTC in Caloocan City has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition.
2. Whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of
Criselda.
3. The enforceability of the writ issued by the RTC in Quezon City.

Ruling:

The RTC in Caloocan City has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition. The filing of the
petition before a family court in any of the cities within the National Capital Judicial Region
is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the same region. Since Caloocan
City and Quezon City belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC in
Caloocan City can still be implemented in Quezon City.

Ratio:

 The Court held that the RTC in Caloocan City has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
petition. The filing of the petition before a family court in any of the cities within the
National Capital Judicial Region is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced
within the same region.
 Since Caloocan City and Quezon City belong to the same judicial region, the writ
issued by the RTC in Caloocan City can still be implemented in Quezon City.
 The Court also held that service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus
petition. The writ of habeas corpus plays a role comparable to a summons in ordinary
civil actions, as it allows the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.
 Therefore, the issue of improper service of summons is irrelevant in this case.

Conclusion:

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The RTC in
Caloocan City has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition, and the RTC validly acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda. The writ issued by the RTC in
Caloocan City is enforceable in Quezon City.

F. Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)

1) Reverend Father Robert P. Reyes, vs. Raul M. Gonzalez, In His Capacity as

The Secretary of The Court of Appeals, Secretary Department of Justice, And
Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan, In His Capacity as The Commissioner
of The Bureau of Immigration, G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioner's right to travel was violated by the inclusion of his
name in the Hold Departure List.

Ruling:

 The court dismissed the petition, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
that denied the privilege of the writ of amparo.
 The court ruled that the restriction on the petitioner's right to travel was not unlawful
and did not constitute a serious violation of his rights.

Ratio:

 The court explained that the writ of amparo is intended to address extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, and its coverage is confined to these instances
or threats thereof.
 The right to travel falls under the right to liberty, which is protected by the writ of
amparo.
 However, in this case, the restriction on the petitioner's right to travel was a
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him, which was not
unlawful.
 The court also emphasized that the petitioner failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty, and security.
 The court further noted that the petitioner should have filed a motion to lift the HDO
in the trial court, as provided by the rules, instead of directly resorting to the writ of
amparo.
 Therefore, the court dismissed the petition.

2) Edgardo Navia Dio, and Andrew Busing, vs. Virginia Pardico for and in behalf of
Benhur Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012)

Issue:

 Whether or not the petition for the writ of amparo is sufficient in form and substance.

Ruling:

 The petition for the writ of amparo is dismissed.

 Ratio:

 The writ of amparo is available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
 For the writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, it must be shown that
the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or
acquiescence of the government or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing person.
 In this case, while there is evidence of physical harm inflicted upon Ben, there is no
allegation or proof of government involvement in his disappearance.
 The petitioners are private individuals and there is no evidence linking them to any
covert police, military, or governmental operation.
 Government involvement in the disappearance is an indispensable element in an
amparo petition, even if the person sought to be held accountable is a private
individual or entity.

3) Mayor William M. Mamba, Et Al. V. Leomar Bueno (G.R. No. 191416. February
7, 2017)

Issue:

 Whether the petition for review on certiorari was filed within the reglementary period.
 Whether the CA erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo.

Ruling:

 The petition for review on certiorari was filed on time.

 The CA did not err in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo.

Ratio:

 The petition for review on certiorari was filed within the reglementary period of five
working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment.
 The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief for
violations or threats of violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty, and
security.
 The writ of amparo covers extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof.
 The respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence that he was illegally
detained and tortured by the members of the Task Force.
 Denial is inherently a weak defense and must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability.
 The respondent's allegations were corroborated by his witnesses and the medical
examination conducted by Dr. Odessa B. Tiangco.
 The petitioners failed to present any evidence to refute the respondent's claims.
 The writ of amparo may still issue even if the respondent has already been released
from detention, as it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
 The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life and guarantees the
secure quality of life free from unwarranted government intrusion.
 The petitioners, as local government officials, have the duty to conduct an
investigation on the alleged violations of the respondent's rights and to provide
genuine and effective assistance to the investigation to be conducted by the PNP
Cagayan Regional Office.
  The CA did not err in directing the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further
investigation, as it has already commenced an initial investigation on the incident.

3) Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et. Al., vs. Honorable Judge Elmo Del Rosario et
al., G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008

Issue:

 Whether the petition should be dismissed due to procedural errors and lack of
necessary allegations.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition due to procedural errors and lack of
necessary allegations.

Ratio:

 The Court found that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time and that the
petitioners were guilty of forum shopping.
 The Court also found that the petition for the writ of amparo lacked sufficient
evidence of threats to the rights to life, liberty, and security.
 The petition for the writ of habeas data was dismissed for lack of concrete allegations
and justification.

4) Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Lt. Francis Mirabelle
Samson, vs. Erlinda T. Cadapan and Concepcion E. Empeño, G.R. Nos.
184461-62, May 31, 2011

Issue:

1. Whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible;

2. Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as
well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the
abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
3. Whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the
aggrieved parties; and
4. Whether Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
party respondent in this case.

Held:

1. Yes, Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of

respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by
forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical
injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of the torture
they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with the
facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the “DTU,” as shown in his testimony and
confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the “Division Training Unit,” firms up
respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. The
corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a
 forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area.
There is thus no compelling reason for the Court to disturb its appreciation in
Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus
crumbles.
2. No, The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its
simplest terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should
he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations
omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied). It bears stressing that
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a
substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability. An amparo
proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of
individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative
suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security
of aggrieved individuals. An amparo proceeding does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance or threats thereof or extrajudicial killings; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance…
for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance…
3. No, Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for
execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and
security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution
of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of
delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
immediately protect. The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court
supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only
find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather
than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with
dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the
extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding. In fine,
the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very
purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings,
it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that
may be taken therefrom.
4. No, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then
President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas
corpus and amparo petitions were filed. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that
he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything
which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then
 President Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three
missing persons.

5) In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of
Lilibeth Ladaga Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General
of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al./In the Matter of the
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Angela A. Librado-
Trinidad Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the
Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al.In the Matter fo the Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Carlos Isagani T. Zarate Vs.
Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine
Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al. G.R. No. 189689/G.R. No. 189690/G.R.
No. 189691, November 13, 2012

Issue:

 Whether the evidence presented by the petitioners satisfies the standard of substantial
evidence required to prove the threats to their rights.

Ruling:

 The Court denied the petitions and affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) denial
of the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Ratio:

 Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 While flexibility is allowed in the admissibility of evidence in cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings, substantial evidence is still required to
establish the State's involvement in the violations.
 The inclusion of the petitioners' names in the OB List alone does not constitute an
actual threat.
 The violent deaths of individuals allegedly connected to the militant groups identified
in the OB List cannot be directly linked to the OB List itself.
 Fear and threat are subjective and vary from person to person, and the alleged threat
must be actual and not merely supposition or likelihood.
 Without substantial evidence of an actual threat, an order for further investigation
would have no concrete basis.

the Court denied the petitions seeking a writ of amparo, ruling that the inclusion of the
petitioners' names in the military hit-list did not constitute an actual threat without
substantial evidence, affirming the Regional Trial Court's denial of the privilege of the
writ.

G. Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)

Read:
1) Leila M. De Lima, vs. President Rodrigo R. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15,
2019)
 Issue:

 Whether the incumbent President can be haled to court even for a limited purpose
under the Constitution.

Ruling:

 The petition must be dismissed because President Duterte is immune from suit during
his incumbency.

