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Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen
zum Neuen Testament · 2. Reihe

Herausgeber / Editor
Jörg Frey (Zürich)

Mitherausgeber/Associate Editors
Markus Bockmuehl (Oxford) · James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala)
Tobias Nicklas (Regensburg) · Janet Spittler (Charlottesville, VA)
J. Ross Wagner (Durham, NC)

565
Thomas Tops

Paroimia and Parrēsia


in the Gospel of John
A Historical-Hermeneutical Study

Mohr Siebeck
Thomas Tops, born 1988; studied philosophy, theology, and classics, University of Ant-
werp and KU Leuven; 2017−21 PhD project, PThU Groningen and KU Leuven; since
2021 post-doctoral research fellow at the Centre for Advanced Studies “Beyond Canon,”
University of Regensburg, Germany.
orcid.org/0000-0002-4399-7045

ISBN 978-3-16-161102-5 / eISBN 978-3-16-161314-2


DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-161314-2
ISSN 0340-9570 / eISSN 2568-7484
(Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 2. Reihe)
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbiblio-
graphie; detailed bibliographic data are available at http://dnb.dnb.de.

© 2022 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, Germany. www.mohrsiebeck.com


This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that per-
mitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies parti-
cularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems.
The book was printed on non-aging paper by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen, and
bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren.
Printed in Germany.
Table of Contents

Preface .......................................................................................................... V

Abbreviations and Used Editions............................................................. XVII

Introduction ................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1 Transforming Historical Objectivism into Historical


Hermeneutics: From “Historical Illness” to Properly Lived
Historicality ............................................................................................... 7

1. The Tension between Theology and Modern-Historical


Methodologies ....................................................................................... 8

2. From Historical Objectivism to Historical Hermeneutics .................... 11

3. The Reception-Historical Methodology ............................................... 14


3.1 Historical Criticism as a Prelude for the Study of Reception
History .............................................................................................. 14
3.2 Historical Criticism as Identical to the Study of Reception
History .............................................................................................. 17
3.3 Historical Criticism as an Integrated Discipline of the Study of
Reception History ............................................................................. 20

4. From “Historical Illness” to Properly Lived Historicality .................. 22

5. From Historical Consciousness to wirkungsgeschichtliches


Bewusstsein ........................................................................................ 30

6. Hermeneutical Consciousness and the Fragehorizont of the Text ........ 33

7. The Alterity of the Text ........................................................................ 35


VIII Table of Contents

8. The (In)Validity of Textual Interpretation............................................ 41

9. Intermediate Conclusion ..................................................................... 49

Chapter 2 An Evaluative Status Quaestionis on and


in the Gospel of John ....................................................... 53

1. Johannine in Early Scholarly Literature ............................. 54


1.1 The Terms and as Synonyms in the
LXX .................................................................................................. 54
1.2 Johannine as Inauthentic ................................................. 59
1.3 Johannine and Synoptic as Equivalent
Translations of an Aramaic Vorlage ................................................ 60
1.4 Johannine as the Means of Communication of the
Johannine Group ............................................................................... 62

2. The Genre-Critical Approach: Johannine as Terminus


Technicus for a Literary Genre ........................................................... 64
2.1 The Literary Genre of Johannine .................................... 65
2.2 Related Studies ................................................................................. 67
2.3 Intermediary Studies ......................................................................... 69
2.4 Critical Reactions ............................................................................. 70

3. The Hermeneutical Approach: Johannine and


as Modi Dicendi and Modi Intelligendi ............................. 73
3.1 Johannine and as Key Terms of
Christological Epistemology ............................................................ 73
3.2 Johannine and as Key Terms of John’s
Philosophical Understanding of Language ...................................... 77
3.3 Dialectics between Johannine and as
Relecture ........................................................................................... 78

4. The Post-Hermeneutical Approach: Johannine and the


Philosophical Idea of Inexpressibility ................................................. 80
4.1 Studies Inspired by Derrida .............................................................. 80
4.2 Related Studies ................................................................................. 83

5. The Reader-Response Approach: Johannine as a


Literary Strategy ................................................................................. 85
Table of Contents IX

5.1 Johannine and the Cosmological Tale (A.


Reinhartz) ......................................................................................... 86
5.2 Johannine and Participation/Transformation (G.R.
O’Day and R. Kysar) ........................................................................ 88
5.3 Johannine and Mark 4:1–20 (C.W. Skinner).................. 90

6. Studies on the Semantics of Johannine ............................... 92


6.1 Johannine as Specifically Christian ............................... 93
6.2 An Initial Attempt to Historical Contextualisation of Johannine
(G.L. Parsenios)............................................................ 100

7. Intermediate Conclusion ................................................................... 106

Chapter 3 and in the Literary Context of


the Gospel of John ............................................................................... 109

1. John 10.............................................................................................. 109

2. John 11:11–16................................................................................... 123

3. John 16:23–33................................................................................... 127


3.1 Relecture and réécriture ................................................................. 129
3.2 The Aporia of John 16:5 ................................................................. 132
3.3 The Fusion of Pre-Paschal and Post-Paschal Time in John
16:23–33 ......................................................................................... 136

4. Intermediate Conclusion ................................................................... 144

Chapter 4 The Orientation of the Teaching of the Post-Paschal


Paraclete in the Gospel of John ........................................................ 145

1. John 14:25–26................................................................................... 146


1.1 John 14:26e: Antecedent(s) of Relative Pronoun? ........................ 148
1.2 John 14:26d: Explicative or Cumulative ? ............................... 151

2. John 16:12–13................................................................................... 153


2.1 John 16:13c, e: + or
+ ? .............................................................. 156
X Table of Contents

2.2 John 16:13c: The Meaning of / .................................. 159


2.3 John 16:12a: The Meaning of ............................................ 159
2.4 John 16:13f: The Meaning of ............... 161

3. Repetition as a Key Notion for Understanding the Teaching


Function of the Paraclete .................................................................. 162
3.1 Kierkegaard’s Distinction between Recollection and Repetition .. 163
3.2 The Paraclete’s Reminding and Teaching as Recollection and
Repetition ........................................................................................ 166

4. Intermediate Conclusion ................................................................... 168

Chapter 5 The Semantics of and in


Connection to and in John 16:23–27 ................. 171

1. and in the Fourth Gospel ........................................ 172


1.1 Pre-Paschal versus Post-Paschal .......................... 172
1.2 Polemical versus Confident .................................. 176

2. and in John 16:23–27 ........................................... 179


2.1 A Philological Analysis of and in John 16:23–
27..................................................................................................... 180
2.2 The Disciples and Jesus’ at the Hour (John 16:25) ..... 181

3. In Jesus’ Name .................................................................................. 187


3.1 Evaluative Status Quaestionis ........................................................ 187
3.2 John 16:26 ....................................................................................... 188
3.3 Being Sent by Jesus ........................................................................ 191

4. Intermediate Conclusion ................................................................... 193

Chapter 6 The of the Johannine Jesus as an


Experimental Teaching Method ....................................................... 197

1. Philodemus: as an Experimental Method ......................... 198

2. as an Experimental Method Beyond Epicureanism .......... 201


2.1 Plutarch ....................................................................................... 202
Table of Contents XI

2.2 Clement of Alexandria ................................................................ 203

3. The Gospel of John ............................................................................ 205


3.1 John 7:1–44 ..................................................................................... 205
3.2 John 10:1–30 ................................................................................... 208

4. Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Fourth Gospel as


an Act of .......................................................................... 209

Chapter 7 The Adaptability of the of Jesus in the


Fourth Gospel ....................................................................................... 211

1. Philodemus: The Two Forms of ....................................... 211

2. The Two Forms of beyond Epicureanism ......................... 214


2.1 Philo ................................................................................................ 214
2.2 The Cynic Epistles .......................................................................... 216
2.3 Plutarch ........................................................................................... 218
2.3.1 Therapeutic ............................................................ 218
2.3.2 Practical ................................................................. 221
2.4 Dio Chrysostom .............................................................................. 224
2.5 Clement of Alexandria ................................................................... 225

3. The Gospel of John ............................................................................ 228


3.1 The Mixed Form of in the Farewell Discourse............ 229
3.1.1 John 13:36–14:10 .................................................................... 229
3.1.2 John 14:11–24 ......................................................................... 231
3.1.3 John 14:25–28 ......................................................................... 231
3.1.4 John 16:25–32 ......................................................................... 232
3.2 The Mixed Form of outside the Farewell Discourse ... 233
3.2.1 John 1:46–51 ........................................................................... 234
3.2.2 John 3:9–10 ............................................................................. 235
3.2.3 John 20:24–29 ......................................................................... 236
3.3 The Simple Form of ..................................................... 237
3.3.1 John 5:37–38 ........................................................................... 237
3.3.2 John 5:41–42 ........................................................................... 238
3.3.3 John 6:26–27, 36 ..................................................................... 239
3.3.4 John 7:14–31 ........................................................................... 241
3.4 The Gradual Intensification of ..................................... 243
3.4.1 John 8:12–20 ........................................................................... 243
XII Table of Contents

3.4.2 John 8:21–30 ........................................................................... 244


3.4.3 John 8:31–37 ........................................................................... 244
3.4.4 John 8:38–47 ........................................................................... 245
3.5 John 19:19–22 ................................................................................. 248

4. Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Fourth Gospel as


an Act of .......................................................................... 249

Chapter 8 Jesus’ and the Salvation of the in


the Fourth Gospel................................................................................. 253

1. The Paraclete’s in John 16:9–11 ........................................ 253

2. , Shame, and Repentance .................................................. 254


2.1 LXX Proverbs ................................................................................. 255
2.2 Philodemus...................................................................................... 260
2.3 Philo ................................................................................................ 260
2.4 Plutarch ........................................................................................... 262
2.5 Clement of Alexandria ................................................................... 264
2.6 John ................................................................................................. 264

3. The Salvation of the in the Fourth Gospel ............................ 266


3.1 John 8:28; 19:37 ............................................................................. 266
3.2 John 12:32 ....................................................................................... 267
3.3 John 12:39–40 ................................................................................. 268
3.4 John 3:16–17; 12:46–47 et al. ........................................................ 270

4. Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Fourth Gospel as


an Act of .......................................................................... 271

Chapter 9 Friendship and in the Fourth Gospel ..... 275

1. Friendship Language in the Fourth Gospel ....................................... 275


1.1 .............................................................................................. 275
1.2 , ............................................................................. 279
1.2.1 Father – Son............................................................................. 279
1.2.2 Jesus – Disciples ..................................................................... 279

2. The Greco-Roman Ideal of Friendship .............................................. 280


Table of Contents XIII

3. Friendship, , and Commitment .......................................... 283


3.1 LXX Wisdom Tradition ................................................................. 283
3.2 Philo ................................................................................................ 284
3.3 John ................................................................................................. 285

4. Jesus’ Death as Act of Friendship ..................................................... 287


4.1 Scholarly Literature ........................................................................ 287
4.2 Friendship and .............................................................. 289
4.2.1 Philodemus .............................................................................. 290
4.2.2 Plutarch .................................................................................... 291
4.3 John ................................................................................................. 294

5. Intermediate Conclusion ................................................................... 296

Chapter 10 Jesus’ in the Fourth Gospel: Public


and/or Private? ...................................................................................... 297

1. The Scholarly Distinction of Public/Political and Private/Ethical


......................................................................................... 297

2. Public and Private from the First Century BCE to the


Second Century CE ........................................................................... 299
2.1 Philodemus...................................................................................... 299
2.2 Plutarch ........................................................................................... 300
2.3 Lucian of Samosata ........................................................................ 303

3. Public and Private in the Gospel of John ......................... 305

4. Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Fourth Gospel as


an Act of .......................................................................... 309

Chapter 11 and in LXX Proverbs, the


Ancient Rhetorical Theory of Figured speech, Plutarch, and the
Gospel of John ...................................................................................... 311

1. LXX Proverbs and its Early Reception .............................................. 311


1.1 LXX Proverbs 1:1–6 ....................................................................... 312
1.2 Early Church Fathers ...................................................................... 314
XIV Table of Contents

1.2.1 Clement of Alexandria ............................................................ 314


1.2.2 Basil of Caesarea ..................................................................... 316
1.2.3 Gregory of Nyssa .................................................................... 319
1.2.4 Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae (Ps.-John Chrysostom/ Ps.-
Athanasius) ....................................................................................... 322

2. Rhetorical Theory of Figured Speech ................................................ 323


2.1 Demetrius ........................................................................................ 324
2.2 Quintilian ........................................................................................ 326
2.3 Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus ...................................................... 330
2.4 Ps.-Hermogenes .............................................................................. 332

3. Plutarch ............................................................................................ 334


3.1 and ............................................................ 335
3.2 and .............................................................. 337

