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The Politics-Administration Dichotomy
The Politics-Administration Dichotomy
The Politics-Administration Dichotomy
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University of Illinois
Ronald C. Nyhan
Florida Atlantic University
fails to obtain itspredicted tendencies in actuality. The results through the application of specialized knowledge Review,PublicAdministration
Quarterly,
Journalof PublicAdministra
International
authors interpret thefindings in light of the contempo and skills?that is, bureaucratic expertise. In a nutshell,
tion,International
ReviewofAdministrative
rary public administration literature. The article aims to asWilson put it long ago, "although politics sets the Sciences,andReviewof PublicPersonnel
make a
theoretical-empirical
contribution to one
of
the task for administration, it should not be suffered to Administration.
E-mail: rcnyhan@fau.edu
most
challenging questions
in
public
administration. manipulate its offices" (1887, 210).
cations for both the intellectual the intellectual "false," and more
identity and
best," recently,
and institutional devel "dead" Fesler and Kettl
identity institutional development of (e.g.,
opment of
public administration 1991; Fox andMiller 1995;
public administration.
(e.g., Goodsell 1983; Guy 2003; Henry 1987; Long 1954; Rainey
Henry 1975; Overeem and 1990). Although set aside by
Rutgers 2003; Rutgers 1997; prominent public administration
Svara 1999; Van Riper 1983;Waldo 1990;Whicker, scholars, neither the theoretical utility
nor the norma
Olshfski, and Strickland 1993). tive power of the dichotomy has totally disappeared
over the past decades. It continues to
inspire public
One of the earliest to the came administration scholars in that models
responses question antidichotomy
fromWoodrow Wilson in his seminal article "The are either
being
built on or
presented
as
reinterpretations
officials claim a strict subordinate role for admin which the are
public theory's assumptions approximately
istrators Lee Most the satisfied. This
(e.g., 2001). importantly, study utilizes structural equation
dichotomy plays a legitimizing role for public adminis modeling,
a
methodology
that helps researchers to
tration the idea that public administra evaluate theoretical models with data.1
by maintaining empirical
tion as a neutral and competent arm of
operates solely
government, with no involvement in
politics and policy The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: A
(McSwite 1997). Conceptualization
The envisions a division of labor and
dichotomy
the dichotomy's presence in the between elected officials and administrative
Despite omnipotent authority
authority between elected officials and public adminis is of three constructs: expertise, neutrality,
composed
trators is not as envisioned the In and hierarchy. The neutral competence construct
practiced by theory.
this study, our purpose is to a more draws from an of the dichotomy that
develop complete understanding
of the dichotomy?a administrators make contributions to
conceptualization conceptualiza public expert
tion that includes not
just the neutral competence (the policy making while maintaining a low political profile
function of administration) and political guidance (the and minimizing undue political influences through the
function of but also the hierarchical administrative structure. The
politics) components planning underlying
and democratic of the of the neutral competence construct is that
ability accountability aspects assumption
In other words, our research is to administration should be distanced from
dichotomy. objective public poli
see whether neutral and tics to the extent Miller 2000).
competence political guidance possible (e.g.,
increase the and democratic account
planning ability
dichotomy. An
empirical evaluation of these
hypoth policy leadership and legislative oversight. This
esized is important because these un construct draws from an of the dichot
relationships understanding
tested relationships
contribute most to the
continuing omy that elected officials formulate and clarify public's
normative of the dichotomy. and communicate them to
power preferences public
administrators. Policy leadership links elected officials
In this article, we undertake a to citizens, while links them to
theory-based empirical legislative oversight
of the politics-administration administrators. Both activities are
study dichotomy, public important
three steps. First, we conceptualize
the for
"setting
the task" for public administration
following
and develop a (Wilson 1887).
politics-administration dichotomy
theoretical model that is consistent with our concep
tualization. Second, based on a review of the We also two constructs called
specified planning
literature, we the theoretical model and then and democratic In the theoretical
explain ability accountability.
