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Megatrends of World Politics
Megatrends of World Politics identifies globalization, integration, and

democratization as three key trends shaping the future of world politics and
international relations, and demonstrates their effects in today’s global processes.
The authors of this book discuss the essence of these three megatrends of world
politics, describing their dynamic and non-linear development, and exploring
how they manifest themselves. Assessing megatrends of world politics makes it
possible to predict further global political development. The authors proceed from
several assumptions: (1) megatrends are global – they operate everywhere around
the globe, although with different intensity and in diverse forms; (2) they influence
and sometimes generate a variety of other trends in today’s world politics; and (3)
megatrends are political. The three megatrends – globalization, integration, and
democratization – are identified and justified based on these three parameters;
then the authors analyze the influence and manifestation of megatrends in various
spheres of world politics, including terrorism, transregionalism, communication
technologies, migration, pandemics, and subnational regions.
This book will be of interest to students, scholars, and researchers of
international relations and adjacent fields who are studying the trajectories of
global development, globalization, integration, and democratization.
Marina M. Lebedeva is Professor and Head of the World Politics Department in

the Faculty of Governance and Politics at Moscow State Institute of International
Relations (MGIMO University), Russia.
Denis A. Kuznetsov is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Governance and

Politics at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University),
Russia.
Innovations in International Affairs
Series Editor: Raffaele Marchetti, LUISS Guido Carli, Italy
Innovations in International Affairs aims to provide cutting-edge analyses

of controversial trends in international affairs with the intent to innovate our
understanding of global politics. Hosting mainstream as well as alternative
stances, the series promotes both the re-assessment of traditional topics and the
exploration of new aspects.
The series invites both engaged scholars and reflective practitioners, and is
committed to bringing non-western voices into current debates.
Innovations in International Affairs is keen to consider new book proposals in
the following key areas:
• Innovative topics: related to aspects that have remained marginal in scholarly

and public debates
• International crises: related to the most urgent contemporary phenomena
and how to interpret and tackle them
• World perspectives: related mostly to non-western points of view
Titles in this series include:

International and Local Actors in Disaster Response
Responding to the Beirut Explosion
Tania N. Haddad
The Broken Promise of Global Advocacy
Inequality in Global Interest Representation
Marcel Hanegraaff and Arlo Poletti
Globalization, Integration and Democratization
Edited by Marina M. Lebedeva and Denis A. Kuznetsov
Africa–Europe Cooperation and Digital Transformation
Edited by Chux Daniels, Benedikt Erforth and Chloe Teevan
Heterarchy in World Politics
Edited by Philip G. Cerny
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/
Innovations-in-International-Affairs/book-series/IIA
Globalization, Integration and
Democratization
Edited by
Marina M. Lebedeva and
Denis A. Kuznetsov
First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 selection and editorial matter, Marina M. Lebedeva and Denis A.
Kuznetsov; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Marina M. Lebedeva and Denis A. Kuznetsov to be identified
as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their
individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and
78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-1-032-34191-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-34192-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-32094-4 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003320944
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents
Contributors vii
1 Megatrends and their reverse waves 1

MARINA M. LEBEDEVA
2 Taming the waves of globalization and democratization:

Global Governance of Megatrends 10
MAXIM KHARKEVICH
3 Subnational actors in the context of megatrends 20

SERGEY ARTEEV, EKATERINA SHLAPEKO, AND IVAN ULISES KENTROS KLYSZCZ
4 Megatrends and socio-humanitarian resources of world politics 29

LEILI RUSTAMOVA
5 Megatrends in world politics and technological development 38

ELENA ZINOVIEVA
6 Transregional integration amid megatrends 47

DENIS A. KUZNETSOV
7 Megatrends in the “Age of Migration” 54

DARIA KAZARINOVA
8 Changing diasporas: (De)structuring by and of megatrends 63

IVAN D. LOSHKARIOV
9 Nationalism and Religious Fundamentalism as challenges to

megatrends of world development 72
KSENIA BORISHPOLETS
vi Contents
10 Megatrends of world politics in the face of international
terrorism’s challenges 81
HASAN R. JABBARINASIR, BAHRI KH. BAHRIEV, AND ALI M. RAJABZADEH
11 Hybridization as a result of megatrends in modern education 90

PETR KASATKIN AND AMINA MAKAROVA
12 COVID-19 and world politics: Does pandemic reverse the

megatrends? 101
MARINA M. LEBEDEVA AND DENIS A. KUZNETSOV
Index 109
Contributors
Sergey Arteev, PhD (Political Science), Senior Lecturer, MGIMO University,

Moscow, Russia; Researcher, Primakov Institute of World Economy and
International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.
Bahri Kh. Bahriev, PhD (Political Science), Senior Lecturer, MGIMO University,
Moscow, Russia; Associate Professor, Moscow Metropolitan Governance
Yury Luzhkov University, Moscow, Russia.
Ksenia Borishpolets, PhD (Political Science), Professor, MGIMO University,
Moscow, Russia.
Hasan R. Jabbarinasir, PhD (Political Science), Researcher, Institute for Social
and Cultural Studies of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, Iran; Research Fellow, Institute for
International Studies, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia.
Petr Kasatkin, PhD (Philosophy), Professor, MGIMO University, Moscow,
Russia.
Daria Kazarinova, PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, RUDN
University, Moscow, Russia.
Ivan Ulises Kentros Klyszcz, Junior Researcher, University of Tartu, Estonia.
Maxim Kharkevich, PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, MGIMO
Denis A. Kuznetsov, PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, MGIMO
Marina M. Lebedeva, PhD (Political Science), Professor, Head of Department
of World Politics, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia.
Ivan D. Loshkariov, PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, MGIMO
Amina Makarova, PhD (Pedagogy), Lecturer, RUDN University, Moscow,
Russia.
viii Contributors
Ali M. Rajabzadeh, Senior Lecturer, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran,
Iran.
Leili Rustamova, PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, MGIMO
University, Moscow, Russia; Researcher, Primakov Institute of International
Relations and World Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow,
Russia.
Ekaterina Shlapeko, PhD (Political Science), Research Associate, Institute
of Economics, Karelian Research Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences,
Petrozavodsk, Russia.
Elena Zinovieva, PhD (Political Science), Professor, MGIMO University,
Moscow, Russia.
1 Megatrends and their
reverse waves
Marina M. Lebedeva
What is meant by (mega)trends and phases of

the political development of the world?
Attention to the megatrends of world politics as sustainable, long-term, and world-
wide political development processes is primarily due to attempts to determine the
vector and patterns of world political changes, as well as to identify the contours
of the political organization of the world in the future, which is important from an
analytical and prognostic point of view.
Megatrends are manifested in various spheres – in the economy, education,
technology, etc. One of the first who introduced the concept of a megatrend,
one way or another connected with politics, was John Naisbitt. He identified
ten megatrends that can be combined into three large categories: (1) scientific
and technical development; (2) socio-psychological characteristics of society
(self-reliance); (3) changes in the United States (Naisbitt, 1982). Later, studies
of megatrends continued, although the concept itself was used infrequently.
As a result, a huge number of studies in the world are devoted to the analysis
of such processes as globalization, integration, migration, etc. In some cases,
megatrends also include the issues of digitalization, ecology, etc. (see, for
example, Megatrendy …, 2022).
It hardly makes sense to consider all processes and trends in the world as
megatrends, since in this case the specificity of megatrends is lost. It seems
that it is necessary to identify criteria for determining the processes that meet
the megatrend of world politics. Among these criteria should include the fact
that:
1. Megatrends are global, i.e., they operate everywhere, although with differ-
ent strengths and manifest themselves differently in different regions of the
world;
2. Megatrends have a long-term nature of action, calculated for decades or
more;
3. Megatrends have a political nature. Scientific and technological develop-
ment, digitalization are only a condition, a factor, and a background for them,
but in themselves they are not a megatrend of world politics.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003320944-1
2 Marina M. Lebedeva
These criteria are met by the process of globalization, which most scholars recog-
nize as a megatrend. At the same time, there are many definitions of globalization
(see, for example, Scholte, 2002). Moreover, it is possible to meet mutually exclu-
sive definitions of globalization. This is largely due to the fact that the phenom-
enon of globalization affects different aspects of economic, political, and social
reality. Accordingly, globalization is studied by specialists from different fields,
namely economists, sociologists, political scientists, researchers of international
relations, etc., each of which highlights its own aspect of study. In addition, the
term “globalization”, having become popular, came to the attention of journalists,
who interpret it quite freely.
In this chapter globalization is understood as the process of transnationaliza-
tion (transparency of national borders of states), which leads to a sharp increase
in the scale of movement of people, things, and ideas across national borders
(Mansbach & Taylor, 2012: 577; Ritzer, 2010: 2). In many ways, transnationali-
zation has become possible due to the current stage of the scientific and techno-
logical revolution.
Globalization contributes to the development of integration processes, which
form the second megatrend in world politics. However, integration, being the sec-
ond megatrend, unlike globalization, implies the mandatory conclusion of inter-
state agreements. Another feature of integration is that despite the development of
integration processes around the world (and in this sense integration as a process
meets the selected criteria), specific integration entities are limited, as a rule, by
regional borders.
The third megatrend that meets the criteria is the democratization of the world.
This megatrend, unlike the previous two, is less obvious. Nevertheless, in his-
torical terms, according to S. Huntington, there is an increase in the number of
democratic states in the world (Huntington, 1991). This process is primarily due
to the transformation of the political systems of states. In addition, as a result of
globalization, many actors take part in the development and lobbying of world
policy decisions. Democratization has been also influenced by integration, which
stimulates cooperation. At the same time, democratization cannot be reduced to
the first two megatrends.
Other processes that meet the above criteria, such as migration, can be
explained by globalization, which has opened borders for human flows, as well as
by integration, which is clearly seen in the example of the European Union.
Such a picture of reality, where only three of these megatrends operate, seems
to be too idyllic, which does not correspond to current realities. In order to remove
this discrepancy, one should use the idea of S. Huntington about the undulating
nature of political development. Analyzing the process of democratization in the
world, S. Huntington showed that the next wave of democratization is followed
by its rollback (Huntington, 1991). It appears that the same pattern of develop-
ment is inherent in the processes of globalization and integration, i.e., they have
their opposite vectors of development (trends): globalization–de-globalization;
integration–disintegration; democratization is the development of de-democrati-
zation processes. In other words, the political development of the world, like any
Megatrends and their reverse waves 3
development, is not a linear process. At the same time, development has a direc-
tion. This was well demonstrated by S. Huntington on the example of democrati-
zation. He showed that throughout the history, the number of democratic countries
in the world has increased, despite the rollback waves. In other words, the vector
of development is directed towards democratization.
In general the vector of development is aimed at megatrends, namely globali-
zation, integration, and democratization. They are opposed by trends (rollback
waves) of de-globalization, disintegration, and de-democratization. In the real-
time period, both megatrends and opposite trends are realized. However, some of
them dominate.
Along with (mega)trends, world politics develops through the change of
two phases: the phase of evolution (ordering and development of structures),
when new structures are built gradually, and the revolutionary phase, when
existing structures are destroyed (chaotic structures). These phases cover the
global world and manifest themselves in all spheres of international relations
and world politics throughout the centuries-old history of world development
(Lebedeva, 2012).
The phase of ordering global political development manifests itself in the
creation of various formal and informal structures – intergovernmental organiza-
tions, interstate “clubs”, coalitions, unions, forums, including state and non-state
structures. The end of the 20th to the beginning of the 21st centuries, in which a
new technological order is being formed, is largely characterized by internal and
international conflicts, the restructuring of the world order (Pantin, 2017), i.e.,
the manifestation of the phase of chaotization, the breakdown of existing struc-
tures. This phase can be traced in such processes as the collapse of alliances and
coalitions, the bipolar system of international relations, the obvious non-compli-
ance with international norms, treaties, etc., the emergence of new phenomena,
the nature of which is poorly consistent with what happened before, etc. Both
phases of world political development come into the focus of attention of leading
researchers, although, firstly, they use different terms to describe them, and sec-
ondly, they focus more on either the revolutionary phase, or, on the contrary, on
the evolutionary phase. For example, R. Keohane and J. Nye in 1972 concentrated
on the analysis of the processes associated with chaos within the Westphalian
system, drawing attention to its erosion due to the activation of non-state actors
in quantitative and qualitative terms (Keohane & Nye, 1971). In turn, for exam-
ple, D. Lake focused his attention on studying the phase of ordering the political
organization of the world at the beginning of the 21st century, analyzing states
and their unions. He showed how regional coalitions are formed and how they
function in the modern world (Lake, 2009). Despite the fact that R. Keohane and
J. Nye, as well as D. Lake consider a large, but still the same historical period
associated with the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st
century, they pay attention to different phases. Obviously, the list of such exam-
ples can be significantly increased. Both phases of development – ordering and
chaos – flow together throughout history, but at one time or another one of the two
phases is especially active. At present, apparently, there is a significant activation
of the chaotization phase. Under these conditions, trends that are opposite to glo-
balization, integration, and democratization begin to appear actively.
Globalization vs. de-globalization

