2018.womens Paticipation in Environmental Decision Making Quasi Experimental Evidence Form Northern Kenya

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World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

World Development
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

Women’s participation in environmental decision-making:


Quasi-experimental evidence from northern Kenya
Tara Grillos
Department of Political Science, Purdue University, 100 N University St., West Lafayette, IN 47907, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Greater inclusion of women is widely believed to improve environmental decision outcomes. Pastoralism
Accepted 16 March 2018 faces increased vulnerability to climate change, and pastoralist women are both disproportionately
affected by severe drought and underrepresented in formal decision-making processes. Increased partic-
ipation by women in decision-making thus promises to offer a win–win solution: greater gender equality
Keywords: as well as enhanced resilience to persistent drought. This quasi-experimental study evaluates an inter-
East Africa vention that aimed to increase drought preparedness in northern Kenyan pastoralist communities
Kenya
through the empowerment of women at the household and community levels. It uses a difference-in-
Environment
Gender
differences design combined with matching estimation to causally isolate effects of the intervention.
Women At the community level, there was an increase in women’s political awareness and participation in formal
Participation decision-making processes, but that participation did not translate into meaningful outcomes. At the
household level, however, there was a large and positive effect on actions taken to better prepare for
drought (which mostly took the form of pre-emptive livestock sales). Given the entrenched gender roles
related to livestock sales in this setting, this finding is encouraging and warrants further research.
Ó 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction solution: tasking women with alternative income-generating


activities may provide them with more power over household
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the impacts decisions while allowing men to continue their traditional roles
of climate change (Thomas & Twyman, 2005). Kenya is among the as pastoralists.
world’s most water-scarce nations (UNEP, 2008), and water avail- At the community level, there is some evidence that greater
ability is expected to decrease further in the wake of climate inclusion of women in decision-making processes may lead to
change. Extreme drought has already increased in frequency more environmentally favorable outcomes (Agarwal, 2001, 2009;
(Opiyo, Wasonga, Nyangito, Schilling, & Munang, 2015). Eighty Leisher et al., 2016). In Kenya, a new constitution has created
percent of Kenya is comprised of arid or semi-arid lands, where opportunities for women in politics, resulting in greater potential
drought is particularly prevalent. The 2009 drought risked the lives for legitimizing greater inclusion of women at the community level
of nearly 10 million Kenyans (Nzau, 2013). as well. Thus it is tempting to conclude that there is a win-win to
While pastoralist institutions have traditionally been quite resi- be had in which women’s empowerment at both the household
lient to environmental change, factors including global climate and community level may have beneficial spillover effects for the
change have called into question their continued viability (López- entire community in the form of enhanced drought resilience.
i-Gelats, Fraser, Morton, & Rivera-Ferre, 2016). Women, in particu- This paper evaluates the impact of a non-governmental organi-
lar, are vulnerable to increasing climactic variability (Cutter, 1995), zation (NGO) intervention in northern Kenya, which aimed to
and they are typically excluded from decision-making regarding improve drought resilience through enhancing women’s participa-
purchase and sale of livestock, the primary source of wealth in pas- tion in decision-making at the household and community levels.
toralist communities (Fratkin & Smith, 1995). They do, however, The NGO, which I will refer to as YARI,1 had previously provided
often exercise some control over secondary livestock products, like financial grants to pastoralist women along with training to start
milk (Kettel, 1992). The perceived need for income diversification small businesses. With funding from a major donor on the theme
and the rigidity of traditional gender roles offers up a potential
1
The actual NGO name is withheld here, by request of the organization itself. The
pseudonym YARI is derived from the Swahili word tayari, which means ready or
E-mail address: tgrillos@purdue.edu prepared.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.03.017
0305-750X/Ó 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
116 T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

of governance for drought resilience, YARI aimed to strengthen its empirical evidence for the claim is actually somewhat mixed
previous work with a community level intervention geared at open- (Meinzen-Dick, Kovarik, & Quisumbing, 2014). Arora-Jonsson
ing up new decision making spaces for women and preparing them (2011) warns that the depiction of women as vulnerable and virtu-
to take advantage of those spaces. The intervention also included a ous in relation to climate change can be problematic. External inter-
workshop directed at men, which aimed to persuade them of the ventions sometimes burden women with more responsibility,
importance of women’s work for livelihood diversification. without providing additional benefits to the women themselves
(Bradshaw, 2010; Chant, 2010). Moreover, such discourse may ‘‘de-
flect attention from inequalities in decision-making” (Arora-
2. Pastoralism, women, and vulnerability
Jonsson, 2011). Thus, scholars have debunked the assertion that
environmental programs will necessarily benefit women. However,
2.1. Pastoralism and climate change vulnerability
there is some reason to believe that the reverse may be true. Policies
that increase women’s decision-making power may produce
Vulnerability can be defined as ‘‘susceptibility to harm from
broader benefits related to climate change resilience.
exposure to stresses associated with environmental and social
In the political sphere, a series of research studies in India
change and from the absence of capacity to adapt” (Adger, 2006).
demonstrate that female representatives do make different deci-
The related term, resilience, originally referred to the magnitude
sions than men, and increasing women’s participation in
of shock that a system could withstand while returning to its orig-
decision-making does change substantive policy outcomes, argu-
inal equilibrium, without having changed its structure or identity
ably for the better (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras,
(Gunderson & Holling, 2001; Holling, 1973; Walker, Holling,
2011, 2012). In Uganda, female members of parliament are more
Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). More recently, however, resilience
likely than men to speak about women’s interests (Clayton,
has been used in a broader sense, to allow for the inclusion of
Josefsson, & Wang, 2016). Across African countries, an increase in
adaptation strategies as well (Adger, 2006; Carpenter, Walker,
women’s representation in legislatures is associated with
Anderies, & Abel, 2001; Folke, 2006; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006).
increased political participation by female citizens more generally
My use of the term refers to this latter, broader definition.
(Barnes & Burchard, 2013), and in the United States, granting
Pastoralist institutions were traditionally among the most resi-
women the power to vote was associated with improved outcomes
lient social-ecological systems in East Africa, representing an effi-
related to infant mortality (Miller, 2008). At the household level,
cient and rational use of scarce resources (Fratkin, 1986; McCabe,
placing income in the hands of women, rather than men, has been
1990; Mwangi & Ostrom, 2009). Pastoralists have various indige-
associated with increased spending on food (Duflo & Udry, 2004)
nous methods of forecasting and mitigating short-term climate
and children’s health and education (Thomas, 1990, 1993), all of
shocks, but these may no longer be effective in the face of more
which arguably are investments which benefit the household as
extreme climactic events (Kagunyu, Wandibba, & Wanjohi, 2016;
a whole. However, the gender difference in stated policy prefer-
Opiyo, Wasonga, Nyangito, Schilling, & Munang, 2015). In northern
ences may disappear when women’s material position improves
Kenya, long-term rainfall data confirms that extreme drought is
relative to men (Gottlieb, Grossman, & Robinson, 2016), and even
increasingly common with negative effects on pastoralist liveli-
when men and women have the same underlying preferences, they
hoods (Opiyo et al., 2015), suggesting that in the long-run, liveli-
may express them differently in public fora due to gendered expec-
hood diversification will necessarily form part of the adaptive
tations of their behavior (Mize, 2017).
response (Desta & Coppock, 2004; Opiyo et al., 2015). In East Africa,
In the context of environmental management, there is also
there has already been an observed shift toward livelihood diversi-
some evidence that women’s involvement results in different deci-
fication and increased sedentarization (Bollig, 2016; López-i-
sion outcomes. In India and Nepal, forest management groups with
Gelats, Fraser, Morton, & Rivera-Ferre, 2016).
a higher proportion of women in decision-making roles are able to
Historically, policies affecting pastoral land were often based on
achieve a better forest condition, according to both qualitative
misconceptions that the lands were underutilized, poorly managed
interviews (Agarwal, 2001) and statistical analyses (Agarwal,
or environmentally degraded (Little, 1994; Swift, 1977). Thus it is
2009). Furthermore, a forest group’s gender composition affects
reasonable to question the extent to which increased vulnerability
women’s substantive participation as well (Agarwal, 2010), sug-
of pastoralists is due to increasing climactic variability rather than
gesting that a gender quota that increases de jure participation
to a legacy of poorly planned development policies (Goldman &
by women could also increase women’s de facto decision-making
Riosmena, 2013; Hobbs et al., 2008; Nori, Taylor, & Sensi, 2008).
power. Women’s participation in forest councils is also associated
It is clear, however, that both factors play some role, and they
with less conflict (Coleman & Mwangi, 2013).
likely exacerbate each other (Thébaud & Batterbury, 2001). Expo-
It is worth noting, though, that sometimes the reverse relation-
sure to climate-related risk is a function of both physical environ-
ship may hold, with women’s participation correlated with worse
mental hazards and socially constructed factors (Brooks, Adger, &
environmental outcomes. For example, a deteriorating environment
Kelly, 2005).
may motivate women to get involved, leading to short-run gender
conflict but ultimately to greater presence of women in leadership
2.2. Women’s decision-making power and climate change resilience positions (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006, p. 161). One cross-country
study of forest user groups found that the groups that included more
Women are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate women were actually less effective, though the authors attribute
change (Cutter, 1995; Denton, 2002; McKune et al., 2015; Mearns this to gender biases in access to resources rather than to differences
& Norton, 2010; Terry, 2009). In the northern Kenyan context in in decision outcomes (Mwangi, Meinzen-Dick, & Sun, 2011).
particular, an implication of the traditional division of labor is that In developed countries as well, a higher percentage of women in
pastoralist men are highly mobile together with their livestock, decision-making roles is correlated with better environmental out-
while women often remain in semi-settled communities, where comes. Survey data from British Columbia suggests that women
they have less adaptive capacity in response to drought. Perhaps are more likely to engage in environmentally friendly behavior
because they are more exposed to the risks of extreme climate, (Tindall, Davies, & Mauboules, 2003). In the United Kingdom, a
women are also understood to be more receptive to mitigation higher percentage of women in managerial positions is associated
and adaptation strategies. Though the idea that women are more with higher recycling rates (Buckingham, Reeves, & Batchelor,
environmentally inclined than men has long been popular, the 2005). Among developed countries in general, those with more
T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130 117