hypothesized to associate with the planning ability over 25,000. The government model predicated on
and democratic of public administrators. the form assumes representative
accountability council-manager
to As such, a council that is elected
Planning ability refers public administrators' capa democracy. by the
to translate into successful for a
bility policies implementa people policy making complements professional
tion. Democratic
accountability refers to policy manager who is appointed by the council for policy
in with intentions "Rather than conflict over
implementation conformity legislative implementation. expecting
and instructions. to the theo the allocation of values," as "reform
According logic of the Loveridge states,
retical model, there are certain activities that public ers that a wise and council
thought public regarding
administrators are
required
to do to
provide neutral with expert advice would reach decisions in the public
competence; there are also certain activities that interest" (1971, 21). According to Svara,
elected officials are required to do to provide political
Political and neutral A central a structural basis
guidance. guidance competence authority provides
increase the democratic and planning for cooperation, and it will be present,
accountability naturally
interfering with the other side" (Martin 1988, 632). to do the work of government
expertly, and to do it
is the fact that a of the staff recom rational administrative decisions rather than
large majority bargaining
mendations were accepted by both planning based decisions (e.g., Abney and Lauth 1982; Heclo
commissions and governing bodies. (1989, 341) 1975; Loveridge 1971; Sparrow 1984; Svara 1990).
case to we
Substantiated by this study, public
administrators In order tap the neutrality construct, identified
are as neutral decision makers two variables: conflict avoidance and
accepted providing expert policy advocacy.
advice to elected officials. Furthermore, Fleischmann's Each variable was with two statements:
operationalized
case is important in terms of its charac (1) "I maintain a neutral stand on issues
study particular any policy
terization of consensus
politics. Elected officials, accord that divide the council"; (2) "Imaintain a neutral
ing
to the
dichotomy,
are not seen as mere
partisans stand on any policy issues that divide the community";
that make decisions to
satisfy particular interests but (3) "Before approval by the council, I do not advocate
rather to maximize
public
interest with assistance from policies in public"; and (4) "Once the council autho
administrators (see, 1971). rizes I don't forth effort to convince
expert public e.g., Loveridge policy, put public
the of interest groups about
leaders/representatives
In order to tap the expertise construct, we identified how good the policy is."
three variables: technical skills,
advising/informing,
and Each variable was
professionalism. operationalized Hierarchy
with one statement: (1) "If I know that policy is The politics-administration dichotomy envisions what
beyond the capacity of the organization (in terms of Fox and Miller (1995) call the "loop model of democ
resources or commitments), in which a unilateral and intermittent influence
budgetary prior policy racy,"
Imake sure that the council becomes aware of these flows electorate, elected officials, and
among public
concerns"; (2) "The council respects my and administrators. In the model, communication
opinions policy
recommendations when it comes to technical matters streams and down citizens, elected officials,
up among
of policy"; (3) "The council provides me with plenty and public administrators; policy direction flows from
of opportunity to saywhat I think about the policy citizens to elected officials and then from elected
to be discussed (or on the
agenda)."
officials to public administrators (e.g., Carrell 1962).
Specifically, "neither individual members nor the whole
council the manager in directions to the
Neutrality bypass giving
Neutrality has been an enduring theme in public staff" (Montjoy andWatson 1995, 236). The hierar
administration (e.g.,Mosher 1982;Watson 1997). chical nature of the administrative organization helps
and activities minimize undue over
influence
Neutrality prescribes "public employees political public
to be and void of any administrators the manager more control
non-partisan, apolitical, particu by giving
lar policy agenda," the affairs of the city over his or her staff (e.g., Abney and Lauth 1982;
"administering
with integrity and efficiency and loyalty to the council, Koehler 1973; Svara 1990).
without participating in or allowing their work to be
affected by contending programs or
partisans," and We identified two variables to tap the hierarchy
a neutral stand on issues that divide construct: with
"maintaining policy managerial authority (operationalized
guidance
sets the task for public administration. policy-making responsibility of elected leadership
(e.g., Carrell 1962). Formal policy making is the most
Policy Leadership significant avenue by which collective leadership can
Banfield and Wilson state that "politics arises out of be exercised and political guidance provided (e.g.,
conflict, and it consists of the activities ...
by which Montjoy andWatson 1995). Official policies serve
conflict is carried on" (1963, 7). Policy management as instruments of
public control, according
to the
providing guidance for the development and imple In order to tap the
policy leadership construct, we
mentation of
policies, strategies,
and programs, all on an identified four variables: community leadership,
basis" (Poister and McGowan conflict resolution, initiation, and formality in
integrated cross-cutting policy
1984, 215). Specifically, for a local elected official, policy making.