Globalization is the leading megatrend of world development, as it has a signifi-
cant impact on the other two megatrends due to the erosion of the basis of the
political organization of the world – the state-centered Westphalian system. At the
same time, of course, there is also the impact of integration and democratization
on globalization. Globalization is discussed most widely by scholars, although the
peak of research on globalization falls at the end of the 20th century. Recently,
the issues of studying globalization have declined. This, apparently, is not acci-
dental, since at present the features of de-globalization have begun to manifest
themselves more and more in the world.
Having defined globalization as a process of border transparency, a number
of clarifications need to be made. First of all, globalization does not necessarily
lead to unification, which is claimed by some of scholars and even reflected in the
educational literature, although some models are unified (this largely applies to
business activities). In each region and in each sphere, globalization has its own
specifics (see, i.e., Many Globalizations …, 2002). At the same time, the process
of globalization itself, of course, has both positive and negative sides.
If the globalization megatrend is a process largely driven by technological,
economic development, the de-globalization trend provides for a certain state pol-
icy in the form of isolationism. To a large extent, isolationist tendencies were the
result of a reaction to the rapid development of globalization (i.e., the “opening”
of national borders) at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries, with all its political,
economic, and social costs.
The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly exacerbated de-globalization trends in
many ways. In the economic sphere, de-globalization has significantly affected
passenger transport, hotel business, etc. in the social sphere, direct interaction,
and communication between people. Thus, the transfer to online work, which
was previously typical for representatives of the IT sector, became the norm in
many companies operating in various sectors of the economy during the pandemic
(Carracedo et al., 2021). In the political sphere, tendencies toward the sovereigni-
zation of a number of states have sharply increased.
As a result, starting in 2010, assumptions about the end of globalization began
to appear more and more often (see, i.e., Girod, 2016; Karaganov, 2021). However,
the processes of globalization and de-globalization intertwined quite intricately
during the pandemic: along with the trend of de-globalization, a globalization meg-
atrend began to develop in terms of transnational communication on various digital
platforms, which manifested itself in the field of higher education, holding various
kinds of conferences, etc. On this basis, V. Naumkin concluded that the pandemic
is to a certain extent globalization, because one of the consequences of the COVID-
19 pandemic was the rapid development of digitalization (Naumkin, 2021).
In general, globalization, on the one hand, entails the chaoticization of the
Westphalian system, on the other – the building and ordering of new network con-
nections. In turn, de-globalization represents a return to the nation-state, but at the
same time the destruction of a number of structures and connections.
Integration vs. disintegration

Like the concept of “globalization”, the concept of “integration” has many mean-
ings. In some cases, it implies any rapprochement of states, in others – the creation
of supranational institutions, in third cases – the process of gradual development
from economic interaction to the formation of institutions and mechanisms of
close political interaction, in the fourth – the development of regional ties, etc.
But integration always implies the existence of interstate agreements and is a
purposeful process.
Globalization, making interstate borders transparent, stimulates integration
processes. But at the same time, globalization can also generate the opposite effect
on integration processes, since the negative aspects accompanying the openness
of borders sometimes force citizens to speak out not only against globalization but
also against integration.
At the beginning of the 21st century, there was an intensive formation of
transregional integration (Kuznetsov, 2016). If integration previously assumed
regional interaction of states, then transregional integration includes countries, as
well as integration associations that are located in different regions of the world.
In this sense, there is a departure from the principle of territorial attachment of
integration entities in its classical sense. Transregionalism can take various forms,
for example, between two or more integration associations, in particular between
the EU-ASEAN, EU-MERCOSUR, etc. (Rueland, 2010).
Disintegration is a trend opposite to international integration, which means the
breakdown of an existing entity. Disintegration is a trend opposite to international
integration, which, like integration, refers to processes related to interstate agree-
ments. An example here is BREXIT.
The crisis situation, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, did not have a signifi-
cant impact on the processes of integration and disintegration. In Europe, at the
very beginning, the pandemic to a certain extent exacerbated internal contra-
dictions in the European Union, but it did not lead to the danger of its collapse
(Gromyko, 2020). In other regions of the world, the pandemic has exacerbated
problems related to social inequality, weak social protection, the functioning of
health systems, etc. However, this did not lead to fundamental changes in the
processes of integration/disintegration.
The integration megatrend leads mainly to the ordering of the political organi-
zation of the world, while the opposite trend leads to chaos. In this regard, integra-
tion and disintegration are different from globalization and de-globalization, since
with respect to the latter two it is impossible to say with certainty what exactly
promotes ordering and what contributes to chaos.
Democratization vs. de-democratization
Democratization as a megatrend causes the most intense objections and disputes.
Initially, democracy was associated with a state and was defined as a form of gov-
ernment of a state. Another understanding of democratization follows from the
studies of S. Huntington, who showed that throughout history there were waves
of democratization: periods in which democratic states were formed, and periods
in which some of these states rolled back toward authoritarianism (Huntington,
1991). According to S. Huntington, with the development of history, waves of
democratization began to be observed more often, covering an increasing num-
ber of states, despite the rollbacks. It is in this sense that democratization can be
considered as a megatrend of global development. S. Huntington actually dem-
onstrated the fact that democratization is a megatrend and has been operating
for several centuries. In the second half of the 20th century, the intensity of this
megatrend intensified, although the decline (fading) of the third wave of democ-
ratization at the beginning of the 21st century gave strength to the opposite trend.
In addition to the increase in the number of democratic states in the world, two
additional parameters should be identified that indicate the development of this
megatrend. These parameters are usually analyzed by scholars at the domestic
level, but for some reason they fall out of the focus of attention of researchers
in the field of international relations. The first of these is related to the fact that
democracy implies the participation of many subjects in the political process, i.e.,
polyarchy. However, this understanding of democracy refers, as a rule, to the
state. It seems that it can be expanded to a global level. It seems that it can be
expanded to the global level. In the modern world, many states are involved in
decision-making and decision-making processes (much more than it was at the
beginning of the 20th century and even in the middle of it), as well as non-state
actors. Usually, the activities of non-state actors on the world stage are studied in
relation with globalization. Indeed, the transparency of borders has allowed non-
state actors to enter the world stage. However, they not only entered the world
stage but also became active subjects that take part in world politics decisions. It
made possible to call them not only participants but also actors of world politics.
The second important additional parameter of the democratization megatrend
is the development of negotiation processes in the world. Thus, V.M. Sergeev
defined democracy as a negotiation process (Sergeyev, 1999). Since the second
half of the 20th century, there has been a sharp surge in the number of negotia-
tions in the world on various issues, different formats, interstate, business, etc.
Although there is a decrease in their number in certain areas, in general, nego-
tiation processes are developing in the world. Multilevel negotiations, in which
states and other actors are participants (for example, on climate change, internet
regulation), became widespread in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
The opposite of the democratization megatrend is the trend of de-democratiza-
tion. The concept of democratization is less often used in world politics and inter-
national relations. S. Huntington linked the rollback waves with authoritarianism.
It seems that there may be other options for de-democratization. For example, one
of the options is archaization, a return to tribal relations (Lebedeva et al., 2016).
Another option for de-democratization is the collapse of statehood, which leads to
the formation of failed states.
As in the case of integration, globalization influences the processes of democ-
ratization due to the “transparency” of borders, accelerating and strengthening
democratization due to the rapid and large-scale spread of democratic norms.
De-globalization, which manifests itself in the isolationist policies of states in
order to protect themselves from external influence, as a rule, restrains democra-
tization. The pandemic contributed to the development of the de-democratization
trend, since authoritarian decisions made it possible to control the situation more
strictly during the crisis, limit contacts, and thereby prevent the spread of the
coronavirus. At the same time, the restrictions also affected civil liberties. It is no
coincidence that some authors have come to the conclusion that the COVID-19
pandemic has contributed to the strengthening of authoritarian regimes, in par-
ticular in Southeast Asia (Rogozhin & Rogozhina, 2020).
At the same time, during the pandemic, the democratization megatrend contin-
ued to operate, which was expressed in the active participation of civil structures
in countering the pandemic (Antonova & Khafizova, 2020). In addition, democ-
ratization has manifested itself in the provision of performances, exhibitions, lec-
tures, etc. by museums, theaters, universities of the world on the basis of digital
platforms. A huge number of people have gained access to art, education, science
in an online format.
Conclusion
Three megatrends, as they were defined above, globalization, integration, and
democratization and three opposite trends (de-de-globalization, disintegration,
and de-democratization) cover the entire modern world and manifest themselves
in various areas. Megatrends and trends have a mutual influence on each other,
but globalization, which contributes to the further erosion of the foundation of the
political organization of the world – the Westphalian system – acts as the main
megatrend.
At the beginning of the 21st century, the processes opposite to megatrends
are becoming more active, which generates further processes of chaoticization in
the world. Nevertheless, megatrends continue to operate. The manifestations of
these megatrends are uneven across spheres, regions, and countries of the world.
For example, during the pandemic, globalization was sufficiently evident in the
field of academic communication. In general, the global crisis, which was pro-
voked by the COVID-19 pandemic, did not fundamentally affect the nature of the
megatrends that were formed before it began, but strengthened and exacerbated
the trends that had emerged earlier. This aggravation due to the intensification of
chaotization has led to a significant polarization of the world in many parameters
(in the spheres of manifestation of (mega) trends, in their geographical manifes-
tation). Polarization can potentially lead to significant contradictions, conflicts,
and wars. In practical terms, there is a need to “smooth out” the resulting splits
that appear as a result of polarization, both at the level of states and at the level
of international organizations. To a certain extent, business can also contribute
to smoothing out contradictions through its social and humanitarian activities.
Finally, the civic activism of NGOs, as well as structures related to education and
culture, can improve the situation.
If these contradictions are leveled, there are grounds for further evolutionary
development of the world. Based on the wave-like development of (mega)trends,
it should be assumed that the trends will again be replaced by processes associated
mainly with globalization, integration, and democratization.
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2 Taming the waves of globalization
and democratization
Global Governance of Megatrends
Maxim Kharkevich
Introduction
Historical studies of democratization and globalization show that these processes
develop in waves, and there is a connection between them (Wolf, 2017). In the late
19th and early 20th centuries, both processes were on the rise. In the period between the
two world wars, they simultaneously went into decline. In the 1950s and 1960s, there
were no special ups and downs; this period for both processes can rather be character-
ized as a stable plateau. A growth and strengthening shift for both globalization and
democratization emerged in the 1970s. Today, amid trade wars between the US and
China, the coronavirus pandemic, and right-wing populism, many observers believe
we are witnessing a decline in both globalization and democratization (Kornprobst
and Paul, 2021; Lee and Park, 2020; Steger, 2013). The connection between globali-
zation and democratization is obviously present but seems to be complicated since
there are many contradictions between these two processes. Democracy is based on
national identity; for transnational capital, nationality is not important. Democracy
is local in scope (national); capitalism is transnational and global in its essence and
scope. Democracy is harmed by strong socioeconomic stratification; capitalism inevi-
tably breeds economic inequality and cares little about the fair distribution of wealth.
Democracy assumes that all electoral votes have equal legal weight; for capitalism,
the voices of the rich are more important. Voters strive for social and economic secu-
rity; capitalism is subject to inevitable crises and is based on the “creative destruction”
of established socioeconomic forms of social organization.
Why these contradictions are not reflected in the seemingly coordinated waves
of globalization and democratization remains not entirely clear. Some governance
mechanisms seem to be at work here. Moreover, the mechanisms must be of self-
regulatory nature because the processes unveil themselves on international level,
where governance structures are still rather weak or non-existent (Drezner, 2009).
The famous globalization trilemma suggests that
we cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national self-determina-

tion all at once. We can have at most two out of three. If we want hyperglo-
balization and democracy, we need to give up on the nation state. If we must
keep the nation state and want hyperglobalization too, then we must forget
DOI: 10.4324/9781003320944-2
Waves of globalization and democratization 11
about democracy. And if we want to combine democracy with the nation
state, then it is bye-bye deep globalization.
(Rodrik, 2011: 200)
Nevertheless, we witness synchronization of democratization and globalization

