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Autonomous Guidance and Flight Control on a Partial-Authority Black Hawk


Helicopter

Conference Paper · June 2020


DOI: 10.2514/6.2020-3286

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Autonomous Guidance and Flight Control on a Partial-Authority Black
Hawk Helicopter
Marc D. Takahashi1, Brian T. Fujizawa, Jeffery A. Lusardi, Matthew S. Whalley
U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center
Moffett Field, CA, 94035, USA
Chad L. Goerzen, Gregory J. Schulein
San Jose State Research Foundation, San Jose, CA, 23604, USA
Nathan L. Mielcarek,
Universities Space Research Association (USRA), Moffett Field, CA, 94035, USA
John L. Archdeacon
ASRC Federal Research and Technology Solutions, Moffett Field, CA, 94035, USA
Mark J. Cleary LTC, James P. Carr IV, David W. Waldman
U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center
Fort Eustis, VA, 23604, USA
Abstract
This paper describes an autonomous guidance and flight control system that was integrated and flight-tested
on a partial-authority Black Hawk helicopter. This effort was part of the Degraded Visual Environment
Mitigation program, whose objective is to provide all weather capability for U.S. Army rotorcraft operations.
The guidance and flight-control system software were previously flight tested on a full-authority helicopter,
and for this work, was adapted to fly on a partial-authority helicopter. The main autonomy components of the
system consist of the Risk Minimizing Obstacle Field Navigation algorithm, Safe Landing Area Determination
algorithm, and the Integrated Cueing Environment. These components provide reactive avoidance guidance,
landing site selection, and pilot situational awareness for degraded visual environments. To test the system, a
LADAR was used as a surrogate-ranging device in lieu of an all-weather sensor system that was concurrently
under development for the program. The autonomous partial-authority flight control system provides a fully
stabilized path-following capability that is directed with a series of waypoints or flight-path vector commands.
This paper describes the control system, its performance, and how it was adapted to a partial-authority system
that is typical of current U.S. Army fleet helicopters. The autonomy software and human interface components
are also described. Flight test results are presented of the fully integrated system navigating through terrain,
selecting landing sites, and autonomously landing. Analysis is presented that compares partial-authority results
to previously collected full-authority results.
I. Nomenclature
  Angle-of-attack, sideslip, and flight-path angle
a, e, p, c Lateral, longitudinal, pedal, and collective stick
  Aircraft roll, pitch, and yaw
ℎ Vertical velocity
H, D, N Flight path horizontal, directional, and normal coordinates
 Track control and flight-path command inputs
p, q, r Aircraft body-fixed angular rates
u, v, w Aircraft body-fixed velocities
VG  Velocity, heading, and glide slope
GM, PM Frequency of gain and phase margins

1
Sr. Engineer, AIAA Member.
Presented at the AIAA Aviation Forum, June 15-19, 2020, Virtual Conference. This is a work of the U.S. Government
and is not subject to copyright protection in the U.S. Distribution statement A. Approved for public release.

1
APAFCS Autonomous Partial-Authority FCS MCLAWS Modernized Control Laws
AvMC Aviation & Missile Center MFL Multi-Function LADAR
CCDC Combat Capabilities Development MTE Mission Task Element
Command OFN Obstacle Field Navigation
DVE Degraded Visual Environment PAFCA Partial-Authority Flight Control
DVE-M DVE Mitigation Assembly
EP Evaluation Pilot RFCC Research Flight Control Computer
FCS Flight Control System SAS Stability Augmentation System
FPS Flight-Path Stabilization SIL System Integration Laboratory
GVE Good Visual Environment STIB SAS/Trim Interface Box
GM, PM Gain, Phase Margin RASCAL Rotorcraft Aircrew Systems Concepts
FBW Fly-by-Wire Airborne Laboratory
ILS Instrument Landing System RiskMinOFN Risk Minimizing Obstacle Field
HAT Hover/Approach/Takeoff Navigation
LADAR Laser Detection and Ranging SLAD Safe Landing Area Determination
MAA Mission Adaptive Autonomy WOW Weight on Wheels
II. Introduction
Rotorcraft operations in adverse environmental conditions such as degraded visual environments (DVE) are a
necessary capability to increase survivability and operational effectiveness of the future U.S. military rotorcraft fleet.
This capability will allow operations of U.S. forces in all weather and in darkness against increasingly sophisticated
adversaries. To address this need, the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC) initiated the
Degraded Visual Environment Mitigation (DVE-M) Program. This science and technology effort was originally
motivated to reduce rotorcraft losses due to brownout conditions occurring on current fleet-helicopters [1]. However,
as the program progressed, its scope expanded from a reactive to a proactive effort, that not only was to reduce losses
of fleet helicopters from brownout DVE, but also was to enable them to operate in a multitude of weather conditions,
thereby “owning” the degraded visual environment [2]. Meeting this expanded objective would require not only the
pilot having enhanced situational awareness, but also increased piloting capabilities that would allow safe
maneuvering through an obstacle-rich terrain in a multitude of degraded visual environments.
The three main elements of the DVE-M program include pilot cueing, sensors, and flight control, which are led by
the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), the U.S. Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR), and the CCDC Aviation & Missile Center (CCDC AvMC),
respectively. To date, the UH-60L aircraft in Figure 1a, has been used in this program for extensive research in cueing
[3] [4] leading to the development of the Integrated Cueing Environment (ICE). Also, using independent control of
the partial-authority trim and Stability Augmentation System (SAS) actuators, flight controls research was conducted
on coupled-landing research [5][6] and piloted, attitude-stabilized, flight controls research in the Modernized Control
Laws (MCLAWS) program [7]. Finally, development of an advanced multimode sensor was initiated [2], which was
scheduled be integrated and tested on the aircraft at a later stage in the program.
Parallel to the DVE-M program, CCDC AvMC research in Mission Adaptive Autonomy (MAA) was conducted
to explore autonomous guidance, flight control, and pilot/autonomy interaction [8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. This
research was conducted on the full-authority Rotorcraft Aircrew Systems Concepts Airborne Laboratory (RASCAL)
JUH-60A Fly-by-Wire (FBW) Black Hawk helicopter shown in Figure 1b. This effort’s first fully-autonomous
obstacle-avoiding flight with landing site selection occurred in 2012, and was the result of the development of the full-
authority autonomous Flight Control System (FCS) integrated with Obstacle Field Navigation (OFN) and Safe
Landing Area Determination (SLAD) algorithms that both used a line scanning LADAR as their primary range-sensor.
These autonomy components were further refined in subsequent development efforts
This paper describes merging the components of the MAA full-authority autonomous FCS, OFN, and SLAD with
the previously developed DVE-M work on the partial-authority EH-60L test aircraft. The objective was to demonstrate
a set of autonomous behaviors on the test aircraft, which would ultimately give it the ability to operate in a multitude
of DVE conditions, thereby meeting the ultimate goals of the DVE-M program. For this work, a surrogate LADAR
range-sensor was used to carry out the integration, with the expectation it would be replaced with the more capable
multi-mode sensor under development.
Reactive rotorcraft autonomy has been flight demonstrated at various levels in other research. One such research
effort was the previously mentioned reactive autonomy first flown on the full-authority, RASCAL FBW JUH-60A.

2
Figure 1: CCDC Aviation & Missile Center (CCDC AvMC) a) Partial-authority EH-60L research helicopter,
and b) Full-Authority RASCAL FBW JUH-60A research helicopter.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) Autonomous Aerial Cargo/Utility System (AACUS) program also addressed
autonomous obstacle avoidance and landing at unprepared sites [15]. An emphasis of this program was portability, so
their autonomy system was tested on a variety of partial-authority aircraft including the Boeing AH-6 Unmanned
Little Bird, Bell 206 variants, and Aurora’s Bell UH-1. The Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS),
funded through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), will also flight test reactive autonomous
flight on a UH-60M that is being modified to full-authority FBW actuation [16].
Similar types of autonomous behaviors were shown in the work here on a partial-authority test helicopter, the
selection of which, being motivated by the emphasis of the DVE-M program on DVE solutions for conventional fleet-
helicopters. This motivation along with the desire of the DVE-M program to use the MAA system flown on a full-
authority FBW helicopter, on its partial-authority helicopter, created an opportunity for a back-to-back comparison of
these two systems. Therefore, this comparison will give insight in the issues of implementing autonomy on a fleet
helicopter. In addition, the methods used here provide an approach for evaluating and comparing autonomous flying
characteristics. With the inevitability of autonomy in future rotorcraft, this approach should be valuable in supporting
the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) efforts in modernization [17].
This paper will show how the MAA components were integrated to perform autonomous navigation through an
obstacle field, scanning a landing zone for safe landing points, and performing an autonomous landing. The adaptation
of the original full-authority control laws to the partial-authority helicopter will also be described providing an
opportunity to highlight potential issues of implementing an autonomous system on a fleet helicopter. The paper will
show how the ICE symbology, previously developed under DVE-M, was integrated with the MAA components to
provide the situational awareness needed by the pilot to monitor and interact with the autonomy, thereby improving
piloting capabilities.
The paper begins with a discussion of the MAA and ICE autonomy mission-level components. Following this, the
paper discusses the flight control laws and how they were adapted from full-authority to a partial-authority system.
Next, the system hardware is discussed, including the surrogate LADAR sensor and the partial-authority EH-60L
helicopter. Results from the flight test are presented including basic, non-reactive, autonomous maneuvering, fully
coupled reactive guidance around obstacles, landing site selection at unprepared sites, and autonomous landings.
Comparisons to previously documented full-authority results to the partial-authority results of this work are also
presented; this includes comparisons of guidance tracking performance and actuator usage.
III. Mission Adaptive Autonomy (MAA) Partial-Authority System
The MAA system in Figure 2 is composed of three main parts: the Mission Software, the Autonomous Partial-
Authority FCS (APAFCS), and the aircraft hardware. The Mission Software provides the guidance to the control law,
while the APAFCS provides the stability and control to follow the commanded path. The aircraft hardware is the pilot
stick inputs, trim and SAS servos, aircraft sensors, LADAR sensor, and pilot displays. The inherent mechanical control
and actuation in pitch, roll, and yaw remained untouched, so the aircraft is a standard UH-60L with a partial-authority
flight-control system typical of the U.S. Army fleet. However, additional actuation was added to the vertical axis from
fleet-available components. Each part of the MAA system is discussed in subsequent sections of this paper.

3
Figure 2: Mission Adaptive Autonomy (MAA) system consists of the mission software, autonomous partial-
authority flight control system, and hardware on the modified UH-60L aircraft.
IV. Mission Software
The Mission Software consists of the Mission Manager/Operator Interface, Path Generation, Vector Command,
Obstacle Field Navigation (OFN), Safe Landing Area Determination (SLAD), MAA Map/Controls, and Integrated
Cuing Environment (ICE).
A. Mission Manager/Operator Interface
A key technology of MAA is the ability of the pilot to operate with varying levels of autonomy. The Mission
Manager/Operator-Interface in Figure 2 represents all the software that allows the pilot to interact and to monitor the
system at an executive level. For example, the Mission Manager allows the pilot or the system operator to control
mission scenarios by selecting a destination point from a map display. When this is done, the Mission Manager looks
up the destination information and commands the OFN algorithm, which in turn guides the autonomous FCS to the
final destination.
In the full-authority implementation described in Ref. [13], the pilot could decouple the full autonomy and fly the
attitude-command system in Figure 2 with all of the guidance cueing active. Due to time limitations, this couple-
decouple feature was not implemented on the partial-authority system. However, the partial-authority system could
be engaged in a special “idle” mode, where the MAA software still provides cueing to the pilot, but with no APAFCS
control inputs to the servos, thereby leaving the pilot to fly the baseline EH-60L configuration. When the MAA
software is in engaged in “coupled” mode, it has full control of the aircraft actuators and flies the aircraft under the
direction of the guidance. The system provides the same cueing to the pilot as if they were flying the aircraft manually,
thereby providing situational awareness of the autonomy’s intent.
In both of these modes, “idle” and “coupled,” the pilot has controls to interact with, and change the mission
autonomous flight behavior. At any time, the pilot has a number of options to cancel the current mission. These include
the following:
- Stop: Bring the helicopter to a hover as quickly as possible
- Go Around: Cancel a mission and continue flying toward the current heading. This mode is referred to
as “direction command”; the system still avoids obstacles and maintains altitude
commensurate with the OFN Mode.
- Reroute: Cancel the current mission destination and begin flight to a new destination
During the enroute phase, the pilot can modify the autonomous flight behavior with the following commands:
- Additive Offset: Path bias the flight direction laterally up to 85 deg from target or vertically up to 5 deg
- OFN Mode: Switch between Cruise, Terrain, TerrainPlus, and Approach mode
- OFN Slower/Faster: Raise or lower the allowable cruise speed
- Landing Point Select: Select one of a multiple of SLAD solutions and commence the landing sequence
- Display: Change the map type (Sectional, topographical, etc.) or zoom in/out

