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Bing Song Editor

Intelligence
and Wisdom
Artificial Intelligence Meets Chinese
Philosophers
Intelligence and Wisdom
Bing Song
Editor

Intelligence and Wisdom

Artificial Intelligence Meets Chinese
Philosophers
Editor
Bing Song
Berggruen Research Center
Peking University
Beijing, China

ISBN 978-981-16-2308-0 ISBN 978-981-16-2309-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2309-7

Jointly published with CITIC Press Corporation, China

Translation from the Chinese language edition: by Bing Song, ©

CITIC Press Group 2020. Published by CITIC Press Group. All Rights Reserved.
© CITIC Press Corporation 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
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The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
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The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
Acknowledgments

This book is made possible by the generous support and inspirations of the colleagues
at the Berggruen Institute and its China Center.

v
Contents

Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers Think About Artificial

Intelligence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bing Song
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order: A Confucian
Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Chunsong Gan
The Artificial Intelligence Challenge and the End of Humanity . . . . . . . . 33
Chenyang Li
Can Artificial Intelligence Lead Us to Genuine Virtue?
A Confucian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Stephen C. Angle
Can a Machine Flow Like Dao? The Daoist Philosophy on Artificial
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Robin R. Wang
When Artificial Intelligence Meets Daoism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Fei Gai
Great Wisdom Holds the Answers to Human Suffering—Artificial
Intelligence Inspired Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Fenghe Liu
“Natural Robots: Locating ‘NI’ Within the Yijing Cosmology” . . . . . . . . . 109
Roger T. Ames
Human Nature, Time-Consciousness, and the New Frontiers
of Artificial Intelligence—An Inquiry from the Perspective
of Phenomenology and the Eastern School of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Xianglong Zhang
The Uncertain Gamble of Infinite Technological Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Tingyang Zhao

vii
Notes on Contributors

Roger T. Ames 安樂哲 is a Humanities Chair Professor at Peking University,

Academic Director of the Peking University Berggruen Research Center, and
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Hawai’i. He is a former
editor of Philosophy East & West and founding editor of China Review Interna-
tional. Ames has authored several interpretative studies of Chinese philosophy and
culture, and his publications also include several translations of the Chinese philo-
sophical classics. His most recent monograph is Human Becomings: Theorizing
‘Persons’ for Confucian Role Ethics (SUNY Press, 2021). He has most recently
been engaged in compiling the new Sourcebook of Classical Confucian Philosophy
with its companion A Conceptual Lexicon of Classical Confucian Philosophy, and
in writing articles promoting a conversation between American pragmatism and
Confucianism.
Stephen C. Angle is a Director of the Fries Center for Global Studies, Mansfield
Freeman Professor of East Asian Studies, and Professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan
University. Angle specializes in Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, and comparative
philosophy, and his research focuses on philosophy’s role in human rights, politics,
and ethics both in China and globally. He has co-directed two NEH Summer Insti-
tutes, is a recipient of several major grants, and was awarded Wesleyan’s Binswanger
Prize for Excellence in Teaching. Angle is the author of four books and co-editor
of two others. His latest book, Growing Moral: A Confucian Guide to Life, will be
published in 2022 by Oxford University Press.
Fei Gai is a Lecturer of Chinese Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at
Yunnan University. She specializes in Chinese Philosophy, with a particular interest
in Daoism.
Her recent publications include A Study of the relationship between Taoism Inner
alchemy and alchemy (道教内外丹关系研究) (Sichuan Bashu Book Society, 2020),
“The characteristics of the Taoist life philosophy in the evolution of the relationship
between external dan and internal dan” (从道教内外丹关系演变看道教生命哲学
的特色), (Religious Studies, 2021.3), and “A discussion on the Core Principle of
Taoist Waidan Theory of Longevity” (道教外丹长生理论的内核探讨) (Studies in
World Religions, 2020.2).
ix
x Notes on Contributors

Chunsong Gan is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Peking University

and Deputy Director of the university’s Confucianism Research Institute. Gan has
published widely on Confucian philosophy and modern Chinese culture, thoughts,
and political philosophy. He is the author of Back to Wangdao (重回王道), (East
China Normal University Press, 2012) Kang Youwei and Confucianism’s ‘New
Era’ (康有为与儒学的“新世”), (East China Normal University Press, 2015), and A
Concise Reader of Chinese Culture (Springer, 2019).
Chenyang Li is a Professor of Philosophy at Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore, where he founded the philosophy program. His primary areas of research
are Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. He is the author of The Tao
Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy, The Confucian
Philosophy of Harmony, and over 100 journal articles and book chapters. His edited
volumes include The Sage and the Second Sex (Open Court, 2000), The East Asian
Challenge for Democracy (with Daniel Bell, Cambridge University Press, 2013),
Moral Cultivation and Confucian Character (with Peimin Ni, SUNY Press, 2014),
Chinese Metaphysics and Its Problems (with Franklin Perkins, Cambridge University
Press, 2015), and Harmony in Chinese Thought (with Sai Hang Kwok and Dascha
Düring, Rowman & Littlefield, 2021).
Fenghe Liu has had a long career in medical education in China and has been active
in the Great Wisdom mentoring for decades.
Bing Song is a Vice President of the Berggruen Institute and the Director of the
Institute’s China Center. She leads the Center’s program, which explore the intersec-
tion of Chinese philosophy, frontier technologies and governance. Prior to joining
the Berggruen Institute, Bing has had a long career in legal practice and banking, and
published edited volumes and journal articles on topics of Chinese judicial reforms,
administrative law, and competition law.
Robin R. Wang is a Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University, Los
Angeles and Berggruen Fellow (2016–2017) at the Center for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University. Her teaching and research
focus on Chinese and comparative philosophy, particularly Daoist philosophy, and
women and gender in Chinese culture and tradition. She is the author of Yinyang: The
Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture (Cambridge University
Press, 2012) and editor of Chinese Philosophy in an Era of Globalization, (SUNY
Press, 2004) and Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from
the Pre-Qin Period to the Song Dynasty (Hackett, 2003).
Xianglong Zhang is a retired Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Peking
University. His research focuses on phenomenology, Confucian philosophy and West
and East comparative philosophy. He is the author of Confucian Mind Philosophy
and its Conscious Foundation (儒家心学及其意识依据, 2019), and “Time-Halo
and the Subtlest Spring of Changes (ji-wei): The Structural Comparison between
Phenomenological Time and Changes’ Hexagram-Time” (时晕与几微——现象学
时间与 《周易》 象数时间的原结构比较), (2017, 2020).
Notes on Contributors xi

Tingyang Zhao is a Academician of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,

Professor of Philosophy, and Senior Fellow at the Berggruen Institute. His trans-
lated works include All-Under-Heaven: The Tianxia System for A Possible World
Order (UC Press. California, 2020), Alle Unter Einem Himmel (Suhrkamp, Berlin,
2019), Un dieu ou tous les dieux (co-authored with Alain Le Pichon), (Cent Mille
Milliards. Paris, 2019), Tianxia Tout Sous un Meme Ciel (Les editions du cerf. Paris,
2018), Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance (Macmillan, London, 2018),
and Du Ciel Ala Terre (co-authored with Regis Debray), (les Arenes. Paris, 2014).
Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers
Think About Artificial Intelligence?

Bing Song

Context and Inquiry

Discussions about artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and their impact on humans
and the future of human society continue to figure prominently across the global
media and policy agenda. In the current global pandemic, AI and robotics have
once again demonstrated their great potential for contributing to the wellbeing of
human society. But mounting concerns remain, including potential overreach in data
collection and the risk of turning contact tracing AI programs into routine surveillance
systems. There can be little doubt that discussions about AI and ethics have entered
the mainstream public discourse.
Since 2015, there have been close to 80 AI and robotics related ethical principles
and value pronouncements issued by international organizations, inter-governmental
organizations, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and research institu-
tions.1 A number of broad values have been declared, including justice, human
autonomy, dignity, humanity, and freedom. AI ethical principles declared have ranged
from individual rights-oriented notions of privacy and prevention of bias to systems-
oriented notions such as interpretability, safety, security, and robustness. They have
also covered group-oriented notions of partnership, sharing and collaboration among
nations and scientific communities. Many international and inter-governmental orga-
nizations have launched campaigns to ensure that their declared principles are the
ones that will be adopted as the new norms by the global community. The European

1“Principles,” Yi Zeng, Cunqing Huangfu, Enmeng Lu et al. Linking Artificial Intelligence

Principles (LAIP), accessed November 13, 2020, http://www.linking-ai-principles.org/.

B. Song (B)
Berggruen Research Center, Peking University, Beijing, China
e-mail: songbing@berggruen.org

© CITIC Press Corporation 2021 1

B. Song (ed.), Intelligence and Wisdom,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2309-7_1
2 B. Song

Union (EU), for example, made clear its determination to export European values
across the world in its AI white paper, published in February 2020.2
Most if not all the notions underlying the declared principles have been around
since the industrial age and are commonly used in other governance contexts. In the
EU’s case, foundational values underlying these principles have been articulated as
“respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.”3 Whereas for the United
States, China and Singapore, the articulated values have been about competitiveness,
wealth maximization and global strategic leadership.4
Here arises two questions: are the AI principles proposed thus far reflective of
the disruptive and transformative nature of frontier technologies? Core values of
modernity may have served us well in the past, but are they the right set of foundational
values for building an inclusive normative framework for AI, the future of humanity
and other beings at a time when we are rethinking globalization and global values?
A clarification on the distinction between a foundational value and an ethical
principle is called for here. A foundational value speaks to the profound motivations
and aspirational goals that a society seeks to achieve. An ethical principle refers
to a notion, which is either operational, or is more likely to be operationalized by
policies, rules and regulations. Foundational values inform and shape the discussion
of ethical principles. Disruptive nature of frontier technologies has created ruptures
in our habitual thinking patterns and notions we have held as self-evident truths. They
also offered a golden opportunity for us to pause and rethink foundational values for
the future and for the greater planetary flourishing.
This current book is centered on how we may rethink foundational values by
tapping into the wisdom of Chinese philosophical traditions.
In 2018, historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Harari aptly noted that, “we are
now facing not just a technological crisis, but a philosophical crisis”.5 He said that
the philosophical framework of the modern world, which was established in the
17th and 18th century around ideas like human agency and individual free will, is
being challenged like never before.6 Tobias Rees, the Berggruen Institute’s founding
program director of the Transformation of Humans, also noted that “today AI and

2 “AI White Paper”, European Union, The European Commission, issued on February 19,
2020, at 9. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-
feb2020_en.pdf.
3 “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI.” Independent High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intel-

ligence set up by The European Commission, The European Commission, April 8, 2019, https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai.
4 “American Artificial Intelligence Initiative,” The White House of the United States, 2019; “Plan for

the Development of New Generation Artificial Intelligence.” State Council of the People’s Republic
of China, 2017; “A Proposed Model Artificial Intelligence Governance Framework,” Personal Data
Protection Commission Singapore, 2019.
5 “When Tech Knows You Better Than You Know Yourself,” Yuval Noah Harari and Tristan Harris,

interview by Nicholas Thompson, Wired, accessed November 13, 2020, https://www.wired.com/

story/artificial-intelligence-yuval-noah-harari-tristan-harris/.
6 “Will Artificial Intelligence Enhance or Hack Humanity?” Yuval Noah Harari and Fei-Fei Li,

interview by Nicholas Thompson, Wired, accessed November 13, 2020, https://www.wired.com/

story/will-artificial-intelligence-enhance-hack-humanity/.
Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers … 3

biotech have become powerful philosophical laboratories –– that is, they have become
experimental sites in which what it means to be human is being re-elaborated.”7
Concurring with such observations and provocations and to foster innovative
foundational thinking befitting this era, the China Center of the Berggruen Institute
brought together AI scientists and Chinese philosophers in late 2017 and since then
conducted a series of dialogues and workshops. The participants were asked to opine
on a series of questions. Firstly, they were asked to think how the essence underpin-
ning humans, nature, and machines is changing in an age of frontier technologies.
Secondly, they were asked to formulate an appropriate ethical framework, if there was
one, for regulating human–machine relationships. Thirdly, what human values, if any,
should be embedded in or learnt by AI? And fourthly, how might frontier technolo-
gies impact the future research direction of Chinese philosophy. These discussions,
which took place over an 18-month period, culminated in an edited book entitled
Intelligence and Wisdom: AI Meets Chinese Philosophers, which was published
in China by Citic Press in February 2020. This current volume consists of nine
pieces written by philosophers from the same project, most of which were translated
from the Chinese book. They are preliminary reflections on AI’s impact on human
beings and the human society by philosophers well-versed in Confucianism, Daoism,
Buddhism and Western philosophical traditions.
In the sections that follow, I will frame the inquiries, highlight key points,
which have emerged from these discussions, and finally share my own thoughts
on foundational values for the era of frontier technologies.

What Is the Essence of Being Human and Its Implications

for Human-machine Relationship?

Different from the modern notion of individual as an autonomous, independent,

and rational self, the native Chinese philosophical traditions of Confucianism and
Daoism endorse notions of relationality and connectivity of all beings encompassing
humans, animals and nature (more broadly understood as cosmic forces).
In classical Chinese thinking, the typical construct for understanding the relation-
ship between cosmic forces and humans is the so-called trinity of Heavens-Earth-
Human (天地人, tian-di-ren). It is derived from the ancient Chinese classics—I
Ching, or the Book of Changes, which is the intellectual fountain of both Confu-
cianism and Daoism. Heavens and Earth with the inherent yin-yang forces form
the cosmic order, within which nature evolves, human beings prosper, and societies
develop. Within this construct, human beings are only one of the myriad things
created by the cosmic forces. There are therefore “correlations” between the laws of
the cosmic order (which nature is a part) and those of human beings and the human
society.

7“2018–2019 ToftH Portfolio”, Berggruen Institute, accessed November 13, 2020, https://www.
berggruen.org/work/the-transformations-of-the-human/2018-2019-tofth-portfolio/.
4 B. Song

Human beings can only flourish and be sustained if they follow the laws of the
cosmic order and aspire to be in unity with it. Humans, who stand in between Heavens
and Earth, are endowed with the ability to learn from nature, take action to further the
cause of creation and growth to sustain Heavens and Earth, and to propagate “Dao”,
which is the essence of the cosmic order.
Even though Confucian tradition emphasizes human beings’ ability of exerting
themselves to propagate and practice Dao, it is still premised on respect and awe
for the laws of the cosmic order rather than placing humans apart from, above or
opposing to the cosmic forces. This notion of cosmic continuity and oneness of all
things within is what Roger Ames calls the One World cosmology.
Confucianism has brought the notion of relationality to bear in social relations
and places paramount emphasis on family and social roles as well as their associ-
ated ethical duties. As contributors Chunsong Gan and Tingyang Zhao pointed out,
Confucian notions about being human firmly rests upon a person’s social relations.
We are all born into a web of family and social relationships from day one and are
defined by our sociality ab initio. We are all intimately linked to our ancestors and
descendants. Confucian ethics is, therefore, first and foremost about family relation-
ships, emphasizing different roles with their associated duties and responsibilities.
This relationship-based role ethics expands into social and political arena.8
Even though Confucianism has often been characterized as systems of social
ethics and political governance, the intellectual tradition concerning the ‘oneness’ of
humans with animals and the cosmic order lived on. Adopting the family analogy,
Zhang Zai (1020–1077), a prominent Confucian scholar in the Song Dynasty, named
Heavens as “father”, Earth as “mother”, fellow humans as “brothers” and myriad
other things as “companion”, and all were derived from the same source.9 Wang
Yangming (1472–1529), a Ming Dynasty Confucian scholar-official also preached
about “the benevolence of Oneness” (一体之仁, yiti zhiren), according to which,
humans, animals, plants and even rocks and stones are of the same source and, as
such, humans should treat them with compassion, empathy or care as appropriate.10
As Roger Ames noted in his contribution to this book, “the Confucian ecological
cosmology is a world of interpenetrating events defined in terms of organic, internal
and constitutive relations”.
If Confucianism’s Oneness doctrine is imbued with its characteristic human-
centered ethical teaching, the Daoist doctrine of Oneness begins and ends with Dao,
emphasizing that human, nature, and myriad things are derivatives of Dao and that
in light of Dao, all things are equal. As the well-known fourth century BC Daoist
philosopher Zhuang Zi famously said: “Heavens, Earth and I were produced together,

8 For a systemic treatment of Confucian role ethics, see Ames (2011).

9 张载, 西铭, “乾称父, 坤称母; 予兹藐焉, 乃混然中处。故天地之塞, 吾其体; 天地之帅,
吾其性。民, 吾同胞; 物, 吾与也。” “Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a
small creature as I find an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which extends throughout
the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All
people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.” (Zhang Zai 1999, p. 683).
10 郭齐勇, “王阳明-一体之仁的生命智慧” (“Wang Yangming, the Wisdom of the Benevolence

of Oneness”, Qiyong Guo, Sohu.com), https://www.sohu.com/a/397987424_242653.

Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers … 5

and all things and I are one.”11 Daoist teaching directs people towards leading a life
that is in tune with cosmic forces. Rather than heavy reliance on external socially
anchored moral and ethical constraints, Daoism advocates a transcendent life of
searching inwards, seeking internal tranquility and finally to be in union with Dao.
Speaking from the vantage point of the Great Wisdom and Buddhist teaching,
Fenghe Liu has approached the issue of human nature from the notion of Being
(存在, cun zai). In his contribution to this book, Liu notes that “the fundamental
nature of the universe at large and all that it contains is Beingness. Being manifests
in myriad ways throughout the universe. Without Being, there would be no universe
or its infinite forms. Humans are one of such forms in the universe, therefore the
essence of humans is, of course, Being.”
On connectivity and Oneness of all things, Buddhist teaching speaks of the connec-
tivity at two levels. At the level of the manifestations of Being, Buddhist teaching
posits that human beings are merely one form of sentient beings and are related
to other forms of beings—animals and spiritual beings included—through endless
samsara and cyclic rebirths. At the most fundamental level, similar to the relationship
between Dao and the myriad things of the universe, in Buddhist thinking, humans,
animals, and nature are all manifestations of Being (or the Truth or self-nature) and
share the same source and the same fundamental essence.
In short, regardless of differences in outlooks about human nature, human life, and
social norms, none of the three dominant schools of Chinese thinking places human
beings in a supreme and crowning position within the universe. They also do not
view human beings and nature as being in a mutually independent or confrontational
relationship.
There are two implications in the context of developing frontier technologies.
Firstly, strong non-anthropocentrism within the dominant Chinese philosophical
schools has contributed to a relatively open, if not entirely relaxed, attitude towards
the rise of the “super-power” of AI and robotics in China in recent years. Conven-
tionally speaking, AI is not a “natural” evolution as it would have been viewed as
man-made devices.12 So from the viewpoint of unity between humans and nature,
AI’s development should be guided by, and sometimes suppressed in view of respect
for the “natural” way of life. Indeed, this is precisely what many Chinese philosophers
have been advocating for, including several of our contributors. However, if we look
at the matter from a different perspective, we can see that non-anthropocentrism in
Chinese philosophy certainly calms the stir of existential risk narratives and broadens
the horizon of many Chinese thinkers. If human beings are conceived in a broader
construct in which they only constitute one form of existence, then there is much
less emphasis on the importance of independent personhood, human subjectivity, or

11 James Legge, “The Writings of Chuang Tzu”, 1891.

12 Roger Ames contested that the current AI should perhaps be viewed as NI (national intelligence)
under the Confucian One World ontology, under which there are no external “others”, but internal
constituents, which may reflect different perspectives on the same events. In this ontology, the
development of AI is best understood as natural intelligence inherently in the human consciousness.
So, a better way of naming intelligence programs and machine intelligence is perhaps “natural
intelligence”. See Roger Ames’ contribution to this book.
6 B. Song

agency. In Daoist and Buddhist traditions, other forms of beings abound. So, living
with devices, programs, or other forms of beings, which may be more capable than
humans, will not inevitably lead to an unimaginable dystopia. According to contrib-
utor Fei Gai, AI or digital beings could be just another form of super being like the
immortals in Daoist religion!
Another contributor, Chenyang Li, suggests that Confucian scholars incorporate
AI into the broader ecosystem and the ethical order of “things (物)”, viewing it as
a “companion”. Stephen Angle also views AI programs as potentially offering a
more effective way to supervise or even guide human self-reflection and the moral
behavior for becoming exemplary persons (君子, junzi). Perhaps because of the
strong influence of non-anthropocentrism in the Chinese philosophical thinking,
there has been much less panic about the existential risks or loss of subjectivity on
the part of the human in the AI superpower frenzy of recent years.
The second implication is that the notion of relationality can perhaps provide
some inspiration when thinking about artificial general intelligence (AGI) or human
like intelligence, both of which have long captivated the public imagination. Rather
than focusing on AI’s individual analytical and “emotional” attributes in terms of
judging its intelligence level, notions about relationality focus on the role that AI
plays in specific contexts and how integrated AI programs are into the familial and
social relations. Chinese philosophers steeped in relational thinking are more likely
in favour of a new machine intelligence test proposed in 2018 by the roboticist
Rodney Brooks. Brooks proposed a home care worker test to replace the Turing Test
in determining machine intelligence levels. In this context, an embodied AI must be
able to offer cognitive and physical assistance enabling a human to live independently
and with dignity.13 To meet this test, AI needs to be physically embodied and have
the requisite cognitive, physical and social intelligence to be a meaningful part of a
family or community life. We can perhaps call this a “relational AI test.” This way,
we can make contextual and dynamic judgments on intelligence levels by examining
the degree, quality and tone of AI or machines’ integration into human society and
the broader environment. Compared to the Turing Test, this is clearly a much harder
and more sophisticated alternative test.

Can AI Achieve “Consciousness”? If It Can, Should We

Allow It?

One of the book’s contributors Xianglong Zhang uses theoretical frameworks of

phenomenology and the Eastern philosophies of mind to argue his case. He says
that consciousness is a form of temporalization and that AI, based on the current
most widely deployed deep-learning methods, demonstrates capacity for learning
autonomously and optimizing desired results. In other words, it has demonstrated
an ability to temporalize its existence. Zhang thinks that deep-learning methods are

13 Mindell (2019).
Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers … 7

a genuine breakthrough and can be viewed as “the seeds of consciousness” even

though he acknowledges that it is still a long way from human like intelligence.
There is, however, much scepticism or outright dismissal, among other Chinese
philosophers on the prospect of developing machine intelligence rivalling that of
human. Daoist philosopher Robin Wang calls human-like intelligence yinyang intel-
ligence. In her contribution to this book, she noted that yingyang interplay involves
several propositions: (1) levels of relationship defined through degrees of integration;
(2) dealing with emergent order as opposed to a predetermined order; (3) constant
change; and (4) a future that is not fully predictable. Clearly, we are a long away off
from the days of human-like intelligence or AGI based on these thresholds.
Contributor Fenghe Liu goes further and completely dismisses any possibility
of developing a human-like conscious AI. He notes that only Being can produce
consciousness and that human consciousness is a mere manifestation of Being, and
thus has its emergence and cessation. A manifested human consciousness can never
itself develop consciousness. Therefore, Liu posits that “machines cannot possess
independent consciousness. Their so-called perceptual capacity, calculative function,
and analytical ability are no more than extensions of humans’ corresponding compe-
tences. Without human initiation, machines cannot of their own accord generate
these abilities. AI is simply a concept born of human consciousness. Outside human
consciousness, no such concept exists.”
Still many others remain open about the possibility of a “conscious” AI emerging
in the future. So, should we develop “conscious” AI? Confucian philosopher and
contributor Chunsong Gan expresses his concern and horror about the possibility
of machines becoming capable of emotional management and self-awareness. He
comments that “what cannot be predicted is the extent to which conscious robots
may define their own sense of meaning and life goals, and how they might assert
their physical and mental superiority in order to protect those interests.” In his view,
the existential risks posed by highly intelligent and “conscious” AI is no trifling
matter.
For different reasons, Tingyang Zhao also expresses his pessimism about the
prospect of human flourishing if we head down the path of developing “conscious”
AI and machines. Zhao points out the paradoxical attributes of being human. On
the one hand, humans have the capacity for rational thinking and self-reflection, and
such abilities have been the driving force of progress and human flourishing. On
the other hand, the relentless pursuit of knowledge and the obsession with affirming
human subjectivity and autonomy may well lead us to keep pushing the boundaries
of science and technology, and eventually to a path of no return, i.e., self-destruction.
He thinks we need to stop developing any kind of AI, which would have the ability
to self-reflect.
There are philosophers, however, who believe just the opposite. They believe that
sensible interactions with humans can only begin if there is a “conscious” AI and
only then we can talk about “embedding human values” through our interactions with
AI.14 Speaking from the perspective of Daoist religion where human transcendence

14 Zhongqiu Yao (2020, p. 105).

8 B. Song

and immortality are the stated goals, contributor Fei Gai is completely open and
optimistic about the long-term prospects of super machine intelligence, irrespective
of their being conscious or not. She believes this higher “species” could enable
humans to achieve transcendence more rapidly. Or, to look at it in another way,
she muses that “artificial super intelligence (ASI)’s emergence is born directly from
humans’ pursuit of transcendence and infinity, that is, the pursuit of Dao.”
One thing all the book’s contributors share in common is an acknowledgement of
humans’ insatiable curiosity, our relentless desire to make the next scientific break-
through, our yearning for immortality, not to mention the profit maximization drive.
As such, humans will not stop pursuing the development of frontier technologies.
So, the question now is how we humans can ensure that this development stays on a
sustainable and beneficial path. Here we enter the domain of values.

What Human Values Should Be Imbedded into AI? What Is

the Relationship between Humans and AI?

Arguing from a Confucian perspective, contributor Chengyang Li recommends that

AI be included in the Confucian moral domain. Confucian ethics promotes a frame-
work of “graded love” whereby the standard of care and responsibilities differ
depending on the nature of the relationship. The ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius
captures this in a well-known formulation (亲亲仁民爱物, qinqin renmin aiwu),
which means “being affectionate towards parents (family), cherishing and caring
about people, and appreciating things”. Li reasons that AI can easily been viewed as
one of the “wu” (物, things) to be appreciated and utilized within this framework. Li
is willing to “upgrade” AI within the Confucian order if AI is able to demonstrate the
capacity to make ethically relevant decisions. Perhaps then AI could be considered
a moral patient. Of course, case specific judgments are to be made in this context.
Chunsong Gan is more pessimistic than his Confucian peers about the prospect
of the philosophy embracing frontier technologies because of his concerns about
the impact that AI and biotechnologies might have on the natural copulation and
birthing processes and on the Confucian ideal of “kinship society”. If we cannot
resist entering into a society of “conscious” machines, he wants AI to be imbued
with emotional capacity, especially the capacity for family affection and kinship.
While these Confucian scholars’ concerns are still human-centric, Fei Gai, on
the other hand, speaks from a religious Daoist point of view, suggesting that human
effort to imbue human values into super intelligence may not be productive given we
know so little about the emergence of human or machine consciousness, or the future
trajectory of their development. Instead, humans can learn much from AI in their
age-old quest for immortality. She even wonders somewhat quixotically whether
“immortality is no longer a myth from the perspective of Daoism. If (ASI) comes
into being, then perhaps Daoism’s Celestial Being pedigree will open up to a new
taxonomical classification: Digital Celestials.”
Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers … 9

Paradoxically, in Daoist philosophy (as opposed to the popular Daoist religious

practices), practitioners do not believe in interventionist or disruptive approaches to
the natural rhythms of things. As such, they are unlikely to embrace disruptive tech-
nologies that result in any displacement of the natural flow of things. However, Daoist
philosopher Robin Wang noted that bearing in mind that the goal of being human is to
be in union with Dao, so the ultimate question that a Daoist would ask is whether AI
can help bring humans closer to Dao? Of course, philosophers have different inter-
pretations of what Dao is. Robin Wang believes that if AI’s development contributes
to the alienation or even annihilation of humans from the natural world, then it can
only be at odds with Dao. But Daoists would be in favor if such technologies can be
redirected to further the Oneness with respect to ourselves, others, nature, and the
cosmos, in other words, the ultimate goal of being in union with Dao.
Xianglong Zhang urges us to overcome a reductionist belief in the supremacy
of technology. Instead, humans should take inspiration from ancient Eastern truth
seekers to engage in deep self-reflection and to revitalize and develop organizations
and communities that are core to human relationships and human flourishing. These
are essentially families, bloodline-based organizations and Confucian communities
in Zhang’s framework. Put differently, Zhang thinks that “AI should be tamed with
human kindness, compassion, and temporalized wisdom.”
Speaking from the perspective of the Great Wisdom and harking back to the
intellectual resources of Buddhism, Fenghe Liu opines that rather than engaging in
the discussion on how human values can be transplanted or learnt by AI, humans
should pause and think what the ultimate value of being human is. There is no doubt,
Liu notes, that seeking enlightenment and appreciating all things from the perspective
of Being is the most meaningful thing that a human being can do. In other words, there
is no better time than now when humans confront existential level risks to engage
in self-awakening and the raising of human consciousness. After all, the world with
all its problems and hopes are manifestations of human consciousness. Without
addressing the root cause of the world’s problems, i.e., ignorance and indulgence in
egoist pursuits by human beings, all other efforts would be like “drawing water with
a bamboo basket”, i.e., in vain.

Harmony and Compassion as Foundational Values

in the Era of Frontier Technologies?

Inspired by the contributors’ discussions in this book, I would like to circle back to
the questions I raised at the beginning of this Introduction. In doing so, I would like
to propose “harmony” and “compassion” as two possible foundational values for the
era of frontier technologies.
We should, however, start off by considering a few criteria. First, foundational
values should speak to the totality of humanity and other forms of beings or existence,
including perhaps even “conscious” machines in the future. This calls for raising
10 B. Song

the level of discussion above and beyond individuals, civil organizations, and even
nation-states. Secondly, the deployment of frontier technologies is highly distributed,
and these technologies are often mutually embedded. They have impacted, and will
continue to impact, our political, social, economic, and personal lives, often in unex-
pected ways. In addition, the non-linear nature of frontier technological development
makes it hard to anticipate, monitor, let alone regulating it in a hard-coded way.
Therefore, foundational values should be open, inclusive, and adaptive in this era
of frontier technologies. Finally, foundational values ought to be grounded in the
notion of Oneness of all beings and we should steadfastly move away from dual-
istic, confrontational thinking and the zero-sum competition mentality. So, with these
criteria in mind, let us look at the notions of harmony and compassion as foundational
values.
You may think that compassion is a uniquely Buddhist concept. In fact, concepts
such as compassion and “pity” (though the two are very different as noted later)
have featured in Western philosophical discussion dating back to ancient Greece.
Aristotle used “pity” to refer to “a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive
or painful, which befalls one who doesn’t deserve it, and which we might expect to
befall ourselves or some friends of ours, and more over befall us soon”.15 Perhaps
the most influential analysis of compassion in the Western philosophy comes from
the nineteenth century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who held that
compassion is the basis of morality. According to Schopenhauer, “it is, what we
see every day, the phenomenon of Compassion (Mitleid); in other words, the direct
participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, in the sufferings of another,
leading to sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent or remove them; whereon
in the last resort all satisfaction and all well-being and happiness depend. It is this
compassion alone which is the real basis of all voluntary justice and all genuine
loving-kindness. Only so far as an action springs therefrom, has it moral value; and
all conduct that proceeds from any other motive whatever has none.”16
In Mahayana Buddhism, “compassion” occupies a central place and is often used
in the context of discussing the Bodhisattva ideal in which, selfless compassion
is a requirement for the Bodhisattva. Rather than contenting with one’s liberation
from cyclic existence, the Bodhisattva ideal of the Mahayana Buddhism stresses
the determination and commitment of liberating all sentient beings from suffering
in samsara. When Dalai Lama called for compassion as the basis for humanity’s
universal ethics, he acknowledged the different meanings attributed to the term. But
he continued to say that the ideas it contains are universally understood. He said:
“[i]t connotes love, affection, kindness, gentleness, generosity of spirit, and warm-
heartedness. It is also used as a term of both sympathy and of endearment…. [I]t does
not imply “pity” … There is no sense of condescension. On the contrary, compassion
denotes a feeling of connection with others, reflecting its origins in empathy.”17

15 Cassell (2009); Barnes (1984).

16 Schopenhauer (1903, p. 170).
17 Gyatso (1999, pp. 73–74).
Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers … 11

Schopenhauer’s compassion was inspired by the Buddhist notion of compassion.

