Civil Wars

ISSN: 1369-8249 (Print) 1743-968X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fciv20

Transborder Ethnic Kin and the Dynamics of Peace

Processes: Insights from the Kurdish Conflict

Sinem Arslan

To cite this article: Sinem Arslan (2019): Transborder Ethnic Kin and the Dynamics of Peace
Processes: Insights from the Kurdish Conflict, Civil Wars, DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2019.1667721

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2019.1667721

Published online: 09 Oct 2019.

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CIVIL WARS
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2019.1667721

Transborder Ethnic Kin and the Dynamics of Peace

Processes: Insights from the Kurdish Conflict
Sinem Arslan
Michael Nicholson Centre for Conflict and Cooperation, University of Essex, Essex, UK

ABSTRACT
Previous literature explains peace negotiations mainly with country-level factors or
events related to the countries where the peace efforts take place. This closed polity
approach contrasts with contemporary peace processes where the actors and
demands transcend nation-state boundaries. This paper challenges this dominant
understanding in the peace process literature and focuses on the role of the rebel
groups’ transborder kin connections in affecting peace process dynamics. By study-
ing the Kurdish Peace Process conducted between the Government of Turkey and
the PKK, the paper argues that the transborder kin connections can both remedy
and exacerbate bargaining problems acute to peace processes.

Introduction
‘The developments in Northern Syria are the most important factors that
affected the peace process in Turkey’ said the former deputy PM, Besir Atalay
who was the leading actor during the peace negotiations (Al Jazeera Turk
2015). For more than 30 years, the government was at war with the Kurdish
rebel group PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and finally, both sides seemed to
find a common ground. What the deputy PM was referring to; was that Turkey’s
domestic peace process was affected by the PKK’s transborder kin group in
Syria, the PYD (Democratic Union Party) who recently declared a de-facto
autonomy along the Turkish borders.1
A similar stance came from Selahattin Demirtas, the leader of the Pro-Kurdish
political Party HDP in Turkey. Demirtas said that the future of the peace process in
Turkey was dependent on the developments in Rojava, mentioning the name of
the autonomous region in Northern Syria under the control of the PKK’s trans-
border kin group PYD (Milliyet 2014). Likewise, Murat Karayilan the executive
council member of the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) that is the Pan
Kurdish umbrella organisation that subsumes both the PKK and PYD declared
that the peace process ended because Turkey supported the ISIS attacks against
the PKK’s ethnic kin in Syria (Dicle 2017).

CONTACT Sinem Arslan sinem@peaceresearch.org

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 S. ARSLAN

Yet, while the main actors of the Kurdish Conflict underline the critical
role of PKK’s transborder ethnic kin group (hereafter TEK) in the peace
process, neither the civil war peace processes literature in general, nor the
Kurdish Conflict literature in particular seem to bring a satisfactory explana-
tion how and by which theoretical mechanism the transnational dynamics
affect peace processes in civil wars.
The literature conceptualises peace processes as bargaining between the
government and rebel groups, in which the former enjoys a military superiority
and legitimacy2 (Salehyan 2009). Accordingly, the literature positions the govern-
ments as the sole veto player before the negotiations, and suggests that unless
the war reveals the necessary information about the heightened rebel military
capabilities, the governments will not be seeking a settlement3 (Zartman 1995,
Clayton 2013). The government’s exclusive veto power is challenged during
negotiations where the rebels also have to give concessions and hence veto
proposals. Consequently, the bargaining failure is attributed to actors’ inability of
dividing the stakes and their lack of commitment (Walter 2002, 2009).
However, if the government’s motivation for peace is correlated with the
rebels’ willingness and capacity for violence, or the failure is about the indivisi-
bility of stakes and commitment problems, then such factors can certainly be
shaped by the existence of a cooperative TEK who provides the rebels tangible
and intangible resources for mobilisation (Cederman et al. 2009, 2013, Forsberg
2015). Yet, the peace process literature overlooks such dynamics.4
Similarly, as noted by Kaya and Lowe (2017), Kurdish politics are also
commonly analysed within the borders of the nation-states5. Scholars working
on the Kurdish peace process often make emphasis on the role of electoral
considerations (Casier et al. 2011, Tezcur 2013, Balta 2016). Those who mention
the transnational dynamics of the process either underline the encouraging
role the role of TEK connections (Candar 2012b, Gunter 2013, Gurses 2015) or
emphasise their damaging potential (Larrabee 2013, Gunter 2014c). Yet, to
date, there is no scholarly work that theorises how both the initiation and
failure can be the outcome of the same transborder factors.
Despite this background, this study aims at offering a theoretical framework
that explains how transnational ethnic kin groups can affect peace processes in
civil wars and how these seemingly contradictory prepositions can co-exist
within the same process. Following the bargaining theory of war, the paper
conceptualises the peace process as bargaining between the belligerents, and
the rebel group’s cooperation with its TEK group as its ‘outside option’ to reach
its demands6. The cooperative TEK groups constitute an ‘outside option’ for
rebels because by providing mobilisation opportunities they greatly increase
the rebels’ capacity towards achieving their political aims, instead of attaining
them through peace process7. The framework suggests that; the ability of an
actor to impose its alternative rather than seek the best outcome within the
bargaining; would make the bargaining more attractive for the other actor
 CIVIL WARS 3

