Three Years With The Khmer Rouge

Nov 24, 2023

The Albanian ambassador to Democratic Kampuchea, Dhimetër Stamo, published this piece in the Italian journal
“Africana”, which focuses on extra-European studies, in 2000. It’s good that he did, because the magazine is still
in publication. I am indebted to its former editor, Giovanni Armolitta, who responded positively to my e-mail
asking him for the piece. Although it was originally published in Italian, I ran it through a translator and have
cleaned it up significantly here for readability.

Although I dislike lengthy introductions, I feel the need to say a few things, because I have never brought up the
subject of Cambodia on this blog before, and this will be seen mainly by people not familiar with Cambodia,
whereas it was written for an audience with a reasonable level of background knowledge. For several months,
the Cambodian genocide has been my primary area of study. I do not want to present myself as some kind of
expert in it after only a few months, especially because as I understand it there are many unresolved questions
on it and on the rule of the Pot-Sary clique on which historians have yet to reach a consensus. The field of
Cambodian history, as I’ve casually observed, has a remarkable degree of honesty and integrity compared to
other countries. Difficulties and disagreements come not from ideological obscurantism, as in Albania, or
sophomoric career-chasing, as in India, but from the substantial challenges that Cambodia presents to generally
honest historians.

For the first few years of its rule, the “Communist Party” of Kampuchea did not reveal itself as the governing
force in Cambodia. Instead, decisions were attributed to “the Organisation”. By convention, English (and
apparently Italian) language literature on this time period leaves the Cambodian word for “organisation”
untranslated. I have abandoned this practice, because the use of a foreign word here gives the word an added
spookiness that it does not have for any Cambodian person; the Khmers continue to use the word to refer to
ordinary organisations, and thus encounter the word in ordinary life, without any spooky factor. I point to the
yellow vests in the recent failed Tacoma blockade who unaccountably insisted that “the organisers”,
corresponding to no one particular group, had declared the blockade over. This is no foreign practice and there
is no need to exotify it with a foreign word.

The Cambodian language is beautiful and not scary at all. Its words have a wildly differing semantic range from
their indo-european translations. Lest someone out there have their first exposure to it in this kind of
exotification, allow me to list some of my favourite Khmer words: “s’ët” can mean humid or sticky, but it can
also mean addictive, close, or reluctant to forgive a mistake; “tvie” can mean door or gate, but it also refers to a
mountain pass or a bay or gulf; “thuulii”, an aspirant stop, not a fricative, means dust. The Khmer language,
atypically for the region, does not mark tone contrasts, except in some dialects, where a syllable-final “R” is
replaced by a rising tone. In these dialects, and probably most others, “Khmer” almost rhymes with “Thai”.
I have left the word “crepa” untranslated because I don’t know what it is. It seems to refer to some kind of low-
quality rubber. Maybe someone who knows about either Italian or rubber production can fill me in here on what
this is. It seems like a very specialised term.

In his remarks to foreigners, foreign minister Ieng Sary and his clique insisted that they were building a society
for which there was “no model” under the spontaneous, “democratic” direction of the people. This line is alluded
to in the following essay. Unfortunately, it’s my opinion that in at least some aspects the society that they
sought to build, with its emphasis on an idealised rural agricultural life and militarism backed by an insane racial
hatred of its immediate neighbours, has parallels to Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the ongoing Zionist
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occupation of Palestine. Particularly with the Zionist occupation, it shares the tactic of repeated forced
“evacuations” designed as torture to break the will of the people. As Hamas is apparently hiding in every water
tower, school, and hospital in the Gaza Strip and beyond, so too did every family, village, and “cooperative” in
“Democratic” Kampuchea have a Vietnamese spy.

The clique’s virulent hatred of the Vietnamese is what allowed it to maintain a base of support in the west and
particularly in the United States, which, fresh from its destructive and rapacious war in Viet Nam, was fully
prepared to accept any claim to Vietnamese barbarity which both necesssitated the extreme police state
measures of the regime as well as caused the millions of deaths now confirmed in the mass graves all
throughout Cambodia.

That the Vietnamese living in Cambodia constituted in large part the country’s proletariat also probably
confirmed their status as a particular target. The Pot-Sary clique was anti-proletarian, through and through.
Rather than developing the skills of its indigenous proletariat and putting them to work, this proletariat, freshly
created by the American carpet bombing all throughout Cambodia, were treated like an enemy and singled out
for harsh treatment and eventually killed. The communist old guard were also mostly killed, and the 1500 or so
communists who had sought refuge in Viet Nam, and who had been educated in exile and therefore almost
definitely constituted the most ideologically capable members of the party, after returning due to the seizure of
power, were also all killed. These events are also alluded to below.

The Cambodian Party, although decades old, had never had a high level of ideological achievement. Pol Pot and
Ieng Sary, along with fifteen or so other people, were a clique of privileged youth who had studied in France, and
returned in 1960. Their experience confirms the Stalinist teachings on the internal struggle within the party, and
the necessity to avoid factionalism and ideological pluralism. The party, recently decimated by a traitor who fed
information on its members and leaders to the illegal coup government of Lon Nol, and then consisting of fewer
than a hundred members, none of whom had been formally educated, and whose communist education
consisted of only a few translated texts, most of them by Mao, whose preference is to “let a thousand flowers
bloom” rather than properly conduct a class struggle within the party, seems to have easily fallen prey to this
relatively articulate and educated group, especially as willing and apparently able as it was to exploit racial
animosities between the Khmer and Vietnamese party members.

Because the western imperialists were so eager to swallow any lie about a communist regime, so-called or
actual, American “communist groups”, despite the anti-Marxist and anti-proletarian ideas and claims apparent
even in carefully measured statements to foreign press by foreign minister Ieng Sary, about a “society for which
there is no model” guided by the “democratic spontaneity of the masses” and so forth, worked to defend the
Pot-Sary clique from the claims of genocide. In this fog of war the wisest comment may have been none at all, or
the second-wisest, after that which could have been made on the party’s anti-Marxist line in light of, for
instance, Chapter II of Lenin’s What Is To Be Done, which disproves this line entirely. Really, one needn’t even go
that far, as a Marxist-Leninist path of development does have models and so a society claiming not to have one
straightforwardly cannot be Marxist-Leninst. As a foreign diplomat, the task of pointing this out was not
Stamo’s to do.

I have not seen any American group which undertook this line of attack. Many of them accused the Vietnamese
of being aggressive Soviet puppets and backed the fascist line of Ieng Sary. This would also be the line of both
the United States and its ally China, which continued to hold Cambodia under siege after the war in which the
Pot-Sary clique were deposed, through non-recognition of the revolutionary government established by the
United Front, whose Central Committee was entirely Cambodian, and many of whose commanders were
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Cambodian, and which was widely supported by a simultaneous uprising of the Cambodian people, on the
grounds of this argument. The United States and China insisted until the mid-1990s that the legitimate
government of Cambodia was the genocidal Pot-Sary clique and none other, although this government had
been deposed easily in the space of two weeks, by that time even weaker than the previous government of Lon
Nol.

Not only was Cambodia held under blockade for daring to defend itself from a genocide, but Viet Nam was
ostracised by the “international community” for its role in the “invasion”, the same “international community”
which is now aiding the Zionist occupation in its holocaust against the Palestinians. Many countries cut off trade
relations, claiming that the “Vietnamese invasion” of Cambodia constituted an act of aggression, even though it
deposed the group that those same countries had been decrying more or less accurately as genocidal monsters
mere weeks prior. This placed a severe economic strain on Viet Nam, then fresh out of its war against the
Americans, which necessitated it to join ASEAN and so forth.