But there are key differences between the two, the most important of which relates
to the notion of suffering. In Buddhist teaching, suffering (duhkha) is inclusive of,
but different from, the physical and emotional pains we feel in our daily lives. Such
suffering is universal to all beings, including human beings. Contemporary philoso-
pher, Patricia Walsh-Frank characterizes this suffering as “the primordial nature of
suffering as an affliction of all living (human) beings.”18 The notion of suffering in
Buddhism is intricately tied to Buddhist theories about “clinging”, “self-grasping”
and endless samsara. It does not depend on the fault or misdeeds of anyone, nor does
it depend on the binary ethical approach to what constitutes right or wrong. Many
similarities remain, notwithstanding different interpretations about the notion of
compassion. Both Western and Buddhist concepts acknowledge connectivity among
all beings and call for attention and care for other beings including animals, plants
and the environment, as well as the obligations of taking certain actions to address
or redress the root causes of suffering.
How can compassion become a foundational value in an era of frontier technolo-
gies? In addition to a belief in the connectivity of all beings, the notion of compassion
addresses disparity of various sorts—be it different levels of consciousness in the
Buddhist and spiritual contexts, or power or capability disparities between those
who can make and lead the change and those who are merely recipients of disruptive
forces. In such circumstances, the notion of compassion calls upon the stronger or
luckier ones to exhibit care, provide guidance and help reduce the suffering of those
who are weaker or less unfortunate. In recent years, this notion of compassion has
found its way into medical and health care research and professional practices. In
the era of frontier technologies there has been an intensifying disparity between rich
and poor, between those in command and control of data and technologies and those
who are “digitally poorer”. Special care is required for those vulnerable persons and
groups such as children, the disabled and the elderly. So, it is only apt that we extend
the notion of compassion to human beings and other forms of beings/existence. After
all, we are all inter-connected and beholden to one another.
The value of compassion is also relevant within a geopolitical context. The United
States and China are a duopoly in terms of the R&D and deployment of frontier
technologies. It is all the more important to emphasize that care and responsibilities
come with technological prowess. The United States, China and other powerful
players in frontier technologies owe responsibilities and care towards the rest of
the world and under-privileged populations, regardless of their race, nationality or
religious belief.
The second foundational value I put forward is the notion of harmony. Why
harmony? It connotates respect of differences while recognizing shared destiny and
vision. It speaks strongly of the need to understand and learn from each other, and it
highly values collaboration and sharing. Harmony is a concept which originates in
music, dating back to ancient Chinese and ancient Greek philosophy. The concept of
harmony (和, he) first originated in pre-Qin classics and its meaning can be traced

18 Walsh-Frank (1996).
12 B. Song

to the ancient text of I Ching (the Book of Changes)”19 Chenyang Li, the recognized
authority on comparative study of harmony, notes five key features: heterogeneity,
tension, coordination, transformation and growth and renewal.20 Harmony does not
refer to a static situation. Instead, it is viewed as “an integration of different forces
and as an on-going process in a fluid yet dynamic world. This notion of harmony
does not presuppose a given, fixed underlying structure in the world; if the world is
to have a structure, it is a result of the harmonizing process rather than a precondition
for harmony.”21 Li refers to this understanding of harmony as “Deep Harmony”.22
Harmony is not conformity either, even though it has been commonly misconstrued
as such. Quite the opposite, it connotates different forces at work—such forces
reshaping, absorbing each other and at the same time merging and transforming
themselves into something which ought to be coherent and in tune with each other.
In short, it is a dynamic process, and a process of creative tension.
The concept of harmony does not really have a place in modern and contempo-
rary Western philosophical thinking. But it was much discussed in Ancient Greece,
originating in music. In fact, Heraclitus’ concept of harmony has many parallels with
its Confucian counterpart. He defines harmony as “the opposites in concert.”23 His
thinking on harmony also included conflict, merging and reconciliation. Commenting
on Heraclitus’ notion of harmony”, Chenyang Li notes that: “Harmony comes from
contrary elements and contrary movements that are neutralized by equilibrium in
a balance of forces. Without tension and opposites there can be no harmony.”24
Pythagoreans, while sharing similar conceptions of harmony, regarded numerical
harmony as the highest order. Numbers are taken to be the “wisest” of things in the
world: a harmonious unification of opposites because they alternatively change their
qualities between even and odd.”25 However, as noted by Li, “[T]he Chinese notion
of harmony is multi-dimensionally dynamic rather than rigidly structured in a linear
sequential pattern as in the Pythagorean numeric model; it does not admit a fixed
formula and it is open-ended and continuously self-renewing.”26
It is perhaps high time that the global community revisits the concept of harmony.
In the context of escalating global tensions between the United States and China
and a purported “civilizational clash” between East and West, harmony becomes
even more important foundational value for human beings to understand our current
challenges and plan for the future.
Having harmony as a foundational value of the current era would require us to
temper our urge to dismiss and denigrate values and practices which are different
from our own, some of which may have long been viewed as self-evident truths.

19 Dunkang Yu (2014).
20 Chenyang Li (2014, p. 9).
21 Ibid.
22 Chenyang Li (2008).
23 Ibid., p. 90.
24 Ibid., p. 91.
25 Ibid., p. 92.
26 Ibid., p. 95.
Introduction: How Chinese Philosophers … 13

It also calls into question the missionary zeal of forcing one’s values and practices
on others without regard to different histories and aspirations. Instead, the value
of harmony would lead to more mutual learning, self-reflection, collaboration, and
contextually appropriate analysis and judgment.
Using compassion and harmony as the foundational values for the new era will help
lessen the zero-sum competition mentality and dualistic thinking, which continue to
hold the sway in national and international politics. The default pattern in today’s
world is dualistic thinking with embedded notions of right and wrong, good and bad.
The widely respected rights thinking also falls into this pattern of dualistic thinking by
pitching one’s “sacred” rights and claims against others, such as “those” encroaching
governments and greedy large corporations. However, we consumers and end users
also need to recognize that we are part of the problem, while not removing the
responsibilities of the governments and large corporates, other constituent members
of the society including developers, advertisers, and service providers. We are at once
victims and perpetrators of many of the social and political problems engendered by
the platform economy and social networks. The binary approach of the state versus
individuals, us versus them, no longer yields satisfactory results in today’s world
plagued by overconsumption, the culture of maximization, divisions, and social rifts.
When confronting global challenges and humanity’s perceived existential risks,
it is paramount that we rise above the current national and international politics and
competitive mindset to seriously contemplate the impact on the entirety of humanity
and other forms of beings in the cosmic order, which may potentially be brought
upon by those disruptive and transformative technologies.
In conclusion, deep thinking is required to come up with foundational values
befitting the scale and depth of the challenges and risks posed by AI, other frontier
technologies and global scale existential risks. It is high time that humanity engages
in profound self-introspection on the lessons learned from human evolution and
human history. If we revive foundational values such as harmony and compassion,
we will not only create a better humanity, but also provide healthy learning data for
AI to be trained and emulated in the future. After all, AI programs and robotics are
the products of human mind and they exhibit nothing but our values and levels of
consciousness. The best chance for developing human-friendly AI is for the humans
to become more compassionate and committed to building a harmonious planetary
ecosystem, and become good role models for AI.

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Lopez and C. R. Snyder. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780195187243.001.0001.
Gyatso, Tenzin. 1999. Ethics for the new millennium. New York: Riverhead Books.
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Li, Chenyang. 2008, March. The ideal of harmony in ancient Chinese and Greek philosophy. Dao
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Artificial Intelligence, Emotion,
and Order: A Confucian Perspective

Chunsong Gan

Over the course of human history, major technological breakthroughs have often led
to the dawn of new epochs, such as the Stone and Bronze Ages. Some historical
periods account for more new developments in science and technology than others.
But generally speaking, these driving forces have transformed modes of produc-
tion, prompting further advancements in science and technology and creating a
self-reinforcing cycle. Examples include the revolution in power triggered by the
invention of the steam engine. This propelled mankind into the great Industrial Age,
laying the foundation for the era of global capitalism we now live in.
The rapid development of computers in the twentieth century marked a partic-
ularly major technological revolution. However, from the very outset, people paid
considerable attention to the potential consequences. The more recent advent of
cloning technology and artificial intelligence (AI) are escalating discussions around
this subject, since both developments will potentially alter the makeup of all human
beings.
Indeed, unlike previous technological advances, some perceive certain frontier
technologies such as gene editing and intelligent robots as fundamentally challenging
to the very nature of what it means to be human. This has sparked fresh interest in
the nature of humanity, its future, and models for the survival and progression of the
human race.
The consequences of all these changes are currently difficult to assess. Some
observers focus on topics such as the effects of increasing labor surpluses as machines
replace humans. Others are paying close attention to possible challenges to the
existing international order because of widening gaps between countries that promote

This article is translated by Darcy Littler, in partnership with Two Headed Duck Translation.

C. Gan (B)
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Peking University, 5 Yiheyuan Road, Haidian,
Beijing 100871, China
e-mail: ganc1234@sina.com

© CITIC Press Corporation 2021 15

B. Song (ed.), Intelligence and Wisdom,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2309-7_2
16 C. Gan

AI and those that do not. For instance, when Saudi Arabia gave a robot citizenship,
it stirred worldwide debate relating to issues concerning rights and identity.
However, most discussions tend to focus on AI’s technological possibilities.
Therefore, a pertinent question to ask from a Confucian perspective is: what is AI’s
potential impact? If we acknowledge that there was a crisis of Confucianism in the
nineteenth century, triggered by changing production methods and values, then what
changes will AI’s emergence bring to human society in the twenty-first century,
and will it constitute a new crisis for Confucianism? It is a question that merits
considerable contemplation.

Confucianism’s Unique Understanding on (Human) Life

The Confucian tradition is extremely rich in understanding what it means to be

human. On an individual level, Confucianism not only emphasizes the natural order
of life based on blood ties and marriage, but also advocates expanding the feelings
inherent in these bonds to encompass all things: a humanness that embraces the
whole universe (一体之仁). As such, the Confucian concept of life comprises a
somewhat contradictory combination of a physiological “human individual” and
a societal “ideal personality.” It is necessary to appreciate this feature in order to
understand the fundamental position of Confucian thought on the value of life.
In the Lunyu 论语 [Analects], we see that Confucius孔子 (551–479 BC) often
distinguishes between a Jun zi 君子 (gentleman or exemplary person) and a xiao ren
小人 (petty person). By affirming those ideals that humanity deems important for
human life, he sought to show how humans can use consciousness to overcome their
animalistic tendencies. The philosopher Mencius孟子 (372–289 BC) developed this
idea further. He utilized the distinction between humans and animals to refine his
understanding of the value of life. For instance, he stated:
That whereby man differs from the birds and animals is but extremely small. The petty man
abandons it, while the gentleman preserves it. Emperor Shun held insight into the multitude
of things, and closely observed the relations of humanity. He travelled the path of humanness
and righteousness; thus, he did not need to pursue humanness and righteousness.1

From the perspective of classical Confucian thinkers such as Mencius, Man’s

essential characteristic is to become a gentleman through one’s own efforts. Such is
the process of self-definition. According to Mencius, people are inherently sympa-
thetic, which allows them to discern right from wrong, comply with social norms, and
show obedience to elders. Mencius believes that people do not always realize they
possess these natural endowments, and even if they do, they are unable to maintain
or enhance them. Eventually, through neglect, these natural endowments become
concealed, causing some people to lose the ability to distinguish between good and
evil, thus becoming “small or petty person.”

1 Mengzi (Mencius), “Li lou xia” 离娄下 [Li lou Part Two], Mengzi 孟子 [Mencius].
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 17

Nevertheless, there are always those who, despite society’s tempering, do not
lose their conscience (liang zhi 良知). They are able to nourish and preserve their
righteousness (hao ran zhi qi 浩然之气) through various means, becoming “great
person”. Individual will is particularly important in choosing to become a “great
person” or degenerate into a “petty person.” The Confucian concept of human life
becomes manifest in the course of making this choice.
Compared with Mencius, the third century BC philosopher, Xunzi’s notion of life
suggests a more passive attitude. The two had substantially different understandings
of human nature. Xunzi endorsed Confucius’ view of human nature as innately
similar yet liable to diverge through habit. He posited that a plain and unaffected
individual’s “original nature resembles an uncarved block.”
However, Xunzi also believes that there is a selfish tendency in human nature,
which sages should regulate through rules of etiquette. This would ensure that
everybody settles in their respective places and enable society to maintain a state
of harmony. Yet, although Mencius and Xunzi’s perceptions of human nature differ
enormously, they have more in common when it comes to explaining what people
are able to become. For example, Xunzi affirmed, as Mencius did, that everyone has
the potential to become a sage. However, while Mencius believed that people must
rely on their own self-awareness to achieve it, Xunzi emphasized the need to derive
inspiration from other sages and men of virtue. Xunzi also highlighted education’s
role in perfecting the individual through enlightenment.
Integrating Mencius and Xunzi’s views of humanity creates a Confucian concep-
tualization of personhood that constitutes a continuum from the “potential” to the
“realized”. In this respect, there is a distinction between a person in a biological
sense and the one interacting in society. Giving free reign to biological drives would
render a person a mere animal.
However, humans can free themselves from animalistic tendencies if they cultivate
and develop themselves through learning and perfection, consequently gaining self-
accomplishment. According to Mencius, the “extremely small” difference between
humans and animals does not concern biological instincts, but humans’ awareness
of their own moral obligations and ability to recognize the “standards” that define
what a person is.
In the Jin xin zhang ju xia 尽心章句下 [Fully Fathoming the Mind, Part Two]
chapter of the Mengzi 孟子 [Mencius], there is a section that defines human beings
through an alternative perspective to their base instincts:
For the mouth to desire flavors, the eye to desire colors, the ear to desire sounds, the nose to
desire aromas, and the four limbs to desire ease and rest—these are symptoms of ‘nature,’ they
are Heaven-ordained [instincts], [yet], the gentleman does not refer to them as his ‘nature.’
The exercise of human-heartedness between father and son, the adherence to righteousness
between a sovereign and minister, the enactment of rites between guest and host, the display
of knowledge in recognizing the talented, and the fulfilling of the Heavenly Way by the
sage—these are heaven-ordained also. But there is an adaptation of our nature for them. The
gentleman does not refer to them as ‘heaven-ordained.
18 C. Gan

The interpretation of “nature” and “heaven-ordained” requires special attention.

This passage’s purpose is to show that physiological instincts are not the most impor-
tant factors in determining a person’s (human) nature. Instead, it is moral codes such
as humaneness (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 义), propriety (li 礼), and wisdom (zhi
智). This is also how Confucianism distinguishes an exemplary person from a petty
man. According to Mencius, a person cannot truly be called a person if they do
not have moral consciousness and are unable to bear moral responsibility. Thus, the
distinction between an exemplary person and a petty man resembles the distinction
between humankind’s moral and natural attributes.
Mencius stated that just because someone is born a person does not necessarily
mean they can live like one. Physiological qualities only show that someone has the
potential or possibility to become a person. To truly become a person, they must culti-
vate a conscience that overcomes desires and private interests. What, above all, makes
a person a person is not how they are similar to an animal, but in the crucial ways
they differ. Specifically, it is humans’ “moral consciousness” that separates them
from animals and other living things. Although Mencius and Xunzi held different
views on human nature, they both contended that rites and norms are the key factors
that distinguish people from other living creatures.
A particularly noteworthy passage can be found in the “Wang zhi” 王制
[Monarchical System] chapter of the book of Xun zi 荀子 [Xunzi]:
Water and fire have breath but no life; grasses and trees have life but no awareness; animals
and birds have awareness but no morality. Human beings have breath, life, awareness, and
morality. Thus, they are the most noble things in the world. They lack the strength of an ox
and cannot run like a horse, but they make use of oxen and horses. Why is this? I say: people
can form communities, while [animals] cannot.

In this passage, Xunzi emphasizes humans’ ability to organize as the crucial

factor enabling them to exploit the abilities of oxen and horses, even though their
physiological strength is weaker. This ability depends on humans possessing the
characteristic of righteousness, which other species lack. It is this righteousness
which distinguishes humans from animals.
If we understand righteousness as justice or legitimacy, then community represents
the social quality of personhood. Our moral characteristics determine our ability to
cooperate among ourselves and gain an advantage over animals. Although Xunzi
does not necessarily emphasize individual initiative in moral activities as Mencius
does, he nevertheless establishes the difference between humans and animals from the
perspective of morality and regards the existence of rites as humankind’s fundamental
characteristic.
Western Enlightenment thought emphasizes human equality and the justification
of natural desires based on a person’s biological attributes. In contrast, Confucianism
emphasizes learning and practice in becoming a person as well as the restraint of
natural desires, thus giving prominence to our social attributes. As such, Confu-
cianism does not define people in terms of their natural endowments but from a social
perspective. It requires everyone to meet the standards of personhood, which is based
on the philosophy’s particular understanding of the relationship between humans and
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 19

animals, emphasizing social responsibilities, morality, and ethics. Of course, such

thinking was once regarded as the main barrier in adapting Confucianism to modern
society.
In traditional Confucianism, there are two representative statements that convey
the ultimate significance of an individual’s life. The first appears in China’s first great
work of history completed around 400 BC, the Zuozhuan 左传 [The Commentary of
Zuo].2 It states:
The greatest of all is the establishment of virtue (lide 立德), then the establishment of merit
(ligong 立功), and finally the establishment of scholarly writing (liyan 立言.) Even when
time has long passed, they will not diminish. This is what is truly incorruptible.

