Digital Journalism

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rdij20

Alternative News Orientation and Trust in

Mainstream Media: A Longitudinal Audience
Perspective

Kim Andersen, Adam Shehata & Dennis Andersson

To cite this article: Kim Andersen, Adam Shehata & Dennis Andersson (2023) Alternative
News Orientation and Trust in Mainstream Media: A Longitudinal Audience Perspective, Digital
Journalism, 11:5, 833-852, DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2021.1986412

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2021.1986412

© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa

UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group

Published online: 10 Nov 2021.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 10591

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 12 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rdij20
DIGITAL JOURNALISM
2023, VOL. 11, NO. 5, 833–852
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2021.1986412

ARTICLE

Alternative News Orientation and Trust in Mainstream

Media: A Longitudinal Audience Perspective
Kim Andersena,b , Adam Shehatab and Dennis Anderssonb
a
University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark; bUniversity of Gothenburg,
Gothenburg, Sweden

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The emergence of online alternative news sites has enabled peo- Alternative news; media
ple to easily access viewpoints corresponding to their social and trust; uses and gratifications
political identities and challenging mainstream media coverage. theory; reinforcing spirals
Taking an audience perspective and relying on a large four-wave model; panel data
panel survey from Sweden, this study examines orientation
towards alternative news, paying specific attention to the poten-
tial reinforcing relationship with trust in mainstream media.
Results show that increasing orientation towards alternative news
is related to decreasing trust in mainstream media, and vice versa.
In addition, the study highlights how alternative news orientation
supplements rather than replaces consumption of traditional
news. These findings provide valuable insights on the alternative
news users and the dynamics of their media consumption,
informing the debate on the role played by alternative news
media in society.

In recent years, a growing number of alternative news sites have emerged online,
positioning themselves as correctives to mainstream media (Holt, Figenschou, and
Frischlich 2019; Figenschou and Ihlebaek 2019). Based on strong ideological profiles
representing anti-system and anti-elite attitudes, some alternative news media provide
content that stands in opposition to the content found in mainstream news media
(Holt 2018), often with an aim of social or political reform (Downing 2001). Prominent
examples include Breitbart in the United States and The Canary in the United
Kingdom, but many more alternative news outlets exist around the world.
The societal and democratic implications of this development are profound. On the
one hand, alternative news sites present a potential challenge to society, as informa-
tion found here may be biased or even false. As a consequence, alternative news
media may exacerbate political polarization, but also foster misinformation and con-
spiracy theories (Mour~ao and Robertson 2019). On the other hand, alternative news
media also create a more diverse media environment, where dominant narratives can

CONTACT Kim Andersen kand@journalism.sdu.dk

ß 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
834 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

be critically challenged and thoroughly deliberated. As such, these information sources

enable people to nurse special interests and connect with like-minded people—some-
thing highlighted as important by, for example, the pluralism theory of democracy
(Baker 2002).
To better understand the role played by alternative news media in society, how-
ever, we lack knowledge about the underlying mechanisms influencing the usage of
these information sources. With notable exceptions (Leung and Lee 2014;
Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou 2020), the users of alternative news media have not
received much attention in the literature. This is a seemingly paradox, as these media
users are likely to be some of the most active and engaged audiences (Downing
2003). Therefore, this study takes an audience perspective and examines orientation
towards alternative news media, paying specific attention to the potential reinforcing
relationship with distrust in mainstream news media.
As media distrust is likely to be both a key reason for using alternative news but
also a potential outcome of such consumption, we assume that the relationship
indeed is reinforcing over time. Media trust has recently declined in many countries
(Hanitzsch, van Dalen, and Steindl 2018). With the emergence of many new alternative
news sites online, people with low trust in mainstream media have more opportunities
than previously for finding information that gives a different picture of reality and fits
their worldview and social identity better than the one found in mainstream media. In
addition, a central part of alternative news media is their criticism of mainstream
media for deficient news coverage (Cushion 2021; Cushion, McDowell-Naylor, and
Thomas 2021; Figenschou and Ihlebaek 2019; Holt, Figenschou, and Frischlich 2019;
Ladd 2012), which may further fuel mistrust in mainstream media among alternative
news users. Previous studies have confirmed the relationship between distrust in
mainstream media and the use of alternative news (Fletcher and Park 2017; Tsfati
2010; Tsfati and Cappella 2003; Tsfati and Peri 2006). These studies have been limited
by cross-sectional data, however, making it difficult to draw firm causal conclusions
and examine the potential of an over-time reinforcement.
To examine the underlying reasons for alternative news consumption, this study,
therefore, examines the relationship between people’s orientation towards alternative
news and their trust in mainstream media over time, enabling us to examine their
dynamic development longitudinally. In addition, the study examines how consump-
tion of traditional news are linked to alternative news orientation. Empirically, the
study is based on a four-wave panel survey with a large sample of the Swedish popu-
lation conducted in 2018–2020 enabling longitudinal analysis. With an increasing num-
ber of online alternative news sites and polarizing attitudes on media trust, Sweden
provides a good case for testing the dynamics at stake.

Alternative News Orientation in a High-Choice Media Environment

Over the past decades, the media environment has transformed from a low-choice to
a high-choice media environment, as the amount of available information has acceler-
ated (Van Aelst et al. 2017). Lately, this development has been driven in particular by
digital inventions like personal computers, the Internet, smartphones, and social
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 835

media. As media choice has expanded, people’s preferences have come to play an
increasingly important role in their media consumption (Napoli 2011; Prior 2007). As a
consequence, media use has become more individualized and fragmented (Van Aelst
et al. 2017). One example illustrating this development is that people’s political inter-
est has become an increasingly important driver for their news consumption
(Stro€mb€ack, Djerf-Pierre, and Shehata 2013). While people with a high interest in polit-
ics can seek out news constantly, people with a low interest likewise have ample
opportunities for finding other content and avoiding news (Skovsgaard and Andersen
2020). For those still consuming news, selective exposure to politically like-minded
content has likewise become easier (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Stroud 2008).
As part of this high-choice media environment, an increasing number of alternative
news sites have emerged online. Such alternative news sites usually have strong ideo-
logical profiles, representing anti-system and anti-elite attitudes (Holt 2018), and pro-
vide coverage that stands in opposition to that of mainstream media, providing a
platform for viewpoints usually ignored (Atton 2007; Haas 2004). Especially right-wing
alternative news media have been very prominent. Alternative news media thereby
illustrate how the boundaries of journalism are fading, challenging journalists’ monop-
oly as a trustworthy source of information (Lewis 2012). As part of their profile, alter-
native media also attack mainstream media for being untrustworthy (Cushion 2021;
Cushion, McDowell-Naylor, and Thomas 2021; Figenschou and Ihlebaek 2019; Holt,
Figenschou, and Frischlich 2019; Ladd 2012), criticizing them for being biased, being
distanced from the people, excluding important voices, and instead acting as an
uncritical platform for those in power (Figenschou and Ihlebaek 2019).
From a historical perspective, alternative news media have been closely linked to
social movements. Thus, alternative news media often thrive well in times of social
and political turmoil (Downing 2001). Alternative media can therefore, in a broad
sense, be defined as “media devoted to providing representations of issues and events
which oppose those offered in mainstream media and to advocate social and political
reform” (Haas 2004, 115). As such, alternative news media is nothing new, and they
have existed for a long time (Downing 2001). But with the technological develop-
ments described above they have expanded in numbers, as it has become easier for
producers to establish and run alternative news media, also for non-journalists, and
easier for the audience to access them. This development is further supported by
social media, where alternative news media can easily distribute their content.
Previous studies have also highlighted that alternative news media take up a large
proportion of shared news on social media (Sandberg and Ihlebaek 2019;
Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou 2020). With algorithms catering for people’s preferen-
ces (Thorson et al. 2021), social media platforms further stress the importance of
understanding the underlying drivers of people’s alternative news consumption.
According to the uses and gratifications theory, people use the media they do to
gratify certain needs (Katz, Gurevitch, and Haas 1973). Within this framework, audience
behaviour can be seen as either ritualized or instrumental (Rubin 1984). While ritual-
ized media use is passive and habitual, often driven by a need for diversion, instru-
mental media use is active and often done for informational reasons. Further,
instrumental media use is likely to produce greater effects than ritualized media use,
836 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

