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modern principles
of economics 10 modern principles:
microeconomics 10
Externalities: When the Price
Is Not Right
S-1
b. Suppose that a family moves in next door to the smelly factory. Do we now have
an externalities problem? If so, who is causing it: the factory by producing the
smell, the family by moving in next door, or both?
c. Suppose that the family clearly possesses the right to a pleasant-smelling
environment. Does this mean that the factory will be required to stop producing
the bad smell? What could happen instead? There are many right answers. (Hint:
Think about the Coase theorem. Actually, it’s always a good idea to think about
the Coase theorem, whether the topic is smelly factories, labor–management
disputes, international peace negotiations, or divorce settlements.)
Solution 3. a. No.
b. Yes, there is now an externalities problem. It is jointly caused by the factory and
the family.
c. The family could demand that the factory shut down or use a less-smelly
technology, but there are other possibilities. The factory could pay the family to
move away and continue to produce the bad smell. The factory could just pay
the family a fixed monthly fee for the right to keep producing the smell. The
factory could buy the family lovely-smelling flowers for their home. That’s the
nature of the Coase theorem: There are usually many possible win-win
outcomes, and if the parties can calmly negotiate, there’s a good chance they’ll
find an option that‘s better than just shutting down the factory.
4. Considering what we’ve learned about externalities, should human-caused global
warming be completely stopped? Explain, using the language of social benefits and
social costs.
Solution 4. It’s probably not efficient to stop human-made global warming completely.The social
benefits that manifest as a result of creating a lot of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases probably outweighs the social costs of such action.The socially optimal amount of
human-made carbon dioxide is likely less than today’s amount, but it’s likely far more
than zero. In supply and demand terms, the social cost curve is to the left of the supply
curve, but not radically so far to the left that the socially optimal quantity is zero.
5. In the following cases, the markets are in equilibrium, but there are externalities. In
each case, determine whether there is an external benefit or cost and estimate its
size. Finally, decide between a tax or a subsidy as a simple way to compensate for
the externality. Fill out the following table with your answers.
a. In the market for automobiles, the private benefit of one more small SUV is
$20,000 and the social cost of one more small SUV is $30,000.
b. In the market for fashionable clothes, the marginal social benefit of one more
dress per person is $100, and the marginal private benefit is $500. Bonus: Can
you tell an externality story that makes sense of these numbers?
c. In the market for really good ideas, ideas that will dramatically change the world
for the better, the private benefit of one more really good idea (from speaker’s fees,
book sales, patents, etc.) is $1 million. The marginal social benefit is $1 billion.
Size of External
External Cost or Benefit (or cost Tax It or
Case Benefit? if negative) Subsidize It?
a. SUVs
b. F
ashionable
clothes
c. Ideas
Size of External
External Cost or Benefit (or cost Tax It or
Case Benefit? if negative) Subsidize It?
a. SUVs External cost −$10,000 Tax
b. Fashionable External cost (or −$400 Tax
clothes negative external
benefit)
c. Ideas External benefit +$99,000,000 Subsidize
onus for part b: Fashion is a relative game. If one person is more fashionable,
B
that makes other people less fashionable by comparison so the private benefits of
being fashionable (signaling wealth, attractiveness, social status, etc.) may exceed
the social benefits.
6. In which cases are the Coase theorem’s assumptions likely to be true? In other words,
when will the parties be likely to strike an efficient bargain? How do you know?
a. My neighbor wants me to cut down an ugly shrub in my front yard. The ugly
shrub, of course, imposes an external cost on him and on his property value.
b. My neighbors all would love for me to get that broken-down Willies Jeep off
my front lawn. It’s been years now, after all. And would it be too much for me to
paint the house and fill up that 6-foot deep ditch in the front yard? The whole
neighborhood is just annoyed.
c. A coal-fired electricity plant dumps its leftover hot water into the nearby lake,
killing the naturally occurring fish. Thousands of homes line the banks of the lake.
d. A coal-fired electricity plant dumps its leftover hot water into the nearby river,
killing the naturally occurring fish downstream. There is one large fishery
one-mile downstream affected by this. After that, the water cools enough so it’s
not a problem.
