BIRAOGO V.

PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010

FACTS:

Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010
was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of
the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is
to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot
determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the Executive Order on the grounds

that it violates the equal protection clause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional and violates the equal
protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:

Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class.
 The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations and must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations.

Executive Order No. 1 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of

the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

Facts: Then president Aquino, upon her assumption of her office as president, issued EO
No. 1 which created the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. One of those
investigated is AFP Maj. Gen. Ramas. There were equipments confiscated in his house while
money was taken from the house of his mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. The raiding team
raided the house of Dimaano without her presence but with her cousins in the house and
seized some items not included in the search warrant. When the constitutionality of the
search and seizure was questioned, the government asserted that the 1973 constitution at
that time was withheld in view of the EDSA revolution where Pres. Aquino took power in
the name of the Filipino people thus the exclusionary rule could not be applied in the case.
ISSUE: WON there was valid search and seizure of the items confiscated from Ramas and
Dimaano.
HELD: No.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of
Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
While the 1973 constitution was not operative at that time, nevertheless, the government
was bound by its treaty obligations under the international law hence, protection accorded
to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum . “Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”
In this case, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it confiscated items not specified
in the warrant in violation of the covenant. The seizure of these items was therefore void,
and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to
the person from whom the raiding seized them.
 STONEHILL vs DIOKNO
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS:
On different dates, 42 search warrants were issued against petitioners and/or corporations
for which they are officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences for “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the
offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code,
and Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the court contending that: (1) the search
warrants do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5)
the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents, papers, and thingsfound and seized in the residences of
petitioners were obtained in a legal manner.

RULING:
No, the warrants issued were invalid, thus the search and seizure conducted was illegal.
The Constitution mandates that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific
offense had been alleged in said warrants. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws.
 Alih vs. Castro
G.R. No. L-69401June 23, 1987

FACTS:On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines
and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners
at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
explosives. 1

On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to
recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against
them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative
of their right against self-incrimination.4

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they
were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is
valid.

HELD:No. The search of the petitioners' premises is not valid.

The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did
not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it
could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should
disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion.

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN
civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged
into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot
just force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his
rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the
ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.

If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution,
all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in
evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the
poisonous tree.
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners
deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material."
 AngTibay vs CIR (Gr No L-46496)
Facts:
TeodoroToribio claimed that there was a shortage of leather soles in AngTibay which
caused thetemporary layoff of a number of employees. All of the dismissed personnel were
only members of the National Labor Union Inc., while no members of the rival union,
National Workers’ Brotherhood, which Toribio was dominating were laid off.This averred
Toribio guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the NLU and unjustly
favoring the NWB.
The case won in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) favoring Toribio and NWB. By and
by, NLU appealed to the Supreme Court to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court approved. The Solicitor General contended and filed a motion
for reconsideration.
Issue:
WON National Labor Union Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
Held:
Yes.
The newly obtained record inclusions of theinventory accounts by AngTibay which were
not previously accessible but already existing proved substantial averments which were so
inaccessible to the respondents at the time of the trial even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
CIR. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered. Hence, the petition is granted and the entire case shall be reopened.
 Ynot vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

Facts:
Executive Order No. 626 ia an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos. To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from one province to another, but as well as the movement of
carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo.
He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violatedhis right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower
court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Order No. 626-A is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process.
EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement
of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are
being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
 Ganaan vs IAC

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.
After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to
his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed
conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then
told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office
of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s
consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification
hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep.
Act No. 4200

Held:
No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for
the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use.
 Cecilia Zulueta, Petitioner,
vs.
Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and
documents belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit Cecilia filed
against her husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC of Manila which rendered a
decision declaring him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress.”The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or
submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the same
documents were admissible as evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissible as
evidence.
Held:
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.
 U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding
charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust
him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge
still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an
auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or
suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The
trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments
of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in evidence by the
accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge
was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently
interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expedienteadministrativo
out of which the accusation in this case arose.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts
at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand,
guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of
Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the guaranties of a free speech and
a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a
fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of
the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of
any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on
the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the
notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that
any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has
been the result of this. Privilgedcommunications may in some instances afford an immunity
to the slanderer. Public policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost
by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public
official’s conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false,
the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There
must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to
a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter
which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring
home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood
and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person,
might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable
conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing
to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have
present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged.
Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are
probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these
citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not
eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a
grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to
convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.
 BURGOS vs CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

FACTS:

The case herein assailed the validity of two [2] search warrants issued by respondent Judge
Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City],
under which the premises of business addresses in Quezon City of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
publication of the said newspapers alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an

examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses,
2. Search Warrants were used to search two distinct places
3. Although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b
belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were seized.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized
under the disputed warrants
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon
application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not

have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause.