The death toll of the Pot-Sary clique is estimated at between a quarter and an eighth of the total population of
Cambodia. Exact figures cannot be known, because new mass graves are still being discovered, and what few
records were kept were mostly destroyed by the clique during the invasion. Differences in the count seem to
stem from legitimate methodological differences rather than ideologically-driven genocide denial.
Foreign communists have disregarded the experiences of the governments of southeast asia as revisionist
capitalist roaders, etc. I can say with my new knowledge of Cambodia’s circumstances, I no longer feel
comfortable dismissing them as revisionists. War-weary Cambodia, whose entire proletariat, whose entire
educated population, whose entire communist old guard, had recently been killed in an unimaginable genocide;
economically backwards Cambodia, with no industry, with no education system, with no medicine, already to be
held in a blockade of no recognition, undertook a path of development that was successful and continues to be
successful. Cambodians, and foreigners who have spent an appreciable amount of time in Cambodia, universally
tell me that every year the country has more hospitals, more education, more paved roads, more industry, and
so forth. The Communist Party of Albania, during its war, aimed to create a liberal democratic country which
could develop under capitalist conditions, which the CPA would lead in a coalition with the other patriotic
parties; circumstances dictated otherwise, but that was the plan. Stamo, below, also criticises the Pot-Sary
clique for sidelining the other parties which had also fought against Lon Nol and unilaterally undertaking a
radical course of development.

It is true that Albania’s example proves that even very backwards countries can develop under a socialist road.
But Albania’s example also proves that every foreign country on earth will stop at nothing to prevent it from
doing so. Only a psychopath or an idiot would fault war-weary, post-genocide Cambodia for not wanting to
start a war against the entire world. For that matter, The United Front consisted not only of communists but
also of former independence fighters, as well as civilians and Buddhist monks, all fighting in an honourable
manner for progressive objectives, outlined in an 11-point program which was agreed upon by all the fighters. I
am not convinced that circumstances were right in 1979, or have been since, for Cambodian communists to
unilaterally declare a war against the entire world. I remind you that even internally Pol Pot remained in the
jungles until his death in the late 1990s, keeping the country already on a wartime footing.
In my eyes, the people of Cambodia have earned a break, and eagerly await the advent of a powerful,
revolutionary ally, like Albania had in Stalin’s Soviet Union.

Of course, these are only the feelings of an amateur historian.

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The President of the Association of Extra-European Studies, Prof. Vittorio Antonio Salvadorini, along with the
editor-in-chief of “Africana” Dr. Giovanni Armillotta and the Scientific Committee, express their gratitude to His
Excellency, Dr. Dhimiter Thimi Stamo, former ambassador to South-East Asia, the Far East and Africa, as well as
diplomat of clear fame, for having chosen our magazine as a forum for your memorial and photographic
sources as the Albanian Plenipotentiary Minister in Cambodia.

Dhimiter Thimi Stamo was the first European ambassador to have had direct contacts and held personal talks
with the entire executive of Phnom Penh from 1975 to 1978, at a time when especially the sad figure of Prime
Minister Pol Pot evaded formal meetings and photo shoots. The Editorial Committee thanks Dr. Loreta Stamo
for her precious collaboration. Photos 4 and 6 were kindly made available to us by the Author; photos 1, 2, 3
and 5 are taken from the photographic archive of the ‘Cambodia Genocide Program’ of Yale University.
While waiting to leave.

Friendly relations between Albania and Cambodia have been cultivated for years, and diplomatic relations have
been established since 1962. At that time no embassies were opened, but during the entire period — both
before the coup d’état of Gen. Lon Nol (18 March 1970), and during the war against the republican regime
(1970–1975) — contacts between the two countries were continuous. Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk,
authoritative representatives of the Gouvernement Royal de Union National du Kampuchéa, and leaders of the
Parti Communiste du Kampuchéa (not yet officially manifested with this name) often visited Albania. Our
country supported without reservation the Front Uni National du Kampuchéa, the GRUNK and the anti-coup
guerrilla; Albania was the first state that — through the government declaration of April 1970 —condemned
the illegal coup government of Gen. Lon Nol.

The Cambodians opened their embassy in Tirana since 1970, but our country — responding to GRUNK’s request
(formulated after the end of the war) — decided to open the embassy in Phnom Penh, but without having even
superficial knowledge of the particular situation created there after 17 April 1975 (date of the fall of the
republican state). On the contrary. Since the Cambodians insisted that the ambassador be sent as soon as
possible, they requested my government that I urgently go to Beijing on November 15, 1975, together with the
first secretary [Enver Hoxha], and so it was done. But for Cambodia, the Albanian representation left only on
December 2nd, since there was no regular route, and we waited for a good two weeks for the flight of the
Chinese plane which from time to time went to Phnom Penh, according to the needs of some delegation or for
other reasons.

From my stay in China — thanks to contacts and conversations held especially with my Cambodian colleague in
Beijing — I believed that the situation in the country could not be considered “normal”: but what we saw and
experienced there went beyond all thoughts and imagination.

2. We are in Cambodia

From the moment we arrived at the airport, where the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
welcomed us, something uncommon was perceived. Pochentang gave the impression of a military airport,
equipped with strong security measures. We left immediately by car preceded by an armed escort. Along the
way, we observed many armed garrisons and numerous checkpoints. But the biggest surprise was the situation
we found in Phnom Penh. The country’s capital looked like an abandoned and deserted city, without
inhabitants and without any sign of normal life. No people could be seen in the houses, and the shops and clubs
were all closed. Only armed soldiers patrolled the streets, guarding additional checkpoints, especially at
intersections, some of which were blocked by Frisian horses.
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In the building chosen as the temporary headquarters, Ieng Sary, second vice prime minister with responsibility
for foreign affairs, was waiting for us, with whom — after the usual greetings and best wishes — we held a brief
conversation. In the evening Ieng Sary offered a banquet in our honor, and this was also the opportunity for a
more extensive dialogue. Discussing the war and the situation in the country, he stated that — as we had
already noted — the population of the capital had been evacuated for various reasons, among other things
because the executive had received information about a bombing by the Americans. Ieng Sary stated that, in
the eight months that have passed since the victory on April 17, the country was still in a state of war and
consequently the working and living conditions for embassies and diplomatic personnel would also have been
affected.

3. The sad conditions of the population. Evidence of horror

Later, in conversations with other Cambodian leaders and officials and diplomats residing there — and during
some visits organized for us — we realized that the population of all the cities without exception had been
evacuated. People were sent to villages and outlying areas, conducted in accommodation of inadequate
conditions: above all in tents only equipped with coverings to protect from the rain. Based on the information
gathered, the evacuation of citizens had been carried out since April 17, furiously and forcefully in a very short
period, leaving no inhabitants behind, including the sick, the elderly and pregnant women (some of whom were
about to give birth or were giving birth). All this was done without means of transport, and at the worst time of
the year, when the tropical climate just before the rainy season produces unbearable heat and humidity. They
were citizens, most of whom were used to living in urban comfort, among luxurious villas equipped with air
conditioning and other comforts.

Among the diplomats of Phnom Penh it was said that part of the urban classes had refused to leave the city,
and abuses were exercised against these people, to the point of physical liquidation. Traces of haste and
violence were also noticed in the abandoned houses. Making a visit with a representative of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to some residential villas and offices, I observed that in them there was stuff for strictly personal
use ready to take away, which was then not allowed; in some homes there were evident signs of extreme
brutality. I refused to stay in a villa suitable for our needs, since in the corridor of the second floor and on the
balcony there were clearly spots of coagulated blood, while in some rooms, among the disorganized objects,
there were also books and school notebooks, prepared to be taken in the evacuation, with the naive hope of
being able to continue their studies where the unfortunates were headed. I couldn’t hold back my emotion at
this horror, and I imagined the terrible scenes in that house, and the child who had packed his books and hadn’t
been able to take them. It seemed to me that the official noticed my state of mind and after I replied that the
villa was not suitable for our tasks, he interrupted the visit to other apartments, claiming that we would resume
it in a few days, after they had been cleaned. . Finally we chose as our official residence a villa recently built by a
French citizen who left shortly before the end of the war.

