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‘Migration has transformed us, with consequences of historic extent: today we
are a trans-territorial nation and, at the same time, we form part of the intense
social shift within the United States. Both processes are structural and we have
yet to finish evaluating its profound effects, both current and future.’
Tonatiuh Guillén López,
Programa Universitario de Estudios del Desarrollo, UNAM
Mexicans and the Future of the
American Dream
Mexicans and the Future of the American Dream examines the lives of Mexican society
and government officials in the United States.
The 2016 U.S. presidential election marked a defining moment in the lives of
Mexicans in the United States. It rekindled nightmares in many Mexicans and
pitted a new generation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans against a shift in
politics. In this book, national experts and former government officials explore
the direction and magnitude of Donald J. Trump’s shifts in immigration policy in
three areas: consular strategies put in motion after the election, drugs, and bilateral
relations. Insights from 19 Mexican consulates throughout the U.S. territory, in
states both favorable to and against immigration, demonstrate shifting perspectives
of government officials and Mexicans visiting consulates for formalities, getting
orientation on a range of topics, or just asking for help.
Mexicans and the Future of the American Dream will be of interest to advanced students
and researchers of politics, sociology, history, ethnic studies, and American studies.
Maria Regina Martínez Casas is Full Professor at the Center for Research
and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS), Mexico. She is member
of the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (National System of Researchers) and
the Mexican Academy of Sciences. Martínez Casas has been a guest researcher in
many national and international institutions, including Cambridge University, the
Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, and Princeton University. She is
particularly interested in linguistic development; cultural validity of linguistic
and educative policies; and indigenous migration and its consequences in the
development of identities, education, discrimination, and inequalities in Mexico
and Latin America from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.
Magdalena Barros Nock is Full Professor at the Center for Research and Higher
Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS), Mexico. Her research focuses on topics
such as mixed status families, children and young migrants, migration policies,
gender and violence, indigenous migrants, DACAmented, and deportations. She is
interested in the migration of Mexicans to the United States and, more recently, of
Central Americans’ transit and their settlements.
Georgina Rojas García has a doctorate in sociology from the University of Texas
at Austin. She is a researcher at CIESAS in Mexico City and a member of the Sistema
Nacional de Investigadores. Her research topics include economic restructuring and
the job market, remunerated domestic work, and international migration and jobs.
Routledge Research in American Politics and
Governance
1. Pop-Up Civics in 21st Century America

Understanding the Political Potential of Placemaking
Ryan Salzman
2. A Tale of Two Parties

Living Amongst Democrats and Republicans Since 1952
Kenneth Janda
3. Homeland InSecurity
Terrorism, Mass Shootings, and the Public
Ann Gordon and Kai Hamilton Gentry
4. The Generational Gap in American Politics

Patrick Fisher
5. A Democracy That Works

How Working-Class Power Defines Liberal Democracy in the United
States
Stephen Amberg
6. Presidential Rhetoric and Indian Policy

From Nixon to the Present
Anne F. Boxberger Flaherty
7. Mexicans and the Future of the American Dream

Trump, Immigration and Border Relations
Maria Regina Martínez Casas, Magdalena Barros Nock, and Georgina Rojas
García
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Mexicans and the Future of
the American Dream
Trump, Immigration and Border Relations
Edited by Maria Regina Martínez

Casas, Magdalena Barros Nock
and Georgina Rojas García
First published in English 2023
by Routledge
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4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
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© 2023 selection and editorial matter, Maria Regina Martínez Casas,
Magdalena Barros Nock, and Georgina Rojas García; individual
chapters, the contributors
The right of Maria Regina Martínez Casas, Magdalena Barros Nock,
and Georgina Rojas García to be identified as the authors of the
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been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Martínez Casas, Maria Regina, editor. | Barros, Magdalena,
1955– editor. | Rojas García, Georgina, editor.
Title: Mexicans and the future of the American dream : Trump,
immigration and border relations / edited by Maria Regina Martínez
Casas, Magdalena Barros Nock, and Georgina Rojas García.
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022038877 (print) | LCCN 2022038878 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781032305943 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032315775
(paperback) | ISBN 9781003310396 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Mexicans—United States—Social conditions—21st
century. | Mexican Americans—Social conditions—21st century. |
Immigrants—United States—Social conditions—21st century. |
United States—Emigration and immigration—Government
policy. | United States—Emigration and immigration—History—
21st century. | United States—Foreign relations—Mexico. |
Mexico—Foreign relations—United States. | Trump, Donald,
1946—Influence.
Classification: LCC E184.M5 M535 2023 (print) | LCC E184.M5
(ebook) | DDC 973/.046872—dc23/eng/20221205
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022038877
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022038878
ISBN: 978-1-032-30594-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-31577-5 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-31039-6 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003310396
Typeset in Bembo
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Contents
List of Figures, Tables, and Mapsx

List of Contributorsxii
Prefacexiv
Introduction 1
AGUSTÍN ESCOBAR LATAPÍ
The Mexican Population in the United States 4

The Defense of Mexicans in the United States 8
Labyrinths of an American Dream 10
1 New Trends in the Mexican Population in the

United States in Times of Donald Trump’s Administration 15
MARIA REGINA MARTÍNEZ CASAS
Introduction 15
Sociodemographic Profile 16
On Insertion Into North American Society 21
Labor Occupation 23
The Geography of Discrimination 24
Final Reflection 27
2 Mobilizing Consular Resources in Light of Greater

Hostility Toward Mexican Immigrants in the United States 30
GEORGINA ROJAS GARCÍA
Introduction 30
Consular Districts 32
The Mexican Model of Consular Attention 35
Attention to Emergencies in 2017: the FAMEU Strategy 37
Centro de Información y Asistencia a Mexicanos
(CIAM) 40
viii Contents
Defense Centers 40
Increasing Visits to Detention Centers 44
Final Comments 47
Epilogue 49
3 DACA Youth: Diversity, Similarities, and Challenges

in Donald Trump’s Administration 53
MAGDALENA BARROS NOCK
Introduction 53
Discussion Groups 54
The DACAmented: Who Are They? 56
DACA in the Lives of Young Migrant Women and Men 59
Drivers’ Licenses 61
Dream Act and Access to Education 62
Family for DACA Youth 65
Jobs 67
Increase in Discrimination Toward DACA Youth 68
Activism Among DACA Youth 69
Final Comments . . . The Future 73
4 Mexican Consular Coordination: Two Case Studies

in the United States 80
JULIÁN ESCUTIA RODRÍGUEZ
Introduction 80
The Case of SB1070 in Arizona: a Defensive Strategy 81
The Case of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA):
an Offensive Strategy 88
Lessons on Strategic Consular Coordination: SB1070 and
DACA 94
5 Policies Against Drugs and Bilateral Mexico–U.S.

Relations During the Trump Administration 98
CARLOS ANTONIO FLORES PÉREZ
Introduction 98
Recent Bilateral Relations Regarding Drugs 98
The Merida Initiative: the Immediate Precedent 99
Institutional Perception on Drugs Coming From Mexico:
Organized Crime and Money Laundering 103
Drug Production and Trafficking 103
Contents ix
Organized Crime for Drug Trafficking and Money
Laundering 104
The Discourse of the Trump Administration and Its
Allies 107
Scenarios and Strategies 111
Scenario 1 111
Scenario 2 112
Conclusions 113
Index119
Figures, Tables, and Maps
Figures
1.1 Own Elaboration/Genders of Sample Study 17
1.2 Own Elaboration/Ages of Sample Study 17
1.3 Own Elaboration/Time Frame for Sample Studies Arrival
in the United States 18
1.4 Own Elaboration/Place of Origin Prior to Migration in
Sample Study 19
1.5 Own Elaboration/Education Level of Sample Study 19
1.6 Own Elaboration/English Fluency and Literacy of Sample
Study20
1.7 Own Elaboration/Indigenous Dialect or Language Within
Sample Study 20
1.8 Own Elaboration/Percentage of Study Connected to
DACA Program 21
1.9 Own Elaboration/Number of Family Members Within
DACA Program 21
1.10 Own Elaboration/Deportation Figures Within Sample Study 22
1.11 Own Elaboration/Voluntary Return to Mexico Figures 22
1.12 CentroGeo Elaboration/Presence in the Workforce 23
1.13 Own Elaboration/Treatment in Businesses and Restaurants 24
1.14 Own Elaboration/Treatment as Non-Americans 24
1.15 Own Elaboration/Police Stops for Documentation 25
1.16 Own Elaboration/Requested to Speak Only English 25
Tables
1.1 Own Elaboration/Interviewees by City; Trump Presidency 16
2.1 List of 41 Consular Interviews Carried Out 31
2.2 Estimated Mexican Population in Consular Districts in the
Sample35
3.1 Attendees at Discussion Groups by Consulate 56
3.2 Approximate Number of (Mexican) DACA by Sex
(September 2017)57
Figures, Tables, and Maps xi
3.3 Number of DACA Youth in States Where Discussion
Groups Were Held (2017) 58
3.4 Drivers’ Licenses for DACA Youth in the States of the Study 62
3.5 Active DACA Youth by Age Groups (September 2017) 70
5.1 Declaration of Mexican and U.S. Alliance Against Drugs
(1997) and Merida Initiative (2007) 100
Maps
1.1 Own Elaboration/Experiences of Discrimination
Categorized by State 26
2.1 The 19 Consular Districts in the Sample 34
3.1 Consulates Where the Project and DACA Discussion
Groups Were Held 55
3.2 States With Inclusive, Exclusive, and Undetermined
Immigration Policies Toward DACA Youth in the
United States 60
3.3 Costs of Education for the Undocumented in the
United States 64
5.1 Areas of Influence of the Largest Transnational Criminal
Organizations106
Contributors
Magdalena Barros Nock is Full Professor at CIESAS, Mexico. Her research