female elected representatives have been more successful at Prior to implementation of the Governance Program, I consulted
reducing their carbon emissions (Buckingham, 2010). YARI on the design and monitoring of this new program, based in
Given that women are disproportionately affected by climate part on focus groups that I organized in YARI beneficiary commu-
change, it stands to reason that increasing their decision-making nities during late 2013. However, final decisions with respect to
power may result in increased adaptation and mitigation activities. both the program design and survey structure were made by
In Southern Ethiopia, near to the border with Marsabit County, Kenya, NGO staff with consideration of donor requirements, logistical con-
a program meant to enhance drought resilience among pastoralists cerns and complementarities with their pre-existing program. An
through income diversification and savings groups found that the additional component that directly targeted men was added to
new activities quickly became dominated by women and that, during the intervention based on the results of focus groups that I con-
the next major drought, participant livelihoods did exhibit greater ducted with beneficiaries of YARI’s previous work. Below I describe
resilience (Coppock, Desta, Tezera, & Gebru, 2011). In the northern the institutional background (reforms related to Kenya’s newly
Kenyan context, livestock is the primary form of wealth, and implemented constitution), the geographical context (Marsabit
decision-making regarding livestock in particular is seen as off- County), the design of the intervention itself and the survey used
limits to women. Thus, enhancing climate change resilience through for data collection.
income diversification could also be associated with an increase in
women’s decision-making power, as alternative sources of income 3.1. The Kenyan constitution and implications for local governance
may be less culturally entrenched in traditional gender roles.
Furthermore, there are seeming complementarities between Kenya’s new constitution, ratified by popular vote in 2010,
the best practices that are encouraged to meet the distinct goals mandates the use of public participation in virtually every area
of gender equity and improved environmental decision-making. of governance, as well as the creation of semi-autonomous county
Previous literature on both climate change resilience (Robinson & governments, who are subject to those participation requirements.
Berkes, 2011) and women’s empowerment (Goldman & Little, It also includes several special provisions for women, such as a
2015) in East Africa suggest that a multi-level approach is essential mandate that no more than two-thirds of a county executive com-
to effective programs. This all begs the question: is there a win– mittee be of the same gender.
win approach in which interventions to empower women also However, at the time of this research, constitutional mandates
result in greater resilience to climate change? were still in the process of being implemented, and provisions
This is far from a settled question. A recent systematic review of regarding public participation were left largely open to interpreta-
the literature on women’s decision-making in natural resource man- tion by individual county governments. In Marsabit County, where
agement found that virtually all of the existing studies on this rela- this study takes place, the existence of a large NGO and civil society
tionship focus specifically on the forestry sector in South Asia, and sector was able to influence this interpretation and convince the
that very few of the studies were methodologically rigorous county government to adopt a community development process
(Leisher et al., 2016). Most of the existing literature on this topic is called ‘‘Community Conversations” (CC) as their formal method
correlational in nature – it demonstrates that in places where women of participatory planning. CC is a process developed by Concern,
participate more, environmental decision-making is improved. How- an international NGO, which they have adopted as their standard
ever, this tells us little about whether external policy efforts to approach to development throughout the world. CC is a participa-
increase women’s decision-making power will have the same results, tory process meant to engage the entire community in making
or whether some degree of reverse causality is instead at play. decisions regarding its own development, and at the time of this
This paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship study, the Marsabit County government had agreed to recognize
between women’s participation and environmental decision out- the decision outcomes of this process as its formal method of
comes in several ways. First, it examines the causal effects of receiving citizen input into their budgeting process, as required
women’s inclusion using a quasi-experimental impact evaluation, by the new constitution.
rather than using observational data. Second, it expands the uni- While Concern designed and advocated for the adoption of CC, it
verse of case studies beyond the forestry sector to a lesser studied typically engages with local NGO partners as implementing agen-
context. Finally, understood in relation to previous literature, it cies. Taking advantage of the formal recognition of CC on the part
provides some initial insights into the particular contextual factors of the county government, YARI agreed to act as a CC implementing
that may mediate the anticipated effects of policies focused on agency in Marsabit County, provided that it could combine that pro-
women’s inclusion. cess with additional components meant specifically to empower
women to take advantage of these new spaces for decision-making.

3. Setting and intervention 3.2. Marsabit County

I conducted this research in partnership with YARI, an NGO As of the most recent official census (2009), Marsabit County
working in Marsabit County, Kenya. YARI had previously supported had a poverty rate of 83.2%, making it the fourth poorest of Kenya’s
pastoralist women in northern Kenya with grants and training to 47 counties. Access to physical infrastructure was similarly defi-
begin small businesses. In the wake of constitutional reform and cient with only 7.5% of households in Marsabit having access to
related donor trends, it received funding from a major donor in electricity and only 35.4% with access to improved sanitation
2013 to begin a program dedicated to enhancing governance for (compared with 87.8% nationally). In terms of human capital, Mar-
drought resilience (henceforth called ‘‘the Governance Program”). sabit ranked 44th out of 47 counties on literacy and 42nd on school
YARI’s existing business training program for women encouraged attainment. Among YARI’s female beneficiaries, the vast majority
livelihood diversification away from sole reliance on livestock. are illiterate.
The new Governance Program would complement this existing Marsabit is comprised primarily of pastoralist populations with
work by promoting women’s political empowerment (access to much household income dependent on livestock and thus particu-
community level decision-making spaces), which would ideally larly vulnerable to fluctuations in time of drought. Women in this
lead to an increase in the adoption of drought preparedness activ- context are particularly vulnerable to drought and other disasters.
ities to limit the negative consequences of drought, which dispro- Traditional gender roles mean that women are often tasked with
portionately affect women. household water collection and childcare. A further implication
118 T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