Solution 6. In all cases, it’s a simple question of whether you need to negotiate with one party or
with many parties. This is an easy way to illustrate low versus high transaction costs.
a and d. One party is annoyed, so the injuring party can probably work something
out with the injured party. The neighbor can chip in half the cost of getting the
shrub removed, and the fishery can pay for the coal-fired plant to cool off the
water first. Or, if the fishery has the right to cool water, then the power plant can
pay for the right to heat the river—it might even pay the fishery to shut down
completely.
b and c. It’s too hard to negotiate with thousands of lake-dwellers or dozens of
neighbors. The few neighbors who care most probably can’t come up with
enough money to convince me to clean up my yard—though every once in a
while it might work out.
7. With electricity, we saw that it was important to tax the pollutant rather than the
final product itself. In the following cases, will the proposed taxes actually hit at the
source of the external cost, or will they only land an inefficient glancing blow?
What kind of tax might be better?
a. Gas-guzzling cars create more pollution, so the government should tax big SUVs
at a higher rate.
b. All-night liquor stores seem to generate unruly behavior in nearby neighborhoods,
so owners of all-night liquor stores should pay higher property taxes.
c. Bell-bottom jeans insist on coming back every few years, and their ugliness cre-
ates external costs for all who see them. Therefore, bell-bottom jeans should be
taxed heavily.
d. American parents are worried about their children seeing too much profanity
on television. Congress decides to tax TV shows based on the number of profane
words used on the shows.
Solution 7. a. It’s possible for SUVs to be fuel-efficient. They could run on electricity alone,
they could be hybrids, they could run on hydrogen fuel cells charged by nuclear
power plants. An extra tax on all big SUVs would discourage people from
driving these cars. Moreover, it’s not just MPG that matters but how far people
drive. An SUV used occasionally is less polluting than a car driven many
thousands of miles a year in congested traffic. A tax on gasoline would hit at the
source of the problem more directly and a tax on carbon emissions from all
sources would be better yet.
b. This sounds like the best one can hope for. You could imagine fining the unruly
drunks, but police can already go after them for being drunk and disorderly.
The transaction costs of finding and fining the drunks sounds extremely high.
Better to discourage more liquor stores, probably.
c. Yes. This reasoning is flawless. The bell bottoms themselves are the problem.
But what is less clear is whether people who wear bell bottoms should be taxed
or whether they should be paid not to wear bell bottoms. The latter case might
be more just, since most people think that people have a right to commit fashion
crimes no matter how heinous, but then everyone might try to claim the subsidy.
d. A tax would discourage profanity but this would harm adults who like to watch
realistic “gritty” shows. The government only needs to tax (or fine, the same
thing) the shows that are on when children watch TV. There’s little need to tax
late-night profanity, since few children are up at those hours. Even better is the
V-chip, which lets parents limit the type of television shows that children watch
without limiting the types of shows that are produced. They allow individual
families, especially parents, the right to choose what is acceptable to be
permitted within one’s household—not Congress or some other authority who
decides what is best for everyone.
8. When the government expands the number of pollution allowances, does that
increase the cost of polluting or cut it? What about when the number of pollution
allowances is cut back?
Solution 8. Pollution allowances work just like a supply curve: If the government creates more
of them, supply shifts out, so demanders bid down the price of an allowance, which
reduces the marginal cost of polluting. Conversely, a smaller supply increases the
price of an allowance, which increases the price of polluting.
9. Maxicon is opening a new coal-fired power plant, but the government wants to
keep pollution down.
a. Based on what we’ve seen in this chapter, which way is a more efficient way to
reduce pollution: commanding Maxicon to use one particular air-scrubbing
technology that will reduce pollution by 25% or commanding Maxicon to re-
duce pollution by 25%?
b. If a corrupt government just grants Maxicon all of the (tradable) pollution
permits in the entire nation (even though there are many energy companies),
does this guarantee that Maxicon will engage in an enormous amount of
pollution? Why or why not?
Solution 9. a. It’s better to command a low level of pollution than a particular method to
reduce pollution. Maxicon could at least look around for a more efficient way to
hold pollution down. One size rarely fits all, especially in a technology-driven
field like energy. One issue, however, is that if the government commands
Maxicon to reduce pollution by 25%, they will need some method of monitor-
ing Maxicon’s pollution output.
b. If the permits are tradable, other companies might bid up the price of the
permits so high that Maxicon would rather cut back on polluting itself and sell
the permits rather than hold on to the permits. The high permit price would
convince Maxicon to sell some of its right to pollute. In other words, a benefit
of tradable permits is that they will tend to flow to the high demanders (those
with the highest costs of reducing pollution).