Tang dynasty (618–907) scholar Kong Yingda 孔颖达 defined “virtue”, “merit”,
and “scholarly writing” respectively in the Chunqiu zuozhuan zhengyi 春秋左传正
义 [Correct Meaning of Zuo’s Spring and Autumn Annals]:
Establishing virtue involves creating an institution to uphold the law for the protection of
the people.

Establishing merit involves rescuing [those in need] from distress and removing obstacles
[for the people]. [Those who have] merit [are the ones that] have aided the people in times
of [adversity].

Establishing words (or scholarly writings) involves writings which convey the essential
thought and analysis which is worthy of broad dissemination and communication.

All three quotes emphasize an individual’s contribution to society. Establishing

virtue places a special emphasis on the establishment of social norms and values;
establishing merit concerns the actual contribution to social development, while
establishing words involves conveying concepts that contribute to community life.
The individual is unable to manifest values independently, only within the dimensions
of society and the history of humanity can one achieve eternity.
The second statement, which is more widely accepted by traditional Chinese
scholars and even contemporary readers, is found in a passage in the Daxue 大学
[Great Learning], one of the four great books of Confucianism:
Investigating things, extending knowledge, rectifying the mind, making the will sincere,
cultivating the self, regulating the family, bringing order to the state, pacifying the world.

If we divide these eight statements into two parts, then the first four refer to an
individual’s self-improvement, while the last four concern a person’s wider existence
within the world. However, meaning for any individual cannot be separated from the
contribution he or she makes to society and the family. So too, all must strive to
ensure the continuance of human life.
This goes some way to explaining why the Xiaojing 孝经 [Classic of Filial Piety],
most likely written between the 3rd and 4th century BC, and other treatises on filial
piety pay special attention to the continuation of the family. The language used makes

2“Xiang gong er shi si nian” 襄公二十四年 [Twenty-fourth year of Duke Xiang], Zuozhuan 左传
[The Commentary of Zuo].
20 C. Gan

it clearly evident that notions of family, country, and the world correspond to one
another almost interchangeably. In the Confucian view, the value of life is rooted in
the family, but extends to the country and the whole world as well.
Since the time of the Scottish economist and philosopher Adam Smith (1723–
1790), many Western thinkers have argued that normal human behavior exhibits a
certain kind of rationality. The belief is that people always make choices based on
their own self-interest. Trading rules are established as a result of adjustment and
compromise of different interests. This is what is known as the Rational Economic
Man, or homo economicus, hypothesis.
In contrast, Confucian thought approaches the question of a human’s life essence
not from the perspective of an individual or self-interest but from the perspective of
totality of the human race. We will call this the Moral Man hypothesis. We cannot
contend that economic and social progression transitioned from the “Moral Man”
to the “Rational Economic Man”. Rather, it made people increasingly aware of the
value of individual existence and of the importance of considering individual rights
and social responsibility side-by-side, instead of simply denying one and affirming
the other.
Since 1840, Western thought has influenced and transformed the way Chinese
people define what being an individual means. One significant shift has been a
growing belief in the importance of an individual’s rights and independence. Never-
theless, the value of the collective whole has not diminished. From the late Qing
to the present day, those who emphasize individual rights have almost always been
nationalists as well.
The Chinese people have worked hard to establish a modern state based on the
objectives of society as a whole. However, there is a contradiction inherent in the
notion of a nation-state. On the one hand, the state protects its citizens and defends
them against foreign aggression. But on the other, the nation-states are caught in
“value tensions” in pursuing national interests.
For as a country protects the individual rights of its own citizens, it may also be
simultaneously colonizing weaker countries and even depriving the citizens of their
individual rights in those colonized countries. The history of globalization and colo-
nialization has unfortunately attested to this point. Yet in the twenty-first century, the
Chinese people continue to be, on the whole, state-oriented. The seemingly antithet-
ical values of state and the community of humanity’s shared future come together
through the concept of “sharing”. To some extent, this represents a reconciliation of
traditional values and modern thought in contemporary China. Clearly, the influence
of Confucian values on the political and public sectors in China remains strong.
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 21

The “Extremely Small Difference” Between Man

and Machine

The moral consciousness, which Mencius emphasized, enables humans to distinguish

themselves from other animals and determine humanity’s highest moral goals. What
type of psychological mechanism brings such moral consciousness into existence and
renders it active? In traditional Confucianism, the trigger mechanism is expressed
in numerous ways. Mencius defines it as “conscience (liangzhi, 良知).” It is defined
as “sense” or “feeling” (gan 感) in classic works such as the Zhouyi 周易 [Book of
Changes or I Ching] and Liji 礼记 [Book of Rites].
Research indicates that animals and even some plants have feelings. What they
lack is self-awareness. It is impossible for animals to ask questions such as “Who
am I?” and they can hardly ponder the meaning of life either. Evidently, moral
consciousness only exists in humans. Humans’ ability to self-reflect on meaning and
value is what distinguishes them from animals.
An individual’s understanding of “self” is continuously enriched through practical
activity. Technological advancement not only expands humans’ range of abilities,
but also their cognitive threshold. Humans first attained their dominant position
in the biological world by learning to make and use tools. Indeed, any form of
meaningful technological advancement or scientific development enhances people’s
ability to utilize and control nature, thereby changing the way that humans understand
themselves.
This is particularly apparent in the Western history of self-cognition. In the early
stages, it was about perceiving the natural world from one’s own senses. Then humans
placed their faith in monotheistic beliefs (placing the power to make decisions in the
hands of an absolute). More recently, following the Enlightenment, Man became the
master of nature. Ostensibly, this process of adjustment has run in tandem with the
progression of knowledge. However, the latter was driven by the ability to put theory
into practice and the advancement of tools.
The Xici 系辞 [Appended Phrases], one of the ten classic commentaries within
the Book of Changes, explains how a sage can promote social progress by “making
vessels” (zhi qi 制器). Each technological advancement helps humanity to move one
step further away from a primitive and natural lifestyle. In ancient China, Daoist
scholars were more hesitant about the relationship between technological progress
and improvements in human nature, even claiming that technology could harm the
purity of the mind. The Tiandi 天地 [Heaven and Earth] chapter of the book of
Zhuangzi 庄子 [by the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi] relates the story of Confucius’
disciple Zigong 子贡 passing through the town of Hanyin. There he saw an old man
arduously irrigating his fields with an earthen jar. Zigong suggested that the old man
use mechanical irrigation instead. Unexpectedly,
The gardener put on an angry face, then laughed and said: ‘I heard from my teacher that,
where there are ingenious contrivances, there are certainly subtle doings; and that, where
there are subtle doings, there is certainly a scheming mind. But, when one has a scheming
mind, their pure simplicity is impaired. When this pure simplicity is impaired, the spirit
22 C. Gan

becomes unsettled, and the unsettled spirit is not the proper abode of the Dao. It is not that
I do not know [this form of contrivance], however I should be ashamed to make use of it.’

The moral of the story is that people who use machinery have a mindset that
errs towards using trickery and exploiting every opportunity to gain an advantage.
The old man who insists on irrigating his field in a primitive manner is aware that
machinery will save him effort. But he is unwilling to resort to trickery. Zhuangzi
uses an allegory to remind us what the natural state of man entails—that any change
in one’s own behavior through unnatural methods will lead to the alienation or even
loss of human characteristics.
Zhuangzi’s reflections reveal substantial differences in the understanding of
human characteristics throughout the history of Chinese thought. According to
Confucianism, human’s ability to use tools is what distinguishes us from animals.
The more advanced the technology, the greater humanity’s ability to control nature.
Tools, or technology, are an extension of humanity’s potential, and serve to magnify
our essential nature.
Zhuangzi’s criticism of technological civilization was extremely advanced given
that, in the pre-Qin era (before 221 BC), scientific and technological developments
had yet to make any substantial impact on human nature. Technology, such as it
was, and nature existed in harmony. People were as yet unable to change the state of
nature, even with the assistance of technology, which served solely to extend their
own capabilities. Bridges built over rivers and terraces cut into hillsides, for example,
had to be adapted according to or around their natural environment, rather than vice
versa.
The relationship between inventing tools to alter nature and maintaining nature’s
untouched disposition was always of great concern to ancient Chinese thinkers. One
significant example of this discussion can be found in the Zhuangzi zhu 庄子注
[Zhuangzi Commentary] written by the philosopher 郭象 Guo Xiang (252–312). In
it, he debates whether oxen should have their noses pierced and horses wear saddles.
His premise is that man’s natural disposition is “received from Heaven”:
Oxen and horses have four feet, such is their [constitution] as endowed by Heaven. When
horses’ heads are haltered, and the noses of oxen are pierced, such are [examples of manipu-
lation by] Man. Thus, it is said, ‘do not employ Human [means] that extinguish the Heavenly
[constitution]; do not for your [Human] purpose extinguish that ordained [by Heaven]…’
(“Qiushui” 秋水 [Autumn Floods])

He has a counter view to the Zhuangzi:

Human life, can it be without the labor of oxen and the riding of horses? Laboring an ox and
riding a horse, can they not be pierced and haltered? As oxen cannot [refuse] having their
[noses] pierced and horses cannot [refuse] being haltered, [then] this [must be] the proper
way ordained by Heaven. If the proper way ordained by Heaven [is fulfilled], then although
this matter is entrusted to people, it has its origins in Heaven.

This passage makes it clear that exploiting nature and other animals is essential to
human life, and permissible because their existence aligns with human purpose. Guo
Xiang reframed Zhuangzi’s idea that human traits and habits must remain intimately
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 23

linked to the “primordial state of life”. Instead, he suggests that exploiting nature is a
human characteristic and therefore an essential feature of what distinguishes people
from animals.
Since our first appearance, homo sapiens have gradually become Earth’s most
dominant species. There were a series of progressions. Mastery of fire changed
our eating habits. Food processing changed our lifestyles and dependence on the
seasons. Cultivating food suitable for human consumption and domesticating and
raising animals changed the structure of the human diet, eventually enabling humans
to cope with food shortages caused by seasonal changes and better equipping us for
survival.
These developments were accompanied by a shift in our relationship with nature
either towards greater closeness or greater distance. Early human history is delineated
by the evolution of tools. After that, social transformation becomes about changes
in methods of social organization, relegating tools to the backseat.
As human beings became capable of recording their own history and refining their
thought systems, they began to reorganize society through the division of labor. At
the same time, gods and sages started to emerge and it was at this point when human
self-consciousness took a key step forward. Behind every change in the way society
organized itself was a change in humans’ technological capabilities. Technological
progress increasingly transformed the way society was organized with respect to the
family, city-states, and the possible “Harmonious World” (da tong shi jie 大同世界)
of the future.
Many centuries later, the development of large-scale manufacturing and global
transportation of resources laid the foundations for modern society. The steam engine
lay behind both these developments, replacing water and animals. This opened the
door for improved communications and new means of transportation, such as trains
and ships. Tremendous changes in methods of production soon followed the arrival
of this new form of motive power too. New transportation hubs emerged, becoming
distribution centers for raw materials and focal points for factory construction. Both
capitalism and the modern nation-states are intrinsically related to this technological
revolution.
The invention of the steam engine elevated the relationship between technological
progress and human life to new, unprecedented levels. Humans had come a long way
from the Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang’s debate about the “haltering of a horse.” Early
thinkers focused most discussions on whether humans should improve their circum-
stances by manipulating flora and fauna. Technological inventions were limited to
“utilizing” certain natural objects for the features they possessed, which included
using horses for their speed to enable long-distance communication, and cattle for
their endurance to compensate for humans’ physical deficiencies. Even the then
contemporary use of bronze and iron through smelting were simply extensions of
those materials’ natural properties. Iron, for example, was exploited for its hardness.
The invention of the steam engine was drastically different in nature from these
earlier technological advances. Subsequent technological progress aimed to change
nature itself, or even establish a new form of “nature” based on people’s understanding
of its laws. Scientific and technological development had a new purpose. It was not
24 C. Gan

simply about improving life. It was creating new forms of power that could be used
to control and even destroy humanity. Take nuclear energy. If used appropriately, it is
more than capable of providing all of the world’s energy needs. However, the atomic
bomb dropped on Japan during the Second World War, the Chernobyl disaster in the
former Soviet Union, and the more recent Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan all
indicate the devastating destruction it can also wreak.
In principle, these inventions obey the so-called laws of nature. However, science
has gradually come to concern itself less with conforming to nature and more with
attempting to control or even unreasonably change it. Scientific and technological
endeavors that were created for humanity’s benefit can easily be wielded for its
destruction. Our current relationship with technology and nature differs substantially
from the classical era.
It is something that many philosophers, including Germany’s Heidegger (1889–
1976), have reflected upon. In their view, humanity has been enslaved by its own
technological advancement. Yet the situation, which Heidegger and his contempo-
raries observed, was a mere turning point in our relationship with technology and its
control over us. It represented the start of a trend, which the advent of AI has only
recently led us to contemplate the possibility of relinquishing all control of our lives
to technology.
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the nexus of technological devel-
opment has been in the fields of biology and computers. Firstly, developments in
biotechnology have attracted people’s attention thanks to progressive breakthroughs
in genetics and adjacent fields, which have begun altering certain aspects of the
basic survival and evolution of the human species. It has triggered a deep-rooted
ethical crisis. For example, cloning technology has technically solved the question
of whether human self-replication is possible. Human reproduction through male
and female intercourse has theoretically been supplanted.
Gene-editing technology now enables us to intervene in our own natural consti-
tution and engage in determining our species’ future direction. One advantage of
gene-editing is that it enables humans to ensure that the next generation is healthy.
However, this “right to choose” can also be abused. For instance, some people would
be able to use their power or money to enhance their own IQ or certain bodily func-
tions, leading to a crisis in social equality and ethics. This is why He Jiankui’s project
of having created the first genetically edited human babies in the name of combating
genetically transmitted diseases created such enormous controversy.
Gene-editing technology may also enable humans to perform somatic cell gene
therapy and germline gene therapy, which alters a patient’s DNA, but not their descen-
dants. But again, such technology is not without its ethical controversies. Principles
established by major countries regarding the use of gene-editing in human germ
cells or early embryos, allow research if embryos are cultured outside of the body
for no more than 14 days, are not transplanted into the fallopian tubes or uterus of
humans or other animals, and meet certain other ethical standards relevant to research
conducted using human samples. However, the research is illegal if genetic editing or
other techniques are employed to modify human germ cells or the genetic material
in early embryos with the aim of reproduction. This is because the impact of the
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 25

attendant genetic changes will not only affect one individual but also their future
offspring, and perhaps even the entire human gene pool.
Yet, it is AI that may have a greater impact on humanity than all other technological
advancements. For now, general data-driven machine learning, or machinery that
replaces humans for general labor tasks, and even robots with learning capabilities
such as Deep Blue and AlphaGo can be regarded as tools in the traditional sense.
They remain an extension of human attributes while their intelligence and memory
are based on a human–computer interface. Subversive challenges to humanity will
only occur when AI enters the “artificial or human setting” phase, becoming capable
of emotional management and self-awareness. At the point when humans design
humanoid machines according to their wants and needs, they may inadvertently
create their own competitions, or even enemies. What cannot be predicted is the
extent to which conscious robots may define their own sense of meaning and life
goals, and how they might assert their physical and mental superiority in order to
protect those interests.
The current AI discussion is focused on merging human intelligence with machine
intelligence. It is clear that the problem will become much thornier whenever AI
possesses the capacity to control emotions and develop self-awareness. Such a tech-
nological development will exceed the scope of all previous scientific and techno-
logical progress, perhaps overstepping into a realm beyond human control, one that
not only represents a brand-new stage in human development, but that also poses a
potentially fatal threat to human survival and development.

What Does AI Mean for Humanity: Evolution or Alienation?