4
Each OFN Mode links to a parameter file that describes the planner geometry, terrain following behavior, speed
limits, acceleration limits, and other parameters. The four OFN modes and flight characteristics are:
- Cruise: 1000 ft AGL, 100 kts
- Terrain: 300 ft AGL, 80 kts – reduced acceleration limits to keep roll attitude less than 15 degrees
- TerrainPlus: 300 ft AGL, 90 kts
- Approach: 100 ft AGL, 60 kts – reduced acceleration limits to stay within available collective limits
These modes are also automatically invoked by the Mission Manager, but the pilot can change them after the fact.
The Cruise mode is for up-and-away flying at higher speeds. The terrain modes are for flying nearer to the ground to
take advantage of terrain masking. The Terrain mode is a less aggressive version of the TerrainPlus mode, of which,
the former has reduced acceleration limits to keep aircraft roll attitude less than 15 degrees. The Approach mode is
for final approaches to landing zones. It has reduced acceleration limits to stay within available collective limits of the
partial-authority system. The Approach mode also reduces the size of the volume elements in the OFN terrain
representation, as well as reducing helicopter speed and aggressiveness. This is done to increase the precision of the
obstacle space nearer to the ground where the probability of collision is increased.
B. Path Generation, and Vector Command
The path generation algorithm is used by both the Mission Manager/Operator-Interface as well as by the SLAD
algorithm when precision placement of the aircraft is required at the time OFN arrives near the final destination. Both
the path generation and the vector command are open loop, non-reactive, guidance methods to move the vehicle and
are useful during the integration testing of the system, where the flight path is known to be clear of obstacles. More
details on these processes can be found in Ref. [13].
The path generation allows the user to specify a predetermined path by entering a few waypoints along with
macro-level parameters such as maximum speed, climb rate, and acceleration limits. When the path generator accepts
a list of raw waypoints, it generates an expanded and smoothed list of waypoints with an associated velocity profile
that are sent to the waypoint control, which initiates flying the trajectory.
The vector command process is an alternate
guidance method to direct the motion of the
aircraft. The vector command process receives
discrete changes to the desired commanded
velocity. For example, the user can enter a speed,
glide slope and heading rate change, and the vector
command generates a continuous stream of
commands in the form of velocity (V), heading (),
and glide slope (G), which are sent to the Waypoint
Control block of the APAFCS. The vector
command uses the same interface to the waypoint
control block as the OFN algorithm described next.
C. Risk Minimizing Obstacle Field Navigation
(RiskMinOFN)
The RiskMinOFN algorithm builds a 3-
dimensional map of space-varying risk factors and
finds a path to the goal with minimum risk. The
major components of this planner are shown in
Figure 3 and they consist of a Terrain Model, Risk
Map, Navigation Function, and Velocity Command
Controller.
- 3D Terrain Model: The terrain sensor returns are
ray-cast into a 3-dimensional evidence grid [11]; Figure 3: Risk-Minimizing Obstacle Field Navigation
this is an array that stores a probability in each cell (RiskMinOFN) takes in LADAR data on the left and
that has information whether the cell is empty, commands velocity out the right to the APAFCS.
occupied, or unknown.

5
- Risk Map: The algorithm classifies each cell of the terrain as empty, unknown, or occupied. It combines risk due to
various factors, such as execution uncertainty, distance from obstacles, altitude penalty, and known threat locations.
- Navigation Function: A three-dimensional A* algorithm periodically calculates a navigation function from the risk
map. Following this calculation, the navigation function provides the lowest-risk path to the goal.
- Velocity Command Controller: The velocity command controller operates at a cycle time higher than the re-plan. It
produces a set of kinematically achievable paths, calculates their cost from the Risk Map, and chooses the one with
the lowest overall cost (including the navigation function value at the end of the path). The vector command
corresponding to the lowest cost path is sent to the APAFCS as a stream composed of velocity (V), heading (), and
glide slope (G). The command speed is based on the amount of known empty space along the straight-line path.
These four modules together accomplish the sensor processing, data fusion, and trajectory planning. This method of
mission risk minimization allows constraints and parameters to be applied in a sound theoretical manner.
The pilot or autonomous system operator can modify the
operating parameters of the RiskMinOFN algorithm while it is
guiding the aircraft. Threat sites and restricted air space can also be
updated dynamically. There are four parameter files accessible to the
pilot representing the OFN Modes, Cruise, Terrain, TerrainPlus, and
Approach. New destination points can be sent to the algorithm at any
time, allowing the pilot to change the mission destination through the
Mission Manager interface. In addition to flying to a specific
destination point, RiskMinOFN can fly a general destination heading,
where it tries to maintain that heading while still seeking the desired
height AGL associated with the OFN Mode, and simultaneously
avoiding hazards. The RiskMinOFN algorithm can be commanded to
cancel and come to a hover at any time. The speed limit can also be
adjusted, allowing slower or higher speed. The pilot can additionally
bias the heading and ground-following aggressiveness. The
algorithm still places avoiding collisions as the highest priority, so
these pilot inputs only influence the long-term flight path and will not
cause any collisions with the terrain.
D. Safe Landing Area Determination (SLAD)
The SLAD algorithm scans a landing zone (LZ) to find
appropriate landing points based on surface slope, roughness, and
proximity to obstacles [14]. The algorithm takes in line-scan data
from a nodding LADAR and creates a height map by collecting
statistical data in each grid cell of the height map. Height changes
across adjoining cells are categorized in terms of absolute and
differential changes. Absolute height changes are based on the
difference between the average heights of two adjoining cells.
Differential changes are based on height changes across the scan line
of the device, which allows sensing of small changes in height. In
addition, the algorithm uses a sliding window over these grid cells to
determine landing-area surface roughness, slope, and other window
statistics.
The steps used to find a solution and present the results are shown
in Figure 4, where an aircraft approaches a potential landing zone
shown in Figure 4a. When the nodding line-scan LADAR is in range,
the area is scanned and point-cloud data are collected by the
algorithm (Figure 4b). When enough nodding scan passes are
accumulated in the height map, a solution is found from using sliding-
window statistics and other metrics. The solution is then displayed as Figure 4: Main steps of the Safe Landing
a color-coded overlay with blue letter-coded markers (Figure 4c). Area Determination (SLAD) to arrive at
The blue letter-coded markers are the solution-recommended landing a final landing point.

6
points A, B, C, and L. The solution color-coded landing mask has green areas representing the safe landing-points that
have a surrounding window area that meet slope, roughness, and data vacancy requirements and are free of any
absolute or differential-edge height changes. The yellow areas represent possibly safe landing-points with window
areas that meet all safe landing requirements but have differential-edge height changes above a given threshold. The
differential-edge height changes are marked in cyan and are usually caused by objects such as small rocks, uncut grass,
and underbrush, which may or may not be dangerous, but nonetheless, will be avoided as recommended by the
algorithm. The absolute-edge height changes in dark blue are usually associated with large solid objects such as trees
or large structures, which must be avoided. The red areas are unsafe landing-points that fail to meet the safe criteria.
Upon finding the first solution set, the primary landing point (A) is sent to the OFN guidance so it can direct the
aircraft to this point. The point (L) is the last solution sent to the guidance and it is retained on each solution cycle
unless deemed invalid as more data arrive. The pilot can keep the current destination or they can select an alternate,
which causes rerouting to occur by sending this alternate waypoint to the guidance.
On each successive solution set, the last point sent (L) is kept as the destination if it is still safe. If the last point
becomes unsafe it is marked with a red X, and the next primary point (A) is sent to the guidance so the path can be
rerouted. Solutions are spaced to have a minimum time between them to avoid sending new ones to the guidance too
frequently. This feature is necessary to keep the information rate manageable, because a rapidly changing landing
display creates a high workload for the pilot when monitoring and interacting with the autonomy. The process repeats
until the aircraft gets to a final landing point.
Once the RiskMinOFN algorithm commands the aircraft within its position tolerance, control of the aircraft is
handed over to the SLAD algorithm. The algorithm checks the RADAR altitude and compensates for height
differences between the SLAD height-map collected with the LADAR system and the onboard EGI. If all the points
on the landing mask on a path between the aircraft and the landing point are safe, then SLAD use the waypoint path-
generation to command the aircraft directly to the landing height over the landing point. If any of those points are
unsafe, the algorithm directs the aircraft horizontally until all points on the path are safe, and then commands directly
to the landing height over the landing point. This procedure reduces the risk of hitting obstacles on the way down to
the landing height. In addition, no heading changes are made during this final maneuvering to avoid unnecessary
movements close to the ground. Once at the landing height, the SLAD algorithm initiates the landing sequence in the
control law.
The landing sequence starts at the landing height, which was set to 25 ft AGL, and lowers the aircraft vertically at
80-100 fpm. The pilot can cancel the landing until the aircraft gets below 15 ft AGL, after which, the landing is
committed and can only be stopped by disengaging the system. The lateral velocities are kept within 0.50 kts to avoid
touching the ground with unsafe sideward motion. Once any Weight-on-Wheels (WOW) sensor is activated (usually
the tail wheel), the attitude loops convert to rate damping, and the collective control continues lowering. When two or
more WOW sensors are activated, all the control loops open up, and the collective continues lowering until
comfortably on the ground.
E. MAA/ICE Pilot Displays and Interface
The pilot’s or operator’s situational awareness is critical to safe autonomous operations, whether in testing or in a
deployed system. For this system, two displays are used, the MAA OFN/SLAD map, and the ICE display, which are
both shown in Figure 5. These displays provide sufficient situational awareness for the pilot to fly the mission in DVE.
The MAA OFN/SLAD Map (Figure 5a) shows a top view that can show satellite, topographical, or sectional
information. A color-coded slice of the RiskMinOFN risk volume at the current aircraft altitude is inset in the map,
where risk ranges from low (light blue) to high (red). Indication of the desired path is shown as a breadcrumb pattern
ahead of the aircraft. The intended destination of OFN is show as a magenta dot and the intended destination heading
shows as a magenta arrow head on the compass rose. When closer to the destination, the SLAD landing mask is inset
in the OFN risk map along with the recommended landing points (Figure 5b). As previously described, the SLAD
inset shows the safe areas as green and the unsafe as red, and the recommended landing points are pilot selectable.
The intent of the MAA guidance is also displayed with magenta symbols on the ICE display, which has two pages
(modes). These consist of the enroute (Figure 5c) page and the Hover/Approach/Takeoff (HAT) symbology page
(Figure 5d). Both of these pages are overlaid on an image generated from the LADAR sensor. The white symbology
is the measured state of the aircraft, while the magenta symbology represents the commanded values from the
guidance.

7
The forward-flight enroute page is set by default to the compensatory tracking symbology, also known as the
“flight director” mode. This display uses error signals in the coordinate space of the cyclic and collective controls.
Figure 5c shows this symbology, which requires the pilot to align the white aircraft nose symbol (Winston) with the
magenta inverted T-symbol circle using the cyclic roll and pitch control, and to keep the diamond aligned on the
horizontal line of the inverted T using the collective control. When the APAFCS is engaged and autonomously flying
fully coupled, the pilot can monitor these control errors using the same symbology. The pilot has the option to switch
to other symbology sets, including a moving corridor display, and a flight-path marker display, which operate in image
space looking out the ICE display. For the results of this paper, only the flight-director symbology was used enroute.
The HAT page (Figure 5d) allows the pilot to monitor the intent of the control law as it approaches the final landing
point at low speeds, where the magenta symbols represent the command inputs from the guidance to the flight control
laws. The HAT page has a cup-and-ball, horizontal velocity vector and acceleration cue symbol, which acts as a
predictor for the velocity vector. The velocity vector emanates from the center of the page and has a logarithmic scale,
which provides a large enough range to keep the velocity vector on the screen, while simultaneously providing cueing
precision to hover or land in manual mode. The aircraft vertical behavior is shown with a vertical speed target (magenta
oval), radar altimeter measurements driving a vertical speed tape (cyan), and a vertical acceleration indicator (not
visible). Landing information from the SLAD landing points is also shown on this page, so the pilot does not have to
refer back to the top-down SLAD-map inset to make a selection.

Figure 5: MAA/ICE pilot displays flying to Calvert (LZ-03), Camp Robert, WV a) MAA satellite map with
OFN risk map inset, b) ICE enroute compensatory-tracking symbology, c) MAA map with SLAD landing-
mask inset, and d) ICE Hover/Approach/Takeoff (HAT) symbology.