as the audience will have a higher motivation to involve themselves with the content
they are exposed to (Rubin 2002). Consumption of alternative news can be seen as
instrumental, as the alternative news users are likely to actively seek information that
better fulfil their preferences and gratify their needs than the content found in main-
stream media. In other words, alternative news users are likely to be highly motivated
and engaged when consuming information from these sources (Downing 2003). In
practice, the audience can access information from alternative news media directly on
the websites of these outlets, but often their content is also accessed on social media
(Sandberg and Ihlebaek 2019; Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou 2020).
To study the role played by alternative news media in people’s media diets and
their motives for relying on such information sources, we examine their alternative
news orientation. Drawing on the concept of media orientations from the uses and
gratifications framework in general, and instrumental orientations in particular (Rubin
2002; Ruggiero 2000), we understand alternative news orientation as the extent to
which people actively seek out information from sources that provide new or different
perspectives on societal issues, either directly or via social media, that are more in cor-
respondence with the users’ own views than information found in mainstream media.
As such, alternative news orientation reflects the extent to which people exploit the
opportunities given by today’s high-choice media environment to rely on other sour-
ces than mainstream media for obtaining news and current affairs content. As we
elaborate on below, alternative news orientation is in particular likely to be related to
people’s trust in mainstream media.

(Dis)Trust in Mainstream Media

One of news media’s most important roles in society is to select and convey informa-
tion that people need to understand politics and society (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2014;
Nielsen 2017). However, it is not possible for journalists to report reality one to one.
Instead, journalists highlight certain information over other as they produce their
news reports. For the audience to trust the media, they therefore need to accept a
certain risk, as they do not have the resources and capabilities to judge the reliability
of each piece of information and check whether the journalists are doing a good job
(van Dalen 2020). According to Kohring and Matthes (2007), media trust has four
dimensions in this regard; trust in the selectivity of topics, trust in the selectivity of
facts, trust in the accuracy of depictions, and trust in journalistic assessment. As wrong
information can have negative consequences, trust in the media can be defined as
“the willingness of the audience to be vulnerable to news content based on the
expectation that the media will perform in a satisfactory manner” (Hanitzsch, van
Dalen, and Steindl 2018, 5).
Trust is important for the media themselves, as it affects their reputation and ultim-
ately economic profit (Vanacker and Belmas 2009). But trust also gives the media legit-
imacy and thereby helps them serve their roles in society as, for example, a watchdog
or facilitator of public debate. If the mainstream media are not trusted, it will be easier
for politicians and other people in power to ignore their criticism (van Dalen 2020).
On a societal level, trust in the mainstream media also helps to create a collective
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 837

sense of community by fostering “belief in a shareable reality” (Coleman 2012, 36). If

people have a low media trust it can thus lead to a situation where other information
sources, such as alternative news media, will be deemed equally or perhaps even
more trustworthy. As such, low trust can ultimately undermine the shared perception
of reality leading to epistemic crisis (Dahlgren 2018). However, it is important to note
that the decline in media trust has been most clearly demonstrated in the United
States (Gronke and Cook 2007; Hanitzsch, van Dalen, and Steindl 2018; Ladd 2012; van
Dalen 2020). In other parts of the world, mainstream media is still trusted by large
part of the public (Hanitzsch, van Dalen, and Steindl 2018; Tsfati and Ariely 2014).
Media trust is linked to trust in other societal institutions, such as, for example, the
political system. If people’s trust in the political system declines, so does their trust in
the mainstream media—the so-called “trust nexus” (Hanitzsch, van Dalen, and Steindl
2018). Partisan identity has also been identified as a key driver for people’s trust in
mainstream media (Gronke and Cook 2007; Jones 2004). As such, increasing political
polarization might also lead to increasing mistrust. When political polarization unfolds,
people are more likely to take extreme positions in politically relevant discourses
(Prior 2013). In consequence, people with strong opinions will be more likely to meet
cross-cutting messages that they will not agree with, and thus not trust, in mainstream
media (Suiter and Fletcher 2020). This dynamic may also be caused by the phenomena
known as the hostile media effect (Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1985), where people
with strong opinions find media coverage to be biased against them irrespective of
whether this is the case or not. In consequence, these people may orientate them-
selves towards alternative news instead. Indeed, research suggests that alternative
news users can be described as “alarmed citizens,” characterized by low trust in the
elite and established institutions (Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou 2020).

A Reinforcing Process?
The relationship between people’s trust in mainstream media and their orientation
towards alternative news is likely to be reciprocal over time, as suggested by the rein-
forcing spirals model (Slater 2007, 2015). According to this framework, attitudinal out-
comes of media use, such as generalized trust in the mainstream media, can be
expected to influence selection and attention to media content, such as use of alterna-
tive news media. As such, the relationship between selection and media effects should
be seen as a potentially dynamic and ongoing process, where media use functions
both as an outcome variable and a predictor variable. This dual relationship can lead
to a reinforcing spiral over time, particularly when attitudes are related to social and
political identities, which is likely to be the case for alternative news orientation and
mainstream media trust.
Drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), the reinforcing spirals
model argues that media use is a principal mean in the maintenance of social identi-
ties among subcultures (Slater 2007, 2015). Social and political identities will make
people selectively attend to media content that reflects and shares the values of their
group. As a consequence, people’s identity will be more salient for them, leading to
additional reinforcement. Such processes are particularly likely among groups that
838 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