ISSUE: WON the Search Warrants are Valid

RULING:

No, the said search warrants are not valid.

The Court rules that the search warrants under consideration are constitutionally
objectionable because they are in the nature of general warrants. In Stanford v. State of
Texas the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets,
cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court
for being too general.
The Court also held that the persons wearing to or supporting the application for search
warrants must know personally the facts. In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
 Valmonte et al. vs Belmonte
[G.R No 74930, February 13, 1989]

Facts:
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent
Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting (a) to furnish petitioners the
list of the names of theBatasangPambansa members belonging to the UNIDO andPDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loansimmediately before the February 7 election thru
theintercession/marginal note of the then First Lady ImeldaMarcos; and/or(b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of thedocuments evidencing their respective loans;
and/or(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for thesubject information.

Mr. Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious legalimplications seek the
help of Mr.Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr.Tiro’s reply letter, a
confidentialrelationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty toits customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentialityunless so ordered by the courts.

On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy
General Counsel, Petitioner Valmontewrote another letter saying that for failure to receive
a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do whateveraction necessary within
the premises to pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public interest.

The respondent also raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of

mandamus, among which is thatpetitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Managerare reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board
ofTrustees, It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted,
then petitioners have no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that Mr.Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the
documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
RULING:
Yes, the court allows petitioners to access thedocuments and records evidencing
loans granted to members of the former BatasangPambansa.
Regarding the objection on the issuance of writ of mandamus, the court held, that
the issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of thescope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passedupon by the regular courts
more competently than the GSIS or its Board ofTrustees, involving as it does a purely legal
question. Thus, the exception ofthis case from the application of the general rule on
exhaustion ofadministrative remedies is warranted.

Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Yet, like allconstitutional guarantees, the right to information is
not absolute. People’s right to information is limited to “matters ofpublic concern” and is
further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and
the administrator of various insuranceprograms for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its
funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and46 of P.D 1146, as
amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977 provide for annual
appropriationsfor to pay for contributions, premiums , interest and other amounts payable
to GSIS by the government, as employer, aswell as the obligations which the Republic of the
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of itsfunds, the GSIS is
expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinentrules and regulations. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure
that these funds are managedproperly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and
its borrowers. He further contends that in view of theright to privacy, which is equally
protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing
loantransactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to
information.There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In
the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc,the right to privacy belongs to the individual inhis
private capacity, and not to public and the government agencies like the GSIS. Moreover,
the right cannot be invokedby juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of
privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right toprivacy is an injury to the feelings
and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to
privacy of its borrowers. The rightis purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions are
private in nature and hence, are notcovered by the Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern which guarantees “access to officialrecords, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions” only. Further, they
arguedthat GSIS, is a governmental corporation performing proprietary functions, are
outside the coverage of the people’sright to access to official records. The Court, citing
ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions andGovernment Corporations and Offices, said that the
government, WHETHER carrying out its sovereignattributes or running some business,
discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the people. Consequently, that theGSIS, in
granting the loans, was exercising proprietary function would NOT justify the exclusion of
transactions from thecoverage and scope of right to information.
 PEOPLE VS. VASQUEZ
{G.R. No. 200304January 15, 2014}

FACTS:

The instant case is an appeal before the Supreme Court, from the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 31, 2011. The said decision affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, which convicted herein appellant
Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, a.k.a. “Don”, of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of regulated drugs under Sections and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The Prosecution’s Case. On April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to the police
station office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug
activity, wherein Vasquez claims that he was an employee of the National Bureau of
Investigation. As per informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the
informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed such
information to P/Supt. Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo
was instructed to form a team and conduct a buy-bust operation against alias Don.

On April 3, 1998, at around 1:45 a.m., alias Don and P/Insp. Fajardo, in disguise as the
potential buyer, met in front of the apartment of Alias Don where the drug deal was to take
place as agreed upon. When P/Insp. Fajardo gave the signal, the rest of the team rushed to
the scene. Alias Don was arrested.