topics include mixed status families, children and young migrants, migra-
tion policies, gender and violence, indigenous migrants, DACAmented,
and deportations. She is interested in the migration of Mexicans to the
United States and, more recently, in Central Americans’ transit and their
settlements.
Agustín Escobar Latapí is a researcher at the Center for Research and
Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS) Occidente in Gua-
dalajara. He has been general director of CIESAS (2014–2019) and
adviser to CONEVAL (2006–2022), in addition to belonging to the Sis-
tema Nacional de Investigadores-III. He specializes on social policy and
migration.
Julián Escutia Rodríguez is an internationalist from the Colegio de Méx-
ico and a member of the Mexican Foreign Service since 2005. From
2016 to 2019, he was Coordinator of Advisors to the Undersecretary
for North America and is currently Director General of Protection for
Mexicans Abroad.
Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez has a doctorate in political science from
UNAM. He is a research professor at CIESAS, Mexico City. He is also
a member of SNI-CONACYT. His lines of research focus on the State,
organized crime, and drug trafficking.
Maria Regina Martínez Casas is a linguist and an anthropologist. She is
a professor-researcher at CIESAS and has been coordinator of the gradu-
ate program in Indo-American linguistics, subdirector of teaching, and
academic director of said institution. She is a member of the Sistema
Nacional de Investigadores and the Academia Mexicana de Ciencias. Her
research topics have concentrated on discrimination for linguistic condi-
tion, migration, and the framework of the education system.
Contributors xiii
Georgina Rojas García has a doctorate in sociology from the University
of Texas at Austin. She is a researcher at CIESAS in Mexico City and a
member of the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores. Her research topics
include economic restructuring and the job market, remunerated domes-
tic work, and international migration and jobs.
Preface
This book was originally published in Spanish in May 2020, a few weeks
after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic caused shutdowns and con-
sternation around the world. Donald Trump and Joe Biden were campaign-
ing for president of the United States, and one of the big issues debated
during their campaigns was stemming the flow of immigration.
At that time, Trump’s policy to halt the flow of migrants from Central
America had already resulted in the deployment of thousands of members of
the Mexican National Guard to the Mexico–Guatemala border. In parallel,
a ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy was in place and land border crossings had been
closed between Mexico and the United States (under the name of Migrant
Protection Protocols), while Title 42 of the United States Code allowed the
immediate expulsion to Mexico of anyone – regardless of national origin
and whether or not they had applied for asylum.
The political and public health situation enabled the United States to
pressure the Mexican government into adopting the most severe migra-
tory control measures in recent decades. In Mexico, however, the general
perception was that the issue was not in Mexican hands. Only in the cities
near the northern border was the increasing presence of expelled persons
evident, many of them unaccompanied children and teenagers. The shelters
located in northern border cities were filled, and only there was it evident
that a growing percentage of people seeking protection were Mexicans.
The flow of Mexican migrants toward the United States was more or less
stable between 2008 and September 2019. In the early months of the pan-
demic, the number of Mexicans detained by the U.S. border patrol dwindled,
but since the second half of 2020, the number began rising sharply again,
and at the close of June 2022, half of the people deported from the U.S.
under the Migrant Protection Protocols and Title 42 were Mexicans. Although
these measures were created with people in transit through Mexico in mind,
more recently, they have affected more Mexicans than other nationals. Even
the pattern of asylum applications in the United States has changed. Until
2020, most of these were people from various countries of Latin America,
especially Central America and the Caribbean. By the close of the first half
Preface xv
of 2022, however, 40% of them were people born in Mexico who had come
from regions wracked by violence and organized crime.
The year 2021 began with a series of events that marked the adminis-
tration of President Biden, starting with the violent takeover of the U.S.
Capitol Building on January 6, and outgoing president Trump’s refusal to
accept his electoral defeat. Latin American countries, especially Mexico,
looked with hope toward the new Democratic administration, believing
that the hard years of racism and xenophobia that characterized the Trump
years were finally over. But more than a year and half since then, the reality
for Mexicans living in the United States is not much different from that of
the Trump era.1
What has changed is that every day these people send more and more
money home to their families and communities in Mexico, which has
helped palliate the economic crisis resulting from the pandemic and infla-
tion that have affected almost the entire planet. But the challenges of their
daily lives do not seem very different. Mexican consulates in the United
States have had to redouble their work of serving Mexicans during the pan-
demic, because many of them lost their lives due to the type of jobs they
usually worked, which made them essential laborers in activities like food
production and processing, caregiving, and cleaning. Without the possibil-
ity of remaining at home, and in many cases without documentation, they
were less able to avoid exposure and less likely to receive proper or timely
medical care.
The United States had more COVID infections and deaths than any
other country in the world. At present, more than 27,000 DACA recipients
work as doctors, nurses, senior citizen aides, pharmaceutical technicians,
paramedics, and medical and nursing students (Griffith 2019; Griffith 2020).
They have provided healthcare services during the pandemic. Yet Trump
used the pandemic as a pretext to step up his attacks on migrant families of
mixed legal status and DACA program beneficiaries. He continued to turn
his back on these youth and their families, endangering their lives and doing
little to quell the public health emergency.
On June 18, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Trump admin-
istration had not provided sufficient justification for terminating the DACA
program and that the program could continue as announced in 2012. Pre-
dictably, Trump responded by tweet that he would resume his attack on
DACA, this time complying with the Supreme Court’s requirements (Wil-
liams 2020). It was a victory for DACA youth, but formal citizenship is the
only way to ensure they can live in peace.
Even the economic relief offered to U.S. taxpayers during the pandemic
was denied, at Trump’s initiatives, to those who had paid their taxes using
an Individual Tax Identification Number (ITIN) instead of a Social Security
Number – the vast majority of whom were undocumented workers. This
was one of the cruelest measures taken in times of crisis. Many members of
xvi Preface
these families had lost their jobs or saw their income sharply reduced. With
the economic crisis brought on by the pandemic, the weight on the shoul-
ders of DACA youth grew.
Ironically, many DACA youth and their family members work in essen-
tial jobs, not just healthcare, as previously mentioned, but in agroindustry,
transporting produce from farms to the marketplace, delivering packages,
providing cleaning services, etc. – all of which kept the United States up and
running in a time of crisis. Thanks to the DACA program, these youth and
their families were able to rely on a minimum of support.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the DACA permit renewal process
became more complicated, even suspended in some states, which caused
some of them the loss of their jobs.
One of Biden’s campaign promises was to find a legal solution to the
situation of immigrants who came to the U.S. as minors, those covered by
the DACA program, also known as Dreamers (for a previous initiative called
the DREAM Act). June 2022 marked the tenth anniversary of President
Barack Obama’s announcement of DACA. In the intervening years, little
has been done to give these young people and their families a measure of
security and peace of mind. The severe labor shortage the country has suf-
fered after the pandemic should influence members of Congress and the
president to act and give these young people a path to citizenship. Numer-
ous demonstrations of support have come forward in recent months: letters
to Congress urging a solution, for example, a letter from 47 companies and
business associations demanding action. Voices have been heard from mem-
bers of the National Security Agency, law enforcement, and evangelical
Christians. Numerous social organizations have given their support. But we
are still waiting for Congress and the president to give DACA recipients and
Dreamers a formal path to citizenship.
Note
1. https://www.migrationpolicy.org.
References
Griffith, Stephanie 2019 “The Medical Profession Has a Diversity Problem. End-
ing DACA Would Only Make It Worse,” Center for American Progress Immigration,
November 8, 2019, available online: https://www.americanprogress.org/article/
medical-profession-diversity-problem-ending-daca-make-worse/
Griffith, Stephanie 2020 “They Can Help Fight Coronavirus. Trump Wants to Deport
Them. Roughly 27,000 DACA Recipients Are Health Care Practitioners. America
Can’t Afford Such a Loss,” Washington Monthly, March 24, 2020, available online:
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2020/03/24/they-can-help-fight-coronavirus-
trump-wants-to-deport-them/ (consulted April 14, 2020).
Griffith, Stephanie and Claudia Flores 2020 “Dreamers Help Keeping the Country
Running During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Center for American Progress, Immigration,
Preface xvii
April 3, 2020, available online: www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/
news/2020/04/03/482637/dreamers-help-keep-country-running-coronavirus-pan-
demic/ (consulted April 15, 2020).
Williams, Pete 2020 “Trump’s Taking Another Run at DACA. And a Texas Case Is a
Real Threat to the Program,” News, June 19, available online: https://www.nbcnews.
com/politics/supreme-court/trump-taking-another-run-daca-texas-case-real-threat-
program-n1231562 (consulted June 19, 2020).
Introduction
Agustín Escobar Latapí
At the beginning of November 2016, I was part of a group of Mexicans

invited by U.S. organizations, the Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económicas, and the Mexican embassy to observe the November 8 U.S.
presidential election. Despite not having done a group survey, most thought,
as did the media, that Hillary Clinton would win. The previous Saturday,
the organizers invited the group of Mexican officials (headed by the Mexi-
can ambassador to the United States) and experts in demography, interna-
tional relations, politics, and opinion studies to discuss their views before the
election and offer elements so the visiting delegation could understand and
communicate its findings.
I remember that two presentations broke the general spirit of things. The
first, by recently named Mexican ambassador Carlos Sada, was a presen-
tation worthy of the representative of a State. He showed no preference
or belief whatsoever regarding the elections and assured that Mexico was
capable of working productively with whoever ended up winning. The sec-
ond, by Ana González Barrera, from Pew Research Center, moderated the
enthusiasm of the attendees by showing that the process by which Latinos –
Mexicans in particular – were acquiring political weight as voters was quite
gradual. The demographic shift towards voters of Mexican origin was still
insufficient to forecast the triumph of a democratic candidate.
The rest of the presentations, on the contrary, maintained a certain implicit
or explicit consensus in the sense that the Mexican government would con-
tinue working with a Democrat in the White House and that the ‘good
times’ in the Clinton–Mexico relationship would experience a new phase.
On election day, our group visited several polling stations in the District of
Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland. Despite the fact the District of Colum-
bia is traditionally Democrat, officials and voters coming out of the polling
place gave us a quick impression that the election was close. Even so, the
group remained fairly calm. I decided not to attend the meeting-celebration
the group had been invited to that night because my flight left at 7:00 in the
morning. However, I could not stay away from the news. At approximately
10 p.m., CNN commentators assured the audience that Broward County in
Florida, where candidate Trump was showing an unexpected lead, would
DOI: 10.4324/9781003310396-1
2 Agustín Escobar Latapí
shift in favor of Clinton when more votes were counted. Finally, it sank in:
the country and the majority of electoral districts tended toward Donald
Trump. To the group, as well as to me, that result was a shock that was hard
to assimilate. From that point on, it was clear that the outlook for Mexico,
but especially Mexicans in the United States, was indeed grim.
When Trump announced his candidacy in June 2015, he had made ample
mention of Mexico and Mexicans.1 One has only to remember that one of
Trump’s first utterances during the campaign was to refer to Mexicans with
words such as ‘rapists’, also relating them to drugs. He stated that Mexicans
‘are not our friends’ and ‘they are killing our economy’. Later, he insisted
that Mexico was ‘sending’ rapists and drugs to the United States.
The election of Trump to the presidency rekindled nightmares in many
Mexicans or children of Mexicans born in the United States. It also pitted
a new generation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans against a shift in
politics whose transcendence was impossible to gauge with precision, but
nevertheless portended setbacks and new obstacles.
For Mexico and Mexicans in Mexico, but especially for Mexicans and
Mexican Americans in the United States, this election marked a drastic and
sudden shift. This is not because the past was all rosy. There were difficulties
enough and, in reality, the balance of 20 years, since the 1996 IIRIRA Act2
up to Trump’s election, had been one mounting restrictions, deportations,
and repression. In 2005, massive roundups in Mexican neighborhoods and
in companies employing them had begun. Mexican diplomacy and consular
services had already had to respond to defend Mexicans in the United States
and innovate services previously not necessary or that were for a handful of
conationals, as Julián Escutia Rodríguez shows in this volume. Beginning
in 2008, however, there was an implicit, but well-defined, policy: more
action and more drastic ones against the undocumented, counterbalanced
by expanding legal migration channels with protections which, though not
ideal, did indeed permit part of the Mexican population to get ahead, to
reach a better level of well-being, and contribute more to U.S. society. The
number of undocumented Mexicans had been falling since 2008. Mexicans
arrived to the 2016 elections with these two legacies: one repressive and
one of increasing avenues for legal migration. That is, more than a mil-
lion undocumented Mexicans were removed and deported, and many more
were convinced they should leave the country. But at the same time, posi-
tive trends could be seen in the Mexican population, in their jobs, in their
percentage documented, and their income. The election should easily make
these modest advances do an about-face.
This book responds to the need of Mexican society and government to
have in-depth, rigorous knowledge of how the lives of their paisanos, both
documented and undocumented, are shifting. It starts from the hypothesis
that the 2016 election marked a defining moment in the lives of Mexicans
in the United States. Its chapters explore three topics: the direction and
magnitude of those shifts based on a broad-ranging survey and on in-depth
Introduction 3
anthropological work, including the voices of those who benefited and who
were affected; consular strategies put in motion after the election; as well as
drugs and bilateral relations. Drugs are only one of the chapters in a bilateral
relationship. They affect the policies that modify, for better or worse, the
lives of Mexicans in the United States. Research was carried out at 19 con-
sulates throughout the U.S. territory, in states both favorable and contrary to
immigration. On the one hand, it analyses the shifts from the point of view
of foreign-relations officials (consular and high-ranking ones charged with
protecting Mexicans in the United States) and, on the other hand, from that
of Mexicans turning to consulates for help with a number of issues.
This book is not an isolated product. It is part of a broader effort by
Mexico’s Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) to document
changes in the lives of Mexicans in the United States since January 2017.
CONACYT took it upon itself to offer society and the Mexican govern-
ment a set of rigorous and timely assessments on the shift and its impact
on the Mexican population on both sides of the border, and on the Mexi-
can economy and policies. The initiative was directed by Tonatiuh Guillén
López, a professor-researcher at the Programa Universitario de Estudios
del Desarrollo at Mexico’s National University. The project’s findings were
shared in bulletins, meetings with government and social actors, and the
media. As academics, however, it was decided that Mexico should per-
manently be able to count on our assessment. If the Mexican population
in the United States were a State, it would be the second most important
one. In 2015, in the State of Mexico, the largest one population-wise, there
were 16 million inhabitants. In the United States, there were slightly under
12 million, almost 10% of Mexico’s population. This, without counting the
population of Mexican ascendance who, since 1996, are likewise, in princi-
ple, Mexican citizens, numbering some 36.6 million.3 For the Mexican gov-
ernment and society, counting on a precise and reliable assessment regarding
the Mexican diaspora is and has to be basic for collaborating with it: to
represent and strengthen them together, to defend their rights, and to make
them participants in their development. Carlos González Gutiérrez (2006)
has put forth, with examples from other countries, that paying attention to
the Mexican diaspora was obviously necessary before providing them with
representation and protection. Moreover, countries that have strengthened
their relationship with their diaspora in the United States have found allies
within that country and successfully carried out projects generating well-
being for them and for their country.
Mexico’s largest research center specializing in social anthropology (CIE-
SAS) bet then on studying this population and the consular apparatus that
attended it at a watershed moment. The consular service welcomed the
proposal enthusiastically. For them, this study was fundamental for its own
reasons. First, it offered a measurement of the well-being and impact of
political change among the population they serve. Second, it examined the
actions of consular services from both the point of view of officials and the
users themselves. Calibrating the consular response to new and increasing
needs for service among the Mexican population in the U.S. helps the State
improve its efforts. Consular offices provided ample support, including help
recruiting Mexican nationals for our case studies and focus groups. Their
participation also crystallized into a chapter of this book written by Julián
Escutia Rodríguez, Director General of Protection of Mexicans Abroad.
The Mexican Population in the United States

