CASE 104

US VS PURGANAN (pls refer to case 53)

CASE 105

[G.R. No. 94902-06. April 21, 1999]

BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, Petitioners, v. HON. ROBERTO L.

MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

FACTS:

On May 15, 1990, two NBI Agents applied for search warrants against Banjamin V. Kho. The
warrants were issued after NBI agents discovered the houses were being used as storage
centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop vehicles. The judge issued Search Warrant
Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15. On May 16, NBI agents searched the premises
and found high-powered firearms and ammunition. They also confiscated radio and
telecommunication equipment, motor vehicles, and a motorcycle. Upon verification, NBI
agents found no licenses for the confiscated firearms and vehicles, and the radio tranceivers
and motor vehicles were unlicensed and unregistered. The raiding teams requested the
custody of items seized by the NBI. The petitioners presented a motion to quash the search
warrants, arguing they were issued without probable cause, prohibited by the Constitution,
violated procedural requirements, and legally possessed. The respondent judge denied the
motion, stating that the NBI agents' surveillance and investigation were insufficient to provide
personal knowledge of the crime. Petitioners challenge subject search warrants, arguing
probable cause is absent due to inadequate NBI agent surveillance and investigation,
claiming personal knowledge of crime-related facts is not sufficient.

ISSUE:
 Whether the search warrants were validly issued based on probable cause and in
compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements.

RULING:
 The petitioners' contention that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrants was untenable.
 The NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified to witnessing the
presence of firearms and vehicles at the premises to be searched.
 The court found no basis to disturb the findings and conclusions of the respondent Judge,
who personally examined the applicants and witnesses.
 The court held that the search warrants were in substantial compliance with constitutional
and statutory requirements.
 The failure to provide precise and minute details of the items to be seized did not render the
warrants general.
 Previous cases were cited where warrants were upheld despite using general descriptions of
the items to be seized.
 The manner of enforcing the search warrants was not within the scope of a Motion to Quash.
 The issues raised regarding the enforcement of the warrants should be addressed through
other legal remedies.
 The petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of merit and mootness, as cases had
already been filed against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms and explosives.
 The court did not rule on the issues of whether the searched premises were government
properties, as it could preempt the disposition of the pending cases.

CASE 106
 G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000

FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. BUREAU OF

INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Respondents.

FACTS:

On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were
engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos,
who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit stating such violations
committed. On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special
Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu. The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant, "Search Warrant B,"
for violating Section 238 in relation to Section 263. The warrant is a verbatim reproduction of
Search Warrant A-2. On October 2, 1993, the BIR and Philippine National Police searched
Unifish Packing Corporation's premises, seized records, and returned the search to Nestor
Labaria.

The BIR filed a case against petitioners in 1995, but the nature of the case remains unclear.
The petitioners filed motions to quash the warrants with the Cebu RTC, but the RTC denied
them, prompting a petition for certiorari with the CA which the latter court also denied.

ISSUE:

 Whether there was probable cause for the judge to issue the search warrants.
 Whether the search warrants particularly described the things to be seized.

RULING:

 The search warrants were valid, but the items not particularly described in the warrants
should be returned to the petitioners.
 The warrants authorizing the seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices remained valid.
 The deposition of Abos, who had personal knowledge of the alleged illegal activities and had
provided photocopies of the documents sought to be seized, justified the issuance of the
warrants.
 However, most of the items listed in the warrants failed to meet the test of particularity.
 The use of generic terms or general descriptions in the warrants was deemed unacceptable,
as a more specific description could have been provided based on the photocopies of the
documents.
 The Court ordered the return of the items not particularly described in the warrants.
 The warrants authorizing the seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices remained valid.
 The Court reasoned that, due to the nature of these documents, it was difficult to give a more
specific description, and a general description was acceptable.
 The Court emphasized that the warrants were severable, and the items not particularly
described could be cut off without invalidating the whole warrant.

CASE 107

G.R. No. 129035 August 22, 2002

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNABELLE FRANCISCO y DAVID, @ ANNABELLE TABLAN, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Federico Verona and his girlfriend Annabelle Francisco were under surveillance after police
confirmed they were selling shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. SPO2 Teneros and
SPO4 Alberto San Juan applied for a search warrant to search the premises at 122 M. Hizon
St., Caloocan City. The warrant was issued by Judge Bayhon.
Annabelle Francisco, nine months pregnant, was found in her apartment in Caloocan City
with a large quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The police, led by SPO2 Teneros,
searched her bedroom and seized various items, including a Salad Set, plastics, aluminum
foil, water pipes, pantakal, a cellular phone motorola, a monitoring device, and masking tips.
The seized items included P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, keys, an ATM card, bank books,
and car documents. The search was conducted by the police team and Barangay
Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus.
The accused-appellant was charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
specifically Section 16, Article III, by conspiring with others to possess and control
methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," without a license or prescription.
Despite this, the accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search warrant, claiming she
and her partner had been leasing an apartment since 1995. She pleaded not guilty and a
trial ensued.

The trial court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of the search warrant. It
rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty as charged. Thus appeal.

ISSUE:

WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED
WAS ILLEGAL AND VIOLATIVE OF ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED AFTER FINDING
THAT THE SEARCH WAS INDEED CONDUCTED AT A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM THAT
DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.

RULING:

The appeal is impressed with merit.

 The Supreme Court acquitted accused-appellant for lack of evidence to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
 The Court held that the search conducted by the police was illegal and violated accused-
appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The search warrant authorized the search of No. 122 M. Hizon Street, but the actual search
was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon Street.
 The Court emphasized that the particularity of the place described in the search warrant is
essential, and the police officers cannot change or amplify the place to be searched based
on their own personal knowledge or evidence submitted.
 The Court also noted that the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being
used as evidence.
 Without these items, the conviction of accused-appellant loses its basis.
The Court reiterated the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant, which include the
presence of probable cause determined personally by the judge, examination of the complainant
and witnesses under oath, and a specific description of the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.
 The Court emphasized that the description of the place in the search warrant must be strictly
complied with and cannot be changed or amplified by the police officers.
 The Court also upheld the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of unlawfully seized
evidence in court proceedings.
 This rule is necessary to enforce the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures and to protect the privacy and sanctity of individuals' homes and possessions.
CASE 108

G.R. No. 141699 August 7, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILSON D. LIM, DANILO S. SY, JACKILYN O. SANTOS and ANTONIO U. SIO, accused-
appellants.