of the traditional gendered division of labor is that pastoralist men knowledge and skills) of women in each community. This latter
are highly mobile together with their livestock, while women often was addressed through the provision of civic education courses
remain in semi-settled communities, where they are less resilient for the entire community (including information about special pro-
to drought. visions for women and women’s rights in the new constitution), as
A combination of poverty and cultural norms within these com- well as leadership and communication training for women specif-
munities leave women with limited decision-making power within ically (which, it was hoped, would help them to take advantage of
the household, as well as very low levels of education. While hard the new decision-making spaces and make their voices heard).
data at the county level is lacking, across YARI’s beneficiaries, at Simultaneously, in response to direct requests from beneficia-
least 30% of women report having no influence whatsoever over ries in the aforementioned focus groups, YARI sought to enhance
household decisions such as purchasing food, children’s medical its previous business training programs for women by engaging
bills and school fees, and this figure is as high as 90% in some directly with men through a seminar meant to educate them about
communities. the importance of the programming for women and the benefits it
Prior to providing guidance on the design of the Governance could provide to the community as a whole. These seminars
Program, I organized five focus groups in each of four regions focused on the usefulness of women’s businesses for resource
within Marsabit County. Within each region, focus groups took diversification and enhanced ability to withstand drought. In other
place in both the central (slightly more densely populated) com- words, they emphasized that women’s empowerment would lead
munity and in one of the more isolated, rural satellite communi- to gains for the community as a whole.
ties. In each location, YARI provided a facilitator with knowledge YARI decided to include this workshop directed specifically at
of the local native language to conduct one focus group with prior men based on the explicit recommendation of participants in their
participants in YARI’s business training program, and one focus previous financial empowerment programming. Beneficiaries of
group with women who meet the eligibility requirements but the previous business training program reported in focus group
had not yet participated in the program. discussions that while they had learned a lot about the importance
Focus group participants indicated that they have little influ- of livelihood diversification in their training programs, their hus-
ence within the household, with their husband making most deci- bands still lacked this knowledge and continued to serve as an
sions without consulting them. There were also frequent obstacle to their business expansion. YARI hoped that this combi-
references to domestic violence. These discussions also indicated nation of activities could generate greater participation by women
that knowledge of the new constitution and the rights and respon- in decision-making processes across multiple levels. For this rea-
sibilities conferred to citizens is limited. While participants cited son, the survey was designed to capture multiple dimensions of
the constitution as bringing positive change in areas such as ‘‘gen- empowerment at both the household and community level.
der equality” and ‘‘peace,” very few details were known about
what specific provisions the constitution provides to accomplish
these goals. When particulars were given, they were often based 4. Research design and survey instrument
upon misinformation. Several focus groups cited female genital
mutilation, which is not actually referenced anywhere in the con- This study examines a pilot of the Governance Program
stitution. Awareness of specific governance structures and political described above using a quasi-experimental approach. YARI
opportunities available to women was very low across all focus selected eight of its beneficiary communities (villages where the
groups. women’s financial empowerment program had already been
Finally, within the focus groups that included beneficiaries of offered), and assigned four to the treatment group (where the
YARI’s prior business training program, women identified a lack intervention would be implemented) and four to a control group
of understanding from their spouses as a barrier to developing (where only the surveys would be conducted). It is important to
their businesses. They explicitly requested that a training program note that the control communities had also been selected for even-
be provided to the men, to help them see the need for livelihood tual implementation of the program, but YARI delayed implemen-
diversification and for women’s role in drought preparedness. tation there until after the pilot period in order to allow a direct
comparison between a treatment and control group for the pur-
3.3. Intervention: The Governance Program pose of program evaluation.
Selection of the eight communities was not random, but rather
The Governance Program involved a mix of interventions (see selected to represent the range of beneficiary communities served
Table 1) that YARI believed would, in combination, empower by YARI. Selection also avoided the communities previously visited
women to participate in community decision-making, both in gen- for focus group discussions, so as to avoid related bias in the survey
eral and with respect to drought preparedness specifically. It aimed responses. Assignment to treatment and control groups was simi-
to do so both by creating new community level spaces for larly conducted in a way that attempted to balance the two groups
decision-making (through the introduction of CC’s development based on size and general location within Marsabit County. First,
committees) and by increasing the resources (in this case, available villages were paired according to similar size and location, and
then one village from each pair was randomly selected to receive
the treatment while the other was assigned to the control group.
One of the control villages was unfortunately dropped from the
Table 1
Components of the governance program intervention.
study because logistical complications made it impossible for YARI
to access the community during the time when baseline surveys
Component of the Intervention Who was invited to participate?
were conducted in the other seven locations. Like the other control
Civic education workshop All community members, with a villages, the program was eventually implemented there, but it
requirement that women be included was not possible to collect data there at the time of this pilot
Leadership & communication Women only
training
evaluation.
Introduction of new community All community members, with a In all seven remaining locations, YARI conducted a baseline sur-
development councils requirement that women be included vey in May 2014 and included 264 women spread across the treat-
Workshop on gender and Men only (husbands of prior women ment and control communities. Enumerators were instructed to
drought preparedness business trainees)
select women for the survey such that there was a balance
T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130 119