seek to shield themselves from outside influences, for example, by using group-spe-
cific media, such as alternative news sites, that consistently reiterate a consistent and
distinctive worldview (Slater 2007, 2015), for example, that the mainstream media can-
not be trusted. Over time, this can lead to increased hostility towards out-groups,
such as the mainstream media and the elite in general.
Although previous research on the relationship between media trust and media use
€mb€ack et al. 2020), studies, in general, support the idea that lower trust
is limited (Stro
in mainstream media is associated with more use of alternative news media (Ladd
2012; Mour~ao et al. 2018; Tsfati and Cappella 2003). There are different potential rea-
sons for this. First, in terms of selection effects, low trust in mainstream media may
lead people to actively turn to the alternative news media that provide the informa-
tion these people feel they are lacking. Such behaviour reflects an instrumental media
orientation, as described by the uses and gratifications theory (Rubin 1984). Second,
also in relation to selection effects, low trust in mainstream media may lead to a situ-
ation where people instead use heuristics, such as correspondence with one’s social
identity and perception of reality, when assessing what information is credible
(Metzger and Flanagin 2013; Metzger, Flanagin, and Medders 2010). In this way, infor-
mation from alternative news sites will seem more trustworthy to those who do not
trust the mainstream media. Lastly, in terms of media effects, alternative news media
also criticize mainstream media for deficient news coverage (Cushion 2021; Cushion,
McDowell-Naylor, and Thomas 2021; Figenschou and Ihlebaek 2019; Ladd 2012), which
may lead to lower trust in mainstream media among alternative news users. When
people are constantly exposed to the narrative that mainstream media cannot be
trusted, a natural consequence will be declining media trust.
In sum, explanations can be identified for both selection effects, where low trust in
mainstream media leads to more use of alternative news, and media effects, where
more use of alternative news leads to lower trust in mainstream media. Therefore, we
have the following expectation.
H1: The relationship between alternative news orientation and mainstream media trust is
reinforcing over time, with decreases in mainstream media trust leading to increases in
alternative news orientation, and vice versa.

Supplement or Replacement?
The idea of a reinforcing spiral could lead to the conclusion that media use and atti-
tudes will become increasingly extreme over time. However, as Slater (2007) writes,
“[t]he pattern of mutual reinforcement between the selection of media content and
the effects of such content … will rarely lead to extremes of attitude or behaviour.
Instead, this pattern may result in the maintenance of various attitudes and behav-
iours for users of specific media content despite competing influences” (289). In our
case, “competing influences” should be understood as mainstream media versus alter-
native news media. As such, an orientation towards alternative news becomes a strive
for a state of homeostasis where beliefs are maintained, or perhaps even reinforced,
when facing competing worldviews from mainstream media. Thus, alternative news
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 839

users can be expected to adjust their media consumption to obtain a picture of the
lying mainstream media fitting their social identity and worldview.
The idea of competing influences from alternative news media and mainstream
media makes it relevant to examine the extent to which an orientation towards alter-
native news supplements or replaces use of traditional news media (Dutta-Bergman
2004). In essence, are people who orientate themselves towards alternative news sim-
ultaneously using mainstream news media, or are they rather turning their back to
mainstream media to rely mainly on alternative news media. Seen from the framework
of the reinforcing process model (Slater 2007, 2015), such adjustment of media con-
sumption reflects how people navigate among competing influences. As such, both
scenarios are possible. Either people orientate themselves towards alternative news to
get different perspectives on the news they get from mainstream media, or they turn
their backs to mainstream media to more or less exclusively rely on information from
alternative news. Thus, we suggest the following research question.
RQ1: Is alternative news orientation positively or negatively related to use of
traditional news?

The Swedish Case

To address our hypothesis and research question, we rely on panel survey data from
Sweden. As a typical democratic corporatist media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004),
Sweden has long been characterized by high newspaper circulation and a strong pub-
lic service broadcaster. Politically, the national newspapers are evenly balanced on the
left and right with ideological content being mainly a subject for the editorial pages
(Weibull 2013). In contrast to other countries, for example the United States, there are
no partisan television channels or talk radio. Thus, the mainstream media in Sweden is
rather homogeneous.
As in most other countries, however, patterns of news consumption are changing.
While regular newspaper readership (at least 3 days/week) has declined from over 80%
in the beginning of the century to 34% in 2019 (Andersson 2020), 50% are now get-
ting news from social media on a weekly basis (Newman et al. 2020). Online, people
can encounter endless amounts of information, including a number of alternative
news sites. Comparatively, the demand for alternative news is quite high in Sweden
with nine right-wing alternative news sites in the top one thousand Swedish websites
(Heft et al. 2020). The most well-known examples are the left leaning Dagens ETC and
the right leaning Fria Tider, Nyheter Idag, and Samha €llsnytt, reaching approximately ten
percent of the population on a weekly basis (Newman et al. 2020). Very few of these
alternative news sites are connected to any specific political party, but they are consid-
ered to work as mouthpieces for political ideas strongly linked to specific political
actors (Weibull, Wadbring, and Ohlsson 2018; Dahlgren, Shehata, and
Stro€mb€ack 2019).
From a historical perspective, alternative news media is nothing new in Sweden. In
the 1960s and 70s, for example, a number of alternative papers and magazines were
associated with the “new left” movement. Inspired by the communist surge in
Western Europe, the movement directed an overall critic of the post-war society,
840 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

focussing on issues such as strikes and labour policy, racism in the United States and
South Africa, and the Vietnam War (Gustafsson, Ryden, and Engblom 2002, 213–214).
With no established political channels or political power, the movement had to create
their own media outlets. By giving an alternative worldview compared to the main-
stream media, the goal was to radicalize both the public opinion and the ruling Social
Democratic Party (Gustafsson, Ryden, and Engblom 2002; Funke 2011). While the alter-
native news media of the 1960s and 70s were mostly situated on the political left,
many of today’s alternative news media are in contrast situated on the political right,
occupied by topics like immigration, crime, and how the mainstream media’s reporting
on these subjects are driven by norms of political correctness (Holt 2018; Holt,
Figenschou, and Frischlich 2019; Ihlebaek and Nygaard 2021).
Despite the recent increase in alternative media sites, there has not been a general
decline in trust for traditional media to the same extent as in other countries
(Hanitzsch, van Dalen, and Steindl 2018). In Sweden, approximately 40% of the popu-
lation think that they can trust most news most of the time, which comparatively is
neither very high nor very low (Newman et al. 2020). There are important nuances,
however, as people voting for right learning parties, and especially those voting for
the nationalist and right-wing populist party Sweden Democrats, have less trust in the
media than people voting for left learning parties (Stro€mb€ack and Karlsson 2017).

Methods
The utilized panel survey consists of four waves and was conducted by the Laboratory
of Opinion Research (LORE) at the University of Gothenburg, using a probability-based
sample of web survey participants. Importantly, LORE’s sampling procedure is not
based on self-selected recruitment, but on probability sampling using both telephone
and regular mail during the initial recruitment phase. A sample of 3,397 respondents,
stratified on gender, age, education, and political interest, was drawn from LORE’s
pool of probability-recruited participants. Wave 1 was fielded in late March 2018
(March 22–April 16), wave 2 in December 2018 (December 10–January 8), wave 3 in
early October 2019 (October 7–October 28), and wave 4 in June 2020 (June 3–June
24). 2,291 respondents participated in wave 1 (AAPOR RR5: 67%), 1,880 in wave 2
(59%), 1,819 in wave 3 (63%), and 1,567 in wave 4 (58%). The fourth wave was col-
lected during the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19)—a point that we will briefly return
to when presenting and discussing the results.