FACTS:

On 27 March 1999, PO2 Nening Villarosa, an Intelligence Operative for

the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF), was summoned
by Superintendent John Lopez to a buy-bust operation at Apollo Motel in
Caloocan City. Villarosa was given a leather portfolio containing
P1,220,000.00 as payment for 2 kilograms of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or'shabu'. Only P6,000.00 was genuine, while the rest was
'boodle' money. Villarosa and an informer were met at Apollo Motel,
where they were met by appellant Danilo S. Sy, Wilson Lim, and Jackilyn
Santos. Sy informed Villarosa that there would be a 20-minute delay due
to the shabu being prepared. Sy and Lim returned with Antonio U. Sio,
who carried a paper bag containing two cartons containing one kilogram
of'shabu' each. Santos claimed the'shabu' was 'Class A' and of good
quality. Villarosa gave the portfolio containing the money to Sio and
arrested the appellants. The 2 kilograms of'shabu' were turned over to
the Legal Division of PAOCTF.

However, Danilo Sy denied conspiring with other accused in selling shabu

to poseur buyer PO2 Nening Villarosa. He presented the facts on defense
evidence, including attending his daughter's graduation and meeting his
girlfriend, Jackilyn Santos, at Apollo Motel. They made love and
discussed plans to leave the country on March 29, 1999, and ordered food
to be served in their room. Police officers forcibly took them down to
the second floor and charged them with the other accused. Appellant
Wilson Lim testified that he was the manager of the Apollo motel and
heard a commotion outside. He was arrested without a warrant and heard a
gunshot. Hotel personnel, including security guard Rolando Tamundong,
cashier Nenita Diosto, and room attendant Gil Madulid, confirmed
Wilson's testimony that he was inside his office during the police raid.
The other accused adopted these witnesses as their own. Both Appellants
testified that they did not meet PO2 Villarosa or Supt. John Lopez or
SPO3 Rolando Sayson at the Apollo motel.

Jackilyn Santos testified that she and Danilo Sy were lovers who checked
in at the Apollo motel in 1999. They made love, ate, and discussed
Danilo's trip to Brunei. On March 27, they were raided by five to six
civilians. Santos was wrapped in a blanket and arrested. The trial court
ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding the testimony of poseur buyer
PO2 Nening Villarosa credible. The court ruled out the defense of alibi
and ruled out an illegal raid. The court concluded that the buy-bust
operation was a buy-bust operation, and no warrant was needed.
Inconsistencies were cited as minor details and collateral matters.

Hence, herein automatic review.

 ISSUE:

 Whether the accused-appellants are guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.

RULING:

 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions of the accused-appellants and

ordered their immediate release from custody.
 The court also directed the turnover of the confiscated shabu to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for destruction.
 The Supreme Court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the
requirement for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 The court found inconsistencies and doubts in the prosecution's case, casting
doubt on the credibility of the witnesses and the legality of the arrests and search
conducted by the police.
 The raid conducted by the police without a warrant was deemed illegal, and the
shabu seized during the raid was inadmissible as evidence against the appellants.
 The evidence presented by the prosecution failed to produce a moral certainty to
sustain the appellants' conviction.
 Therefore, the court concluded that the accused-appellants were not guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act and ordered their release.

Case 109

G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

On April 5, 2000, two separate informations were filed before the RTC against
accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
firearm. Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her
counsel de parte, pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to both charges.5 Pre-trial and trial proper
then ensued. During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses: Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Modesto F. Carrera (Carrera), Police Officer (PO) 2 Jaime Chave.

That on January 24, 2000, two informants reported a marijuana sale by accused-
appellant "Estela Tuan" at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. SPO2 Fernandez
confirmed the report by accompanying them and gave the informants money to buy
marijuana. They then went to the accused-appellant's house and showed the leaves
they bought. After a laboratory examination, they prepared an Application for a
Search Warrant. They filed the application before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Judge Cortes personally examined them and
issued a Search Warrant, confirming probable cause. The CIDG team, led by SPO2
Fernandez, executed a Search Warrant on the accused-appellant's house. They found
a brick of marijuana and a firearm in her room, and later discovered eight more
bricks in a built-in cabinet. The items were confiscated and examined by the National
Bureau of Investigation. The defense presented four witnesses, including the
accused-appellant herself, her husband Beniasan Tuan, Magno, and Barangay
Captain Mabini Maskay. The accused-appellant claimed that a Search Warrant was
issued for her house due to a quarrel with her neighbor, Lourdes Estillore, and filed a
complaint for the demolition of Estillore's house. The defense presented a different
version of events, claiming that the police officers obtained the marijuana from a
previously rented room and that the gun was found under a cabinet in the accused-
appellant's room. Beniasan and his wife, accused-appellant, testified that they were
questioned by police about marijuana they allegedly obtained from their house. They
were shown the items and a certification of the confiscated items. Magno, who lived
on the first floor, testified that the items were found in a vacant room and a gun
under the cabinet. Barangay Captain Maskay confirmed the accused-appellant's
allegation of a quarrel with Estillore, which could have led to the criminal cases. He
also mentioned that the CIDG visited his office in January 2000 to inquire about the
accused-appellant's house location.
The RTC, in its decision dated April 9, 2002, found accused-appellant guilty as
charged. On appeal, The Court of Appeals ruled that the search and seizure of
marijuana bricks were conducted under a valid Search Warrant issued by the MTCC,
and there were no procedural defects or lapses in the issuance. The appellate court
affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana.
However, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by acquitting the
accused-appellant of the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The court granted
the appeal, modifying the conviction for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, RA 6425 and
reversing her conviction for Violation of PD 1866. The court forwarded the case
records to the appellant's Partial Notice of Appeal and directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs within 30 days.
ISSUE:
 Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.
RULING:
 The accused-appellant is guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.
 The court found the prosecution's evidence to be credible and consistent.
 The defense failed to provide sufficient evidence of planting.
 The court upheld the validity of the search warrant, as it complied with
constitutional and statutory requirements.
 The accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug,
without any authorization.
 The search warrant was valid and the evidence presented by the prosecution
proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
 The accused-appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to
pay a fine of P500,000.
 The confiscated marijuana was ordered to be forfeited and destroyed.
Case 110

G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012

(Formerly UDK No. 13980)

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Police officers, led by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, were investigating petitioner who
was selling shabu. They obtained a search warrant from the RTC and went to the
petitioner's house in Mabolo, Cebu City. They found the petitioner running towards a
nipa hut in front of his house, but were unsuccessful in chasing him. They then
returned with two barangay tanods to search the house, including the nipa hut. The
barangay tanods found nothing but confiscated several articles, including four plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance. The contents of these packs were
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory, which confirmed the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

The petitioner was charged with violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended. The information stated that the accused had four packs of white crystalline
powder, locally known as "shabu," containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without a license or prescription from any competent authority.
The petitioner, with the help of his counsel, pleaded not guilty during arraignment. A
trial ensued, with the prosecution presenting testimonies from SPO3 Bienvenido
Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
The defense presented testimonies from petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del
Castillo, and Herbert Aclan. The incident involved installing electrical wirings and
airconditioning units at the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor in Cabancalan,
Cebu. The petitioner claimed the small structure was owned by his older brother and
used as a storage place by his father. The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable of the charge against him. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with
the CA, but the latter denied and affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence petition.