between the number of women who had and had not participated ties. However, 35 women (representing 13.4% of the initial
in previous YARI programming. Those who were not prior YARI sample) could not be located for the follow-up survey, and these
participants were to be selected such that they would be eligible participants were dropped from the final database used for analysis.
for YARI programs (i.e., they were of a similar poverty level). After A balance test confirms that they do not differ from other women in
the implementation of the intervention, YARI conducted a follow- the survey with respect to the outcome variables being measured
up survey in January 2015, which was intended to include the here, but they were less likely to be prior YARI participants and
same individuals from the baseline survey. more likely to belong to certain tribes (see Appendix B). The final
This pilot period represents a window of only about six months. database included observations on 226 women at two points in
Given the entrenched nature of traditional gender roles and the time (before and after the intervention). This included 106 women
newness of the community councils, this may be insufficient time spread across 3 communities in the control group, and 120 women
to witness any long-term changes in the communities that could spread across 4 communities in the treatment group.
come about as the CC process is in place for a longer period of time. The treatment and control groups were not perfectly balanced
Thus, the study may under-estimate potential impacts of the prior to introduction of the program. They differed with respect
Governance Program activities. to tribe/ethnicity, as well as a few of the outcomes of interest.
The word empowerment is often used but rarely clearly Respondents in the control group were more likely at baseline to
defined, and as such has been criticized for becoming a meaning- have engaged in household level action to prepare for an emer-
less buzzword (Balitwala, 2010; Parpart et al., 2002; Rowlands, gency, and they were more likely to think that local leaders pay
1998). I adopt Naila Kabeer’s framework for breaking down the attention to what people like them think before deciding. Because
unobservable process of empowerment into measurable moments, the treatment group began at a disadvantage to the control group
including ‘‘resources (pre-conditions)”, ‘‘agency” (processes of prior to the intervention, the intervention had the potential to nar-
decision-making) and ‘‘achievements (outcomes)” (1999). In this row the gap by increasing outcomes in the treatment group.
study, I adopt these categories for use in analysis, operationalizing
Kabeer’s resources as survey questions related to knowledge and
5. Analytic methods
social capital (resources), participation in decision-making pro-
cesses (agency), and actual actions taken to prepare for emergen-
Given the imperfect balance prior to intervention, the
cies such as severe drought (achievements).
difference-in-differences approach, combined with matching, is
I operationalize Kabeer’s ‘‘resources” with questions measuring
the appropriate analytical choice. The difference-in-differences
political knowledge and social capital.2 The survey included a short
models do not assume that the treatment and control groups begin
political quiz, meant to gauge information gained through the civic
at the same level, only that trends over time would be similar. The
education component of the intervention. With respect to social cap-
matching estimation addresses imbalance between the two groups
ital, the survey included a series of questions regarding trust in var-
by directly comparing the treatment and control observations that
ious groups and institutions at each level of governance. Trust is an
are most similar to each other on observable characteristics. Con-
appropriate aggregate measure of social capital, because social cap-
struction of indices related to empowerment may obscure differen-
ital, when effectively used, results in trust among individuals
tial effects of programmatic interventions on distinct dimensions
(Dasgupta, 2011; Morrone et al., 2009).
of empowerment (Malhotra & Schuler, 2005). For this reason, I
‘‘Agency” is measured through a series of questions about actual
retained distinct, outcome variables and conducted analysis on
participation in decision-making processes both within the house-
each one individually, rather than aggregating them to a single
hold and in formal community level or governmental decision-
indicator of, for example, household decision-making.
making structures. Finally, Kabeer’s ‘‘achievements” are repre-
sented by a series of questions about whether or not the respon-
dent had taken any action to ‘‘better prepare for emergency or 5.1. Difference-in-differences regressions
improve their quality of life” either in the household, in the com-
munity or through the government. (See Appendix A for full text The difference-in-differences analysis compares only the
of survey questions used in the analyses.) change in outcomes between the treatment and control group,
The survey aimed to account for potential spillover effects rather than absolute measures in the post-treatment period. Sim-
across dimensions of empowerment and levels of decision- ply comparing a treatment and control group is problematic
making. Thus for each dimension of empowerment, the survey because differences between them may predate the intervention
tried to measure outcomes at both the household and community in question. Similarly, comparisons of the treatment group alone,
level. Local enumerators, contracted directly by the NGO, adminis- before and after the intervention, is problematic because other
tered the survey. The enumerators were selected on the basis of changes may have occurred in the region over the same period
fluency in the mother tongue of the respondents and familiarity and could actually be driving the results.
with the survey region. Enumerators were not from the same com- The latter is a particular concern here, where drought prepared-
munities that they surveyed but were local to the Marsabit region. ness activities can be expected to vary seasonally with the per-
The NGO did not conduct formal pre-testing or back translation, ceived likelihood of drought, and where other related political
but they vetted all surveys with their local staff, many of whom changes (such as those driven by the implementation of the new
come from the study region. constitution or by YARI’s previously implemented business train-
The pre- and post-intervention surveys asked the same ques- ing programs) could be driving changes across the region over
tions of the same women in the treatment and control communi- time. The difference-in-differences methodology avoids both of
these problems by explicitly controlling for both initial differences
between the two groups and for trend effects that apply to both
2
The survey also included questions about material and financial resources. groups. However, this approach assumes that any changes in out-
However, the short time horizon of this study and the lack of certainty on the part of comes over time would have followed the same trend in the two
women in reporting income and assets raised questions about the validity of this data, groups in absence of the intervention (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
and so these questions were not included in the analysis presented in this paper.
Similarly, I excluded a question about the respondent’s age from these analyses,
Each hypothesized category of effects (resources, agency, and
because women in the region rarely have formal birth certificates and so self- achievements) was regressed on a binary variable indicating
reporting of age was inconsistent and unreliable. whether the observation was from the treatment or control group,
120 T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

another binary variable indicating whether the observation was Next, I created differenced versions of each outcome variable by
from before or after the intervention, and an interaction term subtracting each individual’s baseline response from her endline
between the two. This interaction term is the estimated effect of response to that same survey question. This maintains the advan-
the intervention because it is the combined effect of being in the tage discussed above that treatment and control groups need not
treatment group and being surveyed after the intervention be identical at the outset. Finally, I used nearest neighbor matching
occurred (Puhani, 2012). (teffects nnmatch in Stata) to calculate the treatment effect for each
The equation below describes the linear version of the model outcome variable. I used the Mahalanobis distance specification to
used throughout the difference-in-differences regressions. The match treatment and control observations based on prior YARI par-
term Dv represents the treatment. It is a binary indicator that takes ticipation, tribe, literacy, and membership in existing community
on the value of 1 if the observation belongs to the treatment group groups.
and takes on the value of 0 if it belongs to the control group. The While matching represents an improvement on the basic
term T t represents the post-treatment period. It takes on the value difference-in-differences model in that it corrects for the initial
of 1 if the observation was recorded after the intervention had imbalance between the treatment and control groups, we should
already taken place (the post-treatment period), and it takes on be cautious in assuming that it will yield more accurate treatment
the value of 0 for observations recorded prior to the intervention effect estimates. The survey being used here was designed with a
(the pre-treatment period). The interaction term, Dv  T t takes on difference-in-differences estimation in mind, and thus it did not
the value of 1 only for observations from the treatment group in include many control variables. I can only match on the few
the post-treatment period. The coefficient d therefore represents observable covariates measured by the survey. Without a strong
the actual effect of the treatment: the difference-in-differences theoretical basis for the selection of those variables, matching
between the change in the treatment group and the change in introduces additional assumptions about the covariates that are
the control group before and after the intervention occurs. relevant to our outcomes of interest. When an experimental design
exists, even with imperfect randomization, matching is best used
Y iv t ¼ a þ bDv þ cT t þ dðDv  T t Þ þ eiv t
in conjunction with the design, rather than in place of it, and the
Because the research design hinges on comparing the same peo- intent-to-treat analysis should always be given priority (Sekhon,
ple before and after the intervention, each regression includes only 2009). Thus, the matching estimates provided here are still based
those women for whom there were observations for the outcome on differenced outcome variables and a comparison between those
in question in both the pre- and post- intervention period. Regres- assigned to treatment and those assigned to control. I present both
sions make use of robust standard errors, clustered by village. No the basic difference-in-differences models as well as matching esti-
additional control variables are included. The regressions used in mates of the differenced outcome variables for comparison.
this analysis included a mix of linear, logit and ordered logit mod-
els, depending on whether the outcome in question was continu-
ous, binary or categorical. 6. Results
The difference-in-differences regressions follow an intent-to-
treat analysis, meaning that the treatment group includes those Complete regression models and matching estimations for each
who did not in fact participate directly in the program. Intent-to- set of outcomes are included in the appendices. In Table 2 below, I
treat is the preferred approach for three reasons. First, if very few report a summary of the results from these analyses. While some
people select into a program then it may be inadvisable from a pol- of the analyses took the form of logit or ordered logit models (if
icy standpoint even if the few people who participated did benefit. the outcome variable was binary or categorical, respectively), what
Second, although program effects are likely to be greatest on those I report in Table 2 under the heading ‘‘Difference-in-Differences” is
who participated directly in its activities, it is possible for the pres- the raw difference between the change in the treatment and con-
ence of the program to have spillover effects for others in the com- trol groups. In the case of a linear model, this would be equivalent
munity, particularly where community level decision-making may to the coefficient on the interaction term (Treatment x Endline). I
be affected. Finally, comparing the entire control group only to also report the p-value from the actual model, which indicates
those who participate in the program would produce biased esti- whether the difference between the treatment and control group
mates, and I cannot identify the exact people in the control group was statistically significant. Under the heading ‘‘Mahalanobis Dis-
who counterfactually would have participated given the opportu- tance Matching”, I report the average treatment effect as estimated
nity. However, I can use matching techniques to identify the by the matching procedure, as well as the associated p-value. Also
women in the control group who are most similar to those in the included in Table 2 are the raw differences between the pre- and
treatment group, based on observable characteristics. post-treatment periods for both the control and treatment groups.
This helps to clarify whether the outcome actually increased in the
5.2. Mahalanobis distance matching treatment group, or whether it merely decreased by less than it did
in the control group (which would also result in a positive coeffi-
While true randomization should eliminate the need for control cient in these models).
variables (Mutz, 2011), this research design was only quasi- Results indicate that the Governance Program had a positive
experimental in nature, and there was imbalance between the effect on political knowledge. Scores on the political quiz went up
treatment and control groups on at least one important covariate in both the treatment and control groups, as might be expected since
(tribe). To address this, I use Mahalanobis distance matching to the pre- and post- surveys used the same quiz questions. However,
compare treatment observations with their closest matches in the scores increased by more in the treatment group. Respondents
the control group. I first reshaped the data to wide format. In in the treatment group were also more likely to be able to name
contrast with using a panel dataset (as with the basic difference- female leaders in the region. These effects were statistically signifi-
in-differences models described above), the new, wide version of cant under both analysis types, but not very large in magnitude.
the dataset included only one observation for each individual With respect to social capital, average reported trust in one’s
woman. This means that the sample size is smaller in the match- spouse increased across the whole sample during this period, but
ing specifications than in the basic difference-in-differences by more in the treatment group. This effect appears significant in
regressions, which may result in lower statistical significance for the basic difference-in-differences model but is not robust to the
the same estimated effect size. matching estimation. Trust in the community leader also increased
T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130 121

Table 2
Summary of results.