without much announced “retreat of the state” (Strange, 1996), when both waves
were on the rise in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The chapter tries to find out what governance mechanisms are at work and
how they tame and coordinate the waves of globalization and democratization. To
do this, it starts with conceptual clarification of both processes under considera-
tion, then engages the research literature on causal connection between them, and,
finally, offers the explanation of the governance mechanism taming both waves,
which is the dialectical interaction of two logics of social action – instrumental
and communicative rationalities – suggested by Habermas’s reconstruction of his-
torical materialism (Habermas, 1975).
Conceptual clarifications
The two processes can be conceptualized as two types of freedom – globalization
as economic freedom and democratization as political freedom. Neoliberalism,
for example, puts economic freedom first. Milton Friedman argues that
economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the con-

centration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that
provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also
promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from politi-
cal power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.
(Friedman, 2013)
However, due to the increased criticism of neoliberalism after the global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008, there is a revival of republican ideas about the relationship
between political and economic freedoms (Wolf, 2014). This trend is particularly
evident in works of institutionalists, like Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.
They argue that political freedom must precede economic freedom, first there was
the Glorious Revolution, and only then the Industrial one.
It was the Glorious Revolution that strengthened and rationalized property

rights, improved financial markets, undermined state-sanctioned monopolies
in foreign trade, and removed the barriers to the expansion of industry. It was
the Glorious Revolution that made the political system open and responsive
to the economic needs and aspirations of society.
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 277)
Luc Boltanski shows that the development of capitalism is impossible without
the emergence of new arguments to justify it (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). A
12 Maxim Kharkevich
new “spirit of capitalism” is formed as “set of ethical motivations which, although
their purpose is foreign to capitalist logic, inspire entrepreneurs in activity condu-
cive to capital accumulation” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 8–9).
There are at least three other conceptualization of democracy that can help
understand its interaction with capitalism and globalization: democracy as elec-
tions, democracy as accountability, and democracy as deliberations.
Understanding democracy in electoral terms arguably is the most common way
of conceptualizing the phenomenon, because it is the least demanding concept and
is easily quantifiable and comparable across time and space. Samuel Huntington,
the father of the waves of democratization theory, used for his historical gener-
alizations the electoral conception of democracy, based on procedural concept of
democracy by Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1947: 269) and on the concept of
polyarchy by Robert Dahl (1971: 1–10). Huntington declares in his book that
this study defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the

extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for
votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.
(Huntington, 1991: 17)
Using this definition, Huntington identified three waves and two setbacks of
democratization. Staffan Lindberg and Anna Lührmann argue that the third roll-
back was evident already in 2017 (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019).
Democracy as accountability is presupposed in electoral conceptions of
democracy. Accountability requires the creation of institutions that provide infor-
mation to those who exercise control and that allow them to impose sanctions on
violators. Accountability becomes problematic in discussions about democratiza-
tion on international level, populated by TNCs, IOs, NGOs, etc. Can they be held
accountable and to whom?
Democracy as deliberations is the foundation of deliberative democratic
theory. As Simone Chambers puts it, “talk-centric democratic theory replaces
voting-centric democratic theory” (Chambers, 2003). Electoral democratic theory
views democracy as the arena in which fixed preferences and interests compete
via fair mechanisms of aggregation. In contrast,
deliberative democracy focuses on the communicative processes of opinion

and will-formation that precede voting … A legitimate political order is one
that could be justified to all those living under its laws. Thus, accountability
is primarily understood in terms of “giving an account” of something, that
is, publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying public
policy.
(Chambers, 2003: 308)
Democracy as deliberation can also be conceived in the form of “world culture”

– the key concept of the Stanford School on Sociological Institutionalism (Boli
and Thomas, 1999). The concept was developed in the works of Stanford sociolo-
gist John Meyer and his colleagues, who tried to explain the following paradox:
despite local differences in material needs, identities and resources, organizational
forms of social life in different communities are similar to each other (Meyer et
al., 1997). Meyer suggested that the reason for organizational isomorphism is the
presence on the global level of norms and rules that form the world culture. The
norms are very different:
the rules of chess are elements of world culture; the game is defined by a
standard set of procedures that are deemed valid everywhere, and depar-
tures from those rules are considered nonsensical. The principles of physics
are world-cultural, assumed to apply at every point on the globe and even
beyond. Human rights, as codified in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and its associated conventions, are couched in world-spanning terms,
applying to all humans in all countries.
(Boli and Lechner, 2015: 225)
World-cultural norms are not necessarily embraced universally. Like national cul-
tures, world culture is replete with competing cultural norms and narratives. Boli
and Thomas posit, that
in its contemporary form, world culture began to coalesce in the second half
of the nineteenth century. We can trace its emergence through the rise of
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), which are the key
structural form through which world culture is expressed.
(Boli and Thomas, 1999)
Due to the last proposition – that key structural form of world culture is interna-
tional nongovernmental organizations – I argue that world culture can be concep-
tualized as the result of democracy working on international level.
Relationships between democratization and globalization

I propose organizing literature review on the relationship of globalization and
democratization around questions linking various conceptions of democracy dis-
cussed above to globalization (see Table 2.1).
If we consider globalization as a measure of international trade, then we can
distinguish two waves of globalization – from the beginning of the 19th cen-
tury to World War I and after World War II to the present day. Even though the
history of trade between nations dates back thousands of years, until the 19th
century its significance was modest – the sum of world exports and imports
never exceeded 10% of world production until 1800 (Ortiz-Ospina, 2017).
Then, around 1820, the situation began to change rapidly. The combination
of technological progress and political liberalism at the beginning of the 19th
century gave rise to what is now called the “first wave of globalization”. It
14 Maxim Kharkevich
Table 2.1 Relationships between Democratization and Globalization
Concepts of democracy Questions linking democratization to globalization

Democracy as elections Does increased trade openness lead to stronger democratic
institutions? / Does strengthening democratic institutions
lead to increased trade openness?
Democracy as Is accountability possible at the transnational and global
accountability levels, and what forms does it take?
Democracy as Is deliberative democracy possible on the global level?
deliberations What is the relationship between world culture and
globalization?
ended with the outbreak of World War I, when the decline of liberalism and
the rise of nationalism led to the collapse of international trade. After World
War II, trade began to grow again. Today, about 60% of all goods and services
produced in the world cross national borders.
Coincidence of waves of international trade liberalization and democra-
tization in the 1970s raised the question of the relationship between these
processes. Early research on the relationship between the political regime and
international trade argued that in the developing world it was autocracies, not
democracies, that were more likely to liberalize trade (Haggard and Kaufman,
2018). On the one hand, autocracies are safe from lobbyists who, under a more
democratic regime, could protect some domestic producers from international
competition. On the other hand, trade liberalization increases long-term tax
revenues, which is beneficial for any regime, but at the same time, autocra-
cies may not pay attention to the costs of globalization for some categories
of voters that democracy cannot afford. Adam Przeworski offers a more com-
plex explanation for the link between democratization and economic reforms
such as trade liberalization. He argues that democratizing states are likely to
pursue trade liberalization in the short term but may abandon such reforms
over time as voters bear the costs of globalization (Przeworski, 1991). More
recent research shows that democratization, as a rule, leads to trade liberali-
zation (Milner and Kubota, 2005). The explanation is based on the Stolper–
Samuelson theorem: low-skilled workers will prefer greater trade openness
in developing countries and less trade openness in developed countries, since
unskilled labor is abundant in the developing world and scarce in the devel-
oped one.
In turn, studies show that trade liberalization has a rather negative impact on
democratization. Acemoglu and Robinson argue in their papers that an increase in
the openness of trade leads to an increase in income inequality in society, and this
shift in income distribution usually negatively affects the likelihood of democ-
ratization of the political regime (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Moreover, in
developing countries, narrow interest groups that benefit from globalization may
delay democratic reforms or pursue trade liberalization bypassing democratic pro-
cedures (Adserà and Boix, 2002).
The question of accountability at the transnational and global levels mostly
attracts institutionalists and students of global governance (Buntaine, 2015;
Hale, 2008; Held, 2004; Kahler, 2004; Keohane and Nye, 2021). Among others,
Robert Keohane answers this question by proposing two models of accountabil-
ity based on different notions of legitimacy: the delegation model and participa-
tion model (Keohane and Grant, 2005). The fundamental difference between
them lies in the answer to the question to whom the power holders are account-
able: to those whom they influence with their decisions (participation model),
or to those from whom they receive their authority (delegation model). At the
national level, in liberal democracies, these two models coincide. Through elec-
tions, voters exercise both participatory accountability and delegation account-
ability – evaluating the performance of their delegates, whom they can punish
in case of low evaluation by refusing to vote for them. However, in world pol-
itics, these models diverge since democratic elections are not possible at the
global level. Keohane and Grant propose a list of seven accountability mecha-
nisms in world politics based mostly on the participation model: Hierarchical,
Supervisory, Fiscal, Legal, Market, Peer, and Public reputational (Keohane and
Grant, 2005: 36). Delegation model can be found only in Legal and Hierarchical
mechanisms, when one entity delegates its authority to a subordinate entity
through legal or other means. The most accountable actors in world politics,
according to Keohane and Grant, are multilateral intergovernmental organiza-
tions such as the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, etc. The least accountable are
the great powers, especially superpowers.
If one broadens the question of accountability to a more general question of
legitimacy on translational and global level, one will find even more volumes
discussing this issue (Anderson et al., 2019; Bernstein, 2011; Keohane and Nye,
2021; Scholte, 2019; Zürn, 2018). Among others, Ian Clark undertook a produc-
tive effort to integrate legitimacy within English school (Clark, 2008).
The question of deliberative democracy on the global level attracts many fol-
lowers of Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action. Thomas Risse found
traces of deliberative democracy on international level (Risse, 2000, 2018). Social
contexts in which communicative rationality manifests itself in world politics,
according to Risse, are international negotiations and various public discourses
(for example, on human rights). Communicative rationality comes to the fore
when parties are not sure about their identities, preferences, world views. Such
a situation developed during international negotiations on the accession of a reu-
nited Germany in NATO (Risse, 2000: 25).
The relationship between world culture and globalization is a popular topic
within the Stanford School (Boli and Lechner, 2015). As mentioned above,
Stanford School measures world culture in numbers of international nongovern-
mental organizations operating within a given year. The Yearbook of International
Organizations by the Union of International Associations shows that in 1909
there were only 176 international NGOs, in 1958 – 1,073, and in 2016 – 25,380.1
The increase in the number of INGOs over the 20th and early 21st centuries cor-
responds to the waves of globalization over the same period (Kharkevich, 2021).
16 Maxim Kharkevich
The mechanism governing waves of democratization
and globalization
Arguably the most famous theoretical innovation of Habermas is the ontological
division of society into two spheres that are irreducible to each other – the system
and the life world (Habermas, 1991). Each of these spheres is necessary for the
existence and development of society, but at the same time they are built on dif-
ferent types of rationality and involve different types of social action. The system
is based on instrumental rationality, the life world is based on communicative
rationality.
The life world is the world of everyday communication, a set of informal and
non-market spheres of public life, such as family and household, culture, politi-
cal life outside organized parties, the media, voluntary associations, etc. It is in
the life world that the formation of social meanings, values, ideas that ensure the
social unity of people in society takes place. In the political sphere, the life world
manifests itself in deliberative democratic processes that ensure the preservation
and reproduction of fundamental social values under new historical conditions.
The system is the sphere of dominance of instrumental rationality, where the
rationality of social action is evaluated by its effectiveness in terms of obtaining
the desired economic or political result. In relation to the economic sphere, the
example of a systemic organization is the capitalist system, and in relation to the
political sphere, the system of state power. The main function of the system is the
material reproduction of society, that is, the creation and circulation of goods and
services in society. But the system also performs another very important function,
similar to the function of the life world: it coordinates the interaction of mem-
bers of society and integrates them into a single whole. Habermas calls this func-
tion system integration (as opposed to the social integration provided by the life
world). As societies become larger and more diverse because of industrialization
and modernization, and people become more mobile, the task of social integration
becomes increasingly difficult. Systems such as the economy and public adminis-
tration come to the aid of the life world, which help to keep society united.
In the 1970s, Habermas proposed a reconstructed version of historical materi-
alism to explain social evolution (Habermas, 1975). He suggested that
the species not only learns technical knowledge relevant for the development
of the productive forces, but also the decisive dimension of moral-practical
knowledge which can be embodied into structures of interaction. The rules
of communicative action do not automatically follow changes in the field of
instrumental and strategic action; they develop rather by virtue of their own
dynamics.
(Habermas, 1975: 294)
Using Habermas’s reconstruction of historical materialism, one can assume that

at the global level the role of the system is played by global capitalism, and the
role of the life world is played by world culture. Habermas himself in his works
identifies global capitalism with the system but speaks of the possibility of glo-
balization of the life world only in a normative sense. I go a little further than
Habermas and argue that world culture, as described by the Stanford School, can
be seen as an actual version of the globalization of the life world.
Conclusion
Two waves of globalization and democratization develop almost synchroni-
cally. The governance mechanism that synchronizes them is dialectic interaction
between two rationalities of social action – instrumental and communicative –
which manifest themselves in system and life world on fundamental level, and in
globalization and democratization (globalization of life world in form of world
culture) on global level.
Note
1 Historical overview of number of international organizations by type, 1909–2016.
Retrieved from https://ybio.brillonline.com/system/files/pdf/v5/2016/2_9.pdf
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3 Subnational actors in the
context of megatrends
Sergey Arteev, Ekaterina Shlapeko, and
Ivan Ulises Kentros Klyszcz
International politics have been thought of for a long time as being the exclu-
sive realm of states. International law and organizations such as the UN regard
states as the primary actors in world affairs. However, there has been a long trend
of other political entities becoming actors and entering the international scene.
Non-state actors and non-government organizations in particular have received
attention as new agents, capable of shaping the international agenda. Similarly,
subnational governments – that is, governments of constituent regions of a coun-
try – have increasingly sought to engage partners beyond their countries’ borders
and have their agency recognized in more fora.
In this sense, subnational governments have become part of international
relations and part of the megatrends that shape global politics. This chapter con-
tributes to the study of megatrends by adopting the perspective of subnational
governments. We highlight in particular three dyads of trends shaping the ways
sub-state regions engage in world affairs. These are globalization–isolation, inte-
gration–disintegration, and democratization–de-democratization. These trends
are unevenly distributed across the globe and sub-state regions respond to them
differently according to local dynamics. However, we can identify the main fea-
tures of each one of these and the way regions tend to respond and interact with
megatrends in world politics.
Globalization – deglobalization (isolation)

