Case Analysis of ADM Jabalpur v.

Shivkant Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207

Background of the case
In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain 1, Justice Jagmohansinha rendered a verdict
on June 12, 1975, declaring Indira Gandhi guilty of engaging in improper activities in order
to secure her election to the Lok Sabha. The election in question was deemed invalid,
resulting in her ineligibility to participate in the election or retain her position for the next six
years. Upon appealing to the Supreme Court, the highest court awarded her a temporary
suspension.
On June 26, 1975, President Fakruddin Ali, in accordance with his authority granted by
Article 352 (2)2, proclaimed a severe emergency in India, stating that the country's security
was at risk due to 'internal disturbances'.
The ordinance's outcome was the imprisonment of individuals deemed to pose a political
danger, in accordance with the provisions of preventive detention legislation, including the
Maintenance of the Internal Security (amending Act no. 39 of 1975). Several opposition
figures were apprehended and held in detention under the MISA, as previously stated,
because to their perceived danger to Mrs. Indira Gandhi.
Several modifications were made between the dates of June 25, 1975 and January 26, 1976.
The following adjustments were made:
Section 16A was appended to the MISA, and section 18 was subsequently included in the
same Act.
Subclauses (8) and (9) were included into section 16A on October 27, 1975, as stipulated in
ordinance 16 of 1975. According to clause (9), individuals who have been subjected to an
order of custody are not entitled to be provided with an explanation or justification for their
incarceration, nor are they permitted to see any relevant documents pertaining to their
detention.
On November 16, 1975, an additional ordinance 22 was enacted, which added clause 2 A to
section 16 of the MISA.
As a result of these revisions, several influential leaders from the opposition were subjected
to indefinite preventative custody without being adequately informed of the reasons.

Facts of the case

The government of India at the time, which was headed by Mrs. I.N. Gandhi, declared a state
of emergency in the nation on June 25, 1975, in accordance with Article 358 3 of the
Constitution, citing "internal disturbances" as the reason for the declaration. As a
consequence of this, the seven fundamental liberties guaranteed to citizens by Article 19 were
immediately suspended. Under the provisions of article 359(1) 4, an order was issued on June

1
(1975 AIR 875).
2
INDIAN CONST. art. 352, cl. 2.
3
INDIAN CONST. art. 358.
4
INDIAN CONST. art. 359, cl. 1.
27 in the name of the President of India, which suspended the implementation of Articles 14,
21, and 22. This order was made in furtherance of the emergency situation.

The Maintenance of Internal Security Act brought in the detention of a significant number of
individuals, the majority of whom were political leaders of the opposition party, beginning at
midnight on June 25 and continuing beyond that. The detentions that were thereafter made
were not justified. When detention orders were challenged, a number of writs of habeas
corpus were filed against them, arguing that they violated the constitution and were thus
unlawful.
There were a number of high courts (writ states) that rejected this objection for a variety of
reasons. The verdict of the high courts was challenged at the Supreme Court by the
governments of the involved states, such as Jabalpur, as well as by the government of India.
Each of these governments filed an appeal. Ray, the Chief Justice, together with Khanna,
Beg, Chandrachud, and Bhagwati Jr., were the members of the five-judge bench that presided
over the case.
Issue before the court
The primary matter presented to Their Lordships was whether the High Court could hear a
writ of Habeas Corpus lodged by an individual contesting the grounds for his detention in
accordance with the Presidential Orders that were in effect at the time of his detention.
Arguments of the petitioner
 The primary argument presented by the State was that the primary purpose of the
emergency provisions outlined in the Constitution of India is to provide the State with
distinct authority in the realm of Executive affairs. The State has complete jurisdiction
over the enforcement of these laws throughout the nation, so establishing itself as the
dominant authority during times of emergency.Another argument raised was that
despite the advisory board's declarations stating that the authorities had no legal
justification for detaining him, no detune was given. This would constitute a serious
breach of Article 225. The President's order, in accordance with Article 359(1) 6,
resulted in the suspension of the enforcement of rights under Article 197.
 The suspension of the right of individuals to seek legal recourse was implemented
with the aim of upholding Fundamental rights, including the right to life and personal
liberty. The argument put out was that the action was carried out in accordance with
legal provisions, and it was argued that the current circumstances would not constitute
a violation of the rule of law. It has been argued that Articles 358, Article 359(1), and
Article 359(1A)8 as outlined in Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution are fundamental
requirements for a country, underscoring the paramount importance of military and
economic security.