Estimated treatment effects Raw differences


Outcome variables Difference-in-differences Mahalanobis distance D Control D Treatment
matching
Resources ATE p-value ATE p-value
Political Knowledge
Score on political quiz 0.37*** 0.000 0.44* 0.035 0.25 0.62
Awareness of female leaders 0.19* 0.012 0.17* 0.033 0.09 0.1
Social Capital
Trust: spouse 0.10** 0.001 0.05 0.656 0.08 0.18
Trust: community leader 0.41* 0.011 0.36+ 0.073 0.65 0.24
Trust: county government 0.12 0.830 0.22 0.260 1.05 0.92
Agency
Household Decision Making
Who decides: household items 0.18 0.652 0.37** 0.007 0.13 0.05
Who decides: food purchases 0.14 0.109 0.20 0.108 0.2 0.06
Who decides: school fees 0.05 0.863 0.11 0.841 0.04 0.09
Who decides: livestock 0.01 0.469 0.02 0.856 0.03 0.03
Community Decision-Making
Attended meetings 0.37*** 0.000 0.28** 0.002 0.02 0.35
Spoke at a meeting 0.012 0.447 0.01 0.797 0.029 0.017
Level of attention leaders pay 0.24* 0.031 0.44 0.300 0.13 0.37
Achievements: Actions Taken
Household level action 0.28*** 0.000 0.34*** 0.000 0.18 0.46
Community level action 0.06 0.346 0.10 0.243 0.10 0.16
Political action 0.02 0.971 0.14 0.529 0.02 0.00
+
p < 0.1.
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.

across the sample, but it increased by less in the treatment group. taken action at the household level, a follow-up question asked
Both analyses corroborate this effect. This could indicate that them to identify what that action was. The vast majority of respon-
regional trends (such as implementation of the new county gov- dents replied that the household action took the form of livestock
ernment system) had a bolstering effect on trust of leaders, but sales to diversify income.
the Governance Program had a countervailing effect, decreasing Table 3 below summarizes the results of the study. Italics indi-
trust relative to what it would have been. cates limited confidence in the results, due either to low statistical
In general, results with respect to community decision-making significance or a lack of robustness to both analysis types. The most
were mixed. Women were more likely to attend community robust findings are identified in boldface type.
decision-making meetings because of the treatment, but they were
not likely to speak at those meetings, and (at least according to the
difference-in-differences analysis) they were less likely to feel that 7. Limitations
local leaders pay attention to what they think. While there was
increased access to community level decision-making spaces in These data suffer from several limitations, which should be
terms of physical presence, women did not report that access taken into account when interpreting the results of the study.
translated into meaningful participation. The limitations fall into three general categories: (i) potential
Regarding household decision-making, there were no statisti- sources of bias, (ii) the likelihood of producing false negatives
cally significant effects under the basic difference-in-differences due to low sample size and short time horizon, and (iii) limited
models. According to the matching estimation, one category (out external validity beyond the unique setting of northern Kenya’s
of six) household decisions appears to have been affected. When pastoralist communities.
tribe and prior participation in NGO programming and community
activities are held constant, women seem to have more influence
over the purchasing of household items after participating in the
program. Table 3
Summary of treatment effects.
Finally, with respect to actual actions taken to improve quality
of life and better prepare for emergencies such as drought, women Aspects of Household Level Community Level
in both the treatment and control groups were more likely in the empowerment (Kabeer,
1999)
post-intervention period to report that they had engaged in such
actions at the household level. This likely reflects an important Resources Increased political Decreased trust in
knowledge (+) leader ()
time trend across the whole region as seasonal drought becomes
Increased trust in spouse (+)
more likely. However, this shift was much larger within the treat- Agency Increased influence over Increased meeting
ment group. Under both sets of analyses, this result was statisti- household purchases (+) attendance (+)
cally significant at an alpha level of 0.001. Decreased perceived
There was no such effect with respect to collective action taken influence ()
Achievements Increased household No significant effect
at the community level nor with respect to action taken through
action (+)
formal political structures. When women reported that they had
122 T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

7.1. Potential sources of bias tical power in this study). I thus cannot make any definitive claims
about outcomes for which there was no statistically significant
Attrition of survey respondents poses one potential source of effect detected, other than that, if an effect exists, it must be small
bias. Though attrition was not particularly high in this study in magnitude relative to the larger effects on household level
(13%), this could create bias if attrition is correlated with our out- action and meeting attendance. Thus, in the discussion section that
comes of interest in some way. Attrition is evenly split across the follows, I focus on the results for which there was high statistical
treatment and control groups, and those who left the survey did significance (and for which, by definition, there was sufficient sta-
not differ on any of the key outcome variables (see Appendix B). tistical power to detect an effect).
They were, however, more likely to belong to a particular tribe The positive effects that I detect on household level action,
and less likely to have participated in YARI’s prior business training political knowledge, awareness of female leaders, and meeting
programs. This could be a concern if there is reason to believe that attendance are all supported by the power calculations (see
the effects of the program should be heterogeneous with respect to Appendix H). An evaluation of positive predictive value does cast
tribe or prior YARI participation. Due to low statistical power, some doubt on the two negative effects with respect to trust in
heterogeneity with respect to demographic characteristics is the community leader and the level of attention that leaders pay,
beyond the scope of the present study. In terms of estimating the but we can interpret these negative, low-powered results to mean
overall effects of the NGO program, the matching procedure helps that there was at least no real positive effect on these community
to alleviate some of this concern. Still, heterogeneous treatment level outcomes.
effects could be an interesting avenue for future research.
Social desirability bias could also pose a concern, as a respon-
7.3. External validity
dent’s desire to appear in a favorable light to the interviewer
may influence self-reported survey data. While this is a concern
The uniqueness of this context raises concerns about the exter-
with any self-reported data, it could be exacerbated here by the
nal validity of the findings. We should not expect this intervention
fact that survey enumerators were employed by the local NGO. It
to produce the same results anywhere but in similar pastoralist
is possible that respondents try to say what they think the NGO
contexts. However, since a particular characteristic of this context
wants to hear. The fact that the NGO had already worked previ-
is stark gender inequality, any positive effects observed in this con-
ously in all of these communities may mitigate these concerns
text are that much more encouraging and bode well for the poten-
slightly in the sense that a desire to please the NGO would have
tial success of similar programs in other highly patriarchal contexts
been present at both baseline and endline and in both treatment
where such programming is most in need. Additional research in
and control groups. Arguably, the social desirability bias could be
other settings is necessary to draw any truly generalizable conclu-
expected to be stronger with respect to the community level vari-
sions. Relatedly, the short time frame of the study raises questions
ables (the main stated focus of the intervention) than with respect
as to whether the observed, positive effects can be expected to last
to the household level action (where we observe the strongest
beyond the endline survey. A follow-up survey in these same vil-
effects).
lages could help to evaluate the sustainability of the effects.
Another potential limitation of the study is that, as noted above,
Because the NGO planned to implement the intervention in the
the difference-in-differences analysis assumes that the treatment
control communities following finalization of the endline survey,
and control groups would have followed a similar trend over time
this future analysis would have to be purely observational in
in absence of the intervention. Since I do not have access to survey
nature.
data on these same communities from the period prior to the base-
line survey, I cannot provide any hard evidence to support the par-
allel trends assumption. It is possible that the treatment and 8. Discussion
control groups were already on different paths prior to the inter-
vention. However, the paired randomization process used to assign The intervention had unimpressive effects on community level
villages to the treatment and control groups should make this very processes. While women’s presence at community decision-
unlikely, because it mitigates the risk of a selection bias related to making processes increased, as did their political knowledge, they
that trend. In addition, given the short time frame and the patriar- were not more likely to speak or feel that others listened to them.
chal setting, one would not expect to see a major trend in the direc- There was increased political awareness but no corresponding
tion of women’s empowerment in any of these villages absent measurable success at garnering political action.
some kind of intervention or highly visible event. However, at the household level, women reported an increase
in drought-preparedness activities. The magnitude of the effect
7.2. Likelihood of false negatives on household level action was quite large. The proportion of
women reporting household level action increased across the
I cannot place much confidence in the null results presented in study area, likely indicating a trend related to seasonal drought.
the study. First, the data were collected over a relatively short However, these actions increased by only 18 percentage points in
time-frame. Only six months elapsed between the baseline and the control group compared with an increase of 46 percentage
endline surveys, which is likely insufficient to create large behav- points in the treatment group. Prior to the intervention, only
ioral changes with respect to women’s empowerment, particularly around 5% of women in the treatment group reported having
in a highly patriarchal setting. In addition, the study uses a rela- engaged in direct action at the household level. After the interven-
tively small sample size (n = 226 women across 7 villages), which tion, more than 50% of those same women reported household
can result in low statistical power for certain outcomes, especially level actions, mostly in the form of pre-emptive livestock sales
if the true effect size is relatively small – which one may expect to (see Fig. 1).
be the case due to the short time horizon. Why was the program successful at generating household level
In combination, these two factors (short time frame and low action while its results at the community level were relatively dis-
statistical power) mean that the failure to detect a statistically sig- appointing? There are a few potential explanations for this. These
nificant effect should not be taken as proof that none exists, explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather
because real effects that are small in magnitude would be unde- could all be true to varying degrees. Results could be attributable
tected by this study. (See Appendix H for a full discussion of statis- to (i) the limited ability to detect small effect sizes, (ii) difficulties
T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130 123