Subnational regions became international actors in the second half of the 20th
century. Today the number of subnational actors has been growing in a process
directly related to globalization as a megatrend. Globalization is important for
paradiplomacy due to increasing the transparency of national borders. Thanks to
this, subnational regions are developing international relations in the economy,
science, education, and culture. And the barrier of borders is crucial for such
contacts.
In the 1950s and 1980s, the West as a civilizational community became the pio-
neer for the development of paradiplomacy. And various aspects of this process
are fruitfully investigated in foreign science (Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Cornago
1999; Cornago 2010). In North America, US states and Canadian provinces have
DOI: 10.4324/9781003320944-3
Subnational actors in the context of megatrends 21
established close economic ties with one another (Tolstyh 2004). The regions of
Western European states have also begun to actively develop their international
relations in a wide range of areas. The period of the late 20th–early 21sr centuries
is the time when non-Western paradiplomacy has begun to develop actively. It
was during this period that the post-Soviet space became involved in subnational
transnational relations.
The regions of Russia have begun to actively establish their international rela-
tions at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, although some elements of paradiplo-
macy were present during the Soviet period. This can be seen in the example of
twinning relations of the states that were part of the socialist commonwealth. For
example, the Komi Republic actively cooperated with Bulgaria in the 1960–1980s
(Arteev and Lymtseva 2019).
From the point of view of the megatrend of globalization, the Russian paradi-
plomacy is divided into two periods: the wave of globalization (1990–2014) and
the wave of deglobalization (2014–present).
The wave of globalization consists of two phases – decentralization (1990s)
and centralization (2000s–mid-2010s) (Arteev and Kentros Klyszcz 2021). The
heyday of international relations of Russian regions occurred during the decen-
tralization phase in the 1990s. It was the time when the paradiplomacy in Russia
was formed as a full-fledged political institution and an integral part of the inter-
national communication of the Russian Federation. The legal framework was
formed at the federal and regional levels. The regions of the country gained prac-
tical experience of international cooperation. It is also important that the federal
center began to build a new type of relationship with the regions, which can be
described as a partnership. The institutionalization of Russian paradiplomacy
was not carried out without mistakes, however. Yet, the external relations of the
regions, contrary to the later layers in the public discourse, did not lead to separa-
tism. So, the case of Chechnya was not typical.
The scope of transnational activity of the Russian federal subjects during this
period are impressive: the regions of Russia have signed several thousand agree-
ments with foreign regions, states, transnational corporations, banks, NGOs.
Various forms and formats of interaction have appeared. The list of spheres of
interaction was constantly expanding. In total, two main areas can be distin-
guished – the economy and humanitarian contacts. The Western vector was dom-
inant for the external relations of the regions of Russia throughout the 1990s.
Europe after the Cold War was of great interest to the regions of Russia. At the
same time, the new Russia, which is rightly considered the Russia of the regions,
was attractive to Europe (Sergunin 1999). The peculiarity of the 1990s was the
rapid development of asymmetric relations in several variants: the region of the
Russian Federation – a foreign state, the region of the Russian Federation – an
international governmental or nongovernmental organization, the region of the
Russian Federation – foreign corporations and banks. It was the asymmetric con-
nections that caused the center the most concern.
A special issue of the international relations of the Russian’s regions is
the paradiplomacy of ethnic autonomies. More than a hundred ethnic groups
22 Sergey Arteev et al.
live in Russia, dozens of them have their own autonomies in the form of
federal subjects. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and the republics of the North
Caucasus cooperated along religious lines with the Muslim states of the
Middle East. Kalmykia, Buryatia, and Tuva have organized constant inter-
action with Mongolia on the basis of Buddhism as a common religion. The
Finno-Ugric regions (Karelia, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Komi, Mari
El, Mordovia, Udmurtia, Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug – abolished in
2003) have established close ties with Finland, Hungary, and Estonia in the
field of culture, education, science, and economics.
The second phase of the megatrend of globalization for the paradiplomacy
of Russian regions took place under the shadow of centralization. This phase is
placed in the context of de-democratization and de facto defederalization (budg-
etary over-centralization, unification of regions, including ethnic autonomies).
The financial dependence of the regions on the center increased significantly,
which affected their international relations. Gradually, the external relations of
the regions of Russia began to diminish. The ties of ethnic autonomies with kin
foreign states were particularly affected. For example, the programs of student
education and academic exchanges of the Finno-Ugric autonomies with Hungary
were curtailed.
The wave of deglobalization for Russian regions is associated with two sets of
reasons: (1) the geopolitical situation (in two phases: (a) 2014–2021; (b) after 24
February 2022); and (2) COVID-19.
Russia entered deglobalization in 2014 after the Crimea and the outbreak of
hostilities in the south-east of Ukraine (Donbass). Since 2014, the economic situ-
ation of the subnational regions of the Russian Federation has worsened and their
dependence on the central government has increased. At the same time, the center
began to push the regions to develop their economic ties with China and other
states in Asia. Indeed, the center provides advisory and information support to the
regions through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then, the COVID-19 pandemic
was a blow to Russian paradiplomacy. The economic situation further affected the
resource base for transnational relations. Many projects were frozen. Moreover,
after 24 February 2022 and a powerful Western sanctions strike, Russia’s isola-
tion in many areas became almost inevitable. While regions may adapt, the events
of 2022 around Ukraine raise the question of the existence of Russian paradiplo-
macy as an institution.
The megatrend of globalization has formed the Russian paradiplomacy. And
paradiplomacy has largely created Russian federalism. The reverse megatrend
– isolationism – has put this achievement at risk. The prospects for the return
of Russian regions to the international arena are now directly dependent on the
interstate relations, and a breakthrough is hardly possible because of economic
degradation and militarization of the political situation inside the country. If
the confrontation between Russia and the West can be overcome, then Russian
paradiplomacy can become a tool for further deconfliction. Russian subnational
relations with the states of the East and other regions of the Earth are still at a low
level in general.
Integration – disintegration
Integration implies that a number of governments begin to create and to use com-
mon resources to be committed in the pursuit of certain common objectives and
that they do so by foregoing some of the factual attributes of sovereignty and
decision-making autonomy (Lindberg 1970). The representatives of the school of
functionalism stood at the origins of the theoretical understanding of integration
processes. Furthermore, neo-functionalists proposed a political spillover effect to
explain the importance of supranational and subnational actors in the integration,
as they create pressure for more integration to pursue their interests (Haas 1961).
Integration processes always imply the existence of interstate agreements, institu-
tionalization, and introduction of new norms and practices.
The research in the field of regional studies mainly touched upon the issues
of European economic integration. However, the change in the world order in
the 1980s–1990s strengthened worldwide regionalization, facilitating the entry
of sub-state governments and cities into the international scene. Integration of
states doesn’t not necessarily lead to the convergence of sub-state regions and
vice-versa, but often rapprochement of states stimulates international activism of
sub-state entities.
The ability of regions to interact internationally depends primarily on the
political and legal system of a given country (Raś 2021). Cooperation is possible
when there are opportunities and potential for implementing economic, social,
and intercultural relations. However, the blossoming of socioeconomic and cul-
tural interactions does not necessarily mean that territories converge in terms of
their structural characteristics: in many cases, the intensity of exchanges is linked
to the magnitude of socioeconomic disparities (Sohn 2013).
In the past decades, the reinforcement of regional integration mechanisms such
as the EU, the MERCOSUR, the USMCA (former NAFTA) and the ASEAN gave
opportunity for sub-state entities to enter new markets, develop infrastructure, and
attract human resources. Investors and skilled migrants think about places such
as cities and regions, rather than entire countries. Cities are now integrated into a
world city network of informational flows, knowledge and economic exchange.
For instance, most of the largest headquarters in Europe are located in the so-
called pentagon, an outstanding geographical zone of global economic integration
in Europe defined by the cities London–Paris–Milan–Munich–Hamburg.
While macro-regionalism creates new structures of opportunity, it also cre-
ates new constraints through economic integration and institutional building.
For its part, micro-regionalism reveals a significant ability for policy learning
and adaptation alongside sub-state governments (Cornago 2010). Establishment
of the MERCOSUR Advisory Forum of Municipalities, States, Provinces, and
Departments resulted in an institutional space for greater involvement of subna-
tional governments in the regional integration process. That is, the diffusion of the
integration process, from a paradiplomatic perspective, was an important element
for the incorporation of new actors, strengthening it and making it more open to
local demands (Filho 2013).
Geographic proximity is a key condition for integration; thus, the border loca-
tion is objectively conducive to greater international activity. In spatial terms, the
development of border cities is no longer necessarily confined to the boundaries
of national territories and increasingly concerns cross-border spaces (Sohn 2013).
It is difficult to infer that increasing economic integration provides a positive envi-
ronment for cross-border relations, but there is much data to ponder (Cornago
2010). Economic activities tend to concentrate in cross-border regions where geo-
graphical distance is moderate between major urban centers with good connectiv-
ity and favorable infrastructure.
Border territories can be highly integrated not only economically. For instance,
the twin cities of Valga (Estonia) and Valka (Latvia) facilitate provision of medi-
cal care through the sharing of hospital facilities. In general, there is a massive
amount of regional activity in Europe mainly due to the implementation of cross-
border programs regarded as a development policy tool within the overall context
of European integration. Another example is the Amazon Cooperation Treaty
Organization that brings together eight states sharing the vast Amazon basin and
develops a series of programs for border areas with specific impact on their com-
mon ecosystem.
Permeability is the essential characteristic of bordering. Modern borders are far
from being equally permeable to different flows and actors even within regional
blocs. Schengen cooperation has been one of the most debated European issues
since the migration flows into the EU increased in 2015. In 2016 the Solidarity
Cities initiative was launched to promote government cooperation on refugee
issues, including direct transfer of refugees between cities without state systems
intervening. The COVID-19 pandemic brought new difficulties for cross-border
movement, living, and cooperation. The states have used various strategies to deal
with the COVID-19, directed toward isolationism and restrictions affecting the
crossing state borders. For instance, the borders were closed even for countries of
the Schengen area, where previously they were very conditional.
Territorial disputes continue to affect the international relations of contigu-
ous states. Border relations are part of diplomatic discussions both in the African
Union and in the MERCOSUR (Brunet-Jailly 2022). In Asia, trade relations have
notably contributed to resolve border disputes and seem to continue to be a driver
of peaceful cross-border relations between China and its many neighbors.
Disintegration is a trend opposite to international integration, which means the
collapse of the existing unit and even break of diplomatic relations. Disintegration,
like integration, refers to the processes associated with interstate relations. The
experiences of the impact of disintegration can be economic, cultural, political.
Following Brexit, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland becomes an external EU border. Around half of respondents of the sur-
vey conducted among locals point to problems with the supply, delivery, and
general availability of goods (The Border after Brexit 2021). Current political
situation involving Russia and Ukraine has an impact on the implementation of
the CBC programs even if the programs are not directly under the sanctions set up
by the European Council. The European Commission recommended suspending
payments, advances, or reimbursement, concerning Russian partners, and the
bans set to the Russian banking sector already largely prevent proceeding with
payments.1
The success of regions and cities integration in regional networks depends on
their accessibility, decision-making autonomy, global connectivity, and infra-
structure provision. Regional blocks are able to create an institutional framework
for sub-state units to maintain their organizational convergence by promoting the
adoption of common practices, information sharing, and coordination of actions
across borders.
Democratization – de-democratization
The last thirty years have witnessed a ‘third’ democratic wave throughout the
world (Huntington 1993). This megatrend brought many changes in the poli-
tics, public administration, and foreign policy of the states involved, each one
with consequences for subnational actors. However, from 2011 on, the wave of
democratization reached its peak and democracy has been either stagnating or
declining worldwide. By 2022, many countries that went through processes of
democratization now experienced de-democratization (or ‘backsliding’), affect-
ing all the spheres mentioned above. Examples from Latin America can illus-
trate these trends as the region has featured cases of sharp democratization and
de-democratization.
Democratization is relevant to subnational governments as it often involves
decentralization and devolution. For example, in Mexico, democratization in
the late 1990s brought an end to the Institutionalized Revolution Party (PRI in
Spanish) authoritarian rule. This transition rendered governors into more than del-
egates from the central authorities. Indeed, the scope for regional governments to
oppose and check federal power grew during those years, altering the relationship
between center and region (Haber et al. 2008).
For the regional governments of states under democratization, opportunities
to carry out external relations will likely increase. Democratization – with its
implied governance reform and participatory institutions – opened up the scope of
governors to engage in international affairs without restrictions they would have
found otherwise. Several channels opened up, such as the possibility to lobby the
central government in external relations matters and, most importantly, seek out
and implement partnerships abroad. At the same time, democratization implied
regional constituents – voters – pressuring governors to engage certain interna-
tional matters (Nganje 2014).
In Mexico’s case, federal laws were passed in the 1990s to give governors
a legal framework to enter agreements with foreign partners without the direct
involvement of federal authorities. Subnational authorities made full use of these
and other opportunities. For example, San Luis Potosi, a landlocked state in
central Mexico, actively pursued foreign investment, with foreign governments
opening representations in the region and foreign companies entering agreements
with the regional authorities. In short, democratization opened opportunities for
San Luis Potosi to exploit the opportunities that the former NAFTA agreement
opened.
However, de-democratization puts into question the continuation of these
trends. In fact, some scholars have called the ongoing trend of de-democratization
as a ‘third wave’ of autocratization, mainly affecting established democracies
and democratizing states (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Today’s de-democ-
ratization trend involves executive aggrandizement, and electoral manipulation
and harassment (Bermeo 2016). These processes often feature a legal facade and
are more gradual in nature than the sudden takeovers of the past (Lührmann and
Lindberg 2019).
Venezuela, for example, was a forerunner for those democratizing states that
gradually fell to those de-democratizing trends that would take over later in the
century (Corrales 2020). While Venezuela’s democracy in the 1990s was far
from ideal, the 2000s saw the gradual but constant erosion of democratic institu-
tions and the entrenchment in power of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
(PSUV in Spanish). Venezuelan federalism similarly oscillated from attempts at
decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s to the re-centralization of authority in
the 2000s. Subnational governments saw the prospect of decentralization dashed
as the central government retained the highly centralized nature of Venezuelan
federalism in the 1999 constitution.
The consequences of today’s de-democratization for subnational governments
are not well studied but we can identify a few. The trend of executive aggrandize-
ment is particularly relevant as it involves attempts by the executive to undermine
checks on its power, such as that of subnational governments. Then, subnational
governments tend to engage in international relations with agendas that may not
entirely overlap with those of the central government, including on essential nor-
mative and symbolic matters (Cornago 2013, 118). This latter element can be a
point of contention with aggrandizing executive authorities, as they attempt to
consolidate their authority, with normative consequences along the way.
In Venezuela’s case, de-democratization was gradual but decisive. During
the period of authoritarian consolidation, electoral processes continued, giving
a facade of legal consistency. But, systematic irregularities were exploited early
on by the Fifth Republic Movement (Hugo Chavez’s party before the PSUV’s
creation) to tilt the established processes to the party’s favor from the early 2000s
onward (Corrales 2020). At the level of subnational governments, the political
trajectory of the country took over from other concerns. For instance, border
states actively engaged in cross-border relations with their neighbor regions in
the 1990s, even creating institutions such as the Colombian-Venezuelan Council
of Cross-Border Governors. This council ceased to operate in the 2000s as cen-
tralization took over and polarization pitted opposition regions against the central
government. Since then, opposition federal states remained focused on their bat-
tle against the PSUV’s consolidation and the PSUV-governed states focused on
policy implementation. In either case, de-democratization represented the closing
scope of Venezuela’s federal system along with the potential orientations that
subnational governments could take – abroad or at home.
In sum, democratization implies a widening scope of action for governors and
an opening window of opportunity – at least domestically – to exploit the oppor-
tunities offered by the international system. De-democratization does not neces-
sarily represent a diametrically opposed trend but it does undermine the ability of
subnational governments to engage foreign partners autonomously.
Conclusion
Subnational governments are frequently thought as belonging exclusively to the
realm of a country’s domestic politics. Well-established patterns of international
institutions and law give a framework for states to cope with the world’s meg-
atrends. Subnational governments dispose of no similar frameworks as they are
each subject to those of their respective countries. Yet, this does not prevent sub-
national governments from participating in the larger trends that affect the world.
In this chapter, we examined several megatrends in three crucial dyads: globali-
zation–deglobalization (isolation), integration–disintegration, and democratiza-
tion–de-democratization. Some elements cut across each of these trends, such
as the role of institutional change, both inside states and at the level of multilat-
eral organizations. Moreover, it can be said that in these three dyads, one pole
tends to go with its counterparts found in the other two dyads. So, for instance,
democratization often – although not always – went along with globalization and
integration. Mexico’s case above illustrated these three trends meeting together in
facilitating the external relations of its federal states. There are also cases where
these trends do not meet. Brexit – for example – did not represent a case of de-
democratization and hardly did it represent deglobalization. But it does represent
a sharp case of de-integration, with multiple consequences for Northern Ireland
and the other constituent regions of the United Kingdom. In any case, it is not
possible to exclude subnational actors from megatrends.
Note
1 Information to the project beneficiaries of the Karelia CBC program. Retrieved from:
https://www.kareliacbc.fi/en/information-project-beneficiaries-karelia-cbc-pro-
gramme
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Sohn, C., & Lara-Valencia, F. (2013). Borders and cities: Perspectives from North
America and Europe. Journal of Borderlands Studies, 28(2), 181–190. doi:
10.1080/08865655.2013.854662
Tolstyh, V.L. (2004). Mezhdunarodnaya deyatel'nost' sub"ektov Rossijskoj Federacii
[International activity of the subjects of the Russian Federation]. Moscow:
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. (In Russian).
4 Megatrends and socio-humanitarian
resources of world politics
Leili Rustamova
Trends in the use of social and humanitarian