Ratio:

 The concept of presidential immunity from suit in the Philippines differs from that in
the United States.
 In the Philippines, presidential immunity is absolute and covers both official and
unofficial acts of the President.
 Presidential immunity is intended to ensure the President's ability to perform his
duties without hindrance or distraction.
 The constitutional provision grants immunity to the President during his tenure.
 The rationale for granting immunity is to protect the President from harassment and to
allow him to fully attend to his official duties.
 Requiring the President to respond to every complaint would defeat the purpose of the
privilege.
 The petition for the writ of habeas data must be dismissed because President Duterte
is immune from suit during his incumbency.

H. Change of Name (Rule 103)

Read:

1) (Kimric Casayuran Tan vs. The Local Civil Registrar of Makati City, the
National Statistics Office, and the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
222857, November 10, 2021)
Former natural-born Filipino, now a British citizen, wins petition to change surname
from "Tan" to "Florendo Casayuran" due to lifelong use of the latter name, despite
initial denials by the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals.

Issue:

 Whether Kimric is entitled to change his name from "Tan" to "Florendo Casayuran."

Ruling:

 The Court granted Kimric's petition for a change of name.

 The Court held that a change of name is a special proceeding that requires strict
compliance with jurisdictional requirements, including publication.
 The Court rejected the argument of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to defective publication, as the
OSG actively participated in the proceedings and did not raise the jurisdictional issue
during trial.
 Kimric has sufficiently established a proper ground for the change of name.
 He has been using the name Kimric Florendo Casayuran since childhood, and all his
school, official, and work records bear that name.
 A change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and it must
be granted upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause.
  The Court considered the grounds for a change of name, such as avoiding confusion
and erasing signs of former alienage, as well as the fact that Kimric has been using the
name for most of his life.
 Denying the petition would cause confusion and prejudice to Kimric and his family,
requiring them to change or correct all their legal docume... continue reading

2) (Republic of the Philippines vs. Merlyn Mercadera Through Her Attorney-in-

Fact, Evelyn M. Oga, G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010)

ISSUE: W/N the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC falls under Rule 103 or
108. HELD: It falls under Rule 108. The "change of name" contemplated under
Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A
change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by
law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and
compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds
invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section
2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled
name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s
name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right
under Rule 108. This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule
108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule
108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply
means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means
"to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed
for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name
"MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up
to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its
intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to
avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy
the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to
obtain relief.

I. Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108; R.A.

9048, as amended by R.A. No. 10172)

Read:

1) Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Charlie Mintas Felix, A.K.A.

Shirley Mintas Felix, G.R. No. 203371, June 30, 2020)
Correction of Entries and Cancellation of Second Birth Certificate in Different
Judicial Region

Here, the trial court has jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for correction of entries in his
first birth certificate on file with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet. The trial court has jurisdiction, as
well, to direct the cancellation of respondent’s second birth certificate with the LCR-
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija as an incident or as a necessary consequence of the action to correct
the entries sought by respondent. Indeed, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or
incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles,
may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of
its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to
consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.’

The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly affirmed the trial court’s directive to cancel
respondent’s second birth certificate on file with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, as a
consequence of the main relief sought by and granted to respondent. To file two (2) separate
petitions, one for correction of entries in his first birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon,
Benguet and two, for cancellation of his second birth certificate with LCR-Carranglan, Nueva
Ecija — will certainly violate the rule against multiplicity of suits.

More important, a petition for correction is an action in rem. A decision therein binds not
only the parties themselves but the whole world, as well. An in rem proceeding entails
publication as a jurisdictional requirement— to give notice to and bring the whole world as a
party into the case. Surely, the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija is part of the world and based
on the records, was in fact duly notified of the petition. Consequently, it is bound by the
judgment rendered there in the case.

But then again, respondent’s petition came before RA 10172 took effect, this time allowing
correction of erroneous entries pertaining to one’s biological sex. Surely, to pursue the
administrative procedure prescribed under RA 9048 with respect to his first name and
typographical error in his father’s name and a judicial procedure under Rule 108 with respect
to the correction of his biological sex is anathema to the proscription against splitting a cause
of action under Section 4, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court,

Verily, even with the advent of RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 prescribing the
administrative remedy for correction of entries with the civil registry, the regional trial courts
are not divested of their jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for correction of entries
“Even the failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court.”