After the evacuation of the cities, the population — as already mentioned — was placed in peripheral villages,
forcibly integrating them into agricultural work processes, especially in the irrigation and drainage sector. It was
said around that all this was done in the name of the Maoist slogan “the village besieges the city”, but put into
practice in such an extreme way that even the Chinese themselves never carried it to such consequences in any
period of their contemporary history and in no area of the country/ During conversations with many
Cambodian leaders, I noted that they considered the urban populations parasitic: these — according to them —
did not produce anything important, and accentuated the fact that in the cities there were few industrial, food,
or light installations, and that citizens lived on the backs of peasants. Furthermore, in their opinion, among the
citizens there were numerous enemies of the Khmer Rouge government, linked to foreign intelligence; that
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corruption, immorality, etc. predominated in the cities. As for Phnom Penh, they claimed that its population
had doubled during the war, as “feudal” families and other wealthy classes had settled there: FUNK opponents
who had fled from the “liberated areas”. From the interviews it appeared that the evacuation was carried out
to: a) address the population’s food supply difficulties; b) prevent the organization and activities of opponents;
c) avoid the relative anxieties of the inhabitants in view of a radical change in the socio-economic structure of
the State; and d) make any contact or communication with foreigners impossible. Furthermore, it became
known that even in rural regions the system of moving from one area to another was adopted to also prohibit
contacts between local people and even between members of the same family and their relatives. The soldiers
who guarded our embassy told us that not only during the war, but also after April 17, they had no news of
their relatives and did not know of their fate.

Photo 1 — The National Bank of Cambodia, demolished by the Khmer Rouge in 1975 with dynamite, as a
symbol of the rejection of capitalism

Communication with foreign countries and within the same country was totally impossible since postal and
telephone services did not exist (10 thousand telephones were dismantled); even signs indicating roads or
other places, as well as basic traffic signs, were removed. In the aftermath of the evacuation, only the leaders
and officials of the party and state bodies remained in the cities; the personnel of the garrisons controlling the
roads and checkpoints; the staff of some hospitals or clinics, and some technicians for essential services, the
latter belonging to the army. There was no other public service, there was no type of market and not even bank
branches or money. The riel was declared out of circulation, shortly afterwards the National Bank was blown up
with explosives (photo 1), and paper money was scattered across the streets.

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4. The state of abandonment of the cities

In the first meetings, after our arrival in Phnom Penh, Ieng Sary and other leaders told us that the particular
situation the country was experiencing was temporary, and with the change in conditions, the work and life of
the diplomats would improve. But in reality nothing was seen to normalize the urban trend. After a few
months, the foreign minister, Sarin Chhak confirmed to me that the repopulation of the cities was not in the
plans, and even later (July 1977) the same thesis was expressed by the minister of social affairs, Ieng Thirith,
wife of Ieng Sary, who — after declaring that steps had not been taken and did not intend to be taken to
repopulate the cities — expressed concern about the difficulties encountered in maintaining the buildings and
restoring hygienic conditions. He argued that since the cities were emptied, and with a hot and excessively
humid climate, the houses and urban furnishings were ruining and decomposing, with the relative increase in
debris, dilapidations and waste, which favored the multiplication of flies, mosquitoes, poisonous insects, mice,
snakes, etc. In fact, these increased at exponential rates and became such a nuisance that it was impossible to
go out; rats and snakes proliferated not only in abandoned houses and rubbish heaps, but also in the streets
and embassy courtyards, not to mention the different species of lizards.

As the months passed, the situation in the cities worsened with the utmost administrative immobility of the
authorities, who, on the other hand, strengthened military measures to further control and limit movements.
Checkpoints and guards at intersections and on the roads increased dramatically; new barriers were erected
with barbed wire, and enormous metal plates were often seen to block passage and landscape. The same
garrison personnel and technicians moved in groups with means of transport, but under additional control.
There were no people walking around alone.

5. The classification of citizens

Initially, special aggregation centers collected the evacuees, later they were dispersed into small groups in the
villages, forcibly arranging them in the so-called “agricultural cooperatives”, which in truth were not such, since
cooperatives are organized based on group ownership, and in Cambodia there was no type of private property,
let alone group property. All movable and/or real estate, land, industries, manufacturing companies, means of
transport, buildings, and everything else were declared state or social property. The same applies to the goods
and wealth of foreigners, not recognizing the validity of loans or credits received before 7 April 1975 and even
before the coup d’état of 18 March 1970. Agricultural and industrial production was administered by the State.
There was no type of reward in money or kind. People ate in collective canteens twice a day. There was no
cooking in the family, not only because there was no market and any type of property that could ensure the
purchase of food, but also because the sale of products and their cooking were prohibited. On Radio Phnom
Penh (later Radio ‘Voice of Democratic Kampuchea’), in the only newspaper in the national language
“Padevoat” (revolution), and at party conferences, extensive propaganda was orchestrated against attempts to
cook simple soups on one’s own or wild herbs abundant on Cambodian soil: these initiatives were punished as
“manifestations of bourgeois individualism”. There was even a rationed distribution of clothing and basic
necessities: people dressed in the same way, males in black blouses and trousers, females in blouses and long
black skirts.

6. Family

Family life was significantly affected. In many cases men, young men of both sexes sent to work for long periods
in the construction of dams, artificial reservoirs, canals for irrigation and drainage; while elderly people, women
and children remained in their village homes. The children remained with the family unit until the age of seven.
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Then they were separated from their parents and gathered in special centers where they took care of various
jobs and only learned to read and write and some elements of arithmetic. According to a formal rule, children
were occasionally allowed to visit their loved ones at certain intervals, but according to some testimonies,
propaganda was carried out in the centers against the family considering it “anti-social” and the desire to join it
“bourgeois sentiment”. Therefore, it was said, that many children did not like returning to their parents to visit,
or they went very rarely.

The first year after April 17, marriages were also significantly limited, especially between boys and girls from
military units, under the pretext that the country was still in a state of war. As time passed, due to problems
inherent to a certain youthful impatience, marriages were permitted, but with the consent of the unit
commander, especially when the existence of relationships was evident, or to meet the needs of war invalids. It
was said that in one case a commander ordered twenty girls to line up in front of as many invalids, and forced
them to marry the person in front of them. Impossible to believe, but apparently true!

7. School, culture, art

In the field of education everything was abolished. Immediately, after April 17, every school of order and
degree was closed with maestros, teachers and professors sent to the countryside. School textbooks
disappeared from circulation, and in the beginning the children were gathered in the aforementioned centers
where they learned from the sole voice of the person in charge. Shortly afterwards there was talk of the
preparation of two new texts: grammar and simple arithmetic. Subsequently, courses were also organized with
young people from military units and villages, some of whom were illiterate; on the other hand, professional
sessions began on a practical basis, without books and without interruption of work. In the absence of qualified
teachers, trusted party officials were appointed to lead sessions and courses and teach; but these did not have
teaching experience and the necessary technical expertise.

In the field of culture and the arts, xenophobic and nihilistic conceptions aimed at despising foreign realities
and any value of the national heritage that belonged to the past took hold. All books were removed without
excluding any, both foreign and local: political and artistic literature was banned, as has been said, school
textbooks, volumes on science and technology and everything else found.

We asked for a method to learn the Khmer language from French; at the beginning the official from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us that he would do everything possible, but afterwards he let us know that
there were no grammar books for instruction because they had been destroyed. Institutions of art and culture
were similarly closed, and their representatives — writers, artists, and others — sent to labor camps. Only a
few short films, produced after the war, were shown via the mobile cinemas circulating around the villages;
television had been eradicated (the broadcasting studio and almost 30 thousand devices destroyed). There was
only one folk singing and dancing group, made up of boys and girls from the army, who gave rare shows on the
occasion of parties, conferences and assemblies. The repertoire consisted of pieces created after the war. Radio
Phnom Penh — the country’s only over-the-air mass media — broadcast short programs three times a day and,
apart from news only in the Khmer language, only Cambodian music written by the partisan forces or after the
civil conflict. Left without care and maintenance are the famous temples of Angkor Wat, Angkor Thom and
Bondeay Srei, a marvelous archaeological complex, the pinnacle of Khmer art and civilization, extending over an
area larger than that of the temple of Ammon in Karnak in Egypt. The approximately one hundred temples
were built by the kings of the powerful Khmer empire who expanded over a vast territory that extended from
the tip of present-day southern Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal (around the 10th century AD).