(Powell 2002, Gent 2011). In the case of TEK cooperation, the rebels’ ability to
attain their goals in an alternative way and the government’s inability to contain,
would increase the government’s expected cost of war. Consequently, the
information problems would be resolved leading the government to seek
a negotiated settlement to avoid costly consequences. On the rebel side, as
the decision to start negotiations bring advantages (Svensson 2007), if the rebel
group cooperates with its TEK, civil war actors would be more likely to negotiate.
As noted, TEK cooperation while presenting opportunities for rebels,
increases the cost of war for the government. Consequently, they also
make the actors’ incompatibilities much harder to resolve. Moreover, TEK
cooperation by contributing to rebel mobilisation, signals a shift in the
relative balance of power. As a result, it inhibits the actors’ ability to commit
in the long term because actors’ bargaining position changes when their
relative power changes (Werner 1999, Jenne 2007, Powell 2012). Therefore,
while on one hand, TEK groups would lead to negotiations by resolving the
information problems, on the another, they can cause them to break down
by contributing to the indivisibility of stakes and commitment problems.
The paper tests this proposed theoretical mechanism on the 2012 Kurdish
peace process in Turkey. It contributes to the wider literature on the civil war
peace processes, bargaining, and the Kurdish studies both theoretically and
empirically. Theoretically, it contributes to the existing studies of peace processes
by looking at the wider environment and integrating the impact of transnational
ethnic kin groups that was largely overlooked by the peace process literature. As
a second theoretical contribution, it uses the insights of the bargaining theory of
war and shows that an outside option available to the weaker party in asym-
metric ethnic warfare can both resolve and exacerbate the bargaining problems
during peace efforts. Hence, as a third theoretical contribution, it shows how the
seemingly contradictory arguments presented in Kurdish studies literature
regarding the peace maker and peace wrecker roles of the PKK’s ethnic kin in
Syria, can co-exist together. Empirically, the paper uses the theory-testing pro-
cess-tracing method and relies on the actual peace process meeting minutes and
systematic investigations of 1357 newspaper articles published during the pro-
cess which to date have not been utilised in other contexts.
I begin by describing briefly the Kurdish Question in Tukey and its transna-
tional dynamics, then I will discuss why the existing literature remains inade-
quate to explain the case at hand. Then, I will outline the theoretical mechanism
and derive several testable implications. In the methodology section, I will
discuss the data and the theory-testing process-tracing method that I will use
in this paper. On the result section, I will test my theoretical mechanism on the
2012 Peace Process in Turkey. Lastly, I will discuss the prospects and pitfalls for
peace from a conflict resolution perspective.
4 S. ARSLAN

Brief History of the Kurdish Question in Turkey and Its

Transborder Dynamics
Kurds are an ethnolinguistic community living in the Middle East. With the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, they have been dispersed among Iraq,
Syria, Turkey, and Iran where they become minorities (Gurses 2018). To date,
Kurds rebelled many times for the recognition of their national identity,
cultural rights, demands for regional autonomy and independence. In
Turkey, Kurdish political mobilisation started after the 1950s and has been
accommodated within fragmented socialist parties (Gunes 2012, Jongerden
and Akkaya 2019). However, these political parties have been crushed under
the military junta during the 1980s. The vacuum they created is filled by the
PKK who could escape and survive the government repression by conduct-
ing its operations from sanctuaries located in Syria and Lebanon and secur-
ing external support (Gunes 2019).
During the 1980s, the PKK established itself as the dominant actor in
Kurdish politics and the Kurdish Question in Turkey has turned into a civil
war (Gunes 2012). Even after the imprisonment of the PKK leader, Abdullah
Ocalan in 1999, despite ceasefires and intermitted years of non-violence, the
conflict did not terminate (Candar 2012a, Dicle 2017). PKK today is estimated
to have more than 10,000 armed insurgents in Turkey (Barkey 1993). The
group relies on recruitment not only from Turkey but also from Syria and
Iran, heavily supported by its diaspora, and effectively uses its sanctuaries in
northern Iraq (Tezcur 2014, p. 172). Since PKK’s first attack in 1984, the
conflict caused over 50 thousand lives, resulted with grave human rights
abuses and underdevelopment of the region (Çelik 2005, Yadirgi 2017,
Gurses 2018).
For many years, the government denied the Kurdish existence, and
framed the Kurdish identity as ‘errant Turks’ who should be Turkified with
assimilation policies (Barkey 1993). As a result, the Kurdish movement first
framed its demands around Pan Kurdish ideals of independence, then,
around the idea of democratic confederalism (Ocalan 2011, Akkaya and
Jongerden 2014). Since the 1990s, Kurdish demands were echoed on the
political sphere and Kurds established political parties which have been
abolished on the basis of supporting terrorist activities (Gunes 2019).
Today, Kurdish Question is represented in the parliament with the Pro-
Kurdish HDP that increased its vote share above the 10% threshold in
June 2015 elections when it participated for the first time as a party rather
than through independent candidates.
In Iran, Iraq, and Syria as well; Kurds have mobilised along ethnic lines
and had state-building experience. Although the 1946 Mahabad Republic of
Iran remained a short-lived one, the Kurds have been able to secure an
autonomous region in northern Iraq. In Syria; Assad regime’s withdrawal
 CIVIL WARS 5

from the north along the Turkish border in July 2012; led to the establish-
ment of a de facto autonomous region under Kurdish control.
The transborder cooperation among Kurdish groups in different countries
are not without its problems especially due to the historic rivalry between
the PKK in Turkey and KDP in Iraq over competing political aspirations and
the latter’s cooperation with Turkey (Allsopp and van Wilgenburg 2019; Kaya
and Whiting 2017). However, transnational ethnic ties also presented mobi-
lisation opportunities for the PKK and other Kurdish groups. In fact, the
survival of PKK was shaped by the availability of transnational recruitment,
funding, and military opportunities (Gunter 1991, Gurses 2015)
Since the 1990s, the Turkish government attempted to speak with the
PKK leader various times. However, these attempts were indirect and
revolved around the security dimension8 (Candar 2012a). Even the 2009
Kurdish Opening that aimed at recognising Kurdish democratic rights, con-
ducted by the National Intelligence Agency9 (Candar 2012a, Dicle 2017). The
failure of the process followed by militaristic measures. The Pro-Kurdish DTP
has been abolished, and 11 thousand people affiliated with the Kurdish
movement have been detained (Candar 2012b, Balta 2016). The government
even brought up the issue of the death penalty. (Milliyet 2011)
Yet, on 28 December 2012, the former PM and the current President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the start of a new process with Abdullah
Ocalan. His announcement was followed by the Pro-Kurdish party deputies’
delegation to Imrali Island (the prison where Ocalan is serving his life
sentence). Subsequently, Ocalan declared a cease-fire during the Newroz
celebrations. Despite the spoilers who assassinated three PKK members in
Paris; and before any legal guarantees that would protect the groups from
potential attacks, PKK accepted demobilisation. Not only for the first time
the negotiations were defined in conflict terms as a ‘peace process’ but also
saw the direct involvement of Ocalan and the government.
In this context, the 2012 peace process constituted a significant shift from
the government’s militaristic perspective (Ozpek 2018) but more impor-
tantly, it displayed particularities that the existing conflict resolution litera-
ture seems inadequate to explain.