For researchers, Mexico – U.S. – Mexico migration is always fascinating in
part because it changes continually. Some changes can mark new directions
in trends that seemed structural. Others are short term. In 1996, Philip
Martin and the author had predicted that Mexican migration to the United
States would continue to increase until approximately 2005–2010, when
migratory pressure would subside. The idea was generally rejected, partially
because it was made when Mexico was undergoing a profound economic
crisis. But we believed optimistically that the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) was not an isolated agreement, but the spearhead in
a new relationship between both governments, a relationship that would
marginalize political extremism in both countries and would help consoli-
date the notion that increasingly close collaboration would be a necessary
condition for maintaining and reinforcing North American hegemony in
the world, and that the same would lead to a gradual convergence of both
economies and societies.
Migratory pressure would decrease for two reasons. First, we observed that
Mexican fertility had fallen gradually since the end of the seventies, from
6.5 children to approximately 2.4 children per woman. After some time, this
drop would lead to the arrival of smaller cohorts of youths in the labor mar-
ket. This trend was confirmed by each successive population census. Sec-
ond, we predicted sustained job growth in Mexico and, in particular, formal
employment growth. The reasoning was that, having increasingly more and
better jobs in Mexico for a labor force that would grow more slowly, Mexi-
cans would prefer to stay in Mexico. The prediction of jobs was less certain
than that of population. NAFTA spurred quite significant discontinuities
and ruptures in the Mexican economy. It is false that NAFTA triggered
a drop in the trade balance. That drop was spurred by the crisis of 1986
and Mexico’s untimely and forced incorporation into the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (which later became the World Trade
Organization (WTO)). Between 1986 and 1990, imports multiplied and
a large part of Mexican manufacturing jobs disappeared. New export jobs
offered lower wages, to allow Mexico to compete with low-cost imports.
However, NAFTA did unleash a series of economic, lending, productive,
and commercial reorderings leading many companies to bankruptcy, though
also creating and spurring others. The result was that growth in formal jobs
in Mexico was lower than predicted. While exports increased by over 10%
Introduction 5
p.a., imports also increased, and restructuring led to many tears, conflicts,
and confrontation, in both the public and private spheres. Growth due to
NAFTA was real, but its realization was delayed more than a decade and was
not at the level predicted.
Our prediction, nonetheless, seemed to come true. At the end of 2007
and clearly from 2008 on, Mexican migration to the United States fell drasti-
cally. From 2000 to 2006, Mexico showed a net negative migration balance
of 450,000 persons annually, mostly young adults. The majority swelled the
undocumented population in the United States. Starting in 2008, however,
on the contrary, net migration hovered close to zero and the total Mexican
population in the United States went down slowly. Of the 12.8 million in
2008, some 11.2 million were estimated for 2017.4 This gradual drop is the
product of returns, removals5 and deportations, deaths, fewer Mexicans arriv-
ing in the United States, and other shifts. One can say that, for the first time
since the nineteen sixties, the Mexican population in the United States were
stable, trending downward. Less migration of Mexicans and the stability of
this population spurred other changes. As the first chapter in this book shows,
the length of residence of Mexicans in the United States increased substan-
tially, proficiency in English improved, educational level increased, as did the
mean age of Mexican migrants, since young Mexican workers arrived in far
fewer numbers. Less competition for jobs by recently arrived migrants also
meant that the incomes of those already in the U.S. improved in real terms.
And, quite significantly, the legality of transit and migratory status in the
United States also improved. This shift has been the product of normal resi-
dency and work-visa formalities, such as those for H-IB, H-2A and H-2B,
TN, L, etc., and those non-job-related visas used by the Mexican population.
The drop in emigration from Mexico, the return en masse of almost
980,000 Mexican between 2007 and 2020, the arrival with them of some
775,000 persons born abroad, among which are their children and other
relatives, coincide with our prediction, but not with the factors we foresaw
in 1996. Our prediction was based on the Mexican economy successfully
absorbing those newly seeking work. Reality was less positive and more
complex. First, with the Great Recession of 2008, there was a sudden drop
in jobs available in the United States, from which the economy recovered
slowly. The sector which Mexicans had participated in, construction, was
the one most affected and the unemployment rate among them rose drasti-
cally. Many Mexicans returned to Mexico for simple economic reasons.
Second, the penalties for reentering the United States after having been
removed or deported included mandatory jail, this in addition to arrests in
communities and workplaces. For decades, for migrants, the main risk lay
in the border crossing. Once you reached a community or got a job, the
probability of deportation became almost zero. But starting 2005, nation-
wide roundups in communities and at work increased and jail time was
mandatory for recidivists. With that, the personal cost of illegal migration
increased substantially.
Third, the dangers of migration shot up brutally. Besides the risk of get-
ting caught and jail time, there were walls, high fences, and sensors at the
border, resulting in less success crossing illegally. So that individual migrants
could not manage the crossing by themselves. Crossing became the business
of criminal groups. For as long as crossing did not entail major risks or costs,
migrants could try it alone or with small-time smugglers from their com-
munity. When risk increased this way, criminal groups already organized
for drug trafficking could charge much more to cross, kidnap migrants, and
convert them into a captive clientele or into forced labor. Another conse-
quence of this is that the possibility of migrating successfully depended on a
larger investment. Migrating stopped being for the rural poor.
The criminalization of undocumented migration, therefore, operated
through various channels. One derives from greater risk of living and work-
ing without documents and from reentering the United States illegally.
What was previously a fine became a major crime. Another channel of
criminalization occurred when migrants were subjected to criminal organi-
zations which became increasingly visible, active, and necessary for bor-
der crossings and, starting in 2007–2008, predated on Mexican and Central
American migrants.
Fourth, Mexican cash transfer programs also disincentivized emigration.
The best way to receive these transfers was to not move from place to place.
Government transfers to low-income households had been increasing since
1997, when the Progresa – Oportunidades program was rolled out. A num-
ber of other programs followed similar strategies. To the program Oportu-
nidades was added a program of non-contributive pensions for the elderly,
a subsidy program for campesinos planting basic crops, and others. By 2018,
government cash transfers accounted for 34% of the total household income
for the poorest decile of Mexican homes, and 23% of total income for the
second decile. If the household and its members qualify, it is better to boost
household income this way than take on the costs and risks of migration.6
Finally, rural jobs began to grow in Mexico as agricultural exports did.
Mexican international emigration has mainly come from rural areas in
Western Mexico. The creation of jobs in that region allowed rural workers
to remain in Mexico.7 The outcome of all the above shifts changed Mexico’s
stance in terms of migration. While it had been a country of emigration for
40 years, it suddenly became a country of immigration, on account of less
emigration, an increase in the return of Mexicans from the U.S., and the
inflows of their descendants.8
Migration itself – the flow of those who come and go – became more
regular. On the one hand, a smaller flow ‘fits’ within the visas the United
States generates year after year for Mexico. But on the other hand, from 2008
to 2012 especially, additional opportunities for legal migration were offered.
The Department of State (modestly) increased the number of residence per-
mits9 and, more substantially, temporary work H-2A visas,10 TN visas11 (not
formally visas), and B1/B2 visas to visit the United States without a right
Introduction 7
to work. TN visas granted to Canadians and Mexicans saw a spectacular
increase from 99,000 in 2009 to some 900,000 in 2011.12 Little by little,
from being predominantly undocumented, the overall Mexican population
in the United States became mainly and increasingly documented.
As the ‘problem’ of border enforcement with Mexico dropped substan-
tially because Mexican undocumented migration decreased, the border
ceased to be the source of most undocumented migration. Airports became
the largest source of undocumented inflows, mainly through visa overstays
(people who remain in the U.S. after their visas expire) and visa abuse (peo-
ple who use visitor visas to stay and find jobs). And Mexicans no longer
were the most numerous among the undocumented flow. Technical, media,
and political attention to undocumented migration should have been shifted
to airports and Asian, Central European, and Central American nation-
alities. But this did not happen. Unfortunately, Mexican undocumented
migration remained at the core of political debate.
Is it correct to say that the problem of undocumented Mexican migration
had been resolved? How many Mexicans were really undocumented in the
United States? How had their number evolved since there was a great shift
in migratory movements? Our binational study on Mexican migrants in
Mexico and in the United States shows that, in 2005, it reached a maximum
of 6.3 million undocumented individuals (Masferrer et al. 2022). The Pew
Center points out that 12 years later, in 2017, a few months after the survey
implemented for this volume, they represented 43% of a total population
of 11.6 million persons, or 4.9 million persons. That is to say, a 1.4-million
decrease, when the previous trend was that the number grew by 220,000 or
more per year. For the first time since the seventies, the majority of Mexi-
cans in the United States, that is 6.4 million, have an adequate legal migra-
tory status.13 The decrease in the number of undocumented Mexicans (and
the increase of documented ones) should be reflected in better conditions
for the majority of Mexicans to have access to new opportunities for educa-
tion, jobs, services, housing, and mobility.
But not all undocumented Mexicans are lacking a status that provides
them with protection. The most important undocumented population that
has legal protection to avoid deportation is ‘DACA’ youths,14 also known
as ‘Dreamers’.15 This administrative program, analyzed by Barros Nock
and Escutia Rodríguez in this book, was created by President Obama in
light of the impossibility of Congress legislating on migratory matters.
The beneficiaries of this program are the youngsters who were taken to
the United States by their parents when they were minors (that is, they
did not decide for themselves to violate the laws of the United States by
migrating without documents) and did not commit any crime. According
to the corresponding chapter in this volume, successful entry into DACA
permits these young people to study, work, drive (with varying conditions
in different states, as is pointed out in this book), and start businesses with-
out being pursued or deported, despite not having a permanent residence
permit. DACA beneficiaries are classified as undocumented, but as long as
United States courts suspend the extinction of the program, they cannot
be deported. Pew estimates that in 2019, there were 536,000 Mexicans in
DACA. Being in the program can provide substantial benefits to these Mex-
ican youths. There were an estimated 200,000 Central American beneficiar-
ies as well. This book explores the topic from two perspectives. On the one
hand, focus groups of these youngsters were carried out in 12 consulates and
the policies regarding these DACA youngsters were analyzed in each state
(Barros Nock). From a public policy approach, Escutia Rodríguez analyses
the initiative of the Mexican embassy and the consular service that ensured
Mexican youth received maximum coverage and maximum benefits from
DACA. Having embraced DACA indicates that these youngsters wish to
remain in the United States. But should they have to leave upon conclusion
of the program, Mexico must have policies for including them.
A second population that is undocumented but which also enjoys some
protection to remain in the United States while its status is being defined,
consists of those requesting asylum. Though the number of Mexicans
requesting such has grown, in 2018, it was still too small to produce much
change in the undocumented total.
Taking the preceding into account, besides the reduction of 1.4 million
undocumented, there are at least two groups of undocumented Mexicans that
have a certain protection from deportation. However, this protection is weak:
the DACA program was canceled, though its cancelation was suspended, and
asylum seekers have protection as long as their legal process is underway,
even though requests for asylum submitted by Mexicans are overwhelm-
ingly denied. One can therefore talk about a population of slightly more than
four million Mexicans who have no legal protection during their stay and
of slightly less than one million who, though undocumented, are protected
against deportation. This number of undocumented, though much lower
than that of 2005, still represents the largest undocumented population in the
United States from any country and, therefore, requires consular protection.
The Defense of Mexicans in the United States