3. “The environment is priceless.” What evidence do you have that this statement is
incorrect?
Solution 3. This was a major theme in the chapter: Polluting the environment has a very real
cost, but it’s not an infinite cost, at least according to the way most people see
things. For example, you probably don’t clean up every piece of litter you see and
you certainly don’t spend all your time cleaning up trash along the highway. Even
if a benevolent social planner came along to design a society that took everyone’s
needs into account, he or she would likely design a society that had some pollution
that hurt the environment, because eliminating all pollution would require
shrinking the number of humans and the quality of human lives to an
unacceptable degree.
This question, like the entire chapter, reminds us about the importance of
measuring trade-offs accurately.
4. Cultural influences often create externalities, for good and ill. A happy movie might
make people smile more, which improves the lives of people who don’t see the
movie. A new fashion trend for tight-fitting clothing might hurt the body image of
people who think they won’t look good in the new trendy clothing.
Let’s consider the market for one cultural good that unrealistically raises
expectations about the opposite sex: the romance novel. In romance novels, men are
dangerous yet safe, they are wealthy yet never at work, they ride high-speed motor-
cycles yet never get in terrible accidents, they look fantastic even though they never
waste endless hours at the gym, and so on. (Of course, advertising that focuses on
sexy female models may also unrealistically raise expectations about the opposite sex
so feel free to change our example as you see best.)
a. Consider the following market. Romance novels impose an external cost on
men, who have to try to live up to these unrealistic expectations. Illustrate the
effect of this external cost in the figure.
Demand
Quantity of
romance novels
b. Illustrate in the figure the deadweight loss from the externality, before a tax or
other solution is imposed.
c. If the government decides to compensate for the externality by putting a tax on
romance novels, should the tax be high enough to stop everyone from reading
the novels? Why or why not?
d. Show graphically how big the tax should be per novel.
e. As long as the government spends the money efficiently, does it matter what
the government spends the money from the “romance novel tax” on? In other
words, could the government just use the money to pay for necessary roads and
bridges, or does it need to spend the money to fix the harmful social effects of
romance novels?
Solution 4. a and b. See following figure. The shaded area is the deadweight loss: It represents
novels with a social cost that was higher than the private cost.
Price per
romance Social cost
novel
Supply
(private cost)
Demand
QEffic.QMarket
Quantity of
romance novels
c. No, as the figure shows, there should still be some romance novels: As long as
there aren’t too many romance novels, the benefit to the readers outweighs the
cost to the men.
d. See the following figure:
Price per
romance
novel
Demand
QEffic.QMarket
Quantity of
romance novels
6. In Chapter 6, we said that taxes create deadweight losses. When we tax goods with
external costs, should we worry about deadweight losses? Why or why not?
Solution 6. No. When governments tax external costs, they are preventing transactions that
ought to be prevented. By contrast, when no externalities are present, every trans-
action that is deterred by a tax is a transaction that creates consumer or producer
surplus. So losing those transactions means losing valuable consumer or producer
surplus. Note, however, that if a tax on an external cost reduces the quantity traded
below the efficient quantity because the tax is greater than the externality, then it
will create a deadweight loss.
7. Economists have found that increasing the proportion of girls in primary and
secondary school leads to significant improvement in students’ cognitive outcomes
(Victor Lavy and Analia Schlosser. 2007. Mechanisms and impacts of gender peer
effects at school, NBER Working Paper 13292). One key channel seems to be
that on average boys create more trouble in class, which makes it harder for every-
one to learn. In newspaper English, we’d say that “boys are a tax on every child’s
education.”
a. Using the tools of this chapter, do girls in a classroom provide external costs or
benefits? What about boys?
b. Just based on this study, if you are a parent of a boy, would you rather your son be
in a class with mostly boys or mostly girls? What if you are the parent of a girl?
c. Who should be taxed in this situation? Can you see any problems implementing
this tax?
Solution 7. a. Girls provide neither external costs nor external benefits. Boys provide an exter-
nal cost.
b. Either way, whether we have a boy or a girl, we want them in a class with mostly
girls, so that he or she can learn more.
c. External costs should be taxed, so in this case the standard economic prescription
is to tax boys in order to reduce the number of boys in classrooms. Of course,
that’s a problem since we want all children to be educated and parents aren’t
likely to appreciate boy taxes. Alternative procedures would make classes with a
large proportion of boys be smaller classes or subsidize girls going to school to
increase their numbers in the classroom.