5
INDIAN CONST. art. 22.
6
INDIAN CONST. art. 359, cl. 1.
7
INDIAN CONST. art. 19.
8
INDIAN CONST. art. 359, cl. 1A.
  The Presidential Orders issued under Article 359(1) cannot be contested based on the
violation of Fundamental Rights, since they were first suspended by the
aforementioned Article.
Arguments of the respondents
 In contrast to the Petitioners, the Respondents contended that the legislature acquired
ultimate power under Article 359(1) during the emergency period, and there were no
provisions in place to protect legislation enacted in contravention of basic rights.
 There has been an argument suggesting that the primary objective behind the
enactment of Article 359(1) was to limit individuals' access to the Supreme Court as
outlined in Article 329 of the Indian Constitution, with the aim of protecting their
Fundamental Rights. However, it is important to note that this provision did not
impact the common law and statutory rights pertaining to personal liberty. Instead,
individuals were permitted to approach the High Court for addressing the matter
under Article 226.
 The respondents further contended that the imposition of Presidential Orders was
limited to Fundamental Rights and did not impact Natural Law, Common Law, or
Statutory Law.
 The Respondents further contended that the Executive's authority was not augmented
to any extent; rather, it was either aligned with or opposed to the people. The authority
granted to the Executives was in accordance with the provisions outlined in Article
162 of the Indian Constitution.
 The arguments put forth assert that the detention laws adhered to the conditions
outlined in the Constitution, and that Article 21 encompasses more than just the right
to life and personal liberty. Additionally, it was argued that Article 256, Article 265,
and Article 361(3) grant non-fundamental constitutional rights, and that the
Presidential Orders did not impact these rights. Only the statue has the ability to
sweep it, not the executives. The Respondents contended that the arrests and
detentions were conducted in accordance with the standards outlined in Section 3 of
the MISA legislation. Any arrest that did not fully comply with these parameters was
deemed to be outside the scope of authority granted by the legislation.