8
V. Autonomous Partial-Authority Flight Control System (APAFCS)
The APAFCS provides the stability and path guidance for the autonomy components in the mission software and
its main blocks are shown in the center of Figure 2.
A. Autonomous Flight Control
The flight control is the same system flown on the full-authority RASCAL research helicopter [13]. Some gain
adjustments to compensate for the lower performance associated with the partial-authority actuation were made as
described later in the paper.
1. Waypoint Control
The waypoint control (Figure 2) receives waypoints or vector commands and produces a continuous path position
() that is followed by the tracking control. The waypoint control block has two interfaces, the waypoint-trajectory
and vector-command interface.
The waypoint-trajectory interface accepts a set of commanded waypoints from the path generation block that
includes position, velocity, acceleration, and time information to navigate a predefined path. These points are buffered
as they arrive, and when a full path is received, they are filtered and sampled to produce a trajectory function that can
be evaluated at the APAFCS cycle time to create the continuous path position () sent to the tracking control.
The vector-command interface accepts a time sequence of velocity vector-commands. The stream of velocity
commands can come either from the vector command process or from the OFN guidance. The velocity magnitude
(V), heading () and glide slope (G), are each filtered through second-order limiting filters, which prevent rapid
changes of the velocity vector from entering the tracking control. The glide slope command is limited using upper and
lower bounds that are scheduled with speed, which are set to prevent the aircraft from climbing beyond its power limit
or sinking too quickly. The RiskMinOFN algorithm incorporates these same limits to avoid planning unachievable
paths. Once filtered, the velocity is transformed into inertial coordinates and it is used to calculate position and
accelerations. These are then used to generate a trajectory function, which is used to generate the path () sent to the
tracking control at the 50 Hz cycle time of the control law.
2. Tracking Control
The tracking control in Figure 2 acts as the autopilot around the flight path command. It forces the system to track
inertially referenced path signals (η) generated from the waypoint control block and passes aircraft-referenced
command signals (ξ) to the flight-path command block. It also provides the necessary position disturbance rejection
regardless if the guidance algorithm uses the waypoint-trajectory interface or the velocity vector-command interface
in the waypoint control block. When using the vector-command interface, the tracking control follows a position
integrated from the commanded velocity.
In hover, the control minimizes errors in an inertial Cartesian frame. In forward flight, it minimizes errors in a
rotated frame aligned with the desired flight path, where the direction component is along the path (D), the normal
component (N) is normal to the path in the vertical direction, and the horizontal component (H) is in the horizontal
plane perpendicular to the other two axes. The orientation of the coordinate system is determined by the commanded
flight-path, heading angle and glide slope.
3. Inner-Loop Control
The inner-loop control block in Figure 2 is comprised of two parts, the flight-path command block, and the attitude
command block. The two parts are structured to allow them to be decoupled to allow manual flying of the attitude
command part and to be coupled back to resume autonomous flight. This decouple-couple feature was implemented
and tested on the full-authority system in Ref. [13], but was not fully implemented for this test.
In hover, the flight-path command uses the aircraft-referenced outputs, ξ = [uc, vc, rc, ℎ , from the tracking control
as its inputs and generates the collective stick position (δc), commanded roll attitude (c), commanded pitch attitude
(c), and commanded yaw rate (rc) for the attitude control. In forward flight, the flight path command takes the aircraft-
referenced outputs, ξ = [uc,Ψ , c, c], from the tracking control as its inputs and generates δc, c, and c for the attitude
control, and side-slip command (c).
The attitude command block provides the primary three-axis attitude stabilization for the system and generates the
lateral (δa), longitudinal (δe), and pedal (δp) inputs to the aircraft. In forward flight, turn coordination is enabled and

9
the yaw axis becomes a sideslip command response. The vertical command of the attitude command block has no
feedback, so the collective is an open-loop command to the swashplate. Attitude loops are gain scheduled at design
points for hover, 40, 80, and 120 kts.
4. Idle Mode
The APAFCS can be engaged in a special “idle” mode, where the cueing to the pilot is active, but with no APAFCS
control into the servos. The pilot flies the baseline EH-60L configuration and uses the symbology to follow the MAA
guidance as the system does when the system is engaged in fully coupled autonomous mode.
B. Partial-Authority (PA) Mixing
The PA mixing distributes the control to the trim and SAS actuators assuming slow full-authority trim actuators
(approximately 10 percent/sec rate) and fast partial-authority SAS actuators (10 percent position authority). The
distribution is done to reproduce as much of the full-authority actuation, thereby allowing the re-use of the control law
from the full-authority testing with minimal changes.
1. Trim/SAS Complementary Filter
The PA mixing block shown in Figure 6 takes the
control command results from the Inner-Loop Control in
Figure 2 and separates it into a low frequency (<b)
command to the trim servo and a high frequency (>b)
command to the SAS actuators. The PA mixing logic
transfers control to the SAS actuator if the trim actuator
saturates at its rate limit. This transfer is indicated in the
figure when the “On Limit” condition signals closing of
the switch. When both the trim-rate and SAS actuators
saturate in the same direction, a signal is sent to the flight
control laws indicating it should stop its integrators in the
associated control axes (not shown in Figure 6). The
mixing also contains a lead filter to reduce the delays
from the trim actuator, which is adjusted through the
frequency P and the gain K. The filter has roll-off Figure 6: Complementary filter to allocate the
frequency R, which is set greater than P to attenuate any commands to trim and SAS actuators.
high frequency noise. Adjustment to the SAS gain is
controlled through Ks. These gains are set based on the expected behavior of the trim and SAS servos. Because the
trim servos are very low bandwidth, the lead filter helps improve the phase near the break frequency, b, where the trim
and SAS actuators are added together.
2. Trim/SAS allocation considerations
The critical setting in the complementary filter in Figure 6 is the break frequency, b, which controls distribution
of the command to the trim and SAS actuators. It is desirable to set the frequency as high as possible to maximize
usage of the trim servos. To gain insight into how to set b, consider a simplified block diagram as shown in Figure 7a.
Assume a simple first order model, G(s), of the aircraft dynamics, which is representative of an angular-rate command
response of a helicopter in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes.

𝐺 𝑠 (1)

To get a 1/s crossover behavior from a feedback design around this system, the control law, K(s), takes the form

𝐾 𝑠 (2)

The output of the control law is directed into a low and high pass filter to divide the command to the trim and SAS
actuators, where the break frequency between them is given by b. It is assumed the bandwidth of the trim servo is
much greater than b to simplify the analysis.

𝐿 𝑠 (3)

10
𝐻 𝑠 (4)

From the figure, the trim rate from input command and disturbance are given by

(5)

D s (6)

The SAS position from input command and disturbance are given by

(7)

(8)

where R(s) and D(s) are given by

R s (9)

D s (10)

The disturbance and the command frequency responses of the trim rate and SAS position are determined by these
respective functions, D(s) and R(s), which depend on the break frequency, b, the design crossover frequency, c, and
the aircraft frequency, .
One observation from this simple analysis is that keeping the break frequency low reduces the high frequency
response to commands and disturbances. This can be seen by looking at the gain asymptotes for the disturbance, D(s),
and command, R(s), response functions. Figure 7e-h show how they are affected as the break frequency is moved past
the control crossover frequency, c, and the aircraft open loop, , behavior. The first row, including Figure 7e and
Figure 7f, contains the cases where design crossover is placed higher than the open-loop behavior. In these cases, the
control design is more demanding because it drives the system faster than it would normally as an open-loop system.
The second row, including Figure 7g and Figure 7h, contains the cases where design crossover is placed lower than
the open-loop behavior. In these cases, the control design is less demanding because it drives the system more slowly
than it normally operates as an open-loop system. The left column, including Figure 7e and Figure 7g, contains the
command response functions, while the right column, including Figure 7f and Figure 7h, contains the disturbance
response functions.
It is undesirable to amplify the command and disturbance responses in the high frequency, so designs that avoid
this by keeping the break frequency low are desirable. The worst case is when <c<b, shown in Figure 7e, where
the break frequency is higher than both the open-loop and the control frequency; that is, where the control is designed
to drive the system faster than its open-loop dynamics. The best case is in Figure 7h, where b<c< where the break
frequency is lower than both the control and the open-loop frequency; that is, where the system is designed to drive
the system more slowly than its open-loop behavior. Alternately, it is desirable is to make the break frequency as high
as possible to maximize the use of the trim servos at the cost of more high frequency noise.
Another observation is that the ratio of the trim rate to the SAS position is given by b itself. A value of b less than
one will cause proportionally more activity in the SAS position relative to the trim servo rate. If the trim-servo rate
and the SAS position limits are the same, this increases the chances of saturating the SAS position. A value of b greater
than one will cause the trim rate to be larger relative to the SAS position and increase the chance of causing the trim
servo to rate limit. Both of these conditions are undesirable, so a value of b that minimizes the probability of these
two cases is desirable.

11
Figure 7: Comparison of closed-loop responses of high and low pass actuators to command (R(s)) and
disturbances (D(s)) as the break frequency (b) is increased beyond the control crossover frequency (c) and the
aircraft open-loop ( frequency.

12
1. Trim/SAS Break Frequencies
The values of the break frequency b described in the “Trim/SAS Complementary Filter” section were chosen by
using the known open-loop aircraft characteristics and current feedback design along with the considerations described
in the “Trim/SAS allocation considerations” section. Simulation studies, using the more aggressive maneuvers
expected to be flown during flight tests, were performed with these values to confirm they had an acceptable balance
between not saturating either the trim servo rate or the SAS position.
Table 1 shows the relevant characteristics for
Table 1: Trim/SAS break frequency (b) relative to
the lateral, longitudinal, and pedal aircraft control
axes. The crossover frequencies of the control approximate open-loop response () and feedback crossover
design (c) are given by the current design at frequency (c).
speeds from hover to 120 kts and are based on the Axis Speed k  c b Type
full-authority system that was designed to meet (kts)
performance requirements typical for a military Lat 0 1.69 4.30 3.10 2.0 b<c<
utility helicopter. Due to the lower roll inertia, the 40 1.83 4.00 3.78 2.0 b<c<
lateral axis has an open-loop roll frequency (
near 3-4 rad/sec, which is high enough that the 80 2.20 3.40 3.12 2.0 b<c<
design crossover can be placed near this value and 120 2.60 2.89 3.32 2.0 b<<c
still meet the necessary flying qualities. The break Lon 0 2.47 0.723 2.45 1.50 <b<c
frequency for this axis was placed at 2.0 rad/sec, 40 1.76 1.13 2.45 1.50 <b<c
which is lower than both the crossover and open
loop frequency. Simulation studies showed this 80 1.71 1.43 2.26 1.50 <b<c
value produced a SAS position that is about half 120 1.72 1.62 2.06 1.50 b<<c
the lateral trim-servo rate. The longitudinal axis Ped 0 4.42 0.22 2.89 1.25 <b<c
has a much lower open-loop frequency, and
40 2.28 0.518 3.03 1.25 <b<c
therefore to meet design specifications, requires a
crossover frequency higher than this frequency. 80 2.15 0.629 3.45 1.25 <b<c
Based on these considerations, the break 120 1.93 0.783 3.70 1.25 <b<c
frequency was set at 1.5 rad/sec. The pedal axis
has the lowest open-loop frequency of all the axes
and simultaneously needs a high crossover frequency to meet its design specifications. A break frequency of 1.25
rad/sec was selected, which should produce a SAS position somewhat less than the trim servo rate, but closer together
than the lateral and longitudinal axes. Once the break frequencies were chosen, the rest of the parameters in Figure 6
were determined empirically from the characteristics of the trim servos, which are discussed in the subsequent “Trim
Servo Loops” section.
C. Autonomous Landing
The sequencer in Figure 2 provides a general-purpose capability to run pre-programmed sequences to carry out
specific tasks. A sequence is composed of individual steps that can change internal variables of the APAFCS software
or check variable conditions. Failure to pass a check will cause a sequence to quit and start an abort sequence to put
the system into a known safe state.
The landing procedure is implemented as a sequence that assumes a hover position over the landing point. After
checks on the health of important systems to perform the landing, the sequence begins by taking a reading of the AGL
from the RADAR altimeter. The sequence then sets a waypoint below the ground level and waits until one weight-on-
wheels (WOW) switch is activated (usually the tail wheel). Once this happens, the sequencer begins opening the
control loops and continues to lower the collective in a measured way that is fast enough to keep the vehicle on the
ground, but slow enough to avoid a hard landing or excessive tip-path-plane droop. As the collective lowers, the
sequence waits for the second WOW indication (usually the left wheel), after which the sequencer proceeds to lower
the collective at a slightly higher rate to bring the power down to safe value.

13
VI. Flight Hardware
1. Aircraft
The test aircraft is shown in Figure 8a, which is the EH-60L Advanced QuickFix helicopter, Army Serial
Number 87-24657. Some of its specialized equipment (except the inertial navigation unit (INU), associated
navigation control panel, control display unit (CDU), and external antennas) was removed to make it similar to a
standard UH-60L.

Figure 8: a) EH-60L Partial-Authority Aircraft at the Combat Sod, Fort Eustis, VA, b) H.N. Burns Multi-
Function LADAR mounted (MFL) on nose of EH-60L.

The aircraft hardware configuration is shown in Figure 9, where the uncolored blocks represent standard Black
Hawk equipment. The stick is connected to the Mechanical Mixing Unit (MMU) through a series of linkages that
combine the output of the trim servos with the SAS servos at the input to the MMU. For each control axis, the trim
servo is situated between the pilot stick and the MMU, thereby back driving the pilot inceptors. The details for each
axes differ and will be discussed in subsequent sections. The pilot can push against the force of the servo, thereby
overriding its input to the MMU. Each trim servo has a trim release mechanism activated by a switch on the pilot
inceptor, which prohibits the servo from applying force against the stick, relieving the pilot of having to push against
the servo force. The output of the MMU drives the primary servos to the main rotor swashplate. Similarly, the control
pedals are connected to the MMU through a series of linkages and its associated trim servo has a release mechanism.
The output of the MMU is connected to the tail-rotor actuator by a series of linkages and cables extending to the rear
of the aircraft. All of these linkages and cables are mentioned because, depending on the axis, they can create backlash
and other non-linearities within the control law. The consequences of these issues are discussed in the “Trim Servo
Loops” section.
An EGI, differential GPS receiver, and RADAR altimeter were installed along with Linear Variable Differential
Transformers (LVDT) to measure the positions of the pilot inceptors. Trim position and force measurements were
also available from the devices themselves. The SAS actuator positions and the airspeed measurements were available
from the production aircraft. Instrumentation racks and a Research Data Acquisition System (RDAS) were installed
in the cabin for data collection, and antennas for the research GPS unit and telemetry were externally mounted on the
aircraft.
Conventional UH-60L aircraft are not equipped with a collective trim actuator. To have servo control of this axis,
the trim actuator and stick grip from the U.S. Air Force’s HH-60G helicopter Advanced Hover Hold Stabilization
system were installed.