4. The Gospel of John ............................................................................ 341


4.1 John 7:32–36 ................................................................................... 344
4.2 John 10:1–6 ..................................................................................... 346

5. Intermediate Conclusion and Reflection on the Socio-Historical


Situation of the Fourth Gospel .......................................................... 348

Chapter 12 A Historical-Contextual Comparison of


and in John to and in Mark . 351

1. Evaluative Status Quaestionis on (Mark 8:32a) ............... 351


1.1 The Opposite Term of ? ................................................ 351
1.2 as Univocal Language?................................................ 355

2. and in Mark and the Ancient Rhetorical


Theory of Figured Speech ................................................................. 356
2.1 Markan Parable Theory and Demetrius’ Definition of Figured
Speech ............................................................................................. 357
2.2 The Markan and the Motives/Uses of Figured
Speech in Ancient Rhetorical Theory ............................................ 361
2.2.1 The Motives/Uses of Figured Speech in Mark 4:1–34........... 362
2.2.2 The Motives/Uses of Figured Speech in Mark 12:1–9........... 364
2.2.3 and Safety in Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:33–34 ............ 365
Table of Contents XV

3. Comparison of and in John to


and in Mark ..................................................................... 367
3.1 Initial Attempts ............................................................................... 368
3.2 Historical-Contextual Approach .................................................... 370
3.3 The Johannine and the Markan through
the Lens of Quintilian ..................................................................... 372

4. Intermediate Conclusion ................................................................... 376

General Conclusion ............................................................................. 379

1. Historical Hermeneutics .................................................................... 379

2. Status Quaestionis ............................................................................. 381

3. and in the Literary Context of the Gospel ....... 384

4. The Orientation of the Teaching of the Paraclete .............................. 385

5. The use of and in Connection to


and in John 16:23–27 ............................................................. 386

6. Jesus’ as an Experimental Teaching Method ................... 387

7. The Adaptability of Jesus’ ................................................ 388

8. Jesus’ and the Salvation of the ............................ 391

9. and Friendship in the Gospel .......................................... 392

10. The Public Character of Jesus’ ...................................... 393

11. Johannine and and the Ancient Rhetorical


Theory of Figured Speech ................................................................ 394

12. A Comparison of the Johannine and to the


Markan and .................................................. 395

13. Implications and Avenues of Future Research ................................. 398


XVI Table of Contents

Appendix 1: M š l in the Hebrew Bible and Its Translation Equivalents in


the LXX and the Early Jewish Revisers ..................................................... 401
Appendix 2: Lists of Johannine ............................................... 403
Appendix 3: Carson’s List of Literary Features of the Johannine
Misunderstandings..................................................................................... 423

Bibliography.............................................................................................. 427

Index of Ancient Sources…………………………………………………...465


Index of Modern Authors…………………………………………………...487
Index of Subjects……………………………………………………………493
Preface

This monograph presents my doctoral dissertation defended at the Protestant


Theological University (PThU) of Groningen/Amsterdam on 11 June 2021 (ju-
dicium: cum laude) with some minor adjustments. From April 2017 until April
2021 I worked on a Joint PhD project at the PThU Groningen and KU Leuven
under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Annette Merz (PThU) and Prof. Dr. Reimund
Bieringer (KU Leuven). I would like to express my deepest gratitude for the
guidance and encouragements that I received from my two supervisors. I
greatly benefitted from their comments and suggestions regarding the content,
style, and structure of my dissertation. It was a pleasure to work with them.
Along with my supervisors, I would like to thank Prof. em. Dr. Gilbert Van
Belle, from whom I have learned too much to enumerate here.
In addition to my supervisors, I thank the following persons for having com-
mented on texts that have led to this monograph: Dr. Robert Evans (University
of Chester, UK), Prof. Dr. Arie Zwiep (VU Amsterdam, Netherlands), Prof.
Dr. Hector Patmore (KU Leuven, Belgium), and Prof. Dr. Kristin De Troyer
(University of Salzburg, Austria). I also thank Paul Creevey for having cor-
rected the English of my text.
Special thanks go to Prof. Dr. John Fitzgerald, under whose supervision I
worked at Notre Dame University in June 2018 and from 10 November to 10
December 2019. His comments on my writings greatly helped me to develop
my thoughts on in ancient literature and the Gospel of John in par-
ticular.
Words of gratitude are also directed to the PThU, who have funded the four
years of my doctoral research. I will always be in debt to this institution for
having provided me with this opportunity.
I thank Prof. Dr. Jörg Frey and the associate editors of WUNT II for pub-
lishing my dissertation in this prestigious series. My appreciation also goes to
the editorial team of Mohr Siebeck, who helped me prepare the manuscript for
publication.
Finally, I am grateful for the support and love of my girlfriend, family, and
friends. They were essential to me in the process of writing this monograph.
Abbreviations and Used Editions

For biblical writings, I make use of Nestle-Aland 28, the Biblia Hebraica
Stuttgartensia, and the Göttingen edition of the LXX.1 For the LXX writings
of which there is presently no Göttingen edition (e.g., Proverbs), I am obliged
to consult Rahlfs’ edition.2 Translations of biblical texts are my own, if not
indicated otherwise. For ancient non-biblical writings, I have, as a rule, in the
first quotation mentioned the edition I quote from. If I provide a translation, I
either refer to the translator in footnote or mention that it is my translation, or
a translation that is adapted by me. The reader can find the full references of
the translations in the bibliography.
The abbreviations of journals, major reference works, and series used in this
monograph are taken from the SBL Handbook of Style.3 For the abbreviations
of the names of ancient authors and their writings (including biblical) I have
used the SBL Handbook of Style, Liddell – Scott – Jones, and Lampe.4 In some
rare occasions, these reference works did not offer the required abbreviations,
or the abbreviations offered were difficult to understand for an uninformed
reader. I then used the abbreviations provided by the Franz Joseph Dölger In-
stitut.5
The following abbreviations were used that cannot be found in the above-
mentioned reference works:

1
Karl Elliger et al. (eds.), Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelge-
sellschaft, 51997); Barbara Aland et al. (eds.), Novum Testamentum Graece (Stuttgart: Deut-
sche Bibelgesellschaft, 282012); Joseph Ziegler et al. (eds.), Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum
Graecum. Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Gottingensis editum, 16 Bände (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926–2015).
2
Alfred Rahlfs (ed.), Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum Graece iuxta LXX inter-
pretes (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006).
3
See Billie J. Collins/Bob Buller/John F. Kutsko (eds.), The SBL Handbook of Style: For
Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines (Atlanta GA: SBL Press, 22014), 171–260.
4
See Geoffrey W.H. Lampe (ed.), A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961),
xi–xlv; Henry G. Liddell/Robert Scott/Henry S. Jones (eds.), A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th
ed. with revised supplement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), xvi–xxxviii; Collins/Buller/Kutsko
(eds.), The SBL Handbook, 124–171.
5
See Franz Joseph Dölger Institut, https://www.antike-und-christentum.de/rac_tools/ab-
kuerzungen [accessed January 19, 2021].
XVIII Abbreviations

GW Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Gesammelte Werke. 10 vols. Tübingen:


Mohr Siebeck, 1985–1995.
KNT Kommentar zum Neuen Testament. 18 vols. Leipzig: Deichert,
1903–1926.
KSA Nietzsche, Friedrich. Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe,
edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. 15 vols. Munich:
dtv & de Gruyter, 1977.
NLLT Natural Language & Linguistic Theory
NZST Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphiloso-
phie
Introduction

The Gospel of John is known for its abundance of figurative language, meta-
phors, and symbols. In the last thirty years, major works have been written on
these elements of the Johannine language.1 Much attention has been given to
the classification of the different types of figurative language and how the im-
agery is used in earlier biblical traditions or in the world around the New Tes-
tament.2 These attempts have led to an awareness of the peculiarities of Johan-
nine language and the importance of studying this language in its own right in
comparison to the parables of the Synoptic Gospels. The present study has
grown out of this awareness and aims to provide a historical-hermeneutical
analysis of the Johannine views on language, as they are expressed by the terms
and .3 The main research question is how to interpret
John’s use of these terms in its historical context. As we will see, previous
scholarly literature has mainly interpreted these terms in the literary context of
the Gospel. My evaluation of the scholarly literature will show that many dif-
ficulties of interpretation in John’s use of and have not
yet been observed.4 I will go beyond the limitations of previous scholarship by
providing a broad historical-contextual framework to interpret John’s use of

1
I mention here Jan G. van der Watt, Family of the King: Dynamics of Metaphor in the
Gospel According to John, BibInt 47 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000); Ruben Zimmermann, Chris-
tologie der Bilder im Johannesevangelium: Die Christopoetik des vierten Evangeliums unter
besonderer Berücksichtigung von Joh 10, WUNT 171 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004); Jörg
Frey/Jan G. van der Watt/Ruben Zimmermann (eds.), Imagery in the Gospel of John, WUNT
200 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006); Ruben Zimmermann (ed.), Kompendium der Gleich-
nisse Jesu (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), 697–848; Clémence Hélou, Symbole
et langage dans les écrits johanniques, Pensée religieuse et philosophique arabe (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 2012). Many more studies could be mentioned. For overviews of the literature,
see van der Watt, Family of the King, xvii–xviii; Zimmermann, Christologie, 77–87; Ruben
Zimmermann, “Imagery in John: Opening up Paths into the Tangled Thicket of John’s Fig-
urative World,” in Frey/van der Watt/Zimmermann (eds.), Imagery in the Gospel of John,
1–43, at 2–9.
2
See the studies mentioned in the overviews quoted above in n. 1.
3
As we will see in Chapter One, historical hermeneutics is not a new historical method,
but goes beyond the modern understanding of method, as it grounds historical research in
the historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) of the researcher.
4
See infra, Chapter Two.
2 Introduction

and : Philodemus’ , Plutarch’s


, LXX Proverbs, the ancient rhetorical
theory of figured speech, etc. I will provide original analyses of the views on
and in these writings and will examine whether John is
(indirectly) influenced by these views. By reading John against the background
of these writings I will open up new paths into “the tangled thicket of John’s
figurative world”.5
In Chapter One, I will provide the theoretical framework of the methodology
of this study. It is notoriously difficult to interpret John’s language because of
its incoherent and intricate nature. Our modern love for coherency and clarity
is not shared by John, who appears to have different standards and a different
understanding of how language operates. Interpreting John’s language requires
of us to translate his language to ours. There is always an inevitable historical
mediation in the interpretation of language. In this mediation, it is important
not to project our own understanding and standards of language onto the Gos-
pel and to take into consideration John’s views on Jesus’ language. At the same
time, mediation can only take place on the basis of our own presuppositions.
Biblical interpretation without presuppositions is impossible.6 Chapter One
will provide a critical reflection on this process of historical mediation. With
Gadamer, I will argue for the necessity of elucidating the “prejudices”, or pre-
suppositions, that constitute my historical horizon. Only by becoming con-
scious, as much as possible, of the presuppositions that have guided previous
interpretations of and in the Fourth Gospel, I can be ad-
dressed by the otherness of John’s Gospel. The text can either correct, alter, or
confirm these presuppositions. The confrontation with the otherness of the text
will generate new questions, which will allow me to identify with the hypo-
thetical first reader of the Gospel. Given this substantial influence of Gada-
mer’s understanding of historical hermeneutics on my methodology, the pre-
sent study is characterised as historical-hermeneutical.
In Chapter Two, I will provide an overview of previous scholarly literature
on and in the Fourth Gospel. This overview will not only
be descriptive, but also evaluative. I will provide an analysis of the shortcom-
ings of the scholarly literature, and an elucidation of the presuppositions that
have guided scholarly interpretations. In this endeavour, new research ques-
tions will be formulated that will allow me to provide a new perspective on
John’s use of and . These questions will be addressed by