More generally, there are values other than maximizing social surplus, such
as respecting rights or treating people equally, and we might have to sacrifice
efficiency for these other values on occasion. See Chapter 20 for more on this
topic.
8. In the example of honeybees, we said that the farmers pay the beekeepers for pol-
lination services. But why don’t the beekeepers pay the fruit farmers? After all, the
beekeepers need the fruit farmers to make honey, so why does the payment go one
way and not the other? (Hint: What if the honey produced by some fruits and veg-
etables such as almonds is bitter?)
Solution 8. Start from a situation where beekeepers do not pay farmers and farmers do not pay
beekeepers. Each group creates an external benefit for the other but which group
is willing to pay more for additional services? It could go either way but in practice
it appears that the farmers are willing to pay more for additional pollination than
beekeepers are willing to pay for additional fruit farms. But if bees produced gold
or diamonds instead of honey, beekeepers would probably end up paying the fruit
farmers.
9. A government is deciding between command and control solutions versus tax and
subsidy solutions to solve an externality problem. In each case, explain why you
think one is better, using arguments from the chapter.
a. Suppose that whales are threatened with extinction because a large number of
people like to eat whale meat. Governments are torn between banning all
whaling except for certain religious ceremonies and heavily taxing all whale
meat. Assume that only a few countries in the world consume whale meat, and
that they have fairly efficient governments.
b. Fires create external costs because they spread from one building to another.
Should governments encourage subsidies to sprinkler systems or should they just
mandate that everyone have sprinklers?
c. Pets who procreate can create external costs due to problems with stray animals.
Strays are extremely common on the streets of poor countries. Sterilization
can solve the problem, but is a tax/subsidy or command and control a better
method to encourage sterilization? Does the best solution depend on the sex
of the animal?
Solution 9. a. Command and control might work best here. If the tax is set too low, then
whales may become extinct and there is no turning back from that result.
Banning the eating of whale meat could inefficiently reduce whale meat
consumption creating a deadweight loss, but that loss will probably be small and
we can change the law as whales recover. Notice that if extinction was not likely,
then a tax would probably be better, so as whale populations recover it would
make sense to switch from a ban to a tax.
b. The cost and benefit of sprinklers vary greatly depending on the building
(apartment, house, factory, art gallery, etc.) and location (how close are the
neighbors?). A command and control approach would likely create a lot of waste.
A subsidy allows for more flexibility—even better would be a subsidy that was
larger in more densely populated areas such as cities.
c. This is the most ambiguous of the three. People who own male pets probably
don’t pay the cost of creating new pets so subsidies to male pet owners for
neutering (or a tax on non-neutered male animals) might have to be large to
encourage them to sterilize their pets. Notice also that one male pet can create a
lot of strays. It may be better to use command and control for people who own
male animals. Male pets are like smallpox.
With females, the story is different. People pay a lot of the costs of pregnant
females themselves already, since they have to put up with a pregnant animal
for a few months and because the beloved animal could die in childbirth and
because it may be emotionally painful for owners to give up the new baby
animals. Further, one female can give birth to only a limited number of
offspring at a time. Sterilizing female pets is like getting the flu shot; subsidies
might work better.
Challenges
1. Before Coase presented his theorem, economists who wanted economic efficiency
argued that people should be responsible for the damage they do—they should pay
for the social costs of their actions. This advice fits nicely with notions of personal
responsibility. Explain how the Coase theorem refutes this older argument.
Solution 1. Coase explained that the polluter and the pollutee are both responsible for creating
the externality. If we keep this in mind, we can see that sometimes it will be cheaper
to eliminate the problem by reducing the pollution directly (the traditional
approach) but sometimes it will be cheaper to eliminate the problem by having the
pollutee move or adjust in some other way. If transaction costs are low, bargaining
will reach the efficient solution, whatever it is. But if transactions costs are high and
we need a political solution, it can still be helpful to remember that the problem is
jointly created—thus, Coase’s insight is of general importance.
2. A government is torn between selling annual pollution allowances and setting an
annual pollution tax. Unlike in the messy real world, this government is quite
certain that it can achieve the same price and quantity either way. It wants to
choose the method that will pull in more government tax revenue. Is selling
allowances better for revenues or is setting a pollution tax better, or will both raise
exactly the same amount of revenue? (Hint: Recall that tax revenue is a rectangle.
