The Second Triumvirate, while considerably important in the transformation from Republic

to Empire, retain a much less significant role in the fall of the Roman Republic when
considering the context of the Republic they operated within. The Republic fell because, as
Meier famously coined, it was in a state of ‘crisis without an alternative’. The creation of this
crisis without alternative was not the work of the Second Triumvirate. 1 It was not the
instalment of a dictatorship that led to collapse, but the circumstances which called for such
dictatorial leadership. Thus, the significance of the Second Triumvirate is diminished when
considering the state of the ‘Republic’ which they inherited. For it was a Republic thrust into
disorder and confusion following Rome’s expansion, ridden with political violence and
infighting stemming from Tiberius Gracchus and the actions of Sulla and Marius, a Republic
which had already twice seen a dictator rise to power, left at the mercy of politicians
unsatisfied with anything less than pre-eminence. This is not to say that the Second
Triumvirate did not play its part in the transition from Republic to Empire. For though it was
the contextual circumstances and personalities that sent the Republic to the block, it was most
certainly Mark Antony and Octavian who ensured it was dealt the final blow as its
executioners.

The fall of the Roman Republic, as well as the Second Triumvirate’s ability to transform it,
can largely be attributed to the structural problems arising from Rome’s expansion and the
exploitation of such problems by prominent individuals. The Roman Republic, in its
conception, was forged out of a contempt for the dictatorial powers of a monarchical
structure, thus being borne out of a hatred for kings, the essence of its entire political system
orbited around the maintenance of measured and shared power. The initial disruption of this
political harmony can largely be traced back to its period of rapid expansion, that, by the mid-
second century BC had thrust the humble city-state into near hegemony over the
Mediterranean. This hegemony, as Tacitus elaborates, sowed the first seeds of corruption that
were to destroy the Republican order, “The old lust for power, long ingrained in mankind,
came to maturity and erupted as the empire became great”. 2 This ‘eruption’ stemmed from a
city-state’s incapacity to adapt its structures in order to sufficiently administrate a vast
empire. So, the Republic was forced to forgo its fixation with limiting the capacity for
individual power ‘for the protection of the state’, it was amidst this concession that greed and
violence entered politics.3 Tiberius Gracchus’ undermining of the Republic’s political system,
followed by his violent and public assassination in 133 BC was, as, Velleius describes, “the
beginning of civil bloodshed and of the free reign of swords in the city of Rome. From then
on justice was overthrown by force and the strongest was preeminent”. 4 The brutal force
exercised to quell the perceived threat posed by the Gracchi could not be banished from
Rome, just half a century later the violent squabble of a few at the foot of the Temple of
Jupiter escalated to the outbreak of a civil war staged within the city itself. As city-state,
turned master of the Mediterranean, transformed once more to battlefield. Following Marius’
military reforms in 107 BC, legions who had previously fought for the Republic would
henceforth fight for the ambitions of a singular man. Marius, as David Potter summarises,
“made the army the tool that would permit Sulla and then Caesar to dismantle the
government of the Republic”.5 The significance of this single reform must not be
underestimated. For it took the castle in the air of the ‘old lust for power’, that desire for pre-
eminence that Tacitus identified, and, in giving it a loyal army, made it more than simply
possible, but lethal. If the mere possibility to transcend the order of Rome was not enough,
Billows highlights the fatal demonstration provided by Sulla, “Sulla left a legacy of appalling
violence that could not be forgotten. His example in leading a Roman army against Rome,
could not be legislated out of existence: it was there as a temptation to any future powerful
general”.6 Once it had been made known that political supremacy could be seized through
military means, the flood gates for civil war and dictatorship were open and could not be
closed unless there was some sacrifice of res publica. For the senatorial elites who benefited
from the oligarchic nature of the Republic, this idea was intolerable, the Republic would have
to endure the

For it was the structural failures created and exploited in this period that contributed to, and
catalysed the events that so wearied and weakened the Republic that the concept of autocracy
became palatable by the time of Octavian, to the point where citizens and senators alike
ceded their hatred for Kings in exchange for the prospect of stability and harmony.