2) Re: Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the RTC, Br. 67, Paniqui,
Tarlac, Adm. Matter No. 06-7-414-RTC, October 19, 2007)

A.M No. 06-7-414-RTC – 562 Phil. 597 – Remedial Law – Special Proceedings –
General Principles – Special Proceedings Cases are Non-Adversarial – Rule 108
cases may be summary or adversarial; Need of publication; RA 9048 is not meant to
be applied in judicial proceedings

In 2005, an audit was conducted RTC 67 in Paniqui, Tarlac. The court was presided by Judge
Cesar Sotero. The audit team found, among others, that there were 608 special proceedings
cases that were irregularly proceeded with because no publications were made and no
hearings were conducted.

Judge Sotero, when made to explain, averred that most of those special proceedings cases
were under Rule 103 (Change of Name) and Rule 108 (Correction of Entries); that those
petitions were supposed to be filed with the local civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048 which
authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to correct clerical or typographical errors in an
entry and/or change the first name or nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial
order; that they were only filed in court because there was no local civil registrar assigned;
and so he merely accommodated the petitions. Since RA 9048 allows corrections of entries
without hearing and publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted, Judge
Sotero treated the petitions as summary cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Sotero is correct.

HELD: No. Despite the passage of RA 9048, courts may still take cognizance of petitions for
corrections of clerical errors in entries in the local civil registry. However, the procedure to
be used should be Rule 103 or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere in RA 9048 does it
provide that the summary nature of the administrative proceedings in the LCR may be
applied in petitions for correction of clerical errors filed in court.

Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry are actions in rem,
the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties thereto but on the whole
world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication gives
notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It
is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party to the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Nature of cases under Rule 108:

The proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversarial in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial and the procedure to be adopted is adversarial. The procedure under Rule
108 becomes the appropriate adversarial proceeding to effect substantial changes in the
registry only if the procedural requirements therein are complied with.

3) Bernie Santiago vs. Rommel C. Jornacion and the City Civil Registrar of
Marikina City, G.R. No. 230049, October 6, 2021)

A man files a petition to establish his paternity and correct entries in a birth certificate,
challenging the presumption of legitimacy and presenting DNA evidence, leading the
court to grant the petition and emphasize the best interest of the child.

 The Court stated that the propriety of a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
to establish a child’s filiation is not a novel concept. The Court cited Lee v. Court of
Appeals, which clarified that “Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements
thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in the entries of the civil register.” The Court pointed out
that as regards the propriety of a petition under Rule 108 in cases involving the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, Lee overturned the previous ruling in Republic v.
Labrador, 364 Phil. 934 [1999] which erroneously held that “Rule 108 cannot be used
to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the child.”
 Santiago made no mention of Braza in its holding let alone attempt to distinguish its
holding from that of Braza. It is apparent however that the Santiago ruling that a
court can rule upon filiation or legitimation in a Rule 108 proceeding is the polar
opposite of that of Braza and Miller while being consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Valencia. Santiago thus threw its lot with the Valencia camp rather than
the Braza camp.

Ruling:

 The court ruled in favor of Bernie and granted the petition.

 Bernie has the legal standing to file the petition under Rule 108 of the Family Code.
  The court emphasized that the presumption of legitimacy is not conclusive and can be
overcome by evidence to the contrary.
 Bernie presented DNA test results that showed a high probability of paternity.
 The court considered the best interest of the child and the fact that Rommel had
abandoned Sofia and her siblings.

3) Marlyn Monton Nullada, vs. The Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila, Akira Ito,
Shin Ito and All Persons Who Have or Claim Any Interest, G.R. No. 224548,
January 23, 2019)

A Filipino woman seeks recognition of her foreign divorce decree in the

Philippines, leading to a Supreme Court ruling that allows Filipino citizens to
remarry under Philippine law after obtaining a divorce decree abroad, regardless
of who initiated the divorce proceeding.