The Existing Literature and Research Gap

The literature frames peace negotiations as bargaining where the govern-
ment has an exclusive veto power before the negotiation as it has most to
lose due to military superiority and legitimacy (Clayton 2013). Accordingly,
unless the war reveals the information about heightened rebel military, the
government will not be seeking a settlement (Walter 2009). In this context,
the literature underlines the importance of battlefield conditions such as
relative military capabilities, duration of war, and battle-related casualties.
6 S. ARSLAN

However, what makes the 2012 Kurdish Peace Process an outlier, was that
before the opening of negotiations, PKK’s military power was far from increasing
the government’s expected cost of war. While in 2012, the number of casualties
was the highest since 2004; the significant majority belonged to the rebel side
(Tezcur 2013). Consequently, some scholars suggested that what might have
created the leverage was the Pro-Kurdish party’s electoral success and the
government’s willingness to take the Kurdish support for constitutional changes
(Casier et al. 2011, Tezcur 2013, Larrabee 2013). However, this argument either,
does not fully explain why despite the Kurdish movement’s well-known stance
regarding democratisation, Ocalan statement’s that he would support it unless it
is based on democratic pillars (Ocalan 2015), and despite the electoral superiority
of the nationalist MHP, AKP had to rely upon the Pro-Kurdish Party as the only
potential ally.
According to the literature, during negotiations, the government’s exclu-
sive veto power is contested as the rebels also has to make concessions.
Consequently, the failure is attributed to the indivisibility of stakes and
commitment problems that are related to the main conflict issues and
content of the proposals (Walter 2009). In the Kurdish Conflict literature,
scholars suggested that the main reason of the incompatibility was the
electoral success of the Pro-Kurdish HDP at the expense of AKP (Balta
2016, Ozpek 2018). However, this argument has several shortcomings.
First, it does not fully recognise the Kurdish side as a veto player in the
bargaining but leave the whole process to AKP initiative. Second, the fact
that the Kurdish movement strongly framed its election campaign on pre-
venting Erdogan’s political aspirations, suggests that such decision must be
endogenous to other major incompatibilities instead of being the main
source of incompatibility itself. Third, the actors’ statements about process
indicate they consider the failure way before the elections10 (Al Jazeera
2014, Calislar 2014, Cumhuriyet 2015, Dicle 2017).
As should be evident from the review, both the literature on peace process
and the Kurdish conflict often focus on the domestic determinants of the onset
and failure. While there are few important exceptions they offer two competing
explanations. Previous work either underlines the encouraging role of TEK
connections in the Kurdish Peace Process in terms of creating a leverage
(Gunter 2013, Gurses 2015, Balta 2015) or their conflict fuelling potential
(Larrabee 2013, Gunter 2014c, Itani and Stein 2016). But then if the TEK
cooperation creates a leverage, why the belligerents are unable to resolve
their incompatibilities? Especially when even in intractable conflicts, zero-sum
solutions seldom exist, alternative solutions can be created? (Walter 2009).
Despite this background, I aim to propose a theoretical mechanism that
step by step traces how the transborder kin groups affect the ‘onset’ and
‘failure’ of peace processes in civil wars which also contextualise these
seemingly competing explanations.
 CIVIL WARS 7

The Transborder Ethnic Kin and Dynamics of Peace Processes in

Civil Wars
As the first stage of my theoretical mechanism, following the insights of the
bargaining theory, I propose to conceptualise the rebel cooperation with its
TEK as an outside option for the challenger to achieve their political aims.
I argue that given the rebels are already in war (current stage) and have
demands (future stage); they have several options. They can have their
demands met through making a peace process with the government or
they can rely upon the support of their TEK and try to accomplish their
demands without a peace process. While the support of TEK groups should
not be taken for granted, as the ethnic cooperation is more about politics
than identity (Cederman et al. 2013), a cooperative TEK would increase the
rebels’ power.
The underlying rational is that the success of a rebellion depends on
the willingness and capacity for violence (Gurses 2018). In terms of will-
ingness, TEK groups would contribute to the polarisation of their kin in
the neighbouring country who would identify itself with its kin rather
than other groups that it shares the country (Forsberg 2008, 2015).
A mobilised TEK would also create a demonstration effect (Forsberg
2008, 2015) which would increase the rebel groups’ capacity, as the
collective action problem in terms of public mobilisation would be
resolved. For instance, the Al-Qamishli uprising and Kobani Siege in
Syria fuelled Pan Kurdish sentiments and Kurds rebelled in Turkey
(Kurdwatch 2009, Kaya and Whiting 2017). TEK groups can also provide
financial and military opportunities including sanctuaries (Cederman et al.
2009, 2013). Groups that are mobilised for similar causes can learn from
one another in terms of new tactics and intelligence (Bakke 2013, Gurses
2015). As a result, TEK cooperation constitutes an outside option for
rebels because it provides them the willingness and capacity to succeed
in their aims without needing a peace process.
As a second stage of the theoretical mechanism, I argue that the rebels’
ability to impose their alternative, would increase the expected cost of war
for the government (Gent 2011). Especially in the context of ethnic warfare,
this would intensify the fear of irredentism (Gurses 2015). As such the
information problems regarding the rebel capability would be resolved
and the negotiations would seem a much beneficial alternative. Even if
the decision-makers when choosing the best policy, would evaluate all
potential options, the government’s coercive power over insurgency ends
with its territorial borders (Salehyan 2009). Hence, for containing TEK coop-
eration, it has limited options. As in the case of Kurdish Conflict, govern-
ments can rely on international cooperation, cross-border operations, or try
to prevent the cooperation by maintaining close relations with the rebels’
8 S. ARSLAN