Compare the size of the tax rectangle in Figure 10.5 with the most someone will pay
for the right to pollute at the efficient level.)
Solution 2. Revenues will be the same. If the auction is competitive, the price of each permit
will equal the difference between the marginal cost of producing one more unit of
the polluting product at the efficient quantity (read off the supply curve) and the
selling price of one more unit of the product at the efficient quantity (read off the
social cost curve). If the permit price were any higher, too little of the product
would be produced; if the permit price were any lower, too much. This gap is the
same as the tax rectangle (formed from the tax wedge) in Figure 10.5. The figure
below illustrates.
Tax and Permit Revenues
Price/costs
Social cost
Efficient equilibrium
Tax =
External
Efficient cost Supply
Permit
price Permit price
revenue
= Tax
revenue
Demand
Efficient Quantity
quantity
The permit price at the efficient quantity will be just equal to the tax when the tax
is set at the efficient level. As a result, tax revenues and permit revenues are identical.
3. Palm Springs, California, was once the playground of the rich and famous—for
example, the town has a Frank Sinatra Drive, a Bob Hope Drive, and a Bing Crosby
Drive. The city once had a law against building any structure that could cast a
shadow on anyone else’s property between 9 am and 3 pm. (Source: Armen Alchian
and William Allen. 1964. University Economics, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth). What are
some alternatives to this command and control solution? Are they any better than
this approach?
Solution 3. One could just put an extra tax on shadow-casting buildings. This would deter
people from building such buildings. But it would be hard to find out how much
each person in Palm Springs hates having shadows on their property. Some people
wouldn’t mind much, while others wouldn’t allow it for all the wealth of Croesus.
An easier solution would be the Coasian one. Just let people have a right to “no
shadow,” and let them sell that right to their neighbors if their neighbors pay enough.
4. At indoor shopping malls, who makes sure that no business plays music too loud,
that no store is closed too often, and that the common areas aren’t polluted with
garbage? What incentive does this party have to prevent these externalities? Does
your a nswer help explain why parents are quite happy to let their preteen and teen
children stroll the malls, as in the Kevin Smith movie Mallrats?
Solution 4. The mall’s management does all of this. They set rules, acting as a private
government. They “internalize” the cost of all of these bad behaviors because a
well-run mall can charge higher rents. Thus, malls, especially in affluent suburbs,
have become relatively safe havens with their own private police and cleaning
services.
Brazões da Villa
Vi em Torres tres brazões antigos:
O da Fonte Nova tem a data 1529.
O que está na escada da Camara Municipal tem a data 1518.
O do chafariz dos Canos é muito mais velho, singelo e hieratico,
sem ousadias decorativas; creio que é do seculo XIV.
O da Fonte Nova apresenta duas torres ligadas por um panno de
muralha com sua porta: torres de tres andares, com ameias, frestas
para jogar virotes e béstas, terminando em cobertura pyramidal,
com sua bandeira quadrada e uma estrella sobre a bandeira; entre
as torres um escudo real, sem corôa nem castellos, só as cinco
quinas com os seus besantes. Infra a data 1529 entre duas siglas,
talvez F e R.
O que está na Camara mostra duas torres de cobertura conica,
ligadas pela muralha sem porta; tem barbacan, ameias, sobre as
torres bandeiras farpadas, sobre estas, estrellas.
Sob a barbacan um festão florido, infra um lettreiro:
Esta casa e quintal
he do concelho
1518
Entre as torres o escudo das quinas.
O do chafariz dos Canos tem tres torres eguaes, separadas entre
si, uma a meio do escudo mais acima, duas aos lados d’esta, mais
abaixo. Cada torre sua janella de volta redonda, e quatro ameias; a
ameia formada por um dado ou cubo, sobre este uma pyramide de
base quadrada excedendo muito a face do cubo.
Na fonte está outro escudo com o brazão real, as quinas
collocadas á antiga, as lateraes com as pontas para dentro.
Este escudo da fonte dos Canos parece-me ser o brazão antigo
da villa, o primeiro, o das turres veteres. Depois conjugaram este
com o escudo real, tirando a torre média e mais alta para dar logar
ás quinas, ao que parece no tempo de D. Manuel, o reformador do
velho foral, pois que o brazão que está na escada da Camara tem a
data 1518.