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8. Healthcare

Many problems and difficulties arose in the hygiene and health field. In the war conditions, then in the
particular situation that occurred the following day, combined with the tropical climate, many diseases spread
quickly; among these malaria claimed numerous victims. Malaria had always been a serious issue for Cambodia
even in previous years, but in wartime it had a vast spread, especially in the “liberated areas” where there was
a lack of health services, i.e. doctors, medicines and nursing staff. Malaria was mainly present in the north-east
of the country, where it was said that 80% of the population was affected by it, but — in the aforementioned
state of precariousness — it spread throughout Cambodia and in the 1970–75 war the number of deaths for
malaria, according to many, was superior to those killed in combat. The soldiers guarding our embassy were
also sick, and we tried to help them by offering them anti-malarial medicines that we had brought with us as a
precaution from Albania. After the seizure of power there were some attempts to improve the situation, but in
the following two years there was a general worsening. The removal of medical and paramedical staff to
agricultural work camps contributed to worsening the situation. The Khmer Rouge tried to remedy the situation
by calling in medical teams from China and sometimes from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; but it
was clear that the problem of healthcare personnel could not be solved with small foreign groups or even with
practical courses for nurses. Only after mid-1977 did the situation change somewhat. The Minister of Health,
Thiounn Thioeunn, told me during official talks that in 1977 health conditions had improved with a notable
decrease in diseases, especially malaria. According to him, while previously the peak reached 80% of the
population, it had now dropped to 30%; Thiounn emphasized that progress had been made thanks to increased
health services, etc., but nevertheless. This meant that many problems and difficulties existed, so measures
were taken to increase the production of medicines, repairing and putting the pharmaceutical factories
damaged during the war back into operation, and promoting herbal medicine based on medicinal plants of
which Cambodia was rich.

9. Religion

Religion initially passed unscathed, indeed in the Extraordinary National Congress (25–27 April 1975), among
the delegates of peasants, workers, FUNK, GRUNK, the Cambodian People’s National Liberation Armed Forces
and “revolutionary organisation”, 20 representatives also were members of the Buddhist clergy. But later the
behavior towards the confessional aspect suddenly changed. All the pagodas and other places of worship were
destroyed or converted into warehouses; the monks were sent to work in the fields or in the irrigation works
and drainage. In Cambodia there were numerous pagodas and the number of monks was around, according to
data, around 60 thousand. Discussing with the vice-president of the State Presidium So Phim (i.e. the deputy
head of State) and Ieng Sary, I learned that the actions in regarding religious faiths were undertaken for
political, ideological and economic reasons and, among other things, also in the context of the fight against
espionage that could be conducted “using” the Buddhist clergy. Furthermore, in the context, the methods to be
adopted towards ethnic minorities were also established, which could create many problems, such as the flight
of almost half a million Vietnamese from the country after April 17th.

10. The exacerbation of the class struggle

Both during the post-war period and afterwards, the Cambodian leaders intensified the fight against the class
stratification of the population, and individuals, considered opponents and enemies; especially the intellectuals,
the “feudals” and the other wealthy categories even within the party. Ieng Sary in April 1976 (when the
inaugural session of the People’s Assembly was held), told me:

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During the first three months of the year we discovered a considerable number of traitors who had been hiding
among us for a long time and also had roles in the party and in various institutions. They were agents of the
Americans, Soviets and Vietnamese [ … ] their common goal was to overthrow the government. Some of them
had been hiding in our ranks since before 1960.

A month later, Ieng himself informed me that in some areas groups of saboteurs had been unmasked, who had
attempted to carry out diversionary actions. Therefore, he claimed, security measures had recently been
tightened. Visiting a peripheral area, at the invitation of the local authorities, we noticed many checkpoints and
guards guarding the villages and meeting centers. It was clear that there had also been eliminations since the
early days of the Khmer Rouge power and subsequently (as is known, after the overthrow of Pol Pot many
torture and elimination camps were discovered [photo 2], and the mass graves came to light in municipalities
[photo 3]). But in this period only the dismissal and liquidation of officials at all levels, including ministers and
members of the party’s supreme bodies, was certain. The Minister of Information and Propaganda, Hu Nim,
and the Minister of Public Works, Telecommunications and Reconstruction, Toch Phoeun, who had previously
been present at almost all public events and embassy receptions, were no longer seen on any occasion, and
according to the facts they were removed and eliminated.

Photo 2 — The Tuol Sleng extermination camp. The former Phnom Penh high school became “S-21“, a torture
camp for the Khmer Rouge secret police. Today it is the “Tuol Sleng” Genocide Museum.

10
Photo 3 — Exhumation of thousands of corpses in Choeung Ek, 1980

Talking about it with the Chinese ambassador, Sun Hau, he told me that he too was struck by their absence. He
highlighted this by pointing out to me that they hadn’t even seen each other in the documentary Current
Affairs from Democratic Kampuchea, a film shot by the Chinese, despite the fact that during the filming some
clapperboards had been dedicated especially to Hu Nim, who accompanied the film crew from Beijing. The
ambassador assured me that the reels had been delivered in full to the Cambodians, but evidently there had
been cuts. My colleague, continuing, confirmed the dismissals and perhaps even physical suppressions of
leaders such as the minister of armaments and military equipment, Men San (formerly first secretary of the
North-East Province), and that of economy and finance, Koy Thuon. Even later, new departures from official
positions were learned (Chou Chet, Hou Youn, Norodom Phurissara, Sarin Chhak, etc.).

11. Sihanouk

Among the leadership of the Khmer Rouge there have always been different and conflicting opinions on the
development and situation of the country: on the attitude to be taken towards Prince Sihanouk and how to
treat him, on foreign policy and international relations, and above all on relations with Vietnam and other
countries in the Indochina and western regions. In the clash at the summit, it was clear that the Pol Pot-Ieng
Sary clique, with a pro-Chinese orientation, strengthened its positions thanks to the dismissals and liquidations
of the aforementioned senior officials, some of whom were said to be pro-Vietnamese, or due to balanced
relations between Beijing and Hanoi. As is known, following the coup d’état of Gen. Lon Nol and Sisowath Sirik
Matak of 18 March 1970, Prince Sihanouk, who was returning home after a stay of over two months in France

11
— accompanied by the former Prime Minister Prince Samdech Penn Nouth and other supporters — stopped in
Beijing. Here on March 23 he launched an appeal to create FUNK with the intention of overthrowing the coup
regime through armed struggle. With the support of the Chinese government, Sihanouk made contact with the
guerrilla leaders who were already fighting in the country and together they formed the Front and the GRUNK,
with the Prince as head of state and Penn Nouth as prime minister. Three former left-wing deputies, then
guerrilla leaders, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim became ministers of defense, interior and information
respectively. Without going into the details of the five-year conflict, I note that Sihanouk’s activity was based on
the great sympathy that the Prince enjoyed from his people, receiving further support from them; the same can
be said for the high regard in which he was held by a large part of public opinion and international circles.
Sihanouk, together with his collaborators and supporters, made an active contribution during the war. Even
after April 17, 1975 he continued to support the Cambodian government with public statements, as well as
visits and meetings with the people of the “liberated areas”, encouraging Cambodia’s development. In foreign
relations, he traveled to many countries and contacted representatives of other states at international forums.

The vast worldwide support for the war against the regime of Gen. Lon Nol, the recognition of GRUNK by
almost 80 capitals, was largely due to his personality, the favorable reception he enjoyed, his personal
relationships on a global basis, and his undoubted savoirfaire. Sihanouk returned permanently to Phnom Penh
on 31 December 1975, after returning from visits to some countries, including Albania. At Pochentang airport
he was welcomed by an official ceremony in honor of the head of state, in the presence of all the country’s
senior leaders (except Pol Pot who was not publicly and officially known at the time) and the diplomatic corps.
The next day a reception was set up to celebrate his return, where the national leaders and the ambassadors
accredited to Cambodia took part.

Apart from this occasion, I met Sihanouk at the banquet that our embassy hosted on 11 January 1976 (below),
and also at an official dinner that the Prince and his wife Monique gave in my honor at the Royal Palace on 2
February, where the Minister of Health, Thiounn Thioeunn, an old friend of the Head of State, was present. The
symposium passed in a warm and friendly atmosphere. Sihanouk first of all thanked for the Albanian support
for the struggle of the Cambodian people and for the special hospitality with which he had been welcomed in
Tirana. This was my last meeting with the Prince.