ethnic kin. Even so, the transborder connections are hard to contain.
Therefore, as the third stage of the mechanism, I argue that what would
lead the governments to seek a negotiated settlement would be the out-
come of its inability to contain the rebels’ transnational cooperation.11
Eventually, the governments are not the sole actors in the bargaining. As
the fourth stage of this mechanism; I propose that the rebels’ willingness to
make a peace negotiations would be the outcome of their expected utility
of bargaining versus their expected utility of their outside option. In the
negotiations stage, no matter what their true intentions are; rebel groups
have incentives to make a peace process. (Svensson 2007). Simply because
apart from offering the rebels a platform to express their demands and
evaluate their status from terrorists to political figures, peace negotiations
give them the time to rest and recover, and build stronger armies. Even if
they do not want to settle in the future and keep the armed rebellion going
on; they can always leave and use their increased position for better out-
comes. So, in the presence of a cooperative TEK, civil war actors are more
likely to start a peace process.
Yet, while the TEK cooperation would lead to a peace processes, it
would also make them more likely to break down. The success of nego-
tiations depends first on the actors’ ability to resolve their incompatibility,
and second, on their commitment. TEK cooperation exacerbates both of
these problems. In terms of incompatibility, TEK cooperation creates new
ones because it affects the belligerents in conflicting ways. While on one
hand it increases the government’s expected cost of war, on the other it
has both strategic and symbolic importance for rebels. Moreover, TEK
cooperation makes these stakes largely indivisible as neither side can
get its own way without depriving the other. Since it contributes to
rebel power, it also gives them the power to not surrender12. But more
importantly, TEK cooperation challenges the actors’ ability to commit.
Peace agreements reflect the belligerents’ power balances (Werner
1999). What causes the negotiations not to lead to an actual agreement
but to a failure, is that TEK cooperation signal a constant shift in the
relative balance of power. As the actors do not know whether such
balances would be in their favour, they cannot commit themselves to
an agreement (Powell 2012). Even if they do, they would more be likely to
renege as their bargaining position would change when their power
balances change (Werner 1999). As such, as the fifth stage of my theore-
tical mechanism I suggest that in the presence of TEK cooperation, the
peace processes would be more likely to break down.13
As the causal mechanisms are unobservable entities, I derive several
testable implications. If the theoretical causal mechanism outlined above is
present in the 2012 Kurdish Peace Process; then, (1) TEK cooperation should
present opportunities for PKK to reach its demands, (2) the cooperation
 CIVIL WARS 9

should increase the expected cost of the war for the government (3) the
inability to contain such linkages should lead the government to seek
a peace process (4) the peace process should also be beneficial for the
rebels (5) TEK cooperation should create a major source of contention and
signals a shift relative balance of power leading to the failure.

Research Design
Since the article aims at testing a causal mechanism, the best suited method
would be the theory-testing process tracing. In theory-testing process tra-
cing, the researcher selects a case then outlines a causal mechanism and
tests whether or not there is evidence for each part of this mechanism
(Beach and Pedersen 2013). However, it is important to note there can be no
claim regarding the proposed pathway is the only pathway towards the
outcome, since social science outcomes are not monocausal but have
equifinality and it is hard to control the effect of confounding variables
(Bennett and Checkel 2015).
As data, this research relies on the actual peace process meeting minutes
and systematic investigation of all articles that mention the peace process
published in the Hurriyet Newspaper. In total, the sample covers the period
between 19 July 2012 and 22 July 2015. The dates have been chosen on the
basis that 19 July 2012 indicates the date when PKK’ and PYD increased
cooperation as a result of the changing political opportunity structures in
Syria and 22 July 2015 indicates PKK’s Ceylanpinar attack which was fol-
lowed by the resumption of violence. Hurriyet is chosen on the basis that it
provides the best internet coverage.
At first glance, the data reveal that among 1357 articles that mention
peace process, 242 articles consisting 18% of the full sample were related to
PKK’s ethnic kin. A similar dynamic is also evident in meeting minutes, in
90% of the meetings, PYD related matters have been discussed.
A percentage that is highly unlikely to observe if the peace process was
solely related to domestic factors. Especially considering that these actors
are rarely allowed to meet one another by the government.

PKK-PYD Cooperation and the PKK’s Demands of Democratic

Confederalism
The Kurds in Syria and in Turkey have strong ties (Gunes and Lowe 2015).
Not only the new nation-state borders divided the tribes but also following
1920–1930s rebellions in Turkey many Kurds have resettled in Syria (Van
Bruinessen 2000, Jwaideh 2006, Gurses 2018). Until the Syrian Civil War,
Kurds in Syria constituted a dormant group, their mobilisation was sup-
pressed by the Syrian regime (Gunter 2014a). Although in 2003, former
10 S. ARSLAN

members of PKK have established the PYD in Syria; the cooperation among
groups remained limited14. The geopolitical changes during Syrian Civil War,
gave the PYD and official defence units, the YPG (People’s Protection Units)
the ability to capture three cantons that it names as Rojava (Itani and Stein
2016). This shift in the openness of the political opportunity structure
resulted with increased cooperation and enabled PKK to expand its sphere
of influence and advance its political objectives.
Since its foundation, PKK framed its demands around the idea Pan
Kurdish ideals of independence. Then, after the imprisonment of its leaders,
following his court defences and institutional changes, it adopted the idea
of radical democracy that stands on the pillars of the democratic republic,
democratic autonomy, and democratic confederalism (Ocalan 2011, Akkaya
and Jongerden 2014). While the democratic republic proposes the demo-
cratisation and decentralisation of states; democratic autonomy refers to
a bottom up self-governance, and the democratic confederalism links these
units in all parts of Kurdistan (Ocalan 2011, Akkaya and Jongerden 2014).
Basically, what Ocalan (2011) proposes is the decentralisation and democra-
tisation of states in a way that permits autonomous but unified Kurdish self-
rule without interfering state boundaries.
I argue that PKK’s cooperation with the PYD and the latter’s success in
securing an autonomous region in Northern Syria facilitated the PKK to
reach its aims of Democratic Confederalism by four different mechanisms,
First, Rojava marked the first practical application of Ocalan’s democratic
autonomy (Yildiz 2016, Lowe 2016). Prior to Rojava; the PKK and PKK
affiliated groups that follow Ocalan’s ideology never had the experience of
liberated zones (Gurses 2018). Even though the PYD’s aspirations are limited
to Syria; if the democratic autonomy project would be successful, then it
could be applied to different parts of Kurdistan (Kaya and Lowe 2017).
Second, Rojava created a demonstration effect, inspired Kurds and
made the idea of unified Kurdistan much feasible. Right after Rojava;
the major of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir declared that the only way for
peace was to establish unified Kurdish autonomous regions whose capi-
tals should be Qamishli (Syria), Diyarbakir (Turkey), Erbil (Iraq) and
Mahabad (Iran) (Hurriyet 2012a). On the Iranian front, PKK’s offshoot
PJAK also proposed a similar canton model (Gunes and Lowe 2015).
With the inspiration of Rojava, PKK increased the intensity of attacks,
switched to conventional warfare in Semdinli province with the aim of
seizing towns inside Turkey.
Third, PKK cooperation also increased mobilisation in the name of the
Kurdish cause. Kurds around the world joined the rebel ranks (Kaya and
Lowe 2017). During the same period, hunger strikes started in Turkey. Their
numbers quickly reached to ten thousand. Forth, PYD cooperation also
enabled the group a stronger presence in Syria where it can conduct its
 CIVIL WARS 11