Archivos
Camara, Misericordia, Egreja de Santa Maria
No Varatojo
Na sala do capitulo vi dois lettreiros:
Aqui descansão
as cinzas do Ven.ˡ
P. F. Antonio das
Chagas. Miss. Apost.
e instituidor deste
Semin.ᵒ faleceu a
20 de outubro de 1682.
REQ. I. PAC.
Sinos
Vi os de S. Pedro.
Um tem na fimbria Sanctus Deus e o nome Miguel Delmaco.
Outro: apprehende arma et scutum.
Miguel Delmaco, 1673.
O Asylo da Conquinha
Fica este asylo a breve distancia de Torres, uns vinte minutos de
agradavel passeio a pé. Segue-se a estrada da Varzea, entra-se no
amplo valle, vestido de culturas, arvoredos fructiferos, bellos
vinhedos; ao lado da estrada fica um edificio moderno de aspecto
alegre e confortavel, convidativo, é o asylo de S. José; como o sitio
se chama a Conquinha, é vulgarmente conhecido por este nome.
Santa instituição! Foi este asylo fundado e dotado pela benemerita
D. Maria da Conceição Barreto Bastos, fallecida em 21 de maio de
1901. Velhinhos impossibilitados de trabalhar encontram aqui
agasalho e sustento, abrigo tranquillo nos seus ultimos annos de
vida.
A casa é cercada por ampla quinta bem cultivada com seus
jardins floridos, e bellas arvores de fructa. Tudo muito asseiado e
confortavel; mais me agradou ainda o ar satisfeito dos asylados,
felizes naquelle ninho de caridade. A fundadora instituiu tambem
uma escola, na villa, para meninas, com ensino gratuito; a sua
memoria deve ser abençoada; o seu nome gravado no marmore dos
benemeritos, e no coração de todos os que veneram estes bons
exemplos do incondicional altruismo christão. Quando alli estive,
visita casual, era gerente ou director do asylo, o sr. conego prior
Antonio Francisco da Silva, cujo nome ouvi cercado pelos asylados
da Conquinha com palavras de respeito e gratidão.
Ruços, além!
Preparava-se a jornada de Ceuta.
Havia cabeças enthusiastas, e cabeças duvidosas; timidos e
prudentes ao lado dos muito ousados. El-rei D. João I estava em
Cintra com os infantes; mandou convocar os do Conselho para
Torres Vedras; eram o conde de Barcellos, o condestavel D. Nuno,
os mestres das ordens de Christo, de Santiago e d’Aviz, o prior do
Hospital, Gonçalo Vaz Coutinho, Martim Affonso de Mello, João
Gomes da Silva, muitos outros senhores e fidalgos.
Nesses dias Torres Vedras acolheu muitos cavalleiros de espora
dourada, os grandes senhores territoriaes e militares do paiz.==El
Rey partio de Cintra, e foy folgando por aquella comarca de Lisboa
caminho de Torres Vedras (isto conta o Azurara, na Chronica de D.
João I, parte 3.ᵃ, cap. 24) e antes disto chegando El-Rei a Carnide,
o infante Dom Enrique que muito desejava por seu corpo fazer
alguma cousa aventejada, chegou a seu padre e disse: Senhor,
primeiro que por estes feitos mais vades adiante, porque com a
graça de Deos vem já por tal via, que viram a boa fim, eu vos peço
por mercê que me outorgueis duas cousas. A primeira que eu seja
hum dos primeiros, que filhe terra quando a Deos prazendo
chegarmos davante da cidade de Ceita; e a segunda que quando a
vossa escada real fôr posta sobre os muros da cidade, que eu seja
aquelle que vá primeiro por ella, que outro algum.
Isto disse em Carnide o infante D. Henrique a el-rei D. João;
estranho requerimento para a morte na vanguarda extrema, bem
natural ao forte coração do rapaz. Chegou el-rei a Torres Vedras, e
logo teve uma falla com o condestavel.
Este approvou o plano e prometteu ao rei a sua influencia
favoravel...
Tratou-se logo do corregimento da casa para o conselho a qual
era hua sala dianteira, que está em aquelles paços de Torres
Vedras, onde está a capella.
Numa quinta-feira o rei e seus filhos ouviram missa do Espirito
Santo, naturalmente na egreja de Santa Maria, que era capella real.
Celebrou-se o conselho; foi elrei que publicou o fim da reunião;
depois fallou o condestavel approvando a jornada, e o infante D.