5
The metaphor is derived from Zimmermann, “Imagery in John,” who is inspired by
Adolf Jülicher’s comments on Johannine imagery.
6
For instance, the questions that guide Biblical exegesis already presuppose a certain
idea of the subject matter with which biblical writings are concerned. Correctly observed by
Rudolf K. Bultmann, “Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?,” TZ 13 (1957) 409–417.
Introduction 3

the subsequent chapters. Chapter Two is the backbone of Chapters Three to


Twelve.
Chapter Three will pose the question of how relates to
in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. Are they opposite terms, as might
be concluded on the basis of John 16:25? Or can they be reconciled with one
another? Jesus claims to have spoken before his death (16:25),
yet equally claims to have taught in this period (18:20; cf. 7:26;
11:14). Through literary analyses of and in John 10;
11:11–16; 16:23–33, I will examine whether Jesus’ is in opposition
to his teaching, or whether his is expressed through
.
In Chapter Four, I will address the question of the orientation of the teaching
of the Paraclete. Scholarly literature on and in John as-
sumes that the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete is retrospective (John
14:25–26; 16:12–13). In this interpretation, the Paraclete’s teaching provides
the disciples with a univocal knowledge of Jesus’ words. The authors of this
position claim that this modus intelligendi of the disciples is characterised by
in opposition to the modus intelligendi of misunderstanding, which
is depicted by (16:25). In this dominant interpretation of
and , they are purely cognitive terms used by John to re-
flect on the conditions of Christological knowledge. I will examine on the basis
of philological criteria whether the orientation of the teaching of the Paraclete
is presented as retrospective or prospective in 14:25–26 and 16:12–13. The
formulation that the Paraclete is to teach (16:13f) suggests that
the teaching of the Paraclete is prospective as well.
In Chapter Five, I will analyse John’s discourse on the different forms of
asking ( , ) in connection to and (John
16:23–27). A strong division between past and future is present in this passage.
The pre-paschal is juxtaposed to the post-paschal (16:23–24,
26). The positioning of 16:25 within this discourse suggests a connection of
to , and to . I will address the question
how to understand these connections. Important primary sources that will be
used for interpreting the connection of to in this context are
Philo, Her. 6–7, 26–27 and LXX Job 27:7–10.
Chapter Six will deal with a paradox in John’s depiction of Jesus’
. John repeatedly stresses that Jesus spoke, and even walked,
during his life time (John 7:26; 10:24–25; 11:14, 54). At the same
time, he considers the hour of Jesus’ death to be the time of his
(7:6–8; 16:25). As we will see, this ambiguity in the text is difficult to explain
from within the literary context of the Gospel. The question I will address is
how the hypothetical first reader, who is directly or indirectly influenced by
the contemporary conventions of , probably interpreted this puzzling
description of Jesus’ in the Fourth Gospel. An important idea that I
4 Introduction

will use for this purpose is Philodemus’ understanding of as an ex-


perimental (“stochastic”) teaching method of which the outcome is uncertain
in advance and dependent on the . Other ancient authors who will be
discussed are Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria. Similar to Philodemus, they
compare the use of to the use of medicine.
In Chapter Seven, I will pose the question how Jesus’ adjusts
itself to its addressees in the literary context of the Fourth Gospel. Among oth-
ers, I will examine whether the intensity of Jesus’ to the disciples
differs from his to the ‘Jews’, and, if so, how. I will provide a his-
torical-contextual reading of this adaptability from the perspective of the con-
ventions of as attested by Philodemus, Philo, the Cynic Epistles,
Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Clement of Alexandria.
Chapter Eight will address the question how Jesus’ is connected
to the idea of the salvation of the in the Fourth Gospel. Many passages
in the Gospel speak of, or presuppose, the salvation of the (e.g., John
3:16–17; 8:28; 12:32, 39–40, 46–47). Jesus always taught the
(18:20) and the Paraclete will, as the mouthpiece of Jesus’
at the hour (16:25), continue this teaching by means of
his of the (16:9–11). I will research how to understand this
connection between Jesus’ and the promise of the salvation of the
. The important primary sources and authors that I will discuss for this
purpose are LXX Proverbs, Philodemus, Philo, Plutarch, and Clement of Al-
exandria.
In Chapter Nine, I will ask the question as to how Jesus’ relates
to friendship language in John’s Gospel. Jesus’ death is presented as both an
act of friendship (John 15:13) and an act of (16:25). I will enquire
how to understand this connection between friendship and in the
Gospel from the perspective of the ancient conventions of . Given
that, in antiquity, is the discerning feature of a friend in distinction
to a flatterer, it is to be expected that I will find an application of this criterion
of friendship in John’s presentation of Jesus’ death as both an act of friendship
and an act of . Important ancient authors that I will discuss for this
purpose are Philodemus and Plutarch. Another exegetical question I will ad-
dress is how to understand the combination of the ideas of commitment (John
15:14) and open communication (15:15) in John’s understanding of friendship.
The formulation of the open communication between Jesus and his disciples
reminds us of the idea of between friends. LXX Wisdom literature
and Philo will be my main reference sources to examine these features of the
friendship bonds between Jesus and the disciples.
Chapter Ten will deal with the question as to whether Jesus’ is
characterised as public and/or private in the Fourth Gospel. Scholarly discus-
sions of in antiquity often distinguish between a public (or political)
Introduction 5

use of and a private (or ethical) use of . I will, first, exam-


ine whether John’s readers, who were (indirectly) influenced by the contempo-
rary conventions of , made such a distinction. For my study of these
conventions, I will discuss Philodemus, Plutarch, and Lucian of Samosata. Sec-
ond, I will enquire whether the information that John provides us about what
we – as present-day readers – would call Jesus’ private use of and
his public use of , entails that there is a distinction between both. On
the basis of John 18:20, it is to be expected that John considered the totality of
Jesus’ teaching, including his teaching of the disciples, to be a
teaching performed in public instead of (“in secret”).
In Chapter Eleven, I will pose the question how the first readers of the Gos-
pel probably interpreted John’s use of and . This chapter
builds on the research results of Chapter Three. The main primary sources for
interpreting how relates to in the Fourth Gospel are LXX
Prov 1:1–6 and the ancient rhetorical theory of figured speech delivered to us
through Demetrius, Quintilian, Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Ps.-Her-
mogenes. Especially Plutarch will be an important reference source for inter-
preting the relationship between and in the Fourth Gos-
pel.
Finally, Chapter Twelve will provide a historical-contextual comparison of
John’s use of and to Mark’s use of and
. As Mark is the only other canonical Gospel that uses the term
(Mark 8:32), the question arises why John opted for a different term
(viz., ) to refer to Jesus’ imagery. The historical-contextual frame-
work developed in Chapter Eleven will be used to interpret the relationship
between and in Mark. This historical-contextual frame-
work will enable me to describe the differences between Mark’s use of
and and John’s use of and . Fi-
nally, the rhetorical theory of Quintilian will be used to explain why John opted
for (in combination with ) instead of (in com-
bination with ).
All twelve chapters will end with an intermediate conclusion. At the end of
the study, I will formulate a general conclusion in which I summarise the re-
search results of the entire study.
Chapter 1

Transforming Historical Objectivism into Historical


Hermeneutics: From “Historical Illness”
to Properly Lived Historicality

The present chapter aims to provide a critical reflection on the role of modern-
historical methodologies in Biblical criticism. The first section will analyse the
reservations about modern-historical methodologies coming from recent schol-
arly literature in the field of Biblical studies and theology. On the basis of this
analysis, the second section will argue for the necessity of transforming histor-
ical objectivism, or positivism, into historical hermeneutics. The third section
will evaluate whether the present practices of reception-historical methodology
in Biblical studies are able to perform this transformation by: (i) combining
historical criticism with reception-historical methodologies; and (ii) reformu-
lating historical criticism in terms of reception history. I will demonstrate that
these attempts, although their intent is to criticise historical objectivism, still
operate from the metaphysical subject-object distinction that is fundamental
for historical objectivism.
Due to this inability of present practices in Biblical studies to dismantle the
foundational metaphysical framework of historical objectivism, the fourth sec-
tion of the present chapter will renew the dialogue between Biblical studies and
philosophy. Modern historicism neglects the historical horizon of the historian.
Human consciousness is, however, dispersed in time. It is oriented towards the
past, the present, and the future. The subject-object distinction of historical ob-
jectivism posits the historian outside history. The modern historian operates
from a view from nowhere. The limitations of one’s own historicality are ne-
glected. Modern historical consciousness seeks to gather the totality of history,
but is ultimately overwhelmed by history. By neglecting the limits of historical
knowledge set out by the historicality of human consciousness, one is unable
to carry history further, and suffers from what Friedrich Nietzsche calls “his-
torische Krankheit”. In order to relate authentically to one’s own historicality,
Nietzsche experiments with the idea of transforming historiography into an art
form. I will evaluate Nietzsche’s understanding of antiquarian, monumental,
and critical historiography in this respect. Nietzsche, however, understands the
historical horizon of human life as something that is closed, whereas, even
speaking of one’s own historical horizon presupposes that one can transcend
it.
8 Chapter 1: Historical Hermeneutics

The fifth section of the present chapter will discuss how Hans-Georg Gada-
mer tackles this problem with his notion of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusst-
sein. After the theoretical discussion of this notion, the sixth section will be
more oriented to the practice of Biblical interpretation by addressing Gada-
mer’s understanding of the hermeneutical consciousness of the researcher and
the Fragehorizont of the text. The seventh and eight sections will continue this
focus on the practice of Biblical interpretation by addressing Gadamer’s think-
ing on the alterity of the text, and the (in)validity of textual interpretation. In
the intermediate conclusion, I will explain how Gadamer and historical herme-
neutics are fundamental for the approach of the present study on the terms
and in the Gospel of John.1

1. The Tension between Theology and Modern-Historical


Methodologies
1. THE TENSION BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND MODERN-HISTORICAL METHODOLOGIES
The relationship between theology and modern historicism is one of tension.2
The Pontifical Biblical Commission has argued for the necessity of the histor-
ical-critical method for the interpretation of the foundational texts of Christi-
anity:
“The Eternal Word became incarnate at a precise period of history, within a clearly defined
cultural and social environment. Anyone who desires to understand the word of God should
humbly seek it out there where it has made itself visible and accept to this end the necessary
help of human knowledge.”3

Regardless of the indispensability of historical study for the interpretation of


the Bible, scholarly literature of the 21st century in the field of Biblical studies
and theology has, according to my analysis, three reservations about traditional
modern-historical methodologies.

1
Parts of the present chapter were previously published in Thomas Tops, “Transforming
Historical Objectivism into Historical Hermeneutics: From ‘Historical Illness’ to Properly
Lived Historicality,” NZST 61/4 (2019) 490–515. See, also, Thomas Tops, “The Challenge
of Ideological-Critical Interpretation in Biblical Studies: From Modern Historical to Histor-
ically Effected Consciousness,” in Theology in a World of Ideologies: Authorization or Cri-
tique?, ed. Hans-Martin Kirn/Wolter Rose, Beihefte zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 133
(Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2020), 186–199.
2
The present reader will see that the understanding of theology used in the present sub-
section is very democratic in the sense that theologians and Biblical scholars of different
Christian denominations are discussed.
3
The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church: Address of His Holiness Pope John Paul
II and Document of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, Vatican Documents (Rome: Libreria
Editrice Vaticana, 1993), 189.
1. The Tension between Theology and Modern-Historical Methodologies 9

The first reservation is epistemological. According to George Aichele, Peter


Miscall, and Richard Walsh, claims to knowledge of an essential or definite
meaning of a biblical text are without foundation (anti-foundationalism). They,
therefore, do not accept that there is “a final account, an assured and agreed-
on interpretation” of any biblical text (anti-essentialism).4 As historical critics
think that they reconstruct the definite meaning of biblical texts, Aichele, Mis-
call, and Walsh have portrayed the practice of historical criticism as myth mak-
ing.5
The second reservation about traditional historical-critical methodologies is
theological. According to some critics, historical criticism is anti-theological.
Historical criticism only leads to more historical questions, whereas theologi-
cal questions recede.6 According to Ulrich Luz, the major problem of histori-
cal-critical exegesis is that it isolates biblical texts in their original historical
context so that they have no contemporary relevance at all.7 John Millbank
observes that historical criticism operates from an anti-theological world view,
because it presupposes that the world is ontologically autonomous from God
and leaves no room for divine intervention.8 Jürgen Moltmann claims that mod-
ern historicism has factualised history and has, thus, detached the present from
the past. As the Gospel cannot be reduced to facts, it cannot be the research
object of historical criticism. Moltmann concludes that historical criticism has
diverted New Testament studies from its proper research object.9
The third reservation about traditional historical-critical methodologies is
cultural-historical. According to Bradley McLean, modern historicism has
caused what he calls the present state of nihilism, because it has made people
aware of the cultural and historical contingency of all forms of biblical belief,
values, and ethics. Modern historicism has discovered that there are no eternal
truths, nor is there an absolute point of reference. Everything is subjected to

4
George Aichele/Peter Miscall/Richard Walsh, “An Elephant in the Room: Historical-
Critical and Postmodern Interpretations of the Bible,” JBL 128/2 (2009) 383–404: at 384.
5
See Aichele/Miscall/Walsh, “An Elephant”: 389–396.
6
See Karl Möller, “Renewing Historical Criticism,” in Renewing Biblical Interpretation,
ed. Craig G. Bartholomew/Colin J.D. Greene/Karl Möller, Scripture and Hermeneutics Se-
ries 1 (Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan, 2000), 145–171; Christopher R. Seitz, “Scripture Be-
comes Religion(s): The Theological Crisis of Serious Biblical Interpretation in the Twentieth
Century,” in Bartholomew/Greene/Möller (eds.), Renewing Biblical Interpretation, 40–65;
Johnson T.K. Lim, “Historical Critical Paradigm: The Beginning of an End,” AsJT 14 (2000)
252–271.
7
See Ulrich Luz, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus, vol. 1, Mt 1-7, EKKNT I/1 (Düssel-
dorf: Benziger, 52002), 109–110.
8
See Benjamin Sargent, “John Milbank and Biblical Hermeneutics: The End of the His-
torical-Critical Method?,” HeyJ 53 (2012) 253–263: at 254–256.
9
See Jürgen Moltmann, “‘Verstehst Du auch, was Du liest?’ Neutestamentliche Wissen-
schaft und die hermeneutische Frage der Theologie. Ein Zwischenruf,” EvT 71/6 (2011)
405–414: at 407–409.
10 Chapter 1: Historical Hermeneutics

historical decay. Early Christianity is reduced to pure historical knowledge.