Issue:
1. Whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrant.
2. Whether the confiscated items found in the nipa hut are admissible as
evidence.
3. Whether the prosecution established the element of possession beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court acquitted Ruben del Castillo due to the inadmissibility of the
confiscated drugs and the lack of evidence establishing his possession.

1. The court held that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant. The
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were met, and the judge's
determination of probable cause is given great deference as long as there was
a substantial basis for that determination.

2. The court ruled that the confiscated items found in the nipa hut are
inadmissible as evidence. The search warrant specifically described del
Castillo's residence as the place to be searched, and the items were seized by
a barangay tanod in a nipa hut located 20 meters away from del Castillo's
house. The presentation of the confiscated items as evidence violated del
Castillo's constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

3. The court found that the prosecution failed to establish del Castillo's
possession of the drugs beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution did not provide sufficient proof that del Castillo
owned or had control over the nipa hut where the drugs were found. Without
establishing del Castillo's control and dominion over the place where the
drugs were found, there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The prosecution
must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of
the drugs in the place under his control and dominion, which was not proven
in this case.
CASE 111

G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 161266

PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.

FACTS:

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special

Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for
warrants to search the offices of Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) and Planet
Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) in Quezon City. The applications alleged that
the petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to
theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401. The trial court conducted a
hearing on the applications, with the applicant, Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera), and
Raymund Gali (Gali) testifying as witnesses. Rivera argued that a legitimate
international long distance call should pass through the local exchange or public
switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international
gateway facilities (IGFs) in the Philippines. Gali claimed that petitioners were able to
provide international long distance call services by using PLDT's telephone lines but
bypassing its IGF.

Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was used
to provide a service called GlobalTalk, an internet-based international call service.
Upon an ocular inspection, it was found that the occupant of the unit was Planet
Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. Gali further alleged
that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners to
a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT's IGF.
The petitioners allegedly violated Presidential Decree No. 401 and Republic Act No.
7925 by illegally installing telephone connections and stealing business and revenues
from Philippine Telecom Development Corporation (PLDT). They also evaded
payment of access and bypass charges, piggy-backing on PLDT's facilities and
infrastructure. They also violated Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission, prohibiting the use of customs premises
equipment without securing a type approval license. PLDT alleged that the
petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues and evaded tax, license fees,
and charges. The trial court required the identification of office premises and floor
plans. A warrant was issued by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region
Police Office, leading to the seizure of over a hundred items, including CPUs,
monitors, wires, cables, diskettes, files, and a laptop computer. Petitioners WWC,
Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed motions to quash the search warrants, citing
reasons such as lack of probable cause, toll bypass, general warrants, and "fruits of
the poisonous tree." PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
The RTC granted the motions to quash, stating that the warrants were general
warrants, and the properties seized were ordered to be released to petitioners. PLDT
moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied due to failing to obtain the City
Prosecutor's conformity before filing the motion. The warrants were issued on the
same day as the incident. PLDT appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC
Resolutions and declared search warrants valid. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, but the court denied them. Two petitions were filed by WWC,
Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet, which were consolidated.

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite the following
procedural infirmities:

1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to

question the quashal of the search warrants;

2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause,
considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.

III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were
not general warrants.

RULING:
An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of
the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party
personality to question an order quashing search warrants: Such as a warrant
of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined
in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the
nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. An
application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. It was consistently
recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those
warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of
an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.

An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior

to the filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the
proper subject of an appeal. A final order is defined as one which disposes of the
whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing
to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other
hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the search
warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character
because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein.39An application for a search warrant
is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already
filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether the criminal case (of
which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court
is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or
denial of a motion to quash a search warrant. Where the search warrant is issued as
an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein."41 In
contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a
criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion
for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. The applications for
search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to
pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently
quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the
quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal
may be properly taken therefrom.

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their judicial

functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding
has substantial basis. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside
and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the
person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence
that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or
necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable
cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of
witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.54 In this case, the
testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through
PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the
test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly
what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood.
Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs
in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55 On this score, the quashal
of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge did not
quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue
before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search
warrants are general warrants.

The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is

fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought. A search warrant
fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized
when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued. To our mind, PLDT was able to
establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the
warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the
application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas,
modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support
equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary
records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."

CASE 112

G.R. No. 235348, December 10, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. STANLEY MADERAZO Y

ROMERO, Respondent.

FACTS:

On March 31, 2015, Police Superintendent Jaycees De Sagun Tolentino filed two
separate applications for search warrants against Maderazo, Nestor Alea, Daren
Mabansag, and Lovely Joy Alcantara. Tolentino claimed that he was informed by
barangay officials that Maderazo, Alea, Mabansag, and Alcantara were keeping an
undetermined quantity of dangerous drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms in his
residence in Barangay Lazareto, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro. When they arrived
at Maderazo's house, they found him with approximately 40 grams of illegal drugs,
drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. Tolentino verified these information through
casing and surveillance.

On March 31, 2015, Executive Judge Tomas C. Leynes issued Search Warrant No.
09-2015 for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 and Search Warrant No. No. 10591.
Police officers recovered heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing shabu,
drug paraphernalia, a.38 caliber revolver, live ammunitions, mobile phones,
computer laptop, and cash from the premises. Maderazo filed a Motion to Quash on
July 1, 2015, arguing that Search Warrant Nos. 09-2015 and 10-2015 were issued
without probable cause and that all items seized were inadmissible in evidence.
Maderazo argued that the records do not provide information on the casing and
surveillance conducted by Tolentino, and the statements of Roco and Rivera are not
probative. He requested a certified true copy of the stenographic notes (TSN) for the
search warrant application, but was given copies of sworn statements from Roco,
Rivera, and Cueto, which were identical except for their personal circumstances. The
trial court denied Maderazo's motion to quash on August 14, 2015.
Maderazo filed a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court when it denied his motion to quash search warrants. The CA granted the
petition and nullified and set aside Search Warrant Nos. 09-2015 and 10-2015,
holding that the items seized in Maderazo's rental house are inadmissible in evidence
against him, as the access by police officers used void search warrants.

ISSUE:
whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Leynes
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Orders dated August 14, 2015 and September 21, 2015 in
Criminal Case Nos. CR-15-12-201 to 203, denying respondent's motion to quash the
subject search warrants.

RULING:
The petition has no merit. a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable
cause in connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the
personal knowledge of the applicant and his witnesses.This the substantive
requirement for the issuance of a search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of
probable cause is a personal task of the judge before whom the application for
search warrant is filed, as he has to examine the applicant and his or her witnesses
in the form of "searching questions and answers" in writing and under oath.