Measures
To tap alternative news orientation, we use a set of five survey items covering the
respondents’ general inclination to actively seek online news providing alternative per-
spectives on societal issues. This approach has the benefit of providing us with a gen-
eral measure of people’s orientation towards alternative news, as the many available
sources and their presence on social media make it difficult to capture exposure to
specific outlets. The first two items were measured asking “How often do you use
online news websites or social media to follow … ” (1) “News about societal issues not
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 841

reported by the traditional media” as well as (2) “News that provide an alternative view
on societal issues than traditional media” [Italics in original]. These two items were
combined with three additional items on issue-specific alternative media usage: “How
often do you use online news websites or social media to follow news that provide an
alternative view than the traditional media on the following topics?” [Italics in original].
The items that followed were (3) “News about crime,” (4) “News about the climate and
environment,” and (5) “News about integration and immigration.” Response categories
on all five items ranged from 1 (Daily) to 6 (Never). Based on a PCA revealing one sin-
gle dimension, these items were reversed and averaged into indices for each sur-
vey wave.
In line with recent recommendations concerning media trust (Stro €mb€ack et al.
2020), respondents’ generalized trust in mainstream news media was measured using a
four-item battery based on the survey question: “There are different views in society
on news coverage in Swedish media. To what extent do you agree with the following
statements? The traditional news media in Sweden … ” [Italics in original]. Specific
statements included: (1) “Don’t tell the truth about important societal issues”
(reversed), (2) “Let all important voices be heard in the discussion,” (3) “Provide a one
sided perspective on important issues” (reversed), and (4) “Provide the best and most
reliable information about politics and society.” The response scales ranged from 1
(Completely disagree) to 5 (Completely agree). A PCA suggested a clear unidimen-
sional solution and the four items were therefore averaged into indices for each sur-
vey wave.
Also following recommendations in the literature (Andersen, de Vreese, and Albaek
2016), use of traditional news media was measured with a six-point scale from 1 (Daily) to
6 (Never) for a list of the most prominent mainstream news outlets, including Sveriges
Radio (SR), Sveriges Television (SVT), TV4 Nyheterna, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet,
Go€teborgs-Posten, as well as the category “News from another local morning newspaper.”
After reversing the scales, these items were averaged into indices for each survey wave.
As media consumption is closely linked to content preferences (Napoli 2011; Prior
2007), we also include a measure of interest in news, which was measured with a 5-
point scale from 1 (Completely disagree) to 5 (Completely agree) to the four items
“I’m not interested in news about politics and society” (reversed), “I follow news about
politics and society every day,” “I usually try to avoid news about politics and society”
(reversed), and “I try to follow news about politics and society as much as I can.”
Again, these four items were combined and averaged into indices for each sur-
vey wave.
Previous research has identified a so-called “trust nexus” (Hanitzsch, van Dalen, and
Steindl 2018), where trust in different societal institutions, like the press and politi-
cians, are closely interviewed. Likewise, Blekesaune, Elvestad, and Aalberg (2012) argue
that lack of political and social capital—which, among other dimensions covers trust—
makes people disconnect from mainstream news media. In our analysis, we therefore
also include measures for political and social trust. Trust in politicians was measured
on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (Very low trust) to 4 (Very high trust) (M ¼ 2.33,
SD ¼ .70), while social trust was measured using an 11-point scaled ranging from 0
(People cannot be trusted in general) to 10 (People can be trusted in general), which
842 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

was recoded to range from 1 to 5 to make the scale more comparable with
other measures.
In addition, measures of gender (1 ¼ female), age, and education were also included.
Age was measured with six categories (below 30, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, and 70
or above), and education was measured with a scale of different educational levels in
Sweden, which was recoded to two categories, separating respondents with a univer-
sity degree (1) from those with no university degree (0). Descriptive statistics for all
variables can be seen in Appendix, Table A1.

Analytic Approach
To examine the dynamics of alternative news orientation and test the potential rein-
forcing relationship with trust in mainstream news media, we rely on three different
analytic approaches. First, we provide some basic descriptives of alternative news
orientation and mainstream media trust and examine how alternative news orientation
relates to our additional variables cross-sectionally by examining bivariate correlations.
Second, we turn to longitudinal analyses and conduct a parallel growth curve model to
estimates two sets of intercepts and slopes based on our repeated measures of alter-
native news orientation and trust in mainstream news media (Acock 2013; Preacher
et al. 2008). While the latent intercepts represent initial starting levels of each factor,
the latent slopes capture individual linear change trajectories over time. This proced-
ure allows for simultaneous analyses of correlations between (1) starting levels of alter-
native media orientation and media trust, and between (2) linear change trajectories
as indications of a mutual reinforcement process, as well as (3) how these factors are
related to various predictor variables. Evidence for mutual reinforcement from these
models are only indicative, however. For instance, the analysis relies on linear change
trajectories across the four panel waves but says nothing about time-order of these
changes. Correlations may also be spurious due to unobserved third factors. Third, to
provide an additional robustness test, we therefore analyse the impact of using a two-
way fixed effects panel model, relying on within-person variation over time only
(Allison 2009). A such, these models capture whether a within-person change in the
independent variables are related to a within-person change in the depend-
ent variable.

Results
To get a first sense of how alternative news orientation and trust in mainstream media
develop over time, Figure 1 illustrates average levels of these two measures over the
four survey waves for respondents participating in all waves and answering all relevant
questions. The average on alternative news orientation is slightly below 3, correspond-
ing to “once a month” on the original response scales. Across the four survey waves,
approximately 16% of the respondents score four or above on the scale for alternative
news orientation, corresponding to answering “once a week” or more often on the ori-
ginal response scales. In terms of mainstream media trust, the average is slightly
above 3, which is the mid-point of the original response scales. While there is no
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 843

Figure 1. Averages of alternative news orientation and mainstream media trust over time.
Notes. Original response scale for ANO: 1 ¼ “Never,” 2 ¼ “More rarely,” 3 ¼ “Once a month,” 4 ¼ “Once a week,”
5 ¼ “Several times a week,” and 6 ¼ “Daily.” Original response scale for MMT: 1 ¼ “Completely disagree” to
5 ¼ “Completely agree.” N ¼ 1,146.