resources in world politics
In the 1990s, American researcher Joseph Nye conceptualized the political functions
of social and humanitarian resources in the concept of “soft power”. The essence of
the concept was to develop social and humanitarian resources, while saving on the
instruments of economic and military pressure (Nye, 2004). This concept was adopted
by both democratic states and illiberal democracies, which began to use social and
humanitarian resources as instruments of foreign policy. States actively use sports in
order to conduct informal international negotiations and draw public attention to their
policies, which has become a separate area of diplomacy – sports diplomacy. Culture
is also a tool for shaping the agenda and state image in the framework of the so-called
cultural diplomacy. Cultural events and institutions are also used to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the political system. The use of culture, sports, and science in politics
has led to the popularization of new types of diplomacy and the transformation of the
traditional one, which began to include work with the foreign public.
The significance of social and humanitarian resources has led to the fact that
today their presence and use in foreign policy is reflected in the image and posi-
tion of the state on the world stage, its influence, which Joseph Nye called soft
power. Hence, the assessment of the country’s level of democracy, its accessibil-
ity to the processes of globalization and integration, the ability to participate
in global governance issues depend on whether the state relies on social and
humanitarian resources or not, since they project trust and authority.
Yet the use of the social and humanitarian sphere by the states gave rise to
the problem of serious politicization of all social and humanitarian resources.
Thus, due to the active position of the United States, Canada, and a number of
other countries, whose national Olympic committees are in favor of reforming the
Olympic Charter of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the sports sector
is being seriously politicized today. The Olympic Charter enshrined the principle
of apolitical sports and a ban on demonstrating the political preferences during
the Olympic Games, as well as the independence of sports and sports organiza-
tions from the state, the absence of discrimination on racial, gender, religious, and
political grounds.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003320944-4
30 Leili Rustamova
A number of sports organizations have already allowed for the demonstration
of political preferences, and this has led to the fact that sport has become an arena
for political battles between states and an instrument of sanctions pressure like
never before. Sports have been used to boycott some countries in the past, but
today’s trends are unprecedented. Nowadays the issue of political preferences,
and not just the sporting achievements, largely determines the admission of ath-
letes to sports competitions.
Politicization also affects those areas that seem far from politics: such as the
healthcare sector. This was most evident at the time of the coronavirus pandemic,
during which issues of access to a vaccine were determined by the willingness of
countries to improve their attitude toward the donor state, which was reflected in
such a relatively new term as vaccine diplomacy (Hotez, 2021).
In parallel with political science concepts that conceptualized the changes
taking place in world politics, economic concepts that explain the significance
of social and humanitarian resources and their advantage over others began to
appear. In 2011, the German scholar Klaus Schwab introduced the concept of
the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”, which states the transition to a new social
formation, in the center of which is the human and human capital, actively
developing information technologies. Information technologies have become
the capital on which the economic development of advanced countries is based
(Schwab, 2016). They help to form an information society, in which non-state
actors, thanks to modern information and communication technologies, get
ample opportunities to participate in political life and enter the international
arena. The fact that man and his creative potential today are at the center of new
economic processes has become another reason that the social and humanitarian
sphere is so significant.
Technological changes and the human agenda have empowered actors operat-
ing in the social and humanitarian sphere: scientists, cultural figures, influential
athletes, journalists, INGOs, TNCs, think tanks. They have gained ample oppor-
tunities to limit the state’s monopoly on almost all issues that were previously
within the state’s exclusive competence, contributing to pluralism and democra-
tization of international relations in general.
States have also largely abandoned direct intervention in the work of such
actors and do not regulate most social and humanitarian issues, recognizing the
importance of non-state actors operating in them. Thus, environmental INGOs
actively keep records of biodiversity on the planet, human rights INGOs ensure
the protection of human rights, annually compiling ratings of countries and fixing
offenses on their part. The influence and significance of INGOs is recognized by
the UN, which includes them in its leading structures as observers. One of the
main bodies, ECOSOC, is authorized to give them a consultative status, which
allows them to give expert advice to countries and express their opinion on issues
within their sphere of interest, as well as act as an early warning agent on exist-
ing and new challenges and threats. The list of their powers is quite long and it
includes, inter alia, control over the observance of international rules and norms,
and promotion of codification process of the international law norms.1 At the
Megatrends and socio-humanitarian resources 31
moment 5,593 organizations have a consultative status, giving them full opportu-
nities to promote their vision of political processes.2
Thus, the intervention of actors of the social and humanitarian sphere in politi-
cal issues, promotion of their agenda and assessments of countries’ foreign policy
through their principles has led to the fact that categories related to issues of more
morality than politics prevail in world politics today.
Social and humanitarian resources in the spread of