Therefore, it is a dead religion. It has no contemporary relevance.10
In my observation, all three reservations about modern-historical methodol-
ogies are ultimately criticisms against historical objectivism or positivism. His-
torical objectivism is seen as: (i) a myth; (ii) detrimental for the contemporary
(theological) relevance of biblical texts; and (iii) one of the causes of the “crisis
of nihilism”.11
In spite of these criticisms there is little awareness of the philosophical ten-
ets of historical criticism among Biblical scholars. This is partly because there
is little dialogue between philosophers and historical critics. The aggressive
reaction of the historical critic John Van Seters to the postmodernists Aichele,
Miscall, and Walsh cannot be considered as a dialogue because Van Seters
wrongly compares postmodernists to unhistorical novel writers,12 whereas
postmodernists consider history as “a necessary function of consciousness” and
a condition of possibility for human understanding.13 One might get the im-
pression from Aichele’s, Miscall’s, and Walsh’s polemical projection of the
historical critic and Van Seters’ polemical projection of the postmodernist that
philosophical and historical perceptions of biblical writings are mutually ex-
clusive; a view that is, sadly, still present until today in Biblical studies. Craig
Bartholomew, however, remarks that historical criticism also has a philosoph-
ical subtext. The founding father of Biblical criticism, Wilhelm de Wette, was
conscious of his philosophical subtext as a historical critic, but philosophical
reflection on this subtext became less important for Biblical scholarship when
Julius Wellhausen articulated Biblical exegesis as a science.14 This has led to
a less critical form of historical criticism that is still mainstream in Biblical
studies today. According to McLean, modern historicism does not simply pro-
vide a historical method, but is also a form of metaphysical thinking. The epis-
temology of historical criticism is based on the epistemological model of the
Enlightenment. According to this model, one needs to distance oneself from
the prejudices of one’s historical and cultural context to obtain objective

10
See Bradley H. McLean, Biblical Interpretation & Philosophical Hermeneutics (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 304.
11
McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 304.
12
See John Van Seters, “A Response to G. Aichelle [sic], P. Miscall and R. Walsh, ‘An
Elephant in the Postmodern Interpretations of the Bible’,” JHebS 9/26 (2009),
https://jhsonline.org/index.php/jhs/article/view/7238/5950 [accessed September 10, 2021].
13
Aichele/Miscall/Walsh, “An Elephant”: 400.
14
See Craig G. Bartholomew, “Before Babel and After Pentecost. Language, Literature
and Biblical Interpretation,” in After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation, ed.
Craig G. Bartholomew/Colin J.D. Greene/Karl Möller, Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 2
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001), 131–170, at 136 and Craig G. Bartholomew., “Uncharted
Waters: Philosophy, Theology and the Crisis in Biblical Interpretation,” in Bartholo-
mew/Greene/Möller (eds.), Renewing Biblical Interpretation, 1–39, at 20.
2. From Historical Objectivism to Historical Hermeneutics 11

knowledge. The fundamental metaphysical subject-object distinction of the


epistemological model of the Enlightenment offers a view from nowhere for
an abstract subject. Traditional historical criticism values the historical charac-
ter of the object of knowledge, e.g., a text, but neglects the historical character
of the subject of knowledge, that is, the researcher.15

2. From Historical Objectivism to Historical Hermeneutics


2. FROM HISTORICAL OBJECTIVISM TO HISTORICAL HERMENEUTICS
With Gadamer, I observe that all criticisms against historical objectivism or
positivism have a common feature: “die Einsicht, daß das sogenannte Subjekt
der Erkenntnis von der Seinsart des Objektes ist, so daß Objekt und Subjekt
der gleichen geschichtlichen Bewegtheit angehören” (GW 2.410). In my view,
the task of historicism is, therefore, to ground its knowledge claims in the his-
toricality or Geschichtlichkeit of the researcher. With ‘historicality’ is not
meant the modern-historical thesis that human consciousness is conditioned by
its socio-historical context, but that it is limited by a historical horizon. Human
consciousness is itself dispersed in time. It is oriented towards the past, the
present, and the future. Unlike other objects in the world, the researcher is not
only situated in history, but his or her consciousness of history is also limited
by a historical horizon.16 According to Gadamer, this historical horizon is a
condition of knowledge, and not a limitation of knowledge.17 He defines hori-
zon as “de[n] Gesichtskreis, der all das umfaßt und umschließt, was von einem
Punkt aus sichtbar ist” (GW 1.307). In his view, one denies having a historical
horizon, because one does not see far enough, and overvalues what is close by.
Conversely, having a historical horizon implies that one is not limited to what

15
See McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 55–79. Gadamer, GW 1.177–222 provides a more
complete picture of the historical tenets of historical criticism by adding that the psycholog-
ical understanding of meaning by historical criticism is also influenced by the hermeneutics
of Romanticism.
16
For this understanding of human consciousness, see Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit
(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 192006), 387–392. Osman Bilen, The Historicity of Understand-
ing and the Problem of Relativism in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics, Cultural Her-
itage and Contemporary Change. Series I: Culture and Values, Vol. 27 (Washington: Counsil
for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2000), 19 correctly remarks that for Gadamer, the
historicality of human understanding implies that “[h]uman understanding is neither in his-
tory nor above and beyond history, but moves along with it. The concept of history must be
understood here in its peculiar sense. History is not a domain independent of human involve-
ment. In other words, to think of history and human beings separately is possible only on the
level of abstraction and theoretical reflection”.
17
Bilen, The Historicity, 19: “Gadamer does not take history and the historic[al]ity of
human understanding as negative, but rather he recognizes history as a category of human
knowledge. Also the historic[al]ity of understanding belongs to the ontological—or in epis-
temological terms to the a priori—structure of ‘understanding as.’”
12 Chapter 1: Historical Hermeneutics

is close by, but that one can see further. One can correctly assess the meaning
of all the things within this horizon concerning their size and location (see GW
1.307–308). Instead of promoting boundless relativism, Gadamer’s under-
standing of human consciousness rather calls for an increased attention for
how, e.g., biblical texts are received in history. The requirement that
knowledge operates from within the limits of the historicality of the researcher
calls for a revaluation of the prejudices or presuppositions that implicitly
guided previous interpretations of, e.g., biblical texts. Prejudices do not hinder
understanding, but make it possible (see GW 1.281–295). The historical hori-
zon of the researcher is constituted by his or her prejudices (see GW 1.311).
To ground knowledge in the historicality of the researcher, thus, requires the
study of reception history.
The awareness of the task of historicism to operate from within the limits of
the historicality of the researcher is only partially and sporadically present in
the scholarly literature of Biblical studies. Ronald Hendel remarks that histor-
ical critics cannot posit themselves outside history, because they “are in the
position of author and character at once”.18 Dobbs-Allsopp exhorts historical
critics “to overcome the paradox of making recourse to knowledge about the
past while affirming the utter subjectivity of this knowledge as it is inevitably
constructed from a present context”.19 As a result of this subjectivity, it is self-
evident that the “interpretations and reconstructions of texts from the past” are
“relevant” for the historical and cultural context of the researcher.20 As Gada-
mer claims, there is no difference between understanding a text in its own his-
torical-cultural context and applying the meaning of the text to our historical-
cultural context (see GW 1.312–346).21 According to Jens Schröter, one of the
most important tasks of present Biblical scholarship is “[d]ie Entwicklung ei-
ner Hermeneutik, die vom mehrfachen Schriftsinn mittelalterlicher Exegese
lernt und die Schematische Aufteilung in historische Exegese und nachträgli-
che Applikation hinter sich lässt”.22 This hermeneutics has to do full justice to

18
Ronald Hendel, “Mind the Gap: Modern and Postmodern in Biblical Studies,” JBL
133/2 (2014) 422–443: at 428.
19
F.W. Dobbs-Allsopp, “Rethinking Historical Criticism,” BibInt 7/3 (1999) 235–271: at
252.
20
Dobbs-Allsopp, “Rethinking Historical Criticism”: 255.
21
Gilberto A. Ruiz, “Examining the Role of the Reader: A Necessary Task for Catholic
Biblical Interpretation,” Hor 44 (2017) 28–55: at 52 correctly remarks that this challenges
the view of the Pontifical Biblical Commission in The Interpretation of the Bible in the
Church that there is “a stable ‘message’ that can be ‘actualized’ in different contexts without
itself being changed (§IV.A)”.
22
Jens Schröter, “Gegenwart und Zukunft der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft: Ein au-
tobiographischer Essay,” in Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft: Autobiographische Essays aus
der Evangelischen Theologie, ed. Eve-Marie Becker, Uni-Taschenbücher 2475 (Tübingen:
Francke, 2003), 146–156, at 155–156.
2. From Historical Objectivism to Historical Hermeneutics 13

the textual and the historical, as well as the theological dimension of the text.
One cannot divide between historical interpretation of biblical texts and theo-
logical application. The tasks of Biblical studies and theology are not mutually
exclusive.23
Despite this sporadic awareness of the need to replace historical objectivism
with historical hermeneutics, there is little philosophical reflection on what
such a historical hermeneutics might look like. A philosophical analysis of the
shortcomings of modern historicism is, also, lacking. The present chapter takes
the tension between theology and modern historicism seriously. As demon-
strated above, this implies that historicism should operate from within the lim-
its of the historicality of the researcher.
The growing dissatisfaction with the historical objectivism of modern-his-
torical methodology has generated more attention for reception-historical
methodology. Recent scholarship in Biblical studies has sought to bridge the
gap between the original historical meaning of biblical texts and their contem-
porary (theological) relevance by studying the reception history or Rezep-
tionsgeschichte of biblical texts. According to reception theory, the task of Bib-
lical criticism is not to reconstruct a single and constant meaning of a text, but
to study how the reception of texts has shaped the pre-understanding of a next
generation of readers.24 Thus, the meaning of a text is not situated in the inten-
tion of its author(s), but is itself historical because it is generated by the dia-
lectic relationship between text and reader. The methodology of reception his-
tory is characterised by historical consciousness. This distinguishes it from
many forms of reader-response criticism.25 It is influenced by Gadamer, alt-
hough the origin of its terminology in Gadamer is sometimes barely reflected
upon.26 The question I put forth here is whether the current practices of the
methodology of reception history operate from within the limits of the histori-
cality of the researcher. The next and third section of the present chapter will,
therefore, evaluate whether these practices have transformed the historical ob-
jectivism of historical criticism into historical hermeneutics.

23
See Schröter, “Gegenwart und Zukunft der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft,” 153.
Elsewhere, Schröter pleads for the reception of the epistemological views of Friedrich
Schleiermacher, Johann Gustav Droysen, and others in New Testament studies: see Jens
Schröter, “Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft: Methodologi-
sche Aspekte und theologische Perspektive,” NTS 46/2 (2000) 262–283: at 267–274 and Jens
Schröter, “Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Historiographie und Hermeneutik in der neu-
testamentlichen Wissenschaft,” in Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Exegesis, ed.
Petr Pokorný/Jan Roskovec, WUNT 153 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 191–203.
24
See Anthony C. Thiselton, “‘Behind’ and ‘In Front Of’ the Text. Language, Reference
and Indeterminacy,” in Bartholomew/Greene/Möller (eds.), After Pentecost, 97–120, at 105.
25
See Robert Evans, Reception History, Tradition and Biblical Interpretation: Gadamer
and Jauss in Current Practice, LNTS 510/STr 4 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 9.
26
See Evans, Reception History, 2.
14 Chapter 1: Historical Hermeneutics

3. The Reception-Historical Methodology


3. THE RECEPTION-HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY
In my analysis, there are three distinct understandings of the reception-histori-
cal methodology in scholarly literature of the 21st century. They differ from
one another concerning their view on the relationship between historical criti-
cism and the study of reception history.