Partitioning the dataset by prior YARI participation (Appendix I)


shows that the effect is stronger among those who had participated
in the previous programming, exhibited by both a larger coefficient
and greater statistical significance on the interaction term, which
represents effects of the program.
While I do not believe that the outcome is wholly attributable
to the men’s workshop alone, it was almost certainly an important
driver of these results. It is remarkable that such a short interven-
tion (the men’s workshop lasted less than one day) could have any
measurable impact, given the constraints and limitations of the
study. This could perhaps be credited to the framing of the work-
shop. Simply describing a program in a particular way (framing)
can affect people’s reactions to it (Chong & Druckman, 2007). The
men’s workshop focused on the benefits for the household as a
whole (and for men themselves) that could come from allowing
women to engage in alternate income-generation activities. In
other words, it offered an instrumental rationale for women’s
empowerment, framing empowerment as a positive-sum game
Fig. 1. Proportion of women reporting household level action.
from which both men and women would benefit.
Previous scholars have noted that empowerment need not be a
zero-sum game, but rather, it may be possible to increase the
associated with instigating successful community level action, and power of a marginalized group without a corresponding decrease
(iii) aspects of the Governance Program that were particularly in abilities of others (Knack, 2005; Pritchett & Kapoor, 2009).
associated with household level action. Indeed, at the macro level, a review of the literature shows that
First, as discussed in the Limitations section above, it is possible increasing women’s access to economic resources has been associ-
that there were some additional effects at the community level but ated with an increase in the total size of the pie (Kabeer & Natali,
that these effects were not large enough to detect given the statis- 2013; WDR, 2012). Reducing gender inequalities with respect to
tical power of the study. Negative coefficients observed with education and labor market participation is positively associated
respect to some community level outcomes at least imply that pos- with economic growth (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2009;
itive effects are unlikely to have taken place. If community level Klasen, 2002; Seguino, 2000). The same is also true at the house-
impacts occurred but were simply too small to be detected, this hold level, where equitable intra-household resource distribution
still begs the question of what is driving the difference in magni- is associated with an improved economic situation for the house-
tude between the household and community level outcomes. hold as a unit (Duflo, 2003; Haddad, Hoddinott, & Alderman,
Second, it may be that community level action is simply more 1997; Udry, 1996). While there are certainly important normative
difficult to achieve in this setting. Perhaps men are less willing to arguments for women’s empowerment, it is these instrumental
accept women’s input in the more public community meetings arguments that have been most successful at the level of policy-
than within private spaces. While women do not claim to have makers and development agencies (Jackson, 1996; Kabeer, 2008;
direct decision-making power over most household decisions, they Pearson, 2005; Razavi, 1997). Thus, using it as a strategy at the
may have succeeded in persuading their husbands that income grassroots level, while engaging with local status quo decision
diversification is important. This would be consistent with the makers, seems a logical approach.
observation of increased trust among spouses. It would also echo It is important to note that the men’s workshop was included in
previous research that suggests, despite a lack of highly visible for- the intervention at the direct request of women who had partici-
mal authority, female pastoralists have more indirect power and pated in prior YARI programs. Thus, even if the men’s workshop
influence than scholars generally give them credit for (Hodgson, had been fully responsible for the increase in drought-
2000). preparedness activities, we should not necessarily interpret this
Perhaps increased political awareness and access to decision- as disconnected from women’s agency. Women did in fact exercise
making spaces did empower women, but they chose to exercise agency in identifying the need to persuade men in the first place
their influence in a different arena (the household) and through and in requesting that the NGO provide specific training to their
more subtle forms of persuasion. Results seem to suggest that husbands.
women participated in community level decision-making fora, In conclusion, this paper has examined an NGO intervention in
but failed to have an impact. Even the relatively powerful within northern Kenya, aimed at enhancing drought resilience among
these communities are marginalized relative to the broader Ken- pastoralist communities through an increase in women’s
yan political landscape. Increasing women’s access to decision- decision-making power. It successfully increased drought pre-
making within a community cannot be expected to result in signif- paredness activities at the household level, but had limited impact
icant change if the community itself lacks resources to make such at the community level. The focus of decision-making under
changes. Women may have then turned their attention to the consideration (adaptation strategies to mitigate the vulnerability
household level, where they could have more influence. of pastoralism) was closely related to deeply entrenched tradi-
Finally, aspects of the program that directly targeted household tional gender roles around livestock. Given the perceived difficulty
level action could have driven the effect. A likely candidate is the of changing such deep-rooted cultural norms, the results are
men’s workshop, which was added to the intervention at the encouraging.
request of YARI’s prior beneficiaries. Even after the intervention Additional research is necessary, both in alternate settings and in
women still report that men have final say over decisions related these same villages over a longer time horizon, before we can draw
to the sale of livestock, and the men’s workshop explicitly focused any truly generalizable lessons. Positive household level effects in
on the notion of livelihood diversification. The men’s workshop this case may be attributable to some combination of the following:
was directed specifically at the spouses of women who had (i) a positive-sum approach to empowerment, which directly
previously participated in YARI’s business training programs. engages status quo decision-makers and appeals to their self-
124 T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

interest, (ii) program design that incorporates the direct implementation of the study that I would be free to publish the
recommendations of the intended beneficiaries, and/or (iii) consid- results of that evaluation for an academic audience, with the stip-
eration of both formal and informal avenues for influencing ulation that the NGO would have the right to choose to remain
outcomes. anonymous, which it has exercised. At the time of writing this
manuscript, I had no financial relationship with the NGO.