the processes of globalization and isolationism
Globalization, with its powerful economic and technological components, is the
main force that has empowered non-state actors in the social and humanitarian
sphere. In addition, all manifestations of globalization: interdependence, univer-
salization, massification, as well as negative ones, are also reflected in the social
and humanitarian sphere. So, on the wave of globalization the processes of mas-
sification and commercialization began in sports, which gave powerful financial
and other resources to the hands of the international sports organizations (ISOs).
Today, the revenue of sports organizations is becoming so high that it exceeds the
budget of individual countries. For example, the IOC earned more than $2 bil-
lion in 2018 from sponsorships and the sale of broadcasting rights. In 2018 FIFA
gained record revenues of $5.3 billion thanks to the World Cup in Russia.3
Thanks to the accumulation of significant financial resources the ISOs have
funds to popularize sports as such, to solve problems that are not directly related to
sports. In recent years, the participation of the ISOs in solving global problems has
increased significantly. Moreover, they develop programs to combat the negative
effects of globalization based on the principles of the international sports move-
ment. This type of program includes, in particular, the IOC Olympic Solidarity
program, under which the organization promotes sporting events in developing
countries in order to help attract investment there. The international organization
“World Runners”, which unites more than 10,000 people from 15 countries of
the world, organizes fundraising in favor of countries in need. In 2004, the IOC
and the United Nations Refugee Agency launched the Joint Program “Giving Is
Winning”, in which the ISOs, National Olympic Committees, federations, spon-
sors, athletes, members, and supporters of the Olympic Movement donated a
significant number of unused sports and casual wear, which the United Nations
Refugee Agency distributed among refugee camps around the world.
Globalization includes a significant cultural component, in this regard, some
researchers consider culture to be the most globalized area. Culture is also under
the process of massification, which has made cultural objects more accessible to
the wider audience, not only within a single country but also at the international
level. The consequences of massification is the spread of the same cultural images
in all countries of the world, the so-called globalization of culture (Waters, 1995).
An important aspect is that the accessibility of culture to the wider public has
given unlimited opportunities for the cultural institutions to influence the percep-
tion of social reality by the world community or to draw attention to a particular
32 Leili Rustamova
problem. Thanks to globalization, culture is also becoming an important factor in
the economic development of states, and today they are fighting for markets for
the sale of their cultural products. This predetermined the fact that the current
economic and political competition of states is acquiring the character of cultural
and civilizational competition.
However, globalization has not only spurred the development of social and
humanitarian resources, but globalization itself has largely been influenced by the
trends set up by non-state actors operating in this sphere. First, TNCs, Media,
INGOs have contributed to the fact that globalization has no geographical center.
Those who have previously spoken of globalization as westernization have had to
admit that non-state actors have brought it to every remote corner of the planet and
in doing so have made possible the enrichment of globalization with the products
of various cultures. Secondly, they have changed the face of globalization, making
it more manageable by consciously taking the reins of control of its processes into
their own hands, and also contributing to the solution of global problems. Even
TNCs, which are largely interested in enrichment due to the growth of the social
and humanitarian agenda, have begun to participate in the processes of democra-
tization, the spread of education, scientific, and technical cooperation, not only in
the countries of their presence, but also at the global level. The largest TNCs take
part in the UN program on cooperation with business for sustainable development
“Global Compact”, within which they voluntarily comply with ten principles in the
field of human rights, labor rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption.
Non-state actors operating in the social and humanitarian environment are
active drivers of globalization processes. As an argument that isolationism or
deglobalization will not become the dominant trend, the researchers note that non-
state actors in the social and humanitarian sphere will continue to create new tech-
nologies that will keep borders open, increase interdependence (Kortunov, 2020).
However, the processes of isolationism still manifest themselves in the social and
humanitarian sphere. They are most noticeable in the economy, where trade wars,
protectionist measures, and other protective barriers to the movement of goods,
services, and finances slow down globalization. Other spheres are affected by isola-
tionism to a lesser extent. In culture, there is such a phenomenon as an “explosion
of ethnicity”, which means the growth of ethnic and national identity. In the field of
education, such trends can be observed when the states do not participate in inter-
national publication databases, preferring to support their national databases of sci-
entific works. However, such manifestations can be considered isolated cases, since
culture, sports, tourism, healthcare, and education have always developed precisely
through international cooperation and the exchange of experience and knowledge.
Social and humanitarian resources in democratization

and de-democratization
It is important to note that during the Fourth Industrial Revolution the humanity
and creative potential are becoming central resources that have seriously shifted
the focus on strengthening democratic institutions and human rights issues on the
global agenda. At the same time, the protection of not only basic human rights, but
also of those that occupy the field of social and humanitarian issues – education,
access to cultural achievements – has also become an integral element of high
security and the justification of the popular theory of a democratic world. The
human rights agenda permeates all spheres of the social and humanitarian direc-
tion and proceeds from the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in particular, from Articles 22 to 28 of the Declaration.
Through human rights issues, nowadays there is a legal justification for par-
ticipation in conflicts, as well as information coverage of the conflict, which
determines on whose side the truth is. In Western political science discourse, the
priority of the principle of human rights protection over the principle of sover-
eignty began to be justified for the first time, which was first discussed by Bernard
Kouchner, who published “Le Devoir d’ingerence” (“The duty to intervene”) in
1987. This work and the subsequent discussion on the priority of human rights
protection have changed the nature of international conflicts and the use of social
and humanitarian resources in the military sphere to date. Nowadays, almost all
countries of the world, along with active hostilities, pay attention to peace-build-
ing projects, infrastructure restoration, humanitarian assistance, education dis-
semination, and democratization of society. Social and humanitarian resources, in
particular, have been actively used during all NATO military operations over the
past 20 years in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria.
Nevertheless, not having constitutional opportunities for direct participation
in hostilities some members of military-political alliances fulfill their allied obli-
gations precisely thanks to their socio-humanitarian resources. The list includes
Germany. After Germany joined the operations of the North Atlantic Alliance
in Afghanistan, Berlin sent only a limited number of troops to the country so
practically they were not involved in combat missions, since the Constitution of
Germany prohibits the use of armed forces abroad, especially outside the NATO
operational zone, for combat operations. However, its contribution to the opera-
tions was significant, since Germany ensured the arrival of its humanitarian
organizations in the country, which took care of alleviating the plight of the civil-
ian population of Afghanistan.
If we consider the term “democratization” as the increase in the number
of democratic states, then today this can be argued to have somewhat sub-
sided, and not least reason is that the leading democratic states were relying
on the democratization of countries using the tools of hard power and justify-
ing military interventions in conflicts for the protection of human rights, that
is, “humanitarian intervention”. The first and most serious operation, which fit
into the concept of the so-called “humanitarian intervention” for the protec-
tion of human rights, was the US-led bombing of Yugoslavia by the NATO
coalition. This was followed by operations in Libya, during which, under
the justification of protecting the inhabitants of Libya from the crimes of the
Gaddafi regime, NATO allied forces carried out bombing of Libya, grossly
distorting the meaning of UN Security Council resolution 1973 of 17 March
2011. The situation in Libya led to a growing distrust between countries and
34 Leili Rustamova
peoples in the field of human rights protection and approaches to ensuring
access to social and humanitarian resources. It is with the negative conse-
quences of military interventions that scientists associate the processes of de-
democratization that are gaining momentum now (Wiatr, 2019).
Another reason for the de-democratization and the rollback from the promotion
of human rights in the Western sense is that, according to S. Santino, a researcher
from the Netherlands, the category of human rights reflects the realities that have
developed in the global economic system (Santino, 2018). S. Santino noted that
the dominance of the Western discourse on human rights is also connected with
the dominance of the Western economic model. At the same time, a number of
countries, especially those who are classified as illiberal democracies, postulate
their right to interpret democracy and basic and socio-humanitarian and cultural
human rights and strive to create their own democratic institutions and regulatory
system that takes into account their traditions and approach to the category of
human rights and the principles of the development of many socio-humanitar-
ian resources. The main difference, for example, between Muslim and Western
legal systems is that, while in the West the central place is given to rights, in the
Muslim legal system closely related to Sharia norms, the main place is given not
to rights, but to the duties of a citizen to the state and society. This has a seri-
ous impact on how they use social and humanitarian resources inside the country
and in their foreign policy. The tendency to consolidate their norms is observed
in many countries that are criticized for human rights violations. China, in par-
ticular, is following this path, where the provision of social, cultural, and other
human rights is made dependent on the moral and other qualities of a person. The
so-called “Social credit system” depending on the degree of law-abiding, social
responsibility ensures or restricts a person’s right to freedom of movement, choice
of profession, and access to cultural achievements.
At the same time, a common approach to human rights, a commitment to
democratization, and a vision of cultural development have become another factor
in the integration of states in addition to purely economic ones. Most integration
processes today put the protection of human rights and ensuring their broad social
and economic rights at the forefront of integration processes, in particular, these
include the EU and the ASEAN.
Socio-humanitarian resources in integration

and disintegration processes
As the EU achieved the highest fifth stage of integration namely a common for-
eign policy, it was able to become an example for other organizations. Otherwise,
this could hardly have been achieved if attention had not been paid to the spread
of integration processes through the socio-humanitarian field. Interaction through
culture, educational exchanges, and tourism has allowed Europe to overcome
historical prejudices against each other and overcome historical disputes. So
Germany and France in 1963 created the organization Franco-German Youth
Bureau to establish relations between former rivals.
From the very beginning, integration has been also supported by efforts to
bring countries closer together ideologically, cultural ties of former adversaries
on the European continent. In addition to the economy, European countries have
largely harmonized healthcare, education, and science systems.
Social and humanitarian resources, mostly in the hands of the academic com-
munity, cities and regions created a Europe of Regions and a Europe of Citizens
through the cooperation in these areas. This contributed to the formation of a pan-
European identity and support for European processes by citizens of the Union
member states, that is, strengthening integration step from below.
The associations of Euroregions have become examples of such aspirations
for integration at the grassroots level. Euroregion is an association of two or more
border regions of neighboring European countries aimed at deepening interstate
cooperation of European states and European integration processes. Now there
are more than 80 of them. When the EU launched the programs of the European
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, European regions began to cre-
ate Euroregions, as well as cross-border cooperation programs designed for the
development of traffic infrastructure, environmental challenges decision, pro-
grams to support the local healthcare and other issues with neighboring states.
Russia also joined this mechanism and in the 1990s and early 2000s entered
seven Euroregions: Baltic, Karelia, Saule, Neman, Lyna-Lava, Sheshupe, and
Pskov-Livonia.
It was the creation of a European identity among citizens that played a role
in the rejection of broader disintegration trends in the EU during the active dis-
cussion of the Brexit. Moreover, Northern Ireland refused to leave the Customs
Union with the EU and remained a part of the common market. And the growing
popularity of right-wing populist parties during the migration crisis is precisely a
response to migration processes and has not yet led to the right-wing representa-
tives coming to power in most European countries.
Nowadays those integration associations that have followed the example of
the EU are even more committed to strengthening cooperation on humanitarian
and social issues. A number of associations, as a determining factor on the way to
effective integration, have precisely put the pursuit of common cultural values and
ideological foundations, a common identity that binds them into one association.
ASEAN can be defined as an example of such an association whose charter in
2008 enshrined the desire to identify common values as the basis for its successful
functioning. Common Asian values that have been classified and outlined during
the public discussion include: Responsibility to society and collectivism, Respect
for elders and filial respect, Social justice, Social harmony and Public order, and
the Authority of national leaders.
The Eurasion Economic Union (EAEU) initially positioned itself as an associa-
tion of economic cooperation, but gradually, not only in the intellectual environ-
ment, but also in the ranks of the governing structures of the EAEU, it came to an
understanding that it is fiendishly difficult to pursue relations between nations and
states in the whole world not interacting in the education, science areas and without
the inclusion of cultural and ethnic and national issues. The EAEU development
36 Leili Rustamova
strategy until 2025, adopted in 2020, has already formulated the contours of eco-
nomic cooperation in new areas - education, healthcare, tourism, and sports.4
The social and humanitarian sphere is believed to perform a compensatory
function when relations between countries deteriorate and disintegration processes
begin to dominate. After the Russian-EU relations got complicated after 2014
and mutual sanctions were also introduced, European countries announced that
the restrictions would not apply to the sphere of cross-border cooperation and the
Euroregions format, which Russia had already managed to enter. Until 2020, some
cross-border cooperation programs between Russia and Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, and Finland functioned. They proved to be a successful example of inte-
gration that brought real benefits to the population of border territories in such
areas as modernization of heating systems in schools and hospitals, reconstruction
of checkpoints, popularization of a healthy lifestyle, and environmental awareness.
Yet since non-state actors contributed to the fact that issues of the social and
humanitarian agenda and cultural identity began to dominate in the world, dis-
integration began to concern this sphere as well. At the same time, the need to
form a new identity makes it necessary to develop new mechanisms of social and
humanitarian ties between former allies, but on new terms. So, having decided to
leave the EU, the UK refused to participate in the Erasmus academic exchange
program, but nevertheless developed a new cultural exchange project with former
allies, named after the English mathematician and cryptographer Alan Turing.
Thus, social and humanitarian resources are an inseparable part of the integra-
tion and even those who would like to focus exclusively on the economic issues
cannot move away from integration into the social and humanitarian sphere,
since on the one hand, the contemporary national economic systems are also
based on human development necessity, and on the other hand, such recourses
are also effectively used by those who have a certain affinity in ideas or values.
Disintegration concerns the social and humanitarian sphere, but states endeavor to
preserve a certain groundwork for cooperation in this field.
Notes
1 Working with ECOSOC. An NGOs Guide to Consultative Status. United Nations.
New York, 2018. Retrieved from: http://csonet.org/content/documents/ECOSOC
%20Brochure_2018_Web.pdf
2 NGO Branch. Official UN website. Retrieved from: http://csonet.org
3 FIFA. Financial report. 2018. Retrieved from: https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m
/337fab75839abc76/original/xzshsoe2ayttyquuxhq0-pdf.pdf
4 O strategicheskih napravlenijah razvitija evrazijskoj jekonomicheskoj integracii do
2025 g. (2020, December 11). [On strategic directions for the development of Eurasian
economic integration until 2025]. Retrieved from: https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru
/01428320/scd_12012021_12 (In Russian).
References
Hotez, P.J. (2021). Preventing the Next Pandemic: Vaccine Diplomacy in a Time of Anti-
science. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of My sweetheart's
the Man in the Moon
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
Title: My sweetheart's the Man in the Moon
Author: Stephen Marlowe
Illustrator: Emmanuel Stallman
Release date: June 24, 2022 [eBook #68393]
Language: English
Original publication: United States: Royal Publications, Inc, 1956
Credits: Greg Weeks, Mary Meehan and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY

SWEETHEART'S THE MAN IN THE MOON ***
My sweetheart's the Man in the
Moon
By MILTON LESSER
Illustrated by STALLMAN
Not everyone will think of the first

moon-flight as the first glorious
step on the road to space. There
will always, for instance, be the
fast-buck boys like Lubrano....
[Transcriber's Note: This etext was produced from

Infinity, December 1956.
Extensive research did not uncover any evidence that
the U.S. copyright on this publication was renewed.]
Jeanne turned off the radio and went downstairs slowly, watching
how the gold-shot curtains on the landing window caught the sunlight
in a multitude of brilliant flecks. She shuddered slightly. Up there, the
sun would scorch and sear.
When she entered the living room, Aunt Anna looked up from her
magazine, and Pop puffed on his calabash pipe, occasionally
grunting with satisfaction. Mom looked at Jeanne hopefully, but soon
turned away in confusion. She could not tell whether Jeanne wanted
her to laugh or cry.
"Well," said Jeanne, instantly hating the flippant way she tried to
speak, "he got there." She never quite knew why, but whenever
emotions threatened to choke her up she would slip on the mask, the
carefree attitude, the what-do-I-care voice she was using now.
"All the way—there?" Aunt Anna fluttered her eyebrows, allowing
herself a rare display of emotion.
Mom smiled, laughed briefly and nervously. She touched Jeanne's
cheek tentatively with a trembling hand, hugged her daughter quickly
and drew back. "I didn't know," she said. "None of us knew. We were
afraid to listen. I mean, it's so far."
"Knew he'd make it," said Pop, tamping his pipe full with another
load of tobacco from the humidor. "Tom's got good stuff in him.
Smokes a pipe, you know."
"Not up there," said Jeanne practically. "It would waste oxygen."
"It says here in this magazine the moon is 240,000 miles away," Aunt
Anna told them.
"Did the announcer say how Tom felt?" Mom wanted to know.
"Just imagine how it will be," Aunt Anna said, "when we get Tom
back here and he speaks to the Women's League. We'll have to
make arrangements—"
"Can't," Pop reminded her. "Government hasn't said anything about
when Tom's coming back. Liable to keep him there a long time. Do
the boy good. See what he's really made of, I always say. Andrea,
your roast is burning."
Mom scurried off toward the kitchen. A moment after she
disappeared, the phone rang and Aunt Anna took the receiver off its
cradle. "Hello? Yes, this is the Peterson home. Yes, she is. In a
moment. Jeanne, it's for you."
"Hmmmm," Jeanne chortled. "Some fellow trying to make time
because Tom's too far away to protest." She hated herself for saying
it, and administered the mental kick in the pants which never helped.
She was missing Tom more acutely every minute. The distance was
unthinkable, the moon almost too remote to consider, lost up there in
infinite void, surrounded by parcels—parsecs?—of nothing.
Picking up the receiver, Jeanne turned her back to Aunt Anna, who
appeared quite eager to listen to at least half of the conversation.
"Hello? Yes, this is Jeanne Peterson. The Times-Democrat? I could
see you today, I suppose. Why, here at home. I'm on vacation. But
what—about Tom? Oh, I see. Oh, they told you down at White
Sands. Well, all right. 'Bye."
"It was a man," said Aunt Anna.
"Who said my roast was burning?" Mom asked them all indignantly
as she returned from the kitchen.
"Who was the young man, Jeanne?" Aunt Anna asked.
Jeanne grinned, brushed back a stray lock of her blonde hair. "Sorry
to disappoint an old gossip like you, but—"
"Tom is a long way off!"
"That was just Mr. Lubrano, a reporter on the Times-Democrat. 'How
does it feel to be the fiancee of the first man to reach the moon,' he
said. Funny, I hadn't thought of it that way at all. How does it feel?
Did he expect me to turn cartwheels? (But, I am proud of Tom, so
why don't I admit it?) He'll be down to interview me this afternoon."
"After dinner, I hope," said Mom.
Awkwardly, Aunt Anna lit a cigarette—something she did only on
rare, important occasions. "It never occurred to me," she said slowly,
trying to remove tobacco grains from her tongue as delicately as
possible with thumb and forefinger. "Not for a moment. But Jeanne,
in her own right, is also a celebrity. The Women's League has
watched her grow up, I know. But suddenly, all at once, Jeanne is
different. Andrea, get May King on the phone!"
"May—the president?" Mom wanted to know, somewhat awed.
"Of course, Andrea. A little imagination, that's what you need."
Mom got up doubtfully, approached the telephone as if it might jump
up and attack her.
"Forget it," Jeanne told them. Use big words. Use words which would
have ridiculous double-entendres for them. Frighten them. "I won't
prostitute my emotional relationship with Tom for all the Women's
Leagues in the county. Forget it."
"Jeanne!" said Aunt Anna.
"Jeanne," Mom echoed her, more than a little shocked. "What all this
has to do with—Jeanne! Oh...."
But Jeanne was on her way upstairs to put on something gay and
bright for the arrival of Mr. Lubrano. Now that she thought of it, she
liked the almost electric crackle in the reporter's voice over the
phone.
"Good afternoon, Miss Peterson. Honest, I feel almost like a cub. In

a few hours, you've become quite a figure." Mr. Lubrano was young,
good-looking in a dark, dangerous, eager Latin way. He took
Jeanne's proffered hand, held it and looked at her long enough to let
her know he appreciated what he saw, briefly enough to indicate
everything would be strictly business if she wanted it that way.
Jeanne had been firm with Aunt Anna and her folks. Their part in this
was to be strictly a vicarious one. She would answer their questions
later. As it turned out, Pop almost had to propel Aunt Anna from the
room, and this only because Jeanne had insisted beforehand. Mom
couldn't fathom the fuss or the secrecy, and contentedly did as she
was told.
"You're younger than I expected, Miss Peterson."
"Come now. Tom's only twenty-five. You know that."
"Well, then, prettier."
"Then we're even. After a reporter friend Pop once had, you could be
Tyrone Power."
"Lovely dress you're wearing." He fingered the taffeta at her
shoulder, let his hand rest more heavily than necessary. When she
pulled away and sat as primly as she could on a straight-backed
chair he said the one word, "Business?" He made it a question.
"Business."
"Just how long have you known the Man in the Moon?"
"The Man—really!"
"Oh, that's him. That's your Thomas Bentley. He's the Man in the
Moon now."
Jeanne suppressed an unfeminine snicker. "About nine years. High
school together, dates, going steady, engaged. The usual middle-
sized town sort of thing."
"Love him?"
"Of course. Really, Mr. Lubrano."
For the next thirty minutes, Dan Lubrano asked her the sort of
questions that might make an adequate Sunday-supplement feature.
Nothing startling, nothing very original—except for the fact that
Jeanne, as the fiancee of the first man to rocket across
interplanetary space and reach the moon, was an unusual subject.
Did she plan on marrying Tom upon his return? Naturally, but only
the highest echelon of government and military circles knew when
that might be. Was she afraid the utter desolation of space would
somehow—change him? Lubrano made the pause significant. Might
make him more romantic if anything, although Tom never tended
toward stodginess. Could she be quoted as saying she looked up at
the moon every clear night and called softly, silently, secretly to Tom
across the unthinkable distances? Yes, if it were absolutely
necessary.
When they finished, Jeanne said: "Don't tell me that's all, Dan?"
"Officially, yes. Unofficially, I haven't started. Look, Miss Peterson—
Jeanne—mind if I'm perfectly frank?"
Jeanne said she didn't mind at all.
Lubrano grinned, displaying his piano-key teeth. "Jeanne, all my life
I've looked for something like you. Only it's something you almost
never find. Either you're lucky or you're not. Me, I'm lucky, I've found
the fiancee of the Man in the Moon. To make things even better,
you've got your share of good looks—and you're not dumb, either."
"I don't understand."
"Jeanne, we can make a million bucks together. Quick, with hardly
any work. Want to?"
"It sounds crazy, Dan. You're not making any sense."
"No? Then listen." He turned on the radio, waited for the tubes to
warm up, dialed at random for a station. "... at this hour, we know
only that the Man in the Moon has landed on Earth's far satellite, that
he has signalled the success of his mission with a phosphorous
flare, and that he has as yet established no radio contact, although
that is expected momentarily. It is anticipated that the government
will make an announcement shortly. This much is certain, however.
In order to consolidate our position on the moon, we will have to
send up another spaceman to join fearless Captain Bentley on our
bleak satellite, eventually an entire crew of technicians—"
"Is that all?" Jeanne demanded. "Of course Tom is news. What's the
connection?"
"News is right. The biggest since we exploded the A-bomb. Listen."
Lubrano dialed for another station. "... dream of all centuries, all
generations. A spaceship to the moon. The implications are so
tremendous that man hasn't even considered all of them. American
know-how, scientific ability and determination has once again
brought a new era to mankind. Tonight before you retire, Mr. and
Mrs. America, give a silent prayer of thanks to our Maker for giving
us the Man in the Moon. This is—"
Lubrano flicked the dial again. "... presented by Crunchy Kernels, the
cereal with the truly sprightly crackle. And here he is, ladies and
gentlemen, in a direct interview from White Sands, New Mexico. Dr.
Amos T. Kedder, assistant supervisor of electronics for the final
stages of the spaceship's construction—"
"See what I mean?" Lubrano asked triumphantly, turning off the
radio. "Assistant supervisor in charge of electronics. Well, a pat on
the backside for him. Nobody yesterday, the feature attraction on the
Crunchy Kernel Guest of Honor Show today. Startling, isn't it?"
"What's all this got to do with me?" Jeanne asked.
"Every place you turn," said Lubrano. "Can't avoid it. Honey, who
wants to? Don't get me wrong. You won't just be my meal ticket. I'll
have to do most of the work, but together, watch our smoke. A
million bucks, honey! That's the goal. Want to get on the gravy
train?"
"Maybe," said Jeanne. "But I still don't—"
"Look," Lubrano sneered. "I'm a newspaperman, struggling along at
fifteen bucks a week over the Guild minimum. But I got ideas, honey.
Public relations, that's the field. Public relations. There's millions in it.
"Get the right start and you got it made. We can't have Bentley here
on Earth—tough. But we got his gal-friend. A red-hot item, if handled
properly. Man! Commercial endorsements as a starter, then maybe a
lecture tour, theater appearances, even cheesecake pictures for the
magazines. Get it, honey?"
"Why, yes. I'm beginning to under—"
"Of course you get it! Jeanne Peterson reads Cosmopolite to while
away her lonely hours. Jeanne smokes Dromedaries, relaxes in her
bathtub with Luroscent, dreams of her lover on the moon on a
Softafoam pillow, writes him letters and saves them for his return by
using Perma-blue ink, wears a Furform coat to keep her warm while
gazing at the crescent moon on chill autumn nights. Get it, honey?
Get it?"
Jeanne laughed softly. "Talk about your prostitution," she said, half-
aloud.
"Huh? What say?" Effusive with enthusiasm, Lubrano hardly heard
her.
"Nothing. Nothing. It's been interesting, Dan." She stood up, led him
to the door. "Let me think about it. I've got to think."
"Say, wait a minute." Almost, Lubrano seemed indignant. "You
looked all hepped up about it, honey—why the quick freeze? If you
think you can do this yourself without help from me, you've got
another guess coming. I've got the contacts, you've got the name we
want to sell. You can't do it alone. A fifty-fifty split, straight down the
middle."
Mechanically, Jeanne's mind went to work. Also mechanically, she
spoke. "Fifty-fifty baloney. You get twenty-five per cent, Mr. Lubrano,
and not another penny. You must take me for a yokel."
"Forty."
"I said twenty-five."
"All right. All right. There's still enough in it for me. Twenty-five per
cent. Meet me tomorrow morning at my—"
"That's if I decide the idea is worthwhile," Jeanne said, pushing him
across the door-sill and watching him retreat reluctantly down the
walk to the street.
When Mom and the others asked Jeanne later, she was the picture
of co-operation. She told them everything about Mr. Lubrano and his
pleasant interview. She told them nothing about Dan and his not-so-
fantastic plans.
Jeanne excused herself after dinner, her mind seething with proposal
and counter-proposal, and went upstairs to her room, but found
sleep impossible. Was it fair to Tom, capitalizing on whatever
feelings they had for each other? Was it fair to herself? If Lubrano
had his way, a glorified Hollywood love would result. Jeanne and
Tom would be adopted by the nation as its favorite lovers. Their
faces would grace pop-bottles, sipping cola together in an infinite
regress of progressively smaller bottles. Their forms would loll on all
the beach billboards, proclaiming in the latest, brightest colors that
the Man in the Moon and his girl-friend insisted on Sunburst bathing
suits. And Jeanne would be waiting with her Chlorogate toothpaste
smile for her lover to return from the infinite distances.
When he returned, nothing would be left. Commercial love, exploited
love, hounded love, a cheap, impossible, publicized and doomed-to-
failure marriage, if Tom ever allowed it to go that far.
"Phooey on you, Jeanne Peterson!" Jeanne said aloud, and sat up in
bed, surprised at the loudness of her own voice. She was imagining
things. It wouldn't be as bad as all that. Exploitation for a few months
—and a small fortune, if not the great wealth that Dan promised. And
the physical comforts made possible by whatever she earned would,
over a period of time, smother Tom's anger.
Still, the one honest emotional experience which somehow had
penetrated deeper than the veneer she exposed to the world had
been her relationship with Tom. But she could make money, make
herself happy, make Tom happy—if not immediately on his return
then eventually. But....
Soon after the milkman pulled his truck to the curb down on the
corner, Jeanne fell asleep.
"Hold it! Hold it!" The agency director of photography, a small, round
man with a thin voice, waved the photographer off his camera
impatiently and scowled at Jeanne. "You're a nice girl, Miss
Peterson. That's a nice nightgown, filmy, but not so filmy it won't get
by the censors. You got a nice figure and the country will love you.
So why don't you be a nice model too?
"That ain't just a mattress you're on, Miss Peterson. How many times
I gotta tell you that's the mattress you're waiting for Tom on? 'I miss
Tom so, I'd never sleep, thinking of him so helpless and far away, the
first Man in the Moon. Except for my Beautysleep mattress which
induces sleep with its special inner-spring construction.' I ain't no
copy-writer, Miss Peterson, but it will be something like that. So,
cuddle up on that mattress like it will have to do till Tom comes home
from the moon. Cuddle nice, Miss Peterson, cuddle nice."
It took Jeanne exactly fifty-five minutes longer before she could
cuddle nice. They then took the picture in a matter of seconds, and
Jeanne was allowed to change into her street clothes. Hurrying, she
was only fifteen minutes late for her luncheon engagement with
Lubrano.
"Three months," Lubrano said, after they'd settled themselves over
cocktails. "Not bad, honey. Know how much we grossed, including
the Beautysleep account?"
"Yes," Jeanne told him. "Twenty-eight thousand, three hundred and
four dollars."
"Not bad," said Lubrano. "It takes the right kind of press, naturally.
That's me, honey, the right kind of press."
"Yes," said Jeanne. "We're a good combination, Dan. You're right, it
can't miss."
"Funny, you never sound excited about it."
"Maybe that's the way I am. I don't excite easily. So what?"
"So nothing." Lubrano began cutting his pork tenderloin.
"What's next on the agenda?" Jeanne wanted to know. "Maybe I
lasso the moon with smoke rings blown from Buccaneer cigarettes?"
"Maybe you do eventually. Not right now. Right now you have to hop
a plane for New Mexico and have a chat with the boyfriend."
"What?" Jeanne felt something flip-flop madly in the pit of her
stomach. "Dan! Oh, Dan!"
"That's right, honey. Through the courtesy of 'Hands Across the
Ocean,' sponsored by Cleopatra Complexion Soap. A radio
broadcast across a quarter of a million miles of space to re-unite you
and Tommy boy. At least, for three minutes."
"Oh, Dan, Dan—that's wonderful." Jeanne stood up, removed the
napkin from her lap. "If I hurry home and pack I can make a night
plane and be in New Mexico by—"
"Whoa. Relax, honey, there's no rush. The show is tomorrow night,
11 P.M. our time. I've booked your reservation for the morning."
"I'm too excited to eat, Dan. Really. But thanks for everything."
Jeanne bent down as Lubrano prepared to attack his tenderloin
again. She kissed his forehead playfully, turned to leave.
Someone snickered, "That's the moon girl, I think. I thought her
boyfriend was way up there. Another cheap publicity stunt."
"Careful," Dan frowned. "So you're happy. Don't go around ruining
everything."
Still smiling, Jeanne left.
"Sit down, Miss Peterson." The general waved Jeanne to a chair,

