NAME: MUHAMMAD JUNAID

ROLL NO# 1242-BH-HIS-20

COURSE: MODERN HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
COURSE INSTRUCTOR: DR. NOOR REHMAN
ASSIGNMENT TITLE: Abandoning the wardrobe and Reclaiming Religion in the Discourse
on Afghan Women’s Islamic Rights
SEMESTER: 8TH
INSTITUTE OF HISTORY, GOVERNMENT COLLEGE UNIVERSITY LAHORE

Over 75 years after Queen Soraya Tarzi Hanim's fashion statement, the shadow of
her skirts continues to linger in Kabul policy circles. When images of the newly revealed
queen dressed in Western clothing arrived in Afghanistan in 1928, they sparked a riot in the
isolated landlocked nation. The iconic photos were shot during Queen Soraya's state tour to
Europe with her husband, Afghan King Amanullah Khan. Queen Soraya was well-educated,
attractive, and descended from nobility. Amanullah was driven from the throne in less than a
year and had to escape to Kandahar from Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. The country that
had just gained independence would soon abandon some of the biggest political, economic,
and social advances in Afghan history. Family laws providing women the right to divorce and
prohibiting polygamy were repealed; secular courts were replaced with Sharia courts;
secular schools, including girls' schools, were shuttered; and the elimination of Islamic
clerics' competency exams. Afghanistan had a conflict between secular and religious forces
in the early part of the 20th century, which foreshadowed events during the Taliban era and
is still a powerful force today.
Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. The groundwork is presently being done for a new
national gender policy, which will take effect four years after the Taliban was defeated. The
future is dependent for an estimated 18 million Afghan women on how policy makers
outline the rights and status of women in the framework of Islam. On paper, the situation
appears favorable. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was approved by the Afghan Transitional Authority
in early 2003, establishing a legally binding commitment to uphold women's rights. In fact,
Afghanistan is a signatory to numerous other significant human rights treaties today. An
autonomous human rights commission has been established, a new constitution
guaranteeing gender equality has been ratified, and measures for justice reform are being
developed with the assistance of foreign specialists. However, the differences between
Afghanistan has a gap in the legislation, its application, and its interpretation that exists
throughout many nations. Judges of the Afghan Supreme Court, law enforcement officers,
and religious leaders who administer traditional justice frequently have different
interpretations of the same legislation. Amnesty International (2005) states that several
legislations, like the 1971 Law on Marriage and the 1976 Penal Code, appear to be biased
against women.
Thousands of Afghans depend on tribal traditions like the Pashtunwali, an antiquated
tribal code that governs the lives of the main Pashtun ethnic group throughout the eastern
and Afghanistan's southern portion. Misunderstood by many as a means of enforcing Islamic
law, Pashtunwali fundamentally sees women as property and dependable means of payment
for a wide range of offenses and disputes between clans. These antiquated patriarchal
traditions, when coupled with a persistent lack of security and the widespread impunity
enjoyed by violent offenders, explain for the appalling state of female rights in Afghanistan
to this day.
Seeking Islam in good and bad times:
The majority of Afghans have never lived under the protection of a functional state,
having experienced nearly thirty years of war and political unrest. Afghans have looked to in
their villages, towns, cities, and refugee camps throughout Afghanistan and the surrounding
countries of Pakistan and Iran. Customary tribal institutions were developed to deal with
life's daily challenges. Although tribal institutions have created divisions among Afghans
while simultaneously providing them with a feeling of order and belonging, it is Islam and
their Muslim identity that have united them in a common sense of identity. Islam has served
as the crucible through which Afghans have defined their nationality and their place in the
international community in the absence of a sovereign state.
This Muslim identity and the importance of Islam in all matters, particularly those
pertaining to gender, are notably evident—and heavily utilized—during pivotal moments in
the Afghan political process. For example, in the run-up to the September 2005
parliamentary elections, all the Afghan female candidates I spoke with made a point of
highlighting how pious they were. A few males acknowledged this, though they never spoke
it aloud, that they believed an Islamic discourse to be the most reliable and tactical way to
increase support for women's rights in Afghanistan.
Islamist feminism frames gender rights activities in Afghanistan both now and in the
future, regardless of whether they are the result of sincere religious conviction or a practical
recognition of sociopolitical reality. Regardless of their ethnicity, tribe, class, or location
between rural and urban areas, Muslim women across desire access to education, if not for
their own benefit then for their daughters'. Many of them stated that, if the financial
pressures were not so great, they would like to put off their daughters' marriages so that
they might pursue higher education. They also desired improved health and economic