14
Figure 9: Research aircraft hardware schematic of standard (white) and added equipment.
2. Partial-Authority Flight Control Assembly (PAFCA)
The Partial-Authority Flight Control Assembly (PAFCA) was installed to support development of the Modernized
Control Laws (MCLAWS) software [7], which included a research flight-control computer (RFCC), SAS/trim
interface box (STIB), and cockpit control panels. Additionally, to support landing under RFCC control, landing gear
struts for the main and the tail wheels were replaced with struts developed for the UH-60Mu program that contain
triple-redundant WOW switches.
The STIB allowed the aircraft servos to be commanded by either the standard UH-60 SAS/FPS or the RFCC. The
STIB had a “hybrid” mode that allowed control of the individual trim actuators leaving the UH-60 SAS enabled, and
a “full” control mode where both the trim and SAS actuators could be controlled by the RFCC. The STIB was
controlled by a three-way magnetically-held switch located on a panel in the cockpit center console, where the “full”
or “hybrid” mode could be engaged by positioning the switch in either the up or down position. Both pilots had
disengage buttons on their inceptors to release the magnetic switch and return it to the center position, thereby
returning the aircraft into its standard UH-60 flight control mode. Wiring was added so that the RFCC could release
this magnetic switch via the MCLAWS firmware allowing software enabled disengagements.
3. Range Sensor
To support testing the autonomy components of MAA, a high precision, H.N. Burns Engineering Corp. (HNBEC)
Multi-Function LADAR (MFL) was mounted on the aircraft nose as shown in Figure 8b. The MFL was configured to
produce 50 scan lines per second with 1000 returns per scan line, which were geo-rectified by the MFL computer and
sent to the SLAD/OFN software over Gigabit Ethernet. The MFL has a horizontal field-of-view of 60 deg, and a
maximum sensor range of 2500 m. The nodding range of travel can be set to an upper limit of 30 deg (above the
horizon nose mount) and a lower limit of -120 deg with a maximum nod rate of 20 deg/sec.
4. Displays and MAA controls
To support display research in the development of the ICE software, two side-by-side LCD displays were added
to the right pilot’s station. These displays received video data from cameras mounted on the aircraft or display

15
symbology generated by the onboard Programmable Display Generator (PDG) computer, which hosted the ICE
symbology software.
The ICE computer ran the display and guidance software and was the bus master for 1553 communications. The
ICE software managed 1553 traffic between the RFCC and the MAA-A computer, which also had a dedicated 1553
card that communicated with the flight control software running onboard. The ICE software also communicated with
the MAA computers via Ethernet providing ship’s data, bezel button activity, and inceptor data used by the MAA
software. For pilot situational awareness, the ICE software displayed the command traffic from the autonomous
guidance to the autonomous flight control. This displayed data gave the pilot a sense of the intention of the autonomy
so they could better monitor its behavior.
Figure 10 shows all the MAA controls that were available to the pilot. Figure 10a shows the mapping of the SLAD
landing point selection features to the “Landing Light” switch on the collective; pushing the switch up or down
highlighted a different landing point on the display, and plunging it selected the highlighted landing point. The OFN
Additive Offset feature was mapped to the five-way “Search Light CONT &VAW” switch; clicking it incremented
the left/right bias to the command direction or the up/down elevation bias, and plunging it reset any biases to zero.
Figure 10b shows the mapping of the cyclic switches. When pressed, the “Go Around Switch” activated the OFN GO
Around feature, which cancelled the current mission and maintained terrain avoidance in a constant heading until the
pilot selected another mission. The MAA disengage was triggered by the “Remote Standby switch”.
Figure 10c shows the map and bezel button display used for mission control. On the left side of the display, STOP
brought the helicopter to a hover as rapidly as possible, while simultaneously canceling the mission. The Go Around
button took the same action as on the cyclic grip. OK and Cancel either accepted or declined the main menu selection
along the bottom bar; the OFN Mode menu allowed the pilot to select a specific flight mode (Cruise, Terrain, etc.).
However, this action would not negate any auto-mode selection caused by the Mission Manager script currently
running. The OFN Destination menu allowed the pilot to select from a list of predetermined landing zones. Selecting
one of these and pressing OK initiated a new mission to that location or rerouted there if currently enroute to another
destination. The buttons along the right side zoomed the map, toggled its background imagery, and sped up or slowed
down the OFN flight mode.

Figure 10: MAA Pilot control mapping onto the research systems inceptors and Bezel buttons.
5. Mission Adaptive Autonomy (MAA)
The approach to implementing the MAA system on the EH-60L was similar to that used on the RASCAL
helicopter (Ref. [9]) where the RFCC computer was used as a gateway to the EH-60L trim and SAS actuators. The
MCLAWS firmware was modified so it could be commanded to relinquish its control of the trim and SAS actuators
to the APAFCS process, thereby becoming the firmware implementation of the gateway concept. The RFCC computer
received measurements from analog, digital I/O and 1553 inputs and sent trim and SAS actuator commands to the
Trim/SAS interface box. As mentioned previously, the STIB had a switch, activated from the pilot station that engaged

16
and disengaged the PAFCA system and reverted the aircraft to its original production behavior. The production aircraft
had a SAS and Flight Path Stabilization (FPS) system that drove the SAS actuators and the trim servos, respectively.
The trim servos drove the mechanical control linkages, but with sufficient pilot applied force, they could be
overpowered. There was also a trim release button to deactivate the trim servos so the pilot could fly unhindered by
the trim servo forces. Because the EH-60L was modified with a collective trim servo, the APAFCS had a collective
control capability albeit with only a trim servo, but no SAS
servo. The SAS servos are present in the lateral, longitudinal,
and pedal control axes, and were available for feedback control
via the STIB.
The MAA system communicated with the RFCC using the
1553 bus and Ethernet. The MAA system was implemented
across four computers plus the H.N. Burns Corporation
(HNBEC) Multi-Function LADAR (MFL) system. The MFL
computer communicated directly with the LADAR device and
the MAA system interfaced to the MFL computer. The MAA
flight control computer (MAA-A) communicated via an
AltaDT, 2-channel, dual-function PMC 1553 card and Ethernet.
The remaining MAA computers, B, C, and D communicated via
Ethernet exclusively. The MAA software components were
distributed amongst the four computers. The APAFCS software
and onboard data collection ran on MAA-A, while MAA-B ran
the SLAD software. MAA-B also received and recorded
LADAR data from the MFL computer, and distributed it to the Figure 11: Trim servo feedback used to
SLAD and RiskMinOFN algorithms. MAA-C ran the Mission improve servo response. The servo (G(s)) can
Manager and the system-operator user interface. Finally, be either electric position commanded or
RiskMinOFN software ran on MAA-D. hydraulic rate commanded.
6. Trim Servo Loops
As mentioned previously in the “Aircraft” section, each axis of control from the trim servos had its own unique
issues that needed addressing to make them more responsive to command inputs. Non-linear effects, such as
quantization, coulomb friction, linkage backlash and cable flexibility, all contributed to sub-optimal servo control for
the control task. The trim servo loop shown in Figure 11 was required to overcome these issues. The feedback had a
notch filter and a proportional-integral (PI) feedback. The integrator was stopped if the force, generated by the pilot
pushing against the servo motion, exceeded a threshold value. The integrator was also stopped when the trim release
was activated from the pilot inceptors. For this test, the trim release was not used. In addition, the pilots were instructed
not to push against the stick when the autonomy was engaged. Table 2 summarizes the parameters of the servo loop
for each axis of control.

Table 2: Trim servo feedback parameters corresponding to Figure 11.


Axis Type Cmd Pos Rate Meas kp ki  w d PL FL
%/sec Source ND sec r/s r/s ND in/s pct
Lat Electric Rel Rel 11 Actuator 1.0 2.0 - - - - 50
Lon Hydraulic Rel Abs 9 Actuator 1.0 2.0 - - - 10 50
Ped Electric Rel Rel 10 Actuator 1.0 2.0 10.0 0.80 0.30 - 50
Col Electric Rel Rel 14 LVDT 3.0 3.0 - - - - 100

Lateral Trim Servo


The lateral axis servo was electric and mounted above the pilot station where the control linkages were far ahead
of the MMU and SAS servos. The servo unit had its own force and position sensors and commanded position relative
to the last trim release. The servo had an empirically determined rate-limit of approximately 11 percent/sec and could
move the stick 10 inches side-to-side. The PI gains shown in the table provided approximately 2 rad/sec crossover on
the servo loop. The notch was not used in this loop and the force limit was set to 50 percent of maximum force.

17
Longitudinal Trim Servo
The longitudinal axis servo differed from the lateral servo in that it was hydraulic. Furthermore, it was together
with the SAS servo mounted on the MMU. The longitudinal servo was commanded by rate, but returned an absolute
position signal. The unit did not have its own force measurement, but a force could be calculated using the available
measurements and known spring constant. The servo had an empirically determined rate-limit of approximately 9
percent/sec moving the stick 10 inches fore-to-aft. The PI gains provided approximately 2 rad/sec crossover frequency
in the servo loop. The notch filter was not used and the force limit was set to 50 percent.
The electric actuator in the lateral axis was commanded using is position, but the hydraulic longitudinal actuator
was commanded using rate. This difference was accommodated in Figure 11, by inserting a proportional velocity-
limiting block ahead of the actuator. When the inputs were small, the command was proportional. When they were
large, the block acted like a bang-bang command to the actuator. This was done to extract the most bandwidth from
the system, while preventing limit cycling in steady conditions. The electric servo also differed from the hydraulic
servo in that the latter had first-order dynamic behavior that rolled off rapidly at higher frequencies, whereas the
electric servos had responses with much more high frequency output. This higher-order response complicated
allocating electric trim-servo and SAS actuation in Figure 6, because these higher-order dynamics could be more
readily excited by the lead block if improperly set. Therefore, because of its first-order behavior, the longitudinal servo
control proved more amenable to allocation with the SAS servo than the other axes that used electric servos.
The longitudinal servo was also unusual in that the function of controlling its position on the production aircraft
was built into the FPS firmware. The STIB breaks into the longitudinal servo command ahead of the FPS servo
position control, so it was required by the system herein to provide a similar position control loop. Production safety
features in the FPS also checked on the commands issued from the FPS as part of a fault detection system that disabled
the servo in the event of a detected mismatch between what the FPS commanded and what is measured. When
controlling the servo through the STIB, this feature could cause unintended FPS faults that disabled the trim servo.
No provision was available in the production aircraft to disable this feature when the FPS was not in control of the
trim servo, so a special circuit was installed that fed the FPS fault system with the expected signal, thereby preventing
any inadvertent disabling of the servo.
Pedal Trim Servo
The pedal axis used the same electric servo unit as the lateral axis and it was mounted above the pilot where the
control linkages were far ahead of the MMU and SAS servos. The servo unit had its own position sensor and
commanded position relative to the last trim release. The unit had its own force measurement, and had an empirically
determined rate-limit of approximately 11 percent/sec moving the pedals 5.38 inches left-to-right. The PI gains shown
in the table provided approximately a 2 rad/sec crossover in the servo loop. The notch filter was set to suppress higher
frequency activity near 10 rad/sec, and the force limit was set to 50 percent of maximum force. The pedal axis had the
linkage non-linearities similar to the roll axis and it had considerably more backlash from the cabling running from
the MMU to the tail rotor. In addition, the throw of the pedals axis was approximately half of the lateral axis making
the quantization effects more apparent in affecting the precision of command to pedal axis. All of these effects created
more position chattering when coupled with the FCS feedback than the other axes.
Collective Trim Servo
The collective servo was an electric servo from the U.S. Air Force’s HH-60G helicopter Advanced Hover Hold
Stabilization system and it was mounted above the pilot where the control linkages were far ahead of the MMU. This
servo unit had its own position sensor and commanded position relative to the last trim release.
Initially, the servo linkages suffered considerable backlash, and, to eliminate it, they were replaced with higher
tolerance linkages. In addition, the friction lock on the collective control was disabled when the servo loop was
engaged to reduce coulomb friction effects. Even with these fixes, the collective axis still had considerable coulomb
friction, which made it difficult to both rapidly command it to the desired position without considerable overshoot [6].
The servo feedback was found to be more effective against the coulomb friction when applied using the LVDT
measurement of the collective position. The servo had an empirically determined rate-limit of approximately of 14
percent/sec and could move the stick 10 inches bottom to top. The PI gains shown in the table provide approximately
a 3 rad/sec crossover frequency. The notch was not used in this loop and the force limit was set to 100 percent of
maximum forces.