Meanwhile, until the eve of the March 20 elections, Sihanouk continued visits to different areas of Cambodia,
accompanied by Penn Nouth, Khieu Samphan, and others: he was welcomed with honors as head of state. In
his speeches, the Prince assessed and supported the needs and development of the country, expressing joy at
the possibility of living and working together with his people. All this was broadcast by Radio Phnom Penh and
“Pakdevoat”.

Reflecting on what has been said, it was thought that — although he was far from the levers of power — after
the elections Sihanouk could still be appointed head of state by the People’s Assembly with Penn Nouth as one
of the vice presidents. But at the same time it was clear that the Khmer Rouge had reservations about him, as
he had been a monarch. In a conversation with some ambassadors, in response to a question about Sihanouk’s
future prerogatives, Ieng Sary replied that the Prince did not give credit to those who had informed him of the
general’s intentions. Lon Nol, in fact, even had them arrested, although Ieng was keen to point out that it was
all over and that “now he is a good patriot”. But in 1972, in private, Ieng had already confided to me that since
the war there had been a group within the party that refused to collaborate with Sihanouk, recalling him as
king-prince for thirty years, as well as his collaboration in distinct moments with France, Japan, United States of
America, etc. However, part of the Cambodian leadership did not agree with sidelining Sihanouk and, weighing

12
the contribution and support he received at home and abroad, decided to leave him in the ranks of the
resistance.

According to rumors coming from well-informed local sources, there was a frequent rumor that he would
remain in the saddle for a certain time, holding the honorary rank of president of the State Presidium. Sihanouk
himself, although often expressing the desire to resign, did not do so, declaring that the revolutionary leaders
insisted that he remain; indeed, in a meeting with some diplomats (February 1976), he repeatedly expressed
his hope of leading the Cambodian delegation to the VI Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Havana, 16–19
August). But unlike what we expected, on the evening of April 4, at around 10:00 pm, we received an official
statement in which he “asked the national leadership to accept his resignation; at the same time the document
from the executive in Phnom Penh arrived, he was awarded the title of ‘Great Patriot, the state commitment to
raise a monument in his honor in the capital, and a pension of 8 thousand dollars a year. In reality, nothing
came of this, and as we learned later, the Prince was placed in home isolation, guarded by soldiers.

Sihanouk’s resignation was deemed sudden, and was said to be a late-day decision. Rumors circulated that the
incident expressed the will of the group that supported the prince’s definitive removal, but also for other
reasons. It was obvious that Sihanouk could not agree with the replacement of the old non-communist officials,
who had been following and supporting him for years after the coup: the Khmer Rouge did not care if they had
served during the anti-republic war. Furthermore, aside from superficial declarations, Sihanouk — when he
visited the provinces — could not help but have doubts about the radical changes taking place in Cambodia
including the various physical liquidations. Since his resignation he has never been seen or remembered
publicly again. Only on 24 October 1977 (one year, six months and twenty days), two days after the return of
the CPK delegation, led by Pol Pot — which visited China and the DPR of Korea — were three letters from
Sihanouk sent 1 ) to the Central Committee of the party on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of its
foundation, 2) to Pol Pot congratulating him for the successes achieved in Beijing and Pyongyang and 3) to the
delegation thanking him for the gifts brought to him. But later I learned that the letters had been written to him
by the Chinese, during the visit of the Cambodian guests, so that in a certain way answers could be given to
those (foreign capitals, international public opinion, and the mass media) who asked for news about his fate,
and to silence the news agencies from speculating that he had been killed. After the three letters, there were
others: 3 January, 17 April and 28 June 1978, while he reappeared in public on 28 September of the same year,
at a reception for the XVIII anniversary of the PCK.

From the meetings and conversations held with Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, I remember the vast
culture, patriotism and desire he had to serve his country and his people; I clearly perceived the joy and
pleasure that he felt and expressed in his incessant political and diplomatic actions and initiatives, which he
recalled with incomparable enthusiasm. He expressed these feelings especially in the reception he gave on 11
January 1976, for the 30th anniversary of the Albanian Republic. While conversing, he felt great joy in telling me
that the new flag of ‘Democratic Kampuchea’ had also been hoisted in his palace, and when one of the officials
specified that it had been the first to be raised in the country, Sihanouk, expressing his utmost satisfaction,
stated that this demonstrated that it had been accepted by all the people… he certainly couldn’t have known
what was happening.

12. The communist nomenclature

The People’s Assembly, which emerged from the political consultations of 20 March 1976, closed its work on 13
April. Khieu Samphan was elected to the Presidency of the State Presidium, Nuon Chea at the head of its
Permanent Committee, and Pol Pot as Prime Minister. So Phim and Nhim Ros were also appointed as deputies
13
to the Presidium, and Nguon Kang and Peou Sou deputy to the Permanent Committee. They were members of
the PCK leadership, as were the three vice prime ministers: Ieng Sary (minister of foreign affairs), Vorn Vet
(minister of economy) and Son Sen (minister of defence). Pol Pot and Nuon Chea were respectively general
secretary and deputy secretary of the party, while the others were members of the Political Bureau or its
Permanent Committee.

Before the elections Pol Pot had no government function and was unknown to us. He revealed himself for the
first time on the occasion of his nomination as prime minister (but without mentioning his functions within the
PCK); However, even after the premiership, for a certain time he did not take part in the meetings where the
presence of the diplomatic corps was expected. I and other colleagues saw him later and only at the airport or
at receptions during visits by high-level delegations. To my requests to meet him after his election as prime
minister, he never responded.

13. The “revolutionary organization”

With the ousting of Sihanouk, Penn Nouth and the other non-communist leaders were also sidelined, and in
conversations with local officials, we learned that they were purging all the old officials, replacing them with
war veterans and proven communist faithful. In doing so, the PCK was acquiring total direction of the country,
isolating the other forces with which it had collaborated during the partisan war and in the first years of power.
But even if, in general, the existence of the PCK was intuited, it remained “underground” for a certain period.
Discussing with Ieng Sary on this aspect, he revealed to me that — given the conditions of the country — the
party had to still remain hidden, as for reasons concerning the international scenario, the idea of a democracy
“for which there was no model” and “non-aligned” had to be given. Some Arab and African ambassadors,
resident in Beijing and Hanoi, who then came to present their credentials, told me that Cambodian leaders had
claimed that there was no party that guided the nation’s fate, and that Cambodia was a democratic country on
the path to self-sufficiency.

But in the meantime the communist leaders intensified their propaganda and hastened the time needed to
prepare the party for citizens and international public opinion. In the atmosphere as we lived day after day, we
increasingly felt the presence and role of the “revolutionary organization” (which in fact was the PCK), thanks to
which “all successes were achieved under its correct and far-sighted guidance”. Subsequently, people began to
talk about the “struggle of the revolutionary forces” — even before General Lon Nol’s coup d’etat- “against
American imperialism and the traitors of the country”. Among other things, in February ’77, in the gathering
organized for the ninth anniversary of the foundation of the army, emphasis was placed on the fact that the
armed forces created in 1968 had their origins in the decision of the “revolutionary organization” to establish
strategy and tactics of the “democratic revolution” since 1960. And the victory of April 17 was achieved, since
the military policy of the “revolutionary organization” was based on the line of the “people’s war” (another
Maoist concept). It ignored the role of FUNK and GRUNK, dedicating the propaganda completely to “the
Organisation”. Even when the seventh anniversary of the Front was just remembered, it was preferred to
rename it Front National Democratique instead of Front Uni National, as it had actually been called since 1970.
In the radio commentary it was said that since 1960, the ‘revolutionary organization’ had already chosen the
line of the ‘democratic revolution’, and under its auspices the Front National Democratique had been created,
which only after the coup d’état was officially founded , mobilizing all democratic patriotic forces, regardless of
the political tendencies and social origins of its adherents. In addition to this, the partisan war that began in the
1960s was talked about several times, highlighting that in 1967 Gen. Lon Nol’s group provoked the civil war
while in 1968 the real resistance began. In that period, Gen. Lon Nol was prime minister and Sihanouk head of
state, therefore the move is intended to disavow the Prince, to attempt to obscure his role and contribution. At
14
this point, although not yet publicly announced, the party absolutely guided the life of the country. In the
conversations during the visit I made in May 1977 to the Eastern Province with Ieng Sary and So Phim they
confirmed to me that the communist party was leading at all levels and in every field. I noticed that in factories,
companies and agricultural cooperatives, there were no state bodies, and that the self-styled ones were
nothing other than the party committees; while those who assumed the functions of directors, leaders,
managers, were the secretaries of these Committees, they behaved and were treated as commanders of
military units.