half rose as she seated herself. "Frankly, these publicity things
always make me nervous."
"You're nervous! Look who's talking!" Jeanne waited while the
general lit a cigarette. "Only three minutes! I can hardly think what to
say."
"Is that bothering you, Miss? Don't worry. They showed me a copy of
the script."
"Script?"
"Script, yes. For tonight's program. Your part is all there, word for
word."
"But I thought—"
"That it would be extemporaneous? I guess we're both new at this,
Miss Peterson. I would have thought the same thing. But not with an
audience of twenty million. That's what Mr. Pate said. Pate, he's the
director of the show."
"But—but they can't do that. I want to talk to Tom. I want to tell him—
things. I won't recite any prepared speech." How ridiculous could the
whole situation become? Jeanne thought. She'd made a farce of
their love these months. Now she wanted to forget that, make up for
it at least in part by speaking to Tom, by pouring her heart out to him
(as if she could even start to do that, in three minutes). If that fell
through too.
"You'd better send for Mr. Pate."
"You don't understand. Mr. Pate's in charge, not me."
"Then—then I won't speak at all. Let him tell their audience that."
"What? Why, Miss, you can't do that. They expect you on the show
and—"
"Send for Mr. Pate." Suddenly, she was glad Lubrano hadn't come
out here with her. He naturally would have agreed with Mr. Pate.
The general picked up a phone on his desk, dialed. "Afternoon,
Captain. Have you seen Pate? What? Splendid. Of course I'll wait."
He cupped a well-manicured hand over the receiver. "They're looking
for him, Miss ... Eh? Hello? Mr. Pate? I'm sorry to bother you, but—
yes, important. I wish you could come to my office, whenever you ...
Splendid. Splendid." The general hung up. "Be right here."
Ten minutes later, Pate arrived. He was young, florid of face, and
looked like he'd soon have a bad case of high blood pressure if he
didn't already have it. He waved a hand carelessly at the general.
Too carelessly. Like he was a recently discharged enlisted man who
felt he didn't have to bow and scrape any more.
"You're Jeanne. Recognize you anywhere. Like to tell your Tom he
has good taste."
"Fine," said Jeanne. "Tell him anything you want. I'm not speaking."
"Ha, ha. Good joke."
"It's no joke, Mr. Pate. I won't recite any prepared speech. I
absolutely refuse."
"Say that again. No, don't bother." Pate's brick-red face assumed the
color of good claret wine. "Not ordinary, this. You probably thought
we wouldn't reimburse you. Five thousand dollars all right?"
"Please, Mr. Pate. I came here to talk with Tom. I want to talk, not
recite. Tear up your speech and I'll do it for nothing."
"Can't."
"Don't, then. Good-bye."
"Wait! General, can't you do something?"
"She's not under my jurisdiction. I told her you know your business
and she was being—shall we say—something less than sensible."
"General! You never said anything like that. Don't you think I have a
right to speak to my fiance?"
"There's something to what you both say." Now the general sounded
like he was talking from a prepared speech. If it's a matter of
publicity, never hurt anyone's feelings. Straddle that fence. Walk that
tight-rope.
"Well, I'll be damned," said Pate. "Show's got to go on. Is that final,
Miss Peterson?"
"You can bet your bottom dollar on it, as the expression goes."
Jeanne almost felt like smiling, despite the situation.
"Don't say anything unprintable, then. Tear up your speech. We've
got to. See you in two hours." Muttering a brief word or two, Pate left,
not bothering to say good-bye to the general.
The general grinned professionally at Jeanne. "Any time I can be of
further assistance...."
"Is this seat taken?"

Jeanne looked up from her third cup of coffee, which she'd been
stirring nervously. She'd found a small restaurant outside the post's
main gate.
"Why, no. Sit down, won't you?" Jeanne smiled at the girl who
approached her.
"Th-thanks."
Kind of a plain type, Jeanne decided. Not pretty, though certainly not
homely. Nice hair, if you liked it corn-silk color and long. Some men
did, she supposed. "Cigarette?"
"I—I don't smoke, thank you. You—you're Jeanne Peterson. I
recognized you. My name is Mary."
"Hello, Mary."
"Miss Peterson, I don't know how to begin. But I've got to talk to you.
You're a stranger and—Miss Peterson, please. You've got to do
something...."
"How can I help you if I don't know what you're talking about?"
Jeanne almost felt like saying, sister, I've got problems of my own.
"It's Curt. Captain Curt Macomber. He's—maybe I shouldn't be telling
you this. You won't say anything. I mean—"
"For gosh sakes, what do you mean?"
The girl sniffled.
"I'm sorry," said Jeanne. "Go ahead." Maybe she'd feel better herself
if she heard someone else's problems.
"Curt is going—up there. To the—the moon. I still can hardly believe
it. But they're sending him to join Captain Bentley. Tonight, at
midnight."
"That's right, they did say something about sending a man to help
Tom with whatever he's doing."
"Establishing a base, that's what. Curt told me. Curt said—he said he
was going. He got two weeks of fast training and that's it. He told me
the ship—the spaceship—worked automatically, anyway. Captain

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Megatrends of World Politics 1st

Edition Marina M Lebedeva Editor Denis

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Megatrends of World Politics identifies globalization, integration, and

Marina M. Lebedeva is Professor and Head of the World Politics Department in

Denis A. Kuznetsov is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Governance and

Innovations in International Affairs aims to provide cutting-edge analyses

• Innovative topics: related to aspects that have remained marginal in scholarly

Titles in this series include:

1 Megatrends and their reverse waves 1

2 Taming the waves of globalization and democratization:

3 Subnational actors in the context of megatrends 20

4 Megatrends and socio-humanitarian resources of world politics 29

5 Megatrends in world politics and technological development 38

6 Transregional integration amid megatrends 47

7 Megatrends in the “Age of Migration” 54

8 Changing diasporas: (De)structuring by and of megatrends 63

9 Nationalism and Religious Fundamentalism as challenges to

11 Hybridization as a result of megatrends in modern education 90

12 COVID-19 and world politics: Does pandemic reverse the

Sergey Arteev, PhD (Political Science), Senior Lecturer, MGIMO University,

What is meant by (mega)trends and phases of

Globalization vs. de-globalization

Integration vs. disintegration

we cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national self-determina-

Nevertheless, we witness synchronization of democratization and globalization

economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the con-

It was the Glorious Revolution that strengthened and rationalized property

this study defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the

deliberative democracy focuses on the communicative processes of opinion

Democracy as deliberation can also be conceived in the form of “world culture”

Relationships between democratization and globalization

Table 2.1 Relationships between Democratization and Globalization

Concepts of democracy Questions linking democratization to globalization

Using Habermas’s reconstruction of historical materialism, one can assume that

Globalization – deglobalization (isolation)

Trends in the use of social and humanitarian

Social and humanitarian resources in the spread of

Social and humanitarian resources in democratization

Socio-humanitarian resources in integration

Title: My sweetheart's the Man in the Moon

Author: Stephen Marlowe

Illustrator: Emmanuel Stallman

Release date: June 24, 2022 [eBook #68393]

Original publication: United States: Royal Publications, Inc, 1956

Credits: Greg Weeks, Mary Meehan and the Online Distributed

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY

Not everyone will think of the first

[Transcriber's Note: This etext was produced from

"Good afternoon, Miss Peterson. Honest, I feel almost like a cub. In

"Sit down, Miss Peterson." The general waved Jeanne to a chair,