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Maderazo and affirmed the decision of
the CA.
 The Court held that the trial judge failed to conduct a probing and exhaustive
examination as required by the Constitution and the rules on the issuance of
search warrants.
 The questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses were not
searching and probing, and their testimonies did not establish probable cause.
 The Court emphasized that the core requisite for the issuance of a search
warrant is the existence of probable cause based on facts personally known to
the applicant and the witnesses.
 Therefore, the Court concluded that the search warrants were invalid, and the
items seized were inadmissible as evidence.
 The Court also emphasized that no presumption of regularity may be invoked
when rights secured by the Constitution are encroached upon.
 The trial judge failed to conduct a proper examination, and the testimonies of
the witnesses did not establish probable cause.
 The questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses were not
searching and probing.
 The core requisite for the issuance of a search warrant is the existence of
probable cause based on facts personally known to the applicant and the
witnesses.
 The search warrants were invalid, and the items seized were inadmissible as
evidence.
 No presumption of regularity may be invoked when rights secured by the
Constitution are encroached upon.
CASE 113

G.R. No. 123137 October 17, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO
DOSDOS, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

The case involves a murder case involving accused policeman Abriol, a jailguard at
the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) in Cebu City, and former prisoner
Astellero. Navales, the warden, was found guilty of grave misconduct for allowing
Abriol and Dosdos out of BBRC on the day of the murder and was dismissed from the
police force. Dosdos, convicted of highway robbery, remained in BBRC due to
Navales' failure to act on his transfer. The victim, Alejandro Flores, was dismissed
from the PNP in August 1992 after testing positive for prohibited drugs. Abriol,
Astellero, and Dosdos were also indicted for illegal possession of firearms. All
accused pleaded not guilty to both charges.
That on June 5, 1993, a radio news reporter, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., heard gunshots
and saw a man running towards the intersection of P. del Rosario Street and Jones
Avenue. He saw a red "Jiffy" make a U-turn near the city central school, nearly
running over the man. The man collapsed, and the "Jiffy" followed. A tall, thin man
alighted and fired several shots at the prostrate figure. Sta. Cruz moved his jeep and
focused its headlights on the victim. Meanwhile, PO3 Alexander Rustela heard
gunshots and ran towards the scene. The "Jiffy" with three people on board made an
abrupt left turn at Leon Kilat Street. Rustela radioed for assistance and patrol car No.
201 arrived, followed by PO2 Herbert Ramos, who broadcasted an alarm to police
headquarters and other mobile patrol cars.

Police officers, including SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana and PO2 Romeo Abellana, were on
patrol when they heard a radio message about a shooting incident. They pursued the
suspects, who stopped at the Don Bosco Building near BBRC. Police car No. 205
blocked the path, and three people were alighted. The driver was appellant Astellero,
whom Cue had seen before. Abrigana and Cue found a revolver, pistol, and unfired
bullets under Abriol's seat. Meanwhile, another police team arrived at the crime
scene and rushed the victim to the Cebu City Medical Center. A homicide investigator
found four.45 caliber shells and two deformed slugs near the victim's body. Dr.
Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory autopsied the victim's
body and found that the cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock
and hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk and head."

The appellants were found guilty of murder after a paraffin test and chemistry test
on their handguns. The victim's widow and relatives testified that the victim, a
confessed drug user, may have been "rubbed out" on orders of Navales for failing to
remit P31,000 as proceeds from pushing prohibited drugs. The appellants deny the
accusations, claiming that they were among several "trustees" at BBRC assigned to
work in the kitchen. Appellant Astellero, the warden's driver, was also in charge of
marketing for the prisoners' food. On the day of the incident, they returned to BBRC
and saw Navales an hour later. They heard gunshots and were arrested by several
police cars. SPO4 Eleazar Abrigana frisked him and took the.38 service revolver from
his waist. Abriol testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC
Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in Criminal
Case No. CBU-28843. However, the handgun was defective and was returned to him
for repair by Armscor. He was assigned guard and escort duties by the warden and
was authorized to carry his service firearm on the day of the incident.

The trial court found the appellants' version of the incident neither convincing nor
credible, and instead believed the prosecution's version. The appellants were
convicted of the offenses charged. Hence appeal.

ISSUE:

whether the prosecution's evidence, which is mainly circumstantial, suffices to

convict appellants for murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

The court ruled that the prosecution's evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of
events leading to the conclusion of guilt on the part of the appellants. The evidence
proved not only the identities of the appellants but also their participation and
collective responsibility in the murder of the victim. The court upheld the validity of
the warrantless search and seizure of the firearms. The court also ruled that the use
of an unlicensed firearm in murder is not a separate crime but merely a special
aggravating circumstance.

1. Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon when direct testimony is not

available and to insist on it would result in setting felons free. The evidence
must be consistent with each other and inconsistent with the hypothesis of
innocence.
 2. A paraffin test can indicate the presence of nitrates on the hand, but it cannot
establish that the source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms. Other
substances can also produce positive results for nitrates.
3. The autopsy report may have revealed ambiguities, but expert testimonies
supported the findings of the prosecution. The size of the gunshot wounds
does not necessarily indicate the caliber of the firearm used.
4. An expert witness must possess training, education, familiarity with the facts
of the case, and present authorities or standards upon which his opinion is
based. The qualification of an expert witness rests with the discretion of the
trial court.
5. The unbroken chain of events and the evidence presented prove the guilt of
the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
6. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties applies to minor
lapses in the issuance of acknowledgment receipts.
7. The absence of a motive does not preclude conviction. Proof of motive
becomes essential only when there is no positive evidence of an accused's
direct participation in the offense.
8. The warrantless search and seizure of the firearms was valid as it was
incidental to a lawful arrest and made after a fatal shooting and pursuit of a
fast-moving vehicle believed to be involved in the crime.
9. To sustain a conviction for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must
prove the existence of the firearm and the fact that the accused does not
have the corresponding license or permit to possess it.
10. The use of an unlicensed firearm in murder is not a separate crime but merely
a special aggravating circumstance.

CASE 114

[G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY TING

UY, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was charged on July 24, 1998 for
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act in two separate Informations. Upon arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty to both Informations. A joint trial was thereafter
conducted.

On July 21, 1998, a Chinese-Filipino police informant reported illegal drug activities
in Sta. Cruz, Manila. PO3 Luis Chico was asked to negotiate with Jerry Ting Uy for
the purchase of shabu. The informant agreed to deliver half a kilo of shabu for
P200,000.00 at Severino Street. Police officers, led by SPO2 Rodolfo Rival, planned a
buy-bust operation to entrap the appellant. Eight genuine P500.00 bills were
prepared and placed at the top and bottom of four bundles of bogus money. PO3
Chico was designated as the poseur-buyer.