14. The Communist Party of Kampuchea

The public “revelation” of the Parti Communiste du Kampuchéa was organized for September 1977. A few days
before, during a luncheon with the ambassadors and the entire diplomatic corps (24 September), Ieng Sary
made it known that on 29 September, on the eve of the 17th anniversary of its foundation (30 September
1960) the relevant official ceremony would take place. The celebrations began on the agreed day, as Pol Pot
and companions left the country for China and the DPR of Korea. The celebrations lasted three days; Many
activities took place and the radio broadcasts closed the programs with the tones of the Internationale and the
national anthem.

As mentioned, they informed us that the party had been founded on September 30, 1960, while previously it
was stated that the date of birth corresponded to 1951, after the dissolution of the Communist Party of
Indochina. Ieng Sary himself communicated the date 1951 to me in the conversations in 1972 and we believed
it to be so until the beginning of 1976, when in one of the many meetings with the Foreign Minister (April), he
surprised me by communicating the change in the date of foundation brought to the aforementioned 30
September 1960, when the first congress was held. Ieng underlined that the party assembly was not organized
in 1951 and added that the line of the PCK and its statute were drawn up in the years 1958–59. The news
reached me in a contradictory and discordant way: when I met with the Laotian ambassador, he told me that in
truth the PCK had been founded in ’51, at the dissolution of the Communist Party of Indochina and that a
congress had even been held. Continuing to talk to my colleague he stated:

The change of the date was devised to further distance the Communist Party of Cambodia from the Communist
Party of Indochina, which is also clearly understood from the statements of the Cambodian leaders when they
affirm that in their party there were none of the former members of the Communist Party of Indochina, nor of
the leaders of the early fifties. This is not true because there are such leaders, and among them there is also the
deputy general secretary Nuon Chea.

Some claimed that the change in date was also due to the fact that Pol Pot and his acolytes only joined the
party in 1960; and the pulpit group continually tried to gradually distance the PCK from the influence of the
Vietnamese Workers’ Party. Ieng Sary told me that in 1954 about 1,500 Cambodians who had fled the country
had gathered in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and later returned to their homeland but with “not right”
ideas. In 1972–73, Ieng continued, these were purged and the party appointed new cadres.
In this way, Pol Pot and his clique, both during the war and after, aimed to strengthen their leadership role; in
the aftermath of the liquidations and the overshadowing of Sihanouk and his court — from what I could see —
the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique had gathered absolute power with both hands also through family ties: the
respective consorts were the Khieu sisters Ponary and Ieng Thirith, respectively president of the Cambodian
Women’s Association and minister of social affairs (themselves sisters of Khieu Samphan). As clique ties
strengthened, relations with China became closer and broader in all fields: political, economic, military, etc.;
relations with Vietnam slowly faded away until their complete interruption and the armed conflict.
15
15. Agriculture

In the economic field, agriculture came to the fore, especially the increase in rice production to meet the
population’s food needs, and for the consequent exports. Rice was said to be “strategic and basic to the
economy of “Democratic Kampuchea”. The entire population was subjected to the service of agriculture, also
employing a part of the workers of the industrial companies and also the personnel of the military units in the
irrigation and drainage system. In the climatic conditions — for the six months of the wet season the rain beats
daily and in the others drought predominates — intense efforts were made in every area for the construction
of canals and basins, and the irrigation of the rice fields during the dry period, in order to achieve two rice
harvests per year, and even three in some provinces; taking into account that the rice cycle lasts approximately
four months, the Cambodian climate, with good irrigation, could allow it. Insisting wildly in achieving the
objectives, the watchword was “the water comes from the canals, the rice from the water, and everything from
the rice”. Not only from the data in our possession, but also from what we saw in the visits organized by the
party committees, it was clearly noted that vast forces were concentrated in these works and that the
timetable included twelve working hours per day. Within a relatively short time, results beyond all expectations
were achieved, with the erection of many dams and reservoirs that multiplied the possibilities of irrigation, and
according to officials, by 1976 two rice crops were obtained in one third of the agricultural area, equal to the
entire 1975 harvest. Total production went beyond expectations, and an increase of 900 thousand tons was
expected, a good part of this destined for export. In reality and from conversations with local managers it
seemed that the desired results had not been achieved, as yields were low and the floods damaged the crops. It
was said that more care should be taken for services aimed at increasing production, and that further steps
should be taken to optimize drainage, in order to reduce the consequences of frequent floods in the rainy
season. It was decided to build a motor pump factory with the help of China. In the opinion of the managers an
increase in production would be achieved, and at the end of 1977 two harvests were hoped for in two thirds of
the arable land. In a conversation with Ieng Sary, he argued that once this was achieved, two million tons would
be obtained for export, without excluding the possibility of increasing the agricultural area where other crops,
such as corn, soybeans, cassava, etc. would have priority.

But even if it was publicly stated that “despite the drought the objectives had been achieved and exceeded”, in
truth the predictions did not come true for 1977 either. My impressions were confirmed by Mrs. Ieng Thirith,
Minister of Social Affairs, who after indicating that there had been good results in some sectors, told me that
“especially in agriculture the objectives had not been achieved” due to of the extraordinary drought. But this
wasn’t the only reason. Among other things, from my personal observations, it was clear that the mobilization
and forced labor of the first two years had significantly decreased. Despite the police state, people began to
express tiredness and anguish over the difficulties in various ways, hoping for a normal life and work. It was
clear that the extraordinary climate created in the country could not be perpetuated; furthermore, according to
the information obtained, there had been problems in the villages and work centers also due to sabotage. A
symptom is the fact that on the radio and in the newspaper appeals were made for unity and compactness to
increase mobilization and discipline at work, to also save tools and other materials; and to the fight against
“liberalism, selfishness and individualism, and other manifestations of private property”.

16. Industry

Relatively little was said about the industry. From local and diplomatic sources, it seemed that following the
interruption of work in the industrial plants in the first period — due to their damage during the war and the
expulsion of specialized workers, technicians and managers evacuated together with the city’s population —
attempts began to reorganize work, especially in companies that manufactured consumer items. The deputy
16
prime minister and defense minister, Son Sen, explained to me that even if some specialists and selected
workers had returned, there were inconveniences due to the fact that the peasant-soldiers sent to the plants to
replace the workers were inexperienced, and this it also caused accidents with serious consequences for people
and equipment. Another case is the lack of raw materials and spare parts, a consequence of the breakdown in
economic and mercantile relations with other countries and, especially, with those that had supplied and/or
built the majority of the machines or factories: Bulgaria , Czechoslovakia, France, Democratic Germany, Federal
Germany, Japan, Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland,
Singapore, the United States and the Soviet Union. On this aspect, Vorn Vet, deputy prime minister and
minister of the economy, pointed out to me that in the beginning the reserves were used, but especially after
the first months of 1976, the situation became very serious and some production lines were interrupted.
According to him, attempts were being made to secure raw materials and other necessary materials through
third countries.

17. Natural resources

Aside from the aforementioned hints, Cambodia — favored by its humid heat and geographical position — has
many resources, which with good administration would then have ensured abundance and prosperity. In
addition to rubber plants, the country is rich in forests of various types, having enormous possibilities for
producing high quality cotton, coffee, pepper, fruit and produce in large quantities. The Mekong river and its
branches as well as the other river courses, the Tonle Sap lake and the coast are rich in fish and other fish
products, indeed — half-jokingly — it is said that in Cambodia fish is not only found in water, but also under the
ground and on plants. I said half-jokingly, because up to a certain point it’s true. During the rainy season many
surfaces fill with water up to the branches of the plants, thus forming small swamps or temporary basins. At the
end of the season, as the floods recede, many fish become trapped in the mud, and when the waters subside
the fish also remain on the leaves of the plants which are very large. At a fish center on the Mekong, where the
diplomatic corps was invited, we ourselves saw that the net was pulled every 10–15 minutes and was always
full.