18
PA Mixing
The partial-authority mixing parameters are shown in Table 3. The break frequencies were determined in the
“Partial-Authority (PA) Mixing” section. The parameters of the lead-lag block in Figure 6 were based on the closed-
loop responses of the servo loops. The lead block assumes a first-order like response, which was very much like the
pitch hydraulic actuator. For this axis, the value, P, was set to a first-order approximation of the closed-loop. The
electric actuators did not fit that first-order response as they had much higher magnitude in the higher frequency. The
value P, for the lateral and pedal axes, which had the electric actuators, were adjusted to recover as much trim servo
lag as possible at the break frequency without exciting higher frequency modes. Adjusting P to avoid exciting higher
frequency feedback generally reduced the crossover frequency of the original full-authority design.

Table 3: Trim/SAS Complementary Filter values for Figure 6.


Axis b R P K Ks L Ls
r/s r/s r/s ND ND in/sec in/sec
Lat 2.00 10.0 14.0 1.0 0.90 0.110 1.0
Lon 1.50 10.0 7.50 1.0 0.95 0.090 1.0
Ped 1.25 10.0 7.00 1.0 1.00 0.120 1.0
Col - - 9.48 1.0 - 0.125 -

VII. Flight Test Results


The partial-authority system was flight tested throughout the spring and summer of 2019. Test results of these
flights are presented next and are compared with previously collected full-authority results.
A. Pre-flight Development and Flight Testing
A single-computer standalone desktop simulation was used for the development and testing of the mission software
and APAFCS code. The aircraft simulation model consisted of linearized models derived from the FORECAST model
described in Ref. [18] at 0, 40, 80, and 120 kts. The stability derivatives were interpolated across the speed range and
integrated with the full non-linear kinematics. Bounding trim points were set to preserve speed-dependent stability
derivatives. The simulation did not model the hardware interface, but did have functional models of the partial-
authority servos and LADAR terrain-sensing system.
Prior to flight test, a Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL) simulation of the UH-60 was used to check the software
on a distributed computer system. The SIL was equipped with the same hardware as the aircraft including the 1553
muxbus system, the RFCC with MCLAWS firmware, the four MAA computers, and the ICE computer. The SIL had
a full non-linear simulation model with rotor blade dynamics and detailed aerodynamic look-up tables [19]. Detailed
engine model and sensor interfaces were also modeled as well as models of the trim and SAS actuator configuration.
The non-linear model was the NASA Ames Gen Hel simulation, which was originally derived from the Sikorsky Gen
Hel simulation of a UH-60. The SIL had active inceptors and the same display configuration as the aircraft. It also had
out-the-window screens with a visual terrain, and the same LADAR model used in the desktop simulation.
After validating the software configuration in the SIL, the configuration was flight-tested. Tests were conducted
at Felker Army Airfield, VA and Camp Dawson, WV. Twenty-three research sorties totaling 41.4 hours of flight time
were flown in wind conditions typically in the 8-15 kts range and not exceeding 20 kts.
Engagement of the system was initiated using the same procedure to engage the MCLAWS (Ref. [7]) in position
and altitude hold. A modified version of the MCLAWS firmware was developed allowing it to hand over control of
the trim and SAS actuators to the APAFCS software on its engagement. After MCLAWS was engaged in a stable
hover, the system operator executed all MAA pre-engagement scripts to prepare it for engagement. Once completed,
the trim On/Off button was toggled by the pilot effectively cycling all servo trim-release switches. This action
initialized the PA mixing by capturing the trim absolute positions as a reference around which, to command relative
trim servo inputs. After the PA mixing was initialized, the operator completed the APAFCS engagement allowing it
to fully command of the trim and SAS servos resulting in MAA fully coupled hovering flight.

19
As mentioned previously in the “Flight Hardware, Partial-Authority Flight Control Assembly (PAFCA)” section,
disengagement of the system could be initiated by the Safety Pilot (SP), Evaluation Pilot (EP) or the onboard system
operator. To disengage, the SP or EP pressed the disengagement button on their inceptor grips. The MAA operator
could disengage the system from their user interface, which signaled the RFCC to release the magnetically held engage
switch.
B. Feedback Stability
The first step in the partial-authority implementation of the control law was to combine the trim servos and SAS
servos in the PA mixing (Figure 2), so that the full-authority design from Ref. [9] could be left intact. However, due
to the inherent limitations of the partial-authority hardware, this was not possible, so some changes to the full-authority
design were inevitable. One straightforward change was to reduce the delays of the rotor frequency filtering from 50
msec to 25 msec. The full-authority implementation had 50 msec of filter delay in the three attitude-rates and
accelerations as it used an INU with more noise than the EGI used on the partial-authority test aircraft. This reduction
compensated for phase margin losses due to the slower nature of the combined trim and SAS actuators as compared
to the full-authority FBW actuators used in Ref. [9]. Other changes will be described in the context of the following
stability results.
To verify stability, the envelope of the aircraft was incrementally expanded from hover to 120 kts in 40 kt
increments. Preprogrammed frequency sweeps were injected at the control-law command output with all loops closed
(at a, e, p, and c in Figure 2). The sweeps were used to identify the stability margins with frequency-based system
identification [20]. In forward flight, a time-based script was initiated onboard that sent velocity commands to the
vector-command interface, which kept the aircraft in a racetrack holding pattern at the desired speeds with a 2 minute
turn rate at each end. Each leg of the pattern was 80 sec long allowing enough time for a sweep of 70 sec duration
with a low frequency of 0.5 rad/sec and a high frequency of 10 rad/sec. In hover, the aircraft was kept stationary and
the same duration and frequency parameters were used. The resulting closed-loop responses were then used to
calculate the return-difference response and the stability margins were extracted.
Table 4a shows the return-difference stability margins with the fully coupled APAFCS, where the loops were
broken at a, e, p, and c in Figure 2. Table 4b shows the full-authority design from Ref. [9], which largely met a
6dB and 45 deg design requirement. The return-difference Bode plot for all four axes are shown in Figure 12, where
the hover and 80 kts cases are plotted against the full-authority results from Ref. [9]. The preprogrammed sweep
maximum frequency was 10 rad/sec, so some gain margin results in the pedal and collective axes were beyond this
frequency, which are indicated as Not Available (N/A) or were indicated to be above a measured value. The partial-
authority sweeps differed from the full-authority sweeps in that they had a tapered magnitude to avoid excitation in
the high frequency. This effectively reduced the frequency where the coherence was above 0.6 of the partial authority
sweeps to less than 8 rad/sec.
1. Lateral Axis
The lateral axis results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 12a. The lateral axis had an electric trim actuator ahead
of the MMU, which had considerable high frequency output near 6 rad/sec that was suppressed by lowering the lateral
lead-pole, P, to the value shown in Table 3. This electric actuator characteristic limited how high the control crossover
frequency could be placed resulting in a crossover that was lower than where its full-authority counterpart was. Some
phase margin degradation was observed at 120kts, and required adjustment the APAFCS gains to recover an
acceptable phase margin. Overall, the lateral axis crossover-frequency behavior was largely recoverable in spite of the
electric actuator characteristic and linkage effects.
During testing, the partial-authority system lacked robustness in the lateral Flight Path Command loops (return-
difference at  in Figure 2). The design at hover had acceptable margins, but as the speed increased to 30 kts, the gain
margin deteriorated. For the full-authority system, this exhibited itself as a mild rocking-motion in roll at low speed.
However, on the partial-authority system, this became a much larger, marginally stable, roll oscillation at 25-30 kts.
The Flight Path Command loop had to be adjusted from its full-authority values to make it more robust to that off-
design flight condition. This design loop adjustment only affected the frequency range near 0.4 rad/sec, so it did not
significantly affect the 3-4 rad/sec frequency range of the return-difference for the entire control loop.

20
Table 4: Stability margins of the fully coupled system, a) Partial authority, and b) Full-authority (Ref. [9])
a) Partial-Authority b) Full-Authority Ref. [9]
Speed Axis GM GM PM PM GM GM PM PM
Kts dB rad/sec deg rad/sec dB rad/sec deg rad/sec
0 lat 6.4 9.0 55 3.1 7.3 9.5 56 4.2
40 lat 9.4 10 45 3.8 6.9 11 54 4.0
80 lat 9.1 11 43 3.1 7.4 10 49 3.3
120 lat 7.7 11 46 3.3 8.3 11 48 3.2
0 lon 9.5 6.9 44 2.4 11 7.8 46 2.5
40 lon 7.5 6.8 54 2.4 12 8.7 59 2.3
80 lon 7.9 6.8 47 2.3 10 8.4 52 2.3
120 lon 11 7.5 45 2.1 11 8.8 44 1.8
0 ped 8.9 5.7 31 2.9 >8.4 >10 50 3.8
40 ped 6.8 6.4 38 3.0 >9.5 10 58 3.4
80 ped 7.5 10 41 3.4 >10 >10 58 3.7
120 ped N/A N/A 49 3.7 >8.5 >10 55 4.1
0 col 8.6 4.8 58 1.9 >9.0 >10 64 2.0
40 col 7.3 3.3 55 1.2 21 6.8 63 1.2
80 col 7.6 2.6 43 1.1 21 9.3 52 1.1
120 col 11 3.0 52 1.0 17 4.2 45 1.0
2. Longitudinal Axis
The longitudinal axis results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 12b. This axis had a hydraulic trim actuator mounted
next to the MMU, which exhibited a first-order behavior that was expected in the Trim/SAS Complementary Filter in
Figure 6. Therefore, it was straightforward to select the lead pole value, P, in Table 3 to recover most of the full-
authority return difference behavior. The good agreement between the partial and full-authority results seen in Figure
12b shows how well the recovery worked.
As with the lateral axis, the partial-authority system lacked robustness in the longitudinal Flight Path Command
loop (return difference at  in Figure 2), but it was to a much lesser degree. The Flight Path Command loop was re-
tuned to increase robustness in that off-hover design flight condition.
3. Pedal Axis
The pedal axis results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 12c. As with the lateral axis, the pedal axis used the same
electric trim-actuator and it was mounted far ahead of the MMU. The actuator high-frequency output was suppressed
by lowering the pedal lead-pole, P, shown in Table 3. In addition, this axis had significant backlash due to the long
cable run to the tail rotor. This nonlinear effect degraded the control axis phase-margins compared to the full-authority
margins, which can be seen in Figure 12c. The phase plot shows a drop of 15-20 deg covering a broad frequency range
that cannot be overcome by simply lowering the crossover frequency. Furthermore, the electric servo high-frequency
output prevented any attempt to speed up the axis with lead. Because of these issues, it was concluded that meeting
the 45 deg phase-margin design criteria was not possible and the given margins would have to suffice. It should be
noted, during flight tests, the pilots did not express concerns about the yaw axis characteristics that could be attributed
to this lower phase margin.
4. Collective Axis
The collective axis results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 12d. The collective axis did not have a SAS servo, which
led to a significant phase drop-off at high frequency as compared to the full-authority results. In addition, there was
considerable coulomb friction effects that the servo-loop feedback was employed to minimize (see Trim Servo Loops
section). These combined effects required retuning of the collective axis inner-loop crossover behavior in hover to
recover acceptable phase and gain margins. Above 40 kts, the collective crossover was low enough that no retuning
from the full-authority design was required. However, the loss of high-frequency performance did profoundly affect
the gain margins of this loop at all speeds.