operations towards Turkey. PKK in fact heavily benefited from a similar

structure in northern Iraq where it can rest and conduct hit-and-run attacks
(Gunter 2014c, Gurses 2015, Gunes 2019).

PKK-PYD Cooperation and the Government

The rise of PYD and its increasing cooperation with the PKK was perceived
as a national security threat by the government (Gunter 2014b, Gunes and
Lowe 2015). Since the foundation, politics in Turkey have been dominated
by separatist fears owing the existence to the Treaty of Sevres that was
formalising the partition of the Empire by enabling Kurds to have their
autonomous region (Gunes and Zeydanligolu 2014). Although never imple-
mented, it contributed to the way the Turkish government mistreated its
minorities (Gunes and Zeydanligolu 2014, Gunter 2014b)
PKK’ s armed struggle aggravated these concerns. Although the Turkish
military is the second biggest in NATO, it was unable to win the war
militarily. In this context, the PKK cooperation with the increasingly strong
PYD exacerbated the problem. Previously, Turkey had to control a 331-km
long border to prevent PKK cross-border attacks from Iraq. The rise of the
PYD along the Turkish border and its cooperation with the PKK added
another 900 km to this distance.
The newspaper articles reveal that political discourse is dominated by the
PKK presence in Syria and its security dimension (T24. 2012, Hurriyet 2012a;
Akin 2012.). Columnists were pointing out the emergency of the security
issue (Akyol 2012, Dogan 2012). Turkish analyst Nihat Ali Özcan wrote that
the PKK’s growing influence in Syria would provide the group recruitment,
logistics, intelligence, a sanctuary and it would be difficult to contain cross-
border leaks because law and intelligence are not regulated to deal with
these issues (Ozcan 2012). According to Ozcan (2012), PYD cooperation
would also help the PKK to obtain ammunition; explosives, arms which
would enable PKK to reach its aims more aggressively.
The security fear was also evident in the politicians’ speeches. Politicians
were afraid that PKK-PYD cooperation could provide PKK new sanctuaries,
encourage separatism, and can transform into the idea of Greater Kurdistan.
In July 2012; Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition party
CHP, in a letter addressed to PM outlined the security concerns regarding
PKK’s presence in Syria and called the parliament for an emergency meeting
(Hurriyet 2015). Right after the PKK’s conventional attack in Semdinli, the
CHP spokesperson Haluk Koc pointed out the PKK presence in Syria as the
main reason of this increased confidence:

PKK would like to give the message that; not only the neighbouring countries
but also Semdinli is under our control” (Hurriyet 2012b).
12 S. ARSLAN

The biggest reaction came from the PM Erdogan:

It’s impossible to tolerate the PKK and PYD cooperation in Northern Syria . . . .
there is nearly a Kurdish State in Syria . . . this constitutes a terror structure . . .
intervening is our most natural right, if terrorists threaten Turkey from the
Syrian border” (Hurriyet 2012c)

Erdogan also stated: ‘Forget the Kurdistan’ we will never tolerate imaginary
maps’ (Hurriyet 2012d). Similarly, in July 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ahmet Davutoglu, referring to the PKK’s sanctuary in Northern Iraq and on
PYD’s statements about their PKK cooperation said that:

The cooperation between PKK and PYD no longer remains at the ideological
level, there can be no second Qandil in Syria . . . . we have a right to intervene
(Hurriyet 2012e).

PKK-PYD Cooperation and Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey has always formulated its domestic and foreign policy around the
containment of the Kurdish Question. On the domestic level, assimilation
policies were complemented by counter-terrorism measures. In Kurdish
regions, massive number of soldiers deployed along with ‘Village Guards’,
emergency rule is declared, forced displacement policies were adopted, extra-
judicial activities of paramilitary were overlooked (Gunes 2012). On the inter-
national level; the government relied on cooperation with neighbouring
states, conducted cross-border operations. Although strongly opposed to its
establishment, the government also developed ties with the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) which is under the control of PKK’s historic rival
KDP and used its economic leverage on the KRG to control the PKK and the
Kurdish national aspirations (Balta 2015, Yildiz 2016).
While such measures already proven to be ineffective, another Kurdish
autonomy, this time affiliated with the PKK, exacerbated the anxiety as the
Turkish government makes no distinction between the two entities (see AKP
2018). In this context, Candar (2012b) notes that the Turkish government
had four options: First it could rely upon its cooperation with the KRG
president Masoud Barzani, who has close ties with non-PKK affiliated Kurds
in Syria to counter-balance PKK presence in Syria (Candar 2012b, Yildiz
2016). The second one; was to rely on the Syrian Opposition Forces fighting
against the regime as Turkey would prefer any neighbour to a PKK affiliated
one (Candar 2012b). The third one was to wage a military offensive either by
establishing buffer zones or by direct military intervention, and the last one
was according to (Candar 2012b) ‘Although not foreseeable in the near
future, is to reach a deal with the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan’.
 CIVIL WARS 13

The evidence suggests that Turkey tried to apply all of these measures to
curb the PKK-PYD cooperation. For instance, on 27 July Erdogan said:
Prime Minister Davutoglu is going to Erbil and will tell Barzani our determin-
ism, a buffer zone is also among our alternatives and our military is also
working over the issue.(Hurriyet 2012d)