On the other hand, appellant, as expected belied the prosecution’s version of the case.
Herein appellant had statements contrary to the prosecution. He claimed, among others,
that, he was indeed a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties
at the time included being a subpoena clerk, and in the absence of the laboratory
technician, would weigh the specimens. Furthermore, alias Don also cited his activities and
whereabouts during those days of April 1 and 3, respectively.

The RTC of Manila, Branch 41, convicted herein appellant of the crimes charged. It gave
more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty on the part of police officers was not overcome.
Furthermore, the RTC held that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the
illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the latter’s denials.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the conviction of the appellant.
The CA ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of shabu. The CA held the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties of the police officers for the reason that appellant failed to
adduce evidence to show any ill-motive against the policemen to falsely charge him.
Hence, this appeal. Appellant questions his conviction on two grounds, namely: (1) the
purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers, and (2)
his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him.
ISSUE:

Whether or not alias Don can assail the validity of the arrest.

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that appellant cannot anymore assail the validity of his arrest. In
People vs. Tambis, the Court reiterated that “any objection, defect, or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to
move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants
are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured
upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction.”

Furthermore, as a matter of fact, since the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling drugs to a police officer in disguise as poseur-buyer, his arrest falls within the ambit
of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when an arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. Now, establishing the validity of the warrantless arrest
in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from herein
appellant is likewise valid.

Citing the case of People vs. Cabugatan, the court held that: This interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches
and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1)
search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or
consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a
lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest
effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.

Therefore, the Court has held that the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking
belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.

Lastly, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust
operation was legitimately carried out. Taking note on the case of People vs. Tiu, the Court
said that: to secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited
drugs, the following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer
and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. In the instant case, all of these were complied with.

Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

 ALLADO vs DIOKNO
[G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994]

FACTS: Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of
Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial
confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping
with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested
without bail by respondent judge.Security Guard EscolasticoUmbal, a discharge of the
Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and
slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. In that extrajudicial
confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by petitioners at Silahis
Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who
allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him.

On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners' request, gave them until
8 February 1994 to submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all
the accused. On 7 February 1994, petitioners complied with the order of respondent judge.
The following day8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of
Justice seeking review and reversal of the undated resolution of the panel of prosecutors,
which appeal was adopted by petitioner Mendoza. On 11 February 1994, petitioner Allado
moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of his appeal
before the Secretary of Justice. However, on even date, respondent judge issued the
assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. Hence, on 15 February 1994, petitioners filed
with us the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order.

ISSUE: WON there is a probable cause to issue the assailed warrant of arrest against the
petitioners.

HELD:No,the warrant of arrest issued against them is SET ASIDE. Section 2, Art. III, of the
1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a
warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.

Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated
11 February 1994, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the
evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists; and therefore, a warrant
of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at
such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find any support
for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the
evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners.
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the
arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did
he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts.
Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate the procedure we
outlined in various cases we have already decided.
 Comerciante vs. People
G.R. No. 205926 , July 22, 2015

Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 213, against Alvin
Comerciante. He was found to have in possession 2 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
with shabu which the policeacquired after he was frisked after the police spotted him from
a distance standing and showing improper and unpleasant movementstogether with Erick
Dasilla,with one of them passing a plastic sachetto the other. The RTC convicted him of the
crime of Illegal Possession ofDangerous Drugs. Accordingly, Comerciante appealed with the
Court of Appeals but the CA merely re-affirmed the decision of the RTC. On appealwith the
Supreme Court, it was held that the search conducted on Comerciantewas illegal as
"improper and unpleasant movements" cannot be considered asprobable cause, hence, the
warrantless arrest was unlawful. Considering theforegoing, the evidence acquired from
such search is inadmissible (Fruit of thePoisonous Tree Doctrine). Hence, the SC acquitted
Comerciante andexonerated him from all criminal liability.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction

Ruling:
No. The evidence against Comerciante is inadmissible as it was procured through an
unlawful search (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). The same should result in his
acquittal.
The OSG's argument, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, was that the
warrantless arrest was valid pursuant to the stop and frisk rule, and hence Comerciante's
conviction should be upheld. However, the SC held that there was no lawful arrest because
it is highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be
able to identify from 10 meters, while moving at a speed of 30km/hr on the motorcycle,
miniscule amounts of shabu inside two very small plastic sachets as held by
Comerciante. There is no overt act that could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to
rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3Calag that the former had just committed, was currently
committing, or was about to commit a crime. The acts of standing around with a companion
handing over something cannot be considered as a criminal act. Hence, there being no
lawful arrest, the evidence procured is inadmissible, being a fruit of the poisonous tree.
 People of the Philippines vs. Enojas
(GR No. 204894, March 10, 2014)

Facts:
PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and
SM Southmall when they spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They approached the taxi
driver Enojas and asked for his documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the
veracity of documents shown them, they invited him in their mobile car to the police
station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving his taxi behind. Upon reaching 7-
11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself
there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers
and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still
managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio
was also engaged in a shootout with two more armed robbers who managed to escape. He
then went back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that Enojas was
involved in the attempted robbery, they searched his abandoned taxi and found a mobile
phone apparently left behind by Enojas. The police officers monitored the incoming
messages and posed as Enojas. The accused appellants were later on arrested in an
entrapment operation and wereconvicted of murder by RTC Las Pinas.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having
been properly identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.

Held:

1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions.Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.Here, PO3
Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial
evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It
has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1)
there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented

sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused.
PEOPLE VS CHI CHAN LIU G.R. No. 189272 January 21, 2015 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee, vs. CHI CHAN LIU a.k.a. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE SENGLAO,
Appellants.
FACTS: In broad daylight, on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc,
Occidental Mindoro appellants were seen in the act of transferring 45 bags of illegal drugs
(shabu) from one boat to another and thereafter caught in possession of the same, which
became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the point of view of the arresting
officers even without a warrant arrested them. From the time of appellantsʼ arrest, the
seized bags of shabu were turned over to proper authorities in accordance to law and an
unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated drugs was established. Since the appellants
are Chinese nationals from Guandong, China, through an interpreter they were properly
informed and explained of their rights under Philippine laws. The RTC, then the CA
affirmed that the appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Importation
of Regulated Drugs under Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of
RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.
ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC/CA erred in convicting the appellants.
HELD: No. The RTC/CA did not err in convicting the appellants.
0. The warrantless arrests was proper since it was in flagrante delicto, an exception as
provided in Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
0. It is beyond reasonable doubt that the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of
custody of the illegal drugs was sufficiently established defeating their defence of denial
and frame up.
0. There was no violation of appellantsʼ constitutional right to counsel during custodial
investigation because they were convicted not on the basis of anything they said during
custodial investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
0. In view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in
the illegal importation of regulated drugs, the SC modified appellantsʼ culpability to illegal
possession under Section 16,39 Article III of RA 6425 and not of Section 14 since the
importation was not established.
 G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would
implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the
Resolution provide that the posting of any election propaganda or materials during the
campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the
premises of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned the
prohibition as it impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals.
ISSUE:
WON Resolution 9615 impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUV’s and
transport terminals.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom
of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs
and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign
material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the
penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable
for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their
preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate. t is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that
freedom of speech and of the press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The
rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends on how well we protect our
freedom of speech and of the press.12 It has been our constant holding that this preferred
freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
 EBRALINAG vs THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
[G.R. No. 95570 March 1, 1993]

Facts:

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by
Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department
Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.

On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions
for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right
to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech,
religion and worship.

On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit
the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this Court.

Issue:

Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account
of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting
the patriotic pledge.

Held:

No.Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority

and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to
his Creator.

Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the
flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since
they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution,
to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The expulsion
orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby annulled and set
aside.
 SILVERIO VS. CA
G.R. No. 94284 (April 8, 1991)

FACTS:
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the
Revised Securities Act of the RTC of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional
liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information,
respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport
of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he
had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in
postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
The RTC issued an Order directing the DFA to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny
his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from
leaving the country which was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the
filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and
there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has
gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court"
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, finding that the right to travel can be impaired
upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national
security, public safety or public health."
ISSUE:
WON the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on
grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health".
HELD:
Yes. According to 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, bail is the security given for
the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned
upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules. The
foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to
travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that "An accused released on bail
may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the
Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Petitioner theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to
travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health.Article III,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations.They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limited phrase which did not appear in
the 1973 text. Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the
ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders
into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on
a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.
 VILLAVICENCIO ET AL., VS.LUKBANG.R. NO. L-14639
March 25, 1919