Of various types of fruit, some of which grow on the sides of the roads, I can recall several assortments of
banana, coconut, pineapple, mango, papaya, citrus, etc. But a very important wealth for Cambodia is natural
rubber, considered the main export product. At the time there were plantations that occupied a total of
approximately 70 thousand hectares. When I went with Ieng Sary to two provinces in the North and East, I saw
three rubber plantations, including the largest in the country, Crochoup, where 30 thousand workers were
employed. Near the plantations there were also factories for the preliminary treatment, the preparation of
crepa, and the packaging for exports. As is well known, previously the rubber lands belonged to the French;
expounding on this point Ieng Sary commented that the former colonialists kept the plantations isolated and
the locals were forbidden to enter them. The technical staff and engineers were French or other nationalities,
but the workers were mostly Vietnamese. During the visit to the Chomka Andoung plantation, they told us that
the French had created as a State within a State, off limits to the local authorities. The production complex
(crops, factories, etc.) was administered separately by the Parisian authorities, with distinct institutions and
services: judicial bodies (!), banks, postal service, telephone lines, hospitals, clinics, airport, shopping centre,
cinema, other entertainment venues, etc. Ieng went on to state that the French earned very high incomes and
added that they faced all of their expenses solely with the income from the sale of the third choice crepa, which
was the lowest quality (it was produced from the latex, which leaked from the barrels and was collected on the
floors), while the proceeds from the first and second choice were a net profit. Continuing, he told me that in
the aftermath of the coup, the French left the plantations located within the “liberated areas”, and the
Vietnamese residing there tried to administer and exploit them on their own, trying not to let the local workers
17
in as they had no experience. , but this was not accepted by the Cambodians. Within a short time, all the
Vietnamese left, and since the beginning of the civil war, indigenous workers took over production, repairing
treatment plants damaged by hostilities. In 1976 it was claimed that 60,000 tons of crepa had been produced,
at a price between 700 and 850 US dollars per ton. During the inspection we observed efforts to increase
production by cultivating new areas with the plant “hevea”, and by increasing the number of factories for the
treatment of “latex”, with the aim of reaching 100 thousand tons per year. Although the predictions did not
come true completely, it must be stated that especially in the rice harvest and in the production of rubber, as
well as in irrigation and drainage works, notable tours de force were carried out and goals were achieved, but
numbers in hand and personal visions taken, the same was not done to best optimize each of the
aforementioned potential resources.

18. The activities of the Albanian embassy

In the circumstances created by Cambodian specificities, living and working conditions were also arduous and
very limited. At the beginning of 1976, ten embassies had been opened in Phnom Penh (Albania, China, the DPR
of Korea, Cuba, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Laos, Romania, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Vietnam and the RDP of Vietnam). With the unification of the two Vietnams (25 April 1976), they
dropped to nine and with the breakdown of relations with Hanoi (31 December 1977) and Cuba they went to
seven. Apart from the Chinese and Vietnamese embassies, the others were in the same street, 400 meters long,
the ends of which were barred and guarded by armed guards; diplomatic personnel were not allowed to move
beyond these limits, except when they had to travel to participate in activities or go on guided tours, but always
with the obligation to employ local drivers.

After my arrival, on the same day, as illustrated, I met Ieng Sary; after a week I met with the prime minister in
office, Penn Nouth and with Khieu Samphan (then vice prime minister and commander in chief of the FALNPC),
with whom I held talks informal and friendly, subsequently contact with the two of them became quite scarce.
It often happened that in three-four weeks no type of activity was organized, apart from a few visits that we
exchanged with colleagues from the few embassies. Meetings with people not from the apparatus were totally
impossible. Even visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were avoided. For this purpose, a Protocol official was
appointed who occasionally came to the embassies to bring communications or to discuss the solution to
technical problems. But even his visits, over time, became more and more sporadic; in the end he only came
when we sent for him on the condition of forwarding the request through the soldier who was guarding the
delegation headquarters. There wasn’t even a telephone service for the embassies, which could not
communicate with their countries, nor with Cambodian institutions, much less with each other… except for the
ancient voice mail system, both to invite and to meet government figures.

Even for the presentation of credentials the classic ritual was not applied, for which initially a visit was made to
the director general of the Protocol and only later to the minister of foreign affairs to hand over the relevant
documents. As soon as I arrived in Phnom Penh, I informed the authorities that I had in my possession the
credentials addressed to the head of state, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, but they replied that their
presentation would take place later, the day after the elections of 20 March 1976, by virtue of the related
changes that the People’s Assembly would decide. Consequently, it was necessary to prepare new credential
documentation addressed to the president of the State Presidium, Khieu Samphan. Once the new credentials
arrived from Tirana on 30 April 1976, I notified the director general of the Protocol — present at the embassy
for communication — that I was ready for their presentation, reformulating the request for the ritual
exchanges. Since I received no response, I insisted again: only after ten days did a representative of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs arrive at the embassy and ask me for a copy of my credentials, stating that there was no need
18
to attend the meetings I requested. Finally, on 11 June 1976 — a good six months after my arrival in Phnom
Penh — I was able to present the credentials to Khieu Samphan, in the presence of Ieng Sary and other officials
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (photo 4). On this occasion we held talks regarding the friendship and
relations between our two countries.

But, as before, subsequent requests to meet with the leaders according to diplomatic practice all fell on deaf
ears, even in flagrant cases. When a representative of the Cambodian Women’s Association was sent to
Albania, I asked to go to the airport to send my greetings, but they did not allow me with the excuse that the
other diplomatic delegations had not been invited, since the representation would have visited several
Countries other than Albania, and therefore I couldn’t go there! Similar thing when the representation
returned: I was denied to welcome them at the airport. Whereupon I invited the group in question to the
official dinner, but even this gesture of courtesy had no echo: I was told that some members had already left
for their places of origin. Truly strange reactions and behaviors, but not the only ones! The distribution by
embassies of leaflets, brochures, booklets, maps, informative books on the socio-economic-political reality of
our countries, very normal and well-known initiatives of delegations and cultural institutes abroad, was
prohibited. Then we learned that in Cambodia such materials could only be sent to high-level institutions and
executives. Apart from the fact that due to the non-existence of the postal service and the complete lack of
street addresses, there was no possibility of direct sending, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — to prevent even
the manual delivery of some material during the interviews — let us know, through a note delivered to all the
embassies, that the printed materials addressed to personalities or institutions should have been delivered to
the Protocol of the Ministry itself. We sent the publications, via the Protocol, but from questions asked to the
recipients, we found that they had not received anything at all.

Photo 4 — On June 1976, H.E Dhimiter Thimi Stamo presents his credentials to the Head of State Khieu
Sampham and to the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ieng Sary
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In these conditions, having no other options, we tried to organize local initiatives. In addition to the reception
on the occasion of national holidays (28–29 November), we also set up one for the anniversary of the Republic
(11 January) and even some cinema screenings. We had a good turnout. The first reception on 11 January 1976
was attended by the Head of State Sihanouk and his wife Monique, Prime Minister Penn Nouth, Deputy Prime
Minister Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Son Sen, and other heads of
departments and managers, but not Ieng Sary, who limited himself to sending me a letter of congratulations,
and expressing regret for not being able to attend due to an urgent commitment. The large and authoritative
participation impressed the ambassadors present and remained the only “catwalk” of the highest level, since it
was the last time Sihanouk and Penn Nouth were seen in public. And after the elections of March 20th they
were no longer seen in “international” public places. On further social occasions — but in the first period — the
presence of Cambodian personalities remained high, but as time passed, especially during film screenings, both
the quality level and the number of spectators significantly decreased.

We have already briefly mentioned the difficult and non-normal condition of foreign staff. Since there was no
possibility of supply due to the lack of markets and shops, until the beginning of April 1978 the functions of the
kitchen staff at the embassies were assumed by local workers who also supplied us with the utensils. They did it
at the beginning, but afterwards we and the other embassies often asked to cook on our own, and for a shop to
be opened where we could buy basic necessities, so as not to be a burden. Our request was satisfied and the
only shop in Cambodia was inaugurated, but only for the diplomatic corps: with an irregular schedule and with
many shortcomings. If we asked for a missing product, they told us that they had just emerged from a conflict
and they couldn’t insure everything. Sometimes the answers were absurd, like the time the Egyptian
ambassador, who wanted eggs, was told that the chickens didn’t produce them. In the absence of currency,
payment was made once a month with US dollars, while purchases were made through invoices updated on a
periodic basis.