3.1 Historical Criticism as a Prelude for the Study of Reception History


The present subsection cannot discuss all the authors of this understanding of
the reception-historical methodology individually, but will sketch their main
features and afterwards illustrate these features by presenting an author (Ulrich
Luz) who functions as a paradigmatic example.
In the first understanding of the methodology of reception history, historical
criticism is a necessary prelude for reception history. According to Luz, the
task of historical criticism is to reconstruct how texts seek to be understood.27
Jeremy Punt explains that historical criticism provides reception history with
guidelines for developing the meaning of the text in history.28 Emmanuel Na-
than and Ulrich Luz add that historical criticism at the same time prevents peo-
ple from projecting their ideologies on texts. Historical criticism tests our prej-
udices, and criticises us whenever we seek to gain access to the meaning of a
text.29 Michael Wolter explains that historical criticism guards the autonomy
and alterity of the text in relation to its readers.30 According to the proponents
of this understanding of the methodology of reception history, historical criti-
cism, thus, has a double function. On the one hand, historical criticism is able
to criticise reception history. On the other, historical criticism provides recep-
tion history with the interpretation possibilities of a text. The most eminent

27
See Ulrich Luz, “Theologische Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments als Hilfe zum Re-
den von Gott,” EvT 72/3 (2012) 244–259 and Ulrich Luz, Theologische Hermeneutik des
Neuen Testaments, Neukirchener Theologie (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlagsge-
sellschaft, 2014), 22–23. Luz’ understanding of historical criticism and reception history as
two distinct successive methodological steps is illustrated by Ulrich Luz, Das Evangelium
nach Matthäus, 4 vols., EKKNT I/1–4 (Zürich: Benziger, 1985–2002).
28
See Jeremy Punt, “The Priority of Readers among Meanings and Methods in New Tes-
tament Interpretation,” Scriptura 86 (2004) 271–291: at 280.
29
See Emmanuel Nathan, “Truth and Prejudice. A Theological Reflection on Biblical
Exegesis,” ETL 83/4 (2007) 281–318: at 318 and Luz, Matthäus, vol. 1, 110.
30
See Michael Wolter, “Die Autonomie des Textes gegenüber den Lesern als Anliegen
der historisch-kritischen Exegese des Neuen Testaments,” in Verstehen, was man liest: Zur
Notwendigkeit historisch-kritischer Bibellektüre, ed. Karin Finsterbusch/Michael Tilly (Göt-
tingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2010), 88–99, at 98.
3. The Reception-Historical Methodology 15

proponent of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology is


Luz.31
According to Luz, the task of historical criticism is to reconstruct the theo-
logical horizon of New Testament texts.32 Reception history should afterwards
adapt to this theological horizon. This horizon explicates how these texts seek
to be understood. Luz calls the task of historical criticism “Erklärung” and the
task of reception history “Applikation”. The division between both tasks is re-
quired to safeguard the alterity of the text and to avoid subjectivism. One needs
to divide between our own questions and the ones that the text sought to answer
in the past. The results of the task of “Erklärung” are normative for the task of
“Applikation”. Luz considers, for example, both the structuralist and post-
structuralist approaches to New Testament texts as inadequate attempts to ac-
tualise the meaning of these texts, because these approaches do not agree with
the theological horizon of these texts. These texts require other textual models.
The textual model of the New Testament is, according to historical criticism,
the announcement. A first feature of announcements is that they are more than
just information, because they cannot be adequately understood as detached
from their speaker. One cannot speak of the death of the author, because the
author is present in the text. A second feature is that announcements have con-
crete addressees. Therefore, one should also take the historical and cultural
context of the addressees into consideration. A third feature is that announce-
ments always communicate something extra-textual. This does not necessarily
have to be something factual about the world, but can also be, for example,
images of hope. The textual models of structuralism and post-structuralism
cannot address these features of New Testament texts, because they consider
texts as structured webs. Every extra-textual reference has disappeared in these
textual models. Luz calls for a theological hermeneutics of the New Testament.

31
In addition to the already mentioned authors, see, also, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “The
Reader in New Testament Interpretation,” in Hearing the New Testament: Strategies for In-
terpretation, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 301–327; Teresa Okure,
“‘I Will Open My Mouth in Parables’ (Matt 13.35): A Case for a Gospel-Based Biblical
Hermeneutics,” NTS 46/3 (2000) 445–463; Martin Meiser, “Gegenwärtige Herausforderun-
gen und bleibende Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft,” in Herkunft und Zukunft
der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft, ed. Oda Wischmeyer, NET 6 (Tübingen: Francke,
2003), 35–62; Markus Bockmuehl, “New Testament Wirkungsgeschichte and the Early
Christian Appeal to Living Memory,” in Memory in the Bible and Antiquity: The Fifth
Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium (Durham, September 2004), ed. Stephen C. Barton
et al., WUNT 212 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 341–368; Francis Watson, “Hermeneu-
tics and the Doctrine of Scripture: Why They Need Each Other,” International Journal of
Systematic Theology 12/2 (2010) 118–143.
32
This discussion of Luz is based on Luz, “Theologische Hermeneutik”: 249, 254–255
and Luz, Theologische Hermeneutik, 19–21, 149–203, 311, 366.
16 Chapter 1: Historical Hermeneutics

This hermeneutics should be a dialogue partner who elucidates how New Tes-
tament texts seek to be understood, and what kind of understanding these texts
make possible. At the same time, this theological hermeneutics should make
its dialogue partners aware of the interpretation models they derive from their
social and cultural context. These dialogue partners should adapt their inter-
pretation models to the textual model that New Testament texts require.
Luz’ interest in reception history is not motivated by a philosophical reflec-
tion (e.g., Gadamer), but by a reflection on the historical effect that the Bible
intended to have on its first readers. This implicit meaning, instead of some
modern psychological reading, should, according to Luz, be determinative for
the application of the meaning of these texts in our present context. New read-
ings of a text are justified in as far as they realise what the text intended to
realise, or in as far as they realise a neglected aspect of the text.33
A merit of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology is that
it demonstrates that biblical texts do not have a closed and definite meaning,
but are filled with possibilities. Luz compares texts to trees that always produce
new buds; or to the earth, on which always new flowers grow. These buds and
flowers are not only written commentaries, but can also be paintings, poetry,
songs, prayers, hope, action, and suffering. One can also understand biblical
texts on the basis of these buds and flowers.34
Enquiring whether this understanding of reception history is able to trans-
form the historical objectivism of historical criticism into historical hermeneu-
tics, I remark that Luz sees a difference between understanding and application.
In this understanding of the reception-historical methodology, the task of his-
torical criticism is to discern how a text seeks to be understood, whereas recep-
tion history actualises the meaning of this text to different historical and cul-
tural contexts. This understanding of the reception-historical methodology is,
therefore, not able to transform the historical objectivism of modern historical
criticism into historical hermeneutics. It neglects the historicality of the histor-
ical critic. Mark Knight and Robert Evans correctly criticise Luz for interpret-
ing Gadamer wrongly, because Luz divides between historical exegesis and

33
For this evaluation of Luz’ interest for reception history, see Mark W. Elliott, “Effec-
tive-History and the Hermeneutics of Ulrich Luz,” JSNT 33/2 (2010) 161–173: at 163. More
recently, Dale C. Allison, “The History of the Interpretation of Matthew: Lessons Learned,”
In die Skriflig 49/1 (2015), https://www.indieskriflig.org.za/index.php/skriflig/arti-
cle/view/1879/3109 [accessed January 10, 2021] has, also, emphasised the importance of the
study of reception history for bringing to light credible exegetical and historical interpreta-
tions of a text that were once part of the tradition of interpretation of a text, but were forgot-
ten without any reason.
34
See Luz, Matthäus, vol. 1, 112–113.
3. The Reception-Historical Methodology 17

Wirkungsgeschichte. Luz considers Wirkungsgeschichte as an independent ac-


tivity, whereas, according to Gadamer, Wirkungsgeschichte is integrated into
and not divided from the understanding of the text itself.35

3.2 Historical Criticism as Identical to the Study of Reception History


In the second understanding of the reception-historical methodology, Biblical
exegesis is a form of “ethology”.36 Just as the ethologist observes how animals
behave and interact with their environment, the Biblical exegete ought to ob-
serve how biblical texts are received and what effect they had on their readers.
From an ethological perspective, the identity of an animal is determined by
what it does and what it can do, and not by what it ought to do or by how it
looked like in the past. When studying a biblical text, one should, therefore,
not study an ideal version of this text that did or did not exist at a certain time
in its textual tradition, but all the variants and translations of this text. One
ought to study what texts have concretely done in history, and what they can
do in the future.37 According to William Lyons, the understanding of a text in
its historical context is, consequently, no longer distinguished from the study
of the reception history of a text. There is no distinction between the original
meaning of a text and the meaning that a text has obtained in history. The no-
tions of first- and second-stage interpretations are not insisted on anymore.38
The proponents of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology
propose not to divide between historical criticism and reception history. Eve-
rything is reception and also history. One can better not use the phrases ‘recep-
tion history’ or ‘historical criticism’, but the more general phrase ‘Biblical
studies’.39 Another option is to relabel historical-critical methodology in terms
of reception history.40

35
See Mark Knight, “Wirkungsgeschichte, Reception History, Reception Theory,” JSNT
33/2 (2010) 137–146: at 142–143 and Evans, Reception History, 50.
36
Brennan W. Breed, “What Can a Text Do? Reception History as an Ethology of the
Biblical Text,” in Reception History and Biblical Studies: Theory and Practice, ed. Emma
England/William J. Lyons, LHBOTS 615 (London: T&T Clark, 2015), 95–109, at 98.
37
See Breed, “What Can a Text Do?,” 97–103. For a more extensive elaboration of Bren-
nan’s theoretical views on reception-historical methodology, see Brennan W. Breed, No-
madic Text: A Theory of Biblical Reception History, ISBL (Bloomington IN: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 2014).
38
See William J. Lyons, “Hope for a Troubled Discipline? Contributions to New Testa-
ment Studies from Reception History,” JSNT 33/2 (2010) 207–220: at 214–215.
39
See James G. Crossley, “The End of Reception History, a Grand Narrative for Biblical
Studies and the Neoliberal Bible,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Biblical
Studies, 45–59, at 47–48.
40
See Lyons, “Hope”: 207–220 and Jonathan Morgan, “Visitors, Gatekeepers and Re-
ceptionists: Reflections on the Shape of Biblical Studies and the Role of Reception History,”
in England/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Biblical Studies, 61–76, at 63–64.
18 Chapter 1: Historical Hermeneutics

The authors of this understanding of the reception-historical methodology


consider historical-critical methodologies as forms of the study of reception
history. Consequently, they do not seek to do away with these methodologies.
The study of the response of the original reader(s), hypothetical or not, is in-
herent to research on the Gospels. Redaction criticism is interested in how re-
dactors reacted to their sources, e.g., Matthew’s reaction to Mark. Research is
interested in how certain authors used biblical texts, and how copyists adapted
biblical texts. Form criticism does not only search for literary genres and why
these genres are used, but also describes the Sitz im Leben of the original audi-
ence.41 Text and reception are difficult to distinguish. There is no textual basis
distinct from its reception.42 Textual criticism is, thus, equally a study of the
reception history of a text.43
These forms of written exegesis are, however, not privileged. The visual
artist, the literary writer, and the musical composer are equally considered as
active readers of the Bible.44 In principle, the reception-historical methodology