21
Figure 12: Partial-authority and full-authority broken-loop responses for all axes at hover and 80 kts.

22
C. Pre-Defined Maneuvers
The maneuver performance of the control system
was tested using several predefined patterns to
measure tracking performance. Previous flight testing
(ref. [9]) with full-authority system used these same
maneuvers, so a direct comparison to the partial-
authority system could be made. The performance
and actuator usage if these maneuvers will be
discussed later in the “Tracking Error and Actuator
Usage” section.
Three predefined maneuvers are shown in Figure
13. The box pattern in Figure 13a was a low-speed
maneuver to test all four axes of control. On start, the
aircraft faced out along the base of the pattern and
simultaneously moved right and turned 90 deg right
to align itself with path direction. After the first turn,
the aircraft started to rise to seven meters and, then
descended to make the second turn. After the third
turn, the aircraft returned to the start point, stopped,
and then performed a right and left side step. The
maximum speed of the maneuver was 25 kts (12.8
m/s) with a maximum acceleration of 1.5 kts/sec (0.75
m/sec2). The partial-authority system was able to
perform this maneuver without difficultly and no ride
quality issues were raised.
The Accel/Decel pattern in Figure 13b was
performed using the vector-command interface with a
time-based script. This pattern tested the worst-case
maneuvering expected from the RiskMinOFN
guidance, where sudden deceleration may be required
to avoid a collision with an obstacle. The pattern
started with an acceleration to 40 kts (20.5 m/sec)
followed by a deceleration to 15 kts (7.7 m/sec)
followed immediately by a 15 deg/sec right turn.
After the turn, the helicopter accelerated to 40 kts and
then decelerated to 15 kts followed by an immediate
left turn. After the turn, one more acceleration and
deceleration were performed before coming to a stop.
This maneuver was performed at 1.5 kts/sec (0.75
m/sec2) acceleration, which was typically used for
general maneuvering, and at 3.0 kts/sec (1.50 m/sec2)
acceleration, which was required for the Obstacle
Field Navigation. At the higher acceleration, the pitch
trim servo-rate approached the limit, but did not
exceed it. Moreover, the pitch angles did not fall
below -15 deg or rise above 25 deg. Figure 13: Commanded and measured path of a)
The turn-climb maneuver in Figure 13c was flown Box pattern at 25 kts, b) Accel/Decel maneuver at
at 116 kts (60 m/s) ground speed. The slight reduction 1.5 m/sec2, and c) Turn-climb maneuver at 60 m/s
in ground speed from 120 kts (61.7 m/s) was chosen (116kts).
to account for winds that could have caused the
aircraft to exceed a 130 kts (66.9 m/s) airspeed limit
for the system. This pattern was performed using the
vector-command interface with a time-based script,
and was used to check the expected flight envelope at

23
speeds between 40 and 120 kts at 20 kt intervals. The pattern started in hover, accelerated to pattern speed, and
immediately turned right 180 deg. After the turn, the path climbed, and then turned left 180 deg, followed by a descent.
After the descent, a left and right reversal was performed at the same bank angles of the previous two turns. After
completing the reversal, the same sequence was repeated at steeper bank angles and glide slopes expanding the flight
envelope.
The commanded maximum values for the speed, turn rate, and glide slope are shown in Table 5, where the first
row at each speed are for the first turn-climb and the second are for the second turn-climb. The bank and vertical rates
are the estimated maximum values assuming perfect trim flight through each commanded velocity.
The aircraft was able to perform the maneuver and only came close to saturation when doing the last roll reversal
at the higher speeds. There was more roll overshoot than the full-authority at the higher speeds, but the wind conditions
were higher for the partial-authority runs compared to the full-authority runs, so it was unclear if this was a factor
Other test maneuvers performed included hover, low-airspeed, and forward-flight Mission Task Elements (MTE)
from the manned rotorcraft handling-qualities specification, ADS-33E-PRF [21]. The MTE maneuvers required
different levels of aggressiveness from the APAFCS, which were set by the system operator by running scripts before
each task. The tasks flown are summarized in Table 6 and ranged in speed from hover to 100 kts. Due to operational
testing constraints, some task parameters were altered and these changes are indicated in square brackets in the table.
The second-to-last column gives qualitative comments on the task performance using this system. The last column
shows the results from the full-authority runs for comparison.
In the specification, the MTEs are qualitative measures because, in that specification, pilots are asked to fly the
maneuvers to performance standards and provide handling qualities ratings as an assessment. This qualitative
assessment is based on concepts such as controllability, workload, and compensation, and is related to how the pilot
interacts with the control system. In autonomous systems, this assessment does not apply. The pilot, however, can
assess the ride quality, and stick motions (on a back
driven stick) related how they would have flown the Table 5: Commanded speed, turn rate, and glide
maneuver, which provides valuable insight on how slope for the Turn-Climb maneuver. The first row at
well the autonomy is working. Also, because the each speed corresponds to the first set of turns and
maneuvers should be repeatable for an autonomous climbs and the second row are the values associated
systems, this “qualitative” assessment becomes a with the following set of turns and climbs. The last
“quantitative” assessment in that there are measurable columns are the approximate resulting bank angle
thresholds defining the maneuver, and this, coupled and vertical rate.
with tracking and actuator measurements, provide a
Turn Glide Bank Vert
quantitative way to compare two systems flying the
same maneuver. This assessment is made later in the Speed Rate Slope Angle Rate
“Tracking Error and Actuator Usage” section, |  |max |G|max ||max | h |max
comparing partial-authority to full-authority (Kts) (deg/sec (deg) (deg) (fpm)
performance. 18 9.00 12.0 9.48 421
13.5 15.0 14.3 524
It should be mentioned that some of the quantitative
28 9.00 8.00 14.3 423
metrics from the ADS-33 were measured for the full-
authority Attitude Command portion in Figure 2. The 13.5 11.0 21.7 580
small-amplitude bandwidth and moderate-amplitude 40 9.00 6.00 19.2 423
attitude quickness were checked in analysis to ensure 13.5 8.00 29.6 564
the responses were consistent with a Level-1 system in 60 6.00 4.50 19.2 477
pitch and roll and Level-2 in yaw for the “all other 9.00 6.00 29.6 635
MTE” requirements. As mentioned previously in the 80 4.50 3.75 19.2 530
“Inner-Loop Control” section, the decouple-couple 6.75 5.00 29.6 706
feature was implemented on the full-authority system, 100 3.60 3.33 19.2 589
but was not fully implemented for this test. This meant
5.40 4.50 29.2 797
the manual flying of the attitude command portion
120 3.00 3.00 19.2 636
would not be possible, so no analysis of this response
was done for the partial-authority system. 4.50 4.00 29.6 859

24
Table 6: Summary of Autonomously flown ADS-33E MTE maneuvers.
Task (ADS- Task Description Partial-Authority Full-Authority, Ref. [9]
33E No.)
Hover, GVE, On reaching 6-10 kts on a path 45 Desired: The Task was easily Cargo/Utility GVE Desired. The
Cargo/Utility deg off the nose, stop and hold met. Position regulation was acceleration and deceleration of the
(3.11.1) position in 5 sec, while maintaining well behaved. aircraft was smooth and provided a
altitude (+/-2 ft), heading( +/-5 deg), good ride quality. Position hold was
and final position (+/- 3 ft) within overall very effective in light to
bounds. [No hover target was used]. moderate winds.
Hovering Turn 180 deg in 15 sec and Desired: The task could be Cargo/Utility GVE Desired. Onset of
Turn, GVE, maintain position, while maintaining performed to desired the yaw rate was not overly
Cargo/Utility altitude (+/-3 ft), final heading (+/-5 performance, but in light winds. aggressive and gave a smooth
(3.11.4) deg), and position (+/- 3 ft) within The turn behavior was good execution. Heading capture was
bounds. despite the yaw axis having a precise with no perceptible
31 deg phase margin. overshoot.
Vertical Bob-up 15 ft for 2 sec and descend Adequate: The lack of a SAS in Cargo/Utility GVE Desired. The task
Maneuver, to starting altitude in 13 sec, while the collective and non-linearities met the “DVE desired” requirements
GVE, maintaining start/finish altitude (+/-3 in the collective axis made with a smooth and comfortable
Cargo/Utility ft), heading( +/-5 deg), and position “Desired” result difficult to vertical acceleration with no
(3.11.6) (+/-3 ft) within bounds. achieve. The collective axis excessive altitude overshoot in
could easily encounter limit either direction. Position
cycling, but would eventually maintenance was good with minimal
fade out. aircraft drift.
Lateral Laterally reposition 400 ft in 18 sec Desired: This was achievable Cargo/Utility GVE Desired. The roll
Reposition, while maintaining altitude (+/-10 ft), with partial-authority. This rates and bank angles achieved for
GVE, heading (+/-10 deg), and maneuver did not require the asymmetric acceleration and
Cargo/Utility longitudinal position (+/-10 ft) within repeated reversals in roll, so, deceleration were reasonable and
(3.11.8) bounds. the trim and SAS limits were not similar to those used for a piloted
a factor as in the Slalom MTE. maneuver.
Depart/Abort, Accelerate and decelerate to Desired: This task was Cargo/Utility GVE Desired.
GVE, position not to exceed 800 ft, but achievable in low-wind Performance was achieved with
Cargo/Utility within 20 ft, in 25 sec while conditions, but under high-wind pitch rates and attitudes
(3.11.7) maintaining altitude below 50 ft [+/- conditions, the trim actuator rate commanded that were comfortable.
15 ft], heading( +/-10 deg), and may be insufficient and the SAS Ride quality was generally smooth
lateral track (+/-10 ft) within bounds. authority too small. during the maneuver
Slalom, GVE At 60 kts, perform smooth turns Adequate: The task could be GVE Desired. The aircraft ride
(3.11.9) around 5 markers offset 50 ft from flown at 50 Kts. At 60 kts, the quality was very good and the
centerline at 500 ft intervals. Do not slow lateral trim-rate and limited commanded roll inputs were at
exceed 100 ft off the centerline. SAS authority prevented quickly times smoother than piloted inputs
enough lateral reversal on the for the same task.
last gate. In addition, the pitch
trim-rate was a limiting factor in
pitch control during roll reversals
between gates.
Pseudo ILS Intercept localizer at 8 [2] mi on 45 Desired: Task performance was Desired. The approach performance
Approach [60] deg intercept at 120 kts. easily met. This was a benign was similar to a piloted maneuver
(3.11.21) Decelerate to 90 kts on a glide- task for the partial-authority and achieved “Desired” standards.
slope (3 deg) intercept, while system. There was some overshoot on the
maintaining speed (+/- 5 kts), glide localizer capture, but it did not feel
slope (1 dot), localizer (1 dot), and any worse than if a pilot were flying
altitude at intercept (+/-100 ft) in it.
bounds. [No ILS equipment used]
Decelerating In a 4 deg glide slope at 100 kts, Desired: The task could be met, Desired. Easily met the “Desired”
Approach decelerate to 25 kts to an altitude of although the slow collective performance requirements. The
(3.11.20) 50 [200] ft, while maintaining glide- response could make regulating control activity was relatively
slope (+/-12.5 ft), localizer (+/-50 ft), the height more difficult if the smooth.
and reference speed (+/-5 kts) required deceleration was any
within bounds. higher.

25
The Hover, Hover Turn, and Lateral Reposition task
were met without difficulty. The ILS and Decelerating
Approach tasks were also easily met even with the
reduced performance in the collective axis. The Depart
Abort task was achievable, but came very close to trim-
rate saturation. Heading into or away from winds of
approximately 15 kts determined whether the trim-rate
saturations would occur. Therefore, this maneuver was
achievable, but had little margin for variable wind
conditions.
The two tasks in which the partial-authority control
system could not meet desired standards were the
Vertical Maneuver task and the Slalom task. The Vertical
Maneuver task was limited by the slow rate of the
collective trim servo. This, coupled with the presence of
non-linearities, made the heave axis susceptible to limit
cycling. The control law could damp out the limit
cycling, but not quickly enough to achieve the desired
performance standards. It was also difficult to meet the
Slalom task performance standards given the limited rate
capability of the lateral trim servo. At 60 kts, the lateral
reversal through the last gate was not fast enough,
because it required a higher lateral rate than the servo
could deliver. The longitudinal rate limit also came close
to inhibiting the attainment of the desired performance.
With so little margin, the direction of the winds, or
higher longitudinal accelerations during the maneuver,
could saturate the longitudinal servo rate.
The Slalom task was easily flown at 50 kts, which
was adequate performance. Figure 14 shows the Slalom
task at 50 kts for both the partial-authority system and
the full-authority system. The partial-authority system
could not regulate the height as tightly as the full-
authority system, which was a limitation of not having a
SAS servo in collective. The lateral, longitudinal, pedal,
and collective values in the plot are the total control
inputs. For the partial-authority system, these are the
summed trim-servo and SAS positions. The last four
charts in the figure are the partial-authority trim servo
rates and the SAS servo positions. Both lateral and
longitudinal rate limiting occurred for a short moment,
but not long enough to prevent completion of the Figure 14: Slalom task at 50 kts, partial authority
maneuver. At 60 kts, these saturations prevented the compared to full-authority.
completion of the maneuver to the desired standards. The
pedal trim rate and SAS position approached their limit, so this axis would also need more trim and SAS authority to
perform the maneuver to the desired standards under all loading conditions and wind conditions. The collective axis
does not have a SAS actuator, so only trim servo rate response is shown in the plot.
D. Autonomous Maneuvering
Extensive integration testing of RiskMinOFN was performed at Felker Army Airfield. The system was directed to
navigate around the heavily restricted airspace avoiding preprogrammed no-fly zones using the Cruise, Terrain, and
Approach modes. Unprepared landing zones and obstacles such as radio towers and cranes were used to test the range
sensor integration.