Issue:

 Does Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines allow a Filipino
citizen to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad
and obtaining a favorable judgment against their foreign spouse?

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Marlyn and granted her petition for recognition
of the foreign divorce decree.
 The Court held that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code allows a Filipino
citizen to remarry under Philippine law after obtaining a divorce decree abroad,
regardless of whether the Filipino spouse initiated the divorce proceeding or not.
 The Court emphasized that the purpose of the provision is to prevent an absurd
situation where one spouse remains married while the other is free to remarry.
 The Court also clarified that the nationality principle, which opposes the recognition
of foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipino spouses, is not an absolute rule.

4) In Re: Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment of Divorce with Prayer to

Change Civil Status of Janevic Orteza Ordaneza from Married to Single,
Janevic Orteza Ordaneza, Represented By: Ricky O. Ordaneza, vs. Republic
of The Philippines, G.R. No. 254484. November 24, 2021)

A Filipino citizen seeks recognition of her foreign divorce decree, but fails to comply
with the requirements of Article 26 and Rule 108, resulting in the need for separate
petitions to recognize the divorce and change her civil status.

The Solicitor General appealed arguing, among others, that the trial court cannot order the
cancellation of the marriage certificate because Janevic failed to comply with the venue
requirements of Rule 108 which provides that petitions for correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil register must be filed before a court which has jurisdiction over it – the
Kidapawan RTC has no jurisdiction over the LCR of Pasay City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Solicitor General is correct.

HELD: Yes. This case clarified the ruling in Fujiki vs Marinay and Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas.

There is more than one remedy to judicially recognize a foreign divorce decree in the
Philippines and availing one remedy does not automatically preclude the institution of
another remedy.

The cancellation or correction of her civil status cannot be done through a petition for
recognition under Article 26 (2) without complying with the requirements of Rule 108. An
individual seeking the change of his or her civil status must adhere to the requirements
governing a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108.

While the change in Janevic’s civil status is an expected consequence of the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce, it does not automatically follow that the Petition she filed
is the petition contemplated under Rule 108.

Since Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding, its particular provisions on venue and the
parties to implead must be observed to vest the Court with jurisdiction. Janevic must file a
separate petition under Rule 108 in Pasay City and implead the LCR of Pasay City

5) Republic of The Philippines, vs. Annabelle Ontuca Y Peleño (Mother and

Guardian of Her Minor Child, Zsanine Kimberly Jariol Y Ontuca), G.R. No.
232053, July 15, 2020)

A woman seeks to correct errors in her child's birth certificate, leading to a legal battle over
the jurisdiction of the court to correct certain entries.

Issue:

 Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to order the correction of
Annabelle's first name, middle name, and marital status in her child's birth certificate.

Ruling:

 The RTC has jurisdiction to correct Annabelle's first name and middle name, but not
her marital status.
 The correction of Annabelle's first name and middle name falls under Rule 108 of the
Civil Register Act, which allows for the correction of clerical and innocuous mistakes
in documents.
 The correction of Annabelle's first name and middle name is considered a clerical
error and does not affect her substantial rights.
 However, the correction of the parents' marital status is considered a substantial
alteration that requires compliance with the proper procedures under Rule 108.

6) Republic of the Philippines, vs. Michelle Soriano Gallo, G.R. No. 207074,
January 17, 2018)

A woman successfully petitions for the correction of clerical errors in her birth
certificate, including her name and gender, after providing evidence to support
her claim, leading to a ruling in her favor by the Supreme Court.
 Issue:

 Whether the corrections sought by Gallo in her birth certificate were mere clerical
errors or substantive changes.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gallo and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
 The court ordered the correction of Gallo's name, gender, and other details in her birth
certificate.