Mexican emigration had decreased and the definitive return and arrival of
those born in the United States to Mexican parents increased.16 Conse-
quently, the Mexican population in the United States went down. In addi-
tion, the number of undocumented Mexicans decreased and the percentage
with residence or citizenship permission increased. Is it still necessary for
Mexico to manage the largest consular network of any country in the United
States (there are 50 of them)? This volume argues it is. First, the population
of Mexican origin continued to grow. As was already mentioned, Pew esti-
mated it at 36.6 million in 2017. This population also has access to Mexican
citizenship, though primarily they are U.S. citizens. Their family and social
ties with Mexico remain and they require many services.
Introduction 9
But the main reason for continuing to serve this population as a State pri-
ority for Mexico is that it continues to be extremely vulnerable, which mag-
nifies the impact of any political or economic change. As was mentioned
in the preceding paragraphs, slightly more than four million were at serious
risk of deportation. That is, they could be easily picked up and deported,
and another 12 million persons – their immediate families – would see their
daily lives and their survival in doubt. But the rest – more than six million
native Mexicans who have permission to live or work in the United States
and another 24 million who are of Mexican origin but U.S. citizens by
birth, likewise continue to be vulnerable. That is to say that the crime of
‘looking Mexican’, independently of the legality of their stay or even U.S.
citizenship, not only remained but worsened substantially.
Discrimination against Mexicans in general has moved some to think
that legal status is trivial. This is false. On the contrary: given that, for racist
reasons, the probability of being stopped and questioned is high, it contin-
ues to be fundamental and a priority to encourage and support Mexicans
to get papers. Being a child of undocumented parents, as argued by Bean,
Brown, and Bachmeier (2015), carries with it a high, predictable cost in
terms of education, occupation, and income. In other words, a good part of
the population of Mexican origin inherits significant disadvantages from the
irregular migratory status of their parents. That Mexicans in 2018, in their
majority, had work residence permits or citizenship is extremely positive
for themselves and their children. But even so, they and their children are
stopped and questioned much more frequently than white non-Hispanics,
whatever the latter’s nationality. Having documents is quite valuable.
But without considering whether or not those Mexicans had documents,
having consular support can spell the difference between continuing with
their lives or being removed or deported. This besides the fact that it is
the greatest diaspora of any country in any other country. Therefore, this
population clamors for attention resulting from their precarious status and
from an additional phenomenon exercising a lot of pressure on the lives of
Mexicans and their descendants, about which there is considerable debate.
Some have categorized it as “segmented assimilation” (Gans 1992; Portes
and Zhou 1993); others as “racialization” (Massey 2009). These concepts
refer to the fact that being Mexican in the United States supposes living
with a set of conditions making life difficult. There are other undocumented
populations that have abused their documents and have remained in the
United States without permission or have entered without authorization.
In fact, they are the populations that increased most rapidly when undocu-
mented Mexican migration diminished. But they were not the target of
raids of repression and deportation as is the case with the Mexican popu-
lation. This is a fact the Mexican government has to face and because of
which consular efforts are so meaningful.
This book does not pretend to resolve the conceptual treatment of the
interaction of the population of Mexican origin with other social, national,
or ethnic groups in U.S. society. However, it recognizes it is an identity to
which negative values have been adjudicated, such as done by former presi-
dent Trump. The clearest way of sullying Mexican identity has been associat-
ing Mexicans with crime and, more particularly, with drug trafficking. This
book tackles this topic in detail. It shows that, while interactions between
the two governments on drug trafficking have evidenced a high degree of
cooperation that satisfied those charged with the topic in the United States,
one hardline faction at Homeland Security, the Justice Department, and
those close to Trump raised the need to save U.S. communities from the
flagellation of Mexican drugs and from the drug traffickers. This view trans-
lates into migratory and service restrictions, arrests, and guidelines targeting
Mexicans. In other words, it had repercussions on the objective living con-
dition of the majority of Mexicans who bore no relationship whatsoever to
this criminal world. This could represent a third means of criminalization:
the first corresponds to the increase in risk of arrest and removal within the
United States; the second results from the border strategy forcing migrants
to contract criminal organizations to cross the border; and the third is this
one, by means of which Mexican identity is associated with crime, further
restricting the lives and freedoms of Mexicans in the U.S.
Labyrinths of an American Dream

This book follows three major directions. First, it provides a broad, repre-
sentative investigation of the Mexicans who resort to consulates for any rea-
son. The large number of Mexicans using services who were interviewed by
us guarantees we covered a wide range of personal and family situations. In
this component, we include both the interviews with consular staff as well
as the discussion groups with youths benefiting from the DACA program.
Second, it examines Mexican consular policy. Finally, it analyses the evolu-
tion of the conjunction of drugs, the criminal economy, and their relation-
ship to politics.
The first chapter, by Maria Regina Martínez Casas, explains the origin
and direction of the study and offers general results. The notable decrease in
Mexico–U.S. migration produced major changes in that population. Some
of them led to a relative improvement in the legal and market conditions
they face. The chapter begins with the bases for the research in general,
describing the population that was interviewed at the consulates. As stated
earlier, it finds relatively favorable characteristics, given the poverty, poor
education, and lack of papers that had earmarked the Mexican population
of the United States in the past. From there, Martínez Casas goes into detail
about the number and type of experiences of discrimination and rejection
undergone by users of services. The findings are overwhelming: a signifi-
cant part of them experienced an increase in discrimination, exclusion, and
aggression starting in January 2017.
Introduction 11
The chapter by Georgina Rojas García encompasses the history and the
new strategies and ways of coordinating consular services. The chapter pro-
vides a sounding board for consuls and higher officials from the Secretary
of Foreign Relations who designed responses to the most pressing needs of
Mexicans in the United States. Among them, the most recent and the one
concentrated on in the last part of this article is the FAMEU (Fortalecimiento
para la Atención a Mexicanos en Estados Unidos) program. Rojas García ana-
lyzes each of the program’s components and the coordination going on
among consulates and among them, the embassy and the chancellery, to
achieve the greatest possible protection.
Magdalena Barros Nock tackles one of the three directions of research
at the consulates: dialogue with the youth benefiting from the DACA pro-
gram. As was already mentioned, this program allows youngsters who were
taken to the United States without documentation in their childhood to
have access to a variety of services and opportunities and who, as long as
a program exists and they are a part of it, cannot be removed or deported
from the United States, despite technically being undocumented. Mexicans
make up the majority of those benefiting from the program (more than half
a million of the total 700,000 beneficiaries in 2017). While politicians and
officials extol or condemn what has been done by DACA, this analysis of the
experiences and opinions of around 100 youths who expressed themselves
at the consulates permits an in-depth, but also empathetic, understanding
of how and why it has changed the lives of these youths. In addition to
their personal experiences, it calls attention to the fact that the program has
influenced the lives of their families in a multitude of ways. By giving access
to formal jobs and to drivers’ licenses, families’ freedom and opportunities
have increased. By getting the right to own a business, DACA youth made
it possible for their families to control businesses boosting family income.
The end of the program had been decreed, but its cancellation had been
suspended. As of this writing, the future of these youngsters is uncertain.
They continue needing Mexican consular support.
Julián Escutia Rodríguez, Director General of Protection of Mexicans
Abroad,17 is the author of the fourth chapter, in which he analyzes how
the triangulation chancellery–embassy–consular service came about and was
implemented, thereby taking advantage of conditions favorable to Mexicans
or, on the contrary, fighting initiatives detrimental to the rights of migrants.
The analysis is divided into two parts. The first breaks down the process of
how approval came about and the promulgation of Arizona Senate Bill 1070
in 2010, and the set of actions, coordinated efforts, services, and interven-
tions that were put into play to impede its going into effect. Those efforts,
in which the Mexican government allied with powerful social organizations,
had a certain amount of success by impeding the most harmful provisions
of the law from going into effect. The second case is the DACA program.
The goal of the chancellery was to benefit the greatest number of Mexican
youths possible. The operation included multiple and broad-ranging actions
involving the media, social networks, tens of thousands of informative and
training sessions for the bureaucratic process, as well as other actions. The
result is that 80% of the beneficiaries of the program were Mexicans when
the program was launched and that their families have led better lives,
although, as Barros Nock has pointed out, some benefits the youth expected
did not materialize.
The last chapter was written by Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez. Flores
underscores that the Mexican government’s cooperation with the United
States has been flowing and that Mexico has carried out what was requested
of it. However, he observes how there has been a separate and distinct nar-
rative and policies emanating, above all, from the CIA, Homeland Security,
and advisers close to the president, that Mexico was on the brink of col-
lapse due to violence and measures had to be taken at the border and in the
U.S. communities that, on a map presented by Flores, appear to be invaded
by Mexican cartels. The author does not anticipate any significant relief
for bilateral relations based on what has been achieved in the fight against
drugs. On the contrary, he predicts two scenarios. In both, the main initia-
tive comes from the United States, but, in one, pressure obeys a series of
concessions in other fields such as energy, assuming a coordinated, but sub-
ordinated, military role, or re-negotiating the U.S. – Mexico Canada Trade
Agreement. In the other, the option of the U.S. government is to step up
confrontation for political purposes. From the point of view of this book,
the second option is the most harmful to Mexicans in the United States.
Whenever domestic political tensions are exacerbated, they are scapegoated.
As stated earlier, the Mexican population in the United States would be
equivalent to the second-most populated state in Mexico. We reiterate that,
for Mexico, the “Mexicans on the other side” represent, firstly, an obliga-
tion. They have rights that Mexico must defend. But they also represent
support and a host of services for Mexico. If they were a state, they would
be the richest in the federation for their income. And, as a political force
gradually increasing, they could prove to be fundamental allies in the future.
This volume intends to provide research fostering a closer alliance between
Mexico and its diaspora.
Notes
1. www.washingtonpost.com/news/post/politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-
trump-anounces-a-presidential-bid/.
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.
3. The Pew Center estimates the ‘Hispanic population of Mexican origin’ in the United
States at 36.6 million. Although consulates receive many more requests for services from
Mexicans born in Mexico, this other population, which is three times larger, also requires
services such as birth certificates, Mexican passports, and others. www.pewresearch.
org/hispanic/pact-sheet/u-s-hispanics-facts-on-mexican-origin-latinos/.
Introduction 13
4. www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/u-s-hispanics-facts-on-mexican-origin-
latinos/.
5. The word removal is used, in addition to deportation, because in U.S. legal language,
removals and deportations are different.
6. The reader is advised that this is not a simple hypothesis or one that is always appli-
cable. While migration to the United States was relatively simple, a household’s
enrollment in more social programs increased the probability of migrating, as well
as the probability the migrant would return. A household lowered the risk derived
from migration since it had transfers and it was attractive for the migrants since, after
arriving, they would be safer and have healthcare and income (Escobar, Banegas,
and Teruel in Escobar and Masferrer 2022). When the risk of migrating increases
substantially, however, income from money transfers becomes a safe alternative to
migration and the latter decreases.
7. Of course, there is no perfect coincidence between the traditional region of origin
of emigration and the area of export agriculture, but there is considerable overlap.
8. Up until 2014, the flow of Central Americans was quite small and the number of
those who decided to stay in Mexico was even smaller. In CANAMID.org, the Cen-
tral America – North America migration dialogue coordinated by CIESAS, there are
multiple studies showing the small number of Central American migrants in Mexico
as of that date.
9. From around 145,000 in the years prior to the great recession to 160,000 in 2018.
MPI Data Hub: Legal immigrants by Country of Origin, 1999–2018.
10. The U.S. immigration system has 185 types of visa, according to the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS). The H-2A visa is for temporary agricultural
work with no ceiling by Congress. Slightly more than 300,000 are granted to Mexi-
cans every year.
11. When the United States and Canada signed their bilateral trade treaty, both passed
that their professional nationals could work in the other country with a minimum of
requisites.
12. www.statista.com/statistics/663424/nafta-visa-issuances/.
13. The overall Mexican population had, from 2007 to 2017, decreased some two
million persons. The number of deportations decreased from 2013 to 2017, from
approximately 300,00 to fewer than 200,000. https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2019/06/28/what-we-know-about-illegal-immigration-from-mexico/.
14. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. The name means that actions of removal
or deportation are deferred for those who arrived in the United States as minors,
provided they have committed no other offences, and took part in this program.
15. The author thanks Jeffrey Passel for having explained and broken down the dif-
ferent statuses of Mexican population that generally fall under the category of
‘undocumented’.
16. Another corollary of this great migratory shift is that one has to turn to see how
Mexico is integrating those who return and those Mexicans born in the United
States. That, of course, is an issue of substantial importance. Do the population born
in Mexico that returns to it and their descendants born in the United States have a
favorable incorporation process in Mexico? Our binational study (in press), Jacobo
Suárez (2018), Martínez (2019), and others analyze that in detail.
17. Julián Escutia became Consul General in Las Vegas in 2020.
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and the United States. An IMISCOE Regional Reader. Springer.
Gans, Herbert J. 1992 “Second-Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and
Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immigrants,” Ethnic and Racial Studies,
March. 15(2), 173–192.
González Gutiérrez, Carlos (coord.) 2006 “Relaciones Estado-diáspora México:
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores,” Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, Uni-
versidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Institu-
ciones de Educación Superior: Miguel Angel Porrúa.
Martínez Díaz Covarrubias, Sandra Nadezhda 2019 “Mojado en mi propia tierra.
Integración y exclusión de personas migrantes de retorno en Guadalajara y en San
Gabriel, Jalisco,” PhD thesis, Guadalajara: CIESAS Occidente.
Masferrer, Claudia, Carla Pederzini, Jeffrey Passel and Gretchen Livingston 2022 “Popu-
lation Dynamics of the Mexican Population on Both Sides of the Border,” in Agustín
Escobar Latapí and Claudia Masferrer (eds.), Migration Between Mexico and the United
States. An IMISCOE Regional Reader. Springer.
Massey, Douglas S. 2009 “Racial Formation in Theory and Practice: The Case of Mexi-
cans in the United States,” Race and Social Problems. 65–112.
Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou 1993 “The New Second Generation: Segmented
Assimilation and Its Variants,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science. 530(1), 74–96.
1 New Trends in the
Mexican Population
in the United States in
Times of Donald Trump’s
Administration
Maria Regina Martínez Casas
Introduction
In mid-2017, several of us at CONACYT’s Centros Públicos de Investi-
gación proposed doing a set of research projects that would permit learning
about the impact of the arrival of Trump to the presidency on different
spheres of life in the United States, and its consequences for the economy,
regional development, and the lives of Mexicans living in the United States.
As part of this effort, at CIESAS, we developed a project to do fieldwork
at Mexican consulates in the United States.1 Our research had three compo-
nents: it included implementing a set of questionnaires at 19 of the largest
consulates in that country; focus groups with young people; and interviews
with consular personnel and officials from the Undersecretary for North
America of the Chancellery. With this multiple methodology, we sought to
get closer to the variety of voices that are experiencing the new relationship
between Mexico and the United States in different ways.
In this work, I treat the first component of our research. The objective of
the survey was to learn about the socio-demographic profile of the persons
who go to request services at a consulate; their insertion in the labor market;
how long ago they migrated and their origin; their mobility within the United
States and toward Mexico, voluntarily or involuntarily; and their experiences
with discrimination, especially in recent years due to Trump’s campaign
against Mexico and Mexicans, but also since the increase in deportations that
began in 2008. That reached its highest level between 2011 and 2014 and has
continued as an ongoing threat against large contingents of migrants in irregu-
lar situations and against families with mixed migratory statuses.
Starting from the hypothesis that many Mexicans perceive their condition
in the United States as being increasingly vulnerable and that they are exposed
daily to racist and xenophobic expressions, our research sought to delve into
this set of experiences based on questions dealing with the topic indirectly.
The questionnaire was elaborated by Magdalena Barros Nock, Georgina
Rojas García, and Maria Regina Martínez Casas, with the collaboration
of Agustín Escobar Latapí, all researchers at CIESAS (Martínez Casas, 2007).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003310396-2
16 Maria Regina Martínez Casas
Table 1.1 Own Elaboration/Interviewees by City; Trump Presidency
City Number of Persons Interviewed
Los Angeles 108