There is, both literally and figuratively, no Second Triumvirate without the First Triumvirate.
The combined work of the First Triumvirate and their contemporaries continued the legacy of
violence and undermining of Republican order left to them. They, like their predecessors,
exposed the insufficiency of the Republic’s political system to inhibit unconstitutional
attainment of power. 2ND TRI ONLY CS OF CAESAR. Despite the technical discrepancies
between these two political alliances, overall ambitions and conclusions remain parallel. The
formation of, and extent of power obtained by the First Triumvirate, commencing in 60 BC,
was a demonstration of how crippled the Republican system had already become. For, as
Scullard describes, “The State and constitution were now at the mercy of dynasts, principes,
who strove for potentia and dignitas. It was for these values that the leaders were to fight in
the coming civil war.”7 With the personalisation of Roman political affairs as Scullard alludes
to, came a volatility and instability the Republic could not withstand. For Caesar and
Pompey, following the death of Crassus, it was potentia and dignitas that were paramount.
Thus, Rome was free from military infighting while ambitions aligned, but the manifestation
of the breakdown of this two-person allegiance was full-scale civil war. For the extremist
optimates, it was a misguided protection of Republican tradition that was paramount, and as
Mackay describes of Cato, “It was the Republic’s misfortune that its most prominent
defender was an uncompromising man whose inflexibility would result in civil war”. 8 The
unsustainability of such political order was certain, military pre-eminence had become
synonymous with the political kind, while this temptation remained, there would be no rest
for the Republic. So, if it were not Marius and Sulla fighting over dominance, then it was
Pompey and Caesar, if not them, then Antony and Octavian, nonetheless the outcome
remained dictatorship. Edward J. Watts asserts that, “The conflict that ended the Roman
Republic began with a politically momentous crossing of a physically insignificant river”. 9
When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, he embarked on a journey that resulted in both
dictatorship, and then, assassination, but so spectacular was his influence on the Roman
world, two more civil wars would spring up out of his legacy, the second of which resulted in
the establishment of empire. Caesar’s victory against Pompey and subsequent dictatorship
was proof once more that political supremacy was won through violent and military means,
Octavian would employ the same route to power. Caesar was given the title dictator
perpetuus in 44 BC, Suetonius describes the nature of such an office, “a life consulship, a life
dictatorship, a perpetual Censorship, the title of ‘Imperator’ put before his name and the title
‘Father of his country’ appended to it…but took other honours which as a mere mortal, he
should have refused.”10 Though Caesar offered reprieve to a suffering and near anarchic
Rome through, “so great a program of reform in so short a time”, a short-sighted optimism
lingered, within the senate particularly, that the Republic might be restored in all its past
glory, the notion that there was a Republic left to salvage. 11 Thus, as Caesar’s autocratic
power formally cast aside the already dwindled authority of traditional Republican
institutions of power, namely the senate and tribunate, it remained a subject of contempt
rather than relief to those stubbornly unwilling to forgo the ‘liberty’ of the Republic. 12 Sixty
senators, in the name of the Republic, on the behalf of the Roman populace, ‘liberated Rome
from tyranny’ on the Ides of March 44 BC, as they assassinated the dictator perpetuus. What
transpired was a misguided attempt at retrieving an arguably irretrievable political system, as
Mackay describes it, “What they did not realise was that the concept of personal autocracy
was now irrevocable, and that even after his death, Caesar’s prestige could be used by others
to win a similar position for themselves.” 13 Caesar’s assassination became but a springboard
for the Second Triumvirate to launch themselves on a path towards pre-eminence, a path that
had been well-trodden by multiple armies and their ambitious generals, and that had
relentlessly tired and injured the Republic they carried with them. The First Triumvirate left
for their descendants an incredibly vulnerable and weak Republic. Worn by the tiresome deed
of civil war and divided following the assassination of both ‘Father’ and ‘Tyrant’, the race for
political power had not been quelled, but reignited.