Post status of the judgement

In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India10, which took place in 1977, the Supreme
Court of India accorded Article 21 a basic character and created a living relationship between
Articles 14, 19, and 21. This occurred after the black period of emergency had ended. In spite
of the fact that this viewpoint was overturned in the case of AK Gopalan v. State of Madras 11,
it was further emphasized that Articles 19 12 and 2113 are not exclusive, and the reason for this
is because they cannot be separated. Following the decision in the case of ADM Jabalpur v.
9
INDIAN CONST.
art. 32.
10
AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248.
11
AIR 1950 SC 27.
12
INDIAN CONST. art. 19.
13
INDIAN CONST. art. 21.
Shivkant Shukla, the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Union of India v. Bhanudas
Krishna Gawde14, ruled that any restriction cannot circumscribe a Presidential Order under
Article 359, and that its application is not contingent on the fulfillment of any requirement.
As was shown in the ADM Jabalpur Case, the majority opinion has been rendered invalid as a
result of the 44th Amendment Act, as well as the other court interpretations and decisions that
have followed. It has no bearing on the situation that we are now in. Currently, Articles 20
and 21 are not subject to suspension under any circumstances. After the year 1975, neither
Article 352 nor Article 359 have been cited. 'Internal disturbance' has been changed to 'armed
rebellion' as a result of the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, which further stipulated that
an internal disturbance that does not amount to armed rebellion would not be considered a
basis for a Proclamation of Emergency. For the purpose of ensuring that no future
government would be able to abuse this clause of the Constitution of India, the 44th
Constitutional Amendment Act included a number of additional measures that pertain to the
Proclamation of Emergency legislation.
Judgement of the court
In this particular case, the four judges, Chief Justice A.N. Ray, Justices M.H. Beg, Y.V.
Chandrachud, and P.N. Bhagwati, have all arrived at the same conclusion, which is that the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be maintained in the event of a proclamation of emergency.
Article 359(1) states that "Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President
may by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III (except Article 20 and 21) as may be mentioned in
the order, and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights so
mentioned shall remain suspended for the duration of the Proclamation, or for such shorter
period of time as may be specified in the order." In this particular case, the four judges have
arrived at the same conclusion.
The four judges asserted that the court lacks the jurisdiction or ability to contest the validity
of a detention made under section 16A(9)B. This provision explicitly states that no individual
who is the subject of a detention order under Section 3 is entitled to the communication or
revelation of any grounds, information, or material mentioned in clause (a), nor can they be
provided with any document containing such grounds, information, or material.
Consequently, the court is unable to question the state or executive body to validate the
detention. Therefore, the party lacks the legal standing to bring a lawsuit to any court in order
to assert fundamental rights.
Justice Y. V. Chandrachud further asserted that the executive branch is obligated to operate in
conformity with legislation enacted by the parliament. This principle underscores the
fundamental requirement that all executive actions must be substantiated by legal provisions.
The author additionally asserts that the precedential order, as stipulated in article 359(1),
lacks clarity in relation to the act of disregarding parliamentary legislation. Hence, it is not
necessary for the state to provide a justification for dentation.
Justice Khanna expressed a dissenting viewpoint regarding the possibility of individuals
being unable to seek legal recourse for the enforcement of their fundamental rights under the
14
1977 AIR 1027, 1977 SCR (2) 719, AIR 1977 SUPREME COURT 1027, 1977 (1) SCC 334, 1977 SC CRI R
168, 1977 2 SCJ 516, (1977) 2 SCR 719, (1977) 1 SCC 834, 1977 CRI APP R (SC) 81, 1977 SCC(CRI) 208,
1978 MADLJ(CRI) 18.
constitutional remedy during a proclamation of emergency or presidential order under article
359(1). However, this does not preclude them from exercising their legal remedy through
statutory means. Furthermore, he refuted the notion that article 21 15 is the exclusive source of
the right to life and personal liberty. He said that even without article 21 16 in the constitution,
the state cannot deprive an individual of their right to life and personal liberty, as it
establishes the fundamental principle of a civilized society. During the declaration of
emergency, Article 21 simply forfeits its procedural jurisdiction, but its substantive authority
is of utmost importance. The State is prohibited from depriving any individual of their life
and freedom without legal authorization.
The majority opinion determined that individuals are precluded from seeking legal recourse
through the writ of habeas corpus or any other form of writ remedy. Furthermore, it should be
noted that the court of law lacks the authority to examine the legitimacy of detention under
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, as the legislation does not explicitly grant the
court the jurisdiction to assess the validity of such detention.
The extent to which a State can operate in or against the people is subject to legal and
reasonable limitations. In this particular scenario, there was a significant misuse of powers
for the personal political gain of a certain individual. During an emergency, there is no
mention of the State's authority "increasing" beyond its initial control as outlined in Article
16217.
In addition, the State has the authority to make an arrest if the alleged act is covered by
Section 3 of MISA and all of its conditions are met. If any criterion is not met, then detention
exceeds the authority of the State. The Supreme Court's verdict is widely regarded as the
most significant erroneous judgment to date.
Justice Khanna's contradictory opinion remains more substantive than the majority verdict,
which includes the former Chief Justice. The inequitable aim of Indira Gandhi's
administration became apparent when Justice Khanna posed the initial unsettling although
legitimate inquiry. "Does the Government's argument also apply to life, as it is mentioned in
Article 21?" There was no viable solution. Without any hesitation, the government's counsel
responded, 'Even if life is unlawfully snatched, courts are powerless'. Prior to the
Proclamation of Emergency, there was widespread political instability in the country
following the deemed illegitimate election of Indira Gandhi.
The entire situation was orchestrated to counter the opposition, and during the process, even
the esteemed Supreme Court committed substantial errors in its ruling, rendering it
unequivocally illegal. The audacity of a solitary judge is deemed worthy of examination,
since it aligns with principles of compassion, freedom, and liberty.
Analysis
The case was petitioned to the Supreme Court by Karan Vijay Singh, the ADM of Jabalpur.
The political figures who were detained by the state were represented by Shivkant Shukla.
This case continues to be of immense significance in the Indian legal system due to the fact