Conflict of interest statement Acknowledgements

I hereby certify that I have no direct affiliation with or involve- I wish to thank staff members at YARI (who remain anonymous
ment in any organization or entity with any financial interest in at the request of the NGO) for sharing data, field assistance and key
the subject matter or materials discussed in the manuscript information about the implementation of the intervention. I also
‘‘Women’s Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: thank K.P. Andersson, W.C. Clark, A. Fung, R. Sheely, M. Goldman,
Quasi-experimental Evidence from Northern Kenya.” I was hired Y. Gonzalez, S.A. Guagliardo, T. McCabe, T. Mize, and M. Scudder
as a short-term independent consultant by the NGO referenced for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript. YARI’s
in the manuscript to advise them on the design of the intervention intervention and evaluation was funded by the Department for
and the evaluation plan, prior to implementation of the study. The International Development (DFID). My own fieldwork was funded
NGO receives no direct financial gain related to the results of the in part by the United States Department of Education’s Foreign
evaluation, though it is possible that results could indirectly affect Language and Area Studies Fellowship, as well as by the Sustain-
their future funding opportunities. We agreed in writing prior to ability Science Program at Harvard University.

Appendix A. Full text of survey questions used as outcome variables in analysis

Resources
Political Knowledge
 True or False: The Constitution states that at least one-third of the County Executive members must be women
 True or False: The Constitution forbids female genital mutilation
 Which level of government is responsible for Police services? County or National
 Which level of government is responsible for Pre-Primary Education? County or National
 Which branch of government is responsible for drafting new laws? County Assembly OR County Executive
 What is the Uwezo Fund?
 Are you aware of any female political leaders in this region? Yes No
 Please name them
Social Capital: Trust
How much trust do you place in each of the following? A lot of trust – Some trust – A little trust – No trust
 Spouse
 Community Leader
 County Government

Agency (Access to Decision-Making Spaces)


Decision-making Power in the Household
In your household, who has the final say with respect to:
 Buying Food?
 Children’s Medical Expenses?
 Sending the children to school?
 Paying children’s School Fees?
 Purchasing Livestock?
 Purchasing Household Items?
[Responses re-coded as follows: 1 = Men Only 2 = Men and Women Together 3 = Women Only]
Decision-making Power in the Community
 Have you ever attended a session where villagers gather to make a decision?
 Have you ever spoken at this meeting?
 How much attention do you feel local leaders pay to what people like you think before deciding what to do?

Observable Actions
Actions Taken at the Household Level
 In the past year, have you taken any actions in your own household in order to better prepare your family for emergencies or to improve your quality of life? Yes No
I Don’t Know

Actions Taken at the Community Level


 In the past year, have you taken any actions together with others in the community in order to better prepare your family for emergencies or to improve your qual-
ity of life? Yes – No – I Don’t Know

Actions Taken at the Political Level


 In the past year, how often have members of this village gotten together and jointly petitioned government officials or political leaders with village development as
their goal?
T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130 125

Appendix B. Balance test comparing survey drop-outs with final study sample

Remained in survey Could not be relocated


Mean sd Mean sd p-value
Treatment Group 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.45
Literacy 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.20
Prior YARI Participation 0.52 0.50 0.34 0.48 0.05⁄
Member of Group/Committee 0.29 0.45 0.21 0.42 0.39
Tribe1: Rendille 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.89
Tribe2: Samburu 0.43 0.50 0.69 0.47 0.00⁄⁄
Tribe3: Gabra 0.46 0.50 0.20 0.41 0.00⁄⁄
Score on Political Quiz 0.64 0.93 0.66 0.73 0.90
Household Action 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.41 0.38
Community Action 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.41 0.22
HH Decision: Food 1.65 0.90 1.51 0.85 0.40
HH Decision: School Fees 1.42 0.81 1.41 0.80 0.91
HH Decision: Livestock 1.42 0.80 1.39 0.80 0.84
Community Decision: Attended Meetings 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.47 0.55
Community Decision: Leaders Pay Attn 2.85 0.96 2.97 1.14 0.51
Total Observations 226 35
⁄ ⁄⁄
p < 0.05, p < 0.01.

Appendix C. Balance test comparing treatment and control group at baseline


Control Treatment
Mean sd Mean sd p-value
Literacy 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.83
Prior YARI Participation 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.53
Member of Group/Committee 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.47 0.22
Tribe1: Rendille 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.25 0.04⁄
Tribe2: Samburu 0.58 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.00⁄⁄⁄
Tribe3: Gabra 0.27 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.00⁄⁄⁄
Score on Political Quiz 0.70 1.03 0.58 0.83 0.36
Household Action 0.22 0.42 0.05 0.26 0.00⁄⁄⁄
Community Action 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.35 0.81
HH Decision: Food 1.63 0.90 1.67 0.91 0.74
HH Decision: School Fees 1.32 0.72 1.51 0.86 0.12
HH Decision: Livestock 1.29 0.68 1.57 0.90 0.03⁄
Community Decision: Attended Meetings 0.25 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.73
Community Decision: Leaders Pay Attn 3.23 1.14 2.67 0.72 0.00⁄⁄⁄
Total Observations 106 120
⁄ ⁄⁄⁄
p < 0.05, p < 0.001.

Appendix D. Resources – political knowledge and trust

Difference-in-differences regression results

Score on Awareness of female Trust in One’s Trust in the Trust in the County
Political Quiz political leaders Spouse Community leader government
Treatment 0.180 0.329 0.167 1.168⁄⁄⁄ 0.0268
(0.170) (0.804) (0.250) (0.339) (0.214)
Endline 0.301⁄⁄ 0.355 0.373 1.504⁄⁄⁄ 2.243⁄⁄⁄
(0.0327) (0.207) (0.415) (0.349) (0.518)
TreatmentEndline 0.420⁄⁄⁄ 0.769⁄ 1.691⁄⁄⁄ 0.935⁄ 0.136
(0.0942) (0.305) (0.511) (0.368) (0.634)
Constant 0.359⁄⁄⁄ 0.414
(0.0864) (0.692)
Constant 3.691⁄⁄⁄ 1.363⁄⁄ 0.712⁄⁄⁄
(0.213) (0.441) (0.102)
Model type Poisson Logit Ologit Ologit Ologit

Observations 452 444 382 448 444


Standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.
126 T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

Mahalanobis distance matching – treatment effect estimation

Score on Political Awareness of female Trust in One’s Trust in the Trust in the County
Quiz political leaders Spouse Community leader government
ATE
Treatment 0.437⁄ 0.166⁄ 0.0518 0.363+ 0.220
(0.207) (0.0781) (0.116) (0.203) (0.195)

Observations 224 221 190 222 220


Standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⁄p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.

Appendix E. Agency – household decision-making power

Difference-in-differences regression results

Who has the final say in decisions regarding:


Food Purchases Medical Spending School Fees Livestock Household Items Sending Kids to School
Treatment 0.0890 0.730⁄ 0.545⁄ 0.796⁄⁄⁄ 0.798⁄ 0.416⁄
(0.240) (0.299) (0.268) (0.239) (0.388) (0.210)

Endline 0.554⁄⁄⁄ 0.141 0.223 0.244⁄⁄ 0.265 0.370


(0.117) (0.315) (0.177) (0.0865) (0.716) (0.230)

TreatmentEndline 0.373 0.388 0.0470 0.137 0.374 0.277


(0.233) (0.422) (0.273) (0.189) (0.829) (0.370)
Constant 0.658⁄⁄ 1.365⁄⁄⁄ 1.583⁄⁄⁄ 1.662⁄⁄⁄ 1.269⁄⁄⁄ 0.372⁄⁄⁄
(0.226) (0.301) (0.156) (0.0742) (0.346) (0.0562)

Model type Ologit Ologit Ologit Ologit Ologit Ologit

Observations 450 424 384 306 444 406


Standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.

Mahalanobis distance matching – treatment effect estimation

Who has the final say in decisions regarding:


Food Purchases Medical Spending School Fees Livestock Household Items Sending Kids to School
ATE
Treatment 0.202 0.0750 0.0214 0.0218 0.372⁄⁄ 0.0236
(0.126) (0.110) (0.106) (0.120) (0.139) (0.160)

Observations 223 210 191 152 220 201


Standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⁄p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.