services. .. They emphasized that, contrary to what the Taliban had said, these rights were in
line with Islam and not against its teachings. According to Leila Ahmed, a professor of
women's studies in religion at Harvard University's Divinity School, most Afghan women do,
in fact, understand Islam as a "women's Islam" that is "gentle, generous, pacifist, inclusive,
somewhat mystical" , as opposed to a "official, textual Islam, a'men's' Islam".
In light of Afghanistan's turbulent past and its current historical standing, it is imperative to
investigate the ways in which Islamic discourse and praxis might contribute to the
advancement of Afghan women's rights. Likewise, it is imperative to assess the possibility
and degree to which Islamic law and interpretation may fail Afghan women.
A RIGHT TO IJTIHAD:
Afghanistan is a republic of Islam. "No law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of
the sacred religion of Islam," according to Article 3 of the newly established Afghan
Constitution in January 2004. Having said that, there is a noticeable lack of definition for
these principles and clauses in the constitution. Critics argue that the exclusion is especially
problematic in light of the current discourse on Islamic interpretation, which is broad and
frequently conflicting, as well as the ongoing threat of a conservative Islamist uprising
spearheaded by Taliban power structure remnants. Regarding gender equality, Article 22
declares that "all Afghan citizens, male or female, have equal rights before the law." Afghan
women's rights activists have expressed grave worries about the constitution's ambiguity
and the absence of clear protection and promotion of women's rights, even as they applaud
the equality between men and women that is formally recognized.
This uncertainty could, in theory if not in practice, allow for cunning incremental
maneuvering. The expanding field of Islamic feminism contends that women have a right to
ijtihad, or interpretation and autonomous reasoning, and that Islam grants them a broad
margin for it. It is true, nonetheless, that when nation-states explicitly legislate on family and
personal law under a fundamentalist framework, this privilege is frequently severely
restricted. For instance, since the 1980s Islamization initiatives, laws in neighboring Pakistan
—a nation that many Afghans blame for their problem with fundamentalism—have
gradually and formally deprived Pakistani women of rights granted by previous legislation.
This culminated in the 2003 Sharia Law, which mandates that all laws in Pakistan be in
accordance with Islamic law. Islamic feminists, sometimes known as "gender jihadists," have
made a compelling case in recent years for the strategy that should be implemented in
Afghanistan: questioning the patriarchal readings of the Koran and other texts in order to
dismantle discriminatory and sexist social norms.
For feminist ijtihad to be successful, women must have access to both secular and
religious education. Women were not allowed to attend school during the Taliban rule, but
there are increasing indications that Afghan women and girls are now taking advantage of
this and enrolling in private religious instruction programs. Qaris, or highly skilled Koranic
chanters, say that an increasing number of their trainees are female in places like Herat and
Kabul. In certain regions of Kabul, female competitors compete in qiraats, or Koranic
chanting contests. It is apparent that Afghan women Islamic academics are in a hurry,
regardless of the approach they use or the name they give their activity. Given the
prevalence of Pashtunwali throughout significant portions of the nation and the widely held
conviction that the traditional, mostly oral tribal code serves as a recognized and hallowed
lens through which Islamic law is understood and applied among Pashtuns, the need for an
Afghan feminist ijtihad is especially urgent.4 Pashtuns are an especially important
demographic to track the health of the Afghan economy since they belong to the main
ethnic group that has historically controlled Afghan politics for generations.
Sadly, the picture that emerges from the Pashtun belt is not encouraging at all. By many
accounts, there is a seething dissatisfaction among Pashtuns about the official Dari
language's domination in politics and the media, as well as the excesses of the U.S.-led battle
against insurgency in the unstable Pashtun-dominated regions of Afghanistan.5. Such
animosity may materialize into a potentially deadly type of identity populism if it is not
appropriately addressed. In fact, renewed promises to uphold the territorial integrity of
Pakhtunkhwa—the legendary Pashtun nation-state encompassing the border regions across
contemporary Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran where the Pashto language is spoken—at
formal and informal Pashtun gatherings and discussions reflect this resentment. Eight
decades ago, Afghan women's rights were separated from tribal structures by Queen Soraya,
a Pashtun who came from the powerful Mohammedzai clan. In 1926, she addressed Afghan
women on Independence Day, saying, "Do not think... that our nation needs only men to
serve it." "Women ought to participate as much as they did in the formative stages of Islam."
Three years later, her husband's removal and the collapse of some of the most extensive
reforms ever enacted in Afghanistan's history were caused by a combination of ecclesiastical
hostility to modernization efforts and ethnic and clan strife. The fact that Queen Soraya is
hiding the true lessons from this momentous time under her skirts is terrible.