general change in alternative news orientation over time (F3,4580 ¼ .36, p ¼ .78), there is
a slight increase in mainstream media trust (F3,4580 ¼ 4.13, p < .01). These patterns
reflect recent studies illustrating how media trust increased during the outbreak of the
coronavirus pandemic (Andersson 2020; Newman et al. 2020), but this profound con-
textual change did not seem to affect the overall pattern of alternative news orienta-
tions among our respondents.
Figure 2 displays how different variables relate to having an orientation towards
alternative news. Estimates are based on a series of bivariate regression models from
the first wave of the panel survey, including respondents who answered all relevant
questions. To enable comparison of effect sizes, all variables have been rescaled to
range between 0 (lowest possible value) to 1 (highest possible value). Thus, estimates
represent maximal effects, i.e., what happens when we move between the extreme
points on each scale.
Looking first at our main independent variable, trust in mainstream news media dis-
plays a clear negative relationship with alternative news orientation (b ¼ 2.24,
p < .001). Thus, people who have complete trust in mainstream news media score on
average 2.24 points lower on the 1–6 alternative news orientation index than those
who have no trust at all in mainstream media. None of the other variables included
display effects of comparable size. If we also consider predictive power, or amount of
explained variance, trust in traditional media stands out as the single most important
factor, accounting for 20% of the variation in alternative news orientation (R2adj ¼ .20).
In terms of a more descriptive profile, people orientating themselves towards alter-
native news tend to be younger (b ¼ –.18, p < .05) males (b ¼ –.43, p < .001) with a
lower education (b ¼ –.34, p < .001), but a strong interest in news (b ¼ .77, p < .001) as
844 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

Figure 2. Bivariate relationship with alternative news orientation.

Note. Bivariate relationships are unstandardized b-values from OLS regressions, with each independent variable
rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Alternative media orientation is measured on a 1–6 scale.
N ¼ 2,076.

well as a habit of also using traditional news media (b ¼ .73, p < .001). As it is the case
for media trust, their social (b ¼ 1.15, p < .001) and political (b ¼ 1.52, p < .001) trust
is low, however. The positive relationship with traditional news use gives a first indica-
tion that alternative news orientation supplements consumption of traditional news
media. The negative relationship with age might be a result of younger people’s gen-
eral higher use of online media.
So far, the findings presented relate to bivariate between-person differences based
on cross-sectional data from the first survey wave. Table 1 takes the next step by dis-
playing results from a parallel growth curve model of alternative news orientation and
trust in mainstream media. The latent intercept represents the initial starting value
while the latent slope reflects the linear growth trajectory. Thus, the model estimates
how our independent variables predict between-person differences in both levels and
changes over time. In addition, covariances between latent factors indicate how alter-
native news orientation and mainstream media trust are correlated. Three main take-
aways are worth highlighting.
First, looking at predictors of the latent intercept, many of the previous bivariate
effects hold-up when controls are included. In several cases, these predictors have
contrasting effects on between-person differences in alternative news orientation and
trust in mainstream media. For instance, political and social trust have negative effects
on alternative news orientation (b ¼ –.44, p < .001; b ¼ –.10, p < .001) but positive
effects on mainstream media trust (b ¼ .58, p < .001; b ¼ .12, p < .001). In terms of soci-
odemographic factors, being female has a negative effect on alternative news orienta-
tion (b ¼ -.29, p < .001) but a positive effect on mainstream media trust (b ¼ .09,
p < .05). Likewise, age and education have negative effects on alternative news
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 845

Table 1. Estimates from the parallel growth curve model.

Alternative News Orientation (ANO) Mainstream Media Trust (MMT)
Latent intercept Latent slope Latent intercept Latent slope
Traditional news use .19 (.03) .02 (.01) .01 (.02) .01 (.01)
News interest .23 (.03) .00 (.01) .00 (.02) .00 (.01)
Political trust .44 (.04) .00 (.01) .58 (.03) .01 (.01)
Social trust .10 (.03) .00 (.01) .12 (.02) .02 (.01)
Female .29 (.05) .02 (.02) .09 (.03) .02 (.01)
Age .09 (.01) .02 (.01) .05 (.01) .01 (.01)
University .26 (.06) .00 (.02) .17 (.04) .01 (.01)
Constant 3.17 (.14) .07 (.05) 1.05 (.10) .06 (.04)
R-squared .22 .07 .36 .05
Covariances
Intercept ANO/Intercept MMT .33 (.02)
Intercept ANO/Slope ANO .01 (.01)
Slope ANO/Slope MMT .01 (.00)
Intercept MMT/Slope MMT .00 (.01)
Model fit
Chi-square (60) 113.57, p<.001
RMSEA .022
CFI .994
N 2,502
Note. Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The model was estimated
using full 
information maximum likelihood with missing values (fiml).
p < .05, p < .01,  p < .001.

orientation (b ¼ -.09, p < .001; b ¼ –.26, p < .001) but positive effects on mainstream
media trust (b ¼ .05, p < .001; b ¼ .17, p < .001). Lastly, news interest and traditional
news use continues to have positive impacts on alternative news orientation when
the other factors are accounted for (b ¼ .23, p < .001; b ¼ .19, p < .001). The positive
relationship with traditional news use once again indicates that alternative news orien-
tation supplements use of traditional news media.
Second, beyond these effects on starting values, there are very few effects on the
latent slopes. Only age displays a statistically significant association with the linear tra-
jectory of alternative news orientation. Although older people are less likely to seek
out alternative news initially, they catch up over time (b ¼ .02, p < .05). For the devel-
opment in mainstream media trust, people with higher social trust are more likely to
increase their trust in mainstream media over time (b ¼ .02, p < .05). All other effects
are non-significant.
Third, the growth model also provides key information about the relationship
between alternative news orientation and trust in mainstream news media. Both the
covariances between the two latent intercepts (COV ¼ –.33, p < .001) as well as the
two latent slopes (COV ¼ –.01, p < .001) are negative and statistically significant. Thus,
there is evidence not only for a close cross-sectional connection between orientation
towards alternative news and mainstream media trust, but indication of a correlated
growth process as well. Over time, increasing use of alternative news is related to
decreasing trust in mainstream media. This pattern is in line with a reinforcement pro-
cess as suggested by the reinforcing spirals model.
Even though the growth model indicates the presence of a mutually reinforcing
relationship between alternative media orientation and trust in mainstream media,
these findings are not conclusive evidence of a causal reinforcing process. Two corre-
lated growth curves may reflect other causal influences as well. To provide an
846 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

Table 2. Effects of media trust on alternative news orientation (fixed effects model).
Model 1 Model 2
Trust in mainstream media 0.11 (.02) 0.13 (.02)
News interest – 0.08 (.02)
Traditional news use – 0.10 (.03)
Panel wave dummies YES YES
R-square (within) 0.01 0.02
N (individuals/observations) 2,446/7,167 2,417/6,893
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
p < .05, p < .01, p < .001.

alternative test of this relationship, Table 2 presents findings from two fixed effects
panel models. Model 1 predicts alternative news orientation using mainstream media
trust as the only predictor, along with time-specific dummies. As such, the estimates
capture pure within-person effects over time. Model 2 imposes an even stronger test,
by also including time-varying measures of news interest and traditional news use.
Model one shows that within-person changes in mainstream media trust has a
negative effect on within-person changes in alternative news orientation (b ¼ –.11,
p < .001). Thus, citizens who gain trust in mainstream media also become less oriented
towards alternative media, and vice versa. Model 2 lend additional support to this
within-person effect. Even when controlling for within-person changes in news interest
(b ¼ .08, p < .001) and traditional news media usage (b ¼ .10, p < .01), trust in main-
stream media remains a significant predictor of alternative news orientation (b ¼ –.13,
p < .001). In addition, these results again illustrate how alternative news orientations
supplements use of traditional news. When people’s traditional news use increases,
their alternative news orientation also increases.