However, although Davutoglu conducted a visit to Erbil; and this visit has been
reciprocated later on (Hurriyet 2012f), Barzani had limited influence over the
PKK linked Kurds in Syria. Then, Turkey tried to contact and pressure the PYD
to operate under the Turkish backed Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and
Barzani affiliated Kurdish National Council (KNC) but these efforts were also
futile. The Turkish government also supported various armed Syrian
Opposition groups (Idiz 2013, Gunes 2019), as well as adopted a more aggres-
sive military approach on the winter of 2012. For instance, 4 October 2012, the
government approved the bill allowing a military operation to Syria (Hurriyet
2012g), F-16s have been deployed to Diyarbakir, tanks have been deployed to
the Syrian border (Hurriyet 2012h, 2012i).
However, the military intervention clearly lacked international legitimacy
and risked to alienate Turkey’s allies (Tastekin 2015). In fact, the Turkish
government’s request of establishing buffer zone or intervening in Syrian
territories have been discredited by the international community. Moreover,
such moves also carried the risk of exacerbating the intensity. For instance,
in August 2012, the chairman of the KCK executive council Murat Karayilan
said: ‘If the Turkish state conducts an intervention to Western Kurdistan, all
Kurdistan would turn into a war zone’. (Takvim. 2012)
In this context, given the regional conditions, peace process constituted
an effort to stop the bill before it gets more expensive.

PKK-PYD Cooperation, Peace Process, and the PKK

The government reached Abdullah Ocalan first for the termination of the
ongoing hunger strikes, then finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. On
28 December 2018, the PM announced the peace talks. In January 2013, the
first meeting took place between Ocalan and the delegation of Pro- Kurdish
Party deputies under the presence of government representatives (Dicle
2017). Subsequent meetings followed. During 2013 Newroz celebrations
Ocalan called for a cease-fire.
Finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict had been demanded
various times by the Kurdish movement. In numerous occasions, they stated
their willingness to leave the armed struggle in exchange for the recognition
of their cultural and political rights. Despite the failure, 2009 process even so
slightly recognised some democratic rights (Tezcur 2014). Similarly, during
the 2012 process, the reforms allowed the Kurds to defend themselves in
14 S. ARSLAN

their mother tongue, enabled Kurdish education at the university level, and
the national oath is discontinued (Tezcur 2014)
But apart from ensuring democratic rights, the peace process was beneficial
from a realistic perspective. First, it forced the government to acknowledge
Ocalan as a legitimate negotiation partner. Over the years, the rebel leader was
portrayed as the ‘terrorist’. Yet now that the government started the negotia-
tions, both the government officials and the newspapers started to praise him.
For instance, AKP deputy Mehmet Metiner said that ‘Abdullah Ocalan is con-
tributing to Turkish democracy’ (Sozcu 2014). Columnist Emre Akoz said that
‘PKK is not terrorist, Ocalan is a reasonable politician’ (Akoz 2013)
Secondly, even so slightly negotiations improved the physical conditions
of Ocalan who was in forced isolation (Dicle 2017). Peace negotiations
enabled Ocalan to contact his family, lawyers and Pro-Kurdish deputies.
Third; the cease-fire gave PKK the ability to focus on its ethnic kin who
was at war in Syria (Yildiz 2016, Kaya and Lowe 2017) Although, their exact
number is disputable, earlier work suggests that PKK veterans contributed to
YPG ranks (Itani and Stein 2016, Kaya and Lowe 2017) which to some extent
may account for why PKK has accepted a risky demobilisation at the begin-
ning of the process without any legal guarantees. In fact, during his meeting
with the Kurdish politicians on 23 February 2013, Ocalan stated:
I do not believe that demobilization would be harmful to guerrilla; whichever
country we demobilize to; we will enlarge and expand the guerrilla, don’t
forget Syria, Iran, Iraq. (Ocalan 2015)

Lastly, and more importantly, the time Ocalan’s isolation coincided with the
historical gains of the Kurdish movement that follows his ideology. While
Rojava experience consisted of the first practical application of his ideology, it
remained out of his reach. The peace negotiations enabled Ocalan to transfer his
directives to PKK and PYD through Pro-Kurdish Party deputies. In fact, 90% of the
meeting-minutes consists of Ocalan’s directives to PKK and PYD. For instance; on
23 February and 24 June 2013 Ocalan gives directives about how to organise self-
defence units as well as with whom to collaborate in Syria (Ocalan 2015). Similarly,
on 3rd of April; Ocalan ask more PKK fighters to go to Syria; on 17 August 2013; he
requests KCK executives in Europe to organise the mobilisation in Syria (Ocalan
2015). Ocalan also often explains his views regarding what political moves PYD
should take regarding the peace conferences on Syria.

PKK-PYD Cooperation and the Fate of the Peace Process in

Turkey
After Ocalan’s calls for a cease-fire, PKK announced that its decision to withdraw
from Turkish territories and the demobilisation started (Hurriyet 2013). The
government on the other hand appointed a group of ‘wise people’, to broaden
 CIVIL WARS 15

the public support for the process (Ozpek 2018). Although AKP had to face with
significant domestic opposition; during to Gezi Park Uprising and the corrup-
tion scandal, Ocalan’s stance prevented them to become contentious issues
(Ocalan 2015). The first problem was experienced due to the government
unwillingness to make constitutional changes regarding the group’s demobi-
lisation. However, although the demobilisation stopped after 4 months, the
process continued. The meeting-minutes reveal that the major incompatibility
was in fact related to the PKK’s ethnic kin. Evidence suggests that although at
the beginning both sides were working on a mutually beneficial plan, over time
it became a zero-sum incompatibility. For instance, on 17 August 2013 Ocalan
states that he is working on a joint plan with the government on Syria.
I have spoken with the government representatives yesterday, I guess my
ideas will be put in practice, they will discuss them in the National Security
Council … we are working jointly with the government. (Ocalan 2015)