FACTS:
On the midnight of October 25, 1919, thepolice, pursuant to the orders ofManila City
Chief of Police Anton Hohmann andManila Mayor Justo Lukban, took custody of 170
prostitute women, hustled them aboard the steamers and transported them to Davao City
to work as laborers. The women had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao and had not consented to the deportation.
Consequent thereto, the relatives and friends of the deportees filed petitions for writ
of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court granted the writ and ordered the
respondents to bring before the court the persons alleged to be deprived of liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the authority to expel the women from the City of
Manila and transport them to Davao City.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the liberty of abode is a principle so deeply embedded
in jurisprudence and considered elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. These women despite their being lepers of societies are
nevertheless not chattels but citizens protected by the same constitutional guarantees as
other citizens.
Mayor Lukban’s intention to suppress social evil is commendable but his method is
unlawful. There is no law, order, or regulation which even hints that the mayor of Manila
has authority to force citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality.Even
the Governor-General of the Philippines, or the President of the United States, has no such
arbitrary prerogative. Much less, therefore, the executive of a municipality who acts within
a sphere of delegated power.
 OCCEÑA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-60258 January 31, 1984

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks the declaration as unconstitutional of Sections 4 and 22 of Batas

PambansaBlg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, insofar as it
prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of May 17, 1982 "from representing or
allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party ... or prohibits a
political party, political group, political committee ... from intervening in the nomination of
a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving
aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on the intervention of political parties in the barangay
election violates the right to form associations

RULING:

No, ban on the intervention of political parties in the barangay election does not
violate the right to form associations the right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the
pervasive and dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or
curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interests.

The right to organize is intact as noted in Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of
1982.Political parties may freely be formed although there is a restriction on their
activities. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group action of
political parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may
intervene in the barangay election.It would definitely enhance the objective and impartial
discharge of the duties of barangay officials if they are shielded from political party loyalty.
The ban against the participation of political parties in the barangay election is an
appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the
impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit
of our political and social structure.
.
Petition is DENIED
 Case Digest FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M.
MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORA BLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his
capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
FACTS :
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is th e alleged
conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbiddi ng imprisonment for
debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the i nhibition in the Bill of Rights
which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax."
Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the
dishonor or non-payment of the check wh en it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute
is really a "bad debt law" ra ther than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-
payment of the check, n ot the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more
than a vei led device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.
ISSUE :
Whether or not BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprison ment for
debt.
RULING :
BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment . It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the l aw is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the publ ic interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient subst itutes for
currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or found ation of such
perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefuln ess of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that
confidence should be deterred for the prolifer ation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
 G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015

Juan Ponce Enrile

vs.
Sandiganbayan ( 3rd division ) and People of the Philippines

Facts:

Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan for their
alleged involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund PDAF. When his warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination, he
then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:

Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him.
The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition.7

In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a)
the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b)
although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.

The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that (a) he is charged with
a capital offense; (b)That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because
the prosecution have not yet presented its evidences.

Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of
bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a
matter right and is safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal
appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time
recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of his innocence until
proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the provisional liberty of
the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed independently of the merits
charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his
life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to
bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and attended,
which will then enable him to attend trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.
 AlejanovsCabuay
[G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005]

FACTS:
A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which
required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons
of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already
charged of coup d’etat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’
confinement is under a valid indictment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus valid.

HELD:
Yes. The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the
detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present
case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable.
The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court
orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the
habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is
not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
 IN RE. MARCIAL EDILLON
A.M. NO. 1928 AUGUST 3, 1978

FACTS:

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
(In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws
are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:

WON payment of annual membership dues are required for the members of Integrated
Bar?

HELD:

Yes.Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.
The respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of
law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
 MESINA VS PEOPLE

Facts:

In the afternoon of July 6, 1998, herein accused Bernardo Mesina then Local Treasurer
Officer I of the Local Government of Caloocan City went to the so called Mini City Hall
located at Carnarin Road, District I, Caloocan City for purposes of collection. While thereat,
Ms Baclit, OIC of collection, turned over/remitted to Mesina the weeks' collection for the
period covering the month of June 1998 representing, among others, the Market Fees'
collection, Miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, Community Tax Receiptsand the
'Patubig'collection all amounting to ₱468,394.46. After counting the cash, they were placed
inside enveloped and were then signed by both Ms. Irene Manalang, OIC of the Cash Receipt
Division, and herein accused Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection thereof.