Conclusion and Discussion

The aim of this study has been to examine the dynamics of alternative news orienta-
tion, paying special attention to the potential reinforcing relationship with trust in
mainstream media. Relying on a four-wave panel survey conducted in Sweden, our
study provides three main findings. First, the study gives support for a reinforcing rela-
tionship with media trust over time, as decreasing trust in mainstream media is related
to increasing alternative news orientation, and vice versa (H1). Although previous
research has shown that media trust and use of alternative news media are related
(Fletcher and Park 2017; Tsfati 2010; Tsfati and Cappella 2003; Tsfati and Peri 2006),
our study thereby provides new knowledge by being the first to empirically show how
this dual relationship unfolds over time. Second, our study also highlights that an
orientation towards alternative news seems to supplement rather than replace trad-
itional news consumption (RQ1). Lastly, in terms of a more descriptive profile of alter-
native news users, the study shows that younger and lower educated males with low
media, social, and political trust, but also a high interest in news and consumption of
traditional news, are more like to orientate themselves towards alternative news.
With these results, the study illustrates how alternative news orientation can be
seen as a distinct form of instrumental media use within the uses and gratification
theory (Rubin 2002; Ruggiero 2000). Alternative news users are interested in and
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 847

consume traditional news. However, they do not trust mainstream media, just as they
have low social and political trust. As such, they resemble what Norris (2011) labels
the “critical citizens.” In consequence, they actively supplement their traditional news
consumption with information from alternative news sources that mirrors their world-
view and social identity better. As such, alternative news use seem to reflect a pattern
of selective exposure to attitude-consistent sources rather than selective avoidance of
attitude challenging sources (Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2013).
While our results indicate an over-time reinforcement between alternative news
orientation and distrust in mainstream media, an important part of this relationship is
likely attitude maintenance in a context of competing influences (Slater 2007).
Thereby, the results support the idea of alternative news media as correctives to main-
stream media (Holt, Figenschou, and Frischlich 2019; Figenschou and Ihlebaek 2019)
that also play a key role in delegitimizing mainstream media by attacking them for
being untrustworthy (Cushion 2021; Ladd 2012). As media trust is declining in many
countries (Hanitzsch, van Dalen, and Steindl 2018) and political polarization increases
(Prior 2013), our results suggest that alternative news media will gain importance as
information sources for people with low or decreasing levels mainstream media trust,
but our results also suggest that alternative news users will still be exposed to news
from mainstream media.
In the light of these findings, one might argue that alternative news may not be as
big a societal problem as one could fear, as people orienting themselves towards
alternative news are also using mainstream media and thereby get exposed to view-
points challenging their attitudes (see also Andersen et al. 2021). As such, it may be
possible to uphold a state of homeostasis where beliefs are maintained rather than
reinforced. Here, however, it is crucial to question what individuals with low trust will
actually gain from using mainstream media. In addition, our analyses also illustrate
how mainstream media trust further decreases as a consequence of alternative news
orientation. Thus, although alternative news media create a more diverse media envir-
onment where people can nurse special interests and connect with like-minded peo-
ple, it also comes with the risk of polarization. In addition, research suggests that use
of alternative news facilitate collective action, such as protesting, by fostering strong
in-group identity and generating anger (Chan 2017). As such, an increasing import-
ance of alternative news in people’s media diets is likely to have important societal
consequences, which highlights the importance of understanding who the users of
these information sources are.
Our study is of course not without limitations. Although the four-wave panel survey
is a unique opportunity for examining how the relationships under consideration
develop over time, the data is not perfect, as people with low media, political, and
social trust are less likely to participate in such studies and more likely to drop out
during the study. Further, we do not ask about consumption of specific alternative
media sources, but rather a general orientation towards such sources. Thereby, we are
not able to distinguish between users of right and left learning alternative media.
Likewise, we are also not able to validate whether the respondents can classify what is
meant by “alternative” in the survey questions. In addition, the dichotomous classifica-
tion of alternative and mainstream media may be too simplistic, as some outlets may
848 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

fall in between (see Heft et al. 2020). Thus, future research could potentially examine
the idea of competing influences from the perspective of a continuum instead.
Although we have identified indications of a reinforcing relationship, we still do not
have hardcore proof of causality. Our results suggest a connection between media
trust and alternative news orientation over time, but unobserved factors may still
operate behind the scene. These limitations highlight the need for more research to
get an even better understanding of the alternative media users. In this regard, quali-
tative research may be fruitful for obtaining in-depth understanding of this hard-to-
reach group (Figenschou 2020; Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou 2020). In addition,
future research should also examine more closely how contextual changes, such as cli-
mate change, the immigration crisis, or a pandemic, affect alternative news orienta-
tions. Such times of crisis may both affect the emergence and consumption of
alternative news media. Our analyses did not indicate any change in alternative news
orientation during the coronavirus pandemic, but this might had looked different if
we had been able to follow this crisis over a longer time period.
Despite these limitations, the study has illustrated how an orientation towards alter-
native news is closely tied with low trust in mainstream media, likely mutually reinforc-
ing each other over time as the alternative news users supplements their traditional
news use with alternative news media. Thereby, the study has provided valuable
insights on the alternative news users and the dynamics of their media consumption.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
Data collection for this study was funded by the Swedish Research Council (VR 2016-02262).

ORCID
Kim Andersen http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8282-596X
Dennis Andersson http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7749-9087

References
Acock, A. C. 2013. Discovering Structural Equation Modeling Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata
Press.
Allison, P. D. 2009. Fixed Effects Regression Models. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Andersen, K., C. H. de Vreese, and E. Albaek. 2016. “Measuring Media Diet in a High-Choice
Environment—Testing the List-Frequency Technique.” Communication Methods and Measures
10 (2–3): 81–98.
Andersen, K., J. Johansson, B. Johansson, and A. Shehata. 2021. “Maintenance and Reformation
of News Repertoires: A Latent Transition Analysis.” Journalism & Mass Communication
Quarterly. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/10776990211019750.
Andersson, U. 2020. Medieutveckling 2020 – i Normaltider Och Kristider [Media Development 2020 –
in Normal Times and Times of Crisis]. Stockholm, Sweden: Myndigheten fo €r Press, radio och TV.
Atton, C. 2007. “Current Issues in Alternative Media Research.” Sociology Compass 1 (1): 17–27.
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 849