At around 6 o'clock in the evening, 13 police officers, including PO3 Chico and the
informant, positioned themselves strategically along Severino Street. The appellant
arrived on a green Mitsubishi Lancer and asked for payment of half a kilo of shabu.
PO3 Chico handed the marked money to the appellant, who handed him a
transparent plastic bag containing suspected shabu. PO3 Chico immediately arrested
the appellant and found three more plastic bags containing suspected shabu. SPO2
Rival informed the appellant of his constitutional rights. The marked bills of money
and four plastic bags seized were handed over to SPO2 Benjamin Nuguit for
laboratory examination. In his defense, appellant claimed that he is a victim of
frame-up.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on July 6, 2000, convicting accused n
Crim. Case No. 98-166675 of the crime of Violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425 as
amended. And In Crim. Case No. 98-166676 Violation of Section 15 of R.A. 6425 as
amended.

ISSUE:

I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS PO3 CHICO, THE ALLEGED POSEUR-
BUYER, ON APPELLANT'S SALE AND POSSESSION OF SHABU DURING A BUY-BUST
OPERATION.

II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO PRESENT THE CHINESE INFORMANT AS A WITNESS AS A
CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH RENDER DOUBTFUL THE TESTIMONY OF PO3 CHICO ON AN
ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION.

III. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO APPELLANT'S DEFENSE THAT HE WAS A VICTIM OF A FRAME-UP IN
AN UNSUCCESSFUL EXTORTION ATTEMPT BY POLICE OPERATIVES.

IV. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS INADMISSIBLE THE
THREE BAGS CONTAINING SUSPECTED SHABU AS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 98-166676 FOR BEING ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE IN A WARRANTLESS
ARREST.

V. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT FOR

FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT IN SAID CASES.

RULING:

This Court has carefully examined the record of this case, and finds no justification to
come to conclusions different from those made by the trial court.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are

resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of
their criminal plans. It is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has
consistently proven itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers.
Thus, unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-
bust team were inspired by improper motives or were not properly performing their
duties, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit. In this case,
the evidence shows that it was the police informant who initially contacted and
arranged a drug deal with appellant. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was
accompanied by PO3 Chico, who posed as a buyer of shabu. PO3 Chico handed
marked money to appellant as payment for half a kilo of shabu. Appellant was then
arrested when he handed a plastic bag containing shabu to PO3 Chico.

A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in

the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
accused but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is
within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him the
means of committing violence or of escaping In other words, a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the
three plastic bags containing a total of 1,500 grams of shabu were seized inside the
car where appellant himself was arrested.
There is likewise no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal
Case No. 98-166675 was proved beyond reasonable doubt, appellant knowingly
carrying with him 1,510.8 grams of shabu - without legal authority - at the time of
the buy-bust operation. The elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug (Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280
SCRA 400 [1997]). All these circumstances are present in the case at bar.

Finally, pursuant to Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by

Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall sell or possess 200
grams or more of shabu. Appellant, in this case, was caught selling 505.6 grams of
shabu, and possessing 1,510.8 grams of the same substance. Since no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crimes, the trial court
was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00
in each of the two criminal cases.

CASE 115

G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA

FACTS:

Appellant was sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut
when police officers showed the search warrant and explained the contents to him. The
team searched the hut and found a plastic container under the kitchen dried marijuana
leaves and a .38 caliber revolver. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and
ammunitions and arrested the appellant. He was held guilty of illegal possession of the
illegal drug found therein.

Appellant contended that the hut was not his, hence the search and seizure was illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.

HELD:
No. With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken
— during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered – it is held that the
search was illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence obtained therein
becomes ipso facto inadmissible.

“SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

“(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

“(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

“(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

“In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112.”

CASE 116

G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO

FACTS:

A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives started
searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and
two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized
was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto
Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and
marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after
hearing, the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for
violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.

The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible because
the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.

ISSUES:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of
“drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of
the “plain view doctrine.”

HELD:

Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to
support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of
the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable
cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s
residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed to
allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the
cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court
affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.

CASE 117

G.R. No. 132371 April 9, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO SIMBAHON y QUIATZON

FACTS:

Police operatives, together with the chairman of the barangay which had jurisdiction over
the place, and a member of media, served Search Warrant No. 95-100 upon appellant
Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia, and Charito Mangulabnan at their residence. Thereafter,
the team began conducting a search of all the rooms in accordance with the search
warrant, and found under the bed a brick of dried flowering tops suspected to be
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper, a black bullet pouch containing six (6) live
ammunitions, and sachets of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. After the
search, an inventory receipt of the items seized from the house of the suspects was
prepared and, together with an affidavit of orderly search was signed by Danilo Simbahon.
Appellant Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon was chargedfor alleged violation of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 1866, penalizing the illegal possession of firearms. The Court found him
guiltyof the crime charged against him in Criminal Case No. 95-142514 thereby sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and to pay the cost.
However, appellant contended that the court erred in convicting him because the search
warrant served was invalid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant was invalid.

HELD:

Yes. The record shows serious defects in the search warrant itself which render the same
null and void.

The caption as well as the body of Search Warrant No. 95-100 show that it was issued for
more than one offense — for violation of RA 6425 and for violation of PD 1866.
In Tambasen v. People, et al., it was held:

On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 123 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The
caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866
for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-
Subversive Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a “scatter-shot warrant” and
totally null and void.

Likewise, the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended. The constitutional requirement is a description which particularly points to a
definitely ascertainable place, so as to exclude all others. In the case at bar, only the
application for search warrant contained the address of the place to be searched. The
search warrant issued by the court merely referred to appellant’s residence as “premises”,
without specifying its address. The Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the place to
be searched only to those described in the warrant. The absence of a particular
description in the search warrant renders the same void.

Finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant issued for the
search of appellant’s house. The seizure by the police officers conducting the search of
articles not described in the search warrant was beyond the parameters of their authority
under the search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a
search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose
and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches
and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed.20 Neither can the
admissibility of such seized items be justified under the plain view doctrine, for the bricks
of marijuana in this case were found not inadvertently or in plain view. Rather, they were
found after a meticulous search under the bed, wrapped in a newspaper and inside a
plastic bag.
CASE 118

G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY GO

Facts:

The police officers conducted a test buy operation at the residence of the accused where
they bought P1,500.00 worth of shabu but they did not arrest the accused at that time.
Instead, they applied for a search warrant based on their firm belief that there was a large
quantity of illegal drugs in his house. When they arrived at the residence of the accused,
they “sideswept a car of the accused parked outside his house. When the son opened their
gate and went out, the police officers introduced themselves, informed him that they had
a search warrant entered the house and handcuffed the son of the accused to a chair.
They summoned two (2) barangay kagawads to witness the search. They were able to seize
the following: (a) “one plastic bag containing yellowish substance”, (b) a weighing scale,
(c) assorted documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a
check writer; (i) several dry seals and (j) stamp pads; (k) Chinese and Philippine Currency
and and appellant’s (l) Toyota Corolla car. An inventory was made signed by the police
officers the kagawads and the son of the accused. There was likewise an affidavit of
orderly search but not under oath. Accused was charged with illegal possession of shabu.
One of the kagawads testified that shabu was not even one of the items seized and
inventoried. What originally appeared was merely “Chinese Medicine”, but replaced with
shabu. After trial, accused was convicted. He questioned the validity of the search.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty in
implementing the search warrant by the police officers.