41
See Lyons, “Hope”: 213–214.
42
See Jacques van Ruiten, “Nomadic Angels: Gen 6,1-4 and Reception History,” in A
Pillar of Cloud to Guide Text-Critical, Redactional, and Linguistic Perspectives on the Old
Testament in Honour of Marc Vervenne, ed. Hans Ausloos/Benedict Lemmelijn, BETL 269
(Leuven: Peeters, 2014), 247–276 and James E. Harding, “What is Reception History, and
What Happens to You if You Do It?,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Bib-
lical Studies, 31–44, at 38.
43
This thesis has recently been illustrated for the Apocalypse, see Garrick V. Allen, “Tex-
tual History and Reception History: Exegetical Variation in the Apocalypse,” NovT 59
(2017) 279–319.
44
For the visual artist, see Martin O’Kane, “Wirkungsgeschichte and Visual Exegesis:
The Contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer,” JSNT 33/2 (2010) 147–159; Barbara Baert, In-
terspaces between Word, Gaze and Touch: The Bible and the Visual Medium in the Middle
Ages: Collected Essays on Noli Me Tangere, the Woman with the Haemorrhage, the Head
of John the Baptist, ANL 62 (Leuven: Peeters, 2011); Caroline Vander Stichele, “The Head
of John and its Reception or How to Conceptualize ‘Reception History’,” in England/Lyons
(eds.), Reception History and Biblical Studies, 79–93.
For the literary writer and the musical composer, see Harding, “What is Reception His-
tory,” 35; Ibrahim Abraham, “High, Low and In-between: Reception History and the Soci-
ology of Religion and Popular Music,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Bib-
lical Studies, 241–253; Michael J. Gilmour, “‘God’, ‘God Part II’ and ‘God Part III’: Ex-
ploring the Anxiety of Influence in John Lennon, U2 and Larry Norman,” in England/Lyons
(eds.), Reception History and Biblical Studies, 231–239; Helen R. Jacobus, “The Story of
Leonard Cohen’s ‘Who by Fire’, a Prayer in the Cairo Genizah, Babylonian Astrology and
Related Rabbinical Texts,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Biblical Studies,
201–217; William J. Lyons, “‘Time To Cut Him Down To Size?’ A Critical Examination of
Depeche Mode’s Alternative ‘John of Patmos’,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Reception History
and Biblical Studies, 219–230; Samuel Tongue, “The End of Biblical Interpretation – the
3. The Reception-Historical Methodology 19

can study everything, even politics, and the identity of people.45 This method-
ology can relate many things with one another that at first sight have little in
common, e.g., Lenin, Calvin, and Nick Cave.46 In my view, this considerable
expansion of the research domain of Biblical studies is used as a pragmatic
argument. Biblical studies is a threatened discipline at universities. The recep-
tion-historical approach expands the research domain of Biblical studies, and
connects Biblical studies with other academic disciplines. Given that Biblical
exegetes have competences that the practitioners of other academic disciplines
do not have, the presence of Biblical exegetes at universities is justified.47
Despite this pragmatic argument, this understanding of the reception-histor-
ical methodology is not able to transform the historical objectivism of histori-
cal criticism into historical hermeneutics. The historical-critical method is re-
labelled in reception-historical terms. Its underlying subject-object epistemol-
ogy is, however, still implicitly present. The idea of the reception historian as
an ethologist posits the reception historian outside history in order that s/he can
describe how a text has been interpreted/received in history. This understand-
ing of reception-historical methodology, thus, does not operate from within the
limits of the historicality of the reception historian. Wirkungsgeschichte can
and should, however, be an important building block for the critique of this
method’s false claims to objectivity and the hermeneutical naïveté of modern
historicism. If Gadamer is correct, that all understanding is co-determined by
Wirkungsgeschichte, the study of the Wirkungsgeschichte of a text has an im-
portant remedying role for every researcher working with any method. Wir-
kungsgeschichte does not have any methodological-normative function, but of-
fers a phenomenological description of how understanding is always co-deter-
mined by the historicality or historical horizon of the researcher.48 Wir-
kungsgeschichte is then not simply a description of or a meta-reflection on how

Beginning of Reception History? Reading the Bible in the Spaces of Literature,” in Eng-
land/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Biblical Studies, 111–124. See, also, Christopher
Rowland et al. (eds.), Blackwell Bible Commentaries (Oxford: Backwell, 2003–…).
45
See Masiiwa R. Gunda, “Reception History of the Bible: Prospects of a New Frontier
in African Biblical Studies,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Biblical Stud-
ies, 125–138 and Gerald O. West, “Layers of Reception of Jephthah’s Daughter (Judges 11)
Among the AmaNazaretha: From the Early 1900s to Today,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Re-
ception History and Biblical Studies, 185–198. See, also, Rowland et al. (eds.), Blackwell
Bible Commentaries.
46
See Roland Boer, “Unlikely Bedfellows: Lenin, Calvin and Nick Cave,” in Eng-
land/Lyons (eds.), Reception History and Biblical Studies, 141–153.
47
For this pragmatic argument, see Lyons, “Hope”: 216–217 and Emma England/Wil-
liam J. Lyons, “Explorations in the Reception of the Bible,” in England/Lyons (eds.), Re-
ception History and Biblical Studies, 3–13, at 4.
48
For this critical function of Wirkungsgeschichte, see Moisés Mayordomo, “Exegese
zwischen Geschichte, Text und Rezeption: Literaturwissenschaftliche Zugänge zum Neuen
20 Chapter 1: Historical Hermeneutics

people go about interpreting the Bible, but a necessary condition of all critical-
historical understanding.49 Let us turn to the third understanding of the recep-
tion-historical methodology, which arose from the need to more actively en-
gage with Gadamer.

3.3 Historical Criticism as an Integrated Discipline of the Study of Reception


History
In the third and last understanding of the reception-historical methodology,
historical-critical methodologies play a “distinctive and significant role” within
the methodology of reception history.50 Robert Evans observes that Biblical
scholarship has only partially integrated Gadamer’s thinking into the method-
ology of reception history. It has only adopted Gadamer’s view that the mean-
ing of a text is not restricted to the intention of its author(s) or the historical
horizon of the first audience of the text. One of the difficulties in Wahrheit und
Methode is that Gadamer also claims that identification with the original audi-
ence of the text is an essential part of the hermeneutical process. Evans criti-
cises other Biblical scholars for having emphasised the first aspect of Gada-
mer’s thinking at the expense of the second. For Gadamer, however, the origi-
nal historical horizon of a text is co-constitutive for the meaning of a text, be-
cause it is needed for the mediation/fusion with the horizon or historical situa-
tion of the researcher (Horizontverschmelzung).51 According to Evans, this im-
plies that traditional historical-critical methodologies are required to actualise
the reception of a text again and again. Thus, there is a dialectic relationship
between historical criticism and reception. The task of historical criticism is to
transpose the reader into the place of the hypothetical first reader in order to
reconstruct the question to which the text gives an answer.52
In my view, especially in the case studies that he provides, Evans does not
implement Gadamer in the study of the New Testament, but Gadamer’s student
Hans Robert Jauss.53 Evans uses mainly the Jaussian concept ‘Erwartungshori-
zont’ in his methodological work. Each generation of readers interacts with the

Testament,” VF 55/1 (2010) 19–37: at 34-35; Moisés Mayordomo, “Was heisst und zu wel-
chem Ende studiert man Wirkungsgeschichte? Hermeneutische Überlegungen mit einem
Seitenblick auf Borges und die Seligpreisungen (Mt 5,3–12),” SThZ 72/1 (2016) 42–67;
Régis Burnet, Exegesis and History of Reception: Reading the New Testament Today with
the Readers of the Past, WUNT 455 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2021), 1–73.
49
Contra Richard S. Briggs, “What Does Hermeneutics Have To Do With Biblical Inter-
pretation?,” HeyJ 47/1 (2006) 55–74: at 60–61.
50
Evans, Reception History, 43 n. 91. Italics in the original.
51
See Evans, Reception History, 45.
52
See Evans, Reception History, 24.
53
For the case studies, see Evans, Reception History, 53–113. Jauss has, also, strongly
influenced David P. Parris, Reception Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics, Princeton Theo-
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
guerra la situació normal del Estat gran; pero los efectes d’una sola
que’n tingui no s’esborran durant molts anys. Ademés, la pau en
que’ls Estats grans viuhen, es de una naturalesa molt especial y poch
civilisadora. Plens los uns envers los altres de recels y suspicacias,
han d’estar constantment preparats á la guerra, convertintse las
nacions en inmensos quartels, ahont se consumen los millors anys
del jovent y lo més sanejat dels pressupostos. Lo militarisme es lo
régimen dels Estats unitaris en que’s divideix la Europa actual, y’l
militarisme es incompatible ab la llibertat.

Tan artificial es la unitat produhida per las aglomeracions que


s’anomenan grans Estats, que al moment que han de posarla á proba
se’ls desfá entre las mans. L’element de la varietat es tan essencial á
las societats, que ha de manifestarse en una ó altra forma. Si se’l
comprimeix en un sentit, esclata en un altre; si s’impedeix ó
contraría sa expansió natural, se presenta en un’altra forma, y causa
perjudicis molt més efectius que’ls que’s tractava d’evitar. Bon
exemple d’aixó n’es la Fransa, la nació exemple pels unitaristas. Allí
no hi ha reconeguda cap varietat local ni d’interessos. Un sol poder,
una sola llengua, una sola lley, s’extenen á una aglomeració de trenta
milions d’habitants. La administració es uniforme, y desde’l centre
de Paris té una xarxa extesa damunt de tot lo territori nacional. Res
se mou sens que lo gobern ho permeti, y’l gobern no permet res que
no sigui dintre de la uniformitat. La opinió pública, preparada en
unas universitats y col·legis, en que s’ensenyan los mateixos textos,
en igual número d’anys y dantse las classes en idénticas horas, y
fomentada per tots los medis de que disposa l’Estat concentrat, está
també á favor de la uniformitat, y auxilia poderosament en aquesta
via al gobern, sigui’l que sigui.
Després de tots aquestos esforsos verdaderament extraordinaris,
¿qué ha conseguit la Fransa en lo terreno de la unió? Res més que ser
la nació realment més desunida. Entre mitj de tanta uniformitat hi
ha molta menys compactibilitat que en la Confederació germánica ó
en los Estats-Units d’América. L’element de varietat, comprimit en
totas sas manifestacions llegítimas, ha reventat en los partits, y la
Fransa’s trova avuy sens tenir cap solució pera las qüestions més
vitals. L’Estat está política y socialment uniformat; la igualtat es
completa en tot lo oficial, y aixó no obstant, dintre de la nació hi ha
quatre ó cinch nacions enemigas irreconciliables. La nació
llegitimista, si pogués, destruhiria á la nació republicana, y vice
versa, y cada fracció aceptaria fins l’ajuda d’en Bismark pera
aniquilar á las contrarias. Al veure la impotencia en que’l pays dividit
y enemistat se troba, los unificadors francesos haurian
d’avergonyirse de llur obra. Si haguessin respectat las varietats
llegítimas, seria un fet la unió que avuy los manca.

Las consideracions exposadas bastan pera demostrar, que si’s


planteja la qüestió de quina ha de ser la extensió dels Estats, es ben
difícil decidirse en pró dels grans ni dels petits. Cada una de las duas
especies té las sevas ventatjas propias, compensadas pels seus
inconvenients. La resolució de la qüestió está en un sistema que
pugui produhir la educació política, la intensitat del patriotisme y la
adaptació de la lley á las necessitats d’aquells á qui hagi de regir, sens
la duresa de las faccions locals y’ls terribles efectes de la gelosía entre
poble y poble, propis de la divisió extremada, al meteix temps que la
unitat de miras y la perfecció d’algun serveys públichs que s’alcansan
per medi de las grans agrupacions. Aquesta síntessis no es
impossible, per fortuna, y’s trova en la aplicació del sistema
particularista, que reconeixent y fomentant las varietats llegítimas,
las uneix pera la realisació dels fins socials que siguin comuns á
totas.

Al enumerar los inconvenients dels Estats reduhits haurá pogut


observarse, que tots ells naixen no de llur propia naturalesa, sino del
aislament en que’ls hem imaginat. Trobis un medi qualsevol pera
agruparlos y enllassarlos, y aquells inconvenients desapareixen.
Suposem un número d’Estats petits en possesió de llur soberanía,
limitada sóls per un poder superior als de cada un d’ells, encarregat
de impedir que la gelosía se converteixi en guerra oberta, y tenim ja
guanyada la part més important de la nostra causa. Suposem que’l
meteix poder superior s’encarrega de assegurar l’ordre interior dins
de cada un dels Estats petits associats, y’ls hem salvat ja dels tristos
efectes de la virulencia de las faccions locals. Afegim á las atribucions
que’s concedeixin al poder superior pera’ls indicats objectes, algunas
altras pera dirigir certs serveys generals en los quals la concentració
sigui útil ó necessaria, y tindrem lo problema de que’ns ocupem
completament resolt. Units alguns Estats petits, lo conjunt resulta
tan fort com si formessin un tot compacte, y’s trovan en disposició de
resistir á qualsevol Estat gran, quals forsas no passin de las del
conjunt dels units, en lo cas de que tingués la pretensió de
apoderarse ó d’atacar á algun ó á alguns dels de la lliga.

Encara que concedíssim, —y lluny de concedirho, ho neguem


rodonament,— que l’ideal del progrés sigui la agrupació de tota la
humanitat en un sol tot, nos fora fácil demostrar que la existencia de
grans Estats, lluny de facilitar lo camí cap á aqueix ideal, lo contraria
y dificulta. Las rivalitats y envejas no son patrimoni exclusiu dels
Estats reduhits, sino que ho son encara més dels grans. Cap
d’aquestos se resignaría jamay á deixarse dominar per un altre, y
com que per sa extensió l’amenassat tindria forsas y medis pera
resistir, ni un sol pas cap á la agrupació podria donarse sino per la
guerra y la conquista. Los efectes per tals medis alcansats no són may
definitius, y duran sóls tant com dura la forsa dels victoriosos ó
conquistadors. L’ideal del progrés no es la uniformació sino la unió:
es, com havem ja dit en altres párrafos, la armonía entre la llibertat y
la igualtat. Aquesta armonía sols pot produhirla lo régimen
particularista. L’Estat compost, ó la agregació d’Estats petits y variats
dintre de grans agrupacions ó lligas, es la traducció del
particularisme á la práctica.