Based on current levels of development, it may take an exceedingly long time for AI
to become conscious. It can still be categorized as a tool. Those who benefit most from
this tool, at present, are enterprises that can replace humans with robots to produce
their products. As long as these companies pay for the purchase and maintenance
of the robots, there is no need for them to deal with troublesome labor unions. This
greatly improves labor efficiency and substantially reduces management costs.
A new social system will emerge if and when robots largely replace manual labor.
People’s leisure time will increase substantially, pushing society to re-define itself.
However, this type of sociological prediction is not the focus of this paper. In the
next section, I would like to present my tentative analysis of several issues, which
concern the nature of human life that may arise as a result of this shift.

Robots and Modified Humans

What makes AI different from previous scientific and technological advances is its
focus on the field of human intelligence. According to the Confucian understanding
26 C. Gan

of what it is to be human, intelligence lies at the core of our humanity, more than any
biological attribute. One highly controversial issue concerns artificial intervention
in the fertility process. There are worries that this will lead to disparities in “inborn
intelligence”.
Granted, there has already been a long history of artificial intervention in the
birth process. On the positive side, this has allowed us to identify congenital diseases
through pre-examinations and prevent the births of afflicted babies. However, if
intelligent technology and biotechnology are combined, it takes no great leap to
predict a future where humans can improve a human’s potential IQ or physique at
birth. And even if there were no technical intervention at conception or during the
pregnancy, it could still be possible to change the way that the brain functions by,
for example, artificially implanting smart chips.
This could lead to a whole host of problems. Firstly, certain sectors of society have
historically perpetuated their status through inheritance or high-quality education.
AI could permit certain people to technologically endow themselves with a body
or intellectual capacity that exceeds that of ordinary people. Such technological
advantages are most likely to be taken advantage of by those with the power and
money to afford them, leading to more serious forms of social injustice as the rich
and powerful further cement their dominant social position.
Secondly, within the existing nation-state system, national interests take priority.
Consequently, there is no guarantee that AI advancements will be shared across all
countries, therefore exacerbating existing inequalities between countries as well as
creating new ones. Furthermore, if intelligent technology alters the qualities of certain
ethnic groups, a new form of “ethnocentrism” could arise, potentially resulting in
the intensification of global conflicts.
There could end up being three types of people in the world: natural people who
are born of natural circumstances; hybrid people who are endowed with superior
mental and bodily functions through the use of biotechnology and AI technology;
and artificial people, both those who have been genetically and artificially “created,”
and machines that possess the human faculties of thought and wisdom. New systems
of ethnographic classification may take precedence over current standards of racial
distinction, such as skin color, and of national distinction, such as citizenship. This
creates questions about whether a human and computer hybrid, or a robot with
the ability to self-reflect, can be terminated, dismantled, or even eliminated, in an
ethically sound manner.
Finally, people who acquire superhuman cognitive abilities through AI, (assuming
that they maintain their “self-consciousness,”) will have a different perception of what
it means to be “human” from those who do not acquire such abilities. On a socio-
political level, it will pose immense challenges determining whether such people
should be regarded differently in terms of their identity, rights, and obligations. It
will likely greatly complicate the organization of our future societies.
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 27

Adopting a Confucian Standpoint: How Should We

Understand and Respond to Such Challenges?

Confucian society is generally understood as a hierarchical one. Yet traditional

Confucianism actually emphasizes “learning to become a Person,” (xue yi cheng
ren 学以成人) with a person’s social status determined by their own efforts. Confu-
cianism stipulates that benevolence begins from one’s self. As the Lunyu (Analects)
states: “I need only desire to be benevolent for benevolence to be within my reach.”3
This intellectual tradition largely recognizes people as being born equal.
When it comes to social relations, Confucianism understands people in terms of
their social position, which takes effect from the day they are born. It is this that
determines people’s behavior in society instead of merely abstract virtues, therefore
“the social roles we are familiar with are [essentially] what guide us.”4
Such roles are firstly determined by human relations, and secondly by polit-
ical, social, and professional identities. Each role contains various predetermined
social positions and attendant responsibilities. For example, a man has a different
authority and obligations in his role as a father than as a husband. The philoso-
pher Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) referred to these differences as “ethics-
oriented” order. However, a person’s social status is not determined by their role and
cannot be inherited through blood ties.
Confucianism places a heavy emphasis on blood ties but derides those who inherit
their position. Thus, other than the hereditary position of the imperial sovereign,
people are required to strive for all other social positions. Therefore, the doctrine of
Confucianism adamantly opposes the acquisition of intellectually or socially advan-
tageous positions through the inheritance of power or wealth. It also opposes certain
people’s exploitation of their social status to gain an advantage in terms of intelligence
and biology.
Gene-editing techniques and artificial methods of replicating human behavior
creates an enormous ethical dilemma, especially for Confucian ethics, which are
based on blood ties. How should a genetically modified baby’s ethical identity be
determined? The Confucian standpoint opposes the use of scientific means to “fab-
ricate babies” and is even wary of resolving infertility problems through artificial
insemination, as either constitutes interference in human blood ties and social roles,
with potentially chaotic implications.
People will also be able to live longer with the help of genetic technologies,
causing changes in the family structure. The current average life span means that the
relationships we have come to understand primarily exist within the range of grand-
parents through to grandchildren. If this range is exceeded, relationships between
family members at opposite ends of the spectrum will become increasingly distant,
akin to that of strangers. AI and biotechnology will, therefore, have a fundamental
impact on the Confucian ethical system.

3 Lunyu 论语 [The analects].

4 Roger Ames 安乐哲, Rujia jiaose lunli xue 儒家角色伦理学 [Confucian Role Ethics], 178.
28 C. Gan

The greatest blow AI and biotechnology deals to Confucian ethics, however, will
be the destruction of the “kinship society.” Most Chinese people consider a good
life to be a harmonious family life surrounded by children and grandchildren. A
benevolent life extends one’s love for parents and children to all people. As Mencius
put it:
[I] care for my aged parents and extend the same care to the aged parents of others; [I] love
my own children and extend the same love to the children of others.

Chinese people prefer group living, and their desire for emotional interpersonal
communication is relatively high. With this in mind, I hope that AI intelligence will
be implanted with emotional capacity, especially for family affection or kinship.
Forming an AI-driven society without blood ties will cut family and kinship bonds.
New moral dilemmas will abound regardless of whether the resulting human society
is emotionless or emotionally programmed.
An AI-driven society also promises to devalue the Confucian social integration
process achieved through education. Confucianism places particular emphasis on
the role of jiaohua 教化 (transforming oneself and others through education) in the
construction of social order. If AI and intelligent robots are easily able to obtain the
full extent of human knowledge; will they be able to do so while retaining values
and ethics too? An instructive example concerns AlphaGo’s victories in the game of
Go against Chinese player Ke Jie and Korean player Lee Sedol. Go is considered to
be the most complex of all intellectual games, yet AlphaGo found it extremely easy
to master and continually defeat players at the highest level. However, it is far easier
teaching AlphaGo to defeat other players than to make it feel their sense of failure
about losing.
Successfully embedding all human knowledge within AI, will not, therefore,
sound the death knell for human order. That will come if it ever gains the capacity
for independent emotional processing. It is easy to imagine how this would lead to
ethnical problems and other possible social confrontations between normal human
beings and “them”.

Reflections on Scientific and Technological Civilization:

A New Direction for Chinese Philosophy

The Zhouyi (I Ching) is regarded as the source of Chinese philosophy. Its Xici chapter
discusses in great detail the relationship between technological progress, material
development and the hexagrams (figures comprising six stacked horizontal lines,
each of which has meaning).
The book points out that Fuxi 伏羲 (a mythical ruler at the beginning of
Chinese history) invented the eight trigrams (heaven, earth, water, fire, wind, thunder,
mountain and lake) as a tool to “classify the essentials of the myriad things”.
Inspired by the Li 离 (fire) trigram, Fuxi invented the fishing net and taught people
to hunt. After Fuxi, Shennong 神农 (another mythical sage) invented agricultural
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 29

tools and taught people how to use them in addition to establishing markets for
trade. He drew inspirations from the Yi 益 (increase) and Shihe 噬嗑 (biting through)
hexagrams.
The Yellow Emperor (the first ruler of the land that became China), plus Emperors
Yao and Shun (two sage kings of ancient China), governed the world according to
the principle of wuwei 无为 (non-action), and taught people how to establish social
order. They drew from the wisdom of the two hexagrams of Qian 乾 (heaven) and
Kun 坤 (earth).
Clearly, the ancient sages were partly considered as such because of their involve-
ment with technological progress, just as social progress was influenced by the philo-
sophical principles of the I Ching. A connection between the development of tech-
nology and society and the development of ideas has thus long existed. The general
stance presented in the I Ching is that the development of technology and the estab-
lishment of a society regulated by rites and music should be harmonious. Rather than
advocating the use of technology to conquer nature, it encourages the establishment
of a balanced relationship between nature and human society.
After the Qin (221–206 BC) and Han Dynasties (206 BC–220 AD), Chinese
philosophy gradually moved away from discussions about the relationship between
scientific progress and technological development to increasingly focus on human
nature and social order. Celestial activity still generally served as the lens to interpret
human affairs, but actual research into the heavens and their activity was lacking.
With the exceptions of Ming Dynasty officials Xu Guangqi 徐光启 (1562–1633) and
Fang Yizhi 方以智 (1611–1671), most ancient Chinese thinkers paid little attention
to scientific phenomena. The resulting narrower scope of philosophical concern could
not provide a deep understanding of human life. Some have argued that philosophy
in the Western sense did not exist in ancient China at all.
Such comments, of course, can result in a nationalist counterattack. Those who
defend ancient Chinese philosophy point out that although it never developed a
formal “theory of logic” or “ontology,” theories about human nature and ethical
thought abounded. However, the relationship between technology and human nature
was an area where Chinese philosophers were reluctant to engage in any in-depth
exploration. Even with the establishment of contemporary philosophical disciplines,
substantial academic exchange between Chinese philosophers and natural scientists
remain limited.
The result is a dearth of scientists who make philosophical explorations about
their research, while philosophers struggle to truly grasp the cutting edge of scientific
development. After the birth of He Jiankui’s gene-edited babies, the Chinese scientific
and philosophical community did not initially publish any judgments or valuable
analyses based on their respective disciplines, nor did they try to formulate relevant
guidelines to regulate similar research in the future. The fundamental reason for
this is that the Chinese ethics community has largely failed to participate in related
research, while Chinese scientists lack a deep understanding of human values.
Chinese philosophy was once unparalleled in the field of human nature and ethics.
But the He Jiankui incident clearly demonstrated the end of that primacy. In one sense,
the traditional Confucian discussion about whether people are inherently good or evil
30 C. Gan

is important with respect to the history of philosophy, but irrelevant when employed to
analyze the use of gene-editing and AI for human survival and establishing meaning
in life. AI will impel people to rethink basic philosophical questions.
In movies such as The Matrix, for example, famous themes such as “Who Am I?”
(quisnam sum ego), “Know thyself,” (nosce te ipsum) and “I am what I choose to
become” appear repeatedly. Clearly, artists are thinking about AI’s impact on human
self-cognition. Indeed, when AI’s future becomes difficult to grasp, or perhaps when
we realize that its development will make it difficult for humans to control their own
future, such dictums will regain their power.
Humanity seems to have reached a new crossroad. In the past, humans created
tools for their own service. In the future, those tools may possess the power to escape
the control of their creator, as a child does to its parents when it grows up and has
an independent existence - able to make judgments about where it goes and what it
does. When humans can no longer define how to develop their tools, they might be
forced to redefine themselves instead.
Will gene-editing and AI have a bigger impact on the Chinese worldview and
system of order than the influence of individualistic Western society? This is not easy
to judge. But one thing is certain: the impact will be far greater than modernity’s
challenges on Confucian social ethics. This is because modernity only dissolves the
ethics of family blood ties, whereas AI and gene-editing will change human beings
at the source and fundamentally affect human reproduction and organization.
In that resulting society, Confucianism could even become completely irrele-
vant, nothing but a wandering ghost. However, if the cultural mindset and thinking
patterns that have accumulated over thousands of years can be erased or implanted
through technological means, then it should be possible to pre-install values in the
“human products” that people wish to manufacture. The question remaining for
Confucianism, however, is this: When the family is no longer the foundation of
society’s structure or the basic unit of wealth, what type of adjustments will need to
be made to the Confucian notion of order? An even more serious question is whether
this adjusted notion can still be described as Confucianism—“the AI version?”
Furthermore, AI will fundamentally change humans’ learning process. As a result,
the role of family and schools in the teaching of knowledge and cultivation of char-
acter will be weakened. A shift will take place in the basic means by which humans
organize themselves and in their objective values. If robots replace the majority of
human labor and are able to help humans satisfy their sexual and leisure needs while
also fulfilling family care tasks, there will be many “members” of families that are
not blood relatives. This will lead to the breakdown of Confucian moral education
and the roles-based ethical system.
It is important to remember that it is impossible to look to philosophers in the
current system of academia for an understanding of the impact the development of
this technology will have on human beings. Instead, we must ask AI scientists to
think about the significance of their work for human beings. In so doing, they must
strive to become philosophers and make judgments about the meaning of the work
they are undertaking.
Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, and Order … 31

What is the job of a philosopher in this regard? They should collaborate with scien-
tists to help them understand the traditional Chinese concept of life’s significance
and hold discussions on the value that this can still offer in providing our lives with
meaning. They should lead reflections on how modern Chinese people can under-
stand human nature and human values in the new world and evaluate the changing
significance of love, family, harmony, filial piety, and other moral values that the
Chinese deem important. In the process, we can hope that Chinese philosophers and
scientists raise new issues of concern for Chinese philosophy, thereby delineating
the field’s future direction.
The Artificial Intelligence Challenge
and the End of Humanity

Chenyang Li

The title of this essay has a twofold meaning, as does the word “end.” The word
“end” means the last part of an extended thing or a period of time. A cessation.
“End” also means the purpose and goal of an effort or a course of action. Bearing in
mind this double meaning, I will spend this essay arguing that firstly, the emergence
and the rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence technology means the end of
humanity in an important sense. We will irreversibly lose the special status that we
have claimed to possess. I will secondly argue that we should develop AI technology
to serve our purposes and to that end, we should make advanced AI beings as ethical
as possible as we see fit.
This essay consists of four sections in response to the four clusters of issues
proposed in the Berggruen AI research project. The first section argues that, in an
important sense, the AI challenge means that humanity is at the exit door when it
comes to its essential distinctiveness. The second section examines the implications
of such a change both as a form of progress and alienation. Section three addresses
questions about how to make AI beings moral. The last section explores how AI
technology may affect Chinese philosophy in important ways.