Later that same afternoon, Ms.Baclit received several phone calls coming from the Main
City Hallto inform her that the supposed 'Patubig' collection amounting to P.167,870.90
was not remitted.Meanwhile, City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, after having been informed
of the discrepancy in the collection, summoned both Ms.Baclit and Bernardo Mesina to his
office at the Main City Hall for an inquiry relative to the missing 'Patubig' collection.

The following morning July 7, 1998, Caloocan City Mayor Reynaldo O. Malonzo called for an
immediate probe of the matter.when asked by Mayor Malonzo as to whether or not [t]he
'Patubig' collection was collected and/or remitted, Mesina stood fast in his denial of having
received the same; Ms.Baclit on the other hand positively asserted the remittance and
collection thereof by Bernardo Mesina. They all proceeded to the cashier's room: Mesina's
vault was opened and a cash count of the contents thereof was conducted.

The following day, July 8, 1998,the statement of collection supposedly signed by accused
Mesina was finally recovered at Baclit's desk hidden under a pile of other documents.

The Defense presented the oral testimony of the petitioner and documentary evidence. He
admitted collecting the total amount from Baclit, including the subject patubig collection,
but adamantly denied misappropriating, misapplying, and embezzling the patubig
collection, maintaining that the patubig collection was found complete in his vault during
the inspection.In support of his claim of innocence, he cited his numerous awards and
citations for honesty and dedicated public service.

On November 8, 2001, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of malversation

On July 24, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue:

WON accused-appellant is guilty of the crime.

WON accused-appellant was deprived of his rights mandated by the Constitution.
Ruling:

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

Only after the petitioner's vault was finally opened did he declare that the collection was
intact inside his vault.Even then, the actual amount found therein was short by 137,876.98.

The petitioner bewails the deprivation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights during the
investigation. He posits that a custodial investigation was what really transpired, and
insists that the failure to inform him of his Miranda rights rendered the whole investigation
null and void.Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one of those being
investigated did not by itself define the nature of the investigation as custodial.What was
conducted was not an investigation that already focused on the petitioner as the culprit but
an administrative inquiry into the missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the
custody of the police or other law enforcement office.

Accused found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds

 PEOPLE VS MARTI
[G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991]

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21
(b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Early on August 1987, Andre Marti together with his wife, Shirley Reyes went to a
booth of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) gift wrapped packages to
Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Appellant refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the packages, making it
ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes (proprietor and husband
of Anita Reyes) conducted an inspection of the packages as part of Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP). Upon opening the packages of the appellant, he noticed peculiar odor
emitted therefrom which made him open one of the bundles and took sample of the
substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to
inspect the packages. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious
package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in
Violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal before
the Supreme Court claiming that his Constitutional Right of Privacy has been violated and
that the evidence acquired from his packages was in admissible as evidence against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private
individuals.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech given by Commissioner Bernas that
the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of law. It is not meant to be invoked against private individuals. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be
first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government
It will be recalled that Mr. Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the
presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents
did not convert the reasonable effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and Seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
 PEOPLE v WEBB et al. (GR 176389)

FACTS:

On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the
charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the
victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution
due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as
lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner
that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the
evidence and prosecution witnesses."1

ISSUE: WON the motion for reconsideration is meritorious.

RULING:

As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused

under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being

punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this
provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against
the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense
after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and
repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources,
stamina, and the will to fight.
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In
any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.4
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring
his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court
"must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of
discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence." 5But he has not specified the
violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court
supposedly committed. His claim that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for
the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision" 6 is, without more, a
mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan 7 as authority that the
Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government
proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of
acquittal in that case was "dictated, coerced and scripted."8 It was a sham trial. Here,
however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the
CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that
the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four
who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process.

Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s appreciation of the
evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses’ credibility. He ascribes grave error
on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned
by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the
Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-
evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure
Webb, et al’s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be
disturbed.
 MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along
Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street
from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to
the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the
provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10, 1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?

Held:
 No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest
good to the greatest number.”