Baker, C. E. 2002. Media, Markets, and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Blekesaune, A., E. Elvestad, and T. Aalberg. 2012. “Tuning out the World of News and Current
Affairs—An Empirical Study of Europe’s Disconnected Citizens.” European Sociological Review
28 (1): 110–126.
Chan, M. 2017. “Media Use and the Social Identity Model of Collective Action: Examining the
Roles of Online Alternative News and Social Media News.” Journalism & Mass Communication
Quarterly 94 (3): 663–681.
Coleman, S. 2012. “Believing the News: From Sinking Trust to Atrophied Efficacy.” European
Journal of Communication 27 (1): 35–45.
Cushion, S. 2021. “UK Alternative Left Media and Their Criticism of Mainstream News: Analysing
the Canary and Evolve Politics.” Journalism Practice : 1–20. Advance online publication. doi:10.
1080/17512786.2021.1882875.
Cushion, S., D. McDowell-Naylor, and R. Thomas. 2021. “Why National Media Systems Matter: A
Longitudinal Analysis of How UK Left-Wing and Right-Wing Alternative Media Critique
Mainstream Media (2015–2018).” Journalism Studies 22 (5): 633–652.
Dahlgren, P. 2018. “Media, Knowledge and Trust: The Deepening Epistemic Crisis of Democracy.”
Javnost – the Public 25 (1–2): 20–27.
Dahlgren, P. M., A. Shehata, and J. Stro €mb€ack. 2019. “Reinforcing Spirals at Work? Mutual
Influences between Selective News Exposure and Ideological Leaning.” European Journal of
Communication 34 (2): 159–174.
Downing, J. 2001. Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Downing, J. D. H. 2003. “Audiences and Readers of Alternative Media: The Absent Lure of the
Virtually Unknown.” Media Culture & Society 25 (5): 625–645.
Dutta-Bergman, M. J. 2004. “Complementarity in Consumption of News Types across Traditional
and New Media.” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 48 (1): 41–60.
Figenschou, T. U. 2020. “Nyhetsbruk, Mistillit og Mediekritikk i et Medielandskap i Rask Endring.”
Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning 61 (1): 83–86.
Figenschou, T. U., and K. A. Ihlebaek. 2019. “Media Criticism from the Far-Right: Attacking from
Many Angles.” Journalism Practice 13 (8): 901–905.
Fletcher, R., and S. Park. 2017. “The Impact of Trust in the News Media on Online News
Consumption and Participation.” Digital Journalism 5 (10): 1281–1299.
Funke, M. 2011. “Swedish Business and the Political Radicalism of the 1960s: The Case of
Advertising.” In Akto €rer Och Marknader i Omvandling: Studier i Fo €retagandets Historia
€gande Kersti Ullenhag, edited by F€alting, L., M. Larsson, T. Petersson, and K. Ågren,
Tilla
94–109. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
Garrett, R. K., D. Carnahan, and E. K. Lynch. 2013. “A Turn toward Avoidance? Selective Exposure
to Online Political Information, 2004–2008.” Political Behavior 35 (1): 113–134.
Gronke, P., and T. E. Cook. 2007. “Disdaining the Media: The American Public’s Changing
Attitudes toward the News.” Political Communication 24 (3): 259–281.
Gustafsson, K. E., P. Ryden, and L. Engblom. 2002. Den venska pressens historia, IV. Bland andra
massmedier (efter 1945). Stockholm: Ekerlid.
Haas, T. 2004. “Alternative Media, Public Journalism and the Pursuit of Democratization.”
Journalism Studies 5 (1): 115–121.
Hallin, D. C., and P. Mancini. 2004. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hanitzsch, T., A. van Dalen, and N. Steindl. 2018. “Caught in the Nexus: A Comparative and
Longitudinal Analysis of Public Trust in the Press.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 23
(1): 3–23.
Heft, A., E. Mayerho €ffer, S. Reinhardt, and C. Kn€
upfer. 2020. “Beyond Breitbart: Comparing Right-
Wing Digital News Infrastructures in Six Western Democracies.” Policy & Internet 12 (1): 20–45.
Holt, K. 2018. “Alternative Media and the Notion of anti-Systemness: Towards an Analytical
Framework.” Media and Communication 6 (4): 49–57.
850 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

Holt, K., T. U. Figenschou, and L. Frischlich. 2019. “Key Dimensions of Alternative News Media.”
Digital Journalism 7 (7): 860–869.
Ihlebaek, K. A., and S. Nygaard. 2021. “Right-Wing Alternative Media in the Scandinavian Political
Communication Landscape.” In Power, Communication, and Politics in the Nordic Countries,
edited by Skogerbø, E., Ø. Ihlen, N. N. Kristensen, and L. Nord, 263–282. Gothenburg:
Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
Iyengar, S., and K. S. Hahn. 2009. “Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in
Media Use.” Journal of Communication 59 (1): 19–39.
Jones, D. A. 2004. “Why Americans Don’t Trust the Media: A Preliminary Analysis.” Harvard
International Journal of Press/Politics 9 (2): 60–75.
Katz, E., M. Gurevitch, and H. Haas. 1973. “On the Use of the Mass Media for Important Things.”
American Sociological Review 38 (2): 164–181.
Kohring, M., and J. Matthes. 2007. “Trust in News Media. Development and Validation of a
Multidimensional Scale.” Communication Research 34 (2): 231–252.
Kovach, B., and T. Rosenstiel. 2014. Elements of Journalism. What Newspeople Should Know and
the Public Should Expect. New York: Crown.
Ladd, J. M. 2012. Why Americans Hate the Media and How It Matters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Leung, D. K. K., and F. L. F. Lee. 2014. “Cultivating an Active Online Counterpublic: Examining
Usage and Political Impact of Internet Alternative Media.” The International Journal of Press/
Politics 19 (3): 340–359.
Lewis, S. C. 2012. “The Tension between Professional Control and Open Participation.”
Information, Communication & Society 15 (6): 836–866.
Metzger, M. J., and A. J. Flanagin. 2013. “Credibility and Trust of Information in Online
Environments: The Use of Cognitive Heuristics.” Journal of Pragmatics 59: 210–220.
Metzger, M. J., A. J. Flanagin, and R. B. Medders. 2010. “Social and Heuristic Approaches to
Credibility Evaluation Online.” Journal of Communication 60 (3): 413–439.
Mour~ao, R. R., and C. T. Robertson. 2019. “Fake News as Discursive Integration: An Analysis of
Sites That Publish False, Misleading, Hyperpartisan and Sensational Information.” Journalism
Studies 20 (14): 2077–2095.
Mour~ao, Rachel R., Esther Thorson, Weiyue Chen, and Samuel M. Tham. 2018. “Media Repertoires
and News Trust during the Early Trump Administration.” Journalism Studies 19 (13):
1945–1956.
Napoli, P. M. 2011. Audience Evolution: New Technologies and the Transformation of Media
Audiences. New York: Columbia University Press.
Newman, N., R. Fletcher, A. Schulz, S. Andı, and R. K. Nielsen. 2020. Reuters Institute Digital News
Report 2020. Oxford, UK: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.
Nielsen, R. K. 2017. “The One Thing Journalism Just Might Do for Democracy.” Journalism Studies
18 (10): 1251–1262.
Norris, P. 2011. Democratic Deficit. Critical Citizens Revisited. New York, NY: Cambrigde University
Press.
Preacher, K., A. Wichman, R. MacCallum, and N. Briggs. 2008. Latent Growth Curve Modeling.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Prior, M. 2007. Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political
Involvement and Polarizes Elections. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Prior, M. 2013. “Media and Political Polarization.” Annual Review of Political Science 16 (1):
101–127.
Rubin, A. M. 1984. “Ritualized and Instrumental Television Viewing.” Journal of Communication
34 (3): 67–77.
Rubin, A. M. 2002. “The Uses-and-Gratifications Perspective on Media Effects.” In Media Effects.
Advances in Theory and Research, edited by Bryant, J., and D. Zilmann, 2nd ed. New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Ruggiero, T. E. 2000. “Uses and Gratifications Theory in the 21st Century.” Mass Communication
and Society 3 (1): 3–37.
 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 851