Molt se pondera la forsa expansiva de las grans agrupacions. Si’ns


escoltem als unitaristas, cap idea generosa hauria arrivat á ferse
popular sinó hagués tingut en son apoyo tots los medis de que las
grans nacions disposan. Segons ells, lo progrés necessita moltas
vegadas ser imposat fins contra la voluntat dels que han d’aprofitarse
de sas ventatjas. “Als pobles, diuhen, se’ls ha de fer caminar encara
que sigui per forsa, y per aixó los grans Estats centralisats són los
més civilisadors.” “Deixeu, afegeixen, als individuos y petitas
agrupacions entregats exclusivament á llur propia iniciativa, y
rarament los veureu donar un pás cap endavant.” Pera’ls tals lo
creure ó morir dels mahometans es lo millor sistema pera la
propagació de las ideas civilisadoras.

Aixó sol fa la seva apología. Realment, no hi ha dupte, que si’s


prenen per exemple los pobles tals com ells los tenen, sols á
bastonadas se’ls pot fer caminar. Després que los han tret tota
iniciativa, y’ls han ajunyit á la tiranía de un estat omnipotent, es
natural que estiguin ensopits y no tinguin ni esma pera móures. Mes,
déixisels en llibertat; despertintse las iniciativas; acostumísels á tenir
confiansa en ells meteixos, y no se’ls haurá d’empenyer, puig que
expontaneament avansarán. La situació en que ha posat als pobles y
als individuos es precisament lo més grave cárrech que pot ferse al
unitarisme. Per tals motius presentem lo particularisme, com un
sistema regenerador de las societats.

Ab los antecedents exposats podém ja sistematisar las nostras ideas.


Anem, donchs, á sentar la teoría de l’associació de Estats, síntesis del
positivisme científich aplicat á las materias socials y políticas.
Capitol VI.
L’estat compost.
La perfecció suposa complicació.– Erros produhits per las corrents
unitarias.– Las escolas filosófica é histórica.– Llur impotencia dins l’Estat
simple.– L’associació d’Estats.– ¿Es federalisme? Significació de aquest,
segons Montesquieu, Hamilton y Freeman.– Naturalesa y carácters de la
organisació federativa.– Divisió de la soberanía entre’ls Estats federats y’l
conjunt.– Estudi fet per los fundadors de la Unió americana.– Distints graus
del federalisme.– Lliga, Confederació y Estat federatiu.– Diferencias entre
aquestos graus.– Classificació adoptada pels millors tractadistas de dret
polítich federal.

“Totas las cosas nobles son difícils y complicadas.” Aquest principi,


que repetia constantment Sócrates als seus deixebles, té aplicació
inmediata á las materias de que tractem. La organisació noble de las
societats políticas ha de ser difícil y complicada.

La naturalesa nos ho ensenya en totas sas obras. Las més nobles son
las menys senzillas. En lo món dels sers organisats ocupa l’home lo
lloch preeminent, y l’organisme de l’home es tant complicat, que per
sigles de sigles que duri la humanitat, perfeccionant constantment
sas facultats y medis de observació y d’análisis, jamay arrivará á
ferne un estudi complet. Vagis baixant en la escala dels organismes, y
á mida que anirá disminuhint llur noblesa, se veurá aumentar la
simplicitat. Igual resultat obtindrem si observem lo món moral é
intel·lectual.
Es un error buscar lo perfeccionament de las societats en la
simplificació de llurs organismes. Si major complicació en los sers
naturals es signe de un estat més perfecte, ¿quina rahó hi ha pera
que las agrupacions políticas se separin de la regla que’ns ensenya la
naturalesa? Pera persuadirnos de que no se’n separan, basta
recordar los fets més elementals de la historia. Aquesta nos diu en
totas sas páginas, que las societats atrassadas, com los sers inferiors,
tenen ab prou féinas organismes. En ellas la unitat simple triunfa,
puig si’l jefe mana y disposa sens cap complicació, los subordinats
obeheixen ab igual senzillesa. Mes, la societat avansa, y la
organisació se complica. Del Estat civilisat d’avuy á la tribu errant
semi-salvatje hi ha tanta diferencia com del animal superior al
rudimentari. ¡Y encara no som allá ahont anem!. A mida que la
societat se perfeccioni, s’aumentará la complicació, puig cada
progrés, cada millora, requereixen órgans nous encarregats de
realisarlos, de manera que pot ben bé donarse com axioma social,
que á major perfecció correspón major complexitat.

L’ideal del Estat, donchs, no pot ser la unitat simple, sino que ha de
ser la varietat complexa, y’ls que pretenen haver trobat lo motllo, en
lo qual basta ficarhi una societat qualsevol, pera que’n surti
radicalment transformada y regenerada, ó bé somian desperts, ó bé
explotan las passions y preocupacions populars. Per igual motiu, lo
qui predica que unas pocas reglas, fillas de principis abstractes
d’escola, bastan pera gobernar á totas las nacions, ignora los
rudiments de la ciencia política-sociológica.

De tals errors ó al·lucinaments han sigut víctimas las escolas que de


bona fé s’han proposat cambiar la manera de ser de las societats
políticas per lo medi senzill de dotarlas de una Constitució que
desenrotlli aquells principis en algunas dotzenas ó centenars
d’articles. La práctica ha sigut un desengany complet que’s podia ja
preveure en teoría. Las únicas Constitucions que tenen vida llarga y
robusta, son las que s’acomodan á las necessitats é interessos
particulars dels pobles á que s’aplican, y tenen prou elasticitat pera
anar seguint paulatinament las variacions que’s manifestan.

La corrent unitaria que van determinar en tot Europa las monarquias


al lluytar contra’l feudalisme, extremada més tart, si bé que en altre
sentit, per la escola que’s dongué lo nom de filosófica, va agafar tanta
forsa, que avuy meteix que la está perdent en molts altres camps,
segueix encara sent irresistible en lo que’s refereix á la organisació de
las societats políticas. La escola histórica, ab totas sas pretensions de
antagonista de la filosófica, no va tenir prou pit pera oposárseli,
obertament, y tot portant á la exageració los detalls, tranzigia en los
punts més essencials. Influhida per la corrent que tot ho arrossegava,
no negava l’ideal de uniformitat, que volia alcansar de cop y volta sa
contraria, distingintse d’aquesta tant sóls en lo procediment pera
arrivarhi. Als arguments brillants y aparatosas generalisacions
filosóficas, la escola histórica hi oposava sóls rahons de oportunitat y
conveniencia, que eran interpretadas com manifestacions del
egoisme. Concedia que las aspiracions de la escola contraria eran
perfectament científicas, si be que per desgracia no realisables
encara, lo qual era prou y massa pera reduhirla á la impotencia quan
se tractava de crear. En las qüestions fonamentals no tenia més que
ideas negativas, lo qual de retop la portava á tenir que extremar las
solucions á las qüestions secundarias en sentit purament
tradicionalista. Se titulava histórica, y dels tres moments de la
historia, passat, present y futur, n’olvidava dos, ó millor: n’olvidava
un, lo present, y tranzigia en un altre, lo futur.

En tal situació no es d’extranyar, que en lo terreno polítich social


mostressin igual impotencia las duas escolas. Convenian en que la
uniformitat es l’ideal filosófich de la humanitat, y celebravan com un
progrés las concentracions que havian lograt realisar alguns Estats,
juntant grans territoris y numerosos pobles baix la direcció de poders
únichs, per qual motiu tots los esforsos que una y altra poguessin fer,
devian quedar tancats dintre d’un cércol estret. S’han fet cent
ensaigs, y’l problema d’armonisar la llibertat ab l’autoritarisme no ha
trovat solució en cap de las nacions unificadas del continent
d’Europa.

En efecte, ni’l radicalisme democrátich de la escola filosófica, ni’l


doctrinarisme de la anomenada histórica són tals solucions. Lo
primer ha anat de la república á la monarquía y de la monarquía ha
tornat á la república, sens avansar ni un sol pas, sino al revés,
retrocedintne alguns. Ha lograt destruhir quasi tot lo que li feya
sombra; mes, al tractar de crear, s’ha trobat en la més trista
impotencia. Excitant las concupicencias, y fent á majorias
accidentals y apassionadas árbitras de la direcció dels Estats, lo
resultat ha sigut l’imperi, la dictadura, ó’l domini de oligarquias, que
han pres la política com un ofici més lucratiu que’ls altres. Lo segón,
trovantse sens forsas reals y efectivas en la massa dels pobles á quins
s’ha imposat, no ha conseguit res més que elevar á sistema la
inmoralitat y produhir l’indiferentisme. L’un y l’altre van comensar
cercant de bona fe una solució. Lluytant contra’l poder real, sinó van
destruhirlo, van rodejarlo de limitacions que’l reduhian poch menys
que á la impotencia: y comensant pel sistema representatiu, tan bon
punt com se va evidenciar sa ineficacia, van transformarlo en
régimen parlamentari, ab tan dolent éxit, que avuy per avuy pesa
damunt d’un y altre lo més complet descrédit, no per llurs culpas
sinó per las dels que s’han empenyat en ferne instruments de
imposició. Las nacions grans d’Europa viuhen constantment en
plena crisis política, agravada fins á un extrem alarmador per l’estat
ruinós en que totas tenen la hisenda pública.

Las duas escolas, en tots llurs matisos, s’han deixat encegar tant per
la corrent de uniformitat, que ni han sapigut veure lo que passava en
alguns pochs Estats, que per llur fortuna havian seguit la corrent
contraria. Pera ellas, ha sigut en va que’ls Estats Units d’América
hagin trobat en lo sistema particularista la solució que’s busca
inutilment dins del unitarisme, y en va ha sigut també que en lo
meteix cor d’Europa algunas petitas agrupacions hagin obtingut
iguals ventatjas pel meteix camí que la Unió americana. L’afany de
concentració y’l prejudici de que la unitat dels Estats exigeix la
destrucció de totas las varietats organisadas, són pera una y altra
escola lligaduras que no las deixan sortir del cércol en que s’han
tancat. Llurs ensaigs y probas no poden ferse sinó baix la base del
Estat simple. La idea del Estat compost, ó format per medi de la
agrupació d’Estats simples, es pera’ls polítichs d’Europa tan
disbaratada, que ni los honors de la discussió li concedeixen. Los
tractadistas de dret públich acostuman dedicar al sistema federatiu
sols unas pocas ratllas, com d’almoyna, en las quals se transparenta
sempre lo menyspreu y compassió ab que’l miran.
Y mal que pesi als tractadistas y polítichs d’Europa, aqueix sistema es
l’únich que pót resoldre’ls problemas davant dels quals ells s’han vist
impotents. Teórica y practicament, l’Estat compost es l’únich que
equilibra tots los interessos, armonisa la llibertat y la igualtat, é
impulsa als pobles cap al progrés y la millora.

L’Estat compost es la fórmula práctica del particularisme. Anem,


donchs, á examinar en que consisteix, y quina es sa naturalesa.

L’Estat compost no es res més que la associació de varis Estats


simples. Aquestos, per llur propia naturalesa, gosan dels drets
inherents á la soberanía, y son amos de llurs accions. Al associarse,
realisan lo meteix acte jurídich que los individuos al formar
companyía. Limitan llur llibertat natural en tot lo que es materia de
la associació, obligantse á cumplir las obligacions socials que
s’imposan. Pera la bona marxa del conjunt, nombran també un
gerent, de la meteixa manera que las companyías particulars, y
l’investeixen de atribucions que li donan personalitat propia. Aquest
gerent es lo representant dels associats en tots aquells actes que son
materia de l’associació, y porta la firma social quan té de relacionarse
ab altras entitats ó associacions. Davant de las nacions extrangeras,
lo gerent del Estat compost té la categoría de nació, y tracta d’igual á
igual ab totas ellas.

Essent l’Estat compost una associació d’Estats simples, y debent


aquestos limitar llur independencia al associarse, es evident que la
condició essencial del sistema consisteix en la divisió de la soberanía.
Los Estats simples, al tractar de formar una associació, han de
comensar per descompondre la soberanía en sas diferents
atribucions, y fixar ben bé aquellas de que’s desprenen, puig en la
escriptura social, que en llenguatje polítich reb lo nom de
Constitució, han de constarhi ben claras y determinadas, al objecte
d’evitar duptes.