Each variable was
operationalized with
policy management
means
"community leadership
one statement: (1) "The council plays the leading role
and involves the ability to move
community forces inmobilizing support from the community groups for
together and simultaneously toward a desirable adoption of policy"; (2) "The council plays the leading
objective" (Hulcher 1973, 143). role in
resolving conflicts among community groups
that disagree on policy"; (3) "The council plays the
There is a
practical argument that supports
a
leading leading role in policy initiation"; (4) "Directives from
role for elected officials in policy leadership activities. the council regarding policy come in the form of
The argument is that a rational bureaucratic structure official policy."
makes public administrators less effective in fulfilling
the political function which involves conflict Legislative Oversight
managing
inmatters of public importance (Sparrow 1984, 3). According
to the
politics-administration dichotomy,
the Daniel and Rose elected officials oversee administrators to
Substantiating practical argument, public
(1991) found a low correlation between professional ensure that policy implementation proceeds
in confor
ism and political acuity. Similarly, Newell and Am mity with legislative
intentions and instructions
(e.g.,
nions (1987) emphasize the leadership role of elected Flentje and Counihan 1984). Defined broadly,
officials and out the negative consequences of is behavior and
point "legislative oversight by
legislators
if exercised their staffs, or which results
community leadership by managers: individually collectively,
in an intended or not, on bureaucratic
impact,
Yet, the city manager who either chooses to be behavior" (Ogul 1976, 11). Legislative oversight
the principal either to allocate resources and exercise some form
community spokesperson helps
the role or conflicts of on nonelected administra
performs poorly sharply popular accountability
with dominant forces, or the manager tors (e.g., Lees 1977, 194; 1971).
political Loveridge
who is expected to play the role and fails to live
to the dichotomy,
legislative oversight is
to is not to find
up expectations, likely longev According
ity in office. (Newell and Ammons 1987, not
just
an instrument used by elected officials to
keep
quoted inHassett andWatson 2002, 623) public administrators accountable but also an oppor
to administrators with
tunity provide public timely
accounts also a limited role for feedback a
Descriptive suggest regarding policy implementation. Keeping
public administrators in activities of policy leadership watchful eye on public
administrators enables elected
guidance
to
public administrators (e.g.,
Koehler petence and political guidance increase the democratic
1973; Lee 2001; Pelissero and Krebs 1997). accountability
of
public
administrators. Neutral
consult with the council before drafting the budget of Office of Management and
Budget,
Heclo states,
the city/town/village/borough." (3) "The council moni
tors policy implementation closely." (4) "I (or a staff However well-intentioned some of these efforts
member with my authorization) prepare and have been, the fact remains that the easiest way
frequently
formal reports to the council the for an organization to become and
present regarding politicized
progress of lose neutral competence is to become
policy implementation." visibly
identified with a given political bargain and or
How Does the Dichotomy Operate in piece of public advocacy
.... If the organiza
words, administrators are not allowed to take administrators are decisions in with
public making conformity
actions that may the range and object of the intentions and instructions. The abuse of
change legislative
authorized Independent administrative actions administrative power has been an enduring theme in
policy.
are seen as a violation of the principle of su administration. The dichotomy the
legislative public emphasizes
Democratic refers to the extent of to counter
premacy. accountability importance political guidance potential
to which administrators act undemocratic tendencies.
public Policy
with or without
specific grants of leadership by elected officials
authority from their political Policy leadership by elected helps formulate and communicate
officials formulate and
supervisors (e.g., Cigler 1990; helps policy goals, while legislative
communicate
Finer 1940; Stover 1995). policy goals, oversight helps elected officials to
while legislative oversight helps make sure that
public
administra
In order to tap the democratic elected officials to make tors implement the policies in
construct, we with inten
accountability sure that administrators conformity legislative
identified two variables: policy public tions. the predomi
Emphasizing
the policies in
and creating implement nant role of elected officials in
change exceptions.