Ratio:

 The court held that Gallo's petition involved the correction of a mere error and fell
under the jurisdiction of the civil registrar.
 The corrections sought by Gallo were considered clerical in nature and did not require
a change in her legal status.
 The court emphasized that Gallo was not changing her name, but merely correcting its
entry.
 The court considered the evidence presented by Gallo, such as her diploma, voter's
certification, and medical certificate, as sufficient proof of the errors in her birth
certificate.

7) Bartolome vs. Republic

Dr. Ruben C. Bartolome's petition for a change of name is denied by the Supreme
Court, ruling that the changes sought should have been filed under Republic Act
9048 and that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his claim.

Issue:

 Whether the changes sought by Dr. Bartolome in his first name, middle name, and
surname should be filed under Republic Act 9048, Rule 103, or Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

Ruling:

 The changes sought by Dr. Bartolome are covered by Republic Act 9048.
 Rule 103 applies to changes in surname or both first name and surname, while Rule
108 applies to substantial cancellations or corrections in entries in the civil registry.
 Dr. Bartolome should have filed the petition with the local civil registry office in
accordance with the administrative proceeding provided under Republic Act 9048.
 The evidence presented by Dr. Bartolome was insufficient to support his claim.

J. Rule of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)

Read:

1) Pilar Cañeda Braga et al vs. Hon. Joseph Emilio Abaya, G.R. No.
223076, September 13, 2016
In the case of Braga v. Abaya, petitioners filed a petition against the Department of
Transportation and Communications and the Philippine Ports Authority, alleging
noncompliance with environmental regulations and failure to conduct local consultation
regarding the Davao Sasa Wharf modernization project, but the court ruled that the petition
was premature and lacked merit.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioners' claims are valid and warrant the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan.

Ruling:

 The petition is premature and lacks merit.

Ratio:

 The duty to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system and
secure an ECC rests on the project proponent, which has not yet been determined as
the bidding process is still ongoing.
 The consultation requirements and approval of the concerned sanggunian should be
complied with before the project is implemented.

2) Paulino Alecha et al vs. Jose Atienza Jr., DENR, Michael Romero et al, G.R. No.
191537, September 14, 2016

the court dismisses a petition challenging the dismissal of a mining agreement cancellation,
stating that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies and did not provide
sufficient evidence to prove their arguments.

Issue:

 Whether the DENR Secretary gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the petition
for cancellation of the mining agreement.

Ruling:

 The court dismissed the petition.

 Petitioners failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before resorting to
the present certiorari petition.
 They did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal the DENR resolution to the
Office of the President.
 Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of the judicial
system and should be observed unless any of the exceptions apply.
 Petitioners failed to show that their case fell under any of the exceptions.
 DENR Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in dismissing the petition based
on the records that the DENR had previously received for 168 FPMC's application for
the mining agreement.
 DENR Secretary took judicial notice of the documents submitted by 168 FPMC.
 Petitioners had sufficient notice and opportunity to contest the documents.
 Petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove their arguments.
 Legal presumption that the DENR officials regularly performed their duties.

2) Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, in his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu vs. Joel
Capili Garganera, for an on his behalf, and in representation of the People of
 the Cities of Cebu and Talisay, and future generations, including the unborn,
G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018

The Supreme Court denies the petition to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals regarding the Inayawan landfill, upholding the permanent cessation of
dumping garbage at the landfill and its rehabilitation due to serious
environmental damage and violations of environmental laws.

Issue:

1. Whether the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. No. 9003
and R.A. No. 8749 is needed prior to the filing of the petition.
2. Whether the requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were
sufficiently established.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
 The Court held that the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A.
No. 9003 and R.A. No. 8749 is inapplicable to the present case, as the petition for a
writ of kalikasan is a separate and distinct action.
 The Court also ruled that the requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan were sufficiently established.
 The evidence presented showed that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill
caused serious environmental damage and violated several environmental laws and
regulations.
 Therefore, the Court upheld the CA's decision to permanently cease and desist from
dumping garbage at the landfill and to continue its rehabilitation.