Yet, the meeting between Selahattin Demirtas and Ocalan indicates that
part of the problem was related to the Turkey’s insistence on PYD to join
Syrian Opposition (Ocalan 2015). Evidence also suggests after the second
half of 2013, with PYD’s declaration of autonomy and Turkey’s construction
of a wall along its Syrian border, their perspective become irreconcilable.
The meeting minutes indicate that Turkey’s position towards PYD met with
strong reaction. For instance, on 9 November 2013 Ocalan complains to the
Kurdish politicians about the government’s behaviour:
I have told them let’s make an alliance on Syria; but they have breached this
point. Now they are constructing a wall on the Syrian Border. Are you crazy?
What they really want is that the Kurds should not have any power in Syria . . . .
I have suggested them that the Turkish borders should start from northern
Aleppo, so instead of reinforcing borders between Turkey and Syria, you
should remove them. (Ocalan 2015)

During the meetings, the Pro-Kurdish Party delegates also transfer the
PM’s messages to Ocalan. On 9 November 2013, Sirri Surreya Onder tells to
Ocalan ‘the PM said he would do anything, but he has one red-line; which is
Syria; he will never allow an establishment like Northern Iraq in Syria’.
Ocalan’s answer is the same: ‘then you tell him, we will never let Syrian
Kurds to remain under the Syrian regime, and that’s our red-line’ (Ocalan
2015).
Situation worsened in 2014 as Turkey’s support towards the jihadist
groups in Syria is leaked to the press (Idiz 2014). Especially when Kurds in
Turkey, including the children of Kurdish politicians, are willing to die to
protect Rojava from their attacks (Hurriyet 2014a, Itani and Stein 2016). The
battle of Kobane in October 2014 was a breaking point in the process. The
refusal of the government to aid the Kurds during the ISIS siege and the
PM’s comments about Kobane’s fall resulted with massive uprisings that
16 S. ARSLAN

caused 50 lives (Hurriyet 2014b). Following the Kobane siege, KCK blamed
AKP for supporting ISIS, passing a bill approving the Turkish invasion to Syria
and announced that the peace process is over (Calislar 2014, Al Jazeera
2014). There are also allegations that the government has actually decided
the resolve the conflict with military means already by the end of 2014 (T24.
2015, Dicle 2017).
The developments concerning PYD were not just creating contention
but also changing the power balances between the belligerents. While
the PM was expecting the fall of Kobane, Kurds were able to fully capture
the town, expanded to Tell Abyad, and continued to capture more towns
as a result of their cooperation with US-led anti-ISIS Coalition. Although
US refrained to from official contacts with the YGP for long time, their
contact started with the siege of Kobane and improved over time (2019).
In turn, YPG started to operate under the banner of SDF (Syrian
Democratic Forces) along with different opposition groups which enabled
a direct US support. Yet, even by the end of 2014, the changing US policy
was already signalling a shift in power balances. It was this changing
balance of power, insecure environment where the actors do not know
where their power lies, that was making it impossible for both the PKK
and government to be able to agree on a long-term binding settlement.
As actors’ relative power changes, their bargaining position changes
(Jenne 2007, Powell 2012; Werner 1999). In fact, even if, the government
representatives and the Pro-Kurdish politicians met in Dolmabahce Palace
on 28 February 2015 and announced a 10-point draft peace proposal, the
government back down and refused to commit to the initial promises
(Milliyet 2015). PM blamed the Kurdish side for making additional
demands and denied his approval of the proposal (BBC 2015). While the
Kurdish side rejected the claims, a similar argument was made by the
deputy PM Besir Atalay:

The main incompatibility in the peace process was the development in Northern
Syria. The Kurdish side told me themselves, they said “now the conditions have
changed” The developments in Syria brought PKK a different the mentality.
(Aksam 2015)

The peace process was halted in June 2015 following the elections and ISIS
Suruc bombing. PKK blamed the government and resumed the violence
with Ceylanpinar attack. During summer, violence intensified. To deal with
the Kurdish Conflict, the government adopted securitization measures,
declared curfews resulting with massive destruction and human rights
abuses in Kurdish regions; prosecuted anyone including the academics
and intellectuals who oppose to these military means (Arslan 2016, Martin
2018). On the international level, from August 2016 onwards the govern-
ment launched several military offensives to Syria such as the Operation
 CIVIL WARS 17

Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch. While the Kurdish Question is yet to be
resolved, the research findings indicate that the prospects for resolutions
would be highly dependent on these pull and push dynamics created by the
PKK’s ethnic kin in Syria.

Conclusion
The existing studies of conflict resolution explain the civil war peace pro-
cesses from non-cooperative bargaining perspective and focus on the
importance of domestic conditions in changing the actors’ behaviour.
However, even though civil wars happen within the borders of nation-
states, its actors are widely connected with transgressing bonds to various
external actors around the world (Gleditsch 2007).
This paper aimed at challenging this closed polity approach often
adopted in the peace processes research. By looking at the 2012 Kurdish
Peace process in Turkey, I demonstrated that cross-border dynamics have
a significant impact on civil war peace processes. The data showed that not
only on the onset but also on the failure of peace processes transborder kin
relations alter bargaining dynamics. Findings indicate that before the nego-
tiations transborder kin groups have a positive effect on peace processes as
by increasing the cost of war for the government, they resolve the informa-
tion problems. However, their effect changes during the negotiations
because by making the stakes largely indivisible and signalling a change
in the balances of power they exacerbate the incompatibilities and commit-
ment problems.
The paper contributes to three different literature. First on the bargaining
literature by showing that an outside option available to the weaker party
alters the bargaining dynamics, second, to the broader literature on peace
processes by suggesting to look at the wider environment that the peace
efforts takes places, and third to the Kurdish studies literature by theorising
how the onset and the failure of the process can be the outcome of the
same transnational factors and why the seemingly contradictory position
can co-exist during the same process.
Then, what are the practical implications of this research and what are
the prospects and pitfalls of resolving the Kurdish Conflict? To answer this
question, one needs to distinguish first, between the negative and positive
peace concepts and then, between different stages of peace processes.
While the negative peace relates to the absence violence, positive peace
refers to the cessation of hostilities among communities. Negative peace
depends on the actors’ decision to negotiate, then their ability to find
a mutually beneficial agreement, but most importantly on their ability to
commit to the agreement (Walter 2002).
18 S. ARSLAN

Literature on other context shows that a mediator with a strong lever-

age especially over the government would push the parties towards
reaching a settlement (Svensson 2007). However, this still would not be
enough as sooner or later, one side may want to renege on its promises.
In this context, the literature suggests the need to draft self-sustainable
agreements (Fortna 2003), improving democracy and economy as they
can further contribute to grievances hence rebel mobilisation (Quinn et al.
2007, DeRouen et al. 2010). But most importantly the literature underlines
the crucial role of a credible guarantor that would punish the defector
(Walter 2002).
In the context of the Kurdish conflict, this suggests the need of a strong
great power such as the US on board who would mediate but also guaran-
tee the agreement. However, again the literature on mediation suggests
that third-party conflict resolution attempts should be preceded by the
stabilisation of the wider conflict environment (Jenne 2015). However,
even if the government and rebels can settle their differences and the
violence ends, establishing a durable peace requires reconciliation at the
community level. Especially in the Turkish context the deep-seated differ-
ences between communities have to be addressed with additional peace-
building measures.