Failure in Search for the Human Essence

According to legend, the Temple of Apollo at the sacred site of Delphi in ancient
Greece displayed the inscription “Know Thyself” (γνîθι σεαυτóν). This motto has
been taken to mean that we humans should seek to understand what we are. The
ancient Greek philosopher Socrates followed this motto in his lifetime search (in the

C. Li (B)
School of Humanities, Nanyang Technological University, 48 Nanyang Drive, HSS-03-89,
Singapore 639818, Singapore
e-mail: cyli@ntu.edu.sg

© CITIC Press Corporation 2021 33

B. Song (ed.), Intelligence and Wisdom,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2309-7_3
34 C. Li

fifth century BC) to find out who and what he was. Such an effort is really about the
nature of humanity. We humans have a universal need to try and understand who or
what we are. One common underlying presumption is a belief in humanity’s distinc-
tiveness, a conviction that humanity is different in some essential way from all other
forms of being in the universe. The “essential” requirement in this effort is important,
as the eighteenth century German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel famously said. He
argued that even if humans are the only beings with earlobes: that does not mean
that having earlobes is an essential differentia for being human. Moreover, humans
do not want to be merely distinctive, but distinctive in uplifting ways, in ways that
make us not only unique but also special. Thinking along these lines, for example,
Socrates developed his philosophy of the human soul. However, if we look at human
history, such a wish has seemed forever un-filled. We had thought that we are special
because our earth is in the center of the universe, which means that we are located in
the center of the universe. But that center did not hold. The sixteenth century Coper-
nican Revolution ruthlessly removed it from us. The Renaissance mathematician
Nicolaus Copernicus’s discovery showed that our earth is not the center but merely a
planet that revolves around the sun. At the time, his theory was strongly opposed by
religious adherents because it was perceived as a threat to the status and hence the
special identity of humanity. Since then, we have to recognize that we were never at
the center of the universe. We had also thought that we are special because we were
made in God’s image. The nineteenth century British naturalist Charles Darwin took
that comforting thought away from us with his evolution theory. Darwin argued that
humanity had evolved from less evolved species just like other species have. He said
that how we look (our image) is an outcome of evolution, not out of a special design
by a higher power. And for some, the final blow, psychologically at least, was deliv-
ered when the nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche declared
that: “God is dead!” The slogan implies that the divine is no longer a viable option
for humanity to ground our special status in. We have to create meaning in our own
lives. For a long time, possessing rationality seemed to be the only special thing we
had left that set us apart from all other beings. But even that special feature has been
challenged. The 19–20th century Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud, known as the
“father of psychoanalysis,” argued that the human mind consists of three compo-
nents: the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. The conscious, within
which rationality presumably resides, represents but a small tip of a large iceberg
containing the entire human psyche. The operation of the human mind is influenced
largely by the preconscious and the unconscious. In other words, rationality does not
play a major role in the operation of the human mind. As a result, in Freud’s view
humans can hardly be defined as a rational animal. We may or may not accept Freud’s
theory. But his challenge demonstrates that we cannot take it as a given that humans
are rational animals. It is something that needs to be established. Some may take self-
consciousness as a distinctive human characteristic. Recently, scientists at Columbia
University discovered that some AI beings have self-awareness, posting a direct
challenge to a long-held belief about a human monopoly over self-consciousness.1

1 Bodkin (2019).
The Artificial Intelligence Challenge and the End of Humanity 35

So, where does this series of events leave us? We are still searching for answers to
the eternal question of “Know Thyself.” Freud’s theory has been dismissed by many
in their attempt to hold on to rationality as the last straw. Rationality is a form of
intelligence. Thinking and acting rationally is a function of intelligence.2 Most of us
have been holding and/or hoping that at least we humans are more intelligent than
all other beings. Indeed, our search for answers to the question of “Know Thyself”
can be seen as humans using intelligence to create myths about the distinctiveness
of humanity. At least in this regard, humans have been superior to all other beings.
In other words, we have been distinctive in creating myths about our distinctiveness.
But now, the moment has finally come: the AI challenge to the distinctiveness of
human intelligence. Advancing AI technology will demonstrate that we humans are
neither unique in possessing high intelligence nor the most intelligent beings in the
world. Some advanced AI beings already surpass humans in intelligence. AlphaZero
can beat the best human chess players. Some argue that we are approaching the point
of singularity when AI technology overpowers humanity in intelligence.3
The AI challenge in intelligence is not merely a matter about intelligence levels.
Unlike all other evolved natural species that have been compared with humanity,
AI technology is not a natural occurrence and it can be adjusted expeditiously to
match human capacities. The ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius famously said
that humans are distinct from animals because we have a humane heart that enables us
not to bear to see suffering. Advanced AI can now be programmed to stop proceeding
with their tasks when they “perceive” suffering. They can even be programmed to
take action to reduce sufferings. Think of medical robots created to care for patients,
for example. The third century BC Confucian philosopher Xunzi argued that humans
are different from other species because we can form society (qun 群). But that is
no longer a human distinction. Military combat robots can certainly coordinate their
actions. Indeed, social coordination is a must if they are going to be effective on
the battlefield. The rise of AI technology has significantly reduced any distance
between the human and non-human world. The fluidity of AI technology has made
any attempted claim on human distinctiveness increasingly implausible, if not utterly
impossible. Unlike our compared parties in nature, AI beings can be “customized
to order,” so to speak. Anything that has been considered special and unique about
humanity can be duplicated in AI technology.
The emergence and rapid advancement of AI technology makes a satisfactory
answer to the question of “Know Thyself” as elusive as ever. This compels us to
rethink the question itself. Perhaps, to “know thyself” is not, or should not be, about
looking for humanity’s distinctiveness. Perhaps it is about discovering that humanity
is not so distinctive and learning to live with the consequences of such a discovery.
Daoism is perhaps more ready to accept such a conclusion than many other philoso-
phies. The Chinese Daoist text Daodejing records the ancient sage Laozi’s insight
that “understanding others is intelligence and understanding thyself is wisdom.” Both
understanding others and understanding oneself are about understanding humanity.

2 For a discussion of the relation between rationality and intelligence, see Baron (1985).
3 Kurzweil (2005).
36 C. Li

Yet, he does not seem to stress the distinctiveness of humanity. Between humanity
and other existing things in the world, there are differences without distinction.
It is entirely possible, and even likely, that our future lies in integrating with
advanced AI technology rather than maintaining our distinctiveness. The futurist
Ray Kurzweil said: “We’re going to literally merge with this technology, with AI, to
make us smarter. It already does. These devices are brain extenders and people really
think of it that way, and that’s a new thing.”4 By using nanotechnology, we will be
able to connect AI devices to the nerve systems of our brains, enabling AI-enhanced
brains to operate much faster and more powerfully. Philosophers have already started
contemplating the validity of “extended mind.”5 AI technology has now provided
scientific and technological evidence for its feasibility and reality, in the form of
extended brains. Humanity becomes a hybrid: a mix of what our biological species
has to offer and what we decide to adopt from the AI technology. In that respect,
“humanoid” does not only denote a non-human being that resembles humans, but also
a human being mixed with non-human components. The current Chinese expression
for advanced AI systems, “jiqi ren 机器人”—literally “machine-man/woman”—
may be more appropriate for signifying such hybrid beings than its current usage for
AI devices. A regular AI device is not a ren 人 until it integrates with a human.
In the meantime, AI technology progresses along with biological engineering tech-
nology. Recently, scientists at Cornell University succeeded in a bottom-up construc-
tion of dynamic biomaterials powered by an artificial metabolism that represents a
combination of irreversible biosynthesis and dissipative assembly processes. Using
this material, they were able to program an emergent locomotion behavior resembling
a slime mold. Dynamic biomaterials possess properties such as autonomous pattern
generation and continuous polarized regeneration. It is reported that: “Dynamic
biomaterials powered by artificial metabolism could provide a previously unex-
plored route to realize ‘artificial’ biological systems with regenerating and self-
sustaining characteristics.”6 Metabolism and biosynthesis are characteristics of life.
Dan Luo, professor of biological and environmental engineering at Cornell Univer-
sity’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences said: “We are introducing a brand-
new, lifelike material concept powered by its very own artificial metabolism. We are
not making something that’s alive, but we are creating materials that are much more
lifelike than have ever been seen before.”7 Shogo Hamada, a member of the Cornell
research team, added that: “We are at a first step towards building lifelike robots
by artificial metabolism.”8 When this kind of new technology is combined with AI
technology, it will meet us from the opposite end of humans with “extended brains.”
We may well see artificial organic AI beings coming to us as we see ourselves in a
mirror. The distinction between humans and AI beings will further diminish.

4 https://www.wired.com/story/ray-kurzweil-on-turing-tests-brain-extenders-and-ai-ethics/.
Accessed on 11 December 2018.
5 Clark and Chalmers (1998).
6 Hamada et al. (2019).
7 Hayes (2019).
8 Ibid.
The Artificial Intelligence Challenge and the End of Humanity 37

If the above argument holds, then we are facing the real possibility that we will
not only never find the answer to the ancient question “Know Thyself” in distinctive
ways, but also witness the end of humanity as we know it. “Humanity” has always had
a dual meaning. On the one hand, it stands for the biological species homo sapiens.
On the other, it is a value-laden idea, standing for an ideal. Even though the primary
existence of humanity is always as the biological species, humans have never been
satisfied with being described as something like “featherless biped” beings, even
though humans are perhaps the only such beings in the world. We have always
wanted more than that. The call to “Know Thyself” is to urge us to pursue humanity
in the value-laden sense. The end of humanity does not mean that humans will cease
to exist as a biological species, but that humanity will forever lose its distinctiveness
and uniqueness, its “essence.” The Greek word for essence, τò τί Ãν εναι, literally
means “the what-it-was-to-be” for a thing (or in Aristotle’s shorter version, τò τί ™στι,
“the what-it-is”). Perhaps humans do not have such an essence after all. That kind of
humanity, one with a special essence, has ended. Humans will no doubt continue to
search for answers to “Know Thyself,” but we may have to view human “essence”
as a moving target rather than something that is a given, there to be discovered. For
humanity, the upcoming AI era might be described as a loss of innocence or loss of
self-regarded maturity. Either way, humanity, in its traditional sense, is finished.

Progress as Alienation

By blurring the distinction between humanity and non-human existents, AI tech-

nology allows us to extend human existence into new territories, not only spatially
but also existentially. That is, we have become more than what our natural species
has evolved to be and has to offer. In an important sense, we are what we create
ourselves to be. Scientists now contemplate whether humanity has gone beyond the
Holocene epoch (the time since the last Ice Age) and entered the Anthropocene epoch
when humans will transform nature. As 1995 Nobel Laureate Paul J. Crutzen and
his coauthor C. Schwägerl put it: “It’s no longer us against ‘Nature.’ Instead, it’s we
who decide what nature is and what it will be.”9 In view of the AI challenge, we
may add that it is not only about nature anymore; it is also about ourselves: to a large
extent, we will decide what we are and what we will be. Such a gigantic leap away
from our species’ natural state could be viewed as both progress but also alienation:
a blessing and a curse. It could be called progress because we will be tremendously
enabled and empowered. We will be able to accomplish things that have previously
existed only in the realms of mythologies and dreams. As long as change makes
humans more adaptable to living environments, then it can be regarded as progress.
It can also be alienation in the sense that we have forever left our natural home base.
The very idea of alienation is grounded on some kind of “essence,” something that we
humans are, should, or ought to be. As I have shown earlier in this essay, the presumed

