Case Brief - Olga Tellis Case (1985)

Submitted by:
Bhoomi Mittal
Ba LL.B(Hons)
2K23LWUN01014

Submitted to:
S.K. Bose Sir
(Legal English)
Case- Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
Case Citation:
Citation -
1986 AIR 180, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 51
Parties Involved -
Petitioner: Olga Tellis & ORS
Respondent: Bombay Municipal Corporation & ORS. ETC

Date Of Judgement:
10/07/1985

Bench:
C.J., Y.V. Chandrachud,
J., A.V. Varadarajan,
J., O. Chinnappa Reddy,
J., S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
J., V.D. Tulzapurkar

Facts:
● The state of Maharashtra and Bombay Municipal Corporation decided to evict the
people residing in slums and pavement dwellers in Bombay in 1981. The then CM of
Maharashtra, Mr A. R. Antulay passed an order to evict and deport the slum dwellers
to their original places.
● The eviction was proceeded under section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation
Act 1888

Section 314 Bombay Municipal Corporation Act

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● On hearing about the CM’s announcement, the slum dwellers decided to file a writ
petition in the Bombay High Court appealing for an order of injunction restraining the
announcement made by the CM.
 ● The Bombay High Court granted an ad interim injunction to be in force until July 21,
1981. Respondents agreed that the huts would not be demolished until October 15,
1981. Contrary to the agreement, on July 23, 1981, petitioners were huddled into State
Transport buses to be deported out of Bombay.
● The petitioner challenged the respondent’s action on the grounds that it is violative of
Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. They also asked for a declaration that Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act 1888 is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution.

Issues Involved:

● Whether the forcible eviction and removal of pavement and slum dwellers from their
hutments under the Bombay Municipal CorporationAct deprive them of their means
of livelihood and consequently right to life ?
● Whether the right to life involves the right to livelihood under Article 21?
● Whether the pavement dwellers are considered trespassers under IPC?
● Whether the forcible eviction of slum dwellers under Article 314 of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act was constitutional?
● Whether estoppel can not be claimed under fundamental rights
● How far is the exclusion of natural justice permissible?

Article 14 - Equality before law

Article 19 - To move freely throughout the territory of India
Article 21 - Right to life and liberty
ad interim - in the meantime
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Arguments:
● Respondent-
 ➢ The defence counsel stated that the sidewalk residents admitted in the High Court that
they did not claim any basic rights to install cabins on public sidewalks and roads and
that they would not stop the demolition of the slums and cabins after the scheduled
date.
● Petitioner-
➢ The council argued that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to means of
subsistence. They claimed that if the applicants were evicted from the slums and
pavements, they would lose their livelihood thus constituting a breach of right to life.
➢ The counsel also argued that the procedure prescribed by section 314 of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act to evict the encroachment is unconstitutional because the
act provides the Municipal Commissioner to eliminate the slum dwellers without any
prior information of elimination and any notice.
● Respondent-
➢ The argument on natural justice questioned who should be given the opportunity for a
fair hearing. Should it be the intruders who encroached on public property or people
who committed crimes?

Courts Observation:
● There can be no depreciation of the Constitution or renunciation of fundamental
rights. That is no one can waive the freedoms granted to them by the Constitution.
Any concession made by an individual, whether due to a legal mistake or otherwise,
stating they don't possess or assert a specific fundamental right, cannot be used
against them in the current or any future proceedings. Implementing such a
concession would contradict the intent of the Constitution.
● The right to life, as outlined in section 21, extends beyond mere legal procedures for
extinguishing life. It encompasses the right to livelihood, vital for sustenance. Without
means of subsistence, life loses its essence and becomes unviable. If livelihood isn't

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integral to the right to life, depriving someone of it would effectively negate their life.
Therefore, depriving a person of their means of subsistence constitutes a deprivation
of life itself. Excluding the right to livelihood from the right to life would contradict
 Articles 39(a) and 41, which emphasise social justice and ensure the right to work and
earn a livelihood.
The Constitution doesn't impose an absolute ban on depriving life or personal liberty.
Article 21 mandates that such deprivation must follow the established legal procedure.
Section 314 grants the Commissioner discretionary power to remove encroachments,
with or without notice. This provision serves as an enabling tool rather than a
mandatory one.
It allows the Commissioner to act swiftly to remove encroachments, occasionally
bypassing the principles of natural justice. Sections 312(1), 313(1)(a), and 314
empower the Municipal Commissioner to halt encroachments on public pathways,
which isn't deemed unreasonable, unjust, or unfair.
In this city, it's challenging to find individuals who haven't engaged in any form of
unauthorised use of sidewalks or public spaces. However, it's crucial to note that the
petitioners' actions aren't intended to commit an offence, intimidate, insult, or bother
anyone as outlined in Article 441 of the Criminal Code, which defines criminal
intrusion.
The encroachments made by these individuals are often involuntary, driven by
unavoidable circumstances rather than choice. While intrusion is considered a crime,
the principle of proportionality applies. Even in cases where an intruder may be
forcibly evicted, the force used must be reasonable and appropriate to the situation.
Importantly, the intruder should be given the opportunity to leave voluntarily before
force is employed to expel them.

Decision Of The Supreme Court :

The honourable Supreme Court of India passed a ruling based on the humanistic
approach of the bench. The court held that the slum dwellers must get an alternative
shelter if they are evicted from the pavement. Although the eviction would be held to
be valid under Article 14 and Article 19 of the Indian Constitution and, the Right to

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livelihood was considered to a part of right to life and liberty.The decision of the court
appear to emphasise the concept of a welfare state which suggest that the state has the
 obligation to prevent and protect the rights of the people and to do ensure the social
welfare and justice of its people though, this was not expressed but was implied with
the DPSP(Directive principles of State Policies) under the constitution.

Summary :
In summary, the Court ruled that no individual has the right to encroach upon public
spaces like footpaths or pavements. Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act was deemed reasonable. The Kamraj Nagar Basti was situated on a
road leading to the Western Express Highway. The State Government's assurances
regarding the resettlement of pavement and slum dwellers from the 1976 census must
be honoured and should be provided alternate pitches at Malvani or other suitable
places. Slum dwellers from the same census should be given alternate sites for
resettlement. Slums existing for over twenty years won't be removed unless the land is
required for public use, with alternate sites provided. Programs like the Low Income
Scheme Shelter and Slum Upgradation Program will be pursued earnestly.
To minimise hardship, slums were removed until autumn, that is , until October 31,
1985, and thereafter according to the judgement. Parties can apply to the Court for
any removal before that date. The Writ Petitions were disposed off without costs.

DPSP
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Bibliography:
Legal Services India
IPleaders
Legal Services India-Principles of Jermy Bentham and Supreme Court of India - Case

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Indian Kanoon
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