26
Initial integration testing to the MAA system began with flights where the APAFCS was engaged in idle mode.
These flights confirmed functionality of all MAA system’s communications and displays with the pilot flying the
production EH-60L SAS/FPS flight controls. Both the RiskMinOFN and SLAD functionality with the LADAR were
also tested without being concerned about APAFCS stability. When satisfied with the results of these manually piloted
checkout flights, the system was engaged coupled in fully-autonomous mode and the previously run idle-mode tests
were repeated.
Once this local integration testing was completed, flight tests were conducted in mountainous terrain with
unprepared landing sites. This testing occurred 320 mi west of Fort Eustis at Camp Dawson and was composed of a
series of shorter missions summarized in Table 7. Significant events related to RiskMinOFN operations are described
for each data records in the table.
Table 7: A summary of RiskMinOFN runs totaling 112 km (70 mi) of autonomous flight over 59 minutes (Camp
Dawson, WV, 25 September 2019).
Run # LZ/WP Name Description of events Duration (s) Distance (km)
003 LZ-11 Volk Cruise mode flight to LZ via waypoint 91 820 36.7
004 LZ-10 Vance Climb to plateau LZ 230 5.6
005 LZ-02 Bowmar Climb to ridge LZ 271 6.3
007 LZ-09 Quigley Descend to plateau LZ 253 5.6
008 LZ-03 Calvert Hillside LZ 228 3.8
010 LZ-12 Whitehair Climb to ridge LZ 359 6.9
011 LZ-02 Bowmar Lateral additive input: follow ridge to L LZ 252 6.7
012 LZ-09 Quigley Redirect to LZ-10: descend to plateau LZ 306 6.3
013 WP-20 Morgantown Go-Around following by Cruise mode flight 790 34.0

Each run in the table represents a short mission with several phases that followed a general pattern of initialization
and monitoring by the Evaluation Pilot (EP). Each mission began in a hover with RiskMinOFN in Approach mode.
The mission then proceeded through the following phases:
Takeoff: Starting in a hover at 30 to 90 meters AGL, the EP initiated the maneuver by selecting an OFN Destination
from the map display (Figure 10c).
Enroute: The EP selection caused the Mission Manager to run the corresponding mission script, triggering
autonomous flight toward the desired destination under control of RiskMinOFN.
Approach: Upon arriving within 1500 m of the desired LZ, the Mission Manager commanded RiskMinOFN to
switch to approach mode, which had reduced speed and aggressiveness. Upon arriving within 1000 m of the
commanded LZ, the Mission Manager commanded SLAD to collect data on the LZ and search for a solution. Once
SLAD found a solution, it sent the landing points and mask to the map display, whereupon the EP selected a point
using the SLAD LZ toggle button on the collective grip (Figure 10a). SLAD solutions arrived periodically at
approximately 5 sec intervals.
Landing: The LZ selection sent the landing point with a 20 m AGL to RiskMinOFN, which then guided the aircraft
down to that point. When the aircraft neared the LZ, a signal was then sent to SLAD to take control and bring the
aircraft to the final position, and hover at 7.6 m AGL (25ft). At this point, the landing sequence was automatically
initiated, which brought the aircraft to the ground in a hover-down landing.
At any time, the EP could abort the mission using the STOP or GO-ARND buttons (Figure 10c). During Enroute,
Approach, and Landing phases, the EP could reroute to a different OFN Destination (Figure 10c). During Enroute
only, the EP could apply OFN Additive commands (Figure 10a) and bias the path of the autonomous flight, switch
the OFN Mode (Figure 10c), or direct OFN to speed up or down (Figure 10c). If no landing point was selected, OFN
would direct the helicopter to hover at 50 m AGL above the center of the LZ.
1. Maneuvers commanded by Obstacle Field Navigation
To illustrate the RiskMinOFN capabilities some of the missions outlined in Table 7 in are discussed in detail.

27
Cruise Mode Departing Base, Run #003
Referring to Figure 15a, the mission was started at Morgantown airfield (WP-20) and was commanded through
WP 91 to Dawson Airfield (LZ-11) in a river valley. Predominately in Cruise mode, the run featured an autonomous
landing-zone approach and presented runway-landing points to the EP. As Figure 15b shows, the aircraft overflew
two ridges at 28 km and 4 km from the destination, maneuvering both horizontally and vertically for the first ridge
crossing and vertically for the second. The altitude generally held to about 200 m AGL, with the closest approach to
the terrain of 62 m above the crest of the first ridge crossing.
Figure 16 shows the ground speed profile with a clear
reaction to OFN speed limit changes. Near the end of the run
(event E) the control tower called and asked the pilots not to
land in the field near the north end of the runway as originally
planned due to airfield operational concerns. As a result, the
safety pilot disengaged the system and landed manually
towards the south end of the runway. Pitch and roll angles
remained well within bounds throughout the flight; a
maximum roll angle of 19 degrees occurred briefly during the
first ridge crossing, accompanied with the maximum climb
rate of over 6.0 m/s (1181 fpm). A more typical maximum
roll angle of 15 degrees was evident in the turn toward final
approach near WP-91. In the final approach, a maximum
pitch angle of 13 degrees occurred. As in most of the runs,
the collective control mostly stayed lower than hover trim
value, apart from the first ridge crossing. It hit its minimum
(near the auto-rotation boundary) at the time when OFN
transitioned from Cruise to Terrain mode (event C). This
resulted from a fast deceleration combined with descending
flight while flying near the most efficient airspeed.

Figure 15: a) Plan view of flight records #003 (blue) and #013 (magenta). Distance between WP-20 and WP-11
was 34 km. On the flight out, record #003, began at Morgantown (WP 20), and proceeded through WP-91 to
the landing zone at LZ-11. The return flight (#013) began at LZ-10 and proceeded west-northwest in direction
command mode (go-around) for approximately 10 km. The EP rerouted to fly to WP-20. b) Altitude profile
and ground level for flight record #003 (top), altitude above ground level (middle), and vertical rate (bottom)
as functions of distance to destination. c) Altitude profile and ground level for flight record #013.

28
Figure 16: Time history of departure from Figure 17: Time history of return to Morgantown
Morgantown to LZ-11 (#003). Important EP from LZ-10 (#013). Important EP events: A) Began
events: A) Automatic switch to “Terrain” mode – flight with “GO ARND” button and OFN in
about a minute later the pilot switched it back to “Terrain” mode, B) Pilot puts OFN into “Cruise”
“Cruise” mode, B) OFN-commanded terrain mode, C) Pilot manually sets speed limit down to
avoidance maneuver while crossing a ridge, C) 41.2 m/s, then gradually clicks it back up to 51.4
Automatic switch to “Terrain” mode in advance of m/s D) Pilot selects destination to WP-20 and the
landing approach, D) Automatic switch to OFN speed was automatically set to 56.6 m/s, E)
“Approach” mode, ands E) Safety pilot disengage Pilot entered command to increase speed to 59.1
and piloted landing. m/s, but OFN limited speed according to sensor
range and acceleration capability, and F)
disengage and piloted landing.

29
Cruise Mode Returning to Base, Run #013
This mission started with a GO-AROUND command near WP-10 (Figure 15a), which put OFN into Terrain mode,
while maintaining a west-northwest direction. In this direction-command mode, the goal was constantly placed out of
reach of the array in a fixed direction, causing the helicopter to seek a constant direction while avoiding obstacles for
an indefinite period. The aircraft proceeded toward WP-20, where it came to a hover. At the end, the safety pilot
executed a planned disengage for the end-of-mission, and manually landed the aircraft.
Figure 15c shows the terrain avoidance was primarily in the vertical direction and height above ground level, while
enroute was generally between 200 and 300 m. Figure 17 shows the time histories of several state variables over the
return flight. To test pilot interaction with the guidance, the evaluation pilot changed the OFN speed limit several
times, including setting the speed limit higher than the safe speed given sensor range and acceleration limits. OFN
reacted quickly to the speed limit changes, and limited the speed to a maximum of 59.9 m/s even when the speed limit
was set higher. This was expected because the pilot was allowed to request to fly at a speed faster than OFN could
safely command given the sensor range, but the algorithm was designed not to exceed the maximum safe speed. At
event B, the EP put OFN into Cruise mode. OFN reacted by executing a couple of quick roll angle changes and rapid
climbs, with a maximum angular rate of 12 degrees per second. This lack of smoothness was unnecessary in the
situation and considered undesirable. After event E when the EP set the OFN speed limit up to its maximum, the speed
wavered between 56 and 59 m/s, resulting in unnecessary pitch activity. This was due to the sensor nodding up and
down creating a non-spherical boundary between known-empty space and unknown space with variable distance from
the helicopter depending on where the sensor was in the nod cycle at the time the re-plan was executed. To avoid this
wavering, the OFN speed limit was generally chosen slightly lower than the maximum possible speed.
Unmodified Terrain-Mode Mission, Run #007
This mission represented a typical flight, in which the EP did not modify the autonomous flight plan enroute.
Figure 18 shows the plan view of the terrain mode flight-paths (Figure 18a) along with plots of vertical motion for
runs #007 (Figure 18b), #011 (Figure 18c), and #012 (Figure 18d). A typical MAA run began with a departure from
hover, where RiskMinOFN captured the current heading and used this as the direction-command for 30 seconds in
the current mode, which was typically Approach mode. RiskMinOFN then switched to Terrain mode for an additional
30 seconds. At this point, the Mission Manager commanded RiskMinOFN towards the desired LZ. Once the aircraft
arrived within 1.5 km of the LZ, the approach and landing began.
In Figure 18a, the map shows the path initially taken by the direction-command that departed from LZ-03, and
then turned to head toward LZ-09. This behavior was representative of the transition from takeoff to enroute mode.
The vertical motion plotted in Figure 18b shows the typical parabolic form of takeoff and landing due to maximizing
vertical speed limits combined with maximizing horizontal acceleration limits. Height above ground level was higher
than normal because the flight path passed over a river valley. Figure 19 shows selected variables for this run. The
speed vs time plot shows a profile that was close to the ideal trapezoid form generated by maximizing horizontal
acceleration and speed limits. The acceleration and angular- rate time histories had limited activity, with peak angular
rate at 6.0 deg/sec, well under the limit of 15 deg/sec. Roll attitude showed the expected value of a few degrees left-
wheel-down when in hover, and otherwise was close to zero except for the turn towards LZ-09. Pitch was generally
negative during the takeoff, close to zero when flying at cruising speed, and positive for the approach. Collective trim
dropped through the flight due to translational lift, and gradually climbed back up to the hover trim value.
Mission with Pilot Additive Input, Run #011
The EP exercised the lateral additive feature directing the helicopter to fly on both sides of the ridgeline during
this run. The flight path is shown in Figure 18a, starting at LZ-12 and flying towards LZ-02. The pilot entered different
additive commands near the beginning of the run, resulting in a curved flight path. This pilot input is shown in Figure
20 in the Lateral Additive chart at the bottom, where the roll-angle time history correlates with the entry of the additive
input. The acceleration transient at 140 seconds appeared to be a gust response, since it was not accompanied either
by roll or pitch changes, only collective changes. This run demonstrated the response of OFN to lateral additive pilot
input could follow the commanded direction bias while still avoiding terrain. Since this additive input was on the
outermost loop of the control architecture, the response took several seconds to register a change to the aircraft attitude.
Mission with Diversion to an Alternate LZ, Run #012
In this run, the pilot exercised the redirection feature to command the helicopter to reroute from the first landing
destination and land at a different landing zone. This simulated the situation where an LZ at an unprepared site was

30
identified prior to the flight, but on getting a closer view, the pilot realized it was not safe for landing and needed to
go to an alternate LZ. Figure 18a shows the flight path of this record, which starts at LZ-02 and heads initially to LZ-
09, but redirects to LZ-10. The plot of vertical motion in Figure 18d shows the AGL height reached a minimum at
1200 m from the destination, followed by another minimum at the destination. Figure 21 shows the time histories for
this run, and has one event labeled A, where the OFN destination was switched from LZ-09 to LZ-10. The figure
shows the reaction of the aircraft to the redirection; the helicopter increased altitude and speed moderately then
executed an approach to the new LZ.

Figure 18: a) Plan view of flight records #004 to LZ-10 (blue), #005 to LZ-2 (magenta), #007 to LZ-9 (red), #008
to LZ-3 (orange), #010 to LZ-12 (yellow), #011 to LZ-2 (green), and #012 to LZ-10 (cyan). b) Destination set to
LZ-09 from LZ-03 (run #007). c) Destination set to LZ-02 from LZ-12 (run #011). d) Destination set to LZ-09
from LZ-02, then redirected to LZ-10 (run #012).

31
Figure 19: Run #007 is a typical MAA profile
departing LZ-03 to LZ-09 with no pilot
interaction enroute.

Figure 20: Run #011 is a MAA profile with


Lateral Additive input from the EP. The lateral
additive input is non-dimensional, where -1 is full
command left and +1 is full command right.