15
INDIAN CONST. art. 21.
16
INDIAN CONST. art. 21.
17
INDIAN CONST. art. 162.
that it represents a turning point. While the majority verdict failed to deliver justice to the
prisoners, that error was rectified in a subsequent ruling.
Following the rendering of this decision, particularly in light of Justice Khanna's vehement
dissent, a profound outcry ensued across the state, and his aspiration to ascend to the position
of Chief Justice of India was dashed. Justice P.N. Bhagwati subsequently conveyed his
remorse for abiding by the prevailing opinion of the Court.
Although proponents contend that this ruling adhered to legal propriety, it is universally
recognized that it represented a nadir for both the Constitution and the Supreme Court. As the
chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar frequently
deliberated on the concept of constitutionalism. This concept, which pertains to the
implementation of constitutional principles in order to establish justice, equality, and equity
in society, is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. According to Dr. Ambedkar, this
disposition of readiness to uphold the Constitution's fundamental values was essential for any
political system.
In the absence of a deeply ingrained patriotism towards the Constitution, injustice will
inevitably transpire, notwithstanding its impeccable and impenetrable nature. The implication
is that if citizens adhere to constitutionalist principles, our nation will fare markedly better
despite the Constitution's defects.
While judges and attorneys may have specific legal responsibilities, their primary status is
that of citizens. The sole determinant capable of ultimately ensuring justice is the ethos
embodied in constitutionalism. Hence, there are times when it is imperative to assert the need
for ensuring that all aspects, including the legal system, adhere to this benchmark of fairness.
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has been petitioned to render consequential
rulings that have an impact on civil and human rights in this manner. In several instances, the
Court utilized constitutionalism as a means to uphold and safeguard the rights of citizens,
notwithstanding the explicit statement of the law in the text.
Two examples are sufficient. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), substantive due
process was reinstated in Article 21, notwithstanding all linguistic indications to the contrary.
In a subsequent development, in 1997, the pivotal Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan & Ors 18. case
solidified a collection of precise tenets designed to protect women from sexual harassment in
the workplace.
Given this context, ADM Jabalpur should be regarded as one of the Supreme Court's harshest
days. Aside from the intricacies of the law, the Court's approach and demeanor lacked
constitutionalism. It neglected the fact that the law is merely a means to an end and not an
end in itself.

18
AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 3011, 1997 AIR SCW 3043, 1997 LAB. I. C. 2890, 1997 CRILR(SC MAH
GUJ) 749, 1997 LAB LR 991, (1997) 3 ALLCRILR 283, (1997) 2 CHANDCRIC 112, (1997) 24 CRILT 455,
(1997) 7 JT 384 (SC), 1997 SCC(CRI) 932, (2013) 3 KANT LJ 546, 1998 (1) BLJR 228, 1998 BLJR 1 228,
1997 CRILR(SC&MP) 749, 1997 (5) SCALE 453, 1997 (6) SCC 241, (1997) 3 RECCRIR 187, 1997
CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 25, (1997) 77 FACLR 297, (1997) 3 SCJ 584, (1997) 3 CURCRIR 126, (1997) 2
CORLA 321, (1997) 5 SCALE 453, (1997) 5 ANDH LT 14, (1997) 3 CRIMES 188, (1997) 2 MADLW(CRI)
604, (1997) 13 OCR 305, (1997) 2 EASTCRIC 574, (1997) 3 ALLCRILR 819, (1997) 3 RAJ LW 373, (1997) 7
SUPREME 323, (1997) WRITLR 823, (1998) 2 LAB LN 965.