San Bernardino 88
Oxnard 69
Phoenix 117
Tucson 56
Chicago 104
Dallas 84
Houston 60
Atlanta 157
Raleigh 98
St. Paul 89
Miami 89
New York 162
Little Rock 74
Denver 187
Seattle 62
Portland 175
Fresno 137
Philadelphia 75
Implementation was possible thanks to the collaboration of personnel from

the Undersecretary for North America of the Secretary of Foreign Rela-
tions, in particular Julián Escutia Rodríguez, and with the support of Data
OPM.2 Surveys were implemented during two field sessions. The first took
place during the months of October and November 2017 and was applied
at 11 consulates. The second included eight consulates and was done in
May and June 2018. In both cases, we sought to achieve a balance between
consulates located in urban areas and those in rural ones, as well as areas
with ‘friendly’ policies toward migration, as opposed to areas we considered
more hostile. The selection of consulates was done in coordination with
the Secretary of Foreign Relations. A total of 1,991 questionnaires were
applied to persons who were taking care of formalities at the consulates or
to those accompanying them while they were waiting their turn. All our
interviewees were older than 18. Participation was voluntary and we had a
low percentage of persons who declined to participate in the study. It took
five to 10 minutes to apply each questionnaire. However, in some cases,
people commented on their responses, which were recorded in fieldnotes
by the interviewing team. Table 1.1 shows the number of questionnaires
applied at each consulate.
Sociodemographic Profile
Our sample consisted mainly of men. Research has shown that Mexican
migration to the United States began fundamentally male. But in the mid-
1980s, it became more female, starting with three processes: on the one
Mexican Population in the U.S. in Trump’s Administration 17
hand, women who traveled in search of their husbands; on the other, fami-
lies that migrated together; and, third and more recent, single women or
female heads of family who migrated as the men had predominantly done
earlier (Massey, Pren and Durand 2009). Moreover, in the final two decades
of the twentieth century, many women migrated to work in the in-bond
industries on the northern border of Mexico (see Figure 1.1). That gave
them the tools to later cross the border and seek jobs in the United States.
Our own base mentioned this: 83% of women answering the questionnaire
arrived after 2005.
The age of our interviewees likewise corresponds to persons who are
at the peak of their productive and reproductive life. More than half of
those responding to our survey were under 39 and only 5% elderly (see
Figure 1.2). This related to the following graph, showing how long ago they
migrated and permitting us to infer that most of our interviewees arrived in
Figure 1.1 Own Elaboration/Genders of Sample Study
Figure 1.2 Own Elaboration/Ages of Sample Study

the United States quite young. This type of data forces us to reflect on two
factors we will take up later. On the one hand, the implications for Mexico
of losing a significant percentage of its youth to migration and, on the other,
the increase in money transfers that have been documented during the past
decade. Given that the persons answering our survey are working, almost in
their entirety, it is probable that we currently have a very important number
of conationals living in the United States who send money back to their
families who have not migrated.
Two findings deduced from the graphs are noteworthy: Mexicans contin-
ued migrating during the increase in deportations, but the migratory peak
we found was during the mid-1990s, when major economic crises and polit-
ical changes occurred in Mexico (see Figure 1.3). This continued up until
the mid-2000s, just before the global economic crisis between 2008 and
2010 that had a major effect on jobs in North America. More than 40% of
our interviewees migrated during this window in time. In 2020, we would
surely have found different information. The health crisis originating with
COVID-19 has put a damper on international migration and, as of the date
of the draft of the Spanish text, the border between Mexico and the United
States continues to be semi-closed. Likewise, the behavior of money trans-
fers will vary because of the effects of unemployment affecting the global
economy. In March 2020, there was a record increase in transfers sent from
the United States to Mexico, coinciding with the beginning of the health
contingency in both countries. It is probable that many fellow countrymen
who have families in Mexico will decide to send extraordinary support.
With regard to the geographical origin of migration, our findings coin-
cide with what has already been documented in the bibliography on states
sending the most population out from Mexico (Mummert 2016). The first
Figure 1.3 Own Elaboration/Time Frame for Sample Studies Arrival in the United
States
two places are held by states from the Bajío region, with a long tradition of
migration ever since the Bracero Program (see Figure 1.4). Next are states
not well documented as to sending out people, in particular Mexico City.
It is important to point out that a little more than 3% of our interviewees
were born in the United States and seek consular services to formalize their
double nationality.
Regarding the educational level of our interviewees, we found that more
than one-third had senior high-school studies and a similar percentage fin-
ished secondary (junior high school). It is surprising that they are more
educated than the average in Mexico, where the educational level was just
9.1% for persons above 15 years of age (INEE 2019). The other interesting
piece of information is that 8.8% of our interviewees have university studies
(see Figure 1.5).
Figure 1.4 Own Elaboration/Place of Origin Prior to Migration in Sample Study
Figure 1.5 Own Elaboration/Education Level of Sample Study

According to the information on education, the level of English they can
handle ought to be related to the time they stayed in school. The infor-
mation our survey yields points to the fact that many of them studied in
Mexico and only one-third are fluent in English in the four basic com-
municative abilities. On the extreme, it is also noteworthy that almost 40%
of our interviewees speak little or no English (see Figure 1.6). Educational
research has shown that teaching English as a subject in school in Mexico
is quite deficient, so we assume this sector of our survey learned English as
part of their migratory experience (INEE 2019). Later, we will see that this
has an impact on job insertion and on experiences of discrimination that we
documented in our work.
To complement the information on the linguistic condition of our inter-
viewees, we also delved into whether they spoke some Mexican indigenous
language. It is surprising that the data look much like national trends. Accord-
ing to the mid-census survey the National Institute of Statistics and Geogra-
phy (INEGI) did in 2015, 7% of Mexicans said they were speakers of some
indigenous language and, in our data, it was 7.3% of those who answered the
questionnaire (see Figure 1.7). This trend also contradicts some of the studies
Figure 1.6 Own Elaboration/English Fluency and Literacy of Sample Study
Figure 1.7 Own Elaboration/Indigenous Dialect or Language Within Sample Study

that exist on the migration of this type of population (Martínez 2007). The
literature tends to state that indigenous people migrate less abroad and prefer
internal regional migration. Our data question those statements.
On Insertion Into North American Society

In this section, we analyzed the information that shows us how our inter-
viewees have been inserted into the society to which they migrated. Some
indicators, such as the access they had – at the time – to the DACA program3
and the type of job, show how they relate with other persons in the country
where they now reside.
Regarding the first point, we found that more than 20% of the people
we interviewed at the consulates have at least one family member benefiting
from DACA (see Figure 1.8). This is quite superior to what is reported in
the literature, allowing us to reflect on the profile of the people who come
to request services from Mexican consulates in the United States. It is also
interesting that the vast majority stated having only one family member
benefiting from the program (see Barros Nock in this same volume; see
Figure 1.9). In interviews with personnel from the different consulates, they
Figure 1.8 Own Elaboration/Percentage of Study Connected to DACA Program
Figure 1.9 Own Elaboration/Number of Family Members Within DACA Program

informed us that requests for identification cards increased for youth who
were candidates for requesting DACA. In addition, training events were
organized at many of those consulates to support these efforts.
Another element having a major influence on how conationals go through
the migratory experience has to do with the fact of having family members
who have returned to Mexico, be it by deportation or by voluntary return.
The literature on the dynamics of deportations reached a peak after the
financial crisis affecting the United States between 2008 and 2010 (Selee
2018). Data from the Migration Policy Institute show that this turning point
implied the dynamics of mobility between Mexico and the United States
would become negative, such that, as we can corroborate from our own
data, after 2010, arrivals of new migrants were low and returns to Mexico
marked one of every five families.
Noteworthy from our survey is that the percentage of persons revealing fam-
ily members were deported and the percentage of those stating having family
members who returned to Mexico voluntarily are practically identical (see
Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11). This type of information comparing deportations
versus voluntary repatriations has been explored very little and is one of the top-
ics Selee puts on the table in his most recent analyses of migratory dynamics
Figure 1.10 Own Elaboration/Deportation Figures Within Sample Study
Figure 1.11 Own Elaboration/Voluntary Return to Mexico Figures

between Mexico and the United States. This author posits that, in light of
the deportation of a person close to one, other members of his or her support
network have two types of response: some decide to return to Mexico in light
of the possibility of deportation or to keep the family united, while others
reinforce community-protection measures to avoid the risk of being deported.
In a scenario such as the one postulated by Selee, our numbers would permit
us to state that, for each person who has been deported recently, another has
decided to return. Another hypothesis is that talking about a deportation in
front of an interviewer is not easy for many people. Therefore, our numbers
on voluntary returnees may mask a larger number of deportations than those
recorded in the explicit question on this painful subject.
Finally, the last topic we inquired about in our survey and that has a
major impact on the insertion of Mexicans living in the United States is
their insertion in the job world. As we show in the graph on educational
level and English knowledge, more than half of our interviewees have stud-
ies at a high-school and university level, and close to 60% state they speak
and understand the English language. In the review of the jobs they report,
we found that slightly less than half have unspecialized jobs, while the rest
carry out activities of medium and high specialization. In reviewing the
information, we observe that these results are linked more to how long ago
they migrated than to educational level, but there is a high correlation with
mastering English. Almost all the people who have highly specialized jobs
are highly bilingual in English and Spanish. It is quite probable that the dif-
ferentiated insertion in the job market is influenced by educational level,
bilingualism, and the paisano networks our interviewees have. As part of the
commentaries made on the margin of the survey, many of them said they
work at companies in which other family members or paisanos do. Moreo-
ver, considering that 33% of those interviewed stated they can speak, under-
stand, read, and write English, only 18% are in work spaces where they can
use said abilities fully (see Figure 1.12).
Labor Occupation4
Figure 1.12 CentroGeo Elaboration/Presence in the Workforce5