Inconveniences and impacts were also recorded with the health service. As part of the limitation of our
movements, medical examinations and medications, as well as the analyses themselves, were carried out in our
diplomatic offices. At the beginning, the care provided was good, the doctor was called quickly, and even the
medicines in their possession were offered free of charge in the absence of pharmacies. But shortly thereafter
the situation worsened. Our requests for a medical visit were responded to late and in fact instead of sending
the doctor they sent us an envelope with some aspirin, claiming that the doctor was busy and perhaps would
come later. And towards the end of 1976 they advised us that even for medical visits and other health requests
the request had to be forwarded through the soldier guarding the embassy, by means of a written request
addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the sick person was specified and possibly the problem that
afflicted him. It is clear that in this way delays and inconveniences accumulated.

We ourselves found ourselves in dire straits when an official’s wife suffered a kidney crisis. I made the request
through the soldier on guard, accentuating the urgency of the case. Seeing that the doctor was late, I asked
again, sending the soldier twice more, but in the reply I read that the doctor would arrive later. Finding that the
patient’s condition was worsening, I decided to stop delaying and had her sent to hospital. The Minister of
Health, Thiounn Thioeunn, a sympathetic man and doctor, happened to be there and, after having examined
the lady, reported to our secretary that we had done a very good job in hospitalizing her because she was in
serious condition. When I met Thiounn, I thanked him for his care, and asked him if they could do the same for
all urgent cases, but he replied that the Foreign Office had to be informed first. It is clear that in the hospital he
acted as a doctor of human sensitivity, but later — perhaps against his will and his soul (this is the impression I
got) — he remembered the rules, without a doubt admonished by the foreign cabinet chiefs.
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In the first dialogues with Ieng Sary and others, the assurances of an improvement in the prohibitive living and
working conditions, due to the extraordinary situation, were wasted. Nothing really changed, in fact they
became more and more complicated. We continued to live and work closed and isolated in the environments
designed by the only road contour that was possible for us to travel, outside of which we left only for activities
organized from above or, rarely, to go to the hospital or to that only Cambodian shop, located in proximity to
the road. We were also prevented from communicating normally with our country. In the absence of postal-
telegraph services, it was impossible for us to use the telephone, as well as direct correspondence with the
Albanian institutions and our families and relatives. We sent the mail on the plane that went to Beijing every
fortnight, and from there it was taken to Tirana. Likewise, our state leaders and families wrote us letters and
sent documents and printed matter via the Albanian embassy in China. The considerable delays in the exchange
of correspondence and in the arrival of newspapers did not allow us to update ourselves on the events of our
country, also because the waves of Radio Tirana were not received in Phnom Penh.

The unfulfilled promises of improvement led me to request a meeting with Ieng Sary, through a note I
addressed to his cabinet, motivating by work matters. I saw him in ministry on April 14, 1977 and we had a long
conversation there. I declared that my country had opened the embassy in Cambodia, driven by good will in
contributing to the strengthening of friendship and bonds of brotherhood between the two peoples, but for
obvious reasons, our contribution was modest and concrete activity was scarce. I attributed that to the limited
operating conditions — considering that Albania was a friendly state — the embassy’s activities were not
normal; we could not fulfill our tasks as we wished, and therefore a mutual understanding was hoped for that
would favor profitable work. Ieng replied that he understood our concerns but in Cambodia — he insisted — a
particular situation had been created: cities without inhabitants, without markets, without cultural life, etc.,
things which also increased the problems for the embassies and their staff. I replied that, despite the
difficulties, we had not caused disturbance to the institutions and it was certainly not our intention to do so,
and I reminded him that we had not moved for more than a year, closed inside the walls of the embassy
without any type of contact. Ieng assured that he would do everything possible, and the conversation
continued on aspects related to some problems in the relations between the two countries.

Two weeks after the meeting, Ieng Sary sent me a letter in which he told me that he would leave the next day
(2 May) for a visit of a few days to the Northern and Eastern Provinces (photo 5), and invited me to accompany
him, begging me to keep the invitation secret since he had not let the other ambassadors know anything. I
gladly accepted, but it seemed crystal clear to me from the beginning — especially during the visit — that it had
been specifically organized in response to the previous conversation. We traveled, Ieng and I, in a car followed
by three others, with guards and service personnel. From the inter-provincial border posts, the top
administrative leaders were waiting for us, in that of the North, the secretary Pok, and in that of the East, the
secretary So Phim (vice president of the Presidium). Both of them, each in their own province, accompanied us
the whole time, together with other local officials. Everywhere stages and festoons were set up with the flags
of the two countries, and colorful banners praising the friendship between Cambodia and Albania. At the
entrance to the villages we were surrounded on the sides of the roads by rows of cheering people (photo 6). It
was not a casual invitation, but an occasion transformed into a ceremonial intent, which surpassed the limits of
an ambassadorial visit. I thanked the local organizers for this sign of friendship between the two peoples, but I
wanted to say that they had worked hard and worried excessively.

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Photo 5 — Administrative Zones of “Democratic Kampuchea”, official map of the Khmer Rouge, in Latin
characters)

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Photo 6 — May 1977, Ieng Sary, H.E. Dhimitir Thimi Stamo, and So Phim (deputy head of state), visiting the
Eastern Province

Over the four days we carried out visits to villages and centers where work was being done on the irrigation
system, on rubber plantations, and other crops. I spent a lot with Ieng Sary and So Phim, and I took the
opportunity to address many topics together, getting a broader idea of the national situation and
developments that I have already spoken about. I can add that despite the difficulties, everywhere people
worked intensely and beyond normal hours, they hoed with manual tools and the earth and debris were
transported with small baskets. In the areas we visited, some results were noted in agriculture (especially in rice
production), in the construction of dams, artificial lakes and irrigation and drainage canals. Life was
uncomfortable, but in this sense — to increase production — attempts were being made to make it less
burdensome. On the health front, the food in the collective canteens had improved somewhat, and small and
simple wooden houses had begun to be built, preferable to the semi-open tents covered with palm leaves that
were frequently seen in the country’s villages. In the Eastern Province, while we were visiting a village, they told
us that around 5,000 new houses were expected by 1977.

In Phnom Penh I went back to reliving the previous situation, and as the months passed the climate of siege
and isolation worsened. As regards the aspect of economic-commercial relations, despite my insistence for a
good two years, nothing was achieved, as they lacked will and prospects. In these circumstances our further
presence in Cambodia seemed to me to be devoid of logical sense.

At my suggestion I was called back to Tirana (summer 1978) where I reported in detail what I had seen and
noted: situation and developments and, mainly, non-existent conditions for concrete relations. After the
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outbreak of the armed conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam and its foreseeable expansion, I proposed the
closure of the embassy taking into account that the Cambodians had done the same in Tirana since spring 1977.
My proposal was approved by the Albanian government, and the personnel who had remained in Phnom Penh
left the country in November, two months before the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime on 7 January 1979.

19. Conclusions

I would like to express solidarity and the highest consideration for the Cambodian people, with whom I lived
three difficult years under the Pol Pot regime, more difficult and burdensome for the population of the country,
but to a certain point also for me and my colleagues.

Cambodians are good and communicative people; workers, obedient and cheerful, and despite the harsh living
and working conditions they never erased that typical and traditional smile that I saw on every occasion, even
during visits to the Provinces. The same smile of the ancestors’ work, masterfully carved into the statues of the
Angkor archaeological complex. During a visit there, speaking with a colleague of mine, I said out loud: “If he
doesn’t smile, he’s not Cambodian.”

At the same time, I express personal sympathy and respect for many of the Cambodian leaders: for Prince
Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, for his patriotism and dedication; for the quiet and wise elderly Prince Samdech
Penn Nouth; and also for some officials of the Cambodian party and government, who — despite working with
Pol Pot — had the courage to express their doubts (an attitude that many of them paid for with their lives), but
also for some who, being with him, he tried to influence him for the good, albeit in vain.

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