La associació d’Estats pot ser més ó menys extreta, segons siguin


majors ó menors las limitacions á que’s subjectin los components, y
segons lo carácter més ó menys permanent que’s dongui á las
meteixas. Desde la unificació de tots los membres d’un Estat simple ó
unitat política, fins á la independencia de cada un d’ells, hi van
distints graus que en conjunt forman un sistema. Desde’l punt que la
unitat política entre varias regions deixa d’existir, fins á aquell en que
s’arriva á rompre tot lligament entre las meteixas, convertintse cada
una en personalitat política completa, la agregació reb lo nom
genérich de associació d’Estats, y’l sistema’s diu federalisme ó
particularisme. Aquest mot es lo que havém adoptat nosaltres al dar
títol á aquesta part del nostre llibre, no perqué’l jutjem lo més precís
y propi, sinó per rahons de oportunitat y conveniencia. Entenguis
ben bé, no obstant, que al parlar de organisació particularista, ab tot
y que lo significat de la frase sigui més ample, la usem com sinónima
de associació d’Estats y de federalisme.

En efecte, desde’l moment que varis Estats y regions deixan de estar


unificats sens arrivar á ser independents, forsosament han de estar
lligats en aliansa més ó menys estreta. Foedus no vol dir més que
aliansa, y per lo tant federal, federalisme y tots los demés derivats y
compostos de aquella paraula llatina expressan ideas referents á
aliansa. Gobern federal, donchs, es lo gobern fundat en la aliansa,
aixis com federalisme, federalista, etc., etc., no volen dir sinó afició ó
aficionat á la organisació federal.

Suposem que’ls nostres lectors voldrán saber quinas son las rahons
de oportunitat y conveniencia que’ns obligan á adoptar pera las
nostras aspiracions un qualificatiu menys precís y propi que altres
que podriam emplear, y’ns sembla ja sentir que’ns diuhen: “Si desde
l’Estat unitari, ó sigui d’aquell que te’l poder concentrat, fins á la
independencia completa dels varis trossos ó regions que’l forman, no
hi ha més que federalisme; si la forma federal es la única que pot
pendre’l particularisme regionalista quan no arriva á la separació,
¿per qué no hem de usar lo nom que técnicament expressa la nostra
idea? Perque hem d’amagarnos de dir lo que som á tothom que
vulgui saberho?”

Pera respondre á tals preguntas, nos reduhirem á copiar lo que


estampárem en unas cartas que publicárem en La Renaixensa,
referents á la materia. Fentnos en ellas la meteixa pregunta, nos
contestavam: “No’ns dem lo nom que nos pertany, perqué vivim á
Espanya, y á Espanya, la mala fé y la ignorancia ho falsifican tot.
Perqué un partit de Madrid s’ha apoderat del nom de las nostras
aspiracions, y sens haverlas jamay sentit, las han desacreditat y
malmés. Perque á Espanya, anomenarse federal no vol dir que’s
desitji l’aplicació dels principis del particularisme regionalista á la
organisació del Estat, sinó que s’aspira á exaltar á una part de las
massas ab las divagacions negativas que va vuidar Proudhon en un
opúscul, que si va passar quasi desapercebut pera tot Europa y
América, ha produhit en aquesta terra dels vice-versas un partit, que
no pot arrivar á entendre aquellas divagacions, que ni tan sóls en
teoría donan solució al problema de la organisació política. Perqué
som á Espanya, repeteixo, y si fins en los payssos organisats
federativament, la única oposició que troba’l federalisme prové de las
massas que volen dirse radicals, aqui s’ha pres l’aspiració federativa
com sinónima de radicalisme, y s’ha volgut encarnarla en la part mes
radical de la massa plebeya. Perque som á Espanya, torno á repetir, y
aquí, la paraula federalisme va unida ab lo recort d’un período de
incapacitat gubernamental y de miserias tals, que sa possible tornada
aterra fins als que més persuadits estem de la situació misérrima á
que havem arribat. Per tots aquets motius y altres, no volem usar lo
nom que científicament nos correspón, y n’usem d’altres, que ab tot y
ser menys precisos, expressan ab claretat la nostra idea. Per la rahó
del vice-versa espanyol, los que som federals no podem dirnosho,
mentres que’ls que ni ho són ni volen serho van baladrejant la
paraula per aquestos carrers y plassas. Deixemlos, donchs, la
paraula, ja que la fatalitat aixis ho vol, y quedemnos ab la cosa, que
es lo que’ns interessa.”

Consti, després de lo que acabem de citar, que usem á dretas un


llenguatje poch precís. Al dar lo nom d’Estat compost á tots los graus
del federalisme, sabem també que apliquem al tot lo que en rigor
correspón sóls á una part, com veurem luego, aixís com al calificar de
organisació particularista la que estem estudiant, donem á una part
lo nom d’un tot més extens. En efecte, lo federalisme no es altra cosa
que una de las manifestacions del sistema particularista. Aquest es
molt més ample per sa propia naturalesa, puig que’l separatisme y la
independencia completa de las petitas agrupacions entran també
dins del particularisme.
Entenguis be, ademés, que al dar á la organisació particularista á que
aspirém la calificació d’Estat compost no ho fem á tontas ni á cegas.
De tots los graus de federalisme, lo que trobem mes perfecte y
adequat pera fomentar lo progrés dels pobles, es lo que porta
especialment aquell nom. Verdader terme mitj entre la unificació de
las varias parts d’un Estat y llur separació completa, es l’únich que
reuneix las ventatjas de una y altra, y que pot produhir la armonía
entre la llibertat y la igualtat, que, segons havem demostrat, es la
missió de la societat política.

Després d’aquestas explicacions y al objecte d’aclarar més lo


concepte de la associació d’Estats, passem á desentranyar la
significació del sistema federatiu.

Lo primer que en los temps moderns ha endevinat la trascendencia


de la organisació particularista, es sens dupte Montesquieu. En la
seva obra De l’esprit des Lois, s’hi llegeixen los següents párrafos:

“Si una república es petita, es destruhida per una forsa extrangera: si


es gran, se destruheix per un vici interior.”

“Aquest doble inconvenient afecta igualment á las democracias y á


las aristocracias, tant si son bonas com si son dolentas. Lo mal está
en la cosa meteixa: no hi ha cap forma de posarhi remey.”

“Aixís, donchs, es molt probable, que’ls homens se haurian vist al cap


y á la fí obligats á viure sempre baix lo gobern d’un sol, sinó
haguessim imaginat una forma de Constitució, que té totas las
ventatjas interiors del gobern republicá y la forsa exterior de la
monarquía. Parlo de la república federativa.”
“Aquesta forma de gobern es una convenció, per medi de la qual
molts cossos polítichs consenten en ferse ciutadans d’un Estat més
gran, que forman expontáneament. Es una societat de societats, que
n’estableixen una de nova, que pot engrandirse ab nous associats,
fins y á tant que son poder basti pera la seguretat dels que s’han
unit…”

Aquesta classe de república, capás de resistir á la forsa exterior, pot


mantenirse en sa grandesa sens que l’interior se corrompi. La forma
de aqueixa societat prevé tots los inconvenients."

“Si un sól pretengués usurpar lo gobern, no podria segurament estar


igualment acreditat en tots los Estats confederats. Si logrés ferse
massa poderós en un d’ells, tots los demés s’alarmarian: si arrivés á
ajunyir á una part de la Confederació, la que seria encara lliure
podria resistir ab forsas independents de las que ell hauria usurpat, y
enfonzarlo avans de que hagués acabat de establirse.”

“Si esclata una sedició en l’interior d’algun dels membres


confederats, los altres poden dominarla y restablir la pau. Si en una
de las parts s’introduheixen alguns abusos, son corretjits per las
parts sanas. La classe d’Estat de que nos ocupém, pot morirse de l’un
costat, sens que’s mori de l’altre. La Confederació pot ser disolta, y’ls
confederats quedar soberans.”

“Compost de petitas repúblicas, disfruta de la bondat del gobern


interior de cada una d’ellas, y en relació ab l’exterior, per la forsa de
la associació, disposa de totas las ventatjas de las grans monarquías.”
Los párrafos que acabem de traduhir contenen condensada tota la
teoría política de la associació d’Estats ó federalisme. A despit de llur
tracendencia, los compatricis del autor jamay han sapigut aprofitar
la llissó, que, en cambi, va servir de guia als fundadors de la gran
Unió americana.

En efecte, al tractar de explicar y basar lo federalisme, lo célebre


dogmatisador de aquella Confederació, Alexandre Hamilton, va
prestar al pensador francés l’homenatje de traduhirli los párrafos que
havem transcrit, basant en ells sa argumentació. De conformitat ab
los meteixos, definia’l federalisme dihent: “Es una agregació de
societats, ó una associació de dos ó mes Estats dins d’un Estat més
gran,” y afegia: “La extensió, modificacions y objectes de la autoritat
general, (ó del Estat més gran), son merament materia de discressió.
En tant que la organisació separada dels membres no estigui abolida,
y subsisteixi com necessitat constitucional pera objectes locals, per
més que degui estar en perfecta subordinació á la autoritat general
de la Unió, subsistirá de fet y en teoría la associació d’Estats ó
Confederació.”

Sens dupte que aquesta explicació es poch concreta, puig que en la


práctica es verdaderament difícil precisar en quin punt pot dirse que
queda abolida la organisació separada dels membres d’un Estat pera
objectes locals. De fet no s’ha presentat ni pot presentarse un sol
exemple de agrupació política basada purament en un sistema
determinat. L’Estat més unitarista é igualatari, per exemple, no pot
deixar de fer alguna concessió á la varietat, ó sigui als elements
particularistas, aixis com la organisació més particularista ha de
concedir molt al principi de unitat. De la meteixa manera que en la
historia no s’ha realisat jamay, ni jamay se realisará l’ideal d’una
monarquía pura ó de una democracia completa, tampoch ha existit
ni existirá un exemple d’unitarisme sens barreja de federalisme, ni
un federalisme sens barrejas unitarias. Precís es, donchs, que
profundisem una mica mes la materia á fi de deixar ben caracterisat
en la práctica lo sistema que analisem.

Un dels autors que l’ha estudiat més de debó, l’inglés Freeman, en sa


History of federal Government, després de ferse cárrech de la
dificultat de dar una definició perfecta, diu: “Lo nom de gobern
federal, en lo sentit amplement práctich, pot aplicarse á qualsevol
unió, quals membres components tinguin entre ells un grau de
cohessió que passi del de una mera aliansa, per molt íntima que
s’imagini, y disfrutin particularment d’un grau de independencia que
passi d’una mera franquicia municipal.” Afegeix luego, tractant de
caracterisar lo sistema: “Dos requisits semblan indispensables pera
constituhir un gobern federal en sa forma més perfecta. Per un
costat, cada un dels membres de la Unió deu ser completament
independent en aquellas materias que exclusivament li interessan:
per altre, un poder comú deu tenir atribucions completas pera tot lo
que correspón á la col·lectivitat.” Y pera acabar de aclarir aquestas
ideas, diu més endavant: “La existencia de distints membres en la
Unió deu ser diplomáticament desconeguda pera las nacions
extrangeras, que jamay han de tractar sino ab lo gobern central. Una
Unió federal, en resum, ha de formar un sol Estat en quant se
relaciona ab los poders extrangers, pero ha de compondres de varis
Estats en quant á llur administració interior.”
Podem ja determinar ab precisió quins son los carácters y quina la
naturalesa del Estat particularista ó federatiu. La base es la divisió de
las atribucions propias de la soberanía entre’ls Estats particulars que
s’associan, y l’Estat general que crean pera representar lo conjunt de
la Unió. En la distribució de atribucions, l’Estat general adquireix tan
sóls aquellas que se li encarregan clara y definidament, y’ls Estats
particulars conservan totas las de que no’s desprenen. La Unió y sos
membres coexisteixen en un meteix territori y en iguals pobles, sens
que pugui dirse que la una sigui superior als altres ni vice-versa. Las
atribucions están desllindadas, y cada entitat exerceix las que li
corresponen ab completa independencia de las altras. Quan se
troban y topan, una autoritat independent ha de decidir lo conflicte,
aplicant las reglas constitucionals, y obligant á la que pretengui
entrar en terreno que no li pertany, á deturarse ó á tornar á son camp
propi.

De lo dit se’n desprén clarament que las duas parts de la soberanía


que resultan de la distribució, son desiguals y de distinta especie. La
part que correspón al Estat general se compón de atribucions pocas
en número pero de gran importancia, mentres que la que’s reservan
los Estats particulars són en número indefinit, pero de menor
tracendencia moltas d’ellas. La part de soberania del primer es
delegada; la dels darrers, originaria. Lo gobern de la Unió es un
verdader apoderat dels membres d’aquesta, si be que disposa de
medis pera ferse respectar la delegació fins pels meteixos delegants.

L’Estat general, baix certs punts de vista, no passa de ser un sér


abstracte, una ficció legal. S’extén á un gran territori y al poble ó
pobles que l’habitan, pero aquell y aquestos són los meteixos que

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