32
guidance control to the algorithm, it was able to move
to 25 ft AGL over the desired landing point and
complete the landing several times, thus successfully
validating the integrations.
An incipient failure of the LADAR appeared near
the end of flight-testing at Felker Field and at Camp
Dawson. This failure was intermittent and could
reduce the accuracy of the LADAR for SLAD, but not
enough to degrade the performance of the OFN
algorithm. Nonetheless, enough landing zones at
Camp Dawson were scanned without this failure to
further validate the integration of the LADAR with the
SLAD algorithm in more rugged terrain.
An interesting example of one such result is shown
in Figure 22. This figure is the final landing result from
the SLAD approach to LZ-03 Calvert shown in the
MAA map/ICE display in Figure 5. On the left side of
Figure 22 is a photo of the landing zone with a road
running along two sides of a large field surrounded by
tall trees. On the right side of Figure 22 is the landing
mask solution. A light arrow shows the direction of the
photo view and a blue arrow shows the direction from
which the aircraft approached the landing zone. The
field had some small dirt piles, which caused the
yellow regions on the mask indicative of an area with
smaller obstacles that could be potentially unsafe.
There was a small uneven area with an unacceptably
high slope (>4 deg) causing it to be declared unsafe
(red) in the center of the field. There was pole along
the road with a thin wire stretched across the field to
another pole. This wire was too fine for the LADAR
to detect, but the reader is reminded this LADAR is
only a surrogate test sensor to validate of the
integration of the MAA system. Nonetheless, the
algorithm presented acceptable landing points to the
EP from which one was highlighted and selected.
3. Autonomous Landings
Figure 23a shows a time history of the final
approach and landing at the Felker Field Combat Sod
Figure 21: Run #012 is a MAA profile with an EP landing zone. The RiskMinOFN algorithm directed
reroute to an alternate LZ. The aircraft departed the aircraft near to the final landing point, after which
LZ-02, and then initially descended to LZ-9 it came to a stop at 380 sec into the run. At that time,
followed by a reroute and final descent to LZ-10. the SLAD process directed the aircraft over the
Event A is the time that the pilot changed the OFN landing point using a series of waypoint commands.
destination to LZ-10. Once over the desired point, the landing sequence
commenced. The aircraft descended at 100 fmp
2. Safe Landing Area Determination (0.5m/s). When the rear wheel touched the ground the
control loops opened up and the collective continued
Several approaches to landing zones were lowering until the left main wheel touched the ground.
completed to test the integration of the LADAR with The collective continued its descent until the landing
the SLAD algorithm at Felker Army Airfield. Under sequence completed. During the landing, the lateral
OFN approach guidance, the algorithm presented motions were kept within 0.50 kts (0.25m/s). The
recommended landing points to the EP from which landing was tested at several orientations with respect
one was highlighted and selected. Once OFN handed to the wind at 10-15kts and to the ground contour.

33
Figure 22: A SLAD landing solution at LZ-03 Calvert, Camp Dawson, WV.

Figure 23: Autonomous approach and landing


E. Tracking Error and Actuator Usage
Quantitative performance of the system for specific maneuvers is shown in Figure 24, where low-speed maneuvers
are shown in Figure 24a. The higher speed maneuvers are shown in Figure 24b, and they are grouped together to
represent maneuvering typical of that during autonomous flight. That is, flying towards a destination with
maneuvering around terrain features and making shallow approaches to an unprepared landing site.
The RMS path error and heading error are shown in the first four rows for both the partial-authority and full-
authority systems, where the translational results are in percent of a rotor diameter. In forward flight, the path error is
defined in a rotating coordinate system aligned with the desired path. The coordinate system is aligned with the tangent
of the desired path, where the direction component (D) is along the path, the normal component (N) is normal to the
path in the vertical direction, and the horizontal (H) component is in the horizontal plane perpendicular to the N-D
plane. The orientation of the coordinate system is determined by the commanded flight-path and the heading angle.
In forward flight, the origin of the coordinate system is placed on the path, the shortest distance from the aircraft to

34
the path, thus, by definition the D component is zero. In hover, the origin is placed at the commanded position, so the
directional error (D Err) is in the fore-aft direction, the horizontal error (H Err) is in the left-right direction, and the
normal error (N Err) is in the vertical direction all relative to the commanded hover point. For maneuvers that are a
mix of forward motion and hover, the distance error is only that portion of the maneuver where the commanded speed
is zero. The heading (A) error is the difference between the commanded and actual heading.

Figure 24: Tracking error and actuator usage for a) low-speed maneuvers and b) forward flight maneuvers

35
The total commanded actuation standard deviation for the lateral, longitudinal, pedal, and collective axes are
shown in the next four charts in percent of command available. For the partial-authority system, these are the sum of
the trim servo and SAS command. The last four charts are the lateral, longitudinal, pedal, and collective trim actuator
rates and the SAS position standard deviations in percent of maximum available. These charts show how close the
trim-servos rates and SAS positions were to their limits. For a second-order process, three times the standard deviation
is a reasonable predictor of when an actuator might hit a trim-rate limit or SAS position limit.
In the ideal case, the first eight charts should have no difference between the partial-authority and full-authority
cases, because the objective was to mimic the full-authority actuation with a combination of partial-authority actuation.
Due to the numerous nonlinear differences between the systems, this would not likely occur, and the greatest
disparities would occur when the PA mixing stopped mimicking the full-authority behavior, say, for instance, when
the trim servos saturated in rate.
For the hover/low-speed maneuvers in Figure 24a,
the performance between the partial and full-authority
systems was comparable for the most of the maneuvers.
The Vertical Maneuver task had the largest disparity in
the normal error, since the collective axis had no SAS to
offload the trim servo. The partial-authority total
actuator activity was generally larger, but for the most
part the partial-authority system performed comparably
to the full-authority system for the achievable
maneuvers. The Depart Abort task, Lateral Reposition
task, and Accel/Decel maneuver tended to push the pitch
and roll trim servo-rates near their limits. Recall the
break frequency of the PA mixing was set at 1.5 rad/sec
for pitch and 2.0 rad/sec for roll (Table 1), which was
reflected in the resulting standard deviations of the trim
rates versus the SAS position. That is, the SAS position
was lower than the trim rate because the break frequency
was larger than unity. Further tuning of these break
frequencies could have been done to balance the activity,
however, some maneuvers, such as the Depart Abort
were using both trim and SAS near 33 percent, so there
was very little that could be done other than improve the
actuators themselves. The pedal had the break frequency
set at 1.25 rad/sec, so the distribution between trim rate
and SAS position is more even. However, the pedal
trim-rate and SAS position usage did not have a lot of
margin away from the 33 percent value, particularly for
the Lateral Reposition maneuver.
The maneuvers in Figure 24b, are more
representative of those flown during autonomous flight.
The ADS-33 ILS and Decelerating Approach tasks were
similar to the OFN approach. However, the OFN
approach had more collective activity because it varied
the speed and glide slope more on approach than when
the APAFCS performed the ADS-33 approach
maneuvers. The OFN terrain and cruise maneuvers used
very little of the lateral and pedal trim servo rate and SAS
position. The pitch axis had more usage due to the
regulation of the speed along the flight path.
Figure 25 shows the results from the constant speed
Turn-Climb maneuver at different speeds. Again, the
partial-authority system performed as well as the full- Figure 25: Tracking error and actuator usage versus
authority system in the tracking error. At the highest airspeed.

36
speeds, the horizontal error was about 75 percent of a rotor diameter and the normal error was approximately 15
percent of a rotor diameter. The total actuator usage was higher for the low-speed maneuvering, but was nearly the
same at the higher speeds. The collective trim servo had higher activity at the higher speeds as it had to compensate
for not having a SAS actuator. The partial-authority lateral and pedal usage was relatively low, but the longitudinal
usage approached 30 percent in the low speed.
Overall, partial-authority trim rate and SAS position usage data support what was seen in the “Pre-Defined
Maneuvers” section. The longitudinal and lateral trim servos needed more rate capability. The collective axis appeared
adequate without the SAS to augment its performance, but higher speed flight and OFN approaches put more demand
on the collective servo. Furthermore, this test was conducted with a lightly loaded aircraft, so it is very likely the
collective would need more trim rate capability and SAS augmentation on a heavily loaded aircraft. Under flight
conditions with higher power usage, above 90 percent, the collective could get into occasional short-term limit cycles
aggravated by the coulomb friction effects. The pedal axis was also close to using all its trim servo and SAS actuator
capability for the low-speed maneuvers, so it too may need a trim and SAS servo with more capability. Finally, the
pedal and collective trim-rate experienced considerably more noise than the other axes because of inherent limit
cycling that occurred due to backlash and coulomb friction non-linearities. Eliminating these nonlinear effects would
greatly reduce the duty cycle on these actuators.

VIII. Conclusions
An autonomous guidance and flight control system previously tested on a full-authority helicopter was adapted,
integrated, and flight-tested on a partial-authority Black Hawk helicopter. The autonomy components consist of a
Mission Manager, Risk Minimizing Obstacle Field Navigation (RiskMinOFN) algorithm, Safe Landing Area
Determination (SLAD) algorithm, Integrated Cueing Environment (ICE), and Autonomous Partial-Authority FCS
(APAFCS). The system was able to maneuver through mountainous terrain avoiding obstacles using the RiskMinOFN
reactive planner with a LADAR sensor. At the landing zone, the Safe Landing Area Determination algorithm scanned
the landing site and presented the pilot with a choice of possible landing zones. When one of these sites was selected,
the control law safely maneuvered the helicopter over the position and autonomously landed. Overall, the partial-
authority mixing was effective in distributing the control commands between the trim servos and SAS actuators. The
partial-authority system could match most of the full-authority performance, and did so using a Black Hawk helicopter
equipped with actuation hardware from the current US military fleet. Specific conclusions from the work follow:
1. The partial-authority mixing method to combine the trim servos with the SAS servos was effective. The
hydraulic trim servo in pitch had first-order behavior, and could be more easily mixed with the SAS servo to
recover the linear full-authority return-difference frequency response and associated stability margins. The electric
trim servos in the roll and pedal axes had higher frequency response characteristics that limited adjustment of the
partial-authority mixing to recover the full-authority linearized stability margins. However, an adequate set of
mixing gains was found to handle these characteristics.
2. System performance was significantly affected by hardware non-linearities such as tail rotor linkage/cable
backlash and coulomb friction effects in the collective. In addition, the lack of a SAS in the collective axis limited
system performance. Adjustments to the control law were made to mitigate most, but not all, of these limitations.
However, the remaining limitations did not prevent the partial-authority system from being able to recover most
of the full-authority performance.
3. Most of the hover/low-speed ADS-33 Mission Task Elements originally tested on the full-authority system
could be performed to desired standards with the partial-authority system using the existing EH-60L actuation
with an added collective trim actuator. Lack of a collective axis SAS prevented meeting the desired Vertical
Maneuver task performance standards. Likewise, limited roll trim actuator rate prevented meeting the Slalom task
to desired standards, although the adequate levels of performance were easily achieved in both cases. Although
tasks such as the Depart Abort and Lateral Reposition were achievable to the desired level, there appeared to be
little margin remaining to handle a heavily loaded aircraft and/or higher wind conditions. At the lower speeds, trim
rate and SAS position standard deviations were near or above 33 percent of available authority for the lateral,
longitudinal, and pedal axes for the more aggressive maneuvers.
4. Higher speed approach tasks previously flown on the full-authority system were easily repeated on the partial-
authority system with similar performance. Trim rate and SAS position standard deviations were mostly less than
20 percent of available authority in all attitude axes. Collective activity was higher for the partial-authority system
compared to full-authority at the highest speeds and when performing OFN approaches.

37
5. The evaluation method of using the test maneuvers with quantitative metrics to compare partial-authority and
full-authority performance was effective for these autonomous systems. For autonomous aircraft, the role of the
evaluation pilot changes to observing how effectively the autonomy flies the aircraft from the classic manual
handling qualities evaluation of how well the pilot could fly the aircraft. Therefore, precise quantifiable tasks and
performance metrics will be needed to ensure future autonomous rotorcraft can perform the mission to which they
are designed.
6. The Mission Adaptive Autonomy (MAA) software was successfully integrated with the Integrated Cuing
Environment (ICE) to provide the pilots with situational awareness of the autonomy’s intention. The pilot was able
to interact with the autonomy and monitor the system in short missions scenarios executed through the Mission
Manager, which tested the basic elements of the mission controls.
7. The RiskMinOFN algorithm successfully guided the partial-authority aircraft over 112 km (70 mi) of hilly
terrain and ridges, detecting and avoiding terrain. It showed a high level of integration with the SLAD algorithm,
bringing the helicopter to a destination landing point in constrained and cluttered terrain. Compared to the previous
flights on the full-authority FBW system, some speed and acceleration limits were reduced, but this reduction did
not affect the ability to complete the missions. The maximum angular rates and collective rates, both indicators of
smoothness, were reduced in comparison to previous flights with full-authority control.
8. The partial-authority system functioned well with the SLAD system, which was modified to take control of the
aircraft after the RiskMinOFN algorithm reached the landing zone. After this hand off, the SLAD algorithm
automatically repositioned the aircraft to 25 ft AGL and initiated the landing sequence. The partial-authority
system performed autonomous landings and kept horizontal drift during touchdown to 0.50 kts or less.
9. To improve the partial-authority system performance, it is recommended the tail linkage/backlash and
collective coulomb friction non-linearities be eliminated. To meet the more aggressive horizontal tasks, such as
Depart Abort, Lateral Reposition, Slalom, and more aggressive OFN terrain flying, higher trim actuator rates and
SAS position authority is recommended. Furthermore, to perform more aggressive vertical maneuvering, such as
the Vertical Maneuver task and faster OFN approaches, a collective SAS is recommended. Replacing non-first-
order roll, pitch, and collective actuators with more first-order-like actuators would facilitate recovery of full-
authority stability margins.

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of everyone who contributed to the success of this research
effort. Thanks to pilots LTC Carl R. Ott (Ret.), LTC Michael L. Osmon, MAJ Zachariah G. Morford, MAJ Jonathan
R. Mulder, MAJ John A. Plitsch, CW5 Sean F. Merrill, and CW4 Joseph B. Fay III. Also, thanks to the Crew Chief
SFC Maurice L. Nanton and the entire aircraft support team.

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