Notes
1. I define Transborder kin groups as ‘groups that possess the same ethnic origin
and live densely on opposite sides of the borders’. Following Cederman et al.
(2013), I shorten transborder kin groups as TEK groups.
2. According to Cunningham et al. (2013) Non-State Actor Data, among 342 rebel
groups fighting between 1946 and 2008; 87% of them were weaker, 0.1%
could attain parity, 0.03% were stronger.
3. Peace negotiations elevate rebel status to political figures, signal other poten-
tial challengers that violence is rewarded. Consequently, all governments
refuse political settlements but instead label the rebels as ‘terrorists’ and try
to win the war.
4. Current literature on the transnational dynamics of civil wars is mostly concerned
with how such factors contribute to conflict onset (Salehyan 2009, Cederman
et al. 2013), duration (Cunningham 2010), increasing rebel demands (Jenne
2007). Few studies look at their effect on conflict settlement (Gurses 2015,
Arslan 2018) and settlement implementation (Furstenberg 2012, Arslan 2018).
5. Scholars who look at the transnational dynamics of the Kurdish Conflict are
mostly concerned with the Kurdish diaspora (Eccarius-Kelly 2019) and how
diaspora shapes the Kurdish culture, politics and nationalism (Van Bruinessen
2000, Natali 2004), military and political mobilisation (Adamson 2013), the role
of media in this process (Keles 2015).
6. The outside option has been conceptualised in various ways such as the
actors’ option to go to war (Fearon 1995, Gent 2011); any economic or political
 CIVIL WARS 19

option instead of violent mobilisation (Gates 2002) or rebel groups’ different

tactical choices (Bueno De Mesquita 2013).
7. It could be argued that since the rebel groups are weaker, a cooperative TEK
groups would not help them towards achieving their aims. Data suggests
otherwise. While only 0.03% of the rebel groups (1946–2008) are stronger,
10% of them won the war and 24% received significant concessions.
(Cunningham et al. 2013).
8. Before the imprisonment of the PKK Leader, former President Turgut Ozal, PM
Necmettin Erbakan, military officials attempted to speak with him through
intermediaries including Jalal Talabani, Sabri Ok and Muzaffer Ayata. Between
1999–2005 the talks were conducted face to face by the military (Candar
2012a, Dicle 2017).
9. 2009 process was the result of a series of back-channel talks that started in
2005. It was conducted between the PKK members (Zubeyir Aydar, Sabri Ok,
Adem Uzun; Remzi Kartal; Sozdar Avesta and Mustafa Karasu), Pro- Kurdish
Party DTP (Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk) and National Intelligence Agency
(Emre Taner and Hakan Fidan). Abdullah Ocalan was the most important veto
player but he was not present in the talks. Process was facilitated by Jalal
Talabani, Norwegian Government, London and Geneva-based conflict resolu-
tion centres (Dicle 2017).
10. The KCK executive members Sabri Ok and Cemil Bayik’s statements about the
failure dates back to 2014, the PM’s denial about the Dolmabahce agreement
again dates back to March 2015 (Al Jazeera 2014, Calislar 2014, Cumhuriyet
2015). Similarly, according to Dicle (2017) Ocalan’s acknowledgement of the
failure also dates back to March 2015.
11. My emphasis is on the ‘leverage’ created by this cooperation and the govern-
ment’s inability to contain. My argument is that in the Kurdish Peace Process,
this leverage was created by the PKK-PYD alliance which the government was
unable to prevent. This is not to discredit the role of the Iraqi Kurdish Groups
who contributed to the process by mediation efforts. But, first mediation
comes after the decision to negotiate, second, success of mediator depends
on its power over the civil war parties (Svensson 2007) and since Iraqi Kurds
are economically dependent on Turkey they are far from ensuring compliance.
12. Similar arguments have been made in the literature. Jenne (2007) argues that
such opportunities increase rebels’ demands and made them radicalise.
Fürstenberg (2012) argues that they give the rebels the power to walk away.
13. Then, why the actors negotiate despite the possibility of this incompatibility?
In peace processes, resolving the incompatibility depends on the quality of the
settlements which (despite back-channel talks) cannot be ‘perfectly’ known in
advance.
14. PYD is an offshoot of PKK but it is not an extension of it (Gurses 2018). Both
groups are members of the same umbrella structure, the KCK. They follow
Ocalan’s democratic autonomy ideology and have similar political and military
structures (Kaya and Lowe 2017). However, PYD, as with other groups in the
KCK structure has an autonomous rather than imposed decision-making
mechanism and its claims strictly covers Syria (Kaya and Lowe 2017). As PKK
is listed as a terrorist group; it is this autonomous structure and its ability to
cooperate with other groups within SDF in Syria that made the PYD as
a potential ally for the US during anti-ISIS campaign.
20 S. ARSLAN

Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Han Dorussen, Mehmet
Gurses, Tobias Bohmelt, Ismene Gizelis and two anonymous referees for commenting
on the earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Dr. Sinem Arslan is a Research Fellow at the Michael Nicholson Centre for Conflict
and Cooperation of the University of Essex. She completed her PhD at the University
of Essex and holds Master’s degrees from the London School of Economics and
Bogazici University. By using qualitative, quantitative, and GIS mapping techniques,
she investigates the dynamics of political violence comparatively. Her research
specifically focuses on the transnational dynamics of civil wars, civil war peace
processes, and terrorism within the context of civil wars.

ORCID
Sinem Arslan http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7931-7235

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