The Geography of Discrimination
One of the objectives that led us to do this study was to inquire into new
forms of discrimination starting from Donald Trump’s arrival on the politi-
cal stage. Ever since 2014, we had evidence he started an offensive against
Mexico and Mexicans on Twitter, especially those living in the United States
(Martínez Casas and López Arellano 2020). In prior studies (Martínez Casas
and López Arellano 2020), we documented the differences between expe-
rience and the perception of discrimination. In this survey, we only asked
about the first phenomenon – that is, experience – since we considered
that the particular moment favored such situations. However, we know the
percentage of positive responses tends to be higher when we ask third parties
about the perception of mistreatment. To the direct question on experiences
with discrimination, where President Trump’s arrival is mentioned, only
19% of those interviewed responded positively (see Figure 1.13). However,
when the question was more indirect, the percentage of positive responses
doubled (see Figure 1.14).
As part of this set of questions, we included the possibility of having
been stopped by the police asking for documents, and 7% responded that
this had happened in the months prior to the survey (see Figure 1.15). One
of the pivotal points guiding this analysis is discrimination due to linguistic
Figure 1.13 Own Elaboration/Treatment in Businesses and Restaurants
Figure 1.14 Own Elaboration/Treatment as Non-Americans

condition. Thereto, almost one-fourth of our interviewees stated that, on
occasion, they had been asked to speak in English (see Figure 1.16).
Despite our calculating that part of our research would corroborate there
are states more friendly to migration and others more hostile, we have results
worthy of note. Our information shows that, at a state level, California,
Colorado, and Iowa, are the places where our interviewees reported more
experiences with discrimination. This geography is still being researched,
since, if we search at a county level, we see that those urban California coun-
ties that are close to Los Angeles and San Francisco have low percentages of
discrimination, while border counties and those clearly rural show a differ-
ent behavior. States with the highest percentage of positive responses to the
five questions looking into experiences of discrimination are in black. States
in dark gray are those showing middle percentages of positive responses, and
those in light gray have low percentages. States in white were not part of
the sample in our survey (see Map 1.1). Another important note is that the
states of California and New York are overrepresented in the survey because
of concentrating on a major percentage of the Mexican population living in
the United States and, therefore, in our survey.
Figure 1.15 Own Elaboration/Police Stops for Documentation
Figure 1.16 Own Elaboration/Requested to Speak Only English

Map 1.1 Own Elaboration/Experiences of Discrimination Categorized by State
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uskollisena isänmaansa palvelijana tehneensä maansa viholliselle
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*****
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puhunut, ennenkuin häntä kuljetettiin kotimaata kohden. Hän oli sillä
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VIERUSTOVERIT
Matkalla he eivät tietäneet mitään toisistaan. Mutta perille

jouduttuaan —, tai oikeammin kotimatkan etäisessä
pohjoismutkassa, he tulivat naapureiksi. Toinen heistä sijoitettiin
sotavankisairaalan suuren salin etäisimpään nurkkaan, toinen
vieressä seisovaan vuoteeseen.
Näytti melkein siltä kuin järjestelyssä olisi piillyt jokin ajatus, niin
perin erilaiset olivat nämä vierustoverit. Toinen oli joukkonsa iloisin
mies, toinen oli ainoa, joka ei ilmaissut vähintäkään iloa
kotiinpääsöstä. Toisella ei ollut yhtään mitään matkassaan, sillä
iloisella oli tavallista suurempi matkapussi, jota hän ei, ellei se käynyt
välttämättömäksi, hetkeksikään heittänyt luotaan. Toinen katseli
tuontuostakin osaaottavasti vierustoveriinsa, toinen ei koskaan edes
kääntänyt päätäänkään toveriinsa päin. Hän oli sokea ja hänellä oli
side silmillä.
Näkevä, joka oli iloinen luonteeltaan, puheli aina kun vain sai
tilaisuutta siihen. Hänen täytyi jakaa iloaan muillekin. Ja sekin, että
hänen vierustoverinsa oli sokea, kehoitti häntä puhumaan. Täytyihän
sokean edes saada kuulla, kuulla jotain iloista. Ja hänellä oli iloista
puhuttavaa.
— Tiedättekö, meillä on vain laskettavana pitkä alamäki läpi
Ruotsin.
Sitte olemme kotona.
Sokea kuuli riemuväreen joka sanassa, ja se vihlasi hänen

sisintään kuin miekan terä. Hän ei vastannut.
— Jos uskaltaisin, niin soittaisin teille. Mutta en vielä tiedä, onko

se luvallista, — Hän puhui kuiskaamalla. — Soitto on oivallista
lääkettä.
Sokea päätti mielessään, että hänen vierustoverinsa oli hyvin

nuori. Vanhemman ääni ei koskaan voisi ilmaista tuollaista yli
äyräitten tulvehtivaa iloa, ei ainakaan sen, joka sodan kauhut
nähtyään palaa rintamasta.
— Koetelkaahan mitä minulla on tässä!
Sokea kuuli vierustoverinsa kopistelevan tavaroitaan. Sitte hän

tunsi, että jotain työnnettiin hänen viereensä. Hän kuljetti käsiään
tunnustelevasti peitettä pitkin ja sai käsiinsä viulun.
Toinen vetäisi jousella pari kertaa kielien poikki ja naurahti.
— Oletteko kuulleet moista senjälkeen kuin läksitte kotoa! — Ääni

oli ylpeä kuin kepposistaan kehuskelevan koulupojan.
Taas vetäisi hän muutamia rajun iloisia säveleitä, sitte hän alkoi
kertoa. Hän puhui nyt matalalla äänellä, melkein kuiskaamalla, mutta
nytkin värisi joka sana hillittyä iloa. Viulu oli koko ajan seurannut
häntä. Hän oli peljännyt sen kadottamista melkein enemmän kuin
henkeään. Kukapa oikeastaan ennätti ajatella henkeään sodassa.
Vaaraa hetkenä oli muuta ajattelemista, ja kun vaara oli ohi, oli hän
aina ajatellut viuluaan.
Tämä ei ollutkaan mikään tavallinen viulu. Se oli aito

Cremonalainen. Se puheli, itki ja iloitsi ihan kuin ihminen. Sillä oli
sisimmässään kaikki ihmisrinnan säveleet, ja se ilmaisi ne
ymmärrettävämmin, täyteläisemmin ja ihanammin kuin konsanaan
sanat.
Tämä viulu oli myöskin hankkinut hänelle sen pikku vaimon, joka
nyt kotona odotti häntä.
Sokea makasi liikahtamatta. Ei mikään hänessä ilmaissut, kuuliko

hän vai eikö, oliko hän tyytyväinen vai tyytymätön.
Mutta kukapa ei mielellään kuulisi tuollaisesta herttaisesta pikku

vaimosta, joka oli sulaa päivän paistetta kullalle vivahtavista
ruskeista kiharoistaan kiiltonahkaiseen kengänkärkeensä saakka.
Sentähden toinen jatkoi.
Jo heidän ensi tutustumisensa oli ollut kuin kirkasta kevätpaistetta.

Tosin se alkoi kuutamokävelyllä, mutta siinä ei ollut mitään
haikeamielistä haaveilua, sulaa iloisen kirkasta kevätaurinkoa vain.
Hän oli lähtenyt virkistysmatkalle Sveitsiin. Cremonalainen, jonka

hän äsken oli saanut isoisältään, oli hänellä matkatoverina.
Rajattoman hyvällä tuulella hän kierteli Zürichin nähtävyyksiä
ihailemassa. Illalla hän hankkiutui Zürichbergiin, sai viimeisen
vapaana olevan huoneen, tilasi illallisen itselleen ja asettui
parvekkeelle nauttimaan sekä näköalasta että illallisesta.
— Ehkäpä hän nukkuu. — Kertoja katsoi hetkisen kysyvästi
vierustoveriinsa. Sitte hän ajatuksissaan jatkoi keskeytynyttä
kertomustaan. Kaikki oli yhtäkkiä käynyt niin eläväksi hänelle kuin
olisi se vasta tapahtumassa.
Hänen siinä istuessaan ja nauttiessaan on hänen katseensa

yhtäkkiä kiintynyt pieneen vaaleapukuiseen olentoon, joka kepeät
matkakapineet kädessään seisoo parvekkeen kynnyksellä. Se
vaaleapukuinen puhelee vahtimestarin kanssa. Hän koettaa saada
yösijaa itselleen, mutta tilaa ei ole muuta kuin etäämpänä olevassa
pienessä huvilassa. Vaaleapukuinen ei kuitenkaan siitä säikähdä.
Levollisesti hän tilaa illallista itselleen, valitsee parvekkeelta paikan
josta on mitä ihanin näköala ja asettuu siihen.
Cremonalainen on näihin asti rauhallisesti maannut kotelossaan.

Mutta nyt muistuttaa se olemassaolostaan, — Mitä te täällä istutte
kahden ja vaiteliaina. Olenhan minäkin matkassa.
Cremonalainen pääsee kotelostaan. Sen täytyy saada puhua.
Neiti syö huomattavan hitaasti. Kun hän vihdoin nousee, lähenee

hän soittajaa, — Kiitoksia! Te soitatte ihanan kauniisti, — Katse
säteilee ja kiharoissakin, jotka vallattomasti kurkkivat esiin
yksinkertaisen matkalakin alta, oli kuin kimmellystä.
Kun he viimein yhdessä lähtevät kulkemaan yömajaksi

suositeltuun huvilaan, ovat he jo kuin vanhat tuttavat. Mutta mistä he
puhuvat, sitä hän ei tiedä, ei tietänyt silloin eikä tiedä jälestäkään
päin. Hän tietää vain sen, että hänen rinnallaan kulkee pieni
vaaleapukuinen olento, jonka astunta on joustavaa kuin nuoren
vuorikauriin, ja jonka ympärillä kaikki paistaa ja kimaltelee kuin
auringon kirkkaassa valossa.
Ja sitte, sitte, kun he olivat sanoneet hyvää yötä, teki hän sen,
tuon tavattoman, jota hän ei koskaan ollut katunut niin monesti kuin
sille olivatkin yhdessä nauraneet. Hän vetäisi esille matkakynän ja
nimikorttinsa ja kirjoitti kuutamon valossa suurin juhlallisin kirjaimin:
Huomentervehdys oppaaltanne. Sitte hän pujotti kortin sisään oven
rakoon siinä huoneessa, jonne hänen vaaleapukuinen tyttönsä oli
kadonnut. Kortti tarttui juuri ovenrivan kohdalle, ja hän iloitsi
ajatellessaan, että siitä se varmasti putoaa maahan huomen
aamuna, kun hän avaa oven.
Minkälaisia lapsia he silloin kumpikin olivat! Mutta miten onnellisia

lapsia! Nyt he jo olivat paljoa vanhemmat, vaikka siitä ei vielä ollut
kovinkaan pitkä aika. Mutta he olivat kokeneet paljon, se pikkuinen
kotona ja hän sekä rintamassa että sotavankina. Ja kuitenkin pyrki
nyt ihan lapsettamaan, kun hän ajatteli sitä, että matka lyheni ja koti
läheni. Ja siellä kotona oli kaksi odottamassa, se rakas pikku vaimo
ja ihmeellinen pieni, pehmeä, punainen ja valkoinen käärö.
Sokea viereisessä vuoteessa liikahti. Toinen käytti kohta tilaisuutta

hyväkseen.
— Oletteko valveilla? Kuulkaa, sanokaa minulle, ymmärrättekö,

miten mies voi erota herttaisesta pikku vaimosta kolmenkuukautisen
avioliiton jälkeen ja sitte elää näkemättä häntä enemmän kuin sitä
pehmeätä pikku olentoa, joka on saapunut kotiin isän poissa-
ollessa?
— Elämässä on paljon, jota ei kukaan ymmärrä. — Sokea puhui