Each variable was operationalized conformity with legislative providing political guidance,
with one statement: (1) "If orga
intentions. Finer states, "administration
According
to the
dichotomy,
one of the most 1988, 632). When isolated from the rough-and-tumble
of public administrators is of administrators are more to
important responsibilities politics, public likely
planning (Person 1940). As professionals, public utilize administrative principles and techniques
to
administrators should be "autonomous, shielded from accomplish policy goals (e.g., Koven 1992).
the rough and rumble of political life and free to
apply principles
of resource
optimization neutrally
in
Having explained the hypotheses of the theoretical
the management of public sector" (Koven 1992, 526). model, the
following
section turns to the
sample and
techniques gained widespread use in local govern associations in our theoretical model, we
designed
a
planning horizon regarding policy implementation." (2) respond to the statements by keeping inmind what
"When I begin policy implementation, I know what I happens in the formulation and implementation of
am supposed to do to accomplish the legislated policy." economic
policies
(zoning, rezoning, taxing,
planning,
etc.). Our in
purpose economic as a
using policies
The theoretical model that neutral mental reference was on the belief that
hypothesizes predicated
and increase economic attract more and hence
competence political guidance planning policies politics
ability. Political guidance increases planning ability provide
a
good opportunity
to
fairly evaluate the
by formulating and clarifying public's preferences correspondence between the theory and practice
and them to administrators of the
communicating public politics-administration dichotomy (e.g.,
through policy leadership and legislative oversight. In Fleischmann 1989). Also, in this way we intended
to to minimize the problem of variation in responses
general, political guidance provides "goals" public
administration. The instrumental on which attributable to differences areas.
rationality among policy
the draws assumes that are handed
dichotomy goals
down from elected officials. As Carrell notes, "an A random of 1,000 was drawn
sample city managers
adopted policy
is an ideal instrument for routiniza from a list provided by the International City/County
tion" (1962, 205). The dichotomy assumes that Management Association (ICMA). The first surveys
elected officials are more of were mailed in March 2005, 357
capable providing guid receiving responses.
ance. The absence of would A second to with a
political guidance likely mailing nonresponders follow-up
make rather problematic letter resulted in an additional 158responses. The
policy implementation
because administrators, to the total number of responses was 515, a very
public according acceptable
dichotomy, do not (and should not) have an alternative 51.5 percent response rate. A
key
concern was that the
source of from citizens). drawn and the obtained were
guidance (e.g., guidance sample responses repre
sentative of the ICMA based on
population city size.4
On the other hand, neutral increases In all, 10.1 percent of responses came from
competence large cities,
planning ability by minimizing the influence of politics and 42.4 percent
came from medium cities, and 47.5
in administration and maximizing in came from small cities. Of the managers, 88.9
competence percent
31.7 Hierarchy
don't
forth
Policy
public
advocacy
the
Once Managerial
If
authority
council
amember
to
Iauthorizes
policy,
council
effort
to
the
put communicate
needs
staff
with
for
member
information/advice
specialized
receiving
564.7
regarding
a1.6 Managerial
If
authority
staff
ato
member
that
with
needs
communicate
staff
member,
council
first
permission
member
454.1
amy
receives
1.9
leaders/representatives
convince
of
23.3
feedback
Guidance
Legislative
The
policy
timely
to
provides
council
with
whether
about
the
not
implemented
been
has
intended
me
or
way
64.4
51.5
^ Professionalism
The
6I6.0
? Technical
skills
The
council
respects
my of
think
plenty
council
provides
6with
opinions
and
when to
what
opportunity
policy
the
about
discussed
be
me
say
6.0
761.1
recommendations
it
comes
to
technical
matters
of
policy
1.0
(or
Administrative
staff
Iwith
member
afrequently
authorization)
formal
present
and
my
prepare
65.4
reports
1.2
J1
(in
beyond
know
Neutral
Advising/Informing
is
Expertise
If
that
the
Ipolicy
of
capacity
organization
terms
budgetary
prior
policy
of
76.5
resources
or
0.8 Ability
Policy
implementation
When
Ibegin
policy
Iimplementation,
know
what
am
supposed
Ito
do
to
accomplish
the
legislated
policy
65.6
61.1
Resource
allocation
Iconsult
with
the
council
drafting
before
the
of
budget
the
city/town/village/borough
65.0
61.8
Policy
Political
leadership
Community
The
council
plays
leading
the
in
from
mobilizing
role
support
policy
4for
adoption
groups
5community
of
4.2
1.5 51.8 Creating
Change
Policy exceptions
Democratic
If
interest If
interest
groups
seek
to
"exceptions"
policy
in
implementation
in
the
organized
"policy"
seek
change
to
phase,
groups
advise
6I4.4 the
implementation
phase,
Idirect
them
to
65.0
61.7
?"