HELD:

No. The raiding team’s departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the
search of appellant’s residence, tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus
compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles
inadmissible in evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Court’s solemn duty to
be ever watchful for the constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. In the oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial

question determinable from a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the
purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.

Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules

authorizing search and seizure is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded
because:

x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption
of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While
the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.

In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light
several irregularities in the manner by which the search of appellant’s residence was
conducted.

Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their
intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any
reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its
successful implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellant’s car was unreasonable
and unjustified.

There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the

policemen entered appellant’s residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm
and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible
restraint of Jack Go all the more was unjustified as was his continued restraint even
after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible restraint.

Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section

10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized.

After the inventory had been prepared, it was presented to appellant for his signature
without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and
to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as
evidence against him. In People v. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of
inducing suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession
is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain silent.

The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative
of appellant’s custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in
the manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellant’s residence.

The “Affidavit of Orderly Search” is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the
search. Not having been executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-
prepared form which the raiding team brought with them. It was filled up after the search
by team leader SPO1 Fernandez who then instructed appellant to sign it as he did instruct
Jack Go, Kagawad Manalo and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.

More importantly, since the “Affidavit of Orderly Search” purports to have been executed
by appellant, the same cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his
residence for he was admittedly not present when the search took place, he having arrived
only when it was “almost through.”

In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged “Affidavit
of Orderly Search,” prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers
who searched his residence and eventually arrested him, provides no proof of the
regularity and propriety of the search in question.

On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellant’s
residence failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7),
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. – No

search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (Underscoring
supplied)

As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the
search of the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag
containing the shabu, did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of
the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a
chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law
are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates
both the spirit and letter of the law:

As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a
procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises
unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law
are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in
another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.

That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the
second floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a
hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be
conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search should be witnessed by
“two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality” only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus,
the search of appellant’s residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go
who was present at the time. The police officers were without discretion to substitute
their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.
CASE 119

G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002

RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in
Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with
"kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When asked
what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With
Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked
Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the
highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of
Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the
arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993,
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court
denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision
on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless search without consent is valid?

HELD:

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under
Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The
constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely:

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(3) search of moving vehicles;
(4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive

searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right, and (3) said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is reversed and set aside, and accused Rudy
Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Case 120

G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that
accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago,
Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned
themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other
group acted as their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and
parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying
a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and
introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket.
Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of
live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the
contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud
instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20)
pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and
the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the
office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different
version of the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to
Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He
stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While
at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he
called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and
made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.
During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open
his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At
this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who
just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others
searched his car.

Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about
fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the
presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to
hold the box while pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted
him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found
on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

RULING:

The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police
officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search
is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.

The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be
arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this
exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did
not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of
a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
“stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that
a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first
arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession.
The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s
business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of
accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the
police operatives on accused-appellant.

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

CASE 121

G.R. No. 138881 December 18, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Leila Reyes Johnson, a 58-year-old widow from Ocean Side, California, U.S.A., was a
registered nurse who arrived in the Philippines in 1998 to visit her son's family. She was due
to fly back to the U.S. on July 26. On June 26, 1998, she checked in at the Philippine Village
Hotel and checked out the next day. At Gate 16 of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA), Olivia Ramirez, a lady frisker, felt something hard on Johnson's abdominal area.
Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles due to an ectopic pregnancy.
Ramirez reported the issue to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, who instructed her to
take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection. Johnson brought three plastic
packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2, and C-3, which contained 580.2 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to
the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office at the NAIA, where her passport and ticket
were taken, her luggage opened, and her personal belongings were itemized.

The accused-appellant claimed to have been handcuffed and taken to a women's room by
Embile and two female officers. She was then taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage,
 and a chair, where her passport and purse were taken without a receipt. She was then
transferred to the office of Col. Castillo, where she was tasked with identifying two white
packages. Despite being asked to admit ownership, she denied knowledge and ownership.
She was detained until June 28, 1999, when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest.
Throughout her detention, she was denied access to counsel or contact with the U.S.
Embassy or her relatives in the Philippines.

The trial court found accused Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violating Section 16 of
Republic Act 6425 as amended, imposing a penalty of Reclamation Perpetua and imposing
a fine of ₱500,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and the costs of the
suit.

Issue:
1. Whether the search and seizure of the shabu were legal.
2. Whether the subsequent arrest of Leila Johnson was justified.
3. Whether the prosecution was required to prove that Leila Johnson did not have a license to
possess shabu.

Ruling:
1. The search and seizure of the shabu were legal.
2. The subsequent arrest of Leila Johnson was justified.
3. The prosecution was not required to prove that Leila Johnson did not have a license to
possess shabu.
The search and seizure of the shabu were legal because they were conducted pursuant to
airport security procedures, which are considered reasonable given the minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel.
 Notices, signs, and public address systems in public transportation facilities informing
travelers that they are subject to search are reasonable.
 Searches made pursuant to these procedures do not violate the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from Leila Johnson during the routine frisk at
the airport was acquired legitimately, and therefore admissible as evidence against her.
1. The subsequent arrest of Leila Johnson was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
 Although the arrest was made without a warrant, it was justified because it was made upon
the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
1. The prosecution was not required to prove that Leila Johnson did not have a license to
possess shabu.
 There is nothing in the law that requires the prosecution to prove the negative allegation that
the accused does not have a license or permit to possess regulated drugs.
 The burden of proof is upon the accused to show that she has a license or permit under the
law to possess the prohibited drug.
 The trial court erred in confiscating Leila Johnson's passport, airline ticket, luggage, and
other personal effects.
 These items should be returned to her as they are not subject to seizure under the law.
 The fine imposed by the trial court is also reduced to P50,000.00, considering the quantity of
shabu confiscated from Leila Johnson.
Case 122

G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.

Facts:

On 12 February 1998, SUSAN was arrested at Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
while en route to Saigon, Vietnam. Upon passing through the metal detector booth, Mylene
Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism
(NACHT), discovered a beeping sound and discovered rice granules in SUSAN's abdomen
and genital area. Mylene reported the incident to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, who instructed
Mylene to bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. SUSAN
voluntarily handed over three packages, which were found to contain white crystalline
substances that tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug.

SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that no
investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN. However, SUSAN signed a receipt for the
items seized from her, including three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, an
American passport, a Continental Micronesia plane ticket, and two panty girdles. Cause
informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted she did not have a counsel when
she signed the receipt.