Almost certainly by 44 BC, the Republic had in essence fallen, or at the very leaat collapse
was imminent for it had proven too many times that Rome was defenceless against its own
armies, and that total power could be obtained. Thus, the much of the upward climb to
collapse had been completed, the partial significance held by the Second Triumvirate is found
in their disposal of the last powerful defenders of the Republic, and in the final blow inflicted
by Octavian and Antony’s civil war. Montesquieu attests to the inability for individuals to
restore the Republic,
The preceding events and figures to the Second Triumvirate had left the Republic in a state of
near collapse, suffering and wearied it had pressed on, but simply in the sanctioning of the
formation of the Second Triumvirate, . Thus in the formation of the Second Triumvirate is
seen the desperation of the the second triumvirs inflicted both a kind of death blow while all
the same giving Rome new life, a rebirth. In the place of the people’s advocate, and the
Republicans adversary, Julius Caesar, sprung three new contenders for the inheritance of res
publica. After the ides of March, it was Mark Antony, as surviving consul, and Aemilius
Lepidus, as Magister Equitum, who were the official heads of state. 14 The assassins had
assumed that their act of ‘liberation’ would be received just so by the Roman people. 15 But
Mark Antony, rather skilfully, publicly posted Caesar’s will which contained within it the
endowment of a generous sum to each Roman citizen, and delivered an invigorated funeral
oration, less skilfully, allowed by Brutus.16 Such acts evoked a feeling of gratitude in the
masses for the glimpse of prosperity Caesar had provided them, and so the urban mob
collectively and violently grieved the dictator’s death. This is attested to by Plutarch,
“carrying blazing brands, they ran to set fire to the houses of the murderers, while others went
up and down through the city trying to find the men themselves to tear them to pieces.” 17 In
this way, Mark Antony, for all his lack of statesmanship, was partially responsible for
reigniting the respect and esteem owed to the name Caesar, and those who shared or were
closely affiliated with it. Out of this name rose to prominence Octavian, though young, his
naming as chief heir in Caesar’s will carried with it the weight of a number of years. Thus,
Octavian, who had been dismissed by a bitter Antony, was able to receive the support of
Caesar’s friends and colleagues in Rome, as well as the foolish support of Republicans and
Cicero, “unwisely reviving the plan that Cato had originally inspired for playing off Pompey
and Caesar against each other.”18 Antony, embroiled in war with Caesar’s assassins abroad,
and labelled a public enemy, then faced the collectively led armies of both consuls of 43 BC,
and Octavian, who had been given an illegal grant of pro-praetorian imperium at the request
of Cicero.19 In the fighting both consuls had been killed, leaving the 20-year-old Octavian at
the head of the republic’s entire army. Octavian, proving foolish those who underestimated
him, refused to fight alongside assassin Decimus Brutus, adopting the persona of loyal
Caesarian, and instead marched his eight legions on Rome, demanded and received
consulship. He then immediately ventured back north for a fateful meeting with Antony, and
Lepidus, with whom there are suspicions he had already conspired with, the result of this
meeting in 43 BC was the formation of the Second Triumvirate. The legal disparity between
the informality of the first, and legal sanctity of the second, was less a matter of differing
personalities, but rather a vastly changed Republic. Events in 48 BC at Pharsalus made absent
the immovable opposition of the optimates and the Republic was much more susceptible to
the tempting notion of stability in established authority following the civil wars and blood
that had passed since 60 BC. As Tom Holland explains this was not the conspiratorial First
Triumvirate, “but something altogether more revolutionary: a formal grant of absolute rule.