Competence
commitments),
Imake
sure
that
the
becomes
council
aware
of
these
concerns 1.9 Conflict
leading
The
in
the
structureplays
resolution
council
conflicts
role
resolving
that
groups
Guidance
community
policy
Leadership
disagree
among
5on
1.5
44.1
Hierarchical
city/town/village/borough
My
under
operates
ahierarchical
structure
of
government
62.6
from
in
Formality
Directives
policy
the
policy
council
3regarding
43.9
official
policy
1.7
form
of
come
Conflict
Imaintain
avoidance
that
the
divide
policy
stand
neutral
issues
4community
54.1
1.7
aon
any
Before
by
do
Policy
policies
public
the
I6advocacy
approval
5.1
council,
advocate
1.6
not
in
reporting to the council of policy implementation
progress
the
interest
how
groups
about
good
policy
the
is. regarding
the
to
get
permission
council
exceptions
for
? Neutrality
Conflict
avoidance
Imaintain
neutral
astand
any
on
policy
issues
that
divide
the
council
54.3
41.8 initiation
leading
The
plays
policy
Policy
in
the
council
54role
4.1
1.4 Monitoring
policy
The
implementation
policy
45council
monitors
4.0
1.4
closely Planning
Planning/routinization
Ihave
long-range
5.0
policy
horizon
planning
1.5
regarding
implementation
65a
informs
that
policy
council
member
me
first,
Accountability
them
the
council
to
convince
not
me
(or
the
agenda)
oon
performance
Oversight making
implementation
9j
Table
1Descriptive
Mode,
Statistics:
Mean,
Median,
and
Standard
Deviation administration
0000 "D
CCTn"> Q.
3. d' i// r+-1qjr+o' 13 730)< -c "<
_
reports the statistics for the variables. we decided to improve the model fit though model
descriptive
modification. Structural equation allows
modeling
theory and practice of the dichotomy, we used struc reviewed themodification indices reported by AMOS.
tural equation modeling (SEM). This method helps We decided to add two new parameters to the model:
directly observable or unmeasured latent variables. It The first is between disturbance of neutrality and
takes a
confirmatory approach
and is
particularly
used political guidance. We had two justifications for
to evaluate theoretical models.5 this: (1) the political activities of public administra
tors militate elected officials' power
might against
Prior to the theoretical model, we screened to administration Svara 1990, 37), or
evaluating guide (e.g.,
the raw data. Based on
city managers'
comments on (2) the failure or unwillingness of elected officials
the margins of the returned surveys, we decided to omit to may force public
provide political guidance
a number of variables from the data set because of the administrators to
engage in and thus to fill
politics
confusion that
the wording of some statements created. the void (e.g.,
Hassett and Watson 2002).
Then, while on the second-order measurement The second is between the error term of the
working
models, we decided to
drop
a few more variables that fourth legislative oversight variable (reporting
had residuals.6 Our was to the to the council) and the
large purpose improve implementation progress
fit of the second-order measurement models. The disturbance of planning Because informa
ability.
total number of manifest variables used in the final tion (from subordinate to the
superior)
reduces
structural model was 22 out of 29 in the survey. for the superior, the superior becomes
uncertainty
more capable of providing to public
guidance
We also deleted cases with missing values. After this administrators for planning (e.g., Carrell 1962;
deletion, the number of cases declined to 481, which Koehler 1973; Sparrow 1984).
was used in statistical We also
subsequently analysis.
checked for the normality for each After these two the model fit
assumption ques changes, improved
= < .001,
tion
using kurtosis and skewness values that showed no
(Chi-square 380.043,/> df= 196). The
violation of normality.7 the Mahalanobis dis covariances are in table 2. The fit
Using sample reported
tance, we dropped a number of outliers from the data indices values for the modified model were
greater
set. Also, we checked the data to ensure that there was than the minimum 0.9 except NNFI,
suggested
no serious collinearity problem.