Mylene reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest and search of SUSAN and the
seizure of prohibited items found on her person.The trial court found SUSAN guilty of
violating Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentenced her
to reclusion perpetua and a P1 million fine. SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial, alleging that the trial judge erred in giving weight to the hearsay medical
certificate, upholding the presumption of regularity in police officers' duty, making statements
that shifted the burden of proof to the accused, and deliberately ignoring the decisive issue
of evidence security. She also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without
warrant and filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the motions.
The trial court denied the motions, stating that the conviction was not based on the medical
report, there was no violation of SUSAN's constitutional rights, and the specimens seized
were acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Hence appeal.

Issue:
 Whether the search and seizure conducted on Canton were unconstitutional.
 Whether the frisker went beyond the limits of a "Terry search".
 Whether Canton was under custodial investigation without counsel.
 Whether the admission of a medical report as hearsay evidence was proper.
 Whether the ruling in People v. Johnson was correctly applied.

Ruling:
 The search and seizure were valid under the exception for routine airport security
procedures.
 The search was not limited to weapons, but also included prohibited materials or
substances.
 The search was not incidental to a lawful arrest, but the arrest was justified because
Canton was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug.
 The search conducted on Canton was not limited to a pat down of her outer
garments.
 The search was justified given the minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel.
 No custodial investigation took place, as no statement was taken from Canton during
her detention and used as evidence against her.
 The admission of the medical report was erroneous, but the conviction could still
stand without it.
 Canton's conviction and the penalty imposed on her were affirmed.
 The items seized from her that exceeded the scope of the search warrant should be
returned.
 The search and seizure were valid under the exception for routine airport security
procedures, which includes the search for prohibited materials or substances.
 The arrest was justified because Canton was caught flagrante delicto in possession
of a regulated drug.
 The search conducted on Canton was justified given the minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel.
 No custodial investigation took place as no statement was taken from Canton during
her detention and used as evidence against her.
 The admission of the medical report was erroneous, but it did not affect the court's
finding of guilt.
 Canton's conviction and the penalty imposed on her were affirmed as there was
sufficient evidence to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 The items seized from Canton that exceeded the scope of the search warrant should
be returned.
CASE 123

G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

That on or about September 25, 1996, accused, was caught in flagrante delicto and without
authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate
and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194
kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and
prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution's first witness, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, testified that on September 24, 1996,
he received a tip about a marijuana plantation owned by an appellant in Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao formed a reaction team to verify the report.
The team found seven five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants near the appellant's hut. The
police uprooted the plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms, and arrested the appellant. One
of the plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis, which
found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.
The prosecution presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources stating that the land cultivated by the appellant was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block
B, part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The appellant
was acknowledged as the occupant of the lot but had not yet received a Certificate of
Stewardship. The defense presented the appellant as a witness, who testified that he was
called by an unknown person to "see something" and was taken to the location where the
marijuana plants were found. He admitted to owning the marijuana, but was threatened by a
barangay peace officer who threatened him. The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as a
rebuttal witness, stating that the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from Valdez's
hut and 250 meters distant from Carlito Pascua's hut. The trial court found the appellant's
defense insipid and held him liable for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants.
Issue:
 Whether the search and seizure of the marijuana plants were illegal.
 Whether Valdez's confession during the investigation was admissible as evidence.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court found the appeal meritorious and reversed the decision of the trial
court.
 The Court ruled that the search and seizure of the marijuana plants were illegal
because there was no valid warrant and the plants were not immediately apparent or
in plain view.
 The Court also found that Valdez's confession was inadmissible because it was verbal,
uncounselled, and violated his right to counsel during criminal investigations.
 Based on these findings, the Court held that the seized marijuana plants and Valdez's
confession could not be used as evidence against him.
 Therefore, the Court acquitted Valdez and ordered his immediate release from
confinement.
 The search and seizure of the marijuana plants were illegal because there was no
valid warrant and the plants were not immediately apparent or in plain view.
 The plain view doctrine did not apply in this case.
 Valdez's confession was inadmissible because it was verbal, uncounselled, and
violated his right to counsel during criminal investigations.
 The protection against illegal search and seizure applies to both innocent and guilty
individuals.
 The Bill of Rights belongs to every person, regardless of their location or
circumstances.
 Confessions made without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of their voluntariness.
 The Supreme Court acquitted Abe Valdez due to an illegal search and seizure of
marijuana plants and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession.
 The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights in criminal
investigations.
 Evidence obtained through illegal means or in violation of constitutional rights cannot
be used against the accused.
CASE 124

A.M. No. P-08-2519 November 19, 2008

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P)

ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. MIGUEL MORALES, CLERK OF

COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.

and

A.M. No. P-08-2520 November 19, 2008

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P)

ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST CLERK OF COURT ATTY. HENRY P.

FAVORITO OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, CLERK OF COURT ATTY.
MIGUEL MORALES OF BRANCH 17, CLERK OF COURT AMIE GRACE ARREOLA OF
BRANCH 4, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER III WILLIAM CALDA OF THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT AND STENOGRAPHER ISABEL SIWA OF BRANCH 16, ALL OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MANILA.

Facts:

Atty. Morales, Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC, Branch 67, Manila was investigated on the
basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and
attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA
conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty.
Morales personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned
out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the
name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was seized and taken in custody of the
OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve
the files stored therein.

Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal
computer which was confiscated without any valid search and seizure order, such evidence
should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.

The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to
support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were
interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against
Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct.

Issues:
1. Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the present
administrative case against him?

2. May the right against unreasonable searches and seizures be invoked in an administrative
case?

3. Was there consented warrantless search in this case?

4. Is there a ground to hold Atty. Morales liable of the charge?

RULING:

1. While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every
court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer
against him for it violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

2. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, any violation of the aforestated

constitutional right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

3. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that
is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given lies with the
State. Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. To
constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to
relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the opening of his personal computer and
the printing of files therefrom during the spot investigation, it is also of record that Atty.
Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons questioning the
validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.

4. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly
confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court
had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
 CASE 125

G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco and three other policemen served a warrant of
arrest against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case of kidnapping with ransom.
They conducted surveillance on Valeroso's hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. At
the Integrated National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, they arrested Valeroso
and found a Charter Arms with five live ammunition in his waist. Valeroso was then brought
to the police station for questioning. A verification of the firearm revealed it was not issued to
Valeroso but to Raul Palencia Salvatierra. Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended.

The petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution's version was supported by testimonies
from SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito, while the defense's version was provided by Sr. Insp.
Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr., and Adrian Yuson.

The petitioner recounted being woken up by four heavily armed men in civilian clothes who
bolted the room, trained their guns at him, and forced him out of his room. The raiding team
then searched and ransacked the room, with SPO2 Disuanco standing guard outside. The
petitioner claimed the search was illegal and that the gun seized from him was licensed and
covered by necessary permits. However, he was unable to present documentation related to
the firearm because it was confiscated by the police.