9 Crutzen and Schwägerl (2011).

Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 3º Le critique anglais, mon cher ami, n’est pas le grave et stupide
personnage que l’on s’imagine: je crois qu’au contraire, il a goûté un certain
plaisir en lisant votre livre et qu’il l’a vivement apprécié. En lisant la
reproduction de son article donnée par le Galaxy, je m’imaginais très bien
qu’il riait lui-même aux éclats en l’écrivant. Mais il écrit pour des
catholiques, des traditionalistes, des nobles conservateurs, et il prend plaisir
à les choquer avec vous, tout en ayant l’air de froncer gravement les
sourcils. Il est lui-même un excellent humoriste.
Voilà donc ce qu’on a dit de mon article, car la prétendue reproduction
du Galaxy était mon article. J’en revendique l’entière paternité et
responsabilité. Comme on l’a vu au début de cette chronique, j’avais appris
par un journal de Boston que la Saturday Review avait publié une critique
terriblement sérieuse de mon livre. En y réfléchissant et en songeant à ce
que cela pouvait être, il me vint à l’idée de jeter sur le papier les idées qu’un
grave critique de la Saturday Review pouvait avoir eues sur mon livre. De là
un article qui fut publié par le Galaxy comme étant la reproduction de celui
de la Saturday Review. Je n’eus pas l’occasion de lire le réel article de la
revue anglaise jusqu’à ce que le mien eût paru dans le Galaxy et alors je
trouvai que la véritable critique du chroniqueur anglais était plate, vulgaire,
mal écrite, sans relief et ne signifiant rien.
Si maintenant quelqu’un doute de ma parole, je le tuerai. Non, je ne le
tuerai pas, mais je le ruinerai et ce sera bien simple en lui offrant de parier
ce qu’il voudra que j’ai raison. Cependant, pour être charitable, je lui
conseille d’aller d’abord dans une librairie quelconque et de consulter la
Saturday Review du 8 octobre avant de risquer son argent. Dieu me
pardonne! Plusieurs ont cru que j’avais été «roulé»!
P.S.—Je ne puis résister à la tentation de citer encore quelques savoureux
passages des articles qui ont été publiés au sujet de cette histoire. En voici
un de l’Informateur de Cincinnati:
Rien n’est plus relatif que la valeur d’un bon cigare. Neuf fumeurs sur
dix préféreront une qualité ordinaire, un cigare de trois ou quatre sous à un
Partaga de cinquante-cinq sous, s’ils en ignorent la valeur. L’arome du
Partaga est trop délicat pour le palais habitué aux bûches du Connecticut. Il
en est de même de l’humour. Plus la qualité en est fine, moins il y a de
chance pour qu’on s’en soucie. Mark Twain lui-même vient de faire cette
expérience. Il a été pris à partie par un chroniqueur de la Saturday Review...
Assurément, l’humour de Mark Twain n’est jamais grossier, mais, enfin,
l’humour anglais est tellement plus affiné que le malentendu est bien
compréhensible.
Ça, ce n’est pas mal.
Eh bien, quand j’aurai écrit un article dont je serai satisfait, mais qui,
pour quelque raison, me paraîtra de nature à déplaire en quelque milieu, je
dirai que l’auteur est anglais et qu’il est extrait d’une revue anglaise... et je
crois que je rirai bien.
Mais voici un autre extrait de l’Informateur de Cincinnati:
Mark Twain s’est enfin aperçu que la critique de son livre publié par la
Saturday Review n’était pas sérieuse et il est extrêmement mortifié d’avoir
été ainsi joué. Il prend donc le seul parti qui lui reste et il prétend que la
reproduction que le Galaxy avait faite de l’article en question n’était
nullement authentique, mais que c’était lui-même qui l’avait écrite, en
parodie de l’article véritable. C’est ingénieux, mais ce n’est
malheureusement pas exact. Si quelques-uns de nos lecteurs veulent bien
prendre la peine de venir dans nos bureaux, nous leur montrerons le numéro
original du 8 octobre de la Saturday Review qui contient un article en tous
points identique à celui qu’a publié le Galaxy. Le meilleur pour Mark
Twain est d’admettre qu’il a été mystifié et de ne plus rien dire.
Cela, c’est un mensonge.
Si les directeurs de l’Informateur montrent un article du Galaxy
contenant un article identique à celui qui a été consacré à mon livre dans le
nº du 8 octobre de la Saturday Review, je consens à leur payer cinq cents
dollars. De plus, si, à la date qu’on voudra, je manque de publier ici-même
une reproduction de l’article de la Saturday Review du 8 octobre et si cet
article n’est pas différent d’inspiration, de plan, de phrase et de mots de
celui que le Galaxy publia, je payerai à l’Informateur cinq cents autres
dollars. Je prends comme garants Messrs Sheldon and Cº, éditeurs, 500,
Broadway, New-York, et ils acceptent. N’importe quel envoyé de
l’Informateur sera admis à faire les preuves contraires. Il sera donc facile à
l’Informateur de prouver qu’il n’a pas commis un piteux et misérable
mensonge en publiant les lignes ci-dessus. Va-t-il rentrer sous terre ou
accepter le défi? Je crois que l’Informateur est dirigé par un gamin.
 UNE LETTRE AU MINISTRE DES FINANCES
Riverdale-sur-l’Hudson. Le 13 octobre 1902.
A son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre
des Finances, à Washington.
Monsieur le Ministre,
Le prix des différentes sortes de combustibles étant hors de la portée des
écrivains peu fortunés, je vous adresse la commande suivante:
Quarante-cinq tonnes des meilleurs vieux titres sur l’État, bien secs, pour
alimenter les calorifères, ceux de 1864 de préférence.
Douze tonnes des anciens billets de banque, pour fourneaux de cuisine.
Huit barils de timbres-poste, mélangés, de 25 à 50 cents, vignette de
1866, pour allumer les feux.
Veuillez avoir la bonté de me livrer ces marchandises le plus tôt possible
et d’envoyer la facture à
Votre respectueux serviteur,
Mark Twain,
qui vous sera très reconnaissant et votera bien.
 L’ESPRIT DES ENFANTS
Tous les enfants paraissent avoir de nos jours la désagréable habitude de
faire de l’esprit en toute occasion et surtout aux moments où ils feraient
mieux de se taire. A en juger par les exemples qu’on entend citer un peu
partout, la nouvelle génération d’enfants est composée d’idiots. Et les
parents ne doivent pas valoir beaucoup plus que leurs enfants, car, dans la
plupart des cas, ce sont eux qui racontent ces traits d’esprit et ces preuves
d’imbécillité puérile. Il semble peut-être que je parle de cela avec quelque
chaleur et sans doute avec quelque raison personnelle; et j’admets que cela
m’irrite d’entendre tant louer les mots d’enfants, tandis que moi-même je
n’ai jamais rien osé dire, lorsque j’étais petit. J’ai bien essayé une ou deux
fois, mais cela ne me réussit pas. Les membres de ma famille ne semblaient
attendre aucune faculté brillante chez moi et lorsque je tentais quelque
remarque, ils me réprimandaient ou me fouettaient. Mais ce qui me donne
le frisson et me fait hérisser les cheveux sur la tête, c’est de penser à ce qui
serait arrivé si j’avais osé lancer quelque «mot», du genre de ceux
qu’affectionnent actuellement les petits de quatre ans, en présence de mon
père. M’écorcher vif lui aurait paru le plus doux des châtiments possibles.
C’était un homme grave et il détestait tous les genres de précocité. Si
j’avais prononcé devant lui quelqu’une de ces horreurs que l’on entend
partout maintenant, il m’aurait mis en hachis. Oui, en vérité! Il l’aurait fait
s’il avait pu. Mais il n’en aurait pas eu l’occasion, car j’aurais eu assez de
jugement pour avaler un peu de strychnine avant de parler. Un des plus
beaux jours de mon enfance fut terni par un simple calembour. Mon père
l’entendit et me poursuivit jusqu’à une vingtaine de kilomètres pour me
tuer. Si j’avais été grand, il eût pu être dans son droit, mais, enfant comme
je l’étais, je ne pouvais pas savoir combien j’avais été criminel.
En une autre occasion, j’en dis plus qu’il ne fallait, mais ce ne fut pas un
calembour, et encore cela fut bien près de causer une rupture entre mon père
et moi. J’étais couché dans mon berceau essayant de sucer des anneaux en
caoutchouc, car j’étais fatigué de m’abîmer les dents sur les doigts des gens
et désirais trouver quelque chose d’autre. Avez-vous remarqué combien
c’est ennuyeux de vous casser les dents sur les doigts de votre nourrice ou
sur votre gros orteil? Et n’avez-vous jamais perdu patience et souhaité que
vos dents fussent à Jéricho bien avant d’avoir réussi à entamer ce que vous
vouliez? Pour moi, il me semble que cela est arrivé hier. Mais revenons-en à
ce qui m’arriva ce jour-là. Mon père, ma mère, mon oncle Éphraïm et sa
femme, et un ou deux autres parents se trouvaient là et parlaient de me
choisir un nom. Je me souviens qu’en essayant de sucer mes anneaux de
caoutchouc, je regardais l’horloge songeant que dans une heure et vingt-
cinq minutes j’aurais atteint l’âge de deux semaines et que je n’avais pas
jusqu’à présent beaucoup connu de joies...
Mon père dit:
—Abraham est un bon nom. Mon grand-père s’appelait Abraham.
Ma mère dit:
—Abraham est un bon nom. Très bien. Abraham sera un de ses noms.
Je dis:
—Abraham convient à l’intéressé.
Mon père fronça du sourcil, ma mère parut heureuse et ma tante dit:
—Quel charmant petit!
Mon père dit:
—Isaac est un bon nom, et Jacob est un bon nom.
Ma mère approuva et dit:
—Il n’y en a pas de meilleurs. Ajoutons Isaac et Jacob à ses noms.
Je dis:
—Très bien. Isaac et Jacob sont assez bien. Passez-moi ce hochet, je
vous prie; je ne peux pas sucer du caoutchouc tout le jour.
Personne ne prit note de mes réflexions à ce moment-là, de sorte que je
dus le faire moi-même pour ne rien oublier. Loin d’être bien accueillies,
comme elles le sont maintenant chez les enfants, mes remarques
m’attirèrent une furieuse semonce de mon père, ma mère paraissait peinée
et anxieuse et ma tante elle-même avait sur la physionomie une sorte
d’inquiétude qui indiquait sa crainte que je ne fusse allé trop loin. Je mordis
rageusement mon caoutchouc, laissai tomber le hochet sur la tête du chat,
mais ne dis rien. Mon père ajouta:
—Samuel est un excellent nom.
Je vis que cela devenait grave. Il n’y avait plus moyen de rien éviter. Je
jetai hors de mon berceau la montre de mon oncle, la gaine de la brosse à
habits, le petit chien de son, et toutes les autres petites choses que j’avais
l’habitude d’examiner et d’agiter ensemble pour me distraire; je mis mon
bonnet, pris mes chaussons d’une main, mon bâton de réglisse de l’autre et
sautai sur le plancher. Je me disais: «Maintenant, je suis prêt, arrive que
pourra!» Puis j’ajoutai à haute voix:
—Père, je ne puis pas, je ne puis pas souffrir le nom de Samuel.
—Mon fils!
—Père, c’est comme cela! Je ne puis pas.
—Pourquoi?
—Père, j’éprouve une invincible antipathie pour ce nom.
—Mon fils, cela est déraisonnable. Plusieurs grands hommes se sont
appelés Samuel.
—Père, je n’en connais point d’exemples.
—Quoi! N’y eut-il pas Samuel le Prophète qui fut grand et bon?
—Pas tant que cela!
—Mon fils! De sa propre voix le Seigneur l’appela.
—Oui, père, et il dut l’appeler deux fois avant qu’il n’obéît.
Alors, je m’esquivai et mon père se lança à ma poursuite. Il me rattrapa
le lendemain à midi et, après cette nouvelle conversation, j’avais acquis le
nom de Samuel, avec une fessée et autres avertissements utiles. Ainsi
s’apaisa la colère de mon père et nos relations reprirent leur cours normal;
mais ce malentendu aurait très bien pu nous séparer pour toujours, si je ne
m’étais pas montré raisonnable.
A en juger par cet événement, je me demande ce qui serait arrivé si
j’avais prononcé un de ces «mots d’enfants» dont les journaux nous
assomment aujourd’hui... Sans nul doute il y aurait eu un infanticide dans
notre famille.
 UN MOT DE SATAN
Nous recevons la lettre suivante signée Satan, mais nous avons tout lieu
de penser qu’elle a été écrite par Mark Twain.—L’Éditeur.
A Monsieur le Directeur du «Harper’s hebdomadaire»
Mon cher Directeur.
Finissons-en avec ces conversations frivoles. L’Assistance publique
accepte mes dons chaque année et je ne vois pas pourquoi elle n’accepterait
pas ceux de M. Rockefeller. De tout temps, c’est de l’argent mal acquis qui
a plus ou moins alimenté les caisses des œuvres charitables—alors, qu’est-
ce que cela fait que cet argent ait passé entre les mains de M. Rockefeller?
La richesse de l’Assistance publique lui vient des cimetières—des legs,
vous comprenez—et cela, c’est de l’argent mal acquis, car la libéralité du
mort frustre ses héritiers. L’Assistance doit-elle refuser les legs sous ce
prétexte?
Permettez-moi de continuer. Ce qu’on a reproché le plus violemment et
avec le plus de persistance à M. Rockefeller, c’est que sa fortune est
abominablement souillée par ses fourberies—fourberies prouvées devant les
tribunaux. Mais cela me fait sourire! Car il n’y a pas dans votre vaste cité
un seul riche qui ne fasse chaque année quelques fourberies pour échapper à
l’impôt. Ils sont tous fourbes et tous font de faux serments à cet égard. S’il
y en a un seul qui échappe à cette règle, je désire l’acheter pour ma
collection et je le payerai au prix des ichtyosaures. Direz-vous qu’il ne
s’agit pas dans ce cas d’enfreindre la loi, mais simplement d’y échapper?—
Consolez-vous avec cette gentille distinction, pour le moment, si vous
voulez, mais plus tard, quand vous viendrez séjourner chez moi, je vous
montrerai quelque chose qui vous intéressera: un plein enfer de gens qui ont
simplement échappé aux lois de leur pays. Il arrive qu’un brave voleur ne
vienne pas en enfer, mais ceux qui se bornent à éluder la loi, ceux-là, je les
ai toujours!
Revenons-en à mes moutons. Je voudrais que vous sachiez bien que les
plus fourbes des riches donnent beaucoup d’argent à l’Assistance: c’est
l’argent qu’ils ont pu soustraire à l’impôt, c’est donc le salaire du péché,
c’est donc mon argent, c’est donc moi qui remplis les caisses de
l’Assistance... et, en fin de compte, c’est comme j’ai dit: Puisque l’on
accepte mes dons, pourquoi refuser ceux de M. Rockefeller qui n’est pas
plus mauvais que moi, quoi qu’en disent les tribunaux?
Satan.
 LES CINQ DONS DE LA VIE

I
Au matin de la vie, la bonne fée arriva avec son panier et dit:
—Voici des dons. Prenez-en un, laissez les autres. Et soyez prudent,
choisissez sagement: Oh! choisissez sagement! Car il n’y en a qu’un qui ait
de la valeur.
Les dons étaient au nombre de cinq: la Renommée, l’Amour, la
Richesse, les Plaisirs, la Mort. Le jeune homme répondit avec
empressement:
—Il est inutile d’y réfléchir!
Et il choisit les Plaisirs.
Il alla par le monde et goûta à tous les plaisirs aimés de la jeunesse. Mais
chacun à son tour se trouva être de courte durée, plein de déceptions, vide et
vain, et tous le raillaient en s’en allant. A la fin, il dit:
—J’ai perdu toutes ces années! Si seulement je pouvais choisir de
nouveau, j’agirais sagement!

II
La fée réapparut et dit:
—Il reste quatre dons. Choisissez encore, mais réfléchissez bien! Le
temps passe et il n’y a qu’un don de précieux.
L’homme hésita longtemps, puis il choisit l’Amour et il ne vit pas les
larmes monter aux yeux de la fée.
Après bien des années, l’homme se tenait auprès d’un cercueil, dans une
maison vide. Il songeait en lui-même:
—Un à un ils sont partis et m’ont laissé seul, et maintenant, elle est
couchée là, la dernière et la plus chérie. Je suis allé de désolation en
désolation et pour chaque heure de bonheur donné par l’Amour, j’ai payé
mille heures de souffrance. Du fond le plus intime de mon âme, je le
maudis.
 III
—Choisissez de nouveau.
C’était encore la fée qui parlait. Elle ajouta:
—Les années ont dû vous enseigner la sagesse. Et il reste trois dons. Un
seul est important, souvenez-vous-en et choisissez en conséquence.
L’homme réfléchit beaucoup, puis il choisit la Renommée et la fée s’en
alla en soupirant.
Les années passèrent et la fée revint encore se tenir derrière l’homme
qui, seul dans le crépuscule, était en proie à d’amères pensées. Et elle savait
ce qu’il pensait. Il se disait:
—Mon nom a rempli le monde, sa louange était sur toutes les lèvres...
Oui; tout me sembla bon pendant quelque temps, mais comme cela dura
peu! Puis vint l’envie, puis la médisance, puis la calomnie, puis la haine et
la persécution; ensuite la moquerie et ce fut le commencement de la fin.
Enfin vint la pitié qui enterre la Renommée. Oh! l’amertume et la misère de
la gloire! Elle ne reçoit que de la boue quand elle brille et de la compassion
dédaigneuse quand elle s’éteint.

IV
—Choisissez encore une fois, dit la douce voix de la fée. Deux dons
vous restent et ne désespérez pas. Au commencement, il n’y en avait qu’un
de bon et il est toujours là.
—La Fortune qui est la puissance! Oh! combien j’étais aveugle! s’écria
l’homme. Enfin, maintenant il vaudra la peine de vivre! Je dépenserai,
j’éparpillerai mon or, ce sera un éblouissement. Ces moqueurs et ces
envieux se traîneront dans la poussière devant moi et je me rassasierai de
leur envie. J’aurai tous les luxes, toutes les joies, tous les enchantements de
l’esprit et tous les plaisirs du corps si chers à l’homme. J’achèterai,
j’achèterai, j’achèterai! J’aurai pour mon argent la déférence, le respect,
l’estime, l’adoration, toutes les grâces que ce monde misérable met sur le
marché. J’ai perdu beaucoup de temps et j’ai mal choisi jusqu’ici; mais
c’est fini; j’étais ignorant et ne pouvais prendre que ce qui me paraissait le
meilleur.
 Trois courtes années s’écoulèrent et il vint un jour où l’homme songeait
en frissonnant dans un grenier. Il était triste, blême, décharné; il était vêtu
de haillons et mâchonnait une croûte de pain sec. Il s’écria:
—Maudits soient tous les dons du monde qui ne sont que duperies et
mensonges dorés. Tous sont décevants! Ce ne sont pas des dons, mais des
prêts! Les Plaisirs, l’Amour, la Gloire, la Fortune ne sont que les
déguisements temporaires des réalités éternelles, la Douleur, la Souffrance,
la Honte, la Pauvreté. La fée disait vrai: dans son panier, un don seulement
était précieux, un seul n’était pas insignifiant. Comme les autres me
semblent petits et misérables, comparés à celui que j’ai dédaigné! Comparés
à ce bonheur si cher, si doux, si bienveillant qui plonge dans un sommeil
sans fin l’âme fatiguée de douleurs, le corps persécuté, le cœur angoissé,
l’esprit honteux! Apportez-le! Je suis las, je cherche le repos!

V
La fée vint avec son panier, mais il était vide. Le dernier don, la Mort,
n’y était plus, et elle dit:
—Je l’ai donné au chéri d’une mère, à un petit enfant. Il était ignorant,
mais il avait confiance en moi et m’a demandé de choisir pour lui. Vous,
vous ne m’avez rien demandé...
—Oh, malheureux que je suis! Que me reste-t-il maintenant?
—Il vous reste ce que vous n’avez même pas mérité: une vieillesse
abreuvée d’outrages et de larmes.
 L’ITALIEN SANS MAITRE
Il y a presque quinze jours maintenant que je suis arrivé dans cette petite
villa de campagne, à deux ou trois kilomètres de Florence. Je ne sais pas
l’italien: je suis trop vieux pour l’apprendre, trop occupé aussi, quand je
suis occupé, et trop paresseux quand je n’ai rien à faire. On pensera peut-
être que cette circonstance m’est désagréable: pas du tout! Les domestiques
sont tous Italiens, ils me parlent italien et je leur réponds en anglais. Je ne
les comprends pas, ils ne me comprennent pas et par conséquent il n’y a pas
de mal et tout le monde est satisfait. Pour rester dans le vrai, je dois ajouter
qu’en fait je lance de temps à autre un mot d’italien... quand j’en ai un à ma
disposition, et cela fait bien dans le tableau. Généralement je cueille ce mot
le matin, dans le journal. J’en use pendant qu’il est encore tout frais dans
ma mémoire et cela ne dure guère. Je trouve que les mots ne se conservent
guère dans ce climat: ils s’évanouissent vers le soir et le lendemain, ils ont
disparu. Mais cela n’a aucune importance, j’en cueille un autre dans le
journal avant déjeuner et je m’en sers à ahurir les domestiques tant qu’il
dure. Je n’ai pas de dictionnaire et je n’en veux point. Je choisis mes mots
d’après leur son ou leur forme orthographique. Beaucoup ont un aspect
français, allemand ou anglais et ce sont ceux-là que je prends—le plus
souvent, mais pas toujours. Si je trouve une phrase facile à retenir, d’aspect
imposant et qui sonne bien, je ne m’inquiète pas de savoir ce qu’elle
signifie, je la sers au premier interlocuteur qui se présente, sachant que si je
la prononce soigneusement, il la comprendra et cela me suffit.
Le mot d’hier était: Avanti. Il a un air shakespearien et veut dire sans
doute «Va-t’en!» ou «Allez au diable!» Aujourd’hui, j’ai noté une phrase
entière: Sono dispiacentissimo. Je ne sais pas ce que cela veut dire, mais
cela me semble cadrer avec toutes les circonstances et contenter tout le
monde. Bien que d’une façon générale, mes mots et mes phrases ne me
servent que pour un jour, il m’arrive d’en conserver parfois qui me restent
dans la tête, je ne sais pourquoi, et je les sers avec libéralité dans les
conversations un peu longues, de façon à rompre la monotonie des propos
échangés. Une des meilleures de ces phrases-là est: Dov’ è il gatto. Cela
provoque toujours autour de moi une joyeuse surprise, de telle sorte que je
garde ces mots pour les moments où je désire soulever des
applaudissements et jouir de l’admiration générale. Le quatrième mot de
cette phrase a un son français et je suppose que l’ensemble veut dire:
«Donnez-lui du gâteau.»
Durant la première semaine que je passai dans cette solitude profonde,
au milieu de ces bois silencieux et calmes, je demeurai sans nouvelles du
monde extérieur et j’en étais charmé. Il y avait un mois que je n’avais vu un
journal et cela communiquait à ma nouvelle existence un charme
incomparable. Puis vint un brusque changement d’humeur. Mon désir
d’information s’éleva avec une force extraordinaire. Il me fallut céder, mais
je ne voulus pas redevenir l’esclave de mon journal et je résolus de me
restreindre. J’examinai donc un journal italien avec l’idée d’y puiser
exclusivement les nouvelles du jour... oui, exclusivement dans un journal
italien et sans me servir de dictionnaire. De cette façon, je serais forcément
réduit au minimum possible et serais protégé contre toute indigestion de
nouvelles.
Un coup d’œil à la page de la «dernière heure» me remplit d’espoir.
Avant chaque dépêche une ligne ou deux en gros caractères en résumaient
le contenu; c’était une bonne affaire, car sans cela, on serait obligé, comme
avec les journaux allemands, de perdre un temps précieux à chercher ce
qu’il y a dans l’article pour découvrir souvent enfin qu’il n’y a rien qui vous
intéresse personnellement.
En principe, nous sommes tous très friands de meurtres, de scandales,
d’escroqueries, de vols, d’explosions, de collisions et de tout ce qui y
ressemble, lorsque nous en pouvons connaître les victimes ou les héros,
lorsqu’ils sont nos amis ou nos voisins, mais lorsqu’ils nous sont
complètement étrangers, nous ne prenons généralement pas grand intérêt à
ces dramatiques faits divers. Maintenant, l’ennui avec les journaux
américains, c’est qu’ils ne font aucun choix, ils énumèrent et racontent tous
les drames qui se sont accomplis sur la terre entière et il en résulte pour le
lecteur un grand dégoût et une immense lassitude. Par habitude, vous
absorbez toute cette ration de boue chaque jour, mais vous arrivez vite à n’y
prendre aucun intérêt et en réalité, vous en êtes écœuré et fatigué. C’est que
quarante-neuf sur cinquante de ces histoires concernent des étrangers, des
gens qui sont loin de vous, très loin, à mille kilomètres, à deux mille
kilomètres, à dix mille kilomètres. Alors, si vous voulez bien y réfléchir, qui
donc va se soucier de ce qui arrive à ces êtres-là? L’assassinat d’un ami me
touche plus que le massacre de tout un régiment étranger. Et, selon moi, le
fait d’apprendre qu’un scandale vient d’éclater dans une petite ville voisine
est plus intéressant que de lire le récit de la ruine d’une Sodome ou d’une
Gomorrhe située dans un autre continent. Il me faut les nouvelles du pays
où j’habite.
Quoi qu’il en soit, je vis tout de suite que le journal florentin me
conviendrait parfaitement: cinq sur six des scandales et des drames
rapportés dans ce numéro étaient locaux; il y avait les aventures des voisins
immédiats, on aurait presque pu dire des amis. En ce qui concerne les
nouvelles du monde extérieur, il n’y en avait pas trop, disons: juste assez. Je
m’abonnai. Je n’eus aucune occasion de le regretter. Chaque matin j’y
trouvais les nouvelles dont j’avais besoin pour la journée. Je ne me servis
jamais de dictionnaire. Très souvent, je ne comprenais pas très bien,
quelques détails m’échappaient, mais, n’importe, je voyais l’idée. Je vais
donner ici une coupure ou deux de quelques passages afin de bien montrer
combien cette langue est claire:

Il ritorno dei Reali d’Italia

Elargizione del Re all’ Ospedale italiano

La première ligne annonce évidemment le retour des souverains italiens

—qui étaient allés en Angleterre. La seconde ligne doit se rapporter à
quelque visite du roi à l’hôpital italien.
Je lis plus loin:

Il ritorno dei Sovrani a Roma

ROMA, 24, ore 22,50.—I Sovrani e le Principessine
Reali si attendono a Roma domani alle ore 15,51.

Retour des souverains à Rome, vous voyez! La dépêche est datée: Rome,
le 24 novembre, 23 heures moins dix. Cela paraît signifier: «Les souverains
et la famille royale sont attendus à Rome demain à 16 heures et 51
minutes.»
Je ne sais pas comment on compte l’heure en Italie, mais, si j’en juge
d’après ces fragments, je suppose que l’on commence à compter à minuit et
que l’on poursuit sans s’arrêter jusqu’à l’expiration des vingt-quatre heures.
Dans la coupure ci-après, il semble indiqué que les théâtres s’ouvrent à 20
heures et demie. S’il ne s’agit pas de matinées, ore 20,30 doit indiquer 8
heures 30 du soir:

Spettacoli del di 25
TEATRO DELLA PERGOLA.—(Ore 20,30)—Opera: Bohème.
TEATRO ALFIERI.—Compagnia drammaticá Drago—(Ore 20,30)—
La Legge.
ALHAMBRA.—(Ore 20,30)—Spettacolo variato.
SALA EDISON—Grandioso spettacolo Cinematografico: Quo Vadis?
—Inaugurazione della Chiesa Russa.—In coda al Direttissimo.—
Vedute di Firenze con gran movimento.—America: Trasporto tronchi
giganteschi.—I ladri in casa del Diavolo—Scene comiche.
CINEMATOGRAFO.—Via Brunelleschi, n. 4.—Programma
straordinario. Don Chisciotte.—Prezzi popolari.

Tout cela m’est parfaitement compréhensible, excepté l’inauguration de

ce Chiesa russe: en anglais cheese veut dire fromage... cela se ressemble...
enfin je ne comprends pas.
Ce journal n’a que quatre pages et comme il a de longs articles de fond
et beaucoup d’annonces, il n’y a pas beaucoup de place pour les crimes,
désastres et autres abominations, grâces au ciel! Aujourd’hui je n’y trouve
qu’un scandale:

Una principessa
CHE FUGGE CON UN COCCHIERE
Parigi 24.—Il Matin ha da Berlino che la Principessa Schovenbsre-
Waldenbure scomparve il 9 Novembre. Sarebbe partita col suo
cocchiere. La Principessa ha 27 anni.

Vingt-sept ans et décamper (scomparve) le 9 novembre avec son cocher!

Pauvre Princesse! J’espère que Sarebbe ne s’en repentira pas, mais j’ai peur
pour elle. Sono dispiacentissimo...
Il y a encore quelques incendies, deux accidents; en voici un:
 Grave disgrazia sul Ponte Vecchio
Stammattina, circa le 7,30, mentre Giuseppe Sciatti, di anni 55, di
Casellina e Torri, passava dal Ponte Vecchio, stando seduto sopra un
barroccio carico di verdura, perse l’equilibrio e cadde al suolo,
rimanendo con la gamba destra sotta una ruota del veicolo.
Le Sciatti fu subito raccolto da alcuni cittadini, che, per mezzo della
pubblica vettura n. 365, le trasportarono a San Giovanni di Dio.
Ivi il medico di guardia gli riscontrò la frattura della gamba destra e
alcune lievi escorazioni giudicandolo guaribile in 50 giorni salvo
complicazioni

Cela paraît signifier: «Sérieux accident sur le Vieux-Pont. Ce matin vers

7 h. 30, M. Joseph Sciatti âgé de 55 ans, originaire de Casellina et de Torri,
se trouvant assis au sommet d’un tas de verdure (feuilles? foin? légumes?)
qui remplissait sa voiture, perdit l’équilibre, tomba et sa jambe droite passa
sous une des roues du véhicule.
«Le dit Sciatti fut vite ramassé par quelques citadins, qui, à l’aide de la
voiture publique (fiacre?) nº 365, le transportèrent à Saint-Jean-de-Dieu.»
Le paragraphe 3 est un peu plus obscur, mais je crois qu’il y est dit que
le médecin arrangea la jambe droite d’une manière assez adroite et que du
moment que la gauche n’est pas atteinte, il nous est permis d’espérer que
dans cinquante jours le blessé sera tout à fait giudicandolo guaribile, s’il
n’y a pas de complication.—Au fait, guaribile doit se rapprocher de
guérissable, mais n’importe.
Il y a un grand charme à lire ces petites nouvelles dans une langue que
l’on connaît à peine—c’est le charme qui s’attache toujours à ce qui est
mystérieux et incertain. En de telles circonstances, vous ne pouvez jamais
être absolument assuré de la signification de ce que vous lisez: c’est comme
une proie que vous poursuivez, vous essayez comme ceci, puis comme cela,
et c’est ce qui rend l’exercice amusant. Un dictionnaire gâterait tout!
Quelquefois un seul mot douteux jettera un voile de rêve et d’incertitude
dorée sur tout un paragraphe plein de froides et pratiques certitudes. Vous
resterez songeur et chercherez à deviner un adorable mystère dans un récit
qui n’est au fond que vulgaire et laid. Serait-ce sage de détruire tout ce
charme à l’aide d’un coup de dictionnaire?
 Après quelques jours de repos, je me suis remis à chercher chaque jour
ma petite pâture d’italien. Je la trouve sans peine dans mon journal. Voici,
par exemple, un câblogramme de Chicago à Paris. Tous les mots, sauf un,
sont intelligibles à ceux qui ne savent pas l’italien:

Revolverate in teatro.
Parigi, 27.—La Patrie ha da Chicago:
Il guardiano del teatro dell’ opera di Wallace (Indiana), avendo
voluto espellere uno spettatore che continuava a fumare malgrado il
divieto, questo spalleggiato dai suoi amici tirò diversi colpi di rivoltella.
Il guardiano rispose. Naque una scarcia generale. Grande panico fra gli
spettatori. Nessun ferito.

Traduction:—«Coups de revolver dans un théatre. Paris, le 27.—La

Patrie reçoit la dépêche suivante de Chicago. Un gardien de théâtre de
l’Opéra de Wallace (Indiana), ayant voulu expulser un spectateur qui
continuait à fumer malgré la défense, celui-ci, spalleggiato par ses amis,
tira plusieurs coups de revolver. Le gardien riposta. D’où frayeur générale,
grande panique parmi les spectateurs. Personne de blessé.»
Je parierais que cette bénigne bagarre qui avait eu lieu à l’Opéra de
Wallace (Indiana) ne frappa personne en Europe, excepté moi. Mais j’ai été
vivement frappé et ce qui m’a frappé, c’est l’impossibilité où je suis de
savoir, de science certaine, ce qui a poussé le spectateur à tirer de son
revolver contre le gardien. Je lus ce récit tranquillement, sans émotion et
sans étonnement jusqu’au moment où j’arrivai à ce mot spalleggiato qui
expliquait tout, mais dont j’ignorais la signification. Vous voyez quelle
affaire! et quel riche et profond mystère entourait pour moi tout ce petit
drame. C’est là le charme délicieux de l’ignorance. Vous commencez à lire
un récit... le mot principal d’une phrase vous échappe, vous voilà livré à vos
suppositions, vous êtes libre de vous amuser à votre guise, vous n’avez pas
à craindre de voir le mystère se dissiper tout d’un coup. Aucune supposition
ne vous fournira la signification exacte du mot inconnu. Tous les autres
mots vous fournissaient quelque indice par leur forme, leur orthographe,
leur son, celui-là ne vous dit rien, il garde son secret. Que veut dire
spalleggiato? S’il y a un indice quelque part, une légère ombre d’indice,
c’est dans les cinq lettres qui se suivent au milieu du mot, alleg... Cela
signifierait-il que le spectateur fut allégé par ses amis et que c’est là ce qui
le conduisit à faire feu sur le policier? Mais allégé? Volé? Je ne vois pas du
tout comment il se fait qu’un bonhomme volé par ses amis se soit obstiné à
fumer dans un théâtre et se soit mis en état de rébellion contre l’agent de la
force publique... Non, je ne saisis pas le lien qui pourrait enchaîner toutes
ces circonstances et je suis obligé de penser que le mot spalleggiato
demeure pour moi un mot mystérieux. L’incertitude reste donc et avec elle
le charme.
S’il existait un guide de conversation vraiment bien fait, je l’étudierais et
ne passerais pas tout mon temps à des lectures aussi suggestives; mais les
guides de conversation ne me satisfont pas. Ils marchent assez bien pendant
un certain temps, mais quand vous tombez et que vous vous égratignez la
jambe, ils ne vous indiquent pas ce qu’il faut dire.
 L’ITALIEN ET SA GRAMMAIRE
J’avais pensé qu’une personne tant soit peu intelligente pouvait lire très
facilement l’italien sans dictionnaire, mais j’ai découvert depuis qu’une
grammaire n’est pas inutile en bien des circonstances. Cela parce que, si la
personne en question ne connaît pas les temps des verbes italiens, elle fera
souvent des confusions regrettables. Elle pourra très bien croire qu’une
chose doit arriver la semaine suivante alors qu’elle sera déjà arrivée depuis
une semaine. En étudiant la question, je vis que les noms, les adjectifs, etc.,
étaient de bons mots francs, droits et dépourvus d’artifice; mais c’est le
verbe qui prête à la confusion, c’est le verbe qui manque de stabilité et de
droiture, c’est le verbe qui n’a aucune opinion durable sur rien, c’est le
verbe qui leurre le lecteur ignorant, éteint la lumière et cause toutes sortes
d’ennuis.
Plus j’étudiais, plus je réfléchissais, plus je me confirmais dans cette
opinion. Cette découverte m’indiqua la voie à suivre pour acquérir la
science qui me manquait lorsque je lisais les dernières nouvelles des
journaux: il me fallait attraper un verbe et m’en rendre maître. Il me fallait
le dépecer jusqu’à ce que j’en connusse le fort et le faible, les mœurs et les
habitudes, les formes et les excentricités.
J’avais remarqué en d’autres langues étrangères que les verbes vivent en
famille et que les membres de chaque famille ont des traits de ressemblance
qui leur sont communs et qui les distinguent des membres des autres
familles. J’avais noté que cette marque de famille ne se voit pas sur le nez,
ni sur les cheveux—pour ainsi parler—mais sur la queue du mot, sur sa
terminaison—et que ces queues les distinguent parfaitement, à tel point
qu’un expert peut toujours dire s’il a affaire à un Plus-que-parfait ou à un
Subjonctif sur simple examen de sa queue, tout comme un cowboy
distingue un cheval d’une vache. Naturellement, je ne parle que de ces
verbes légitimes que, dans l’argot des grammairiens, on appelle réguliers. Il
y en a d’autres—je ne cherche pas à le cacher—qu’on appelle irréguliers,
qui sont nés hors mariage, de parents inconnus et qui sont naturellement
dépourvus de toute marque de famille, de tout trait de ressemblance avec
d’autres, leurs queues ne signifiant rien. Mais de ces bâtards je n’ai rien à
dire. Je ne les approuve pas, je ne les encourage pas; je suis un délicat et
sensible puriste et je ne permets pas qu’on les nomme en ma présence.
Mais, comme je l’ai dit, je décidai d’attraper un bon verbe et de le
disséquer à fond. Un suffit. Une fois familiarisé avec les formes de sa
queue, vous êtes avertis, et, après cela, aucun verbe régulier ne saurait vous
cacher sa parenté et vous ne pourrez plus confondre le passé ou le futur
avec le conditionnel—sa queue vous renseignera toujours.
Je choisis le verbe amare, aimer. Ce ne fut pour aucune raison
personnelle, car les verbes me laissent tout à fait indifférents. Je ne me
soucie pas plus d’un verbe que d’un autre, et, pris dans leur ensemble, je les
respecte fort peu, mais enfin, dans les langues étrangères, il faut toujours
commencer avec le verbe «aimer». Pourquoi? Je ne sais pas. C’est une
simple habitude, je suppose. Le premier grammairien le choisit: Adam ne fit
pas la grimace, et aucun professeur n’eut assez d’originalité d’esprit pour
choisir un autre verbe. Il n’en manque pas, cependant; tout le monde
l’admet. Mais les grammairiens n’aiment pas l’originalité; ils n’ont jamais
émis une idée nouvelle et sont tout à fait incapables de répandre un peu de
fraîcheur et de vie dans leurs tristes, sombres et ennuyeuses leçons. Le
charme, la grâce et le pittoresque leur sont étrangers.
Je savais donc qu’il me fallait veiller moi-même à rendre mon étude
intéressante; j’envoyai donc chercher le facchino et lui expliquai mon désir.
Je lui dis de rassembler quelques contadini en une compagnie, de leur
donner des costumes et de leur distribuer leurs rôles. Je lui enjoignis
d’exercer sa troupe et d’être prêt au bout de trois jours! Chaque division de
six hommes, représentant un aspect du verbe, devait être commandée par un
sergent, un caporal ou quelque chose comme cela; chacune d’elles devait
avoir un uniforme différent, afin que je puisse distinguer un parfait d’un
futur sans être obligé de regarder dans mon livre; le bataillon tout entier
devait être sous les ordres du facchino avec le grade de colonel. Je payai les
frais.

Alors, je m’enquis des mœurs, formes et autres idiosyncrasies du verbe

amare, aimer, et je fus très troublé d’apprendre qu’il était capable de
prendre cinquante-sept apparences. Cinquante-sept façons d’exprimer
l’amour, et encore aucune d’elles n’aurait suffi à convaincre une jeune fille
à l’affût d’un titre ou un jeune homme à l’affût d’une dot!