kuin jatkoksi omiin ajatuksiinsa.
— Mutta me voimme katsoa kaikkea joko valoisalta tai synkältä

kannalta. — Huomautuksessa oli ojennuksen makua, mutta tarkoitus
oli parhain. — Nähkääs, minulta on toinen sääri mennyt. — Hän
hätkähti omia sanojaan muistaessaan että vierustoveri ei voinut
nähdä mitään. — Olisihan minullakin syytä surra, jatkoi hän
kuitenkin, — kun näin nuorella ijällä olen joutunut raajarikoksi. Mutta
sen sijaan olen iloinen, rajattoman iloinen. Mitä merkitsee poikki
ammuttu sääri, kun vaimoni ja se pieni, pehmoinen ovat kotona
odottamassa!
— Onko teillä lapsia? kysäisi hän äkkiä, samalla kun kohosi

istualleen ja kietaisi peitteen paremmin polven alta poikki sahatun
säären ympärille.
Sokea nosti hiukan kättään. Se tapahtui vaistomaisesti, kuin olisi

hän tahtonut suojata itseään.
Hyvä Jumala, kuinka kiduttavasti tuo toinen osasi asettaa

sanansa! Ikäänkuin hänellä ei olisi ollut murhetta tarpeeksi
sokeudestaan ja repivistä, raatelevista muistoista!
Äkkiä hän muisti kysymyksen. — Ei ole, vastasi hän väsyneesti.
— Mutta vaimo?
— Vaimo on.
— Me olemme kaikki kadottaneet paljon, mutta meidän täytyy

iloita siitä mitä meillä on.
Sokean mieli kuohahti.
*****
Eikö hänellä vielä ollut ikää tarpeeksi ymmärtääkseen, että vaikka
he kaikki olivatkin palaavia, palasivat he eri asteisesti ruhjoutuneina,
eri mielentilassa ja erilaisiin oloihin. Rikkiammuttu sääri oli
korvattavissa keinotekoisella, mutta mikä korvasi sokealle hänen
näkönsä? Ja kuka aavisti, mitä näkö merkitsi juuri hänelle? Hän ei
voinut avautua ihmisille, ei kuten vierustoveri sanoin viskellä heille
sisintään niinkuin rikas rahoja taskustaan. Hän oli luonnostaan saita
sisimpänsä suhteen. Ja olot olivat yhä enemmän kehittäneet häntä
tähän suuntaan. Hän oli oppinut olemaan yksin ja yksinäisyydessä
tuijottamaan omaan sisimpäänsä, niinkuin saita raha-arkkuunsa,
Barbel ei käsittänyt tällaista. Ajatukset eivät koskaan rasittaneet
häntä. Hän purki sisimpänsä lauluun ja laverteluun. Kaikki oli
helppoa hänelle paitsi yksinäisyys. Sitä hän ei sietänyt. Sentähden
olivat he oppineet kulkemaan kukin omia teitään, toinen koko
maailman ystävänä, toinen sisäisesti eristettynä kaikista, joskin
ulkonaisesti yhtenään kosketuksessa sen monivivahteisen
ihmisvirran kanssa, joka päivittäin vieri hänen ja hänen kotinsa
ohitse.
Mutta hänenkin täytyi joskus avautua. Yksinäisyys kävi hänelle

liian raskaaksi. Ja sentähden avautui hän vuorisen kotiseutunsa
suurpiirteiselle luonnolle, tuolle luonnolle, jonka jokainen väri ja
vivahdus oli hänelle tuttu kuin piirteet rakkaissa kasvoissa, ja joka
ehdottomasti painaa syvän ja vakavan leimansa ystäviinsä. Sen
ystävän suhteen hän ei koskaan pettynyt. Sille hän uskoutui. Siltä
hän sai apua. Ja nyt, — nyt — —
Hoitajatar oli salin toisesta päästä siirtynyt yhä lähemmäksi

nurkkaa, missä vierustoverit makasivat. Sokea kuuli hänen
suojasidettä avatessaan puhelevan säärensä menettäneelle. Hän
puhui uudesta säärestä. Nykyaikana saatiin aivan erinomaisia.
Viuluniekka ei sitäpaitsi ollut riippuvainen säärestä. Hän saattoi sekä
edistyä että elättää itseään siitä riippumatta.
— Entä te? — Hoitajatar kääntyi sokean puoleen ruveten

aukomaan silmäsidettä. — Voitteko tekin jatkaa tointanne?
— Minulla on pieni liike ja majatalo alppiseudussa. — Ääni oli

kalsea, luota lykkäävä. Sen täytyi hinnasta mistä hyvänsä salata,
salata — — —
— Ettekä enää koskaan saa nähdä ihanaa maatanne! —

Huudahdus luiskahti kuin vahingossa hoitajattaren huulilta. Sokea
kuuli siinä osanottoa. Mutta sekin repi.
Hoitajatar irroitti samassa siteen. Sokea kuuli äännähdyksen, joka

purkautui kuin säikähdyksestä.
— Kauniin näköistä vai mitä? — Sokean kasvot vääntyivät

omituisesti. Hänen teki mieli ilkkua omaa onnettomuuttaan. Mutta
ainoa kohta hänen kasvoissaan, joka oli kyllin ehjä jotain tunnetta
ilmaistakseen, oli suu. Ja se osasi tulkita ainoastaan tuskaa.
Hoitajatar ei kohta vastannut. Hänen kätensä vapisivat, kurkkua

kuristi henkeä salpaavasti, — Miekkako teidät näin on ruhjonnut? sai
hän viimein kysytyksi.
— Miekka. Nenä poikki, silmät poissa! Minä mahdan olla kaunis!
— Vaimonne on hoitava teitä entistä hellemmin! — Uusi side

laskettiin hellävaroin ruhjoutuneille kasvoille.
Barbelko hoitaisi entistä hellemmin, hän, joka vihasi kaikkea

rumaa ja joka aikoja sitte olisi jättänyt miehensä, ellei tämä olisi ollut
kaunis, arvossa pidetty ja hyvä vaimonsa elättäjä!
Kuinka kiduttavia sanoja ihmiset saivatkaan suuhunsa! He

seisoivat kuin rautaraipat käsissä häntä suomimassa. Mutta he eivät
tietäneet!
Sokea painui raskaasti takaisin vuoteelle.
Hellemmin kuin koskaan! Barbel hellästi ja lämpimästi hoitamassa

inhottaviksi ruhjoutuneita kasvoja!
Hänen täytyi nauraa. Sitte hän kääntyi seinään päin kuin

kääntyäkseen pois ajatuksista, jotka olivat liian raskaat. Mutta
ajatukset olivat yhtä armottomat kuin ihmiset. Ne eivät laskeneet
häntä rauhaan. Hän näki Barbelin edessään puhuttamassa
majataloon poikenneita vieraita, veikeä hymy suupielissä ja silmät
elämänhalua säteilevinä, Hän näki, miten kaunis hänen nuori, häntä
yhdeksän vuotta nuorempi vaimonsa oli. Hän tiesi, miten huolellisesti
ja sievästi hän pukeutui, ja että hän joka paikassa herätti huomiota.
Hän oli nähnyt tätä siksi usein, että hän nytkin sokeudestaan
huolimatta näki sen. Mutta hän tiesi senkin, että-Barbel ajatteli
muutakin kuin ulkokuorta, että hänessä oli kiihkeä, tarmokas halu
päästä eteenpäin ja ylöspäin elämässä. Hän pani arvoa kaikelle mille
ihmiset panivat arvoa. Hän rakasti kaikkea mikä kuului joltain ja
näytti joltain. Kuoren kauneutta vaille jääneet sisäiset arvot olivat
arvottomat hänelle.
— Minä poloinen, vaikeroi hän sisimmässään, — minä olin kaunis,

arvossa pidetty mies. Ihmiset kohtelivat minua kuten asemansa
yläpuolelle kohonnutta. Minä kelpasin hänelle porraspuuksi!
Sokea tavoitteli peitettä. Hänen oli vilu. Häntä puistatti.

Heidän avioliittonsa oli ollut kovaa ja kuluttavaa kamppailua, siitä
asti kun ensi huumaus oli haihtunut. Barbel rakasti leikkiä ja sai
leikkiä. Mutta leikkikentän rajat olivat selvät. Miehen katse vartioi
häntä. Se puhui suoraa, tinkimätöntä kieltä. Se sanoi: "valitse, sinä
näet rajan. Rajan toisella puolella tulee meistä ero." Mutta Barbel ei
tahtonut erota. Arvossa pidetty aviomies ja luotettava elättäjä painoi
paljon vaa’assa. Heidän kaksintaistelunsa keskeytyi ainoastaan
siihen aikaan, kun he odottivat lastaan. Silloin hän hellitti ohjia. Hän
oli niin rajattoman onnellinen lapsesta. Aina kun hän siihen aikaan
palasi matkoiltaan kotiin ja laaksosta nousi rinnettä ylöspäin, katseli
hän vuoren kielekkeelle kohonnutta kotiaan omituisella hartaudella.
Se oli siinä kuin räystään alle rakennettu linnunpesä. Ja sydän
vavahti rinnassa, kun hän ajatteli, että sieltä pian kuuluisi sellaista
heikko-äänistä vikinää kuin linnunpesästä ainakin.
Hän oli jo näkevinään pienen, vakavakatseisen pojan kodin

kynnyksellä. Poika tähysteli tielle päin. Hän odotti isää. Ja kun isä
näkyi, juoksi poika vastaan. Hän pujotteli pienen kätensä isän
käteen, ja sitte he käsitysten jatkoivat matkaansa. Aurinko laski.
Alppien huiput hehkuivat kuin tulessa. Varjon puolella vivahtelivat
tummat, sulavanpehmeät värit keskenään, kilpaillen kauneudessa.
Ei isä eikä poika puhunut mitään. He kulkivat vaijeten toistensa
rinnalla. Mutta he ymmärsivät toistensa ajatukset ja tunsivat
toistensa tunteet. Isä ei ollut yksin eikä köyhä. Hän oli rikas ja
onnellinen.
Siihen aikaan, jolloin hän unelmoi tästä kaikesta, palvoi hän

vaimoaan korkeampana olentona. Hän oli vakuutettu siitä, että
Barbel lapsen synnyttyä kokonaan muuttuisi.
Mutta muutoksen sijaan tulikin tuo hetki, joka opetti häntä
vihaamaan vaimoaan, tuo hetki, jolloin Barbel tiedottomana
kannettiin kotiin eräistä huvitilaisuuksista ja hänelle ilmoitettiin, että
hänen toivonsa oli surmattu!
Jospa hän vielä olisi voinut vihata niinkuin silloin! Mutta hän oli
taistellut voidakseen antaa anteeksi. Ja kun hän oli voinut sitä, oli
hän uudelleen ruvennut rakastamaan. Hän uskoi vieläkin
mahdolliseen muutokseen. Etenkin sodan puhjettua oli toivo
hänessä virinnyt. Ero oli yhdistävä heidät. Ero oli ehjentävä
särkyneen.
Hän näki monta kaunista unta, sillaikaa kun kuulat vinkuivat hänen
ympärillään ja tykit soittivat surmasäveleitään. Hän toivoi sekä
omasta että toisten puolesta. Ei kai tällainen hävityksen kauhistus
ollut vain äkillisen mielijohteen seuraus. Sillä täytyi olla jokin
tarkoitus, niin hyvä ja suuri tarkoitus, että sen saavuttamiseksi
kannatti kärsiä ja uhrautua.
Tuo tarkoitus näytti hänen omaan elämäänsä nähden läheiseltä ja

ymmärrettävältä. Miksi ei sitä olisi olemassa kokonaisuuteenkin
nähden?
Mutta nyt, nyt oli häneltä sammunut toivo kokonaisuuden

tarkoituksesta samalla kuin hänen omastaan. Hän tiesi, minkälainen
hänen osansa oli. Sokea, petetty, halveksittu mies hän oli. Hänkö
voisi toivoa?
— Te näytätte niin kovin synkältä. Minä soitan teille vähän. Ovet

ovat kiinni toisiin huoneisiin.
Sokea säpsähti. Hän oli ennättänyt unohtaa missä hän oli.