Our review of collin which was very close to 0.9. The RMSEA was 0.045
statistics showed that all tolerance values were (see table 3). Taken these values show a rea
earity together,
than .2, and all VIF values were smaller than 4. sonable fit of the model to the data. We also reviewed
greater
the standardized residual covariances to see whether
Using the maximum likelihood estimation method, their distribution was normal. This review revealed
the full model was tested and the model converged that their distribution was normal, most of them
0.9. For RMSEA, Browne and Cudeck (1993) suggest variance in the
endogenous variables is
explained by
that values lower than 0.08 would indicate a reasonable the model. In the section, based on stan
following
fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom. dardized path coefficients and R2 values (see table4),
It should be noted that there are numerous fit indices we the between the
interpret correspondence theory
and there is no and of the politics-administration
reported by SEM programs, agreement practice dichotomy.
in the literature as to which fit indices should be used.
Kline (1998) suggests reporting at least four fit indices. Discussion of Findings
Following Fan, Thompson, andWang's (1999) sugges The results of SEM indicate a lack of correspondence
tion, we used AGFI, CFI, RMSEA, and NNFI, as they between the theory and practice of the dichotomy.
are
among the fit indices least affected by sample
size.
According to the dichotomy model, the function of
is which means
politics political guidance, formulating,
The initial test of the theoretical model produced fit clarifying,
and communicating public's preferences.
In
indices lower than the minimum values. other words, is for the task"
suggested political guidance "setting
22
.129
.312
.301
.042
.038
-.005
.081
.188
.163
.127
.200
.251
.048
.319
.392
.204
.130
.362
.103
.060
.424
1.332
.161
.346
.343
-.156
-.174
.542
-.436
21
.056
-.030
-.178
.371
-.028
.117
-.249
.466
.369
.560
2.345
.297
-.144
.504
20
.053
.015
.023
.834
.721
.618
.265
-.046
.109
-.057
.302
.346
.494
.515
.237
.540
.395
.192
1.402
2.794
19
.060
.070
-.081
.642
.657
.483
.576
-.073
-.034
.176
.379
.502
.503
.422
.171
.331
.341
.058
3.243
18
.126
.166
.213
-.015
.022
.014
.280
-.254
.085
.068
.203
.273
.120
.248
.340
.339
.428
1.487
17
.073
.114
.071
.364
.563
.365
.076
.391
.232
.168
.410
.555
.697
.597
.636
.855
2.042
16
.084
.114
.129
.150
.330
-.004
.304
-.087
.125
.003
.097
.253
.142
.526
.207
3.186
.176
.498
.407
.170
.174
15
-.025
.400
.663
.281
.894
.145
2.430
.742
.776
.818
14
.129
.166
.190
.422
.152
.357
.044
.609
.156
.405
.747
.552
.590
2.793
13
.111
.300
.351
.332.039
.154
.445
.233
12
.090.122
.597
-.156
.426
2.255
1.125
.344 .570
.504
.291
.237
.240
.085
.781
.703
2.113
11
.086
.266
.244
.335
.360
.435
.073
.088
.439
.272
2.216
10
.069
.171
.148
.160
.164
-.095
.251
.476
.575
1.918
9.088
.251
.204
.004
-.128
.340
-.078
1.370
3.669
.126
.501
.536
82.692
.009
.015
.180
-.156
-.087
-.075
.553
2.819
7.253
.501
-.156
6.058
.068
.098
1.052
1.192
2.743
-.053
-.148
5-.008
2.952
2.036
4-.057
-.182
-.107
3.286 follow
Table
Variables
in
their
1.
order
*
.160
1.279
.586
3
Table
2%
Covariances* 2 .900
.344
1 .149
10o c <Tn'> Q.