Sandberg, L. A. C., and K. A. Ihlebaek. 2019. “Start Sharing the News. Exploring the Link between
Right-Wing Alternative Media and Social Media during the Swedish 2018 Election.”
Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 121 (3): 421–440.
Skovsgaard, M., and K. Andersen. 2020. “Conceptualizing News Avoidance: Towards a Shared
Understanding of Different Causes and Potential Solutions.” Journalism Studies 21 (4):
459–476.
Slater, M. D. 2007. “Reinforcing Spirals: The Mutual Influence of Media Selectivity and Media
Effects and Their Impact on Individual Behavior and Social Identity.” Communication Theory 17
(3): 281–303.
Slater, M. D. 2015. “Reinforcing Spirals Model: Conceptualizing the Relationship between Media
Content Exposure and the Development and Maintenance of Attitudes.” Media Psychology 18
(3): 370–395.
€mb€ack, J., M. Djerf-Pierre, and A. Shehata. 2013. “The Dynamics of Political Interest and
Stro
News Media Consumption: A Longitudinal Perspective.” International Journal of Public Opinion
Research 25 (4): 414–435.
€mb€ack, Jesper, and Michael Karlsson. 2017. “Sjunkande Fo
Stro €rtroende Fo €r Svenska Medier?
[Declining Trust in Swedish Media?].” In Misstron Mot Medier [Distrust of the Media], edited by
Truedson, L., 84–99. Stockholm: Institutet fo €r mediestudier.
€mb€ack, J., Y. Tsfati, H. Boomgaarden, A. Damstra, E. Lindgren, R. Vliegenthart, and T.
Stro
Lindholm. 2020. “News Media Trust and Its Impact on Media Use: Toward a Framework for
Future Research.” Annals of the International Communication Association 44 (2): 139–156.
Stroud, N. J. 2008. “Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept of Selective
Exposure.” Political Behavior 30 (3): 341–366.
Suiter, J., and R. Fletcher. 2020. “Polarization and Partisanship: Key Drivers of Distrust in Media
Old and New?” European Journal of Communication 35 (5): 484–501.
Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” In
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, 7–24. Chicago, IL:
Nelson-Hall.
Thorbjørnsrud, K., and T. U. Figenschou. 2020. “The Alarmed Citizen: Fear, Mistrust, and
Alternative Media.” Journalism Practice : 1–18. Advance online publication. doi:10.1080/
17512786.2020.1825113.
Thorson, K., K. Cotter, M. Medeiros, and C. Pak. 2021. “Algorithmic Inference, Political Interest,
and Exposure to News and Politics on Facebook.” Information, Communication & Society 24
(2): 183–200.
Tsfati, Y. 2010. “Online News Exposure and Trust in the Mainstream Media: Exploring Possible
Associations.” American Behavioral Scientist 54 (1): 22–42.
Tsfati, Y., and G. Ariely. 2014. “Individual and Contextual Correlates of Trust in Media across 44
Countries.” Communication Research 41 (6): 760–782.
Tsfati, Y., and J. N. Cappella. 2003. “Do People Watch What They Do Not Trust?: Exploring the
Association between News Media Skepticism and Exposure.” Communication Research 30 (5):
504–529.
Tsfati, Y., and Y. Peri. 2006. “Mainstream Media Skepticism and Exposure to Sectorial and
Extranational News Media: The Case of Israel.” Mass Communication and Society 9 (2):
165–187.
Vallone, R. P., L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper. 1985. “The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased
Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre.” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 49 (3): 577–585.
€mb€ack, T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. H. de Vreese, J. Matthes, D. Hopmann, et al.
Van Aelst, P., J. Stro
2017. “Political Communication in a High-Choice Media Environment: A Challenge for
Democracy?” Annals of the International Communication Association 41 (1): 3–27.
van Dalen, A. 2020. “Journalism, Trust, and Credibility.” In The Handbook of Journalism Studies,
edited by Hanitzsch, T., and K. Wahl-Jorgensen. (Red.). 2nd ed., 356–371. London: Routledge.
Vanacker, B., and G. Belmas. 2009. “Trust and the Economics of News.” Journal of Mass Media
Ethics 24 (2–3): 110–126.
852 K. ANDERSEN ET AL.

Weibull, L. 2013. “Ar€ Partipressen Do €d Eller Levande? Reflexioner Från Ett Presshistoriskt
Seminarium. [Is the Party Press Dead or Alive? A Reflection from a Press Historical Seminar.].”
Nordicom-Information 35 (1–2): 37–48.
Weibull, L., I. Wadbring, and J. Ohlsson. 2018. Det Svenska Medielandskapet: traditionella Och
Sociala Medier i Samspel Och Konkurrens. [The Swedish Media Landscape: Traditional and Social
Media in Interaction and in Competition]. Stockholm: Liber.

Appendix A

Table A1. Descriptive statistics for all variables.

Variables M SD Min Max a N
Alternative news orientation
Wave 1 2.74 1.25 1 6 .90 2,189
Wave 2 2.70 1.27 1 6 .91 1,783
Wave 3 2.74 1.29 1 6 .91 1,733
Wave 4 2.70 1.26 1 6 .91 1,500
Media trust
Wave 1 3.14 .98 1 5 .83 2,228
Wave 2 3.26 1.02 1 5 .85 1,806
Wave 3 3.24 1.03 1 5 .86 1,755
Wave 4 3.32 1.05 1 5 .87 1,520
Use of traditional news media
Wave 1 3.11 .88 1 6 .50 2,158
Wave 2 3.18 .85 1 6 .50 1,771
Wave 3 3.16 .84 1 6 .35 1,714
Wave 4 3.23 .85 1 6 .43 1,464
Interest in news
Wave 1 4.02 .90 1 5 .76 2,221
Wave 2 4.14 .84 1 5 .74 1,817
Wave 3 4.12 .84 1 5 .74 1,754
Wave 4 4.14 .82 1 5 .72 1,529
Political trust
Wave 1 2.33 .70 1 4 2,278
Social trust
Wave 1 3.56 .97 1 5 2,272
Gender
Wave 1 .51 .50 0 1 2,291
Age
Wave 1 3.68 1.75 1 6 2,291
Education
Wave 1 .25 .43 0 1 2,291