Hiljainen, hillitty sävel kaikui salia pitkin. Tuntui siltä kuin soittaja
olisi käyttänyt sordiinoa, mutta sittekin väreili sävel iloa.
Parvi iloisia säveliä karkasi taas esille.
— Kuuletteko? Me palaamme kotiin, — odottavien luo.
Sokea ei liikahtanut. — Hän soittaa toisten iloa ja riemua, ajatteli

hän. Minulle hän soittaa maasta, jossa paimenpoikanen jokeltaa ja
kellot kilahtavat, maasta, joka oli ainoa ystäväni ja jota silmäni ei
koskaan enää näe.
*****
Hänen täytyi taas ajatella, millä inholla hänen vaimonsa kääntyisi

pois hänestä. Sokeudessaan hän näki sen kuin ruumiillistuneena.
— Kuulkaa! Ymmärrättekö näitä säveleitä?
Soittaja kumartui sokean puoleen. Hänen äänensä väreili

herkkänä kuin viulun kieli. — Näin jokeltaa pieni lapsi! —
Ymmärrättekö, hän on nukkunut levollista, makeaa lapsen unta. Sitte
hän ynähtää unissaan, — näin — ja nyt hän herää, — itkasee
pikkuisen, mutta näkee äidin ja nauraa! Näin, näin! — Kuuletteko, se
on oman pikku poikani ääni! Se on puhunut minulle vankeuden
maassa. Se on kutsunut ja kutsuu minua kotiin!
Sävelet loppuivat autuaalliseen jälleennäkemisen iloon. Sokea

kuuli soittajan pistävän viulun pussiinsa.
— Teistä minä kai olen puolihassu, mutta tiedättekö, minä

rakastan aivan rajattomasti tuota pientä, pehmeätä olentoa, jota en
vielä koskaan ole nähnyt.
Hän naurahti kuin hämillään. — Kotiin palaava sotavanki on kai
hullu ilosta, lisäsi hän itseään puolustavasti.
Samassa tuli hoitaja. Hän tiedusteli kunkin vointia, korjasi vuoteita

ja toivotteli hyvää yötä. Vahvistava lepo oli tarpeen. Seuraavana
päivänä oli jatkettava matkaa.
— Kotiin, täydensi soittaja, ja kävi kuin hyminä läpi huoneen. —

Nukkukaa tekin hyvin, jatkoi hän, kääntyen sokean puoleen, samalla
kepeästi koskettaen häntä, ilmaistakseen kenelle hän puhui. — Uni
antaa voimia iloitsemaan.
— Kiitoksia! — Ääni ei enää ollut kylmä, mutta se oli väsynyt,

läpeensä väsynyt. Illan tulo, josta hän toisten kautta sai tiedon,
muistutti hänelle aina hänen nykyistä täydellistä avuttomuuttaan.
Vuoteessa kääntyminenkin muistutti, että hänen oli mahdoton
kääntyä valoon päin.
Nämä ajatukset kuluttivat ja kiduttivat häntä. Ja kuitenkin täytyi

ajatella. Eihän hän muuhun kyennyt.
Hän naurahti taas niin ilkeästi, että hän itsekin säikähti sitä. Hänen
mieleensä oli johtunut, ettei hän koskaan niinkuin muut illoin voinut
ummistaa silmiään. Hänellähän ei ollut silmiä.
Niin, hän oli ilkeästi ruhjottu raukka, jota kuka tahansa milloin
tahansa saattoi pettää, mies, joka ei enää voinut elättää itseään,
mies, jolta kaikki oli riistetty.
*****
Ajatus etsi haparoiden tukikohtaa.

Saattoiko kaiken takana sittekin olla tarkoitusperä, päämäärä, joka
teki elämän elämisen arvoiseksi?
Jos saisi ajatella niin, jos voisi luottaa ja uskoa johonkin, ehkä
silloin jaksaisi elää tulematta hulluksi.
Häntä alkoi huimata. Hän tunsi suurta ruumiillista heikkoutta.

Sieluntuskat olivat jo kauan kiduttaneet häntä, ja vierustoveri oli
tänään nostanut hänen epätoivonsa huippuun asti.
Tuntui raukaisevan niin omituisesti. Tulisikohan uni vihdoin

hänellekin, jolla ei ollut silmiä, joita ummistaa?
Hän tunsi vaipuvansa kuin pohjattomaan syvyyteen. Mutta se

syvyys oli unen pehmeä syli.
Etäisyydestä hän kuuli viulun ääniä. Se jokelsi ja nauroi kuin pieni,

unesta heräävä lapsi.
Hän kohotti kätensä. Hän tahtoi pujottaa sen oman pikku poikansa
käteen ja kulkea hänen kanssaan kotirinteitten varjoisaa polkua
pitkin.
Mutta hänen kätensä painuikin hervottomasti takaisin vuoteelle.

Se ei tavannut tukea. Hän ei löytänytkään lapsensa kättä. Hänhän oli
sokea.
"SUURI TODISTAJIEN JOUKKO"
Feodor Feodorovits Iwanoffsky oli pitkä ja harteva. Leukapieliä peitti

tiheä, pikimusta parransänki. Töyhdöksi tuuhistuneiden viiksien alla
loistivat helakanpunaiset, paksut ja himokkaat huulet. Otsa oli
matala, kulmakarvat paksut ja tuuheat, silmäripsien alla välähtivät
mustat, keskitettyä voimaa ilmaisevat silmät.
Feodor Feodorovits oli syntynyt käskijäksi. Se ilmeni jo

lastenkamarissa, jossa hänen vanha "njanjansa" sai suojella sekä
silmiään että hiuksiaan aina, kun hän uskalsi asettua pojan tahtoa
vastustamaan. Sisaretkin, sekä Feodoria vanhempi että nuorempi,
oppivat häntä pelkäämään. He kätkivät visusti lukon taakse kaikki
millä oli jotain arvoa: nuket, kirjat ja koristukset, jotta ne eivät joutuisi
vaaraan, jos Feodorln päähän pälkähti käyttää niitä, ellei muuten niin
hävittämishalunsa esineenä.
Enimmän kärsi tästä kuitenkin äiti. Hän koetti kauan, mutta

turhaan, pitää puoliaan poikaa vastaan. Niin kauan kuin isä eli, taipui
poika pakosta ja pelosta hänen rautaisen tahtonsa alle. Mutta isän
kuoltua ei enää mikään pannut sulkuja pojan rajulle itsevaltiudelle.
— Feodor, Feodor, minkätähden sinä olet tuollainen! Sinä poljet
sydämeni jalkojesi alle. — Äiti, joka turhaan oli koettanut sekä
hyvyyttä että kovuutta, puhkesi kerran valituksiin.
— Minkätähdenkö olen? Kysy itseltäsi! Pyysinkö minä tällaista

luontoa!
Vastaus taittoi ikiajoiksi kärjen kaikelta mitä äiti olisi tahtonut sanoa
pojalleen. Se suuntasi syytöksen hänen oman sisimpänsä
veristävään haavaan. Hän sulkeutui huoneeseensa. — Miksi, miksi,
kysyi hänkin. — Miksi tuli juuri Feodor Petrovits Iwanoffsky lasteni
isäksi?
Hän vastasi epätoivoisella vastakysymyksellä. Miksi oli olemassa

kouluja kaikkia mahdollisia ja mahdottomia tarkoitusperiä varten?
Miksi ahdettiin tietoja ihmisten aivoihin, kehitettiin heidän ääntään,
heidän jäseniään, valmistettiin heitä toimiin mitä erilaisimmilla aloilla,
mutta kun oli kysymyksessä elämän ratkaisevin askel, suurin ja
vaikein kaikista tehtävistä: äidin, silloin vaijettiin.
Hän muisti katkeruudella kuinka vanhat, kypsyneet ihmiset

touhuuttivat nuoria naimisiin. Ottaminen oli pääasia, kenen otti,
onnistuiko valinta vai eikö onnistunut se jäi sattuman varaan.
Sellaisella opastuksella hänkin nuorena oli lähtenyt liehumaan

huvista huviin, niistä löytääkseen oman onnenosansa. Ja hän luuli
sen löytäneensä silmätessään Wladimir Markowskyn syviin, tulisiin
silmiin. Mutta heille tuli pientä riitaa. Hän tahtoi tehdä Wladimirin
mustasukkaiseksi ja siten sytyttää hänet uudelleen. Siitä syystä hän
antautui Feodorin seuraan. Kun hän huomasi, että Wladimir tämän
perustuksella vain loittonemistaan loittoni hänestä, oli myöhäistä
korjata mitään. Wladimir oli poissa. Revolveri kädessä Feodor vaati

Mexicans and The Future of The American Dream: Trump, Immigration and Border Relations 1st Edition Maria Regina Martínez Casas

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Mexicans and The Future of The American Dream: Trump, Immigration and Border Relations 1st Edition Maria Regina Martínez Casas

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Mexicans and the Future of the

American Dream : Trump, Immigration

The Future of the Presidency Journalism and Democracy

The Border Within: The Economics of Immigration in an

Inter American Relations Past Present and Future Trends

Soccer and the American Dream 1st Edition Ian Lawrence

Martin Scorsese and the American Dream 1st Edition Jim

The Big Rig Trucking and the Decline of the American

The Big Rig Trucking and the Decline of the American

Black American Refugee Escaping the Narcissism of the

1. Pop-Up Civics in 21st Century America

2. A Tale of Two Parties

4. The Generational Gap in American Politics

5. A Democracy That Works

6. Presidential Rhetoric and Indian Policy

7. Mexicans and the Future of the American Dream

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

Edited by Maria Regina Martínez

List of Figures, Tables, and Mapsx

The Mexican Population in the United States 4

1 New Trends in the Mexican Population in the

2 Mobilizing Consular Resources in Light of Greater

3 DACA Youth: Diversity, Similarities, and Challenges

4 Mexican Consular Coordination: Two Case Studies

5 Policies Against Drugs and Bilateral Mexico–U.S.

Magdalena Barros Nock is Full Professor at CIESAS, Mexico. Her research

At the beginning of November 2016, I was part of a group of Mexicans

The Mexican Population in the United States

The Defense of Mexicans in the United States

Labyrinths of an American Dream

City Number of Persons Interviewed

Los Angeles 108

Implementation was possible thanks to the collaboration of personnel from

Figure 1.1 Own Elaboration/Genders of Sample Study

Figure 1.2 Own Elaboration/Ages of Sample Study

Figure 1.4 Own Elaboration/Place of Origin Prior to Migration in Sample Study

Figure 1.5 Own Elaboration/Education Level of Sample Study

Figure 1.6 Own Elaboration/English Fluency and Literacy of Sample Study

Figure 1.7 Own Elaboration/Indigenous Dialect or Language Within Sample Study

On Insertion Into North American Society

Figure 1.8 Own Elaboration/Percentage of Study Connected to DACA Program

Figure 1.9 Own Elaboration/Number of Family Members Within DACA Program

Figure 1.10 Own Elaboration/Deportation Figures Within Sample Study

Figure 1.11 Own Elaboration/Voluntary Return to Mexico Figures

Figure 1.12 CentroGeo Elaboration/Presence in the Workforce5

Figure 1.13 Own Elaboration/Treatment in Businesses and Restaurants

Figure 1.14 Own Elaboration/Treatment as Non-Americans

Figure 1.15 Own Elaboration/Police Stops for Documentation

Figure 1.16 Own Elaboration/Requested to Speak Only English

Joutuessaan näkemään sodan tekemää tuhoa, auttoi Dimitriä

Dimitrin tyytyväisyyttä lisäsi tietoisuus, että hän monesti oli voinut

Juuri tällaisella matkalla Dimitri ensi kertaa joutui katsomaan

Heitä oli pieni joukkue tiedusteluretkellä vihollisen rintamaan päin.

Mutta tarkasti tähdätty ase hervahti yhtäkkiä hänen kädestään.

Hän ei oikeastaan ollut pahoin haavoitettu. Oikea käsi tosin oli

Sairassalin ovi avautui samassa. Kynnykselle ilmestyi nuori,

Dimitri kohoutui kyynärpäälleen, esitti itsensä ja ojensi tulijalle

Nuori vänrikki kumarsi, — Kiitoksia, minulla on kiire. Olen juuri

Mutta te olitte pyytänyt — —

— Niin, minä pyysin saada tietoja siitä miehestä, jota aijoin

— Sota on sotaa. Minä ymmärrän. Älkää luulko että syytän teitä.

Vänrikki vilkastui. Oliko sillä siis todella syynsä? Hän muisti

Dimitri kohoutui sotilaallisen suoraksi vuoteellaan. Hänen silmänsä

List of Figures, Tables, and Mapsx