How successful was US foreign policy in this period?

Given the seemingly confused, and incompatible nature of US foreign policy aims in this period, it
can be said overall that its foreign policy was unsuccessful. Its desire to return to the ‘isolation’ it
enjoyed prior to entry into World War One, became increasingly difficult to achieve given its
newfound prominence on the world stage, especially in an economic respect. Additionally, the US’s
equally large desire to maintain economic dominance, and, following the Great Depression, recovery
its economy, interfered with its isolationist aims, ultimately forcing a sacrifice of its isolationism to
allow for its return to economic superpower status. Similarly, its efforts to encourage peace and
disarmament globally, were not only largely ineffectual as measures taken to retreat from
international relations limited US influence in such matters but can also be seen to be incompatible
with its economic attitudes. Ultimately, as conditions in the US shifted in this period, so too did its
aims regarding foreign policy, seeing the isolationism and peace it valued in 1919 almost entirely
sacrificed by 1941 as a changing economic position and shifting relationship with foreign powers
called for US intervention abroad.

Following the conclusion of World War One in 1918, many Americans were unhappy with US
involvement, and sacrifice in a ‘European War’, preferring its previous isolation from such matters.
Such a sentiment is seen clearly in the election of Republican Warren Harding in 1919, who
promised, ‘the return to normalcy’, over internationalist Democrat Woodrow Wilson whose time in
office had seen the US enter into WW1 and the suggestion of a strong international body, The League
of Nations, to avoid future mass conflict. Congress’s isolationist sentiment can be seen to have been
equally strong in this time, as just prior to Wilson’s exit from office, they refused to join the League of
Nations and to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, the opportunity for the US to influence
international politics by aiding in the creation of a strong international body which could act
collectively against aggressor nations had passed. Anti-immigration policies of the 1920’s can be
taken as another manifestation of this isolationist sentiment, especially towards non-involvement in
European affairs, as the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 placed harsh restrictions on immigration from
southern and eastern European countries through a quota system. The period between 1919 to 1933
saw a continuation in this trend as the election of a string of Republican presidential candidates
allowed for the isolationist mood to triumph. President’s Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover all refused
to recognise the USSR, delaying recognition until 1933, blocking USSR admission to the League of
Nations until 1934. This can be taken as a profound mistake, as the US’s refusal to engage with its
external neighbours ultimately allowed for fascist forces to grow relatively uninterrupted, seeing
intervention occur only when these states had become so powerful, they directly threatened US and
European security. When Democrat Franklin D Roosevelt was elected to office in 1933, the
isolationist mood still dominated in congress and existed among Roosevelt’s own administration.
While Roosevelt recognised the importance of strong international relationships and the opportunity
for business to profit from war in the time of a dire economic situation, he also understood the
importance of public opinion and support as well as parliamentary backing. This allowed for
numerous more isolationist acts to be passed under FDR, most significantly the Neutrality Acts of
1935 and 1936 banning the sale of war material to belligerents and forbidding any exports on credit
to belligerents. These acts prevented US involvement internationally even if favoured by the majority,
manifesting in US inaction concerning Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia and Japan’s increasing aggression
towards China. However, as foreign threats developed and the need as well as the opportunity for
economic recovery increased, Roosevelt was able to covertly and gradually involve the US in foreign
affairs, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, shook the US firmly out of its stubbornly
maintained isolationism, into near total investment into the war effort alongside Britain and Russia.
World War One transformed America’s role on the world stage, establishing it as an economic
superpower, as the US wished to maintain this dominant position, and, following the Great
Depression, regain it, its economic interests came into conflict with its isolationist aims. While the US
wished to distance itself from European affairs, this became increasingly more difficult given its
continued influence in international affairs, especially given the repayment of war debts and
reparations. This led to the agreement upon the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan with Germany under
Republican President Calvin Coolidge, through these plans US banks essentially financed Germany’s
economic recovery to ensure it was in a position to meet reparation requirements, in turn leaving
European nations like Britain and France in a position to repay their own war debts to the US.
America’s changing attitude towards its continental neighbours, countries in South America, can also
be attributed to economic ambitions. FDR’s ‘Good Neighbour’ policy, while likely somewhat
motivated by a desire to improve relations with Latin America, nonetheless came at a time when
markets in Europe and Asia came under threat, this different approach towards South America saw a
massive increase in trade between Central and South America. However, it was with increasing
fascist aggression in Europe during the mid to late 1930’s that US foreign policy truly began to shift
further towards economic ambitions. As tensions escalated in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific
American industrialists indulged in the opportunity this presented them, supplying Germany and
Japan with all the materials they wanted, making no distinction between trading with these two
countries and trade with democratic nations. Alfred Sloan of General Motors claimed that ‘political
beliefs are irrelevant in business’, an example of the role industry and business in America held in
foreign affairs, and how they were motivated simply by profit. As FDR was gradually able to legislate
his way around the Neutrality Acts and other restrictions placed upon collusion with belligerents, the
US was already heavily invested in the allied war effort by the time of Japan’s Pearl Harbour attack in
1941. Thus, as the Second World War lifted much of the economic burden the Great Depression
placed upon the US and saw its return to global economic dominance, US foreign policy motivated by
economic interests can be said to have been largely successful despite resulting in the sacrifice of its
isolationist mood and desire to encourage peace and disarmament.

The aspects of US foreign policy which aimed to encourage and organise forums for international
peace and disarmament can largely be described as unsuccessful as the later part of this period saw
the lead up to, commencement and escalation of World War 2. The failure of many of these policies
can, for the most part, be attributed to the US’s seemingly confused attitude towards world affairs
following the conclusion of WW1. For, it is understandable for a global superpower, like that of the
US in 1919, with all its influence, to adopt the role of peacekeeper among foreign affairs. However,
while the US rather quickly displayed its willingness to accept this role, the actions of Congress and
President Harding, who set the example for the following Republican presidents, in the immediate
post-war period crippled America’s diplomatic potential. The US’s joining of the League of Nations
would doubtless have provided the league with much more wide-reaching and effectual power,
however from refusing the opportunity, the US not only damaged its own peacekeeping potential,
but that of the League of Nations as well. Thus, America’s seeming enthusiasm to adopt the role of
negotiator, exemplified by its organisation of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922 where
it took the lead in negotiating a de-escalation of tensions between the great Pacific powers, can be
seen to be disadvantaged by its own isolationist policies and attitude. It was the US that suggested
Japan, Britain and the US scrap dozens of warships in order to put a stop to the escalating arms race
occurring in the region.