Legally, the goal of the Triumvirs had been defined as ‘the restoration of the Republic’”. 20
One dictator, had been essentially replaced by three, handed ‘license to rule the world as
Caesar’s avengers’, having Cicero executed in 43BC, and later destroying most of the
remnants of avid Republican defence at Phillipi in 42 BC resulting in the suicides of Brutus
and Cassius.21 Cassius Dio describes the inevitable breakdown of allegiances after the
disposal of many of those who remained invigorated with reviving the Republic, “For it is a
difficult matter for three men, or even two, who are equal in rank and as a result of war have
gained control over such vast interests, to be of one accord.” 22 Lepidus fell to the background,
and so it was left to Antony, in charge of the East, and Octavian, ruler of the west, to battle
for supremacy.23 Despite a number of concessions made to solidate this alliance, such as the
Treaty of Brundisium, resulting in Antony’s marriage to Octavia in 40 BC. Both parties had
set their sights on autocracy, moreover, marriages had already once proven a futile tether
between allies. Octavian utilised his remaining time in the West as ruling triumvir to
consolidate bases of power and capitalise upon the difficulties faced by Antony in the East, as
well as his compromising relationship with Cleopatra VII, Queen of Egypt. 24 Moreover,
young Caesar had the example of his adopted father’s missteps to learn from, senatorial
approval remained essential, not in the seizure of power, but in its maintenance, and Octavian
was successful in this respect. His appeals made to traditional Republican values and strategic
offer to rescind his extraordinary powers if Antony were to do the same in 36 BC charmed
the senate, as Octavian was presented as a centre for traditional peace and stability. 25 Plutarch
describes the actions taken by Octavian against Lepidus in 36BC, “ejecting his colleague
Lepidus from office and degrading him, he was keeping for himself the army”. 26 Thus, as the
Republic was in such a state that military supremacy had proven to decide matters of political
competition, Octavian’s ever-expanding army was an important political tool. The statesman
Octavian, through the assistance of his friend Agrippa, having defeated Sextus Pompeius in
36 BC, a source of great danger to the Italian provinces and, in willingly rescinding the title
of triumvir in 33 BC when it was due to end, strengthened his relationship with the senate and
received much gratitude throughout Italy. However, Antony, as described by Florus, “began
to aim at sovereignty… he wore a purple robe studded with huge gems; a crown only was
lacking to make him a king dallying with a queen.”27 It was the triumvir able to learn from the
mistakes of Julius Caesar who ultimately prevailed in the Battle of Actium, 31 BC, with the
sworn loyalty of Roman senators, Italian settlements and his western provinces, Antony,
despite Egyptian backing, was defeated. Scullard describes the aftermath of Octavian’s
victory, “The century of civil wars that had started with the murder of Tiberius Gracchus was
ended. The Republic and liberty had gone; men turned gratefully to their new saviour.” 28 The
Republic had sanctioned the unlimited and far-reaching power of the Second Triumvirs, thus
before even given much of a chance to , the path to surrender was already underway
CONCLUDING POINT
The events and figures that made the Republic so unsustainable it required a First Man, that
created ‘the crisis without an alternative’, all preceded the time of the Second Triumvirate.
The lifeless body of the Republic had been dragged along by ‘optimates’, ‘republicans’ and
senatorial elites. Thus, some significance can be found in the Second Triumvirates ability to
largely rid the state of these obstinate defenders of ‘liberty’, and in the statesmanship
exhibited by Octavian that allowed a largely unopposed transition away from Republic.
However, the Second Triumvirate was largely just a symptom of the failed Republic, riding
the wave of Julius Caesar, their activities, for the most part, were unoriginal in aim and
method. With much of the work completed for them, it simply took one more civil war for
pre-eminence, the war between Octavian and Antony, to put the Republic out of its misery
and make desirable to patricians and plebeians alike the rule of one-man.
1
Meier, C., Between Republic and Empire – C. Caesar Divi filius and the Formation of the Alternative in Rome, University
of California Press, 1990, Los Angeles, pg 55
2
Tacitus, Histories, 2.38
3
Mary Beard
4
Paterculus, V., The Roman History, 2.3.3-4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Scullard, Gracchi to Nero, pg 129
12
13
14
Scullard, From Grachi to Nero, 154
15
16
17
Plutarch, Caesar, Chapter 68
18
Shotter, D., The Fall of the Roman Republic, London, Routledge, 1994, pg. 89
19
Montesquieu, pg 115
20
Tom Holland
21
The Roman Republic: A Very Short Introduction, Gwynn, D., pg.115
22
Cassius Dio, Roman History,
23
Werner Eck, Lives of the Caesars, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2008, pg 11
24
Shotter, pg 92
25
Meier, Between Republic…, pg 64
26
Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 55.1, pg 264, 1920, Loeb
27
Lucius Florus, The Epitome of Roman History, Loeb, 1929, XXI, 11.3, pg 325
28