-o 3 3' {/*'r+-n o" 13 0)< cuD C Q>-^
?_ 0>O"-^
-n c ^_ o _00
Neutral .95 .95 .93 .049 (e.g.,White 1982;Wikstrom 1979). Both explanations
competence
Political guidance .93 .92 .88 .071 point to the diminishing role of elected officials in
Original structural model .89 .85 .83 .054
providing political guidance to public administrators.
Modified structural model .91 .90 .88 .045 who the role of micro-level vari
Scholars emphasize
ables propose structural changes (e.g., strengthening
the mayor as a maker in cities,
policy council-manager
for public administration. Instrumental on
rationality, adding more staff support to elected officials).
which the politics-administration is based,
dichotomy
assumes that clear are handed down from politics
goals Others, however, macro-level variables and
emphasize
to administration. In other words, the formulation of call for a reevaluation of roles and in
responsibilities
and means can and should be Political local government
goals separated. (e.g., Nalbandian 1999; Svara 1999).
enables administrators to do better
guidance public local government scholars the im
Many acknowledge
which means
planning, processing goals successfully portance of collaborative between elected
relationships
into concrete However, the standard officials. Svara
implementation. and administrative (1999), for
example,
ized path coefficient we found between political
develops a dichotomy-duality model (also known as the
and was .002, meaning as an alternative
guidance planning ability just model) to the
complementarity poli
that political guidance had a low and nonsignificant tics-administration The
dichotomy. dichotomy-duality
on the of the public adminis
impact planning ability model accepts dichotomy between and
solely politics
trators. This very low and nonsignificant of
impact management, yet it encourages influence and
reciprocal
political guidance on planning ability of public overlapping
roles between elected and administrative
administrators into question two fundamental to
brings officials with respect and administration.
policy
assertions of the dichotomy: (1) clear policies formu
lated by elected officials are a prerequisite for public If political guidance from elected officials is not strong
administrators' planning ability, and (2) politics is done
enough to influence the planning ability of public
more effectively by elected officials. Our finding raises then what is the source of for
administrators, guidance
two was the association between
questions: Why politi administrators? Public administrators' technical
public
cal guidance and planning ability weak, and what is the and values? That
knowledge professional is, neutral
source of political for administrators?
guidance public competence? The standardized coefficient be
path
tween neutral and was
competence planning ability
In response to the first some adminis <
question, public 0.79 .001). The of neutral on
(p impact competence
tration scholars have drawn attention to the diminish was
ability but neutral compe
planning significant,
ing capacity of elected officials in providing guidance tence and
political guidance together explained
62
to administration. There have been two basic
public percent of the variance in planning ability. This finding
offered scholars in the past. The first can as
explanations by be support for
the argument that
interpreted
emphasizes macro-level variables, such as increasing on
its focus neu
neutral competence (with hierarchy,
complexity of the environment and the com is not to solve
political trality, and expertise) enough problems
nature of in contemporary local govern
plex problems in a environment (Nalbandian
complex political
ment Nalbandian 1994). These macro-level
(e.g., 1999). Indeed, contemporary public administration
variables us to understand elected officials
help why scholars call for a broader participation of public ad
have lost much of their influence on the task
setting ministrators in
policy process. Svara (2001), for ex
for public administration. The second, on the other
ample, the interaction and
emphasizes ongoing
hand, emphasizes the role of micro-level variables, such
reciprocal influence between elected officials and ad
as the nature of the work
part-time done by elected ministrative officials. Furthermore, attention to
paying
the problems of representative model,
democracy
many contemporary public administration scholars
Table 4 Standardized Path Coefficients
that administrators should interact more
suggest public
Democratic with political actors and interest groups. It is this kind
Planning
Construct Accountability8 Abilityb of interaction that may enable administrators
"public
Neutral -? -0.73* to administrative resources
Competence 0.79* complement provided by
Expertise with the resources can muster on their
hierarchy they
Neutrality own" (Long 1949). Abney and Lauth (1985) argue
Hierarchy
-* that interest function as a form of
Political Guidance 0.94* 0.002 groups popular
Policy Leadership representation that the electoral process.