The petitioner argued that the police had an axe to grind against him, as he had turned down
a request from Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation. SPO3 Timbol,
Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued a Memorandum Receipt to the
petitioner covering the firearm and its ammunition. Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room
where the petitioner was arrested, testified that two policemen entered his room and pointed
a gun at him.

On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner moved to
reconsider47 but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998. He appealed to the CA. On May
4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition.Petitioner resorted
to the present petition under Rule 45.

Issue:
 Whether there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict Valeroso of illegal possession of a firearm.
 Whether the search and seizure of the firearm were legal.
 Whether the Memorandum Receipt issued to Valeroso by the PNP Narcotics Command proves his
innocence.

Ruling:
 The court ruled in favor of the prosecution and affirmed Valeroso's conviction for illegal possession of a
firearm.
 The court found that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the firearm and ammunition, as
well as Valeroso's lack of authority to possess them.
 The court also held that the search and seizure of the firearm were valid, as the arrest of Valeroso was
lawful and the firearm was found during a valid search incident to arrest.
 Additionally, the court found that the Memorandum Receipt issued to Valeroso was not regular and did
not prove his innocence.
 The prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of the firearm and ammunition, as well as the
lack of authority of the accused to possess them in illegal possession of firearms cases.
 The prosecution was able to discharge its burden through the testimony of witnesses and the certification
from the Firearms and Explosives Division.
 The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court, and its findings are generally viewed as
correct and entitled to great weight.
 The non-presentation of the firearm as evidence is not fatal as long as there is competent testimony as to
its existence.
 The penalty under the current law for illegal possession of firearms is prision correccional.
 The court ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm and ammunition in favor of the
government.
 CASE 126

G.R. No. 182010 August 25, 2010

SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

On December 10, 2002, PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas conducted surveillance on an alleged
notorious snatcher in the area of "Ryan." They noticed a suspicious woman, who was seen
placing a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance inside her
cigarette case. Upon approaching her, PO1 Cruzin introduced himself as a police officer and
asked her to remove the sachet. After informing her of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin
confiscated the sachet, marking her initials "SRE." The woman was taken for investigation,
where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, requested a
laboratory examination of the substance and a drug test on her. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas
executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension detailing their surveillance and the circumstances
leading to her arrest.

The petitioner denied the charges. She claimed that the police had planted evidence against
her, claiming it was an attempt to extort money from her and her family. Two other
witnesses, her daughter Josan Lee and her friend Ma. Stella Tolentino, corroborated her
account, stating that the police officers never informed them of the reason for taking custody
of her. The trial court found her guilty of illegal possession of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu on July 28, 2003. The petitioner's daughter Josan Lee and her family
friend Ma. Stella Tolentino also corroborated her account, stating that the police officers
never informed them of the reason for taking custody.

On appeal, petitioner questioned the legality of her arrest without a warrant, arguing that the
police had probable cause to search her under the "stop-and-frisk" concept, an exception to
the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches. The appellate court, however, affirmed the
conviction, stating that the arresting officers had no evil motive to falsely charge her.
Petitioner then argues that the "stop-and-frisk" principle could only be invoked if there were
overt acts of unusual conduct that would arouse suspicion. Petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, seeks the affirmance of the appealed decision but seeks a modification
of the penalty to conform to R.A. No. 9165.

Issue:
 Whether the search and seizure conducted by the police without a warrant violated the
petitioner's constitutional rights

Ruling:
 The search and seizure were valid under the "stop-and-frisk" principle
 The evidence obtained from the search, including the seized shabu, is admissible
 The petitioner's conviction is affirmed
 A "stop-and-frisk" operation is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement
 It allows a police officer to stop and search a person if there is a genuine reason to believe
that the person is armed and presently dangerous
 In this case, the police officers had a genuine reason to suspect the petitioner based on her
suspicious behavior and attempted flight
 Therefore, the search and seizure were justified under the "stop-and-frisk" principle
 The Supreme Court upheld the petitioner's conviction for drug possession
 The court found that the police officers had a genuine reason to suspect the petitioner based
on her suspicious behavior and attempted flight
 Therefore, the evidence obtained from the search was admissible, and the petitioner's
conviction was affirmed.

Case 127

G.R. No. 190889 January 10, 2011

ELENITA C. FAJARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

On August 27, 2002, the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) was
instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza to respond to a
complaint of armed men drinking liquor at the residence of a woman named Valerio. The
PISOG arrived at the area and observed several people running in different directions.
Valerio was seen holding two.45 caliber pistols and firing shots at the policemen before
entering the house of the petitioner.

The police cordoned the perimeter of the house to deter Valerio from evading apprehension.
The petitioner then went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops.
No agreement materialized.

On August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2) and SPO1 Teodoro
Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), as witnesses, recovered two receivers of.45 caliber
pistols. The recovered items were surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1), Group
Investigator, who applied for and obtained a search warrant.
The police team searched the petitioner's house and found and confiscated the following:
two pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle, 35 pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56
Caliber, and 14 pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol. A criminal information for violation
of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
Petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective because
the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on
his personal knowledge. They also asserted that the execution of the search warrant was
infirm since the petitioner was not asked to accompany the policemen as they explored the
place.

Petitioner disowned the confiscated items and refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared
by the raiding team, as the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff
sergeant of the Philippine Army.

The RTC rejected the accused's defenses, stating they were already denied in the Orders
dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, which were not appealed and have reached
finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were not allowed to question the
legality of their arrest, as they participated in the trial and applied for bail, effectively waiving
irregularities and defects.

Issue:
 Whether the search warrant was defective.
 Whether Fajardo was asked to accompany the police during the search.
 Whether Fajardo possessed any firearms.
 Whether the confiscated items belonged to Fajardo's brother.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision with respect to Fajardo and acquitted her on
the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 The Court affirmed Valerio's conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm based on the evidence
presented.
 The Court held that Fajardo's defenses were not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of the search warrant.
 Fajardo's argument that she was not asked to accompany the police during the search was not a valid
defense as it did not affect the validity of the search warrant.
 The Court found that Fajardo's denial of possessing any firearms and claiming that the confiscated items
belonged to her brother were self-serving and unsupported by evidence.
 The Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) correctly rejected Fajardo's defenses and found her
guilty of illegal possession of firearms and explosives.
 However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the search warrant was void. The
Court held that the officer who applied for the search warrant had personal knowledge that Fajardo and
Valerio had no license to possess firearms.
 The Court also found that Fajardo was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the receivers and
that there was no evidence linking her to Valerio's actions.
 The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish that the gun allegedly seen tucked in
Fajardo's waistband matched any of the seized receivers.
 Therefore, the Court acquitted Fajardo on the ground of reasonable doubt.