Appendix F. Agency – community decision-making

Difference-in-differences regression results

Attended village decision- Spoken at village decision- Level of attention local leaders pay to
making meeting making meeting people’s opinions
Treatment 0.104 0.566 0.746⁄
(0.362) (0.514) (0.324)
Endline 0.102 0.319⁄⁄⁄ 0.166
(0.250) (0.0827) (0.105)
T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130 127

Appendix F (continued)

Attended village decision- Spoken at village decision- Level of attention local leaders pay to
making meeting making meeting people’s opinions
TreatmentEndline 1.582⁄⁄⁄ 0.189 0.611⁄
(0.303) (0.248) (0.283)

Constant 1.074⁄⁄⁄ 2.367⁄⁄⁄


(0.288) (0.487)

Constant 2.666⁄⁄⁄
(0.328)
Model type Logit Logit Ologit

Observations 452 450 334


Standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.

Mahalanobis distance matching – treatment effect estimation

Attended village decision-making Spoken at village decision-making Level of attention local leaders pay to
meeting meeting people’s opinions
ATE
Treatment 0.279⁄⁄ 0.0147 0.437
(0.0890) (0.0571) (0.421)

Observations 224 223 167


Standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⁄p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.

Appendix G. Achievements – actions taken to prepare for emergency

Difference-in-differences regression results

Action taken in Household Action taken with Community Political Action Taken

Treatment 1.670 0.118 0.0878
(0.711) (0.711) (0.598)
Endline 0.864⁄⁄⁄ 0.656⁄ 0.0174
(0.219) (0.259) (0.366)
TreatmentEndline 2.100⁄⁄⁄ 0.423 0.0174
(0.504) (0.449) (0.477)
Constant 1.253⁄⁄ 2.147⁄⁄⁄ 0.842
(0.451) (0.376) (0.476)

Model type Logit Logit Logit

Observations 394 345 365


Standard errors in parentheses

p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.

Mahalanobis distance matching – treatment effect estimation

Action taken in Household Action taken with Community Political Action Taken
ATE
Treatment 0.338⁄⁄⁄ 0.100 0.141
(0.0718) (0.0857) (0.223)

Observations 196 170 181


Standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⁄p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.
128 T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130

Appendix H. Discussion of statistical power calculations the graph also demonstrates, I have very limited statistical power
to detect effects of less than 0.3 standard deviations.
Statistical power is the probability of detecting an effect if one Low statistical power increases the likelihood of a Type II error
exists, and thus determines the likelihood of Type II errors or false (false negative), but it does not directly affect the Type I error rate,
negatives (Banerjee, Chitnis, Jadhav, Bhawalkar, & Chaudhury, which is by definition, alpha. Thus, the main impact of low statis-
2009; Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013, p. 251). Statistical power tical power on my study is that I cannot assume there is no true
in a cluster-randomized trial is a function of sample size (both total effect with respect to outcomes that failed to produce statistical
n and number of clusters) but also of intra-cluster correlation and significance. With respect to any null effects reported in this paper
effect size. All else equal, power, the ability to detect an effect if it (for example women’s household decision-making power), there is
exists, is lower if the effect size is smaller and if intra-cluster cor- a possibility that the effect does exist, but is small and therefore
relation is higher. As a result, the statistical power of a given sam- undetectable with the given sample size. I thus avoid drawing con-
ple size will vary depending on the outcome variable in question. clusions from non-effects and focus my discussion on the out-
I generated the graph on the next page using Optimal Design comes for which a statistically significant result was observed.
Software (Raudenbush et al., 2011). Holding constant sample size, Low statistical power could also affect the PPV, which is the
number of clusters, and alpha, it shows with what power effects of probability that a statistically significant effect detected in a study
various sizes could be detected, depending on the intra-cluster cor- reflects a true effect. However, PPV is a function not only of power,
relation. When intra-cluster correlation is near to 0.00 (which is but also of the pre-study odds of a non-null effect (which is
the case for several of my outcome variables), then with a power unknowable), and the alpha level at which significance is observed
of 0.80 I could be expected to detect normalized effect sizes of (Button et al., 2013). Of the 7 statistically significant results that I
0.5 or greater. With a power of 0.50, I could detect effect sizes as report in this paper, two are significant at an alpha level of 0.01
small as 0.35. Thus while I cannot rule out that there are effects and two are significant at an even lower alpha level of 0.001.
I have not detected, I can be confident that those effects I may have Assuming a conservative pre-study odds of 0.2 (the example used
missed are relatively small in magnitude. in the Button et al. paper), an alpha level of 0.1 yields a PPV above
Since the literature on this topic lacks empirical data, and the 0.8 with statistical power of 0.5. At an alpha level of 0.001, even an
literature on this particular intervention is non-existent, there is extremely low statistical power of 0.1 yields a PPV above 95%.
no directly comparable prior knowledge I can draw from to esti- Thus, despite low power in some cases, the PPV remains quite
mate the effect sizes for particular outcome variables. In the table high for the majority of my key findings. In particular, the increase
on the next page, I calculated the intra-cluster correlation (ICC) in household level action, meeting attendance, and political knowl-
detected at baseline, as well as the actual standardized effect size edge are very strongly corroborated by the PPV calculations, and to
(the normalized difference in differences, d) detected at endline a lesser extent, the effects on Awareness of Female Leaders and
for each of the key outcome variables previously reported in Table 2 Trust in One’s Spouse are also highly likely to reflect a true effect.
of the main text of this paper. Many of the outcomes for which I The negative effects on trust in the community leader and the
find no statistically significant effect (Trust in County Government, perceived level of attention that leaders pay have the lowest PPVs,
the Household Decision-making variables, and whether the largely due to very high intra-cluster correlation and therefore par-
women reported speaking at a meeting) are characterized by very ticularly low statistical power. Thus, my discussion of the results
low intracluster correlation (<0.05). (The ICC for Community level does not assume that a true negative effect has been observed. How-
and Political Action are both not much higher at 0.06.) ever, the observation of a negative effect demonstrates that there
For relatively large effect sizes (d > 0.7), such as that found with was almost certainly not a positive effect on either of these cate-
respect to attendance at decision-making meetings, this study gories of outcomes, which is consistent with my overall discussion
actually has quite good statistical power (P > 0.08). However, as of the results.
T. Grillos / World Development 108 (2018) 115–130 129

Resources d ICC p Agency d ICC p


Political Knowledge Household Decision-Making
Score on Political Quiz 0.400 0.000 0.006⁄⁄ Food Purchases 0.154 0.000 0.109
Awareness of Female Leaders 0.379 0.243 0.012⁄ School Fees 0.059 0.002 0.863
Social Capital Livestock 0.006 0.019 0.469
Trust in Spouse 0.170 0.000 0.001⁄⁄ Community Decision-Making
Trust in Community Leader 0.479 0.141 0.011⁄ Attended Meetings 0.833 0.018 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Trust in County Government 0.158 0.000 0.830 Spoke at a Meeting 0.037 0.017 0.447
Level of Attention 0.246 0.178 0.031
Achievements: Actions Taken Local Leaders Pay
Household level Action 0.791 0.144 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Community level Action 0.186 0.060 0.346
Political Action 0.018 0.060 0.971
⁄ ⁄⁄ ⁄⁄⁄
p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.

Appendix I. Regression results (Household actions partitioned by prior YARI Participation)

Action taken in household?


(1) (2)
Prior YARI business training participants only No previous participation in YARI programs
⁄⁄
Treatment 2.440 0.800
(0.841) (0.959)
Endline 0.859⁄⁄⁄ 0.968⁄⁄
(0.148) (0.334)
TreatmentEndline 2.473⁄⁄ 1.647
(0.801) (0.896)
Constant 0.818⁄⁄ 1.815⁄⁄
(0.288) (0.586)

Observations 206 188


Standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.05, ⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.

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