complements
Legislative Oversight from a council member, Nalbandian states,
Excerpting
at .001 level. is of little use in those
*Significant "hierarchy handling problems
aR2 .43. that require and innovation,
independence, creativity
b/?2 .62. connectedness, communication, and
cooperation"
politics-administration relationship, neutral compe and what elected officials expect public administrators
tence is with a new that Nal to do. then can administrators be more
being replaced concept Only public
bandian (1999) calls political competence towhich confident to determine what constitutes an
"exception"
administrators should and can make or to an authorized If ismore
public significant "change" policy. "policy"
contributions. As Nalbandian states, "efficiency alone than a piece of written as
many scholars
legislation,
no will suffice as a to effective administra democratic then, may
longer guide acknowledge, accountability,
tivework" (1994, 535). Our statistical results provide require public administrators to
get
more
actively
in
some for this claim. volved in environment of the government.
preliminary support political
Active involvement becomes
political especially impor
The standardized path coefficient between political tant as a
corollary
to the
diminishing
role of elected
guidance
and democratic accountability
was 0.94 officials in providing political guidance. Political in
< .001), that political guidance had a volvement administrators understand
(p meaning may help public
engaged in and influential on legitimizing policy official's perspective will be able to assist the
initiatives or demands for change in the policy elected official who wants to develop political
In other words, rather than competence. An of the
implementation phase. understanding general
providing strong political guidance to public adminis perspective of the elected official is crucial and
trators, elected officials engage in what is called the complex environment in which
political
casework, through which they address specific elected officials are
trying
to make decisions and
prehensive understanding of why the hypothesized normative and empirical dimensions that are
associations failed to obtain the expected results in prac interrelated (Svara 1985). In our opinion, there are
tice research, no purely normative or
requires follow-up possibly using in-depth purely empirical proposi
interviews with and elected officials. tions regarding the politics-administration rela
city managers
tionship. That public administration scholars
This study intended tomake a theoretical and empirical develop normative propositions {should) is closely
contribution to one of the most in related to the way inwhich they establish cause
challenging questions
the field of public administration. The data came from a effect relationships in reference to empirically
where the dichotomy's were observable problems (is). For example, when some
sample assumptions approxi
our to
mately satisfied. However, analysis failed produce public administration scholars infer that poor
administration dichotomy. If the dichotomy model fails guidance from elected officials, they tend to
to obtain its tendencies in a in which that elected officials should provide more
predicted setting prescribe
the dichotomy ismost likely towork, it is less likely that political guidance to
help increase the planning
itwill work in other governmental settings inwhich the ability of public administrators. In this research,
labor and between elected and administrative we try to understand whether these cause-effect
authority
officials are not divided clear functional can be
along lines. relationships supported with empirical data.
2. The council-manager form of local government has
The results of statistical some structural and contextual characteristics that make
analysis provide empirical
support for public administration scholars' assertion it an appropriate source of data collection and
that a revaluation of roles and in con model evaluation. Two particular characteristics
responsibilities
temporary American local is needed. justify our selection: (1) The explicit and formal
government
However, the failure to find founda division of labor and authority between council
strong empirical
tions the dichotomy
for would, in no means, take the and manager and the separation of policy making
out of administration's discourse, from policy (no agent with both
dichotomy public implementation
a number
unless of affirmative steps are taken. As Svara policy and administration responsibilities, such as
one of the most rea elected mayors with
(1985) rightly noted, important policy and administration
sons for the continuing power of the is the in mayor-council cities); and (2)
dichotomy responsibilities
lack of a strong alternative to the the nonpartisan ballots, at-large elections, and
dichotomy?an
alternative that would not better describe the absence of competitive actors. These characteristics
only
responses in a particular direction was the most data are more stable when the maximum likeli
challenging aspect of this research. Lack of fore hood estimation method is used (e.g., Chou and
thought and pre-tested surveys increased challenges Bender 1995). In the test of the structural model,
to operationalize the theoretical constructs. We we used the maximum likelihood estimation
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